Policy Papers

Policy Perspectives
on Countering Violent
Extremism in Pakistan
Editors
Muhammad Saleem Khilji
Dr Shafqat Munir Ahmad
Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri

Sustainable Development Policy Institute

Islamabad
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
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without prior written permission of the publisher.

This is a publication of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI). The opinions expressed in the
policy papers compiled in this book are solely those of the authors and publishing them does not in any
way constitute an endorsement of the opinion by SDPI.

Sustainable Development Policy Institute is an independent, non-profit research institute on sustainable

development.

First Edition: October 2021

© 2021 by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute

ISBN: 978-969-8344-29-0

Mailing Address: PO Box 2342, Islamabad, Pakistan. Telephone ++ (92-51) 2278134, 2278136, 2277146,
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Policy Papers I

Acknowledgements
This effort would not have been possible without the support, leadership
and assistance of our great staff and colleagues. We would like to express our great
appreciation to the authors of the policy papers compiled in this book for their valuable
research work. A special note of thanks to Dr Muhammad Raheem Awan, Dr Tahir
Jameel, Dr Wasim Ishaque, Dr Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, and Dr Farhan Zahid
for their review, feedback, and constructive suggestions to improve these policy papers.
We also express our thanks and gratitude to the Chairman of Creative Learning’s Board,
Dr William Kruvant for his guidance and support in this effort. Likewise, we appreciate
the great contributions of the SDPI team members Muhammad Awais Umar. A special
thanks to SDPI’s partner, Creative Learning in the provision of technical and financial
support to produce this publication, specifically to Project Director Dean Piedmont,
Rachel Landale, Muhammad Saeed Khan, Shabbir Ahmad Khan, and Khandoker Nazrul
Islam.
II Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

About Authors
Dr Mohammad Makki
Dr Makki is the Head of Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Centre for
International Peace and Stability, National University of Science and Technology,
Islamabad. His research interests include human and non-traditional Security, security-
development nexus, extractive industries and conflict, counter-terrorism and violent
extremism, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and the political economy
of post-conflict. He is the Editor-in-Chief of NUST Journal of International Peace and
Stability.

Dr Mehtab S. Karim
Dr Karim is currently the Senior Research Advisor, Centre for Policy Studies, Institute
of Business Management, and Distinguished Senior Fellow at Schar School of Policy and
Government George Mason University. He did his PhD in Sociology/Demography from
Cornell University, USA. He served at Aga Khan University, Karachi; South Asia Division,
World Bank, Washington DC; Pew Research Centre; London School of Economics; and
Princeton University. He was the founding Vice-Chancellor and Chief Academic Officer
of Malir University of Science & Technology, Karachi.

Dr Faryal Razzaq
Dr Razzaq is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of The Framework for Emotions,
Ethics, Empowerment and Life Skills (Pvt) Ltd, and Director at Ethics Centre, Karachi
School of Business and Leadership (KSBL). She developed the first indigenous model,
scale, and theory for emotional intelligence at Pakistani workplace for her PhD thesis.
She is an academician, master trainer, researcher, philanthropist, Emotional Intelligence
and ethics’ education evangelist, instructional designer & member advisory boards for
few institutions.

Dr Naeem Ahmed
Dr Ahmed is the Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of
Karachi. He did his PhD titled: “State, Society and Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan
after September 11”. He is the recipient of various fellowships, including SUSI (Study
of US Institutes) Fellowship 2021; Fernand Braudel IFER-Incoming post-doc fellowship
at the Foundation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (FMSH), Paris (2013); Fulbright
Pre-Doc scholarship at the University of Cincinnati, Ohio, USA (2004); and Hansard
Society Scholars’ Fellowship at the House of Commons, London, UK (2002). He has
several research publications to his credit published both in national and international
journals.
Policy Papers III

Dr Fatima Waqi Sajjad

Dr Sajjad is the Associate Professor at University of Management and Technology
Lahore. She did her PhD in International Relations from Punjab University and MPhil
from Kinnaird College, Lahore. She has several research publications to her credit,
including Radicalization and Education: A post-colonial perspective (2020); Lagging
Behind Others: An Exploration of Muslims’ Educational Outlook in Modern Times
(2020); Countering Radicalization through Education: Global Policy Trends and the
Case of Pakistan ( 2019); De-radicalizing Pakistani Society: the receptivity of youth to
a liberal religious worldview (2017); Countering Extremists’ Narratives in Pakistan
(2015); Reforming Madrasa Education in Pakistan: Post 9/11 Perspectives (2013), etc.
Saba Noor
Ms Noor is the lecturer at the Department of International Relations, National
Defence University, Islamabad. She is a PhD Scholar at the Department of Theology and
Religious Studies, University of Gloucestershire, UK. She did her MPhil in International
Relations from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Earlier, she has also served
as Researcher at Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS). She has been conducting
research work in the field of counter-terrorism, de-radicalization, violent extremism,
security, etc. for the last 13 years. She has published a significant number of research
papers and articles in national and international journals.
Dr Ilam Khan
Dr Khan did his PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from National University of
Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad. He is an ethnographer who has extensively
studied the post-conflict environment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He has been Research
Fellow at the department of Political Science and Legal Studies at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, USA. His areas of interest are the indigenous approach to
conflict management, resolution and rehabilitation, ethnography and participatory
research, restorative justice, etc.
Dr Muqarrab Akbar
Dr Akbar is currently the Chairman of the Department of Political Science,
Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan. As topper in the BZU, he secured Gold Medal
in MA. He did his PhD from Glasgow and got the student of the Year Award in 2014. His
PhD research entitled: “Pakistan at Crossroads: War against Terrorism and International
Law”. He has published two book chapters and more than 40 articles in national and
international Journals.
Dr Iram Khalid
Dr Khalid is currently the Chairperson of Department of Political Science, Punjab
University. She did her PhD titled: “Crisis Decision Making: A Case Study of Pakistan-
India Conflicts (1950-1999). Her credibility as an academic visionary reflects in the
IV Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

decision and policy making of many eminent decision and policy making bodies,
including governmental and nongovernmental organizations. She has been published
in various well-reputed national and international journals. Human security with social
context remains her main area of research.
Rana Saifullah Hassan
Mr Hassan is presently serving as a civil judge and Judicial Magistrate at Thatta.
Prior to his appointment in judicial services in 2018, he remained an active member
of Karachi Bar Association and Sindh Bar Council. Besides performing his professional
duties, he holds passion for research and teaching. He is currently pursuing his doctoral
studies on Comparative Legislation and Criminal Justice System against Terrorism from
University of Karachi. In addition to that, he teaches courses on International Law,
Criminology and Law in University of Karachi, SZABIST and Bahria University, Karachi
campuses.

ABOUT CO-AUTHORS
Dr Asiya Mukhtar
Dr Mukhtar is currently the Assistant Professor, Department of international
Relations, Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore. She is the author of a book
titled: Threat Perception: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.” She also has two book
chapters to her credit.

Sakina Riaz
Ms Riaz is Assistant Professor at the Department of Social Work, University of
Karachi.
Hamayun Khalid
Mr Khalid is a freelance researcher based in Islamabad.
Amna Siddiqui
Ms Siddiqui is the Research Executive at The Framework for Emotions, Ethics,
Empowerment and Life Skills (Pvt) Ltd.
Sana Ashfaq
Ms Ashfaq is the 4th year student at Islamabad Medical and Dental College
(IMDC).
Policy Papers V

About Editors
Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri
Dr Suleri has been heading Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan’s
premier policy research think-tank, since 2007. Dr Suleri earned his PhD in Food
Security from University of Greenwich, UK. He is the Editor-in-Chief of SDPI’s “Journal of
Development Policy, Research and Practice”. He regularly delivers lectures on different
aspects of sustainable development to the career civil servants, officers of armed forces,
and parliamentarians. He is an acclaimed writer and besides publishing in academic
journals, he also contributes his policy analyses on sustainable development issues both
in print and electronic media.
He is the member of various policy making forums and advisory boards, including
PM’s Economic Advisory Council; National Advisory Council of Planning Commission of
Pakistan; Pakistan Climate Change Council; Convenor of Food Security Advisory Group at
National Security Division, Government of Pakistan; Member of Agricultural Universities Vice
Chancellor’s Search Committee, Govt of Punjab, and Member of Board of Directors, National
Disaster Risk Management Fund.
Dr Shafqat Munir Ahmad
Dr Shafqat is a researcher, policy analyst, and humanitarian and development
professional. Currently, he is associated with the SDPI as a Research Fellow/Director,
Resilient Development Programme. He earned his PhD in Pakistan Studies (Human
Rights Policy and Influencing) from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. He has been
the team lead of the project ‘Community Resilience to Violent Extremism’. He has
served with Oxfam GB, Actionaid Asia and the UNDP/UNMC Regional Centre, Bangkok
as programme/policy specialist. He had also served with Pakistan’s leading English daily
The News. Routledge (2021) has published a chapter by Dr Shafqat in its book ‘Re-
Interrogating Civil Society in South Asia- Critical Perspectives from India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh’
Muhammad Saleem Khilji
Mr Khilji has served in media and development sectors for about 30 years. Prior
to joining SDPI in 2012, he held senior editorial positions in various English dailies,
including DAWN, Daily Times, The Nation, etc. He also worked with electronic media,
including NHK (Japan Broadcating Corporation) as Researcher/Reporter and Rohi TV
as Director News. He has worked with Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment
(DTCE - a project of UNDP on Local Government System in Pakistan) as Media and
Communication Specialist. He did his Master’s in English Literature from Islamia
University Bahawalpur in 1988 and later joined the university faculty as Lecturer where
he served for more than a year.
VI Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Editors’ Note
The 20 years on the 9/11 incidents in the United States, the world has undergone
an unprecedented era of terrorism. Being neighbour of Afghanistan and an ally in the
war on terror, Pakistan has been among the most hit countries. Pakistan lost thousands
of precious lives and properties worth billions of dollars. This two-decade long war
has impacted each and every segment of the society in terms of providing a breeding
ground for radicalization and negative impact on economy, security situation and
cultural values. Religious extremists and non-state actors started creeping in the society
and increased their influence exploiting religious sentiments and anger of the people.
Gradually the extremism started turning into violent extremism leading to terrorism.
The rising trend of violent extremism in Pakistan is attributed to a host of reasons,
which include the successive governments’ somewhat flawed policies and practices
and options of using force. The path to extremism that was initially linked to madrasas
(seminaries) has crossed the barriers by entering into the country’s Higher Educational
Institutions (HEIs). The available literature suggests that now the educated youth seem
more inclined towards radicalization as compared to their illiterate counterparts.
Aggression and anger, degeneration of moral and ethical values, hate and envy even
within the social milieu, violence and intolerance in the society are quoted in various
studies as manifestations of extremist views. The faculty at some HEIs is reported to
have been using their religious biases while teaching aiming at tilting students towards
extremist views and narratives. There are many other aspects that somehow influenced
Pakistani society in terms of religious extremism.
Amid the growing radicalization, Pakistan took number of steps to counter terrorism
and countering violent extremism backed by policy frameworks, including some anti-
terrorism laws, National Plan of Action 2014 and Paigham-e-Pakisan- a new narrative
of peace and harmony with a view to lead Pakistan towards stability and sustainability.
Under the Paigham-e-Pakistan and some other initiatives, CVE activities are being held
at various universities and colleges across the country where youths are being trained
on a narrative of peace, interfaith and inter-sect harmony.
In addition to a lot of policy efforts by the government, Pakistan’s civil society,
academia and think tanks are greatly contributing to peacebuilding initiatives to prevent
people from being lured to violent extremism, the worst form of which is terrorism.
The academia and think tanks have been working to come up with policy and evidence
backed propositions to countering violent extremism.
In this book, the policy papers, produced by some noted authors hailing from
academia on various aspects of P/CVE, have been included as a full compilation. These
Policy Papers VII

