Tac70 12
Tac70 12
Tac Attack
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SURVIVAL. .. Page 4
Jamie sez: You are not necessarily · a dynamic
for efficint tactical air ,ewer personality simply because you blow your top.
current interest
lAC ATTACKDECEMBER 1970
THE PROBLEMS OF COLD WEATHER
SURVIVAL Pg 4
VOL. 10, NO. 12
THE LONG REACH Pg 16
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
Pilot of Distinction Pg 11
SPO's Corner Pg 12
Crew Chief/Maintenance
Man Award Pg 15
editor
Maj Bill Richardson TAC Tips . Pg 20
Mariella W. Andrews Article8, accident briefs, and associated material In thi s magazine are non-direc-
ti ve In n atur e. All sugges ti ons and recommendations are Intended to r emain within the
scope o f existing directives. Information used to brief accidents and in cidents does
not Identify th e persons, places, or units involved and may not be construed as Jn-
c riminatlnQ under Article 31 ol th e Uniform Code of MHitary justice. Names, dates,
and places used in conjunction with accident stori es are fictitious. Air Force units
are encouraQed to republish the material contained herein; however, con tent s are not
lor public release. Written permission must be ob t ained from HQ TAC before ma t e rial
may be republish ed by ot her than Department of Defense organizations.
Contributions of articles, photos, and items of interest from personnel in the field
printing
a re encourag ed, as are comments and criticism . We reserve the r/Qht to edit all manu-
Hq T AC Field Printing Plant scripts for c larit y and readability. Direct communlcif ll on is authorized with: The Edi-
tor, TAC ATTACf:C, HO TAC (SEP) , LanQ.Iev AFB, Va. '23365.
Distribution F )(, Controlled by SEP - TAC Publications Bulletin No. 22, da~
June 1970 Autovon 4 3'2-2937 )
Angle of ATTACK
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the problems of ••••
As we approach the coldest time of the year, it's survival narratives compiled by Richard A. Howard, Ph.D.
The records used to compi le this information are from the
appropriate that we discuss a subject that many pilots I ike
to ignore in the hope that it will go away ... survival in crashes of 268 aircraft. Personnel involved in these
winter. It's easy to pick out the troops who believe it episodes number 64 1, of wh ich 480 either survived or
"only happens to the other guy," just check the garb of their stories cou ld be reconstructed from diaries or later
the jocks getting ready to fly. investigations. The remaining 161 were either ki lled in the
Because of the nature of the beast we're going to ta lk crash or are still missing.
about, it would be almost impossible to cover the full No emergency descent was included in this study
range of situations a pi lot could get into. Your surviva l unless at least 24 hours had elapsed before the individual
environment cou ld range from mountainous terrain to or crew was rescued. This does not mean that the men
plains, it could abound with game, fish, and plant who spent less than 24 hours on the ground did not
life . .. or be as sterile and hostile as the surface of the endure hardships, only that their experiences are not as
moon. significant as those of men "on their own" in remote areas
Let's face it, no matter how carefu lly you plan, for longer periods of time. Even within this short interval
emergencies involving raw, basic surviva l are bound to of time ·there were cases of frostbite requiring
occur . In such emergencies nothing is more valuable than hospitalization. One man committed suicide rather than
experi ence, but we have no training to simu late this. face the prob lems of survival.
Second only to persona l experience in value are the In contrast to these are the many stories of heroism
lessons to be learned from the experiences of others. Since and endu rance against great odds. Two men parachuted
the subject of cold weather survival is so complex , this is by error from a transport and one was injured on landing.
the vehicle we' ll use here. The other man carried and dragged his injured companion
Following is a compilation of excerpts of arctic 150 mil es to safety. As they had no food or equipmen•~
4 DECEMBER 19iu
·· - necessary to forage along the way. The journey took comments were made on the treatment of shock cases
l yS. other than keeping the patient warm and in a sleeping bag.
'-.._..,.ne crew of a bomber which landed along an Arctic One reported that the shock cases in his crew required
beach never gave up hope. Only a diary revealed their more water, which they could supp ly on ly as snow. The
story. The men ran out of food after 38 days of rationing impairments of health or physical condition following the
limited supplies. The diary records their plight for a total emergency landings were attributab le, in the vast majority
of 53 days. Their bodies were located a month after the of cases, to the environment and the loca lity of the
last entry. accident. These are reported as exposure, cold, frostbite,
One survivor was fortunate in finding trapper's supplies lack of food, and malnutrition.
and cabins along his lonely route. He was out 84 days The survivors often showed a lack of training in the use
before he returned to his base but suffered no hardships and care of clothing. Men wore wet clothes, gloves, socks ,
and lost no weight during his emergency trek. and shoes and failed to dry them when the situation
The longest experience in the stories exam ined is that al lowed it. Men forgot their gloves when working outside.
of a crew isolated on the Greenland Icecap. They were They used cold tools with wet hands and learned better
found and supplied by air after only a few days, but 164 "the hard way." They took off their gloves to wipe snow
days passed before they could be removed from the from the wings of the aircraft . Only after being frostbitteR
icecap. did they find life raft paddles ideal for the purpose.
