SIMUN 2022

United Nations First Committee

DISEC
Background Guide

Topic A:

Assessing the Proliferation of Non-Conventional Weapons by Non-State

Actors

Topic B:

Promoting Developments of Science and Technology for International

Security

Dang Vinh Khoi

Ho Bui My Duyen

1
TABLE OF CONTENT
TABLE OF CONTENT 2

CHAIR LETTERS 4
Dang Vinh Khoi 4
Ho Bui My Duyen 4

COMMITTEE OVERVIEW 5

Topic A: Assessing the Proliferation of Non-Conventional Weapons by Non-State

Actors 6
Glossaries 6
Statement of the Problem 7
1. The Means of Acquisition and Usage 7
2. Nuclear and Radiological Weaponry 9
A. Loose Nukes and Stolen Nuclear Technology 9
B. Dirty Bombs 10
C. Cyberwarfare and Nuclear Terrorism 11
3. Biochemical Weaponry 12
History of the Problem 13
Past Actions 15
1. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) 15
2. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 17
3. NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force 18
Bloc Positions 19
1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 19
2. Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) 20
3. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 20
Possible Solutions 21
1. Maintaining and strengthening current security measures 21
2. Demilitarization and nuclear de-escalation 21
3. Tackling the source of CBRN weapons production 22

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 4. Legal representation and obligation for non-state actors 22
Bibliography 23

Topic B: Promoting Developments of Science and Technology for International

Security 26
Statement of the Problem 26
Cyberspace 27
New methods of warfare 27
Militarization of Cyberspace 28
Framing Cyber-threats 29
Glossaries 29
History of the Problem 30
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 31
International Humanitarian Law 32
The Liability Treaty 33
United Nations Conference on New Trends in Science and Technology 34
Vienna Programme of Action 35
Closing the Skills Gap 2020 35
Bloc Positions 36
Asia-Pacific Region 36
Europe 37
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 38
Possible Solutions 38
Controlling Arms and Stemming the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 38
Alternative ways of framing Cyber-threats 39
Consolidating a multilateral space for innovation and new technology 40
Bibliography 41

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CHAIR LETTERS

Dang Vinh Khoi

Greetings delegates,

I am Khoi, and it is my pleasure to be your chair for DISEC of SIMUN’s 2022 Conference.

The First Committee is traditionally a frankly infuriating ordeal. The minimal momentum made
by the Member States in the last few decades speaks to the complexity of the issues discussed in
the committee. Nevertheless. it is considered the First Committee for a reason. DISEC tackles
the most significant concern over international security and the direct physical wellbeing of all
citizens of the world. With armed conflicts taking on new avenues and possibilities, the discourse
of DISEC becomes even more important.

I hope that we can have a fruitful discussion over the course of the conference, gauging the
important questions and assessing the critical arguments. As always, please do not hesitate to
reach out to me or my co-Chair Duyên in case you have any questions before, during, or after the
conference.

Best,
Khoi Dang.
[email protected]

Ho Bui My Duyen

Greetings delegates,

My name is My Duyen, it is my honor to serve as a Chair of the Disarmament and International

Security Committee (DISEC) at Saigon International Model United Nations 2022.

Everyone, from yourself to me, we are all newbies to this world and trying to puzzle out the
mysteries. Model UN will be a perfect uniting place for us - who are passionate to be
contributing global citizens, to acknowledge ourselves with a new worldview, with the
fascination in full-fledged debates and constructive discussions. The pleasure is ours to

4
accompany you all as prospective delegates to explore distinct angles of the landscape of
international security.

Whether you are an MUN veteran with pages long of MUN experience or merely a newbie, it is
guaranteed that the excitement and intellectual experience in SIMUN 2022 will be worth your
ride. Within MUN, there is nothing that hinders us from being innovative here other than our
own imagination. We, however, are not idle dreamers for a better world - we take concrete steps
to realize our goals and make a lasting impact. Rest assured, I, along with my co-chair Khoi
Dang, will be by your side whenever you need a piece of advice or emotional support.

Until then,
My-Duyen Ho-Bui.
[email protected]

COMMITTEE OVERVIEW
Born out of the increasing concern over military expansion and nuclear weapons escalation after
World War II, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (henceforth referred to
as the First Committee) still holds utmost importance today as it did decades ago.

The First Committee was formed around three months after the establishment of the United
Nations, on January 24th, 1946. The first General Assembly resolution, Resolution 1 (I) titled
“Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic
Energy” became the establishment of the First Committee. Being one of the six main
committees of the UN General Assembly, the First Committee consists of all 193 members of the
UN, meeting yearly in October.1

The First Committee deals with all things regarding disarmament and denuclearization. The
Committee discusses methods and cases of disarmament and international security worldwide,
under the provisions of the UN Charter. The bulk of the First Committee’s work is foster

1
UN, "UN General Assembly - First Committee - Disarmament and International Security," United
Nations, https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/index.shtml.

5
international cooperation to maintain international security and regulations of armaments
across all member-states, thus encouraging international peace through disarmament.

The topics discussed within the First Committee falls into 7 themes2:
1. Nuclear weapons
2. Other weapons of mass destruction
3. Disarmaments regarding outer space
4. Conventional weapons
5. Regional disarmaments
6. Other disarmament measures and security
7. Disarmament machinery

This conference will touch on almost all of these aspects. Most importantly, the discourse on
disarmament will permeate throughout all discussions during the conference.

Topic A: Assessing the Proliferation of Non-Conventional

Weapons by Non-State Actors

I. Glossaries
1. Non-state actors: Organizations and/or individuals that are not affiliated with, direct by,
or funded by any government. These vary anywhere from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and multinational companies to criminal organizations and
paramilitary groups. For the purpose of this committee, non-state actors will refer to
paramilitary groups, criminal organizations, and terorrist groups.
2. Nuclear weapons: An explosive device that derives its destructive power from nuclear
reactions, either nuclear fission or a combination of nuclear fusion and fission.
3. Radiological weapons: Weapons deployed with the deliberate intention of triggering
radiation poisoning or contamination using radiological sources.
4. Biological weapons: The use of biological toxins of infectious agents (bacteria, virus,
parasites, fungi… ) with the intent to kill, harm or incapacitate humans, animals or plants

2
Nicole Ruder and Johann Aeschlimann, The PGA Handbook: A Practical Guide to the United Nations
General Assembly (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations, 2011), xx.

6
 5. Chemical weapons: Weapons that uses chemicals formulated to inflict harm or death on
humans. Harmless chemicals that triggers violent and fatal reactions when in contact
with humans are also considered a weapon.
6. Weaponized nuclear power: radioactive chemicals such as plutonium, uranium, and
polonium… going through processing to increase its stability and makes them suitable
for nuclear warheads.

II. Statement of the Problem

1. The Means of Acquisition and Usage

It is universally understood that there are two major ways in which terrorist organizations and
other non-state actors can acquire CBRN weapons. These scenarios remain to a certain extent
hypothetical because there are not many cases of successful acquisition and usage of CBRN
weapons by non-state actors.3 However, the ever-growing complexity of warfare and technology
is slowly turning these hypothetical situations incredibly real and threatening.

Non-state actors can acquire CBRN weapons by stealing them from existing military arsenals.4
From ready-made WMDs to volatile materials, non-state actors once in possession of these
items can create their weapons and wreak havoc on society. This method, however, is near
impossible more often than not. Countries with nuclear devices have multi-step security
procedures that make it extremely difficult for anyone to get close to stealing their nuclear
weapons.5 In addition, the efforts of the First Committee, other disarmament agencies, and
bilateral arms control agreements have worked to reduce the number of nuclear devices in each
country. In the last 50 years, the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) have
reduced their nuclear capacity from a combined 70,000 warheads to around 6,800 and 7,000,
respectively.6 These disarmament agreements are not done specifically to deter nuclear
terrorism, but the reduced number of nuclear devices also reduces the chances of one being
stolen by non-state actors.7

3
Elena Sokova, "Non-state Actors and Nuclear Weapons," Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks, 2017,
xx.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.