10 policy papers cover almost all perspectives on P/CVE work in Pakistan. The very
first paper in this book analyzes incumbent CVE and anti-terrorism policies and laws
and provides policy recommendations for further improvement. Other policy papers
throw light on the recent wave of radicalization, how it is targeting Higher Educational
Institutions, the issues being faced by the former combatants’ reintegration process
and loopholes in our justice system against extremism. The book with these policy
papers will be a good reading for policy makers, academia, civil society, media as well
as intelligentsia.
In their analyses, the authors have talked about the state of extremism in Pakistan
and suggested, in the light of their analysis and findings, short-term and long-term policy
measures to overcome this challenge and secure society, especially the youth, from
being victims of extremism by keeping them away from this new wave of radicalization.
This publication is the outcome of hardcore research carried out in different parts of the
country and surely will be a value addition in the contemporary knowledge on violent
extremism and countering violent extremism.
Contents
1. Community First’: Community Resilience and Policy Effectiveness against Violent
Extremism in Pakistan ....................................................................................... 01
Dr Mohammad Makki
2. Opinions and Attitudes Towards Extremism ..................................................... 09
Dr Mehtab S. Karim and Sakina Riaz
3. Promoting Critical Pedagogy to Counter Violent Extremism on
Campuses ........................................................................................................... 21
Dr Fatima Waqi Sajjad
4. Countering Violent Extremism through Community Resilience in Southern
Punjab ................................................................................................................ 33
Dr Muqarrab Akbar
5. Developing a National Narrative: University Faculty’s Perception
of Violent Extremism ........................................................................................ 47
Dr Faryal Razzaq , Amna Siddiqui and Sana Ashfaq
6. Engendering Counter-Extremism Behavior through Model Female Vocational-
cum-Educational Institutions in southern Punjab ............................................ 69
Dr Iram Khalid and Dr Asiya Mukhtar
7. Countering Violent Barelvi Extremism in Pakistan: Challenges, Implications and
Way Forward ...................................................................................................... 83
Dr Naeem Ahmed
8. Exploring post-Conflict Community Resilience Options for Reintegrated
Individuals of Swat ............................................................................................ 95
Noor Saba and Hamayun Khalid
9. Community-based Rehabilitation Program for Ex-Combatants: Policy Options for
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ........................................................................................ 109
Ilam Khan
10. Justice for Resilient Communities: Evaluating Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System
against Violent Extremism ................................................................................. 119
Rana Saifullah and Dr Naeem Ahmed
Policy Papers 1

01
‘Community First’
Community Resilience and Policy Effectiveness
against Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Dr Mohammad Makki

Abstract
Given the escalating threat posed by Violent Extremism (VE) at the community
level, developing ‘community resilience’ has gained significant importance as a response
strategy. However, little is known about the extent to which governments’ or policy
efforts have augmented community resilience outcomes. Particularly in the context of
Pakistan, scholarly efforts to systematically appraise the extent to which governments’
CVE initiatives have enhanced community resilience outcomes have been limited. With
regards, this policy paper systematically considers National Counter Terrorism Authority
(NACTA — an administrative state-entity to counter violent extremism) — and developed
policies [such as NISP 2018 & National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines [NCEPG,
2018) to yield necessary arguments. In doing so, the paper first grapples with the
indispensable role of non-government (developmental) actors to ensure community-led
approaches to CRVE. It further highlights the challenges associated with empowering
sub-national actors and the impediments to the development sector itself, not only in
implementing resilience-based projects but also in their overall positioning within the
counter-terrorism and P/CVE domain (i.e., policy & programming). Finally, the paper
concludes by suggesting some actionable/strategic recommendations illuminating the
need for an integrated actors framework to implement community-centric initiatives
concerning building resilience to violent extremism.

Keywords: Violnet extremism, NACTA, NISP, P/CVE, National Action Plan

Introduction
Given the escalating threat posed by Violent Extremism (VE) at the community
level, developing ‘community resilience’ has gained significant importance as a response
strategy (Olojo et al. 2020; Salyk-Virk, 2020; Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Weine, 2013; Weine et
al., 2013; Van Metre, 2016; Taylor et al., 2017). Indeed, significant contributions made
by both the scholars and practitioners have identified various contours of Community
Resilience to Violent Extremism (CRVE). However, little is known about the extent to
which governments’ or policy efforts have augmented community resilience outcomes.
2 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Particularly in the context of Pakistan, scholarly efforts to systematically appraise the

extent to which governments’ CVE initiatives have enhanced community resilience
outcomes have been limited (Makki & Yamin, 2021). Notably, there is a greater need
to acknowledge and elucidate the increasingly demonstrated role of non-governmental
actors-led community programs — the vanguard — in building CRVE.
Similarly, in the context of Pakistan, we have observed a significant shift towards
preventing and countering violent extremism P/CVE, as outlined in the National Internal
Security Policy (NISP 2018). Such policies are closely tied to Pakistan’s counter-terrorism
strategy released in 2014: the National Action Plan (NAP, 2014; see also Sahill, 2018;
Makki & Yamin, 2020; Ullah & Baloch, 2019). Yet, at the same time, Pakistan’s Preventing
and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) drive — at an institutional level — continues
to support the ‘hard’ approach (e.g., Mirahmadi et al., 2016; Orakzai, 2019; Shaukat,
2021). Furthermore, it remains reluctant to embrace non-government (development)
actors as a part of P/CVE toolkit; hence, impeding the progress from policy-rhetoric into
actions. Consequently, the critical component of the drive — i.e., ‘resilience building’ —
has yet to heed calls for a more inclusive approach to accommodate the aforementioned
developmental and other sub-national actors (including the role of civil society).
In view of the above, this study aims to bridge the aforementioned gap by
examining the several (institutionalized) policy initiatives in Pakistan, which were
primarily designed to counter and prevent the menace of violent extremism at the
community level. Thereby, the paper systematically considers National Counter
Terrorism Authority (NACTA1 — an administrative state-entity to counter violent
extremism) — and developed policies [such as NISP 2018 & National Counter
Extremism Policy Guidelines [NCEPG, 2018) to yield necessary arguments. In
doing so, the paper first grapples with the indispensable role of non-government
(developmental) actors to ensure community-led approaches to CRVE. It further
highlights the challenges associated with empowering sub-national actors and the
impediments to the development sector itself, not only in implementing resilience-
based projects but also in their overall positioning within the counter-terrorism and P/
CVE domain (policy & programming). Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting some
actionable/startegic recommendations illuminating the need for an integrated actors
framework to implement community-centric initiatives concerning building resilience
to violent extremism. Considering that resilience-led response to violent extremism
is highly context-specific, particular attention is being paid to ensure how the carved
policy recommendations can be generalized coherently.
1
‘NACTA was established as an administrative entity under Ministry of Interior in 2008. However, it was reorganized
as federal authority vide NACTA Act 2013 to act as a focal national institution and unify state response to counter
extremism and terrorism by combining the efforts of law enforcement & intelligence agencies and by formulating and
implementing policies & action plans through continuous research, adaptive innovation and ancillary mechanisms’
(https://nacta.gov.pk).
Policy Papers 3