The effects of the extreme cold were both physical and Others used their bare hand to scoop up snow to eat or to
mental. Some men came very close to mental breakdowns melt. One man commented he was so anxious to rush
in combating the arctic winters. A bomber was forced to after the supplies dropped to him that he forgot to put on
ditch in the ocean off the coast of Greenland. The his foot covering. The result was wet feet and eventual
ditching was successful and the men were dry when they amputation of two toes. Another man landed his fighter
entered the life raft. They paddled all night long and by safely but walked around the plane and then sat in the
morning were soaked and cold when they reached a cockp it all night w ith snow-fi ll ed shoes and wet feet. He
pinnacle of rock. Two days of snow and sleet were had frostbitten feet by morning and eventually lost all his
followed by 48 hours of freezing weather with strong toes. Such comments as swollen, blistered hands, feet with
· -rJs. Then came three additiona l days of gales and gusts such large blisters a man couldn't walk, loose skin on one
•ind and finally a long snowstorm which lasted finger, lost one fingernail and may lose another, were in
"-..._....rmittently until their rescue 3 days later. Only a short the report of three men who lived in an insulated hut.
break in the weather saved their lives. The few minutes of They had a fire over which they said they dried their
sunshine allowed them to use a signal mirror to attract a sleeping gear but never mentioned drying socks or gloves.
passing ship. The rescue party found all three men The results of these actions were frostbite, frozen limbs,
unconscious and thought that only one was alive. This gangrene, and eventua l amputation.
rescue appears to have been accomplished at the last Treatment of frostbite was often wrong. Many cases
possible moment. were reported where the first aid given frozen or chilled
feet and hands was rubbing with snow, rubbing with
HEALTH AND INJURIES alcohol, rubbing with gasoline, or just simple massage.
One su rvivor, who admitted being ignorant of Arctic first
About 50 percent of the men involved in these survival aid, treated a fellow crew member's frozen feet correct ly
episodes suffered injuries in the course of the descent, at first by putting them under his armpits. Had he read
whether a crash landing or parachute landing. The injuries the manual in the first-aid kit in his plane, he would not
ranged from fractured skulls, broken legs, arms, and have made the mistake of rubbing the feet for 2 or 3
shoulder blades to sprai ns, bruises, cuts, and concussions. hours. The next day the victim's feet turned all colors of
In two reports broken limbs were set by a member of the the rainbow and after his rescue all the toes had to be
party. One of these was set so successfully by a amputated.
non-medical man that resetting was not necessary when In a very few cases the frostbite was unavoidable. The
the party was rescued and taken to a base hospital. In all three men who spent 10 days on a windswept pinnacle in
other cases the fractures were immobilized by splints. the Arctic Sea had on ly the clothes they wore. They were
Burns from fires in flight or following the crash were soaked from travel in a life raft and from the blowing
reported in 17 stories. Cuts occurred most frequently on spray . Their hands and feet were frozen and paralyzed.
the face, they were caused by fractures of glass in the They had discarded their shoes, which had frozen to the
plane or by broken flying goggles. hardness of ·cement in the first day on the rock, and wore
l=ifteen cases of shock were recorded. No specific only their flying boots. Their feet were so swollen they
CATTACK 5
...survival...
even filled the boots. It was impossible to make a fire. resulted in parched and burning throats. Additional snow
Under such conditions frostbite is inevitable. did little to relieve these sensations and only added to the
Other men found preventing frostbite in fractured chapping .
limbs a serious problem. The impaired circulation made Effects of cold wind were frequent ly noted. Men said
keeping a broken hand or foot warm, very difficult. The the strong gales made breath ing difficult and seemed to
narrative of one crew whose seven members all suffered make the lungs burn.
frozen hands or feet notes that a frozen limb doesn't feel G Iare bothered a few men; they improvised snow
cold but simply aches. The pain kept them groaning for goggles or wore smoked flying goggles. Red or sore eyes
hours at a time. and swollen or dry, cracked eyelids were attributed to the
In general, caring for injured men in sleeping bags was wind and to the glare. By contrast, a few men reported
an exhausting, difficult, and trying task. Providing a level they didn't need or use snow glasses or goggles. Others
and dry spot for the patient was one problem, keeping stated they couldn't use the gogg les for protect~
him warm and clean another. One rescue party found an because the melting and freezing snow froze on ther '
injured man " fi lthy from head to foot," as the survivors few men smeared oil or grease on their faces to prev,
were unable to dispose of his excreta and the infected sunburn.
secret ions from his injured nose. The men who spent most of their time in shelters had
Lack of knowledge of the principles of first aid was pertinent comments on hea lth conditions. Many of them
conspicuous. No treatment, inadequate treatment, or the suffered from violent headaches which they blamed on
wrong treatment of injuries occurred all too frequent ly, the fumes from the stoves and fires. A common complaint
showing the men lacked the basic knowledge of first aid was a headache on arising which disappeared when they
principles that all air crews should have. went outside. Although many survivors reported worrying
Living in a snow shelter, as some men did, proved about the dangers of carbon monox ide poisoning, no cases
dangerous if the men were not constantly aware of the more seri ous than these were mentioned. One group
frostbite problem and other effects of cold. The warmth which used gasoline torches for light was bothered by
of a man's body penetrating through layers of sleeping black sputum and b lack nasal mucus f rom the fumes and
bags melted the snow or ice beneath. This, in turn, soaked soot of the leaged gasoline. One party reported sore and
the sleeping gear so that definite steps had to be taken to inflamed eyes from the smoke of an open spruce fire.
dry it out. One survivor reported that his sleeping bag Fires were a major hazard in shelters, especially when the
froze to the ice and had to be chopped f ree. Most men, men used open fuel or improvised stoves. Flash fires and
however, cared for their sleeping gear and aired and dried accidental fires from spi lled fue l resulted in burns,
it frequent ly. The survivo rs also found it necessary to generally of the face, hair, or hands.
insulate themselves from the snow and ice even when just Three men reported sufferi ng intermittently from an
sitting around. Fourteen cases of hemorrhoids were upset stomach, described as vomiting accompanied by
reported, most of them attributed to sitting on cold vio lent aches and chi ll s. No further explanation was given.
surfaces. One man was made ill by rations contaminated by
Chapped or sore li ps, faces, and tongues followed camphor heat tablets. On ly once was a survivor bothered
eating or sucking snow or ice. Several survivors by high alt itude and thin air.
complained t hat snow only made one more thirsty and Perhaps the most common complaint was a progres_c:'
6 DECEMBER l!1".1
weakness when rations were limited. Fatigue set in Once rescued, the men were exam ined and given
ru•ick ly, so that work periods had to be li mited to a few proper med ica l care. In the reports availab le, more than
or to less than an hour in severe cases. As men tired, half the men needed no medical attention other than rest.