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In contrast to nuclear-possessing countries like the US and Russia, newcomers to the nuclear
club, such as Iran, North Korea (the DPRK), and Pakistan have nearly quadrupled their nuclear
capacity since the early 2000s.8 Although their number is still incredibly small compared to the
US and Russia, these countries currently do not follow through on agreements of disarmament.
This can cause a major problem in the future, as more warheads are produced, and greater
leverage is possessed by these countries.

The situation with these countries leads to the second way of acquiring CBRN weaponry for
non-state actors. Non-state actors can build themselves CBRN weapons if given the right
materials and instructions. Given that non-state actors already possess a certain level of military
technology, either sponsored by states or stolen through conquest, they only need to fill in the
gaps to create their own WMDs. In the case of nuclear weapons, for example, enriched
radioactive materials such as plutonium or uranium are the once crucial ingredient that
non-state actors sought out since they have possessed all other materials to build a warhead.

This is often exacerbated by the political instabilities in newly nuclear-possessing countries.

Unstable governments, political turmoil, and inadequate crisis management give non-state
actors more chances to get their hands on crucial materials in order to build their own CBRN
weapons.9 This is shown in the 1961 coup in Algeria, where a French nuclear site was the
battleground for opposing political ideologies. Parties with political dissent can also use their
insider knowledge to assist non-state actors in acquiring materials, both in terms of the
technical know-how as well as important ingredients to create CBRN weapons.10 This can either
be done to give themselves a leg up in a political battle or simply because they are sympathetic to
the non-state actor's cause. The ever-growing nuclear capacity in these countries, coupled with
political instability makes it even easier for non-state actors to either steal nuclear devices or get
their hands on the necessary materials to build themselves one.

Lastly, an element in the landscape of international warfare that is often overlooked is the
criminal underworld and the underground network of illegal trade and trafficking of weapons.
Criminal organizations looking to profit off of war would supply materials and weapons to both
sides of the war, more concerningly non-state actors. It has also been long speculated that states
also use these criminal organizations to indirectly sponsor non-state actors themselves, in order

8
Ibid.
9
Elena Sokova, "Non-state Actors and Nuclear Weapons," Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks, 2017,
xx.
10
Ibid.

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to keep their hands clean. Tracking these organizations down proves to be a challenge, due to
their transboundary operations and a lack of governmental cooperation.

2. Nuclear and Radiological Weaponry

The two methods of acquiring CBRN weaponry hold the most true in the case of radiological and
nuclear weapons. These two types of weapons also happen to be the most commonly discussed
within disarmament agencies, due to their volatile nature and their prevalence in modern armed
conflict. Compared to biochemical weaponry, radiological and nuclear devices are much easier
to produce and handle. This is because they are sealed within physical explosives and can be
tested for their relative destruction. This works as a double-edged knife, however, as non-state
actors are more interested in acquiring radiological and nuclear devices as means of
non-conventional warfare. Radiological and nuclear applications on weaponry come in several
variations:

A. Loose Nukes and Stolen Nuclear Technology

In a way, the discussion of "loose nukes" is what sparked the larger discussion of CBRN
proliferation by non-state actors, and precedence to speculations of radiological and biochemical
weapon usage by terrorist organizations. The concept of "loose nukes" is derived from Russia
when dealing with the aftermath of Cold War de-escalation.11 The Soviet Union and its satellite
states housed more than 27,000 nuclear weapons, and weaponized uranium and plutonium to
produce triple that number.12 The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about political
instability, economic distress, and most importantly, no central management for these volatile
weapons. Security at these nuclear storage sites becomes alarmingly scant, with some standing
entirely unguarded and ungated ever since 1991. There have been considerable efforts made by
the United States and NATO to locate these weapons in former satellite states, such as Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and to either return them to Russia or destroy them entirely.13
However, it is believed that many stockpiles remain today, which becomes a cause for concern.

In addition to unchecked nuclear devices, "loose nukes" also refer to the stockpiles of enriched
plutonium and uranium that are unaccounted for. These materials can and have been smuggled
by and to non-state actors, in order to either attempt to create their nuclear device or the

11
Council on Foreign Relations, "Loose Nukes," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 11,
2006, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/loose-nukes.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.

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aforementioned dirty bombs14. Enrich uranium and plutonium makes up a considerable part of
the hundreds of nuclear smuggling incidents reported by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) since 1993.15

The human capital involved in nuclear weapons production is also involved under the umbrella
of "loose nukes". Underpaid Soviet nuclear scientists would look to sell their skills to the highest
bidder, bringing with them knowledge of how to construct and operate nuclear weapons, and
non-state actors are more than willing to sponsor these individuals.16 While these components,
from ingredients to human capital can be acquired due to the lack of management (or frankly
sheer ignorance) on behalf of the Russian government, it still takes a lot more for non-state
actors to assemble a working nuclear warhead. Thus, many attempts have failed, and many
non-state actors seek other forms of CBRN weaponry.

B. Dirty Bombs

Radiological explosives, or as they are aptly named "dirty bombs" is the alternative to
full-fledged nuclear weapons for non-state actors. Not only are they easier to manage on
battlefields, but it is also incredibly simple to assemble a dirty bomb. A dirty bomb is a normal
explosive that is rigged with radioactive material. The purpose of the explosive is to accelerate
and disperse the radioactive materials.17 The radioactive material in dirty bombs is not fully
enriched materials found in nuclear warheads; they can be extracted from radioactive items
used in military, medical, and industrial settings. For example, radium and cesium isotopes used
in cancer treatment can be used to create dirty bombs.18

Since these radioactive materials in themselves are not strong enough to cause radiation
sickness or other illnesses associated with prolonged exposure to radioactivity, dirty bombs are
not considered the most physically destructive.19 However, they can cause massive disruption in
society. The contamination from radiological materials would require costly cleanup, and
civilians within the area need to be temporarily evacuated.20 While the health risks of a dirty
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Council on Foreign Relations, "Loose Nukes," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 11,
2006, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/loose-nukes.
17
Shahzeb Rathore, "Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8,
no. 2 (February 2016): xx.
18
Ibid.
19
Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, "Use of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons by Terrorists?,"
International Review of the Red Cross 87, no. 859 (September 2005): xx,
https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_859_5.pdf.
20
Ibid.

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bomb are still up for debate, its economic and societal impact is detrimental. If planted in the
right places, these explosives could completely immobilize a densely populated area, or
contaminate important infrastructures, such as harbors, ports, and stations. Decontamination
would take months or years, and billions of dollars would be lost not only from cleanup costs but
also the economic cost of shutting down important trading sites.21

The psychological and economic impact of dirty bombs is exactly why many non-state actors are
actively acquiring radioactive materials and building them themselves. Terrorist organizations
such as ISIS has access to government facilities and hospital where they have an abundant
supply of radioactive materials.22 It is also suspected that criminal organizations with alleged
Russian ties are also selling radioactive materials to ISIS and that ISIS themselves have the
financial capacity to purchase these materials on the black market.23 The fact that these devices
can cause tremendous destruction while being incredibly easy to put together creates a great
cause of concern. One might argue that the proliferation of dirty bombs by non-state actors is far
more critical that the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by these parties, simply on the
ground of accessibility and destruction.

C. Cyberwarfare and Nuclear Terrorism

In this age of advanced technology, especially in cyberspace, non-state actors can trigger a
nuclear scenario without having to get their hands on a warhead at all. Every nuclear system has
an early-warning mechanism or detection features. These systems on their own are already
prone to false alarms.24 Non-state actors can tap into these systems to stage a nuclear scenario.
This can cause a state to go into a nuclear crisis, causing mass panic within the population.
Other scenarios involve the use of this manipulation as leverage against the concerned state.
These acts would also be exacerbated through the spreading of disinformation on social media.

These strategies do not cause direct physical or significant economic harm to a state, but it
implants a sense of panic and paranoia in the population, which can turn the state against the
government. Cyberwarfare leaves a very small window for countries to react to attacks, and a lot
of effort is involved in controlling the public opinion on the matter.

