Walker, 2011 The Methods of Cost Effectiveness Analysis To Inform
Walker, 2011 The Methods of Cost Effectiveness Analysis To Inform
Health care systems exhibit their features and nuances that impose constraints on the
appropriate way to analyze interventions and make decisions about their implementation.
This article seeks to explain the theoretical foundations of these methods and their
implementation in practice. It focuses on a budget constrained health care sector, where
implementing a new technology with additional costs will result in other health care
services being displaced hence forgoing health improvement elsewhere. It is intended to
provide grounding in the policy motivation for economic evaluation and the underlying
normative issues in undertaking studies. The article further develops the key elements of
undertaking economic evaluation in practice. It outlines a simple scenario regarding the
comparison of chemotherapy treatments for breast cancer. This example helps to
illustrate some of the conceptual issues raised in this article. The approaches that have
been taken to quantify outcomes and costs from health care interventions are also
discussed.
Keywords: health care systems, costs, economic evaluation, decisions, normative issues
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31.1 Introduction
THE developed world is faced with rising real health care costs. An important driver of
increased cost pressure is the arrival in the market of new medical technologies such as
pharmaceuticals and devices. The question facing health care systems is whether these
new technologies should be funded by collectively funded health care systems and made
available to patients. A range of other resource allocation decisions face health systems,
including whether to invest in new equipment and buildings and the appropriate
organization of services.
In standard economic theory, the supply and demand for new technologies and health
services in perfectly competitive markets would result in efficient outcomes (so called
“market clearing” prices and quantities). However, health and healthcare have many
characteristics which, taken together, limit the functioning of markets (Arrow 1963).
These include significant uncertainty (about both the occurrence and recovery from
illness); limits to effective individual choice arising from asymmetries of information
between healthcare (p. 734) professionals and patients and individuals not facing the full
cost of their care at the point of delivery; and the presence of significant ineradicable
monopoly characteristics among providers. As a result health care markets, without
government intervention, are unlikely to produce efficient solutions. Furthermore,
unregulated markets for health care raise a number of profound distributional issues as
individuals' use of services is necessarily governed by their willingness and ability to pay
rather than medical need. Private insurance is a partial market-based response to this but
insurance itself is characterized by potential inefficiencies (such as moral hazard; Nyman
2006) and fails to address equity concerns if cover is unavailable or prohibitively
expensive for those with pre-existing or chronic health conditions.
The basic economic problem is often described as a problem of unlimited wants but with
limited resources to satisfy them. This applies as much to health care as to any other
market, but the shortcomings of free markets in health care, on the basis of efficiency
and equity, means that alternative ways of allocating resources need to be established—
that is, choices must be made about which health care interventions to provide and which
not to provide within a health care system. The methods of economic evaluation have
been developed to help to inform these choices.
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Health care systems around the world are not homogenous. Each exhibit their own
features and nuances which imposes constraints on the appropriate way to analyze
interventions and make decisions about their implementation. This chapter will, in the
main, focus on a budget constrained health care sector, where implementing a new
technology with additional costs will result in other health care services being displaced
hence forgoing health improvement elsewhere. While not all health care systems operate
under such a “hard” budget constraint in the long run, in the short run they must make
trade-offs within the health care sector. This simplification also makes easier the
exposition and interpretation of what is presented in this chapter.
viewpoint has an impact on analytic methods and the types of recommendation likely to
flow from the analysis. These normative viewpoints can be classified broadly as either
“welfarist” or “non-welfarist” as described briefly below.
31.2.1 Welfarism
For this practical reason the welfarist framework has been extended using the concept of
“potential Pareto improvement.” Developed by Kaldor 1939) and Hicks 1939) the idea is
that if the “gainers” from a policy change, those individuals made better off by a change,
can potentially compensate the “losers,” those made worse off, such that no individual
would be worse off and therefore such a change would result in an increase in social
welfare. Note the emphasis on “potential compensation”: if compensation was actually
paid this would be equivalent to a Pareto improvement. The Kaldor-Hicks compensation
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The welfarist approach is open to criticism (Sen 1979). For many people the assumptions
underpinning it are too restrictive and the notion that social welfare is only a function of
individual utilities too narrow (Sen 1979; Culyer 1991). Welfarism has also been criticized
because of the mechanisms needed to employ it as a method for economic evaluation. In
general, utilities are expressed through individuals' willingness to pay; that is, the largest
amount an individual would be willing to pay for a change in policy. Willingness to pay is
often calculated from market prices (if these are prices arising in competitive markets) or
imputed using other methods if market prices are not available (“shadow prices”), but
these methods raise major issues in healthcare. First, an individual' willingness to pay is
likely to be closely related to their ability to pay, but when individuals' incomes are widely
dispersed the sum of willingness to pay values may not actually reflect aggregate utility.