- tended to stumb le more frequently in traveling and In other cases severe effects from exposure and lack of
-....._.... .
to misjudge their movements and bump or bru1se food were cited. The effects of frostbite and frozen limbs
themselves in normal activities. Men reported being wet all we re the most serious.
the time from continued falls because they were too weak
to vvalk normally. Ankles in particular suffered from cold REST
and bruises. Bruises seemed to remain painful for longer
periods of time than usual. Living under emergency conditions in the Arctic can
Peculiar attacks of dizziness were mentioned twice. In be exhausting, as the survi vors' stories prove. All attempts
one case the men reported they had trouble sta nding to work in cold and in strong winds required expenditures
upright and seemed unable to ori ent themselves in the of energy beyond the expectations of the fliers. Walking
snowy landscape. In the other story the survivor reported in deep snow o r against the wind quickly exhausted them.
that when digging for a box on a snowy. hazy day he Often they were too tired to build shelters on the trail and
stopped digging and t ried to stand up. He promptly fell simply wrapped themselved in parachutes before falling
down, unab le to ori ent himself in a vertical plane. He felt asleep. Even breathing in the cold climate seemed to
his semicircular canals failed to give him any indi cation require more effort. The shortage of food and the alti tude
of up from down. He found he could keep erect only also contributed to their discomfort. Most su rvivors
when look ing at the wreck of the aircraft, using it as an reported they were always fatigued, always tired .
artificial horizon. These men may have been weak, but Their reactions to this ever-present fatigue varied.
men in good condition somet imes react the same way in a Some men had trouble keeping awake and slept at every
"white-out." When light reflected by the snow has an opportunity. Others f ound themselves too tired or too
intensity equivalent to that received from the sun, uncomfortable to sleep. One party of three men claimed
everything appears hazy or milky. There is no horizon, no they went 15 days with less than 2 hours' sleep per day.
shadow. In a white-out a man on the ground has to probe Some men found it impossible to sleep at the beginning of
his way. their ordeal , while others slept at first but began to have
Cases of dizziness and nausea from smoking were t roub le going to sleep after 2 o r 3 days even though they
rted more frequently. One group of men had been on were tired. In one party excessive smok ing contributed to
.t rations for 38 days. After 12 addit ional days with insomnia.
no food at all they decided to smoke . One pipe of t obacco Several groups tried to stay awake by taking the
made them sick . Another group with I imited food but benzedrine tablets in the first-a id kit, fearing they might
u n I i m ited cigarettes were dizzy frequently from miss search planes o r rescue parties if they fell asleep. In
chain-smoking. two instances benzedrine tab lets were used as stimulants
8 DECEMBER 18,-.....
Leather oxfords, combat boots, high-top leather problems and difficulties in procuring drinking water.
, and tennis shoes were all mentioned as inadequate In the freezing temperatures of winter, obta ining a
\,_-unsat isfactory. Shoes were soon replaced by flying water supp ly became a more serious problem. After
boots, supplemented inside or out by layers of burlap, landing his plane on a frozen lake, one man chopped a
parachute cloth, or tarpaulin, and insulated with fiber, hole through nearly 3 feet of ice to get drinking water,
straw, moss, or excelsior. Most of those who mentioned which froze in his canteen cup almost immediate ly when
mukluks approved of them as ideal footwear for Arctic brought into the air.
emergencies. They praised their convenience, comfort , Snow is not as sat isfactory a source of drinking water
and insulating properties when properly used. One man as ice, yet many survivors used it. Two injured men were
thought rubber footwear possibly the most practical dependent for water on the snow they cou ld reach
because snow wouldn't stick to it. Leather footwear through the plane window. Various men who ate snow
tended to freeze and was described as like armor, reported that their hands, I ips, tongues, and mucous
concrete , or rocks. membranes were soon chapped, cracked, and bleeding.
Emergency repairs to clothing usually were made with Snow proved unsatisfactory in other ways. Many
pieces of parachute or tarpaulin sewn with unraveled reported, "No matter how much snow we sucked we
shroud lines. All the men praised the parachute as cou ldn't quench our thirst." At least 10 men complained
emergency material and valued it highly. All groups that eating it caused a burning sensation in the throat.
carried one or more parachutes with them, and every One man noted that he and severa l other members of his
individual saved whole or selected parts of parachutes for party who ate snow directly or drank it melted suffered
shelters, bedding, insulation, repairs, and clothing. from diarrhea. In others, it caused severe gas pains and
belching . They discovered that snow is difficult to melt
WATER and that tremendous quantities must be heated to supply
even a sma ll amount of water. Many concluded that
In spite of the abundance of ice, snow, and water melting snow is not worth the effort, for drinking water
almost everywhere, many of the narratives mention can be obtained from ice with less energy and fuel.