21
Ibid.
22
Shahzeb Rathore, "Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8,
no. 2 (February 2016): xx.
23
Ibid.
24
Elena Sokova, "Non-state Actors and Nuclear Weapons," Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks, 2017,
xx.

11
3. Biochemical Weaponry

Biochemical warfare is nothing new to the world of armed conflicts. Some of the most significant
cases were the use of mustard gas during World War I or the deliberate release of toxins by the
Japanese army during World War 2 to create cholera and typhoid outbreaks in China.25
Similarly, non-state actors such as the ISIS has seen to have a desire to weaponize diseases as
part of non-conventional warfare.

Biological agents are extremely difficult to defend against, due to their invisible nature and the
ease at which it spreads. It can be spread in various ways, from crop dusters to contaminating
the water or food systems. With the contamination source being difficult to detect, countries
cannot devise appropriate containment procedures, allowing the biological agent to infect
millions.26 The damage goes beyond the medical field. Taking the case of Covid-19 (which is not
a biological attack, but a case of massive simultaneous infection), the infected population would
overcrowd hospitals and pharmacies seeking treatment, while pharmaceutical companies are
reluctant to keep up the demand for antidotes and vaccines since it is not profitable.27 A
biological attack, if done at an appropriate scale, would cripple a society for a long time, both in
terms of wellbeing and economy. While extremely dangerous, biological weapons are also very
difficult to weaponize. Since it is difficult to contain and operate at a more strategic level, it is no
longer a desirable project for many non-state actors. Other means of causing destruction are
much more economical and convenient, such as that dirty bombs.

As for chemical agents, there is a justifiable concern since it has been perpetrated with success
over the years. Most evident among them is the mustard gas attack conducted by ISIS in August
2015 in Kobani, Iraq.28 Chemical analysis on victims later showed traces of sarin, an extremely
toxic substance. While chlorine and sulfur mustard gas remain the two most prominent forms of
chemical attacks by non-state actors, chemical agents work best when paired with conventional
explosives, similar to radiological weapons.29 Bullets or explosives laced with toxic substances
can be deployed with considerable damage. Alternatively, non-state actors can target chemical

25
Friedrich Frischknecht, "The History of Biological Warfare," Decontamination of Warfare Agents, June
2003, xx, doi:10.1002/9783527621620.ch1.
26
Mollie Williams, Liza Armstrong, and Daniel Sizemore, "Biologic, Chemical, and Radiation Terrorism
Review," 2022, xx, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/29630269/#:~:text=Terrorists%20use%2
27
"Evaluating the Threat: Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear," Wilson Center, last modified February
2005, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/evaluating-the-threat-chemical-biological-and-nuclear.
28
Shahzeb Rathore, "Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8,
no. 2 (February 2016): xx.
29
Ibid.

12
factories, as blowing up a stockpile of volatile chemicals would achieve the same effect as a
chemical explosive. The terrorist attack on a chemical factory in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, France
in 2015 is an example of such a strategy.30

Overall, there are obvious challenges for non-state actors in their quest for CBRN weaponry. It is
clear that they do not possess the technological and military might that of nation-states, and the
weaponization of CBRN devices is more difficult than what their military capabilities allow them
to. However, non-state actors do not require massive city-shattering nuclear warheads or
epidemic-sized biological agents to cause havoc. Crude devices of conventional weapons when
combined with CBRN components can cause as much destruction, and non-state actors require
next to nothing to produce these weapons. Therefore, when looking at ways to tackle the
proliferation of non-conventional warfare by non-state actors, the First Committee needs to (1)
examine the status quo and continue the gatekeeping of high-level CBRN weapons and (2)
determine the sources and limit the means to which non-state actors can produce crude CBRN
devices.

III. History of the Problem

Non-conventional warfare has been around since the turn of the 20th century, and the concept
was given ample space to be experimented with and evolved throughout the century. Helped by
the two World Wars, Cold War military escalation, and various proxy wars in the latter half of
the century, non-conventional warfare was allowed to prosper, in a rather hidden manner as the
world focuses on conventional armed conflicts at the time.

Non-conventional warfare refers to any form of armed conflict that goes beyond the use of
conventional weaponry. To be precise, the First Committee and other demilitarization agencies
identify any weapons falling into the categories of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) weapons to be non-conventional. These forms of armed conflicts can be
operated on their own, or work in tandem with conventional weapons. The majority of CBRN
usage comes from chemical and radiological attacks, while both nuclear and biological weapons
are incredibly difficult to weaponize and handle.

30
Shahzeb Rathore, "Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8,
no. 2 (February 2016): xx.

13
The use of CBRN weapons by non-state actors has been proliferated for as long as non-state
actors have been around. As the world entered the decolonization period in the late 1950s
onwards, several international non-state actors came into existence, from terrorist organizations
to illegitimate political parties. Due to their inferior military capability compared to
nation-states, resorting to CBRN warfare is a viable, economical, and equally if not more
destructive option. Several international and domestic attacks have been carried out by these
non-state actors over the years. The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack in 1995 is amongst the most
notable. Perpetrated by the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, the attack killed 14 people, severely
injured another 50, and caused vision damage to at least 1,000 others.31 Major terrorist
organizations, such as the Islamic State (ISIS) or Al-Qaeda also have their own CBRN
developments, most notably the 2001 Anthrax Attack.32

All forms of non-conventional warfare are restricted to a certain extent on the international
level. Chemical and biological warfare has been banned by the 1925 Geneva Convention, and
several regulating bodies have been put in place over the years to ensure this status.33 Nuclear
de-escalation efforts have also reduced the threat of nuclear and radiological weapons indirectly
by reducing the production of warheads and weapons-grade nuclear materials (uranium and
plutonium).

The problem that arises in this committee is that these conventions and regulations pertain only
to nation-states, and not non-state actors. Acting outside of the global jurisdiction and beyond
state borders, these non-state actors can proliferate CBRN warfare without much resistance
from nation-states. The 1925 Geneva Convention in particular only prohibits the use of
biochemical weapons in armed conflicts, but it does not ban the production and possession of
such weapons.34 This can be a problem because simply possessing WMD-level weapons already
gives certain parties leverage in conflicts. Nuclear de-escalation continues to be a sticky subject
for all Member-States, let alone non-state actors. The refusal to reduce nuclear capabilities,
especially from newcomers to the nuclear club such as Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea can create
a breeding ground for non-state actors to develop their own CBRN weapons.

31
Monterrey Institute of International Studies, "Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo's CBW Activities," 2001,
xx, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/aum_chrn.pdf.
32
Shahzeb Rathore, "Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 8,
no. 2 (February 2016): xx.
33
, Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, Or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Protocol, (Geneva: UNODA, 1925).
34
Ibid.

14
To note: CBRN weapons are not to be mistaken for weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). While
many CBRN weapons are considered WMDs by international governing bodies, they are not one
and the same, as certain conventional explosives are also categorized as WMDs.

IV. Past Actions

As mentioned before, previous conventions and regulations by UN bodies as well as other

international systems have their flaws when dealing with non-state actors. For one, these
treaties are ratified only by nation-states, and not non-state actors. The member-state is also
more obligated to uphold their promises, as they are bound by pressures from their citizens and
other member-states. Non-state actors, on the other hand, operate outside of the realms of
international law. Since they do not have representation in the discussions of these treaties,
non-state actors are not necessarily bound to comply with the regulations. In addition, it is
extremely difficult for states to engage in disciplinary actions against non-state actors. Due to
the transboundary nature of their operation, a multinational coalition is required to tackle
issues, which run into logistical problems on their own.

1. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

Founded in July 2006, the GICNT was spearheaded by the governments of Presidents George
W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. The organization consists of 89 countries, endorsing nuclear
security principles for nuclear terrorism deterrence, prevention, detection, and response.35
Working on a voluntary basis of member-states, the initiative works to foster international
cooperation and prevent terrorists from acquiring, transporting, and using nuclear materials or
radiological substances.36 Experts from different fields, from non-proliferation to
counterterrorism and capacity building are involved in the initiative, to strengthen joint security
capabilities. Other international bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the European Union (EU), and the UN Office on Counterterrorism (UNOCT), etc. are all
observers.