This is because those with higher income are prepared to pay higher prices but they are
likely to derive less utility from their last unit of income (termed a lower marginal utility
of money). One response is to give greater weight to a pound spent by a poor person than
by a rich person—but all attempts to reweight these “pound votes” are likely to prove
controversial (Lerner 1944).
Second, as a result of problems in the functioning of the market for healthcare (e.g.
asymmetries of information) consumer sovereignty may be compromised, and this raises
(p. 736) still further issues about whether the willingness to pay of individuals actually
reflects the utility they derive. Applications of welfarism are also usually based on the
assumption that we are in a “first best” world, one in which markets are perfectly
competitive and result in efficient outcomes. In such a world, at the market clearing price
the marginal social benefit is equal to the marginal social cost. Thus the price represents
the opportunity cost in terms of both demand and supply and as such the market price
can be used to value both the outcomes and the resources used (where the opportunity
cost represents the value of the next best alternative forgone). Several authors (Sculpher
et al. 2005; Claxton et al. 2007) have argued that this first best world does not exist, for
example as a consequence of the existence of externalities whereby individuals do not
incur the full cost of their actions, and as such making decisions based on prices that are
assumed to be derived in a first best world may actually reduce social welfare (Diamond
and Mirrlees 1971a and 1971b).
Non-welfarist approaches, which can take several forms such as extra-welfarism or social
decision-making, exchange the notion of the objective being the maximization of some
aggregation of individual utilities for another set of objectives. When considering
decisions in health care this generally involves maximizing some target measure of
health, though this does not necessarily have to be the case. Some would argue that the
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When making decisions in health care, the use of an objective function under which
health is maximized may be controversial given that this would appear to negate
individuals' preferences and can thus appear paternalistic. However, if such objectives
arise from some form of legitimate process, for example from the decisions of a
democratically elected government, or through the voluntary purchase by a consumer of
an insurance plan which makes decisions on the basis of such an objective function, then
it is more difficult to interpret the function as paternalistic. Although such functions
clearly involve strong assumptions and social value judgments, Claxton et al. (2007)
argue that these value judgments can be seen as explicit.
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Consider first the situation where the new intervention generates two QALYs per patient
but at an additional cost of £20,000 per patient (based on a price 〈 P⋆). Given the fixed
budget, to fund this new intervention another existing service must be displaced
elsewhere in the health system (possibly in a quite different clinical area). This
displacement generates an “opportunity cost”: forgone health for another group of
patients who no longer receive the service. The cost-effectiveness “threshold” reflects the
estimate that, for every £20,000 generated through displacement of one or more existing
service, the opportunity cost is 1 QALY. In this first scenario, then, the additional cost of
the new intervention has an opportunity cost of 1 QALY but itself generated two QALYs,
hence its introduction would be cost-effective as there is a net gain in health of one QALY
from the same fixed budget. In contrast, Figure 31.1 shows that, if the additional cost of
the new intervention is £40,000 (due to a higher price = P⋆), then the benefit of the new
treatment is exactly offset by that lost elsewhere; the health system gains nothing from
funding the new intervention. If the additional cost per patient is £60,000 (with a price 〉
P⋆) then the opportunity cost, resulting from the displacement of existing services to fund
the new intervention, is greater than the additional health it generates (3 QALYs versus
two QALYs); this could not be considered cost-effective as there is a net loss in health.
CEA (or its variant, cost-utility analysis) is the most widely used form of economic
evaluation in health care. The NHS Economic Evaluation Database (See 〈http://
www.crd.york.ac.uk/crdweb/〉) shows that, of 7212 published full economic evaluation
studies in the database, over 98 percent used some form of cost-effectiveness analysis.
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Any explicit approach to making these types of choices needs to specify the
(p. 739)
decision problem being addressed which involves two key questions. These are described
below in the context of choosing between alternative medical interventions, but this can
be readily generalized to the other types of choice summarized above.
