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Republic of the Philippines

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 154609 April 24, 2009

MA. CORAZON SAN JUAN, Petitioner,

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 July 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 52597 entitled
Offril v. Maria Corazon San Juan,1 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branc
Case No. 92-3604.

The facts of the case follow.

Celeste M. Offril (Offril) used to be the registered owner of a 264 square meter lot in Makati City covered by Transfer
(TCT) No. (114181) S-24948. On the lot is a five (5) door apartment leased to tenants, one of whom was Ma. Corazo
(San Juan), who leased the first door. Sometime in 1990, San Juan convinced Offril, who was then trying to obtain a
her, to deliver to her the title to the property so that San Juan could present it to the bank to enable her to apply for a
proceeds of which she would lend to Offril. It appears that without Offril’s knowledge, two deeds of sale were execute
April 1979 and 14 June 1979, respectively, allegedly between Offril and San Juan. By virtue of these deeds, San Jua
the subdivision of the lot into six (6) sublots—Lots 20 A-F—and caused the issuance of separate titles to the said lots
claimed that she neither sold the property to nor received any consideration from San Juan, as such; she claimed tha
are spurious, and the signatures appearing therein were forged. Additionally, she claimed that she learned of the can
her title and existence of the new TCTs through her granddaughter, who was told by a personnel at the Assessor’s O
Makati City that Offril’s tax declaration and title had been cancelled and that San Juan had already caused the cance
Offril’s TCT and secured new ones. Thus, she prayed that the deeds of sale be declared null and void and the TCTs
On the other hand, San Juan maintained that she acquired the property from Offril through valid sales, as evidenced
deeds of sale of the unsegregated portion, and for which she paid in cash and by checks subsequently encashed by
granddaughter Consuelo Gorostiza in the latter’s capacity as attorney-in-fact. 3

In its 6 March 1996 decision,4 the trial court ruled that only Lots 20-A and Lot 20-B were sold to San Juan, and thus th
said lots are valid. According to the trial court, Offril had no serious objection against the deed of sale concerning Lot
hence, she admitted the due execution of the said document, including the authenticity of the signatures appearing th
the other hand, the basis for considering Lot 20-B as having been sold to San Juan is a Deed of Partition executed be
and San Juan, which Offril herself submitted as part of her rebuttal evidence, and which was not objected to by San J
Deed of Partition, the parties agreed that Lot 20-A and Lot 20-B are to be adjudicated to San Juan. The trial court rule
through the Deed of Partition, Offril had negated her claim that she never sold nor received consideration for the sale
property to San Juan. On the part of San Juan, her participation in the execution of the deed negated her assertion th
acquired the entire property from Offril through a sale, 5 the trial court added.

Anent the two deeds of sale presented by San Juan, the trial court ruled that the same have no probative value. The
found that in 1979 when these deeds were purportedly executed, San Juan was not yet a lessee of Offril’s apartment
Juan had already acquired the property at that time, there would have been no reason for her to occupy the premises
lessee, sign the lease contract with Offril in 1988, and subdivide the property in 1990. The trial court also pointed out
the deeds of sale were executed in 1979, they were presented for registration only in 1990. 6

Finally, the trial court ruled that neither party is entitled to the claim for damages and recovery of costs of suit, since th
clear showing who caused the execution of the two spurious deeds of sale. Suffice it to say that both parties appear t
brought upon themselves the damage that they allegedly suffered. 7

The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is rendered:

1. declaring TCT No. 170403 and TCT NO. 170404 covering Lot No. 20-A and Lot No. 20-B respectiv
name of defendant Ma. Corazon San Juan, valid;

2. declaring as null and void the two (2) deeds denominated as "Deed of Sale of Unsegregated Portio
April 2, 1979 and June 14, 1979;

3. ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. 170405, 170406, 170407, 170408 covering Lot Nos. 20-C, 20
and 20-F respectively, and in lieu thereof new titles be issued to plaintiff Celeste Offril; and