Ever since its inception, the GICNT has been one of the most prominent non-proliferation
bodies. Although small in number, the initiative has been able to build security capacity for

35
GICNT, "Overview," Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, accessed June 22, 2022,
https://www.gicnt.org/.
36
Ibid.

15
member-states, as well as address pressing matters concerning weapons development and
stockpiling. Below are some of its key principles:

- Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control, and physical protection systems
for nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances.
- Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials and substances in
order to prevent illicit trafficking in such materials and substances, to include
cooperation in the research and development of national detection capabilities that
would be interoperable.
- Improve capabilities of participants to search for, confiscate, and establish safe control
over unlawfully held nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or devices
using them.
- Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and financial or economic resources to
terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and
substances.
- Improve capabilities of participants for response, mitigation, and investigation, in cases
of terrorist attacks involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials and
substances, including the development of technical means to identify nuclear and other
radioactive materials and substances that are, or maybe, involved in the incident.
- Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism
and their facilitation, taking appropriate measures consistent with their national law and
international obligations to protect the confidentiality of any information which they
exchange in confidence.37

2. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BWC came into effect in March 1975, effectively banning the development, production,
acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons. It was the first
multilateral disarmament agreement to ban the production of an entire category of WMDs.38

The treaty has set a strong global norm against biological weapons. Particularly important to the
First Committee on the topic of non-state actors is Article III of the Treaty:

37
GICNT, "Overview," Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, accessed June 22, 2022,
https://www.gicnt.org/.
38
"Biological Weapons Convention – UNODA," United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, accessed
June 22, 2022, https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/.

16
 “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any
of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the
Convention.”39

The treaty effectively bans the transfer and assistance in terms of biochemical weapons from
states to other governments and non-state actors. While this does not focus on non-state actors
entirely, the article works to reduce one of the main sources of biochemical weaponization for
non-state actors. By cutting away one of the sources, the Treaty would help reduces the
possibilities of non-state actors getting their hands on a biochemical agent.

Article IV of the Convention shows that national implementation is also of particular importance
to the BWC. Most notable is the United State’s 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act,
which incorporates the Convention into national policies.40 One of the Convention’s main
objectives is to integrate its principles into the national policies of all of its member-states.

The Treaty has its drawbacks, however. The verification process in terms of the proliferation of
biological weapons is difficult, as mentioned before. Biotechnological equipment used for
bioweapons is also used for developments in the medical field. Small harmless quantities of
biological agents can quickly be weaponized into dangerous proportions. Lastly, it is very easy to
quickly eliminate biological agents, meaning any facility that produces them can erase their
tracks before inspection from the BWC.41 Due to circumstances somewhat uncontrollable by the
BWC, it is difficult to reliably detect biological weapons development.

3. NATO Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force

NATO CBRN Defense Task Force (Task Force for short) is a multinational, multifunctional task
force consisting of the CBRN Joint Assessment Team and the CBRN Defense Battalion. Created
in 2003, and declared operational a year later, the Task Force is equipped to deal with CBRN
incidents and/or attacks against NATO populations and territories. Although the Battalion is

39
"Biological Weapons Convention – UNODA," United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, accessed
June 22, 2022, https://www.un.org/disarmament/biological-weapons/.
40
Ibid.
41
Filippa Lentzos, "Hard to Prove: The Verification Quandary of the Biological Weapons Convention,"
Global Perspectives On Re-envisioning The Biological Weapons Convention 18 (2011): xx,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2011.618662.

17
trained for armed conflicts, they can also be deployed to any CBRN-related incidents, such as
industrial chemical accidents or natural disasters.42

The Task Force contains all departments pertaining to the management of CBRN armed
conflicts, from Reconnaissance, and Assessment to Exploitation and Decontamination. The Task
Force works closely with other NATO Response Teams and Special Operations Teams to carry
out operations in dangerous environments. Among the Task Force’s main tasks are:

- Supporting NATO forces in CBRN-affected environments

- Supporting national governments in CBRN crises
- Hazard management operations, such as decontamination, disinfection, and sanitation.
- Reconnaissance and monitoring operations.43

The Task Force has been deployed several times to aid civil authorities in potentially volatile
settings. The Task Force had a key planning role in the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Greece.
They were once again deployed in 2020 to help contain the Covid-19 pandemic, working to
disinfect public institutions and transport infected patients.44 The Task Force continues to be a
reliable backbone to NATO’s initiative and contingency plans when dealing with unpredictable
CBRN-related incidents on NATO soil.

V. Bloc Positions

The issue that plagues all member-states in the First Committee when it comes to generating a
consensus on demilitarization matters is the clashing of interests between state priorities and its
obligations to international military and political alliances. Representatives within the
committee would need to consider both the interests of their state and their previous
commitments to the international community. Yet, since the issues presented above affect all
states and are outside of the realms of inter-state conflict, there is a possibility for complete
cooperation of all member-states regardless of previous military alliances.

42
NATO, "Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Task Force,"
NATO, last modified May 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49156.htm.
43
NATO, "Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Task Force,"
NATO, last modified May 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49156.htm.
44
Ibid.

18
To note: Since chemical and biological weapons have been banned through various
aforementioned treaties, discussion on bloc positions will focus on the management of nuclear
and radiological weapons.

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Possibly the most prominent military alliance in the world, NATO has had many run-ins with
non-state actors, especially in its endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq. The aforementioned NATO
CBRN Defense Task Force shows the organization’s initiative in tackling the proliferation of
CBRN weaponry. In addition, NATO has conducted several military operations to prevent the
movement of WMDs into enemy territory, such as the maritime Operation Active Endeavor.45
Out of all NATO members, only France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have
nuclear power. The security of all NATO members is dependent on these three countries
providing them with shared nuclear power.46 Despite relying heavily on its superior nuclear
power (especially that of the US), NATO has seen to have the most initiative in terms of nuclear
disarmament. Ever since the Cold War, the number of nuclear warheads in NATO’s possession
has reduced by around 90 percent.47 It is prudent for NATO members to re-assess their status
quo in terms of their CBRN defenses, as well as encourage other member-states and military
alliances to confer in the process of nuclear disarmament.

2. Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC)

The IMCTC deals directly with terrorist threats in the region, specifically military intervention
against ISIS. The Coalition consists of countries in the Muslim world in the Middle East, Africa,
and Asia. The bulk of the IMCTC’s operations is to provide joint security for its members in
cases of terrorist attacks, as well as to spread information on religious extremism.

The IMCTC has yet to discuss thoroughly the proliferation of CBRN weapons by these terrorist
organizations, or provide defense mechanisms and training for its members in cases of CBRN
attacks. Nuclear de-escalation in nuclear-possessing countries has been stagnant, with the
governments’ justification of national security and leverage against the Western world’s
intervention on their sovereignty.

45
NATO, "Operation Active Endeavour (2001-2016)," NATO, last modified May 19, 2022,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.
46
NATO, NATO Nuclear Deterrence, (NATO, 2020),
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/2/pdf/200224-factsheet-nuclear-en.pdf.
47
Ibid.

19
3. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The SCO is a transcontinental political, economic, security, and military alliance. founded in
June 2001. It is the world’s largest regional organization, covering 40% of the world’s
population and 30% of the global GDP. Russia and China are among the most notable members
of the Organization, along with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, and
Kyrgystan. Military cooperation within the SCO focuses heavily on joint military training to
prepare countries for terrorist threats. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was
formed in 2006 as a means to that end. The Diplomat reported that the SCO has foiled 600
terrorist plots and extradited 500 perpetrators through the RATS program.48 Counterrorism
military training is conducted regularly by SCO members, in addition to increased information
sharing and strengthening cyberwarfare countermeasures.

The SCO however, has not shifted its attention to CBRN warfare. Little has been done in this
regard to defend its member-state against an attack of such caliber. In terms of demilitarization
and nuclear de-escalation, SCO members, specifically China, Pakistan, and India, have not
shown interest in reducing their nuclear capacity. Russia also continues to be a major supplier of
munitions and military equipment to other SCO members.

