MASTER’S DEGREE IN CIVIL ENGINEERING

ADVANCED HYDROSYSTEMS ENGINEERING (AHE)

MODULE 3
Uncertainty & Risk in Hydraulic Systems
Homeworkacademicyear2018-2019

Name: Alabed Alrazak Moath

Matricola: (879963)
Instructor: Prof. Vittorio Di Federico
 Part (A)

System Structure and data:

The following schematic draw is the system considered for the project

Mission’s Requirements:
1) To Describe in a short report the system (Consider also the structure of the pumping station, including the pump engine and
electric cabinet) identifying:
a. Components,
b. Function(s) of each components,
c. System types (series or parallel),
d. Operational and design assumptions.
 2) To draw the functional block diagram (FBD) for the pumping station shown in the above figure.
3) To create a suitable FMECA worksheet based on EXAMPLE 1 with description of failure, risk priority numbers, and risk reduction
measures;

1) Fulfilling these requirement needs to introduce the schematic representation of the Pumping Station. From the provided graph,
the element consists of two pumps connected in parallel and several valves.

This is head-flow diagram that corresponding to parallel connection:

Then, the main components of the pumping station have been schematized as shown below

The figure shows three pump units connected in parallel; I pointed to the main components of one pump unit.
A definition for the different components of which the system is made up of and with the introduction of the relative functions are
necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of any system; in particular, considering the previous system schemes there are:

• Reservoir: represents an infinite source that consequently can supply or accept water without changes of the hydraulic head;
• Pump: is a device to which mechanical energy is transferred to the water as pressure head. Energy needs to be added to
distribution network to overcome elevation differences, friction losses or minor losses;
• Gate valves: regulate/block the flow of water in a pipeline, usually in order to permit the maintenance of activities to be
undertaken. They are also used to separate areas of different pressure or to create water quality zones and meter areas;
 • Drive pipe: conveys water flow in order to supply the water from a junction node or elevated source to another node
through the pump;
• Delivery pipe: is the pipe with an end connected to the outlet by back flow valve and the other end to destination reservoir.
It is the component in which the water that leaves the pump is conveyed to the destination point;
• Electric cabinet: provides electricity to the pump. It allows also to control and supervise the pumping station operating;
• Engine: generates power and velocity to pull water; hence pumping it via impellers;
• Backflow valves: also called check valves, are used to ensure that the water can flow in one direction through the pipeline
but cannot flow in the opposite direction. Any water flowing backwards through the valves causes it to close;
• Tank: stores excess water within the system and releases that water at times of high usage (it receives water from the
system and distributes it into the network). In the following study we will assume the second reservoir as a tank. Tank has a
finite storage volume with a fluctuating level; unlike reservoir.

In addition to the physical components of the system, the environmental or/and operational conditions (such as: predefined minimum
flows, temperature limit, etc..) have key roles; but in this case it had been decided to neglect their contribution for the sake of
simplicity.

More detailed vision has been introduced for each branch of the configuration. So, a unique label was set for each individual
component with a reference number, hence we can simply reach and identify them.
As mentioned previously, the system is connected in parallel configuration. Parallel system is intuitively connected with Redundancy,
with the following properties:
a. Higher resistance against failure
b. the resistance against certain failures can decrease
c. Higher complexity
d. New failure types can appear
e. Apparent increase of resistance
f. Danger of dependencies
 2) Functional block diagram (FBD): performed for the pumping station, all other parts relatively connected will also be taken
into consideration; like pump engine and electric cabinet.

2) FMECA worksheet
The FMECA is often the first step of a system reliability study and it is used in order to identify and analyze: the whole set of potential
failure modes of a system and of its components of the system; the effects that these failures may have on the system or its parts;
how to avoid or reduce the probability of the failures or mitigate their effects on the system.
It is a useful tool to identify and to prevent criticalities before they occur, by means the combination of qualitative and quantitative
approach about the potential risks.
Considering the fact that the System Structural Analysis represents the second main step of the FMECA analysis, it has to be stated
that this method is realized by means the realization of the following five steps:
1) FMECA prerequisites;
2) System structure analysis;
3) Failure analysis and preparation of FMECA worksheets;
4) Team review;
5) Corrective actions.