This typically takes the form of the patient group which is the intended recipient of, for
example, a new therapeutic or diagnostic intervention. This will often need to be quite
specific—for example, in making decisions about whether to give patients access to new
pharmaceuticals, the recipient group of patients will usually be tightly defined by the
product's license. There may be a series of sub-groups of recipients which are
distinguished in the decision problem—for example, the cost-effectiveness of a new
treatment for ischemic heart disease may be considered separately for sub-groups of
patient defined in terms of the severity of their current condition.
It is necessary to define the options being compared. Economic evaluation is often used
to assess new medical technologies, so these need to be specified together with the
options against which the new intervention will be compared. In principle, comparators
should reflect all the existing ways in which the recipient group is currently (or could be)
managed. This may include a “do nothing” option or a sequence of possible interventions.
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You are in control of a central budget from which the healthcare services for a
specific population must be paid for. For example, you may be an insurance
company or an institute with the remit to assessing health care interventions and
programs for possible reimbursement or coverage within a national health care
system.
You must decide which chemotherapy (if any) to make available to patients
presenting with early breast cancer, while being mindful of your obligation to
provide healthcare to patients with other diseases from your finite budget.
The regulatory body with the remit for licensing drugs lists three approved
regimens for use in patients with early breast cancer:
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However, things can become rather more complicated if we have two different clinical
measures within a disease area, which are not perfectly correlated—for example, severity
of symptoms and duration with symptoms. Or, similarly, we may be trying to make
decisions across disease areas which have different clinical measures of outcome. For
example, a choice may be faced between funding a new drug for a cancer which gives an
extra eight weeks of progression free survival or a new drug for the treatment of flu
symptoms which reduces the time with symptoms by two days. In these circumstances we
need to be able to establish a trade-off between the two measures, but how would this be
addressed?
Overall survival clearly has benefits over disease specific units of health by facilitating
comparison across treatments in different disease groups where the change in survival is
considered one of the key impacts of health care interventions on health. However, few
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There are arguments, therefore, for measuring health in such a way that it captures both
changes in the quantity of life (overall survival) as well as the HRQoL (morbidity). The
most commonly used and well-known measure, which jointly encompasses both the
quantity and quality of life, is the quality adjusted life year (QALY), although other
measures have been proposed (Murray et al. 2002). QALYs are generated by the
summation across all health states of the length of time in a particular health state
multiplied by a weight representing the HRQoL attached to that health state (see Box
31.2). These weights are often referred to as “utility” although this has a quite different
meaning to the same term used by the neoclassical economist. The HRQoL weights are
based on a scale where 1 represents perfect health and 0 represents death. Negative
values are also permitted (i.e. health states considered worse than death).
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There are now a number of measurement instruments that facilitate the measurement of
individuals' health states in a way that can be expressed in terms of HRQoL weights. One
of these measures is the EuroQol (EQ)-5D (Kind 1996) which is used widely in RCTs and
other clinical studies (See Box 31.4).
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Getting all patients in a clinical trial to value their health states using the TTO or SG
would be very time consuming. Instead values using these techniques have been
placed on health states through the use of questionnaires. An example of such a
questionnaire is the EQ-5D which is a standardized instrument for use as a measure
of health outcome. Applicable to a wide range of health conditions and treatments,
it provides a simple descriptive profile and a single index value for health status.
Individuals are asked 5 questions about various aspects of their health (mobility,
self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression) on which there
are 3 levels to choose from (no problem, moderate problems, severe problems). The
states described by the instrument are linked to existing preference weights which
are available for several countries (see 〈www.euroqol.org〉).
Mobility
I have no problems in walking about □
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I am confined to bed □
Self-Care
I have no problems with self-care □
Usual Activities
I have no problems with performing my usual activities (e.g. work, study,
housework, family, or leisure activities) □
Pain/Discomfort
I have no pain or discomfort □
Anxiety/Depression
I am not anxious or depressed □
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Patients will receive chemotherapy for three months. Patients on COMB experience
a health-related quality of life (HRQoL) score (in terms of a 0 to 1 “utility”) of 0.5
while on treatment, those on SGO a score of 0.6 and those on FGO 0.7.
Following treatment and until progression all patients have a HRQoL score of 0.75.