VI. Possible Solutions

The two main objectives of the First Committee in devising possible solutions for the
proliferation of non-conventional warfare by non-state actors are (1) to assess the status quo and
maintain working security measures and (2) to tackle existing issues from their root, especially
in terms of military and legal treatment of non-state actors.

1. Maintaining and strengthening current security measures

When looking at the status quo of nuclear security, it is clear that the current security
procedures has worked so far. There has not been a case of a containment breach, where
non-state actors have been able to steal a nuclear warhead, or any critical materials necessary to
construct a warhead. These strategies should remain in place, but further upgrades can be done

48
Suyash Desai, "India’s SCO Challenge," The Diplomat, last modified December 5, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/indias-sco-challenge/.

20
to fill in the gaps in security. With loose nukes being an apparent problem and one of the major
sources of the illegal distribution of nuclear materials to non-state actors, increasing efforts to
locate and secure these devices need to take place to cut off one of the major sources of
radiological and nuclear warfare.

As for biochemical warfare, as much as states have prohibited the use of them in any capacity,
little has been done as a contingency for when actual attacks take place. While biochemical
attacks by non-state actors have not reached a catastrophic level, the Committee needs to devise
an appropriate framework to deal with an invisible and destructive attack, to minimize
casualties and prevent long-lasting economic and infrastructure damages. Overcoming the
challenges of detecting and locating logistical channels would be one of the first steps in dealing
with biochemical warfare.

2. Demilitarization and nuclear de-escalation

This is in line with the First Committee’s main goal. Nuclear de-escalation and demilitarization,
in general, would indirectly reduce the chances of non-state actors acquiring CBRN weapons, by
downsizing the munitions industry and cutting off many trading routes. It is important to note
that there is also an extent to which nuclear de-escalation can happen. The possession of nuclear
warheads has proved to be more useful as leverage than its destructive capability. Therefore,
maintaining a level of nuclear capacity is prudent. Nuclear de-escalation should also be a
collaborative effort for all countries, especially those with nuclear power. Disagreements on the
matter would only slow down the demilitarization process, giving non-state actors more ground
to acquire and use CBRN weapons.

3. Tackling the source of CBRN weapons production

One of the main goals of the First Committee is to identify major sources of CBRN weaponry for
non-state actors and devise frameworks to restrict or eliminate these distribution channels in
order to remove the possibilities of acquisition. As seen with how these weapons are made,
certain sources are more difficult to tackle than others.

In terms of radiological weapons, particularly dirty bombs, it is a challenge to restrict the

proliferation of radiological materials, since they are extracted from legitimate uses of nuclear

21
power in civilian applications, such as industries and the medical field. Not much can be done in
terms of restricting these sources without intervening in state sovereignty. However, countries
can still track down other major sources of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium, which deals
with a major munitions network involving non-state actors, criminal organizations, and
governments themselves. Cracking down on criminal organizations would remove a major
distribution channel for nuclear materials, and non-state actors would have limited resources to
build dirty bombs. Cutting down on weapon suppliers, especially those coming from within
governments, can also be an option to limit the resources for non-state actors to build CBRN
weapons. Newer strategies should also be discussed, be it directly or indirectly.

4. Legal representation and obligation for non-state actors

One of the main reasons for the proliferation of non-conventional warfare by non-state actors is
that they operate outside of the boundaries of international law. This is not because non-state
actors refuse to obey the law; there is no legal obligation for non-state actors in the first place.
Regulatory and judicial bodies at the international level often disregard non-state actors, only
dealing with the actions of legitimate nation-states. The International Court of Justice, for
example, only deals with cases related to any non-state actors if that non-state actor is
represented by a state.

As the concept of non-state actors evolves rapidly, transcending everything from politics to
borders, the First Committee needs to redefine the term and devise legal frameworks against
these factions. Binding non-state actors to international law would tremendously help countries
to enforce international agreements, as well as prosecute these parties if need be. This would
require legal assistance beyond the scope of the First Committee, but it is necessary to tackle the
very root of one of the main challenges when dealing with non-state actors.

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Rathore, Shahzeb. "Is the Threat of ISIS Using CBRN Real?" Counter Terrorist Trends
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Topic B: Promoting Developments of Science and Technology

for International Security

I. Statement of the Problem

There is an inextricable link between a modern society with fast-paced development and a new
wave of technology for the globally multifaceted change in such an era of Big data. “Waves” of
technology is a necessary and inevitable development since the Industrial Revolution 4.0, driven
by inventions from steam power to electricity to the automobile, and have contributed to the
economic development and social transformation. A fusion of technologies has been argued
whether to be blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres. In this
latest technological revolution, “new technologies” expands their coverage from the Internet to
drones to big data, and the potential applications of these technologies are rapidly transformed
and implemented serving distinct intentions of international peace and security. In December
1988, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to follow the future scientific and
technological developments, especially those with potential military applications, and to
evaluate their impact on international security.49 The broad fields in which scientific and
technological developments are adopted were identified as information technology,
biotechnology, materials technology, nuclear technology, and space technology.

49
"New trends in science and technology Implications for international peace and security," United
Nations, last modified March 1991,
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/23/037/2303

25
We stand on the brink of a technological revolution that will basically transform our lives to an
unexpected extent. In its scale, scope, and complexity, no one knows how it will unfold with
certainty, especially when the Political Realism in International Relations suggests that all
nations are motivated by national interests, or, at best, national interests disguised as moral
concerns.50 Also, the national interest must be defined in terms of power and such power can be
defined in terms of military, economic, political, diplomatic, or even cultural resources. In other
words, nations firmly believe that they have to rely upon their own power in today's
international order to ensure their autonomy since every nation is driven by their best distinct
interests, especially when it comes to military power to ensure the country’s stability and
security. Therefore, an integrated and comprehensive response is urgently made, involving all
stakeholders of the global polity, including both public and private sectors to academia and civil
society.

1. Cyberspace

Within such an era of Big Data, the potential implementation of Information and
Communications Technology for development, governance, and peace has exerted concerns over
how to govern the Internet, issues related to security—and to cyberspace in particular—have
made these concerns more urgent. The accessibility to cyber domain varies from region to
region, thus cyberspace includes many different actors—from criminal hackers to terrorist
networks to governments engaged in cyber espionage. Cyberspace and cyberattacks can
undermine the safety of Internet users, disrupt economic and commercial activity, and threaten
military operations. Furthermore, a conflict that occurs in the cyber domain often reflects the
conflict in the physical world.

2. New methods of warfare

The cyber security landscape becomes even more complex as new technologies reshape warfare.
New technologies result in new methods of employing lethal force such as armed unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, that cause new challenges. There is broad consensus that the
use of armed drones is not itself illegal, but there is no agreed consensus on how to apply
international law on the use of force to drones. As a result, there is a risk that entities could

50
"Political Realism," Mount Holyoke College |, accessed June 25, 2022,
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/realism.htm#:~:text=R

26
expand the geographical and temporal boundaries of using force. The potential use by non-state
actors also raises further regulatory challenges.

Lethal autonomous weapons systems, or “killer robots,” are also raising serious questions about
the conduct of modern warfare and the applications of international humanitarian law. The
notion of the decision-making process is at the heart of the international humanitarian law and
as these technologies become more and more autonomous with little or no human intervention,
accountability also becomes harder to determine.

New technologies have also given rise to modern forms of hybrid warfare. Many technologically
advanced weapons systems are now available at relatively low cost. More widely available
technologies, namely mobile phones and the Internet, are simultaneously being used more
often to support war efforts by serving as a means of communication, lobbying, propaganda
among the public, teaching new warfare techniques, gathering intelligence, and engaging in
cyberattacks, as particularly adopted in the conflict in Ukraine.51

Distinguished growing interest of nations when using these technologies also raises questions
about international humanitarian law and security.52 International humanitarian law requires
states to utilize at least harmful military means available for achieving their tactics, which could
also be interpreted to use cyber operations as the predominant least-harmful response. Such
cyber operations are believed to avoid physical attacks that could cause even more damage and
casualties. This notion thus assigns states to invest in offensive hacking capacities. New
technologies have dramatically enhanced our ability to both prepare for and execute military
actions. With the tremendous support from information technologies, sensors, and simulation,
nations strengthen their capacity to plan and conduct military operations, design and produce
military systems are quickly conducted and forces are well trained in more realistic settings.
These technologies are also central to greater battlefield awareness, enabling our forces to
acquire a large quantity of information, quickly analyze, and a platform for a fusion of users to
have coordinated and precise actions.