The last two point will not be treated in this report

The initial point of the method is represented by the definition of the system (in terms of system boundaries, main system missions
and functions, operational or/and environmental conditions) collecting available information about system functions and previous
designs.

In the definition of the system boundary comes to the aid a model that is plotted in the slides of the course, in which is possible to
understand how the searched entity is something that encloses the different components of the studied system leaving outside
what belongs to an higher functional level.

FMECA sheet consists of the several aspects like functions, failure, cause of the failure, severity, concurrency, detection.
The Risk Priority Number (RPN)
𝑹𝑷𝑵 = 𝑺𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚 ∗ 𝑶𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
Functions:
The work which is be done by the component.
Failure:
The damage or repair which is been occurred to that part(component) is termed as failure
Causes of the failure:
The defects in design, process, quality, or part application, which are the underlying cause of a failure
Severity:
A qualitative measure of the worst potential consequences resulting from the item/function failure. It is rated
relatively scaled from 1-10
 FMECA Worksheet:

No.
Ref.No. Component Group Function Failure Cause Effects Remedies S O D RPN on
chart
High
Deliver Regular
calcium Due to
Store good polluted maintenance
content in hardness of 4 6 6 144.00 1
quality water water to of filtration
stored water
users devices
water

Insufficient Leakage in Velocity of Maintenance

6 8 5 240 2
1 Reservoir PHS flow reservoir flow affects of reservoir

Continuous water Release

resource provider Defect in gates of
Intense other reservoir to
Flood 8 6 2 96 3
rainstorm related reduce
components volume
trapped

Due to Cleaning the

Reduce
Transport water to Pipe accumulated pipes by any
water 5 7 6 210 4
pump blockage material technical
velocity
e.g. calcium methods
2 Drive pipe A PHS
waste of
Maintenance
Provide full Pipe water and
and RE-
service water Partial leakage; lower 6 9 5 270 5
Habilitation
demand demand crack or hole volume to
process
provided users
 Due to Cleaning the
Reduce
Transport water to Pipe accumulated pipes by any
water 5 7 6 210 6
pump blockage material technical
velocity
e.g. calcium methods

3 Drive pipe B PHS

waste of
Maintenance
Provide full Pipe water and
Partial and RE-
service water leakage; lower 6 9 5 270 7
demand Habilitation
demand crack or hole volume to
provided process
users

Due to Cleaning the

Reduce
Transport water to Pipe accumulated pipes by any
water 5 7 6 210 8
tank blockage material technical
velocity
e.g. calcium methods
Delivery pipe
4
A
waste of
Maintenance
Provide full Pipe water and
Partial and RE-
PHS service water leakage; lower 6 9 5 270 9
demand Habilitation
demand crack or hole volume to
provided process
users

Due to Cleaning the

Reduce
Delivery Transport water to Pipe accumulated pipes by any
5 PHS water 5 7 6 210 10
pipe B tank blockage material technical
velocity
e.g. calcium methods
 waste of
Maintenance
Provide full Pipe water and
Partial and RE-
service water leakage; lower 6 9 5 270 11
demand Habilitation
demand crack or hole volume to
provided process
users

valve Technical
defects are No steady
6 Gate valve A DP Control of flow Add sensors 5 7 4 140 12
due to functioning
enclosure
ageing

valve Technical
defects are No steady
7 Gate valve B DP Add sensors 5 7 4 140 13
due to functioning
Control of flow enclosure
ageing

valve Technical
defects are No steady
8 Gate valve C DP Add sensors 5 7 4 140 14
due to functioning
Control of flow enclosure ageing

valve Technical
defects are No steady
9 Gate valve D DP Control of flow Add sensors 5 7 4 140 15
due to functioning
enclosure ageing

No proper
Changing the
Due to water
Electrical Provides power to Fluctuation defect parts
10 PS electrical supply, 8 9 5 360 16
Cabinet the Engine of power or regular
board, fire reduce
check up
safety
 Due to high Alternate
voltage engine
Technical
power should be
defect like No water
11 Engine A PMP start the pump supplied to connected 6 9 2 108 17
engine transported
the circuit in or replacing
fails
engine the circuit in
burnt the engine