Why Emerging Policy Directions: ‘Community’ Matters in Building Resilience

to Violent Extremism
The concept of ‘resilience’ has evidently gained an elemental position in the
counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism related- discourse (Salyk-Virk, 2020;
Olojo et al., 2020; Östevik, 2020; Ellis & Abdi, 2017; Weine et al., 2013; Van Metre, 2016;
Aly & Jacques, 2015; Taylor et al., 2017). The concept primarily advocates for a ‘local
turn’ in the literature on both preventing and countering violent extremism. Hence,
such a paradigm shift has necessitated the role of ‘soft’ measures (e.g., Silla, 2020;
Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). For many scholars and practitioners, the main impetus for
‘resilience building’ derives from the community-led and community-centric approach
(Östevik, 2020; Ingram, 2018; Cottee, 2015; Atwood & Jacob, 2019; Lowndes & Thorp,
2012; Ellis & Abdi, 2017). Hence, this perspective has led to significant advancements
in the literature; thus, bringing theoretical sophistication to the concept of ‘community
resilience’ within the P/CVE discourse. Both the practitioner and scholarly community
take the strained argument further and assert that to capture the manifestation and
functional dynamics of CRVE, it is essential to grapple with how resilience materializes?
Moreover, which factors are cardinal in promoting local resilience against violent
extremism?
It is equally important to acknowledge the recent convergence between ‘community’
and ‘policymakers’ towards developing an integrated and dynamic approach for
mobilizing and enabling local actors to steer the very idea of CRVE (Östevik, 2020;
Olojo et al., 2020; Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016; Lowndes & Thorp, 2012). The
underlying assumption of such an approach is that the community provides an organic
local-network (i.e., social resources) that connects the actors across the P/CVE space.
Such a community-centric approach is analogous to the idea of ‘inclusivity’ to ensure
context specific, action-oriented, and sustainable operationalization of CRVE-related
agendas (e.g., Lowndes & Thorp, 2012; Peters & Saeed, 2017).
However, the mentioned community-based approach to building community
resilience met with stark criticism for its exceedingly simplistic design, which seems to
be committed to excluding any other sub-national actors who can play an important
role in functionalizing community resilience. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge
the pivotal role of non-governmental (development) sector or organizations that
fundamentally constitute set of widespread community-resources; hence, stimulate
micro-meso-level coordination (see e.g., Salyk-Virk, 2020; De Leede, 2019; Kessels &
Nemr, 2016; Cortright et al., 2008). Within these organizational contexts, the actors not
only respond towards the developmental needs, but also practice social interaction —
(tangibly) — which further strengthen the idea of collectivity and a sense of community.
In addition, the widespread role of development sector also offers concrete cases
to be observed in vulnerable or post-conflict societies. Therefore, it is important to
4 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

acknowledge that, in addition to state or institutional fora, the non-governmental

organizations have remarkable ability to respond to conflict-related crises — i.e. in
humanitarian crises, rehabilitation phase, and post-conflict societies. Furthermore, with
regards to the community-based approaches, the sector does not produce or manifest
the community per se; instead, it captures and mobilize the community resources for
effective project implementation. Therefore, at the policy and/or institutional level, there
is a greater need to recognize, encourage and establish a network of non-governmental
actors at the local level to confront the menace of violent extremism.
Program and Polciy Approaches: Resileince and Countering Violent
Extremism in Pakistan
The dynamics behind Pakistan’s counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism
related efforts have been primarily propelled by increasing terrorist attacks and the
urbanization of violent extremism. Therefore, for a significant period of time, the
country lacked any comprehensive approach and institutional or policy infrastructure to
counter the menace of violent extremism. Later this reflected what became the primary
defect in the state’s approach against the threat: i.e., an exclusive focus on ‘hard’
measures. Consequently, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism and counter violent extremism
efforts remained principally within the confines of the military. At the policy level, it took
several years to develop a strategic concept of P/CVE; that is highly multidimensional in
nature (e.g., Heydemann, 2014; Makki & Yamin, 2021).
In view of the above, the major development was the revised version of the National
Internal Security Policy (NISP-II), released in 2018. It gave a new life to NISP-I, which
was first released in 2014 (NISP, 2014). Indeed, NISP-II (NISP, 2018) re-established
the threat of terrorism and violent extremism as highly transnational and coordinated
in nature; hence, necessitated the role of ‘hard’ measures (such as military operations
in erstwhile FATA, border management, targeted intelligence-based operations, LEAs
capacity-building etc.). Interestingly, the policy also brought to the fore the role of
‘soft’ measures to prevent and counter the menace of violent extremism and terrorism.
And, in doing so, it recognized the multifacetedity of the issues embedded within
the structural determinants (such as socio-economic, political, regional, identity and
ideological-based). Hence, the policy recognized the significance of understanding what
drives (violent) extremism in order to be able to address the root causes. Similarly,
NISP (2018, p. 24) considered youth as a vulnerable and ‘at risk’ and a vulnerable
segment of society. It further suggested several themes such as: supporting community
actions, the role of mosques and madrassas, lack of social justice and the rule of law, and
exclusionary identity narrative.
In January 2018, NACTA produced ‘National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines’
(NCEPG, 2018). The guidelines aim to present a pathway towards “an inclusive,
connected, peaceful, and harmonious society” (p. 3). Rather than viewing (violent)
Policy Papers 5

extremism as a static phenomenon or mere constituted by anti-state elements/actors,

the NCEPG identified several ‘casual’ factors which build a “conducive environment
for breeding extremist ideologies” (p. 5). Based upon the strategy called CONNECT,
the guidelines aims to revive the lost people-to-people and people-to-state contacts.
Overall, the policy also had a blueprint to streamline and institutionalize the counter-
measures and intra-departmental collaborations under a single framework.
Particular emphasis was also put on ‘citizen engagement’ to prevent violent
extremism and ensure sustainable peace. With regards, NCEPG proposed ‘Ilaqa
committee Baraye Aman wa Behbud’ (local area committees for peace and welfare). The
role of these committees was envisioned at a very local, union-council or district level.
The policy document emphasized providing necessary support to the local authorities
to develop programmes and committees to tackle violent extremism actively. More
importantly, the committees were planned to be integrated within the existing local-
government administration. Three main pillars of the local area committee were: (i)
localized mapping of issues and solutions; (ii) citizen engagement projects; and (iii)
dispute resolution. In general, the strategy clearly had a community aspect in its
approach. The UK adopted a similar approach (under CONTEST strategy) through
appointing ‘prevent engagement’ police officers, providing necessary support to the
vulnerable groups in a particular spatial designated area. However, in the context
of Pakistan, we did not observe this policy rolling out at the national level to build
community resilience through engaging local authorities, per se.

Policy Recommendations
In a broader perspective, the evolution of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism journey does
exhibit a shift towards the key aspects of preventing and countering violent extremism.
For instance, the policy showed a tendency towards accommodating localized or
community-led approaches. Nevertheless, persistent challenges continue to impede the
effectiveness of NCEPG and NISP II. Three years after the policy documents, it is difficult
to claim that NACTA — as an authority — has tangibly contributed towards P/CVE. So as
for scholars and P/CVE practitioners are concerned, it is extremely difficult to convince
them that such policies (indeed commendable) have added value to the countering
toolkit(s).
Since 2014, NACTA’s role in P/CVE has been considerably heightened and
centralized. But without wholly realizing it, NACTA ‘discovered’ itself an unchartered
and ill-mapped territory; since the issue of violent extremism was deeply intertwined
with the ‘community’. It is probably fair to argue that the lack of inter-organization
coordination (civil vs. military) also signalled mixed messages about adapting soft and
community-centric approaches. Furthermore, the policies (i.e., NISP, 2018 & NCEPG,
6 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

2010) failed to recognize, include, and integrate the sub-national actors (such as non-
governmental/development organizations) who were well familiar and grounded
within the communities (both in conflict and post-conflict contexts). Consequently, the
policies did not produce substantial results and still has an inadequate or non-existent
relationship with local authorities or communities. While the scholarly community in
Pakistan moved to redress the theoretical deficiency, the studies related to CRVE, to
a greater extent, remain circumscribed by the lack of data or assesments (as proposed
in NISP, 2018 & NCEPG, 2018). It is to be further noticed that the landscape of P/CVE
is dependent upon the external consultants (via multi-lateral organizations) who are
mapping the related agendas.
Overall at policy level, there is no clear structure and delivery of the community-
based strategy, which has indeed compromised its very efficiency and effectiveness.
Therefore, several deficiencies need to be addressed at the tactical level. This study
suggests that the policy needs to invest in communities and non-government
(developmental) organizations, i.e. sub-national actors. Such an approach will enable
the P/CVE policy-led practice to refocus on downstream prevention of violent extremism;
hence, bolstering the resilience and capacity building at the local level. In addition,
our decades of experience has concluded that the threat (i.e. violent extremism and
terrorism) primarily originates from the marginalized communities, (ethno-religious)
identities and/or segments of the society.
Furthermore, as pointed out by several studies, violent extremist narrative
necessarily works towards widening the gap between the society, government and LEAs;
and, therefore, undermine any P/CVE related initiatives. Thus, the authorities must
provide confidence to the communities that their involvement is necessary and will
significantly improve the P/CVE practice. The outcome of such a formulation is a shared
understanding and environment, which is vital to ensure the best response to violent
extremism at a community level.
For the aforementioned reasons, the community needs to be at the centre of counter
terrorism and counter violent extremism. This principal must become implicit within
the state policies. This is without doubt the area where community itself become an early
warning system for the security organs of the society. We also need to understand how
can policy reach the most vulnerable groups of the society (such as youth, minorities,
ethnic identities) that are on the margins and whose views are potentially at odds with
integration (e.g., Grossman et al., 2020).
Indeed, the aspects pertaining to the delivery of preventing and countering violent
extremism in NCEPG (2018) are all evidence of an attempt to make the policy and
practice more apparent. However, it is crucial to consider the fragmented nature of
the departments or authorities. Therefore, the guidelines or trajectories may seem to
be understood differently from department to department; thus causing significant
Policy Papers 7

confusion among the ones responsible for delivering on the ground. In addition,
there is confusion concerning the preventing or countering approaches should revolve
around mere religiously-oriented or sect-oriented violent extremism, or it should also
encapsulate the wider society where ethnic-nationalists groups also commit or mobilize
themselves to commit violence. As a result, at the policy level, there is an additional
need to develop a (non-)linear linkage between extremism and violent extremism, and
why other forms of extremism which are not reliegously oriented or induced should be
part of countering strategy. It is, therefore, not surprising to observe that the broader
society and related sub-national actors are confused about the exact orientation of the
soft measures.
Lastly, the construct of community resilience must be considered as an effective
and long-term response to the threats of violent extremism and terrorism. The existing
policies must recofigure the tactical (but organic) manifestations of CRVE and its
functionalization at the macro or structural level. The strategies must envisage an
‘institutional-nongovernmental’ approach where NACTA can assist in developing the
capacities of the non-governmental actors (and other stakeholders) to include them
in a framework that allows them to conduct specific activities to the local conditions.
In addition, there is a need to empower and integrating non-governmental actors and
strategic donor engagement (i.e., multi-lateral organizations) at an institutional level;
thus, building resilient communities against violent extremism.