51
Tim Maurer and Scott Janz , "The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Cyber and Information Warfare in a
Regional Context," The Web Site Cannot Be Found, last modified October 17, 2014,
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/187945/ISN_184345_en.pdf.
52
Heyna , "Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism to the 68th Session of the General Assembly,"
OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2014/02/statement-special-rapporteur-promotion-and-protectio
n-human-rights-and.

27
 3. Militarization of Cyberspace

There are signs to reevaluate the nature of events in cyberspace in terms of their
professionalism, intent, and increasing complexity, especially the transparency of the line
between states’ civil defense and military apparatus. The existing literature provides two
arguments that serve to explain the phenomenon of arming cyberspace. The first recognizes that
the rising societal dependence on technology introduces an existential threat that may be
exploited by states and thus requires cyberspace to be secured. The second acknowledges the
advantages that the cyber domain offers relative to land, air, and sea. Most notably, its
asymmetric nature, plausible deniability, and its offensive advantage are factors for
militarization. While both offer probable reasons why states would choose to militarize
cyberspace, certain realities remain unaccounted for.

This phenomenon has been rising since the first decade of the twenty-first century, the discourse
concerning cyber security in the global landscape has shifted from criminal acts to particular
political and/or military events. Most remarkably, the discovery of the Stuxnet worm in June
2010 overturned previously held beliefs regarding offensive cyberspace operations, which is
believed to have been the first instance of a weaponized malware.53 Such discovery disclosed that
Stuxnet was aimed at disrupting Iran’s nuclear development program. In the years since, states
have gradually militarized cyberspace through the establishment of many programs that as a
consequence has framed this domain as new warfare.

4. Framing Cyber-threats

The existence of cyber threats as a central point of the current national security debate between
states can be drawn from a confluence of two interconnected and mutually reinforcing factors:
the notion that modern societies are facing a rising number of potentially disastrous vulnerable,
and the notion of an ever-increasing willingness of threatening actors to brutally exploit such
vulnerabilities. This immense sense of vulnerability stems from a heightened sense of dread and
urgency and has resulted in a propensity to “militarize” the cyber security negotiations.

53
"The Real Story of Stuxnet," IEEE Spectrum, last modified July 29, 2021,
https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-real-story-of-stuxnet.

28
 II. Glossaries
1. Cyberspace: refers to the virtual computer world, and more specifically, an electronic
medium that is utilized to assist online communication. Cyberspace typically includes an
extensive network of computers made up of many computer subnetworks worldwide
2. Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs): is the infrastructure
and components that enable modern computing
3. Cybercrime: is any criminal activity related to cyberspace, which typically involves
computers, networked devices, or a network
4. Cyberattacks: are any offensive actions that aim at computer information systems,
computer networks, infrastructures, or personal computer devices
5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): also known as a drone, is an autonomous craft
6. Cyber espionage: is a form of cyberattacks targeting classified, confidential data or
intellectual properties
7. Lethal Autonomous weapons: types of military weapons that can independently
seek and engage targets based on algorithms or programmed descriptions

III. History of the Problem

Warfare and technology have had a symbiotic relationship. Any technological development at
some point is applied to warfare. On the other side of the coin, wars have been incredible
accelerators for technological advancements. The prevalence of technology in warfare has never
been a new concept. Technologies themselves evolved through war, and war breeds technology.
The way war is fought changed drastically with the application of gunpowder by the Ottomans in
the 15th century. The latter half of the 20th century saw a new form of war with the Cold War,
due to the significance of the nuclear bomb. Currently, the world is witnessing several diversions
in our preconceived notions of war; wars being fought without soldiers, wars being fought
without bullets, and wars being fought without tangible spaces.

Take World War II for instance. Despite being the most destructive war in human history, the
period also gave rise to massively significant technologies that shaped the 20th and 21st
centuries. Medicines, such as penicillin was discovered a few years before the war began. It was
only during the war that mass production of penicillin took place, due to the massive waves of
battlefield injuries and infections. During the famous D-Day landing, the United States shipped

29
2.3 million doses of penicillin to the frontline Allied troops54. The drug, of course, became
prevalent for civilian use after the war.

In a case more relevant to the First Committee, World War II also propelled the jet engine and
missile technologies. The need to fly faster, higher and longer to gain tactical advantage pushed
engineers on both sides of the war to improve their jet engines. After the war, these technologies
are then applied to produce commercial airplanes, cruise ships, and space shuttles. Missile
technologies developed during the war now take the form of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and UAVs55.

The rising problem of cyber warfare today has in itself a rather ironic origin. The Internet, where
this new form of war is being proliferated, was created specifically for military purposes. The
technology started as a military venture, funded by the US Department of Defense, and was
intended to connect military computers to university computers to increase information sharing
and bring computers to the front lines of war56. Initially called Arpanet, the project kicked off in
the late 1960s and has left an eternal impact on the world. Today, the same technology that was
intended to improve national security in the US is directly threatening the security of the world.
Such is the case for the 2017 NotPetya cyberattack, infecting hundreds of public and private
institutions, including the National Bank of Ukraine57.

This goes to show that technology is not a new phenomenon in the discussions regarding war
and disarmament; war and technology have always been inseparable. A pattern can be seen with
technologies created in conjunction with wars. As these beneficial technologies become
prevalent for civilian uses, an opening occurs for exploitation and manipulation. These
technologies then become the very thing it was created to prevent: a threat to international
peace. The assessment of technologies in warfare thus should look at warfare and technology as
a single unit that works off each other, not two separate entities that should be resolved
individually.

54
Becky Little, "6 World War II Innovations That Changed Everyday Life," HISTORY, last modified April
26, 2021, https://www.history.com/news/world-war-ii-innovations.
55
Peter Suciu, "World War II’s Indelible Influence on Technology," Tech News World, last modified July
31, 2020,
https://www.technewsworld.com/story/world-war-iis-indelible-influence-on-technology-86775.html.
56
Ben Tarnoff, "How the Internet Was Invented," The Guardian, last modified November 28, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/15/how-the-internet-was-invented-1976-arpa-kahn-
cerf.
57
"Global Ransomware Attack Causes Turmoil," BBC News, last modified June 28, 2017,
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40416611.

30
IV. Past Actions

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The treaty has its own organization, which is CTBT Organization, to ensure the implementation
of its provisions, including those provisions for international verification measures. The CTBT
bans any kind of nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. The CTBT is
often associated with another primary element in the protocol of nuclear disarmament: a ban on
producing fissile material for anything but verified peaceful use. Such a ban would have the
amount of nuclear material available for weapons use at bay. That objective also lays a
foundation for further initiatives to negotiate a treaty banning other kinds of fissile material for
military purposes. The CTBT has conducted many conferences and made attempts regarding
disarming nuclear tests. Progress has been conducted years after years with an increasing
number of countries signing the treaty. On March 24, 2022, The Gambia became the 171st state
to ratify the CTBT. Also on March 31, Tuvalu became the 172nd state to ratify the Treaty.58

There are two primary issues regarding the Treaty Obligations that have sparked unexplicit
disagreements that are whether the treaty includes the ban on pre-existing stocks and
verification tasks. In terms of the issue of pre-existing stocks, under the 2009 International
Panel on FIssile Materials’ draft treaty, States involved would be demanded to declare to the
IAEA all fissile materials in its civilian sector, excess for all military purposes, and for use in
military reactors. Under Article I, States Parties would favor not to manufacture, acquire or
encourage the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.59 The treaty itself does not ask for verification requirements but calls upon the IAEA to
adopt any necessary verification arrangements. However, the United States with their 2006
draft excluded the verification procedures as Bush Administration believed the teary could not
be effectively verified. Unless all or most of these States (China, France, Russia, the U.S, the
U.K-under NPT; India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan-not under NPT) are involved, a fissile
material cut-off would has little value and impact. Therefore, bringing the verification

58
"Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)," The Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified October
25, 2021,
https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt
/.
59
"FMCT," The Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified October 13, 2021,
https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/.