Due to high Alternate

voltage engine
Technical
power should be
defect like No water
12 Engine B PMP Start the pump supplied to connected 6 9 3 162 18
engine transported
the circuit in or replacing
fails
engine the circuit in
burnt the engine

Maintenance
Deliver the water Not Standard No water or
13 Pump A PMP 7 8 3 168 19
to the Reservoir working defects transported replacement
of pump

Maintenance
Deliver the water Not Standard No water or
14 Pump B PMP 7 8 2 112 20
to the Reservoir working defects transported replacement
of pump
 Due to Water flow
Backward improper to pump; in Replace the
7 8 3 168 21
flow workability wrong valve
of valve direction
Back flow Restrict the flow
15 DP
valve direction
Water flow
Corrosion,
Valve to pump; in
standard Add sensor 5 7 4 140 22
enclosure wrong
defect
direction

Cleaning
Due to Water got
Receive water No should be
16 Tank PHS improper clogged in 4 6 6 144 23
from the reservoir Capacity done inside
level the system
tank

Cleaning the
Due to Reduce
Transport water to Pipe pipes by any
pollutant in water 5 6 6 180 24
pump blockage technical
reservoir velocity
methods

17 Inlet Pipe PHS

waste of
Maintenance
Provide full Pipe water and
Partial and RE-
service water leakage; lower 6 9 5 270 25
demand Habilitation
demand crack or hole volume to
provided process
users

Cleaning the
Due to
Transport water to Pipe Velocity is pipes by any
18 Outlet Pipe PHS pollutant in 5 6 6 180 26
pump blockage decreased technical
reservoir
methods
 waste of
Maintenance
Provide full Pipe water and
Partial and RE-
service water leakage; lower 6 9 5 270 27
demand Habilitation
demand crack or hole volume to
provided process
users

After calculating the Risk Priority Numbers, they could be classified easily according to vulnerability. I introduce the column chart
that describes better this idea:

Risk Priority Numbers Rating

400.00

350.00

300.00

250.00
RPN

200.00

150.00

100.00

50.00

0.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Failure type Num.
As shown, the failure mode (3) which has the lowest RPN=96, related to the failure of flood events that are rear in our scope of
analysis. Hence, no need to take any investment towards flood risk that are completely treated in another filed (design phase) of risk
study related to rain analysis and ground water resources.
On the other hand, the failure mode with highest RPN is (16), which is Electric Cabinet failure. So, we need to prioritize this problem
for corrective action in the scheme of risk analysis of the pumping station system.
 Part (B)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Consider for the system structure the schematic layout; a pipe(I1) connects the water source(W) to the pumping station, where two
identical pumps(P1, P2) work in parallel; another pipe(I2) connects the pumping station to the valve(V) and then(I3) to the tank(T).
Further components to be considered are electrical cabinet and pump engines.

1. Select as Top Event (TE), i.e. the undesired event= “no flow of water to the tank”
2. Decide their solution of the FT (resolution=level of analysis);
3. Clarify events not modeled and why;
4. Define failures (the ones adopted for the contributor’s events);
5. Draw Fault Tree diagram (FT);
6. Quantification of FT in terms of:
a. identification of the cut sets,
b. Identification of the minimal cut sets contributing to the TE.

7. Quantification of probability of the TE given the probability of the basic events identified;
8. Evaluation of one or more Importance Measure (IM) for each of the basic events.

The main purpose of the fault tree analysis is to help identify potential causes of system failures before the failures actually occur. It
can also be used to evaluate the probability of the top event using analytical or statistical methods.
The main steps in defining, constructing and quantifying the FTA requires the following descriptions:

• Definition of the system

• Top Event definition and boundary conditions
• Failure definitions
• Fault tree diagram construction
• Identification of cut sets and minimal cut sets contributing to the Top Event
• Qualitative analysis of the fault tree
 • Quantification of probability of the Top Event
• Reporting of results