Patients who receive FGO are expected to have a cancer recurrence four years after
the end of treatment, those who receive SGO have a recurrence five years after the
end of treatment and those who receive COMB have a cancer recurrence six years
after the end of treatment.
Following progression, all patients have the same expected survival of two years
with a HRQoL score health-related quality of life of 0.6.
Those patients who receive no chemotherapy treatment are expected to receive four
QALYs.
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No 4 QALYs
treatment
Despite these criticisms, QALYs are now widely used in economic evaluations supporting
decision-making in health care. For example, NICE requires their use in studies
undertaking to inform its decisions about whether to recommend new technologies for
use in the NHS (NICE 2008); similar agencies internationally recommend QALYs, at least
as an element in studies submitted to them (Tam and Smith 2004). The QALY, then, is an
extensively used and understood measure of health in cost-effectiveness analyses. For
example, they were recommended as the appropriate unit for health measurement by the
Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, a US panel with expertise in cost-
effectiveness analysis, clinical medicine, ethics, and health outcomes measurement,
which was convened by the US Public Health Service (Gold et al. 1996).
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Hypothetical example
Current risk of death without safety feature: 10-in-100,000
within a welfarist paradigm? Given the general absence of unregulated markets in health,
the focus would be on estimating the shadow price of the health outcomes— that is, the
price at which the health outcome would be valued if a market for them existed and all
market distortions were removed. There are two approaches which have been used to
find this shadow price: revealed preference and contingent valuation (see Box 31.6).
Revealed preference involves finding real life situations where individuals trade health
and wealth, and then estimating an implicit value based on the individuals' behavior in
these circumstances. An example of this method is the use of wage premiums for more
dangerous jobs as a measure of how much the individual is willing to accept in return for
increased risk of loss of life or injury (Johanesson 1995). Contingent valuation attempts to
calculate the shadow price of health by creating hypothetical markets where trade-offs
between health and wealth are investigated in a sample of individuals (Drummond et al.
2005). Discrete choice experiments have also been used to value different treatments,
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The use of contingent valuation and discrete choice methods is not confined to valuing
health outcomes. Indeed, one of the suggested advantage of these methods is that they
enable a wider set of outcomes to be incorporated into studies (e.g. effect of interventions
on other areas of individuals' well-being such as convenience and the value they attach to
information). These allow the comparison of benefits across different fields although it is
unclear how decisions can be made, particularly when transfers between different sectors
are not possible.
31.7 Costs
It is not the money costs of resources that we are directly interested in, but instead the
opportunity costs, i.e. what is the next best thing we could do with the resources we use
to provide a course of treatment. However, the most direct way to estimate the
opportunity cost is, first, to estimate the resource costs associated with an allocation and
then transform this into the opportunity costs (whether they be in terms of health or
utilities). Which resources will be included depends on the perspective taken, e.g.
whether we should include productivity costs if the focus is on health and there is a fixed
budget, where productivity costs are any gain in output as a result of the health care
intervention. The transformation into opportunity costs also depends on the view we take
on prices, i.e. do we accept that prices reflect opportunity cost or do we instead need to
calculate shadow prices?
Costs associated with different health care programs and treatments can be split into
several groups: costs arising from the use of resources within the health care sector;
costs relating to resource use by patients and their families; costs arising from resource
use in other sectors of the economy; and costs stemming from productivity changes.
The range of the above costs considered in an economic evaluation is likely to be based
upon the consideration of four points (Drummond et al. 2005). First, what is the
perspective of the analysis? This is perhaps the most essential, as it is determined by the
budget constraint imposed on the decision-maker and also on specific judgments that we
are making. If the perspective is that of the healthcare sector, we are unlikely to be
interested in the costs imposed on patients or their families. However, these costs would
clearly be of importance if we took a broader societal perspective, i.e. an all-
encompassing perspective whereby changes in costs and productivity are all included.
Many health care systems use economic evaluation methods to inform (p. 748) resource
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Second, is the comparison restricted to two or more programs immediately under study?
If the comparison relates to set of specific options with specific costs being common to all
the interventions being compared, then these costs need not be considered as they would
not affect the choice between interventions. However, if it is thought that, at some later
stage, a wider comparison of interventions may be considered, including some
interventions not considered in the original evaluation, it would be wise to include costs
which are common. Third, are some costs merely likely to confirm a result that would be
obtained by consideration of a narrower range of costs? If it is felt that the costs are
unlikely to affect the balance of costs between the various interventions it may not be
worth the extra resource use required to collect them. Finally, what is the relative order
of magnitude of costs? Similarly to the last point, if it is considered that some costs will
be very small and unlikely to change the balance of costs between different interventions
then it may not be worth considering them given the cost of collecting information on
them.