31
procedures to India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan is considered crucial to legally have them
at bay in the international nonproliferation regime.60

International Humanitarian Law

The treaties of International Humanitarian Law, notably the Geneva Conventions and their two
Additional Protocols of 1977, supplemented by regulations of customary humanitarian law,
remain the relevant frame of reference for regulating behavior in armed conflict.61 From the
viewpoint of The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the fundamental principles
and rules governing the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons in foe hands,
continue to reflect a reasonable and pragmatic balance between the demands of military
necessity and those of humanity. Furthermore, ICRC supposes that the main cause of suffering
during armed conflicts and of violations of IHL remains the failure to implement existing norms
– whether owing to an absence of a political will or to another reason – rather than a lack of
rules or their inadequacy. Therefore, the need to revise, review, and update such regulations is
recognized, especially when International humanitarian law requires states to utilize at least
harmful military means available for achieving their tactics. Such military means could be
associated with the use of cyber operations as the predominant least-harmful response to civil
defense. However, when under attack, a belligerent party that has a weaker capacity in military
strength and technology may be tempted to hide from modern sophisticated means and
methods of warfare. As a result, it may be led to partake in practices prohibited by International
Humanitarian Law, such as feigning protected status, mingling combatants and military
objectives with the civilian population and civilian objects, or using civilians as human shields.
Such practices clearly increase the risk of incidental civilian casualties and damage.

The Liability Treaty

The Liability Convention - a treaty established in September 1972 through Resolution 2777
(XXVI), declares that a launching state shall be liable to pay compensation for the damage
caused by its crafts on the surface of the earth, to aircraft, or in space. The treaty imposes a

60
Ibid.
61
"International Humanitarian Law," European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, last
modified October 2, 2022,
https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/international-humanitar
ian-law_en#:~:text=International%20humanitarian%20law%20(IHL)%20is,groups%20during%20an%2
0armed%20conflict.

32
regime of strict liability and successfully permits orderly settlements of disputes between
nations.62 Nevertheless, there remain multiple inconsistencies with customary international law.
For instance, the treaty fails to harm due to its inconsistencies with the basic principles of state
accountability as third parties involved, thus the losing party in the dispute holds no legally
binding accountability and consent to pay compensation. Moreover, although the convention
embodies laudable goals, it is incapable of dealing with the significant changes in technological
capabilities that are inevitable with the rising prevalence of cyberwarfare.63 The convention
contains its share of sweeping terms but inadequately addresses issues concerning space objects
deorbiting or causing damage due to intervening causes. To illustrate, while it draws a line
between strict and fault-based liability, it makes no mention of whom the “owner” of and the one
“responsible for” the space object causing the incident is.64 Additionally, the current strict
liability regime does not take the agency into account. Such a regime would be inutile in today’s
space climate which, unlike the past when only two countries had the ability to major space
programs, is a multi-polar world with some 54 countries participating in the space domain.
Such loopholes hinder the coherency and effectiveness of the Liability Convention and warrant
review and amendment.65

United Nations Conference on New Trends in Science and Technology66

The conference reproduces the emblem of the United Nations and the emblem of the World
Disarmament Campaign, a global information programme on disarmament and international
security hosted by the General Assembly in 1982 at its second special session devoted to
disarmament. The programme focuses on three key objectives: to inform, to educate, and to
generate public understanding of and support for the objectives of the United Nations regarding
arms limitation and disarmament. In order to fulfill the missions, the programme is carried out
in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual, and objective manner.

62
Robert.wickramatunga, "Liability Convention," UNOOSA, accessed June 26, 2022,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html.
63
Ibid.
64
Avgerinopoulou, Dionysia-Theodora, and Katerina Stolis, "Current Trends and Challenges in Space
Law," European Space Sciences Committee, last modified July 1, 2017,
https://www.essc.esf.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/53rd_Athens17_Avgerinopoulou_Current_Tre
65
"Closing the Liability Loophole: The Liability Convention and the Future of Conflict in Space," Chicago
Journal of International Law,
https://cjil.uchicago.edu/publication/closing-liability-loophole-liability-convention-and-future-conflict-s
pace.
66
"New trends in science and technology Implications for international peace and security," United
Nations,
https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/23/037/23037427.pdf.

33
According to the highlights of the conference’s report, in current context of changing
international environment, the concerns over the nature and development guidelines of
technological change are essentially twofold. First, the anxiety is noticeably growing lest modern
technology should assist rather than hinder the positive trends in international relations. To be
more specific, there are concerns lest the application of new technologies might lead to
operating qualitative development of nuclear weapons against efforts that are being made for
their reduction and elimination. The conference also raised concern over the capacity that
whether diffusion of technologies could be developed serving the purpose of securing
international peace or the international community would be in a position to deal with harmful
side-effects of technological proliferation instead. A number of new technologies are now in
public view, which, if being developed and deployed to the fullest extent, could have implications
for existing military capabilities.

Vienna Programme of Action67

Thirty-two of the world’s landlocked developing countries are dealing with a wide array of
challenges created by technologies mostly due to their lack of direct territorial access to the sea
and remote regions from world markets. These countries have their trading and transit
compounds dependent on other countries, which means their social and economic capacity
partly depends on their partnerships. The Vienna Programme of Action is carried out to focus on
tackling the difficulties faced by landlocked developing countries and with an aim of
contributing to the eradication of poverty through the implementation of specific actions to
support energy and information and communications technology infrastructure.

Closing the Skills Gap 2020

On a global scale, the integration of technological reforms, if well executed, can bring
inherent social progress and opportunities to the international security. A scenario that should
be avoided is the lose-lose situation where the technological shift and talent shortage co-exist,
which would specifically result in an unfavorable position for developing countries to defend
themselves in the technological warfare.

67
"Vienna Programme of Action | Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries,
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States," Welcome to the United Nations,
accessed June 26, 2022, https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/vienna-programme-action.

34
Recognizing the essence of upgrading the educational and training systems, Closing the
Skills Gap 2020 operates as an initiative with an aim to “upskill the current and future the
workforce” and give thoughtful insights on how the Human Capital Index is being developed
by industries.68 It reinforces the adaptive abilities of workers to the increasingly challenging
economy caused by technological disruption. The programme is closely interconnected to the
World Economic Forum, specifically a platform to include its partners from global regions such
as France, MENA, South Africa and ASEAN in the initiatives.69 The initiative lays emphasis on 4
particular areas, Basic E ducation, Adult Learning, Higher Education and Technical Vocational
Education and Training (TVET). The chief target of this initiative is to provide above 17,2 million
workers with proper education and training to keep pace with the new labour markets, which
exceeds that of the World Economic Forum to reach 10 million.

V. Bloc Positions

Asia-Pacific Region

Asian-Pacific land, sea, and air forces are all rapidly modernizing and improving their power
projection capabilities. Broadly speaking, however, trends in the region are greatly
strengthening air forces and navies, while reducing the traditional significance of ground forces.
These trends are reflected in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese defense planning as
well as in Southeast Asia. The current pace of military modernization in Taiwan, Korea, and
much of Southeast Asia is such that the lag in Chinese capabilities versus Taiwan and China's
neighbors seems likely to widen over the next few years. The gap may then begin to narrow. It
will not be closed soon. With China's focus now firmly fixed on deterring Taiwan separatism,
there is less ground for short-term concern about the "China threat" than many in the region
seem to imagine, though long-term concerns may be justified. Regrading United States, ever
since the launch of the International Space Station, America has been the leader in calling for
cooperation in space. The success has manifested in the current structure of the ISS in space
with multiple modules coming from the United States, Russian Federation, European Union,
Japan, and Dominion of Canada. U.S. allies also had the privilege of sharing U.S. information
and research on space programs to aid their own development, such as Israel and South Korea.