Schematic Layout

System components:
o Water Source (W) : provider of water to the system
o Pipe (I1) : transfer water from the water source to the pumping station (10 meters length)
 o Electrical cabinet (EC) : provides electrical energy to the engines E1, E2 respectively, and controls
o Pump (P1) : provides energy to water by increasing its hydraulic head of the water
o Pump (P2) : provides energy to water by increasing its hydraulic head of the water
o Pipe (I2) : transfer water from the pumps P1 and P2 to the valve (10 meters length)
o Valve (V) : allow or prevent water flow or regulates the water flow
o Pipe (I3) : transfer water from the valve to the tank (100 meters length)
o Tank (T) : water storage
o Pumping System (PS1, PS2)

System Type
The system is a Water Transport System, based on a pumping station composed of two pumps connected in parallel.
Assumptions and limitations
▪ Markov process: future is independent from past
▪ Fault rates are constant
▪ Bernoulli hypothesis: Each system element analyzed has two, mutually exclusive states (Successive/Failure).
▪ a pipe could fail at different points, but I will consider a failure of the whole pipe
▪ the two pumps work simultaneously and independently
▪ the electrical energy provided to the cabinet is infinite
▪ the electrical cabinet controls that the two pumps are in ideal condition
▪ the water source has infinite supply capability and the tank has infinite capacity
▪ the components repeated in each pumping system are identical and have the same properties and failure rates (this also
applies to V1, V2, and V3.
The chosen approach of FMECA is Top-Down Approach
1. Our aim of this case study is to identify the events and conditions causing undesired TOP event which is “no flow of
water to the tank”
2. Decide their solution of the FT (resolution=level of analysis);

Analyzed
S.no Sections Function Failure in this
FTA?
Contains high calcium
Provides good quality No
amount in water
1 Reservoir
Water Demand Insufficient flow Yes
Continuous water resource provider Flood No
Transport water to pump Pipe blockage Yes

2 Drive pipes Provide full-service water demand Partial demand

provided(leakage) No

Valve
3 Gate valves Control of flow Yes
enclosure

4 Electrical Cabinet Provides power to the Engine Fluctuation of power Yes

5 Pump Deliver the water to the tank Not working Yes

6 Tank Receive water from the reservoir No Capacity Yes

 3. Clarify events not modeled and why;
I will not into account the concentrations of the particles inside the reservoir and flood; because our un-desired top event
that will be built analyzed by the FTA diagram is not related with this type of failure. So, they might contribute in another un-desired
top event that needs another different FT.
As for the pipe leakage, based on the previous assumptions of Bernoulli hypothesis the partial failure is not considered.
In fact, it is a simplified/ basic level of analysis because several assumptions were set to be able to make it. Otherwise, going
in more advanced analyses, needs some in-depth details that requires a professional safety engineer who has more experienced
knowledge in this field.

➢ Define failures (the ones adopted for the contributor’s events);

Failure Definitions
o Water source failure: absence or reduced quantity of water in the system

o Pipe 1 failure: no water transported from reservoir

o Electrical Cabinet failure: no electrical energy provided to the pumping station and reduced control on safety and security

o Pump 1 mechanical failure: no water pumped to the tank with the same energy (hydraulic head)

o Pump 2 mechanical failure: no water pumped to the tank with the same energy (hydraulic head)

o Pipe 2 failure: no water transported through t

o Valve Failure: inability of regulating the water flow

o Pipe 3 failure: no water transported to the tank

➢ Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
6. Quantification of FT in terms of:
a. identification of the cut sets
By using a Top-Down Method and the Boolean Algebra, we have the following expressions for the set of basic events whose
occurrence ensure that the top event occurs:

𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴+𝐵+1+𝐵+𝐶+𝐷+𝐸
𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴+𝐵+𝐹+2+𝐵+𝐶+𝐷+𝐸
𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐹 + (𝑃𝑆1. 𝑃𝑆2) + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 + 𝐸
𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐹 + (𝐺 + 𝐻 + 𝐶). (𝐺 + 𝐻 + 𝐶) + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐷 + 𝐸
Then after distribution of parentheses and several steps of Boolean Algebraic simplifications rules:
𝑋+𝑋 =𝑋
And by rule 7 we have:
𝑋. 𝑋 = 𝑋 and
…….
We get the top event:

𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐹 + 𝐺 + 𝐻 + 𝐶 + 𝐸

b. Identification of the minimal cut sets contributing to the TE.