CATTACK 9
the six thousand foot level. The survivor was dressed fo~
...survival ... chilly spring day in a summer flying suit, summer fl'
jacket, and G suit. The temperatures during his "sun.
training" ranged between twenty and thirty degrees with a
Both ice and snow had to be melted for drinking water wind averaging about twenty-five knots.
in containers. The men found it best to save one container He ejected about four in the afternoon and had thirty
for melting ice alone, because of the difficulty in cleaning minutes of daylight remaining. He used his radio to
those used for cooking or other purposes. One observant transmit a mayday call but got no reply. Then he decided
lad noted that a solid block of ice melted as quickly as to follow some telephone poles hoping to reach a ranch
small cubes or shaved ice. Several mentioned that if the house. He abandoned his insulated I ife raft and began
water was allowed to heat a little after the ice had melted walking. About nine that night he wrapped up in a
completely it kept better and provided a more satisfactory reflectorized survival blanket and his parachute, to spend
drink than when only slightly above the freezing point. the night. It was cold. He lit a candle occasionally to
Drinking water was kept in thermos jugs or canteens. warm and dry his hands and feet, it snowed all night.
Some rnen noted that a constant water supply could be After daybreak he saw a rescue helicopter and directed it
easily maintained by adding ice and snow as needed to a to him by radio, he was picked up fifteen hours after
container of water in their shelter. ejection.
Our TAC pilot was lucky - or perhaps he had that
CONCLUSIONS ultimate faith in immediate rescue. He certainly proved
his faith in the rescue troops by leaving his winter flying
It should be obvious from what you've read so far, that gear and long johns at home. But had that snowstorm
your pHysical condition and dress may well determine continued, he could have spent the rest of the winter on
how you return to civilization ... or if you will. Such that lonely peak. And for those of you who fly the big
things as injuries, the length of your ordeal, the ones - an injured man can place a heavy burden on the
environment you are deposited into, and other variables rest of the crew, how stands that union before flight? Are
will certainly have a bearing on the outcome but you have you prepared to take care of your own? If you can't take
no direct control over these things. care of yourself ... th~ injured will have to stand alo~
Our experience in TAC along these lines is about nil. Not a nice thought, is it? )
We have one known surviva l tale in the past few years, and Before you leave home for that next flight, give sc..
it turned out to be a bad example. The crew of a two-seat thought to where you're going and what you'll do, and
fighter from a southern base had to eject about seventy what you will be flying over . It's important because,
miles from home over mountainous terrain. One man was although experience is the best teacher, the cost of tuition
fatally injured, the other landed on a mountain around may be prohibitive ... it may take all you have. ~
If you'd get chilly prefl ighting this bird you are wearing the wrong gear.
10 DECEMB ER 1970
CTICAL AIR COMMAND
Pilot of Distinction
Major Standerfer
Major Ronald G. Standerfer of the 177 Tactical the engine under control and accelerate to military power.
Fighter Group, 108 Tactical Fighter Wing, Atlantic City, Major Standerfer . terminated the zoom maneuver at 600
New Jersey, has been selected as a Tactical Air Command feet because of low airspeed and heavy gross weight at
Pilot of Distinction. flameout. Notifying his instructor pilot of his difficulty he
Major Standerfer was flying number two position in an began a turn to a downwind leg for an immediate landing.
F-1 05D on a formation GCA missed approach when his He landed the aircraft without further incident.
engine flamed out. Gear and flaps had just been retracted Investigation revealed that internal failure of the main fuel
and the aircraft was 200 feet above the ground at 240 control caused the engine flameout and made restart
knots. He immediately zoomed to gain altitude and possible only by using the emergency system.
simultaneously attempted a restart using the emergency Major Standerfer's outstand ing airmanship du ri ng this
system. As decision altitude and airspeed for bailout critical inflight emergency, with less than six hours in the
approached, the engine compressor stalled violently F-105 aircraft, readily qualifies him as a Tactical Air
several times and then began to accelerate. By matching Command Pilot of Distinction.
ttle position with the actual RPM he was able to bring
THUDS
Jhis one's a little different! The pilot landed with
utility failure (ATM off the line) and went off the side of
the runway during rollout with complete wheel brake
failure. Yes, he had pulled the emergency brake handle,
but not far enough. The brake handle is connected to a
hydraulic valve that selects the pressure source for the
system. This valve can be positioned in-between as it was
in this case. If you need it, pull it all the way out - it's
only a two inch throw.
Many PACAF machines have now been returned to the
States. They don't have the trailing edge flap interconnect
shafts as our TAC birds do. Therefore, the full split flap
potential is back among us and can cause you the same
grief reported by PACAF recently. The f inal fix, TCTO
1F-105-1126, will install a new, reliable flap synchronizer
and remove the interconnecting shafts. However, this
installation won't get underway until January 71 at the
earliest. Until they're all modified, be sure someone
doesn't slip one of these beauties in on you ... and keep
boned-up on your split flap emergency procedures.
14 DECEMBER 19tv
Tactical Air Command
Crew C:Lief of t:Le Mon t:L
SSgt Atkinson
SSgt Whitaker
LONG Rf;AC~
\ \
16 DECEMBER 19tu
I I
In reply to your letter I submit the following informal Now to follow your letter and make a statement to
brief of combat tact ics which are in every respect very each question as I would do it and to add any further
general and have been published in different forms many comment I might think useful at the end of this letter.
times previously. I can only d iscuss tactics as I
encountered them, which are only my own views and are DEFENSIVE
open to the criticism of others.