References
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Jacob_Spring2019.pdf
Cortright, D, Lopez, GA, Millar, A & Stellingwerf, LG 2008, Friend not foe: Civil society and the struggle
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pbei/kroc/0016499/f_0016499_14255.pdf
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88-94). IOS Press.
Ellis, BH & Abdi, S 2017, Building community resilience to violent extremism through genuine partner-
shipsm, American Psychologist, vol. 72, no. 3, p. 289.
Grossman, M, Hadfield, K, Jefferies, P, Gerrand, V & Ungar, M 2020, Youth resilience to violent extrem-
ism: Development and validation of the BRAVE measure, Terrorism and Political Violence, pp. 1-21.
Heydemann, S 2014, Countering violent extremism as a field of practice, United States Institute of
Peace (USIP) insights, 1(1), 9-11.
Ingram, HJ 2018, Terrorism Prevention in the United States, A Policy Framework for Filling the CVE
Void, Program on Extremism, Policy Paper, November 2018, viewed 14 July 2021, https://extremism.gwu.edu/
sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Terrorism%20Prevention%20Policy%20Paper.pdf
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Kessels, E & Nemr, C 2016, Countering violent extremism and development assistance, Policy Brief,
Washington, DC, Global Center on Cooperative Security
Kessels, E & Nemr, C 2016, Countering violent extremism and development assistance, Policy Brief,
Washington, DC, Global Center on Cooperative Security, viewed 15 July 2021, https://www.cvereference-
guide.org/sites/default/files/resources/Countering%20Violent%20Extremism%20and%20Development%20
Assistance.pdf
Lowndes, V & Thorp, L 2012, ‘Preventing violent extremism’–why local context matters. In The new extremism
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Counter Violent Extremism, Pakistan: Paramount.
Mirahmadi, H, Ziad, W, Farooq, M & Lamb, R 2016, Empowering Pakistan’s civil society to counter violent
extremism, Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 188.
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gov.pk/nap-2014/
National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines 2018, National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), viewed
10 July 2021, https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/NCEP-Guidlines.pdf
National Internal Security Policy 2018, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan.
Olojo, A, Sigsworth, R & Kaduyu, NM 2020, Preventing violent extremism in Uganda: the role of resilience and
dialogue, ISS East Africa Report, 2020, vol. 34, pp. 1-12.
Onapajo, H & Ozden, K 2020, Non-military approach against terrorism in Nigeria: Deradicalization strategies
and challenges in countering Boko Haram, Security Journal, pp. 1-17.
Orakzai, SB 2019, Pakistan’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Reframing the Policy Frame-
work for Peacebuilding and Development Strategies, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 42, no. 8, pp. 755-770.
Östevik, E 2020, An examination of local resilience against violent Islamic extremism in Sweden, Master
thesis, Swedish Defence University, viewed 02 August 2021, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1392773/
FULLTEXT01.pdf
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10 August 2021, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Pakistan-CVE-Case-Study.pdf
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violent extremism, Democracy and security, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 327-333.
Policy Papers 9

02
Opinions and Attitudes Towards Extremism
A comparison of students enrolled at public and private
universities in Karachi

Dr Mehtab S. Karim and Sakina Riaz

Abstract
Youth espousing extremist views is a global phenomenon. People in this age are
prone to extremism. This study is based on data collected from students enrolled at
public and private universities in Karachi about their attitudes and opinions regarding
extremism and the best way to curb it. Based on student opinions, an index of extremism
was constructed, which suggests that extremism is more prevalent amongst those
enrolled at public sector universities, particularly among males, who are younger, belong
to lower economic strata and are studying natural sciences, information technology and
engineering. The differences between students enrolled at public and private sector
universities remain statistically significant while taking into account their demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, age, economic status of the family
and their subject of study. However, neither their self-proclaimed religiosity levels nor
attendance of madrasa show any significant impact on extremism among the students.
It is recommended that all universities may offer compulsory educational programs on
countering violent extremism, particularly focusing the vulnerable students.

Keywords: Students rival groups, violence on campus, violent extremism,

militancy, unemployed youth

Introduction
The youth, particularly university students, are a crucial segment of a population
who are supposed to be the future agents of change as well. Economic progress,
national cohesion and social harmony of a country largely depends upon the economic
opportunities that should be provided to them with the ultimate goal of engaging them
positively and productively. In this respect, knowing their opinions on extremism is
critical so that appropriate policy measures might be taken to prevent them from being
radicalized.
In Pakistan, the total number of youths (in the age group 15-29) as reported in the
2017 census was 56.3 million, which constitutes 27.1 per cent of the total population.
Of these, the young adults, who fall in the college and university going age groups
10 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

(17-24 years) were 31.1 million (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 2021). The youth bulge in
Pakistan, together with the dearth of economic opportunities available to them and easy
access to internet to reach out to radical ideology, could be the major factors behind the
spread of extremism among them.
In the past, rival groups of students have often been found in conflict with one
another on campuses. In the 1980s, Rangers had to be brought in to control students’
rival groups in Karachi University (Mahmood 2019). Similarly, the rival groups had often
fought with each other in Punjab University (Baloch & Musyani 2018).
In recent times, violence on university campuses has been on the rise. Clashes have
been reported between student wings of various religious, political, and ethnic groups
on the university premises across the country. Student groups particularly in most of the
public sector universities are deeply polarized along linguistic, sectarian, and political
lines (Haq 2017). The surge in violence can be attributed to the emergence of extremism
on university campuses. The most heart-broken incidence was reported at Abdul Wali
Khan University in Mardan in 2017, where Mashal Khan, a 23-year-old student of Mass
Communication, was killed by a group of students for allegedly posting blasphemous
content on social media. Rashid (2017) argues that “today, with the exception of a few
campuses, Pakistani universities have no space of freedom for learning, ideological
debate, or critical thinking.
During post 9/11 era, several studies have been conducted on the rise of extremism
in Pakistan. However, studies based on quantitative data with a large enough sample
size are limited. These studies are also scattered, therefore, have rarely been used to
reach a policy decision. Siddiqa (2010) interviewed about 600 students from Karachi,
Lahore, and Islamabad and reports that attending elite educational institutions does not
result in youths becoming liberal.
In another study, Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro (2013) conducted a nationally
representative survey of 6,000 adults (18 years and older) across Pakistan, measuring
their attitudes toward specific militant organizations. The study did not find a relationship
between the intensity of self-proclaimed religiosity and support for militarized jihad.
The authors suggest that both Pakistani and international policy makers will have to first
understand, and then engage the specific militant organizations to meaningfully reduce
militancy.
Ahmed and Jafri (2020), for their comparative study of students’ perception about
extremism, collected data from two public sector universities in Islamabad. They
suggest different dynamics of extremist material and extremist recruitment between
1
‘NACTA was established as an administrative entity under Ministry of Interior in 2008. However, it was reorganized
as federal authority vide NACTA Act 2013 to act as a focal national institution and unify state response to counter
extremism and terrorism by combining the efforts of law enforcement & intelligence agencies and by formulating and
implementing policies & action plans through continuous research, adaptive innovation and ancillary mechanisms’
(https://nacta.gov.pk).
Policy Papers 11

the two universities. They report that while one university is dominated by politically-
motivated ethnic groups, students at the other are exposed to religiously-motivated
contents, violence, and recruitment.
Todate, no such study has been specifically conducted in Karachi. Karim and Baqai
(2020) argue that migration to the city of Karachi from within Pakistan and Afghanistan,
has resulted in militant organizations finding sanctuary. Unemployed and disenchanted
youths, and those from poor families easily fall prey to these organizations, resulting in
the spread of extremism among the youth, and spread of violence in the city.
The Case of Karachi
Karachi is not only the largest metropolis of Pakistan, but also the country’s
commercial hub. The city is also known as “mini Pakistan” where people from all the
districts have migrated (Shah 1987). Among the megacities of the world, Karachi city
is considered as overly populated, ethnically diverse, politically volatile and poorly
managed (Karim 1996). Over the past three decades, Karachi has often seen ethnic,
sectarian and political violence (Ahmer 1996; Budhani 2010; Baqai and Hassan 2017).
Historically, post-colonial megacities’ premier economic status contributed to an
enormous increase in their populations. The population of Karachi grew from about
300,000 in 1941 to over a million in 1951, mainly due to immigration from India (Karim
and Baqai 2020). Since then, there has been a constant internal migration to Karachi
from other provinces in addition to inflow of illegal immigrants from neighboring
Afghanistan. During 1981-1998, Karachi’s population almost doubled as reported in
the 1998 census. The 2017 census counted about 16 million people, however, most
commentators have argued that the city’s population is more than 22 million (Karim
2018). The constant waves of migration to Karachi from other areas of the country have
changed the ethnic complexion of the city. Post 9/11 conflicts and surgical strikes in
Afghanistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province) have resulted in large-scale migration to Karachi that also led to ethnic
polarization (Baqai & Hassan 2017)
However, the violence matrix of Karachi is not about law and order. This is
apparently a by-product of the demographic convulsions the city has been experiencing
since the early 1960s, too many people moving to the city from all over the country,
while most of the city’s population has been deprived of the basic civic amenities, a
phenomena identified in the mid-1980s (Karim 1987) which led to widespread riots
(Hussain 1986). Since then, violence has continued in Karachi which is considered
one of the most violent cities of comparable size in South Asia as reported by key
international newspapers and magazines. According to one estimate, the city has a
significant number of illegal lethal weapons, which was one of the major factors behind
murders and crimes (Chotani et al. 2002). In 2001, the murder rate in Karachi was
4.04 per 100,000 population and between 1994 and 2004, there were 8,816 casualties
12 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