4. ordering the parties to shoulder their respective damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Initially, both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; however, Offril subsequently withdrew her appea
submitted that the trial court erred when it (i) shifted the burden of proof to San Juan; (ii) when it overlooked the fact t
second and third deeds of sale were actually antedated; (iii) when it found that San Juan was in estoppel despite the
estoppel is not applicable against her; and (iv) when it erred in not dismissing the complaint in toto despite the failure
discharge its burden of proof to overcome the validity of San Juan’s TCTs.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. It ruled that there was no valid conveyance of all the disputed properties fro
San Juan, as Offril was able to discharge the burden of proving that there was fraud through forgery in the execution
general power of authority and the deed of conveyance. The appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court as to
credibility as a witness, and gave credence to the finding of validity of the Deed of Partition. Like the trial court, the Co
Appeals relied on the Deed of Partition, which was allegedly not objected to by San Juan. It concluded that had there
intention by Offril to sell the property to San Juan, the intention should have been stated in categorical terms in the de

San Juan thus filed the instant petition for review, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that (i) there was
conveyance of all the disputed properties; (ii) the disputed properties were not sold by Offril to San Juan; and (iii) that
is in estoppel based on the deed of partition which was presented by Offril as rebuttal evidence. 11 In essence, San Ju
assignment of errors challenges the findings of fact and the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court and later
respondent court.

In urging us to reverse the courts a quo, San Juan insists that Offril failed to overcome the presumption of validity wh
to the notarized deeds of sale. She points out that the trial court never found Offril’s signatures in the deeds as forger
to the Court of Appeals’ statement that there was fraud through forgery in the execution of the questioned deeds, San
posits that Offril’s testimony is unbelievable considering that Offril was already affected by Alzheimer’s disease or los
at the time she testified before the trial court, pointing out portions of the latter’s testimony wherein it appears that she
recall the answers to the cross examination questions on personal matters and incidents related to the case. 12 San Ju
argues that the best proof of ownership are the TCTs in her name, which enjoy a strong a presumption of being valid
been regularly issued, a presumption which Offril once more failed to dispute. 13 San Juan points out that the receipt o
she presented is clear evidence showing that the disputed properties were sold to her by Offril. 14

Moreover, San Juan argues that the partition agreement is completely irrelevant to the issue of forgery of Offril’s sign
deeds of sale. She also points out that the second and third deeds of sale were antedated, a fact which was never dis
Offril. In any case, the antedating of the deeds is immaterial because Offril’s cause of action is based on the allegatio
never executed the documents in question, she continues. 15

Finally, San Juan claims that estoppel with regard to the Deed of Partition applies only to Offril and not to her, Offril b
party who used the said deed to support an assertion/ representation. According to her, the partition was only a safet
taken by both parties since payment for the remaining property, at the time of the partition, was still to be made in futu
installments. In fact, she was still making payments five months after the execution of the deed of partition, which sh
1avvphi1.zw+

she never intended to relinquish her claim of ownership, she adds. 16

To begin with, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight w
coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is
that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous. 17

San Juan makes much of the fact that the testimony of Offril, which was replete with inconsistencies and lapses of m
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized document. While indeed, a notarized document en
presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. 18 The presumption is no
and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The presumption cannot be made to apply in
because the regularity in the execution of the documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their prima
validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances pointed out by both trial and appellate courts. 19 The
circumstances include: (i) the registration by San Juan of the deeds of sale in 1990 notwithstanding the fact that the d
allegedly made in

1979; (ii) the execution of a deed of sale dated 2 April 1990 despite San Juan’s claim that the deeds of sale were ant
avoid the payment of tax; and (iii) the execution of the Deed of Partition on 2 May 1990, in spite of San Juan’s claim t
acquired the entire property.20

The lone testimony of a witness, if credible, is sufficient. 21 The Court cannot ignore the fact that both the trial court and
of Appeals found Offril’s lone testimony as credible, "clear, unequivocal and rang with truth." 22 The Court has repeate
it will not interfere with the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record so
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterprete
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to do so because it heard the witnesses testify before it and
opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. 23