Since:
𝑇𝐸 = 𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐹 + 𝐺 + 𝐻 + 𝐶 + 𝐸

The TOP event occurs if at least one of the minimal cut sets fails. The TOP event probability is:
 Hence, we will get our minimal cut sets as follows:
{A}, {B}, {F}, {G}, {H}, {C}, {E}

7. Quantification of probability of the TE given the probability of the basic events identified

The probabilities of the top event failure should be evaluated at three time periods; 1 month, 1 year and 2 years. Considering the
given failure rates 𝜆𝑖 and adopting exponential model for reliability:
a) Pump mechanical failure 𝜆𝑃 = 75 . 10−6 ℎ−1
b) Backflow Valve broken or closed 𝜆𝑉 = 3 . 10−6 ℎ−1

c) Electrical board failure 𝜆𝐸𝐶 = 6 . 10−6 ℎ−1

𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑠
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
d) Pipe failure 𝜆𝐼 = 2 . 10−3 𝑚

e) Failure of the water source probability

𝑃𝑊 = 4 . 10−5 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) , 𝑃𝑊 = 5 . 10−3 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) , 𝑃𝑊 = 3 . 10−2 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠)

F) Failure of the Tank 𝜆 𝑇 = 1 . 10−5 ℎ−1

 ➢ 1 month (time = 720 hours)

𝑃𝑇 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑇.𝑡 = 0.0072

𝑃𝑃 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑝. 720

= 0.0525

𝑃𝑉 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑣. 720 = 0.00216

𝑃𝐸𝐶 ( 1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐸𝐶 . 720 = 0.00431
𝑃𝐸𝑀 ( 1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐸𝑀. 720 = 0.00431
10
𝑃𝐼1,𝐼2 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 𝑁 . = 0.00166
12
100
𝑃𝐼3 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 𝑁 . = 0.0166
12
𝑃𝑊 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 4 . 10−5

𝑃𝑇𝐸 (1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) = 1 − ((1 − 𝑃𝑤 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙1 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙2 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑉 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙3 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑇 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑆 ) =0.0366

𝑃𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝑃2 − (𝑃𝐸𝐶 . 𝑃2 ) = 0.0077
𝑃2 = 𝑃𝑆1 . 𝑃𝑆2 = 0.0034
𝑃𝑆1 = 𝑃𝑆2 = 1 − ((1 − 𝑃𝐸𝑀 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑃1 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑉 ) =0.0586

So the probability of top event occurs is 3.66 % at one month time period.
 ➢ 1 year (time = 𝟖𝟕𝟔𝟎 hours)

𝑃𝑇 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑇.8760 = 0.0838

𝑃𝑃 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑝. 720

= 0.48

𝑃𝑉 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑣. 8760 = 0.0259

𝑃𝐸𝐶 ( 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐸𝐶 . 8760 = 0.0512
𝑃𝐸𝑀 ( 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐸𝑀. 8760 = 0.0512
𝑃𝐼1,𝐼2 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 𝑁 . 10 = 0.02
𝑃𝐼3 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 𝑁 . 100 = 0.2
𝑃𝑊 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 5 . 10−3

𝑃𝑇𝐸 (1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − ((1 − 𝑃𝑤 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙1 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙2 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑉 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙3 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑇 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑆 ) =0.9857

𝑃𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝐺 + 𝑃2 − (𝑃𝐺 . 𝑃2 ) = 0.3072
𝑃2 = 𝑃𝑆1 . 𝑃𝑆2 = 0.2698
𝑃𝑆1 = 𝑃𝑆2 = 1 − ((1 − 𝑃𝐸𝐶 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑃1 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑉 ) =0.5194

That means we have a probability of 98.5% that the top event occurs once a year.