As an introductory statement, I trained several small When attacked by enemy aircraft the main objective is
units of new pilots after I completed my tour and noticed to break into the attacking aircraft and get on the
that their training had lacked discipline as soldiers as well offensive immediately. To stay on the defensive means
as air discipline. I make such a statement on the grounds defeat to part or all of the formation; so I would climb
that new pilots should "listen" and ask questions to try to the formation trying for every advantage to gain a point
learn, instead of starting to dictate after a mission or two. where a successful attack could be launched. Once a turn
'"'len not training or flying actual combat, new pilots is started in an engagement it is of the most importance
Jld be learning their equipment and constantly and safety of the individual pilot to remember, NEVER
...__..mtaining a higher standard of proficiency rather than REVERSE YOUR TURN. It has been my observation
the lackadaisical attitude, which can so easily jeopardize that a great majority of the victories of my unit were
the efficiency of a combat organization . made good when the enemy reversed the turn allowing an
Before answering your individual questions, I will attack to be made from dead astern without the slightest
make a brief summary of our formation and tactics, as deflection. When attacked always be aggressive; and if
they differ greatly in every unit. decidedly outnumbered and the offensive cannot be
Our takeoffs were in ships of two's, using two runways gained, I would then, and then only, hit the deck for
for quicker scrambles. Immediately the flights of four's home.
closed in to a Vickers V formation, and the flights as well ·In any engagements, offensive or defensive, tak e
closed in to three Vickers V formations to form the advantage of favorable conditions, clouds, sun, etc.
squadrons which orbited to the desired altitude in this Launch your attacks from up sun. When the enemy
manner and on into enemy-occupied territory. This type aircraft least expect it, if possible. Your position, and the
formation is maneuverable and very good for bad weather element of surprise, initiated during the attack, mean
flying, saving fuel, prevention of accidents, keeping everything. Never allow yourself or your formation to be
compact formation, etc. As the group set course for placed in such a manner that you do not have at least one
enemy territory, the squadrons kept well abreast and sure plan of withdrawal.
about a mile apart slightly above the lead squadron. When When engaging vastly superior numbers, do so with as
the group reached enemy-occupied territory, the group many planes as possible; and remain on the offensive with
leader gave the signal for battle formation, which spread plenty of aggressiveness. When you lack offensive
the squadrons slightly out and the flights out 600 to 800 aggressiveness, get out in as compact a formation as
yards. Each man in the flight stacked out to the sides and possible until you can gain an advantage point. It is my
not dead astern, so the flight leaders can keep accurate estimate that one friendly plane operating against the
check on each ship. This battle formation is maintained at enemy can be of more value later when you have the
all times over enemy territory and until a safe distance advantage, rather than not admit defeat and lose several
· '1m home bases with each man constantly on the alert. planes foolishly against superior equipment or odds of one
ACATTACK 17
the
LONG R~AC~
particular combat . formations or flight leaders. For any man just to peel out
If caught on the deck get as many objects between you of the formation and attack is fool-hardy! A lways
and the attacking enemy aircraft with as much speed as announce you r intentions so the remainder of the
possible, always in the direction of your home base. formation can give CQver, as you are briefed and trained
to do.
OFFENSIVE It is a bad practice to engage enemy aircraft while still
carrying belly tanks or to keep the tanks when an attack is
When on the offensive use every element in your favor about to be launched against you. In my opinion tanks
against the enemy as long as possible. To say the least, be should be released when exhausted. (Circumstances may
aggressive at all times. make different action mandatory.)
During an attack have your men stacked out to the It is the duty of the individual pilot to know his
sides so you can account for every plane. Wingmen are geographic features very well and other military map~
definitely for cover only of their leader's tail. Place your case there are adverse conditions and he is force•
formation to block and attack every possible ·means of return alone. The individual pilot shou ld know
escape available to the enemy airc raft, making sure you equipment so that he can get the best efficiency,
are not being tricked. The common trick of the enemy- endurance, speeds, etc. Never ditch a fighter-type plane.
to place a decoy with a main force stil l in the sun - has Bail out, especia ll y over water . Over the friendly coast, if
work~d on numerous occasions w ith men who bounced possible, try a belly landing.
first and looked afterwards. If you have sufficient planes Last of all, and a most important factor is the use of
available, take care of the decoy. Otherwise, maneuver the R/T. Know exactly what you are going to say before
into position to attack the ma in body and let the decoy you press the button, and know when and which button
go. to press. If you are in command and give an order, do so
It is useless to fire great deflection bursts. Maneuver with assurance so that you do not convey to others that
and orbit until you are certain not to over-shoot the you are not master of the situation. If it's wrong, go
enemy aircraft and so you can get a dead astern shot at through with it. That is better than changing horses in the
the proper range. The closer the better! Only engage the middle of the stream. Call in only aircraft that you can
enemy when you have a definite picture of the present identify as ones that appear to be enemy within attacking
sur~oundings and aircraft that can participate in that range. Never cut others out on the R/T; neither of you
particular battle. When you lose the advantage, break have accomplished anything. Most important of all, give
away before you lose your formation and always break the R/T to the pilot who is actua ll y engaged and need~
into the sun straight up. There may be planes there you you may save his life. Remember it could be you!
did not see and you can cover all the other areas fairly In conclusion, I adv ise each individual pilot to keep
well. After the attack be sure to join, regardless of your trying to maintain a higher standard of proficiency at al l
rank or position, the largest number of friendly aircraft so times. When yoL• get too good to learn and listen to
that you still can withd raw in force and help others who experi ence, you will soon meet with someone who is just
are less fortunate. Never allow yourself or your formation a I ittle better - and he is always present, no matter what
to become scattered over too large an area . the task. _......::::...
The attack shou ld be launched by the leaders of the
18 DECEMBER 1&. _
HI
WANT A NEW
PLANE''
No.454-AC-II-1).
lLe s pectfully,
Tac Tips
CALL SIGNS same drill. Steady state turns for longer than 15 seconds
resulted in a stuck ADJ.