68
"Closing the Skills Gap: Key Insights and Success Metrics," World Economic Forum, last modified
November 2020, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GSC_NES_White_Paper_2020.
69
Ibid.

35
As of September 2020, there were 1.74 billion websites in cyberspace, and the Asia-Pacific now
makes up 50.1% of all Internet usersworldwide. Another interlinked trend is the development of
Artificial Intelligence (AI).70 Malicious technologies, which are developed with an intention of
disrupting and sabotaging the digital and physical world, have and will become more
widespread as more devices are connected to the Internet. Over the years, the intensity,
frequency, and severity of cyberattacks have increased. For instance, in recent years, attacks on
Internet of Things (IoT) have aimed at critical infrastructure: hackers attacked a German steel
mill in 2015, shut down the Ukrainian power station leading to 80,000 people losing power in
the same year. Furthermore, financial losses related to compensation for compromised data,
lawsuits, and recovery from cyberattacks through rehiring and securing networks, are extremely
high.71

Europe

In December 2016, the European Parliamentary voted to give a new programme a pass, which
also for the first time provided major European Union funding for military research projects.
The programmed, called the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), is planned to
spend approximately 90 million Euros within three years to 2020.72 In June 2017, the European
Commission officially established a new European Defence Fund, which has been
complemented and amplified with Member States’ efforts, has rapidly expanded the EU funding
for arms industry.73 The expansion of EU funding has focused on two main areas: the emerging
‘security’ sector, which is about technologies for law enforcement; and ‘traditional defence’
work. The first research projects being funded under the PADR has a key priority surrounding
robotic systems, especially military drones74 – and the signs are that such technologies will be a
priority under the European Defence Fund in general, despite their highly controversial nature.

Regarding the cybersecurity, EU governments and lawmakers have all agreed to have a tough
cybersecurity rules for large energy, transport and financial firms, digital providers and medical
device makers amid concerns about cyber attacks by state actors and other malicious players.

70
"Enhancing Cybersecurity in Asia and the Pacific," ASIA - PACIFIC INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
POLICY BRIEFS, last modified March 27, 2020,
https://repository.unescap.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12870/537/ESCAP-2020-Enhancing-cybersecu
rity-Asia-Pacific-n2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
71
Ibid
72
"Publications & Data," Default, accessed June 27, 2022,
https://eda.europa.eu/publications-and-data/publication-details/pub/factsheet-preparatory-action-(pa)-
on-csdp-related-research.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.

36
The European Commission two years ago proposed regulations on the cybersecurity of network
and information systems called NIS 2 Directive, to further expand the scope of the current rule
known as NIS Directive. The new rules cover a wide array of companies in vital sectors - energy,
transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, vaccines and medical devices,
drinking water, waste water, digital infrastructure, public administration and space.75

Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

At the corner of the 4.0 Industrial Revolution, technological advancement in the workplace
presents both as a challenge and opportunity for MENA countries. While the MENA region
merely holds 62% of its human capital potential according to the World Economic Forum’s
Human Capital Index (2018), it is endowed with a highly educated future workforce and
novel opportunities.76 However, taking the fact that only few of MENA’s regions are predicted
to withstand technological disruption, it is quintessential for this region to prepare for its
working-age population. Therefore, there is a growing dependence on technologies in such
regions. It has been estimated that 41% of all work activities in Kuwait are susceptible to
automation, as are 46% in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 47% in the UAE, 49% in Egypt, 50% in
Morocco and Turkey and 52% in Qatar.77 To combat the existential risks of over-dependence
upon automation, it is essential that the core skills in the region be shifted and potentials be
excavated, especially in professional workers and digital-mechanical experts to have
technologies under control according to humans’ intentions.

These regions have to suffer from many attacks by other states and by increasingly sophisticated
criminal rings from around the world. Every national government in the region is in an urge to
create a secure digital environment, but these efforts are often too fragmented, tactical, and
reactive. Also, they do not involve all essential stakeholders. As a result, governmental responses
often lag behind the ever-evolving threat landscape, and the defensive measures taken are
circumvented or exploited.

75
"EU Governments, Lawmakers Agree on Tougher Cybersecurity Rules for Key Sectors," Reuters,
last modified May 13, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-governments-lawmakers-agree-tougher-cybersecurity-rule
s-key-sectors-2022-05-13/.
76
"Close Skills Gaps and Gender Gaps to Prepare MENA for the Future of Jobs," World Economic Forum,
accessed July 2, 2022,
https://www.weforum.org/press/2017/05/close-skills-gaps-and-gender-gaps-to-prepare-mena-for-the-f
uture-of-jobs/.
77
Ibid.

37
VI. Possible Solutions
1. Controlling Arms and Stemming the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction

Stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a priority that demands

both science and technology investments and cooperation. A broad range of attempts has
been made to reduce existing military threats and stem the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and their missile delivery systems, including new agreements, enhanced
safeguards, and new technologies for monitoring and verification. The need to revise and
re-evaluate existing legitimate documents to ensure the adoption of nations. For
instance, an indefinite extension has been achieved regarding the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, the up-to-date progress of working towards a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, and Ban on Fissile Materials78, for the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention; and the strengthening of the Convention on Biological Weapons.

Science and technology are necessary to arms control treaty verification and
nonproliferation. Some suggested policies could be named: strengthening the technical
know-how to build effective arms restraint; continually improving detection, monitoring,
and verification capabilities; and promoting science and technology cooperation to
advance arms reduction and nonproliferation goals.

2. Alternative ways of framing Cyber-threats

a. Technical Discourse
The technical discourse is concentrated on computer and network disruption
caused by various types of malware. Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) can be exploited for criminal purposes (through cybercrime)
or used to undermine international security (which is so-called cyberattacks or
cyber operations). In today's context when global citizens grow with more
dependence on ICTs, there is an urgent need for greater understanding of how
international frameworks and policy discussions on addressing cybercrime and

78
"Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)," The Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified October
25, 2021,
https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt
/.

38
 promoting accountable State behavior in the use of ICTs may be better leveraged
for coherent responses.
b. Crime-Espionage Discourse
The cybercrime and technical discourses have a close relation to each other. The
development of IT law (and, more particularly, Internet or cyber law) in different
countries has a crucial role in ensuring public safety, especially as it allows the
definition and prosecution of a misdemeanor. It should be taken into
consideration the transparency and consistency between domestic and
international laws, especially being well-prepared for special scenarios that may
occur due to the loopholes of not being transparent.
c. Military-Civil Defence Discourse
As clarified in the Statement of the Problem, the development of military doctrine
has been dramatically transformed in light of the integration of science and
technologies. Therefore, it is vital to take advantage of the prestige sides of
technologies to investigate and identify whether those military operations are
conducted serving military purposes or civil defense.

3. Consolidating a multilateral space for innovation and new technology

Given the increasingly important role of science and technology in the geographical
arena. Issues range from the race for technological supremacy between global powers to
the increasing politicization, militarization, and commercialization of the global
commons namely the polar zones, the high seas, and outer space.79 New technologies
arise together with questions for diplomacy, from artificial intelligence to cybersecurity
to automated drones. Science, technology, and innovation can support diplomatic efforts
in many aspects of life. Therefore, a multilateral space for innovation and new
technology is favored in the context of international peace and security in light of its
always being a backbone of multilateralism through the global cooperation of
researchers. Science can act as a bridge between even non-likeminded countries and lead
to tangible results, e.g. making multilateral institutions adapting the challenges and
opportunities of the 21st century. Also, in order to strengthen the positions of countries
in such cooperation, there is a need to narrow the gap between developed countries and
developing countries with the disparity of high technologies and learned labor force.
79
"Science Diplomacy," EEAS | EEAS Website, accessed June 26, 2022,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410838_ro.

39
 Besides, disarmament initiatives and new technology innovation would be most
successful when they involve effective partnerships between Governments, the expert
community, and civil society. More education and training opportunities should be
organized, in order to empower young people to be a force for change and disarmament.
Finally, there must be better engagement and integration of experts, industry, and civil
society representatives into United Nations efforts for disarmament.80

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