Once the Costs To Be Included In the Evaluation Have Been Decided Upon, Then the
Method For Valuing the Costs is Based On the Measurement of Two Components. First,
the Physical Quantities of the Resources Consumed (E.g. Days In Hospital, Doctors' Visits,
Etc.) Must Be Estimated. Second, the Value of These Resources In Money Terms Must Be
Estimated (I.e. the Prices).
The measurement of the physical quantities of the resources consumed will often depend
upon the context for the economic evaluation. If the economic evaluation is being
undertaken as part of a randomized controlled trial, data on the resource use may be
collected as part of the study's case record forms. This could be supplemented by patient
questionnaires for resource use not easily captured from routine clinical notes (e.g.
patients' use of community care services). If there is no trial (or similar clinical study)
providing a vehicle for the collection of resource use data, these could be collected from
patients' clinical notes, hospital data systems, or through patient questionnaires.
For many resources, market prices may be available. Theoretically the proper price for a
resource is its opportunity cost (the value of the forgone benefits given the resources use
in its next best alternative). However, the pragmatic approach to costing is to take
existing market prices which would reflect the opportunity cost in a “first best” world
(Drummond et al. 2005). However, there are many reasons why the market price may not
reflect the true cost of the resource—for example, some prices may be subsidized or set
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If we take a societal perspective we may also need to value productivity costs if there are
productivity gains or losses associated with the health care interventions being assessed,
for example due to the patient or one of their relatives being unable to work. These are
commonly valued using one of two approaches: the human capital approach or the
friction cost method, with the latter only being used to assess productivity losses. More
discussion of these approaches and their strengths and weaknesses can be found in
Sculpher 2001).
Once resource use and prices have been collected, the total resource cost of a patient can
then be calculated by the summation of the resources included multiplied by their price.
Box 31.7 considers the measurement and aggregation of costs in our clinical scenario.
The published pricing lists indicate that SGO is the most expensive chemotherapy
regimen simply in terms of purchasing the drugs, followed by COMB, with FGO
being the cheapest. Due to the more serious side effects associated with COMB
patients will require more treatment than those on SGO, and similarly those on FGO
will require less treatment than those on SGO. Each year of progression free
survival costs $250 in medical care resources. Following progression, care costs
$5000 until death.
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No treatment $7500
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Earlier we briefly touched upon how costs and outcomes can be combined for the purpose
of decision-making (see Figure 31.1). We will now examine this further. Let us consider a
decision-maker allocating resources across the health system. Ideally, with (p. 750) a
fixed budget, the decision-maker would select from all available treatments, which
includes all possible treatments in all disease areas, the subset that maximizes health
benefits for the entire patient population subject to the given budget constraint. This
approach could be achieved using mathematical programming (Epstein et al. 2007).
However, in practice such an approach is not possible: there is no single decision-maker
deciding on all treatments, nor is there enough information about the effectiveness and
cost of all services to be able to formulate such a problem. Instead, when making
decisions using economic evaluation, decision rules are used which attempt to proxy this
ideal solution.
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Let us first consider the decision between a set of mutually exclusive interventions/
programs before extending our analysis to consider independent interventions/programs.
We consider two interventions for a disease, A and B, from a health system perspective
where the relevant unit of output is a QALY. Figure 31.2 shows the cost-effectiveness
plane which represents the incremental costs and effects of one of the treatments
compared to the other. Note that the north east quadrant is what we illustrated in Figure
31.1. The origin represents the comparator treatment, in this case let it be B. If treatment
A lies to the right of the origin it is more effective (has more QALYs than B), or if is to the
left it is less effective. If treatment A lies above the x-axis then it is more costly than B,
and vice versa.