➢ 2 years (time = 𝟏𝟕𝟓𝟐𝟎 hours)

𝑃𝑇 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑇.17520 = 0.1607

𝑃𝑃 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑝. 17520

= 0.73
𝑃𝑉 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑣. 17520 = 0.0512
𝑃𝐸𝐶 ( 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐸𝐶 . 17520 = 0.0997
 𝑃𝐸𝑀 ( 2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝐸𝑀. 17520 = 0.0997
𝑃𝐼1,𝐼2 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 𝑁 . 10 . 2 = 0.04
𝑃𝐼3 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 𝑁 . 100 . 2 = 0.4
𝑃𝑊 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 3 . 10−2

𝑃𝑇𝐸 (2 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) = 1 − ((1 − 𝑃𝑤 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙1 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙2 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑉 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑙3 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑇 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑆 ) = 0.9998

𝑃𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝐺 + 𝑃2 − (𝑃𝐺 . 𝑃2 ) = 0.6326
𝑃2 = 𝑃𝑆1 . 𝑃𝑆2 = 0.5919
𝑃𝑆1 = 𝑃𝑆2 = 1 − ((1 − 𝑃𝐸𝐶 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑃1 ). (1 − 𝑃𝑉 ) =0.7694

This yields the barley the same result of one-year estimation; hence we are expecting a system failure due to our top event
once a year at probability of 99.98%.

8. Evaluation of one or more Importance Measure (IM) for each of the basic events.

Risk Achievement (Worth)

It is the increase in the top event probability if a given event occurs

𝑅𝐴(𝑖) = 𝑃𝑇 (𝑃𝑖 = 1) − 𝑃𝑇

The relative RA, risk achievement worth RAW is the ratio of the (conditional) system
unreliability if component 𝑖 is not present (or is failed) with the actual system unreliability

𝑃𝑇 (𝑃𝑖 = 1)
𝑅𝐴𝑊(𝑖) =
𝑃𝑇
Risk Reduction (Worth)
It is the decrease in the probability of the top event if a given event is assured not to occur

𝑅𝑅(𝑖) = 𝑃𝑇 − 𝑃𝑇 (𝑃𝑖 = 0)

The relative RR, risk reduction worth RRW is the ratio of the actual system unreliability with the system unreliability if
component 𝑖 is replaced by a perfect component

𝑃𝑇
𝑅𝑅𝑊(𝑖) =
𝑃𝑇 (𝑃𝑖 = 0)

Birnbaum's Importance Measure

It is the rate of change in the top event probability as a result of the change in the probability of a given event
𝐵𝑀 = 𝑅𝐴 + 𝑅𝑅

If BM 𝑖 is large, a small change in the reliability of component i will result in a comparatively large change in the system
reliability.
 Fussell-Vesely (F-V) Importance

It is the contribution of the event to the top event probability

This provides a numerical significance of all the fault tree elements and allows them to be prioritized.
The following tables provides the IM for all basic events in our FTA for three time periods:

1 Month
Failure Pi PT PT(Pi=1) RA RAW PT(Pi=0) RR RRW BM F-Vi

Pw Water source 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0365 0.0000 1.0011 0.9635 0.0011
0.00004
Pp1 Pipe 1,2 0.0017 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0334 0.0032 1.0961 0.9666 0.0454

PP3 Pipe 3 0.0166 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0203 0.0163 1.8010 0.9797 0.4540

PEC Electrical cabinet 0.0043 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0161 0.0205 2.2764 0.9839 0.1179

PEM Electrical Motor 0.0043 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0361 0.0004 1.0123 0.9639 0.1179

PM Pump 0.0525 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0333 0.0033 1.0986 0.9667 1.4357

PV Valve 0.0022 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0345 0.0021 1.0605 0.9655 0.0591
PT Tank 0.0072 0.0366 1.0000 0.9634 27.3472 0.0296 0.0070 1.2362 0.9704 0.1969
Ps1,2 System1,2 0.0586
P2 Pumps system 0.0034
Pps Pump station 0.0077
 1 Year
Failure Pi PT PT(Pi=1) RA RAW PT(Pi=0) RR RRW BM F-Vi

Pw Water source 0.9700 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.5249 0.4608 1.8779 0.4751 0.9840

Pp1 Pipe 1,2 0.0200 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9855 0.0003 1.0003 0.0145 0.0203

PP3 Pipe 3 0.2000 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9822 0.0036 1.0036 0.0178 0.2029

PEC Electrical cabinet 0.0512 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9886 -0.0029 0.9971 0.0114 0.0519

PEM Electrical Motor 0.0512 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9852 0.0005 1.0005 0.0148 0.0519

PM Pump 0.4800 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9806 0.0052 1.0053 0.0194 0.4869