The reqJJirement for control and rotation of aircraft In less than five months this unit had experienced 16
call signs has been with us for a long time. Occasionally, ADI failures similar to this one. All attitude indicators
words crop up that tend to cause confusion in our involved had recently been overhauled, six newly
operations or test our mettle in sorting out tongue overhauled attitude indicators failed bench check prior to
twisters. For example, last summer a unit operating out of installation! That's some record, isn't it? This unit
a busy civilian airport was given UNITE as a call sign. considers ADJ failure the highest accident possibility -
Since United Air Lines also used the facilities, you can with that record, who wouldn't?
imagine the confusion that ensued.
If something like this occurs to your organization, you
should know there is relief from AFKAI-1 assigned call
signs. A request for change to the TAC Communications
and Electronics Call Sign Branch (DCOCF) will take care
DOUBLE TROUBLE
of your problem - pronto. On the approach for landing the Herky's gear and flap
extension was slower than normal. Utility system pressure
looked okay. After landing, the crew checked the bird for
signs of hydraulic leaks, but found none. On engine start,
20 DE CEMBER 19tv
,
with morals, for the TAC a1rcrewman
50-percent flaps approach and landing. His utility system syst em selector to sta ndby ... both att itud e indi cators
pressure, nose wheel steering, brakes, and antiskid system went to a 30 degree dive and 15 degree left bank
worked okay. indication.
Hydraulic system specialists couldn't dupli cate the
crew's inflight indications of number two hydraulic pump ... AND AGAIN
failure. However, they f ound the utility suctio n boost
pump manual shutoff valve handle installed 90-degrees While in a holding pattern at 30 degrees of bank, the
left of its proper position. This could explain the slow ADI sudden ly erect ed itself t o a level flight indication.
gear and flap travel. It had been replaced just prior to The HSI developed a head ing error of 30 degrees.
their first takeoff. Switching from primary to standby had no effect. Rear
The number one throttle hangup was caused by a loose seat indi cations throughout were normal. Within a minute
ydraulic dry bay access panel. They cou ldn't identify the ADI co rrected itself and worked normally for the rest
naintenance personnel responsible for the improper of the flight.
Installation of the panel. But they're hoping that two
maintenance errors per aircraft are the max allowable on ... AND ONE MORE TIME
any one flight.
At 8000 feet, 320 knots, a port turn was started. At 30
degrees of bank the ADI still said straight and level.
FAST ACTION Standby was selected, nothing changed. After several
cyc les betwee n primary and standby the ADI began
The Gonney Bird flight engineer reported strong working in al l modes. The rear cockpit indica tions were
hydraulic fluid fumes just after takeoff. He informed the normal at all times, no off flags were noted.
pilot of the leak and he lowered the gear handle
immediately. His gear lowered before hydrau lic pressure
reached zero and it stayed in the green through landing .
Hydraulic specialists found a flare on the hydraulic line
leading to the landing gear pressure gauge worn thin. It
DOWNWIND DID IT
slipped out of a "B" nut and dumped all hydraulic fluid in The C-7 pilot onloaded his cargo pallets and requested
a hurry. Fortunately, crew reaction was faster. a. downwind departure to get airborne with minimum
ground time. At the end of the runway he encountered
two F-4s co mpleting their landing roll. As the Phantoms
headed for the dearming area they taxied past the
AD I-AGAIN Caribou, drag chutes trailing behind . One chute snagged
the airlifter's left outboard flap and pulled a hinge loose.
Throughout the last half of the flight the rear cockpit That delayed the C-7's expeditious departure. Operating
attitude indicator showed a 10 degree dive despite efforts against normal traffic flow is now on
• ..., correct it. The front cockpit system worked fine. After emergency-situation-only takeoff. Taking off downwind
ing the aircraft commander switched the reference can spoil your day in many little unpredictable ways.
TACATTACK 21
PMV Accident Prevention ..
22 DECEMBER 197U
0-- next largest involvement (18 percent). violations committed by his team members. The PMV
the summer of 1967 the PMV program began in team chief is our KEY MAN.
in the form of TACR 127-3. The regulation has been Within the program are the PMV control units. There
revised twice and the current issue is dated 13 October should be at least one control unit established in each
1970. The idea was to assign to PMV teams, personnel in squadron with a control unit chief in the grade of E-7 or
grades E-1 through E-4 who possessed a valid state driver's above in charge. A PMV control unit should never have
license, with personnel in grades of E-5 or above as team more than six members assigned and in many cases will
chiefs. Team strength was restricted to 3 - 10 members. have none. Personnel assigned to PMV control units will
By appointing the E-5's as team chiefs, the personnel most be drivers who have shown they need close control over
involved in PMV accidents were included by the program. their driving activities. There is no grade restriction for
PMV teams are required to meet twice a month and to assignment to a PMV control unit. Personnel should not
record the dates of the meetings, topics discussed, and be assigned to a PMV control unit for more than 90 days.
members present. The regulation also directs that the The PMV program at each base is directed from the
PMV team chief should inspect the automobiles of his ground safety office through PMV team monitors in each
members at least once each six months. It was understood organization who oversee activities within their unit.
that the team chief would not necessarily be a Material for use in the PMV team meetings is prepared by
professional at inspecting automobiles, but the idea was to the Office of Safety at TAC and the base safety offices.
have a meeting of the PMV team member, his automobile, There is no limit or restriction on what can be used as
and his team chief. Any mature and conscientious long as it promotes safe driving conduct. Some items that
individual can observe an automobile and determine its are readily available are TAC SALs, the USAF DRIVER
general safety condition. If work or new tires are needed magazine, the National Safety Council TRAFFIC
the PMV team member can be encouraged to get this SAFETY magazine, TAC ATTACK, and many other
accomplished. publications that relate to safe PMV operation.