If intervention A is less
costly and more effective,
then A is said to dominate
B. Similarly if A is more
costly and less effective
than B, then it is
dominated by B. In both
cases the choice between
A and B is obvious: the
dominant option is clearly
Click to view larger
preferable. In practice,
figure 31.2 The incremental cost-effectiveness plane however, it is rare that
costs and outcomes lend
themselves to the dominance rule. Usually A will be both more costly and more effective
than B or vice versa, i.e. in the (p. 751) north-east or south-west quadrant. The critical
issue in these cases is whether the additional (incremental) cost of the intervention is
worth paying for its incremental benefits, or similarly if it is worth making the cost saving
given the lower outcomes which are associated with it. The decision rules developed to
address this issue generally focus on the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)
which is defined:
The ICER defines the amount that must be paid, per extra QALY, for the more expensive,
but more effective, intervention. Whether to implement A given an ICER of a particular
value will depend on the perspective the analysis is taking, with the key being what is
displaced at the expense of the extra expenditure, i.e. the opportunity cost. If we define
the threshold that we are willing to pay per extra QALY as λ, then if the ICER is greater
than this we would not fund A, if it is less than λ we would fund A; if it is equal to λ we are
indifferent between funding A and not funding A. This takes us back to the principles we
covered earlier as illustrated in Figure 31.1. But where does λ come from? In general the
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An ICER compares two alternatives. However, when there are a number of mutually
exclusive alternatives, then a number of comparisons can be made which will generate a
series of possible ICERs. Table 31.1 looks at a number of hypothetical alternative
interventions. Treatment X is dominated by all other treatments, it is both more expensive
and less effective. Therefore, as discussed previously, it can be ignored. The choice is
then between W, Y, and Z. These should be ranked in order of cost. The ICERs for each of
these non-dominated options is then calculated relative to the next cheapest as shown in
Table 31.2.
Figure 31.3 represents the cost-effectiveness plane for these three treatments where the
origin is Z. As can be seen from the figure, there is a combination of Z and Y (e.g. if we
give 50% of the patients Z and 50% of the patients Y), whereby the combination
dominates W. Therefore, W is said to be subject to “extended dominance,” and can be
(p. 752) removed from consideration. Extended dominance can also be found from the
ICERs. Once all dominated treatments are removed and the treatments ranked in order
from least to most costly and the ICERs calculated, then if the ICER of the next most
effective and expensive treatment is less than the ICER for the treatment compared to
the next less effective and expensive treatment, then the treatment is subject to extended
dominance.
W $8000 7
X $10,000 5
Y $9000 8
Z $4000 6
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Z $4,000 6
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(p. 753)It should be noted that decision rules outlined above are based on several
assumptions, notably constant returns to scale, perfect divisibility and non repeatability,
which may not always hold. A critique can be found in Birch and Gafni 1992). While
extended dominance may not hold, in that a combination of two programs may not be
possible in practice, its implications for decision-making still holds as long as λ is constant
no matter how expensive a new treatment is. This is based on the argument that if you
were willing to pay for the extendedly dominated treatment you must also be willing to
pay for the next more expensive and more effective treatment. The largest criticism of
ICER decision rules is related to the argument above in that ICERs only give us
information about the cost per unit, not the total cost of the program. With perfect
divisibility and constant returns to scale this does not matter. However, when this is not
the case the size of the project does matter as it can alter the cost per QALY on the
marginal project which will be displaced, or the societal WTP (Birch and Gafni 1992).
You must now make a decision about which treatment, if any, to make available to
patients with early stage breast cancer. The incremental costs and QALYs are
presented in the table below:
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As can be seen from the ICERs, both FGO and SGO are subject to extended
dominance by a combination of No treatment and COMB. Assuming we accept the
exclusion of treatments based on extended dominance, this leaves us with a choice
between two options: No treatment or COMB.
Consider how you would now choose between No treatment and COMB, and what
additional information you would need to know.
Decision rules for CBA are rather different to those of CEA. Both costs and benefits of
health care interventions are expressed in monetary terms using appropriate prices (or
shadow prices), and the “net present value” of an intervention (the difference (p. 754)
between its aggregate benefit and its aggregate cost) is assessed. Any project with a
positive net present value should be considered as a potential Pareto improvement using
the welfarist principle discussed above. When selecting between mutually exclusive
alternatives then the alternative with the highest net present value should be selected.
The simplicity of this rule relies upon the assumption that budget constraints can
typically be ignored. If budget constraints are recognized under CBA by health system
decision-makers then, similarly to ICER decision rules, it would be necessary to compare
the net present value of the treatment with the net present value of the treatments which
would be displaced to fund it. If a broader view of public sector decisions is taken, CBA
methods can be used to compare policies across sectors, although such decisions would
typically be outside the remit of health system decision-makers.