reported through incidents of violence including murders, torture by non-state actors,

kidnappings for ransom, vigilante reprisals, bombings, and suicide attacks. Lately, low
intensity violence was carried out without any gap (Budhani 2010).
The operation by Pakistan Army against Taliban in Swat in 2007 and 2009 resulted
in internal displacements. Thousands left their homes and Karachi was the obvious
choice for majority to settle in, which was already home to some millions of Pashtuns.
This trend gained momentum in 2009, when the military operation reached South
Waziristan, Mohmand Agency, Bajaur, and Dir. This resulted in unchecked migration to
Karachi from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA as well as Afghanistan (Karim & Baqai 2020).
The increasing violence in Karachi apparently had bearing on university students
who are mainly drawn from the city. One example of violent extremism affecting
university students is of Saad Aziz, a graduate of an elite university in Karachi, who
was affiliated with Al-Qaeda sleeper cell in Karachi and along with others, was involved
in target killing of members of religious minorities and security officials (Sahoutara,
2019). In this background, this study aims to ascertaining the attitudes and opinions of
students regarding extremism keeping in view the following questions.
• To what extent extremist views have penetrated among the students attending
public or private sector universities in Karachi?
• Do socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, self-assessed religious
observance, and madrasa attendance affect students’ views about extremism?

Methodology
Karachi city has about 47 universities and degree-awarding institutes. Of these, 11
are in the public sector and 36 in the private sector. During the months of April and May
2021, an online questionnaire was developed aiming at ascertaining information from
students. A pre-coded questionnaire was used, which was divided into several sections
seeking demographic and socioeconomic information about the respondents, including
their family background, and their attitudes towards and opinions on extremism.
Students were approached through faculty members at several public and private
sector universities and their opinions and attitudes were ascertained through several
research questions, each measured with the help of a five-point Likert scale, i.e. (1)
strongly agree (2) agree (3), neutral (4), disagree (5), and strongly disagree. A total of
690 students completed the survey. About five per cent of students did not respond to
all the questions, which were treated as missing vales.

Key Findings
Demographic and Socio-economic Background of Student
Table 1 shows demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and religious
Policy Papers 13

orientation of students. They are from diverse backgrounds. About three-fourths of the
students, who responded, were males; about one-third fell below age 22; over one-
third came from lower economic background; over two-fifths were studying business
and commerce, one fourth were studying natural sciences, IT & engineering and three-
tenths were studying social sciences; over two-thirds consider themselves as moderately
religious, and about three-tenths attended a religious school or madrasa. Slightly over
half are enrolled at private universities.
Table 1: Number and Percentage Distribution of students by their Characteristics
Characteristics of Respondents Number Percent
Gender
Male 397 58.4
Female 283 41.6
Age-group
Below20 112 16.5
20-21 325 47.9
22-23 128 18.9
24 & above 114 16.8
Economic Status*
Lower 251 36.4
Middle 128 18.6
Upper 311 45.1
Subject of Study
Management Sciences & Commerce 286 43.8
Natural Sciences, IT & Engineering 165 25.3
Social Sciences 202 30.9
Self-Assessed Religiosity
Not Religious 78 11.5
Moderately Religious 443 65.4
Very Religious 156 23.0
Ever Attended Madrassa/Religious School
Attended 200 29.5
Not Attended 478 70.5
Type of University
Public 323 47.1
Private 363 52.9

* Based on possession of car and air-conditioners by the family. Those having neither are
considered belonging to the lower strata; those having one of the items are from the middle
strata, and those having both are from the upper strata.
14 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Note: Total does not add to 690 due to non-responses to some of the questions.
Opinions and Attitudes of Students towards Extremism
In this section we discuss how those enrolled at public sector universities differ
with those enrolled at private sector universities.
Main Causes of Extremism
As shown in Table 2, a higher percentage of students at private sector universities
is in agreement with the statement that economic deprivation, political exclusion,
global discriminatory policies, and joining a group having extremist ideas are causes of
extremism.
When compared with those enrolled at public sector universities, about twice
enrolled at private sector universities strongly agree with the statement that global
discriminatory policies are the major causes of extremism. Over one-third of students
strongly agree with the statements that global discriminatory policies, having extremist
friends, and joining a group having extremist ideas are causes of extremism.
Policy Papers 15

Table 2: Perception of students about the causes of extremism in Pakistan by the type of
university
Statement Type of University
Public Private Both
Economic deprivation among young people promotes
extremism
Strongly Agree 12.0 7.4 9.6
Somewhat Agree 43.8 61.0 52.8
No Opinion/Neutral 38.2 24.7 31.1
Disagree 4.7 5.7 5.2
Strongly Disagree 1.3 1.2 1.2
Number of Students 336 317 653
Political exclusion is a cause of extremism
Strongly Agree 13.3 7.7 10.4
Somewhat Agree 38.0 56.7 47.8
No Opinion/Neutral 40.5 30.6 35.3
Disagree 5.7 4.2 5.2
Strongly Disagree 2.5 0.9 1.2
Number of Students 337 316 653
Global discriminatory policies are major causes of extremism
Strongly Agree/// 19.9 39.2 29.9
Somewhat Agree 31.0 24.6 27.6
No Opinion/Neutral 40.8 29.1 34.8
Disagree 6.6 6.5 6.6
Strongly Disagree 1.6 0.6 1.1
Number of Students 337 316 653
Friends play an important role for a young person to
have violent extremist ideas
Strongly Agree 22.9 48.4 36.0
Agree 41.6 30.7 36.0
No Opinion/Neutral 31.1 16.7 23.6
Disagree 3.8 3.9 3.8
Strongly Disagree 0.6 0.3 0.5
Number of Students 335 315 650
A young person could easily become extremist
or radical by joining a group having extremist ideas
Strongly Agree 23.8 46.0 35.2
Agree 44.1 34.3 39.1
No Opinion/Neutral 27.3 15.2 21.1
Disagree 4.4 3.9 4.2
Strongly Disagree 0.3 0.6 0.5
Number of Students 335 315 650
16 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Countering the Spread of Extremism

When students’ opinions were ascertained about the best way to control the spread
of extremism in the country, a much higher percentage of those enrolled at private
sector universities tend to strongly agree that parents and university teachers could
play an important role in controlling violent ideas among adult children and students.
This shows a significant confidence in parents and teachers among students. With
regard to an effective way to deal with those having extremist views, more than twice
of those enrolled at private sector universities as compared with those at public sector
universities, strongly agree with the statement that the most effective way to deal with
those with extremist views is to avoid them.
Table 3: Percentage of Distribution of students by their response to the best way to control
the spread of extremism
Statement Type of University
Public Private Both
Parents could play an important role in controlling
violent extremist ideas of adult children
Strongly Agree 33.1 53.9 43.8
Agree 44.9 31.4 38.0
No Opinion/Neutral 17.8 11.7 14.7
Disagree 3.2 3.0 3.1
Strongly Disagree 1.0 0 0.5
Number of Students 334 314 648
University teachers could play an important role in
controlling violent ideas among students
Strongly Agree 27.0 48.7 38.2
Agree 45.7 35.2 40.3
No Opinion/Neutral 23.5 13.1 18.2
Disagree 3.5 1.5 2.5
Strongly Disagree 0.3 1.5 0.9
Number of Students 335 315 650
The most effective way to deal with those with
extremist views is to avoid them
Strongly Agree 21.9 40.1 31.3
Somewhat Agree 37.5 24.0 30.5
No Opinion/Neutral 31.4 21.4 26.2
Disagree 8.3 11.3 9.8
Strongly Disagree 1.0 3.3 2.1
Number of Students 337 315 652
Index of Extremism
An index of extremism was constructed with the help of three questions; whether
the students showed interest in visiting an extremist website; whether they showed
Policy Papers 17

interest in chatting on internet with people who advocate violence as a mean to achieve
a political objective and whether they would not mind being in the company of those
having extremist views. Those answering strongly agree or agree with all the three
statements are considered as having extremist tendencies.
As illustrated in Figure 1, about one-fourth of the students were classified as having
extremist views, however, there is a significant difference among those attending public
and private sector universities. The percentage of students espousing extremist views
is twice among public sector universities than private sector universities (34 and 17 %,
respectively). Further analyses as reported in Figure 2, indicate that extremist views are
highly prevalent among males in 20 , those who are 20 years or younger, belong to
families from lower socioeconomic strata, are studying natural sciences, information
technology and engineering, had attended madrassa and reported themselves as
moderately religious.
Figure 1: Percentage of university students in Karachi with or without extremist views
Public University Students Private University Students All Students
Have extremist views Have extremist views Have extremist views
Don’t have extremist views Don’t have extremist views Don’t have extremist views

17%
26%
34%

74%
66%
83%

Figure 2 illustrates differentials in having extremist views among students by their

background characteristics, indicating substantially higher percentage having extremist
n Have extremist views n Don’t have extremist views
86 86 85 83
83 83 81 80
77
70 71
65 64
55 51
49
45
35 36
30 29
23
17 17 19
17
20
14 14 15
Business
Management