The team chief should be the team member's One of the greatest frustrations that a safety man
supervisor if possible. The job need not be a laborious encounters is his inability to measure his successes. He can
task. He is required to maintain a file on each member. He only count his losses. Therefore, he relies on rates and
uld create a team atmosphere by motivating the trends. Since the inception of the PMV program, TAC's
bers to contribute to the team's safe PMV record. He rates and trends have decreased in the face of mounting
.N--ruld keep his team informed of local traffic laws, fatalities and rates at the national level. The program is
licensing, inspection and insurance requirements, and working - we need the help of every one to keep it
current driving hazards. He must be aware of any driving rolling.
COMMAND STRENGTH
E-1-E-3 E-4 E-5 E 6-E-9 0 -1 -0 -6
28% 25% 18% 17% 12%
ACCIDENTS
E-1-E-3 E-4 E-5 E 6-E-9 0 -1 -0 -6
34% 35% 18% 8% 5%
FATALITIES
E-1--E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6-E-9 0 1-0 6
I
31% 29% 18% 16% 6%
1AC ATTACK 23
incident and incidentals
Chock talk
Dual Rail foot Trap this t ime it was the aircraft's navigator who felt the bite.
Notice that in each case, no loadmaster was hurt. Each
We haven't had one of these for a long t ime so here's a time it was a well-meaning person trying to help. If you
reminder. About a year ago three people were hurt don't understand what's going on - don't help. A
seriously in mishaps concern ing sliding pallets in C-130 comp lete knowledge of primary and secondary speed
aircraft. In each case a person other than the load master off- loading procedures is a minimum to qualify you for
was assisting during speed-offloading. the task of assistant loadmaster. But if you have to get in
The first incident involved a stan-eva I engineer and the among those pallets, keep clear of those rails un less you
copi lot assisting the loadmaster. Four pa ll ets were being understand what's going on. Moving pallets is the name of
off-loaded, one at a time. As the third pallet was rolling the game . .. but not on peop le's feet.
free, the fourth also released and trapped the engineer's
right foot. He received lacerations and seven broken
bones.
The second incident also invo lved four pallets , this
time two Army troops were assisting. The first pallet
Use All Tl.e Parts
rolled free and the pilot was instructed to move the
aircraft forward. As the aircraft moved, the remaining Following a normal landing, the F-100 pil ot felt his
three pal lets began to ro ll and caught one of the Army bird pull to the left and vibrate. He stopped it for
helper's feet. Th ey had a hard time removing the pallet inspection, they found the left main loose and canted five
from his t rapped feet but he was finally freed and degrees on the axle. No t race of the bearing seal and
air-evaced. Amputation of one foot was certain. spacer assemb ly could be found. This was the third
The third incident was about like the other two but landing since the last tire change.
24 DECEMBER 197U
with a maintenance slant
No Cl.ute crew chief reported a fire in the engine exhaust area. The
fire department was called and the ground crew applied
This F-100 jock landed out of a GCA and pulled the fire suppressant to the phenolic seal on door 78. An
drag chute handle. He waited for the gentle tug but none unserviceable cartridge had been Clsed for the start - its
came. He got on the binders and slowed the bird with shelf life had expired five months earlier.
brakes only. He was met by the fire department and his
maintenance troops who advised him to shut down for
hot brakes. They turned blowers on the wheels and after
cooling them off, pulled it in. Investigators found the drag
FOD
chute teleflex cable quick disconnect had separated just
·rd of the forward teleflex control box. The nut had The F-4's right engine compressor stalled ·when the
,een saftied. This was the third flight since the aft aircraft commander came out of burner after takeoff. He
'section had been pulled - the man who signed off the red heard a 'BANG' and saw the EGT rise to 800. The stall
cross inspection after the bird was put back together is cleared when the throttle was retarded to idle, they
being retrained. landed ASAP. Inspection of the engine inlet, vari-ramp
area, and the front of the aircraft turned up a missing
screw from panel 6R. The pilots were sure it was in place
during preflight. More check ing revealed that the panel
Start Cart had been removed the day before, and this was the third
flight since re-installation . This unit is placing heavy
As the number one engine of the F-4 was accelerating emphasis on insuring that all fasteners are secure ... not
through 30 percent, there was a muffled bang and the merely installed .