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Economic evaluation is not only concerned with the measurement of costs and effects but
also with the appropriate synthesis of relevant evidence to inform resource allocation
decisions within healthcare. It should be noted, therefore, that RCTs and decision analytic
models are not competing alternatives (Drummond et al. 2005). Instead, RCTs are
focused on different types of measurement whilst decision models are concerned with
informing specific decisions.
All relevant comparators must be considered for the correct calculation of ICERs.
However, many RCTs will fail to compare all the relevant options that might be
considered by decision-makers, for example in RCTs drugs will typically just be compared
to one other treatment which may not even be an active intervention but instead a
placebo. To compare all the relevant options it is probable that evidence from a number of
RCTs will be required to be synthesized through a meta-analysis (Egger et al. 1993). A
decision analytic model will allow the results of the meta-analysis to be combined with
other types of evidence, such as costs and utilities.
As was described in the outcomes section of this chapter, clinical trials often compare
interventions in terms of intermediate endpoints rather than final outcomes, for example
in cancer trials, time in remission. However, as discussed previously, the economic
evaluation may require outcomes to be in QALYs. Decision models can be (p. 755) used to
link intermediate outcomes with the outcomes required for decision-making.
Decision analytic modeling provides a framework for the synthesis of the data from all of
the relevant sources. It also allows for the consideration of decision-making under
uncertainty (see Chapter 32).
Decision analytic modeling provides a framework for decision-making which can satisfy
the important objectives of economic evaluation (Drummond et al. 2005), namely:
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There are many types of decision models that can be used in economic evaluation, with
perhaps the most common being decision trees and Markov models. However, two
features that they all have in common are probabilities and expected values (Drummond
et al. 2005). Probabilities represent the strength of belief that an event will happen; this
may be based on prior evidence when available, but this may not always be the case and
such values could be elicited from expert opinion if required. The other key feature is
expected values; given a treatment it is still uncertain what the patient's outcome will be,
for example, with a cancer drug there will be probabilities that they will progress or not
progress. The expected costs and outcomes are a weighted sum of the possible costs and
outcomes dependent on what occurs, with the weight based on the probability that those
events will occur. The expected values represent the best estimate of the endpoints of
interest for decision-making. More detailed discussion of decision modeling can be found
in Drummond et al. (2005).
31.10 Summary
Resources are finite but wants are infinite. The scarcity of resources will always lead to
decisions about which competing treatments to choose in health care. Methods for the
economic evaluation of health care interventions facilitate a formal joint consideration of
costs and outcomes for the purpose of decision-making. They allow for a decision over
whether one allocation of resources is more preferable to another, not just within disease
areas but also across them.
Two broad principles of choice have been proposed for economic evaluation,
(p. 756)
welfarist, based on orthodox welfare economics, and non-welfarist, which changes the
objective from utility maximization to another set of objectives. The latter is more
prominent in policy, but the choice between the two has key implications for some aspects
of methodology including the types of outcomes and costs that should be included in any
analyses.
This chapter has discussed the approaches that have been taken to quantify outcomes
and costs from health care interventions. Perhaps the most predominant measure of
outcome used in economic evaluations in health care is the QALY. The choice of costs to
use depends on the decision-making context and the perspective taken. Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios can then be compared to cost-effectiveness thresholds to allow for
efficient decision-making. It should be clear that using solely the results of individual
trials to conduct such analyses has significant drawbacks, and that it is more appropriate
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Simon Walker
Simon Walker is a member of the Team for Economic Evaluation and Health
Technology Assessment in the Centre for Health Economics, University of York. He
joined in October 2006 after completing an M.Sc. in Health Economics at York. He
had previously graduated from Clare College, Cambridge, with a B.A. in Economics.
Mark Sculpher
Mark Sculpher is Professor of Health Economics at the Centre for Health Economics,
University of York, where he is Director of the Programme on Economic Evaluation
and Health Technology Assessment. He has over 160 peer-reviewed publications and
is a co-author of two major text books in the area. Sculpher has been a member of
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) Technology
Appraisal Committee and currently sits on the NICE Public Health Interventions
Advisory Committee. He chaired NICE's 2004 Task Group on methods guidance for
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Michael Drummond
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