Moderately
Religious

No

Yes
Upper
Female

Male

21 & older

Lover

IT & Engineering
20 & younger

Social Science
Middle

Not Religious

Very Religious

Gender Age Economic Status Subject of Study Self-assesed Attended

Religiosity Madrssa

Figure 2: Percentage of university students in Karachi having or not having extremist views
by their background characteristics
18 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

views among males, those who are younger, belong to lower economic strata, are
studying natural sciences, information technology and engineering.
Further analysis was conducted using logistics regression. As reported in Table 4,
differentials in espousing extremist views between students attending public and private
sector universities remains significant after taking into account students’ background
characteristics.
Students at public sector universities are 2.6 times more likely to have extremist
views against those enrolled at private sector universities. While all other socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics show significant impact on having extremist views
among students, neither their self-proclaimed religiosity nor their experience of
attending madrassa show any significant impact on their inclination toward extremism.
Table 4: Multivariate analysis of having extremist views among students enrolled at public
and private sector universities in Karachi.
Number of Per cent Adjusted Odds P-value
Students Ratio and
(95% Confidence
Interval)
UNIVERSITY TYPE
Private [REF] 363 52.9 1.00
Public 323 47.1 2.59 (1.637-4.096 0.029
SUBJECT OF STUDY
Business Management [REF] 286 41.4 1.00
Social Sciences 239 34.6 1.40 (0.831-2.363)
IT & Engineering 165 23.9 2.27 (1.241-4.154) 0.008
GENDER
Female [REF] 283 41.6 1.00
Male 397 58.4 1.94 (0.900-2.434) 0.010
AGE
21 years & older [REF] 354 52.8 1.00
20 years & younger 326 47.2 1.61 (0.344-2.191) 0.044
ECONOMIC STATUS
Upper [REF] 251 36.4 1.00
Middle 128 18.6 1.49 (0.776-2.897)
Lower 251 36.4 3.18 (1.930-6.167) 0.001
RELIGIOSITY
Very Religious [REF] 156 23.0 1.00
Moderately Religious 443 65.4 1.39 (0.771-2.502)
Not Religious 78 11.5 2.13 (0.988-4.586) Not significant
ATTENDED MADARSSA
Yes [REF] 200 29.5 1.00
No 478 70.5 1.05 (0.836-0.637) Not significant
*A total of 690 students responded, however, some did not respond to a few questions.
Policy Papers 19

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This study has identified that university students in Karachi (who are attending
public sector universities, particularly those who are males, 20 years and younger belong
to lower economic strata, and are studying natural sciences, IT and engineering) are at
a higher risk of getting exposed to extremist views. However, there is no indication
that those who tend to have extremist views are prone to become radicalized and may
be used by extremist elements to advance their agendas. Therefore, it is critical that
those students who have tendencies to get involved in extremist activities are identified
pre-emptively.
• To protect students from extremist elements, it is important that students
remain civically engaged, and participate in sports and other social activities,
including community service and the democratic process.
• Moreover, since a majority students indicate that university teachers play an
important role in curbing extremism, faculty members should be offered
short courses and workshops aimed at garnering their attention towards
more productive activities. These include fostering a learning environment
and promoting public spaces where social and intellectual personalities and
other public figures from civil society can hold a dialogue directly with young
students about the detrimental impact of extremism on themselves, their
families, and society at large.
• It is imperative that educational programs should focus on equipping students
with skills to counter extremist ideas, by teaching them critical thinking and
comparative religions. Extremist propaganda must be removed from curricula
across all subject-matters.
• There should be regular check on the activities of different student groups on
the university premises. Those found involved in extremist activities or having
links with extremist or terrorist outfits should be interrogated and expelled
from the institution. In this regard, both faculty and staff should take the
responsibility of keeping the suspected students under surveillance.

References
Ahmed, ZS and Jafri, QA 2020, “Drivers of violent extremism in higher education institutions of Pakistan”,
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 17 September, vol.13, no.3, pp. 230-244
Ahmar, M. 1996, “Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crisis” Asians Survey. vol. 36, no. 10
Baloch, SM and Musyani, Z 2018, “Pakistan’s Dark History of Student Extremists”, The Diplomat, November
16, viewed 10 June 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/pakistans-dark-history-of-student-extremists/
Chotani, HA, Razzak, JA and Luby, SP 2002 “Patterns of violence in Karachi, Pakistan”, Injury Prevention, vol
8, no.1.
Fair, CC, Malhotra, N and Shapiro, JN 2013, “Democratic Values and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence
from a National Survey of Pakistan”, Journal of Conflict Resolution. March
Haq, R 2017, “Campus violence rising in country”, The Tribune, 12 February, viewed 10 June 2021, https://
tribune.com.pk/story/1324239/student-clashes-campus-violence-rising-country.
20 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Karim, MS 1987, “Karachi’s Demographic Dilemma,” Dawn Magazine 27 February.
Karim, MS 1996, Megacities: Crises and Challenges, Aga Khan University, Karachi.
Karim, MS and Baqai, H 2020, “Migration and its Impact on Political and Demographic Scenarios: The Case of
Karachi” Pakistan Journal of International Affairs, vol. 3, no.2.
Mahmood, N 2019, “Student affairs in Karachi”, The News, 06 October, viewed 10 June 2021, https://www.
thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/568632-student-affairs-karachi.
Rashid, A 2017, “Mashal’s death is the result of regression of our student politics”, DAWN, 28 April, viewed
12 June 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1329778/mashals-death-is-a-result-of-the-regression-of-our-student-
politics.
Sahoutara, N 2019, “Saad Aziz jailed for 20 years for attempting to kill American educationist”, DAWN, 01
March, viewed 12 June 2021, https://www.dawn.com/news/1466788.
Shah, NM (ed.) 1987. Pakistani Women: A Socioeconomic Demographic Profile. Pakistan Institute of Devel-
opment Economics, Islamabad
Siddiqa, A 2010, Red Hot Chilli Peppers Islam - Is the Youth in Elite Pakistani Universities Radical?, Heinirich
Boll Foundation
Policy Papers 21

03
Promoting Critical Pedagogy to Counter Violent
Extremism on Campus
Dr Fatima Waqi Sajjad

Abstract
Violent extremism is an alarming phenomenon, which is a threat to global peace,
security, and sustainability. It relates to a specific mindset and thinking pattern. The
United Nations (UN) considers education a key area of action to counter and prevent
it. Poor quality and inequality in education and it’s link to unemployment are identified
as key drivers of violent extremism. However, these drivers do not explain incidents
of violent extremism among the highly educated and financially well-off university
students. This study explores the phenomenon of violent extremism among university
students and suggests ways to effectively counter it. By analyzing qualitative data, the
study argues that if extremism is defined as ‘closing one’s mind to the possibility of
difference’, education can counter it by ‘opening up minds to different perspectives
and possibilities’. Hence an open and informed dialogue on contemporary issues must
be encouraged in universities. Apart from initiating an open dialogue, critical pedagogy
is an effective tool to instill critical consciousness into students, which can help build
resilience against extremism. The study seeks to devise a social science policy vision
based on indigenous needs and social, political, and cultural norms.

Keywords: Critical Pedagogy, violent extremism, radicalization, P/CVE, critical

thinking

Introduction
Violent extremism among the highly educated individuals is an alarming
phenomenon that raises critical questions for scholarly exploration. Gambetta & Hertog
(2017) explore profiles of militants involved in terrorist activities, according to which
a staggering 46 per cent of militants from the Middle East were identified as university
graduates, of whom 45 per cent were engineering graduates. The study questions as
to why such highly educated individuals were inclined towards terrorist activities.
Similar questions have also been raised in Pakistan when certain university graduates
were found guilty of such activities. Sabeen Mahmood, a human rights activist, was

1
Ansar ul Sharia was a Pakistan-based Al Qaeda-inspired militant group. It reportedly comprised hardly 10 individu-
als caught by the security forces in 2017
22 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

killed by a graduate of a top business school in Karachi on 24 April 2015. In 2017,

Pakistan’s security forces busted all the members of Ansar ul Sharia,1 whose leader held
a Master’s degree in Applied Physics from a well-known public sector university, and
all other members of this group were also university graduates; Mashal Khan, a student
of Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan was killed by a crowd of his fellow students
on the university premises. Incidents of violent extremism in universities and growing
militancy among the highly educated pose serious question to our education system. In
this backdrop, this study probes the following questions:
a) What factors explain violent extremism among the highly educated?
b) How can education be used to prevent violent extremism?
c) How can critical pedagogy build resilience in students against extremism?
d) How do the prevailing education practices hinder education’s potential to
counter extremism?

In the light of above questions, the study seeks to understand the link between
education and countering violent extremism. It argues that education can counter
extremism when it promotes free dialogue on critical issues to develop critical
consciousness among students. It proposes critical pedagogy, a philosophically grounded
practice, as a mean to nurture critical consciousness in students and effectively counter
extremism on campus. It further questions the contemporary education policies and
practices that nurture compliance and block the way of critical thinking.
The broader objective of the study is to inform higher education policy-making
institutions how to effectively counter extremism on campuses. It identifies the gaps in
existing CVE policies and problems with the prevailing education practices.
Significance for the Policy Makers
The study aims to inform policy makers about the missing link between countering
violent extremism (CVE) and higher education policies. The target audience is
government security agencies, NACTA, Ministry of Education, Higher Education
Commission (HEC), international agencies / local NGOs / think tanks working in the
field of CVE and education.