In any case, San Juan’s allegation that Offril was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease or loss of memory and as such h
testimony cannot be given credence, as there was no proof of such affliction. The claim that Offril had Alzheimer’s dis
already brought up before the trial court and before the Court of Appeals, but this was rejected by both courts. Moreo
significant is that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of Offril and found it to be truthful and w
credence. Even the Court of Appeals declared that there was no major inconsistency in Offril’s testimony. 24 Besides, e
Court’s perusal of Offril’s testimony reveals that indeed, there was no such major inconsistency. While Offril did in fac
names of her other children, her address, the date when San Juan started leasing the apartment, or the amount of th
was clear that she knew and considered San Juan as a mere tenant in her apartment, 26 and she was certain that she
the five-door apartment to San Juan, nor received any amount corresponding to the value of the said property. 27 She
denied having signed the deed purporting to sell the five-door apartment to San Juan. 28 Thus, on all matters material
complaint, the Court finds that Offril’s testimony was clear, equivocal and consistent.

Contrary to San Juan’s claim, the Deed of Partition is material to instant case. The trial court and the Court of Appeal
evidence on record shows that per the partition agreement, Offril did not intend to dispose of, and that San Juan did n
acquire, the entire property. More importantly, the Deed of Partition, which was executed on 2 May 1990, debunks Sa
claim that she had acquired the property at a much earlier date, since there would be no need for a partition if San Ju
the owner of the entire property. The Court notes too, the fact that San Juan did not deny the existence of the Deed o
as well as the fact that she was a signatory thereto; neither did she raise any objection to the admission of the Deed o
Thus, the Court finds that San Juan is estopped by the Deed of Partition.

Finally, the Court quotes with approval the following findings of the trial court:

As described above, this Court finds that both parties have made representations, admissions and omissions adverse
their respective allegations in this case. This Court considers both parties to have commonly declared in Exhibit 2 (De
Absolute Sale) and Exhibit Q (the Deed of Partition) not only their intention but also the extent of their rights over the
subject matter of this case. It is interesting to note that after the execution of the Deed of Partition on May 2, 1990, no
document was executed to cover the sale of the other lots.

In sum, the evidence considered by the Court point to the finding that plaintiff has sold to defendant Lots 20-A and 20
by TCT Nos. 170403 and 170404 only. There is no legal basis by which titles to Lot Nos. 20-C, 20-D, 20-E, and 20-F
been Transferred [sic] to defendant Ma. Corazon San Juan, the two (2) deeds Exhibits 3 and 4 being spurious. 29

All told, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in upholding the decision of the trial cou

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 July 2002 is AFFIRMED. Cost
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO**

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby c
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer o
of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting Chairperson as replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per S
Order No. 618.

** Additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 619.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices A
Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guariña III.

2
Celeste Offril died intestate on 22 May 1994, while the case was still pending before the trial court. S
substituted by her children and grandchildren, Records, pp. 317, 319.

3
Rollo, p. 107.

4
Id. at 106-110.

5
Id. at 107-108.

6
Id. at 108-110.
 7
Id. at 110.

8
Id.

9
CA rollo, p.35.

10
Court of Appeals Decision, rollo, pp.56-69.

11
Id. at 25.

12
Id. at 29-33.

13
Id. at 37.

14
Id. at 40.

15
Id. at 41-44.

16
Id. at 48-49.

17
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 651.

18
Supra note 17 at 637, 652, citing Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 452 (1995).

19
Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No. 151035, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 561, 567.

20
Rollo, p. 109.

21
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 637 ,652.

22
Rollo, p. 61.

23
People v. Conde, G.R. No. 133647, 12 April 2000, 330 SCRA 645.

24
Rollo, p. 63.

25
TSN, 24 May 1993, pp. 51-53, records, pp. 176-177.

26
Id. at 46.

27
Id. at 48-49.

28
Id. at 49-50.

29
Rollo, pp. 109-110.

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