CATTACK
TITLE MONTH
A-7
A-37
C-130
TAC
CT- HAMPERED HERKY JAN
TACK
TT- I'VE GOT IT APR 13
CT- NICE GUY MAY 15
TT- PROP PISTON PROBLEM MAY 20
TT- OUT OF SEASON! JUN 21
TT- BRING YOUR OWN BOTTLES? JUL 15
CT -WAYWA RD WIND AUG 19
TT- PLATFORM PROBLEM AUG 28
~
TT- FOUL FOWL SEP
TT- BOTTLE BABY? SEP
TT- ONE-SIDED REVERSE OCT
TT- A TEMPORARY CONDITION NOV
IND F-4
26 DECEMBER 19tv
F-4 (Con't) 0 -2
C ATTACK 27
COMMUNICATIONS
~
TI- NEW SQUAW KS FEB 14 READ ALL ABOUT ITI NOV
TT- WOULON"T YOU KNOW IT! JUL 14 I WANT A NEW PLANE DEC
TO BE OR NOT TO BE SEP 24
GROUND SAFETY
ENGINES
SIGNS OF THE TIMES JAN 30
THINK CLEAN FEB 10 HOW TO BE AN I DIOT JUL 16
THEY SAID IT COULDN'T BE DONE OCT 24 BE SEEN JUL 20
TELL SOMEBODY '! NOV 19 STAYIN" ALIVE .. . IN PUBLIC JUL 28
CRUNCH NOV 28
EJECTION AND EGRESS A TEAM EFFORT DEC 22
28 DECEMBER 19iv
MAINTENANCE (Con 't) PROFESSIONALISM
CLEAN IT UP JAN 10
- CHAFING JUN 14 BO LD FACE •.. SCHMO L FACE . .. WHO NEEDS IT! JAN 24
MAVERICK TAJ<ES LOOSE REINS JUN 14 BEWARE THE TRUSTY "T" JAN 27
-MAVERICK PANEL JUN 15 THE ROOTS OF ACCID ENT PREVENTION FEB 3
- DIRTY TRACK TRICK! JUN 15 WHAT WILL BE ... WI LL BE? MAY 22
CT - TWISTED TECHNIQUE JUN 15 "TOGETHERNESS" JUL 3
SU PER SABR E SAFETY JUN 16
TT - STUBBORN NOSE GEAR JUL 15 REFUELING
CT - T-33 . . . HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBER> JUL 26
CT - DANGEROUS DRA I N. JUL 26 TT - PITY THE POOR PACHYDERM JAN 9
CT - TOPSY-TURVY BOLT ... JUL 26 CT - CAN'T PUMP A IR FEB 26
CT - CAPS ON-CHECK AUG 18 TT - WH AP-WHAP-WHAP MAR 18
CT - BUTTON 'EM . . TIGHT AUG 18 TT - "K NUCKLE SANDW ICH" APR 13
CT - LOOSE GOOSE AUG 19
CT- WAYWARD WIND AUG 19 RUNWAY GROOVING
CT - BIRDS. YES . .. BUT BEES! AUG 19
TT - PLATFORM PROBLEM AUG 28 GROOVY MAR 20
IT - DOWN, BUT NOT OUT! AUG 29
TT - PART-UP, PART-DOWN FLAPS AUG 29 SECOND LOOK
IT - MISSED THE BOAT AUG 29
TT - WHOOPS! SEP 14 BUZZ ING APR 14
TT - BLADE BOMB SEP 15 THE STOPP ING PROBLEM JUN 4
TT - OIL SPOIL SEP 15 F-4 EMERGENCY GEAR LOWERING SEP 4
CT - MISSING DZUS DOWNS PLANE SEP 18 ANATOMY OF A TRAP NOV 4
CT - SAF ETY PLUG FOULS ENG INE SEP 19
CT - ENG IN E RIGGERS SET-UP ABORT SEP 19 SURVIVAL/RESCUE
nUSHED RUN-UP SEP 20
WE SEE 'EM LIK E "YOU" CAL L 'EM SEP 26 BACKSLIDER JAN 16
CT - LOOSE BREECH CAP OCT 10 BACKSLIDER II JUL 24
CT -SHORT FUSE OCT 10 THE PROBLEMS OF COLD WEATHER SURVIVA L DEC 4
CT - BOOM BOOM OCT 11
CT FROM OUT OF THE PAST OCT 11 TAKEOFF
CT- ENG INE LINKAGE NOV 15
TT - BRING YOUR OWN BOTTLES? JUL 15
M IDAIR TT -BOTTLE BABY? SEP 15
CT- BLC NOV 14
LOOK OUT!' HEADS UP!! MAR 16 TT - AN "S" MAN NOV 18
TT - BLADE BOMB NOV 19
MISSILE SAFETY
TAXIING
''i LB HEAVYWEIGHT JAN 22
- PINS AND WOMEN FEB 26 TT - APU ANXIETY FEB 14
\ .RK IV FALSE FLAG FEB 28 CT - AN 0 -2 TRAP SEP 18
~N ITI O N S FLIGHT LIMITS MAY 16
JUN 21 TIRES
rT - 'TWAS THRILLING
INADVERTENT MI SSILE LAUNCH JUN 24
JUL 27 CT- BEWARE OF WHEELS APR 19
CT - BDU -33 STRIKES AGAIN!
AUG 14 CT- FLAT TIRE EXPLODES AUG 18
A IM-40
SEP 18 F-4 NOTES NOV 20
CT - BE SURE TH EY KNOW
TRAINING
OPERATIONS
CT- WHO HAS THE RED FACE? FEB 27 CT- WHEEL DEAL .. JUL 27
CT- SPONTANEOUS INITIATORS MAR 26 TT- BUM STEER AUG 28
TT - NO CHECKEE - NO LAUNDRY OCT 20 TT- GEAR GRIPES OCT 21
AC ATTACK 29
Letters to the Editor
HE MADE ME DO IT
We're honored by your request, permission is You caught us. We asked Stan Hardison what
granted. The October TA C ATTACK and F-1 05 happened and all he would say was ... "The de~
photos are on the way. Ed. made me do it." Ed.
30 DECEMBER 1970
TAC TALLY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES
• Estimated
UNITS
MAJOR ACCIDENT RATE COMPARISON THRU OCT THRU OCT
1969 1970 1969 1970 1969 1970 4 TFW 4. 5 0 23 TFW 17.5 4.7
4.9
FEB 6.2 3.9 12 .8 2.6 0 0 31 TFW 3. 9 479TFW 9.9 11.0
CATTACK 31
ATTENTION
FELL OW JOCI<t'
TilE COLD HIJNDOF WINTER
IS HEllE••• THI5 MEAN/
CA.) SNOW AND ICE ON
RUNWAYt.
{BJ ~NdWAND ICE ON
AIRCRAFT.
(C.) COLO PI?EFLIGHTS;.
{D) LOW CEILINGS:
F---1