Methodology
The study uses qualitative data as evidence in support of the arguments presented.
The first research question has been explored through a systematic review of literature.
The second and fourth questions have been addressed through literature review as well
as in-depth interviews of experts (Appendix A). The third question uses secondary data
for analysis.
Policy Papers 23

Literature Review
Factors that explain extremism among the highly educated and how
education can counter them
Before exploring the afore-mentioned question, one needs to be clear about the
term, violent extremism. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
[UNESCO] 2017) points out the complexities of defining this term, as it refers to an
essentially contested phenomenon. The absence of a universally accepted definition
remains a problem. However, Desmund Tutu2 most properly defines extremism as: “…
when you do not allow for a different point of view; when you hold your own views as
being quite exclusive, when you don’t allow for the possibility of difference.” (The Doha
Debates 2006)
This concise yet a comprehensive definition of extremism explains how insisting
on a fixed set of ideas and unwillingness to accommodate different ideas, is an attitude
that needs to be rectified.
This definition gives us a clue as to how education can be used to prevent or
counter extremism. If extremism is understood as closing our minds to the possibility
of difference, preventing or countering it should entail doing the opposite, which is
opening our minds to the possibility of difference. It means education can prevent
or counter extremism when it encourages open thinking, promotes broader, deeper,
and critical thinking that questions our pre-conceived ideas and assumptions. It is not
only the education in general, but also critical thinking and critical consciousness that
prevent or counter extremism.
To further consider how education can be used to counter extremism, one needs
to examine the factors that breed extremism among the well-educated, and then reflect
how education can address these factors. UNESCO policy guide summarizes multiple
drivers of extremism identified in literature. These are divided into two categories:
‘individual motivations’ termed as pull factors and ‘conducive conditions’ termed as
push factors. Among the pull factors identified in the study, the following points may
explain extremism among the well-educated:
- search for identity and purpose
- boredom
- sense of mission
- promise of adventure
- identification with collective grievances
- distortion and misuse of beliefs
- attraction of charismatic leadership

2
A South African Anglican cleric, who received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1984 for his role in the opposition to
apartheid in South Africa.
24 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Among push factors, the following points may explain extremism among the well-
educated ;
- marginalization and sense of injustice
- prolonged unresolved conflicts
- poor governance and violations of human rights
Now, one needs to examine how education can address the afore-mentioned drivers
of extremism. That is, how education can provide students with a sense of identity,
purpose and mission; how education can promise adventure and alleviate boredom;
how education can address collective grievances, enable students to undo ideological
distortions or manipulation by charismatic leadership. We also need to consider if and
how education can address injustice, marginalization, and human rights violations and
if it can contribute to resolve prolonged conflicts (Sajjad 2019).
Today, most anti-radicalization policies and practices view education either as a
mean of surveillance on students or a mode of promoting the state narratives. Sukarieh
and Tannok (2016) point out how European countries have developed a massive anti-
radicalization industry in recent years, which seeks to identify radicalization among
students. UK’s Prevent Extremism policy has been described as a frontrunner of this anti-
radicalization industry. Prevent strategy seeks to monitor students to identify potential
terrorists, and to promote British values in schools (Novelli 2017). Such policies attempt
to monitor and control students’ thinking rather than develop it. Sukarieh and Tannock
(2016) point out that anti-radicalization policies stress the need for debate and critical
thinking on issues related to radicalization. Wallner (2020) offers a systematic and
comprehensive review of Prevent/ Counter Violent Extremism (P/CVE) interventions in
education. She has listed a number of P/CVE strategies adopted in recent years, including
interventions focusing on knowledge of students and interventions focusing on the way
students think. She points out that most P/CVE strategies are based on assumptions
instead of rigorously tested theories.
She concludes that interventions that involve students in dialogue and debate on
controversial topics tend to be far more effective than monitoring or spying students.
When students are equipped with life skills that enable them to critically analyze the
world around them and interact with different people, they develop an open-minded
attitude and respect for difference. Critical thinking has been repeatedly described in
literature as a key skill that builds resilience in students against the sway of violent
ideologies (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]
2017, p. 32; Ghosh et al. 2017; Sajjad 2019, p. 212). It is pertinent to note that Wallner
(2020), at one point, describes situations in which critical thinking may not prevent
violent extremism. It is when ‘grievances voiced by extremists on structural inequality,
poverty, injustice, marginalization and discrimination are often real, making ideas of
overcoming these injustices through violence – as advocated by violent extremists – a
Policy Papers 25

legitimate argument for rational and educated individuals’. Critical thinking in such
cases may not prevent violent extremism. These are precisely the situations where we
need to rethink the problem of violent extremism and what we are trying to achieve
through education. Education can prevent/counter violent extremism when it allows
students to think for themselves and nurtures their critical judgment, especially in the
situations where injustice is real.
How Critical Pedagogy can build resilience in students against extremism?
Critical pedagogy represents a wide range of teaching practices that take inspiration
from the philosophy of Paulo Freire3, a Brazilian philosopher, who was the staunch
advocate of critical pedagogy. He envisioned classrooms as sites of social change.
Kincheloe (2008) says: Critical pedagogy is grounded on a social and educational vision
of justice and equality; it aims to mitigate the effects of power and subtle workings of
structural and cultural violence on students. It is dedicated to the alleviation of human
suffering; it argues that suffering is a humanly constructed phenomenon and can be
alleviated through collective action. It prevents students from being hurt; it contends
that parts of school curriculum should address the everyday problems faced by teachers
and students in their effort to live just and ethical lives.
In critical pedagogy, teachers retain the role of researchers and learners; they are not
simply the functionaries who follow top-down orders without question. They should be
the producers of knowledge. Teachers become researchers of their students; there is a
continuous dialogue with students that questions prevailing power structures. Teachers
listen carefully to students’ problems and frame them in broader social, political, and
cultural contexts. Critical pedagogy remains interested in margins of the society and
aims to voice the concerns of the oppressed.
The key characteristics of critical pedagogy indicate the promise of this educational
approach in addressing the fundamental drivers of extremism identified earlier. It
is precisely the kind of education that alleviates boredom, gives a sense of purpose/
adventure and empowers students to make a positive change in the real world through
peaceful means. Paulo Freire terms this type of education as ‘problem posing education’,
a humanist and liberating practice of education that enables individuals to overcome ‘their
false perception of reality’ and to transform reality into a desirable way (Freire 2005; 86;
McLaren & Kincheloe 2007). A transformative and empowering education practice that
addresses real life concerns can become the most effective strategy to prevent extremism
and build resilience against extremism among the well-educated individuals.
Freire’s critical pedagogy aims to nourish critical consciousness in students, a
vital skill that builds resilience in students against dogmatic and extremist ideologies.
Through a dialogue about their lives, grievances, and everyday experiences with multiple
3
A Brazilian philosopher and educator, who was staunch advocate of critical pedagogy. He envisioned classrooms
as sites of social change.
26 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

forms of structural and cultural violence, students are able to see oppression not only
as a fixed or given condition (from which there is no exit except through violence), but
also as a changeable situation that can be transformed through positive collective action.
Education that offers hope and promise through collective action can counter violent
extremism in the best possible way.

Discussion and Analysis

How prevailing education practices hinder education’s potential to counter
extremism?
Based on in-depth interviews with university faculty, it has been observed that
existing education practices and teaching methods in Pakistani universities do little
to empower students or develop their critical consciousness or instill among them
passions for collective action.
University teachers, interviewed for this study, gave a number of reasons behind
the rise of extremism on campuses. One reason was the dominant traditional methods
of teaching that do not allow students to think independently. It was pointed out that
quite often teachers neither believe in critical thinking, nor promote it. Independent
thinking that promotes creativity is blocked. When thinking is blocked, students become
vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Mariam Chughtai (personal communication, 28
October 2020) said:
If universities become spaces where like-minded people meet each other and
enforce that like-minded mentality on everybody else, such places will promote
greater extremism.
Pointing out the perils of prevailing hierarchical, compliance-oriented culture
in universities, many teachers noted that there seems to be a fear of free and critical
dialogue. In addition to the predominance of traditional teacher-centric methods of
education (called the banking model of education by Freire), two further trends in
higher education have been pointed out as factors that block critical thinking and open
dialogue.
The growing influence of market-oriented neoliberal values has been considered a
major hindrance to free and critical dialogue on campuses (Giroux 2002, 2010, 2014,
2015; Ball 2012a, 2012b; Kincheloe 2009). Sukareih and Tannok (2016) idntify the key
features of ‘the neoliberal turn in education’ as:
The narrowing of the curriculum to focus on market valued skills and knowledge,
the closing down of humanities, social sciences and liberal arts perspectives, the
imposition of high-stakes standardised assessments, the suppression of student
dissent … recurrent attacks on academic freedom, and the overall, endless
promotion of corporate interests and partnerships. (p. 14).
Policy Papers 27

Spring (2014) terms this trend as the ‘economization of education’, where

education is guided by the goal of economic growth and evaluated through the lens
of an economist. Such a lens reduces education to ‘an investment in the workforce’,
where students are viewed as ‘human capital’ and learning is limited to ‘skills-based
instruction’ measured through standardized assessment.
According to most university teachers, market and career-oriented higher education
not only restricts freedom of thought but also students’ right to pursue a degree of their
choice. Khalid Zaheer (personal communication, 02 September 2020) said:
Real and genuine learning is not taking place because students do not choose
their field of study in accordance with their inclinations and abilities owing to
family and peer pressures.
A compliance oriented managerial culture in universities also restricts meaningful
classroom interaction and open dialogue. Khalid Zaheer (personal communication, 02
September 2020) said:
Universities are revenue generating projects. They focus only on numbers. In this
environment, a fruitful student-teacher interaction is by and large missing. The
impact that a good teacher can have on students is seriously missing.
Another prevailing trend that blocks critical and reflective thinking in universities is
a tendency to blindly imitate the Western academia. Alatas (2016) observes that research
and scholarship in post-colonial societies, especially in the field of social Sciences and
Humanities, remains dominated by the Western thought, concerns and practices. He
coins the term ‘the captive mind’ to refer to ‘an uncritical and imitative mind dominated
by an external source, whose thinking is deflected from an independent perspective’
(Alatas 2016, 1). Many scholars interviewed for this study expressed dismay over the
captive mind syndrome in research and higher education policies in Pakistan. Tahir
Kamran (personal communication, 08 September 2020) said:
The knowledge we produce has to have an immediate connection with ourselves.
We need to identify problems that connect with ourselves. (Currently) we are far
too abstract. Our Social Sciences do not connect with our historical experiences.
There is a disconnect between our being and our knowledge.
Being a university teacher, I can relate to these observations. Instead of nurturing
local academic communities and generating authentic research on indigenous problems,
current higher education policies as well as public and private sector universities
encourage the unthinking race for global rankings. Instead of taking pride in resolving
local issues, and questioning global epistemic injustice and epistemic violence,
the universities take pride in their inclusion in the global rankings. There is little
engagement with critical scholarship in education and social sciences that questions
university rankings’ purpose and criteria (Ball 2014; Pusser and Marginson 2013; Mc
Clean, Abbas & Ashwin 2017). There is seldom a reflection on the meaning and purpose
28 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

of higher education for our society and people.