PV Valve 0.0259 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9854 0.0004 1.0004 0.0146 0.0263
PT Tank 0.0838 0.9857 1.0000 0.0143 1.0145 0.9844 0.0013 1.0013 0.0156 0.0850
Ps1,2 System1,2 0.5194
P2 Pumps system 0.2698
Pps Pump station 0.3072

2 Years

Failure Pi PT PT(Pi=1) RA RAW PT(Pi=0) RR RRW BM F-Vi

Pw Water source 0.9990 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.8382 0.1616 1.2 0.1618 0.9992

Pp1 Pipe 1,2 0.0400 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9998 0.0000 1.0000 0.0002 0.0400

PP3 Pipe 3 0.4000 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9997 0.0001 1.0001 0.0003 0.4001

PEC Electrical cabinet 0.0997 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9998 0.0000 1.0000 0.0002 0.0997
 PEM Electrical Motor 0.0997 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9998 0.0000 1.0000 0.0002 0.0997

PM Pump 0.7300 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9996 0.0002 1.0002 0.0004 0.7301

PV Valve 0.0512 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9998 0.0000 1.0000 0.0002 0.0512
PT Tank 0.1607 0.9998 1.0000 0.0002 1.0002 0.9998 0.0000 1.0000 0.0002 0.1607
Ps1,2 System1,2 0.7694
P2 Pumps system 0.5919
Pps Pump station 0.6326

Conclusion
❖ From the reported previous results, we notice that all the failure modes have the same RA and so RAW, which means that
all of them have the same contribution towards the occurrence of top event. It is noticeable that each of basic event
stands alone as a Minimal Cut Set, this will yield a value of PT(Pi=1) =1 then a higher value of RA.
These basic events are very critical as they contribute directly in the occurrence of Top Event. Being a Risk Analyst will not
prefer this type of layout since it is not at a high redundancy. Prevention activities should be focused to assure preventing
these failures with equal priority; in other words, the top event is very sensitive for these types of failure

❖ Electrical Cabinet has the maximum value of Risk Reduction RR and Relative Risk Reduction RRW (at the 1 month
estimation) in the top probability and the maximum value in case of 1 and 2 years is Water resource failure so, those
types of failure is important in decreasing the Top event probability/ sensitivity.

❖ As per BM indicator, Electrical Cabinet has the maximum number BM (in case of 1 month), so the change in the reliability
of each component will result in a comparatively change in the system reliability with the same magnitude. Whereas in
case of 1- and 2-years estimation the highest BM measure is related to Water resource failure.
 ❖ F-V Importance measure shows the biggest impact on the system in terms of sensitivity, and the highest value was for
pipe 3 failure which has a relative high indicator. But if we are taking the 1- and 2-years cases the highest F-V is related to
water source failure/ reservoir which is the most important body in the system that provides demand of water. So, these
failure events must be prioritized in the system improvement scheme.

Suggestions and Recommendations

This study case was simplified in order to have a better understanding of pumping station system. Further level of detail could (and
of course better) to be performed on this system risk analysis. More FTA could be constructed for several kinds of failures and even
for the basic events in this case study. For the same FTA that was performed, a Bottom-Up approach with (Hardware FMECA) could
be also useful to verify the result obtained previously.
A number of feasible improvements of the system may be achieved to reduce the risk by:

• Implement warning devices on the water source (e.g. reservoir), to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of the water source
failure.
• Add sensors to each valve and pump in order to check if they are working properly; this contributes in increasing the
likelihood that the failure is detected before the system reaches the end-user.
• Invest more in maintenance of pumps and the long pipe.
• Replace the existing valves with a more reliable brand that has a good material.
• Modifying the design of the pump plant by the architecture to decrease the severity of the most important basic events
• Reallocate some existing components to mitigate the effect of their failure.
• Focalize attention on the Electrical Cabinet and Pipe 3 and invest in implementing monitoring devices on the main body of
the system; Reservoir.
• Perform a sensitivity and uncertainty analysis where component failure rate is changed and see how this change will affect
the top event probability and in some cases two or more parameters are changing to see the interaction between them or
assigning a probability distribution to each data in order to describe the uncertainties in a given estimated data
If improvements are decided, the FMECA worksheet must be revised and the RPN should be updated.