Worldcom - The Story of A Whistleblower
Worldcom - The Story of A Whistleblower
L EA R N ING OB JE C T IVE S
After completing and discussing this case you should be able to
[1] Understand the pressures a person faces when he [3] Recommend characteristics of an effective
or she becomes aware of an accounting fraud corporate whistleblower program
[2] Describe possible actions a person can take [4] Describe key requirements in the Sarbanes−
when he or she suspects fraud may exist Oxley Act related to whistleblower and code of
ethics processes for public companies
BACKGROUND1
Don’t ever tell yourself, “that won’t happen to me.” Just ask Cynthia Cooper, former Vice President
of Internal Audit at WorldCom.
Cynthia Cooper was a typical accounting student as an undergrad at Mississippi State
University. Raised in Clinton, Mississippi, Cynthia was “the girl next door.” Growing up in a family
with a modest income, she attended the local high school, worked as a waitress at the local Golden
Corral, and headed off to one of the state’s well-known universities.
After graduating from college, she later completed her Master of Accounting degree at
the University of Alabama and became a certified public accountant. Her career began like most
accounting graduates in the field of public accounting, working with one of the major accounting
firms in Atlanta.
Most likely, she never thought she would face the challenge of her lifetime before reaching
the age of 40. However, a few short weeks in May and June of 2002 changed her life forever. This
case summarizes how she unraveled a $3.8 billion fraud that ultimately grew to over $11 billion and
sent one of the country’s largest and most visible companies to its knees in bankruptcy. Consider
how you would have handled the situation if you had been in her shoes.
The case was prepared by Mark S. Beasley, Ph.D. and Frank A. Buckless, Ph.D. of North Carolina State University and Steven M. Glover, Ph.D. and
Douglas F. Prawitt, Ph.D. of Brigham Young University, as a basis for class discussion. It is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective
handling of an administrative situation.
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WorldCom started as a small “mom and pop” company in the early 1980s. Bernie Ebbers
moved the WorldCom headquarters to Clinton, Mississippi, because it was the college town of his
alma mater, Mississippi College. By 1997, the company had emerged within the telecom industry
and caught the eye of many on Wall Street when it issued a bid to acquire the much larger and better
known company, MCI.
Cynthia Cooper enjoyed the rising status of WorldCom’s growth in the business community.
She was promoted to Vice President of Internal Audit in 1999, leading the internal audit function
in what became the 25th largest company in the United States. WorldCom’s stock price continued
to rise through 2000, and she and her colleagues dreamed of retiring early and starting their own
businesses. Cynthia dreamed of opening a bead shop and actually purchased a couple hundred
thousand beads that she stored in her garage.
Establishing internal audit’s role in the company wasn’t easy. WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie
Ebbers, was forceful about his distaste for the term “internal controls” and allegedly banned the use
of the term in his presence. At one point, Cynthia called a meeting with her boss, WorldCom CFO
Scott Sullivan, Bernie Ebbers, and a few others to help them see how an internal audit department
could help the company’s bottom line. Despite being almost 30 minutes late to the meeting, Ebbers
was the last person to leave the meeting. At that point, internal audit’s focus on efficiency of
operations became its primary charge, leaving the financial audit-related tasks in the hands of the
external auditor, Arthur Andersen, LLP. Cynthia, as Vice President of Internal Audit, would report
to the CFO, Scott Sullivan.
While WorldCom’s growth skyrocketed throughout the 1990s, the telecom market was
saturated by 2001 and WorldCom’s earnings began to fall. WorldCom executives began to feel
tremendous pressure to maintain their stellar track record of financial performance.
UNRAVELING OF A FRAUD
According to press reports, Cynthia Cooper and her internal audit team didn’t know about any
unusual accounting manipulations until March 2002. It wasn’t until a worried executive in a division
of WorldCom told Cynthia about the handling of certain expenses in his division. At that point,
Cynthia learned that the corporate office accounting team had taken $400 million out of the
division’s reserve account to boost WorldCom’s consolidated income.
As Cynthia and her team pursued the matter with WorldCom’s CFO, Scott Sullivan, she
immediately faced tremendous resistance and pressure. In fact, Sullivan informed Cynthia that there
was no problem and that internal audit shouldn’t be focused on the issue. She received a similar
reaction when she approached the external auditors at Arthur Andersen, who told Cynthia there
was no problem at all with the accounting treatment.
Fortunately, Cynthia did not let the intimidation of her boss or the opposition of a major
national accounting firm dampen her concerns about getting to the truth. In fact, Sullivan’s harsh
reaction only increased her skepticism surrounding the matter. She and others within the internal
audit team began to secretly work on the project late at night. At one point, they began making
backup copies of their files in response to fears that if their investigation was revealed, files might
be destroyed.
Within two months—at the end of May 2002—Cynthia and her team had unraveled the
key aspects of the fraud. They discovered that the company had erroneously capitalized billions
of dollars of network lease expenses as assets on WorldCom’s books. The accounting gimmickry
allowed the company to report a profit of $2.4 billion instead of a $662 million loss.
In some ways the fraud was simple. The corporate accounting team led by Sullivan had merely
transferred normal operating lease expenses to the balance sheet as an asset. The expenses were for
normal fees WorldCom paid to local telephone companies for use of their telephone networks and
were not capital outlays.