The university teachers interviewed for this study also questioned policies that
prefer importing expertise from foreign countries as if experts from foreign lands can
fix all issues swiftly. Tahir Kamran (personal communication, 08 September 2020) said:
Importing people from outside who are not able to understand ground realities,
does not help the situation at all. (To fix issues) there is a need to trust, train and
empower the locals.
Dr Nadeem ul Haq (personal communication, 09 October 2020) said:
The mindset that those who come from abroad have a magic wand and can
resolve all problems needs to change.
Owing to the growing influence of neoliberal values and the widespread
assumption that imitation can bring quality in education, the prevailing education in
Pakistani universities lacks a critical engagement with issues that matter to our context
and students. Hence our universities fail to inculcate critical consciousness in students
that can defend them against extremism.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

To prevent/counter violent extremism in universities, one needs to ensure that
universities become safe places for open and critical dialogue. The prevailing culture of
compliance nurtures uncritical minds that remain susceptible to extremist ideologies.
Higher education must aim to nurture critical consciousness in students to build resilience
against extremism. Economic growth is an important goal, but it is certainly not the only
goal of higher education. The exclusive focus on economy overshadows the goals of
nurturing human intellect and transforming human society. This oversight is very costly.
To prevent violent extremism through education, the goal of nurturing human mind
and intellect must be given due importance in institutions of higher education. For this
purpose, the importance of social sciences and the humanities must be duly recognized.
Critical pedagogy is an effective way to cultivate human minds and address multiple
drivers of violent extremism on campus. Hence critical pedagogy must be promoted as
a policy. With the intent of developing students’ critical faculties to effectively counter
extremism on campus, following policy measures for higher education may be suggested.
Current education policies and practices must be reviewed and reformed with the
aim to instill critical consciousness in students that remains the most effective way to
counter extremism.
• A broader social sciences policy vision based on our indigenous needs and
socio-political norms should be devised. It should be theoretically informed;
Critical, historical, post-colonial, and de-colonial perspectives should inform
and shape the goals of social sciences education, as these perspectives resonate
Policy Papers 29

with the worldview and concerns of the Global South.

• State-of-the-art courses of social sciences/ peace education/critical pedagogy/
world history, specifically designed for Pakistani students, should be introduced
as general courses in universities as well as professional colleges. The current
HEC Undergraduate Education Policy (2020) includes courses on ‘Civilizational
Knowledge’. The scope, quality and number of these courses must be significantly
enhanced. These courses must aim to develop critical consciousness in students
through dialogue and discussion on social, political, and moral issues.
• Teachers should be trained to teach these courses in a manner that encourages
free debate and discussion. Teachers’ training and development is the most
challenging task. If a culture of open dialogue is encouraged as a policy,
teaching skills can be developed over time.

References
Alatas , SF 2016, ‘Captive Mind’ Wiley Online Library, 1st August, viewed 03 June 2021, viewed 02 Septem-
ber 2021 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosc006.pub2
Ball, SJ 2012a, Global education inc.: New policy networks and the neo-liberal imaginary, Routledge
Ball, SJ 2012b, Show me the money! Neoliberalism at work in education. In FORUM: For Promoting 3–19
Comprehensive Education, March, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 23-28.
Ball, SJ 2014, Education and the tyranny of numbers, , Institute of Education (IOE) London blog, 16 Novem-
ber, viewed 20 June 2021, https://ioelondonblog.wordpress.com/2014/11/16/education-and-the-tyranny-of-numbers/
Freire, P 2005, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York, Continuum International
Gambetta, D & Hertog, S 2017, Engineers of jihad: The curious connection between violent extremism and
education, Princeton University Press.
Ghosh, R, Chan, WA, Manuel, A & Dilimulati, M 2017, Can education counter violent religious extremism?
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vol. 23, no. 2, pp.117-133.
Giroux, H 2002, Neoliberalism, corporate culture, and the promise of higher education: The university as a
democratic public sphere. Harvard educational Review, vol. 72, no. 4, pp. 425-464.
Giroux, HA 2010, Bare pedagogy and the scourge of neoliberalism: Rethinking higher education as a demo-
cratic public sphere, In The educational forum, June, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 184-196, Taylor & Francis Group.
Giroux, HA 2014, Neoliberalism’s war on higher education, Haymarket Books.
Giroux, H A 2015. Against the terror of neoliberalism: Politics beyond the age of greed, Routledge.
HEC Undergraduate Education Policy 2020, viewed 19 June 2021, https://www.hec.gov.pk/english/services/
faculty/Plagiarism/Documents/UGE-Policy.pdf
Kincheloe, JL 2008, Critical pedagogy primer, vol. 1, Peter Lang.
Kincheloe, JL 2009, Contextualizing the madness: A critical analysis of the assault on teacher education and
schools, In Critical pedagogy and teacher education in the Neoliberal Era (pp. 19-36), Springer, Dordrecht.
McLean, M, Abbas, A & Ashwin, P 2017, Quality in undergraduate education: How powerful knowledge
disrupts inequality, Bloomsbury Publishing.
McLaren, P & Kincheloe, JL (Eds.) 2007, Critical pedagogy: Where are we now? vol. 299, Peter Lang.
Novelli, M 2017, Education and countering violent extremism: Western logics from south to north? Compare: A
Journal of Comparative and International Education, vol. 47, no. 6 pp.835-851.
Pusser, B & Marginson, S 2013, University rankings in critical perspective, The Journal of Higher Education,
vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 544-568.
Sajjad, FW 2019, Countering Radicalization through Education: Global Policy Trends and the Case of Paki-
stan, Radicalization in South Asia: Context, Trajectories and Implications, pp. 198-225, Sage Publishing.
Spring, J 2014, Globalization of education: An introduction, Routledge.
Sukarieh, M & Tannock, S 2016, The deradicalization of education: terror, youth and the assault on learning,
Race & Class, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 22-38.
The Doha Debates 2006, Definitions of Extremism and Terrorism, Doha Debates Special Event: Extremism,
February 28, viewed 25 August 2021, https://archive.dohadebates.com/debates/item/index1dd9.html?d=33&s=2&-
mode=transcript#234
30 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Wallner, C 2020, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism through Education Initiatives: Assessing the
Evidence Base, viewed 19 June 2021, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/preventing-and-countering-vi-
olent-extremism-education
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2017, Preventing Violent Extremism
through Education, A Guide for Policy-Makers.

Appendix A
List of Experts interviewed
University Faculty involved in Education/Development Policy Making
1) Dr. Nadeem ul Haq
Vice-Chancellor, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Quaid-e-Azam
University Campus, Islamabad.
2) Dr. Tahir Kamran
Iqbal fellow at the University of Cambridge, as professor in the Centre of South
Asian Studies. Professor at Beaconhouse National University (BNU)
3) Dr. Mariam Chughtai
Associate Dean and Assistant Professor at the LUMS School of Education.
4) Rahat ul Ain
Founding Director/ Professor of Practice School of Governance , University of
Management and Technology , Lahore.
5) Dr. Abdul Hameed
Professor / Former Dean School of Social Sciences and Humanities University
of Management and Technology Lahore.
6) Dr. Afshan Huma
Assistant Professor, Educational Planning Policy Studies and Leadership, Allama
Iqbal Open University
University Faculty/ Distinguished Scholars
1) Dr. Tariq Rahman
Dean, Beaconhouse National University, Lahore and Professor Emeritus, NIPS,
Quaid-i-Azam University
2) Dr. Umbreen Javaid
Dean, Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, University of the Punjab Lahore
3) Dr. Iram Khalid
Chairperson, Dept. of Political Science, University of the Punjab Lahore
4) Dr. Shoaib Pervez
Chairperson, Dept. of Political Science and International Relations, University
of Management and Technology Lahore
5) Dr. Zahid Shahab Ahmad
Research Fellow, Deakin University, Former Assistant Professor at the Centre
Policy Papers 31

for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and
Technology (NUST) Islamabad
University Teachers running Alternative Education Programs
1) Dr. Khalid Zaheer
Islamic Scholar, Faculty Member Information Technology University (ITU)
Lahore , University of Central Punjab ( UCP) and LUMS.
2) Shahid Rasheed
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Sociology Forman Christian College Lahore.
(Founder Zaawiya Trust School)

Appendix B
Questionnaire for Expert Interviews
- Major problems with Higher Education in Pakistan? Top three in your view?
- Major problems with Social Sciences and Humanities Education in general?
- Your opinion on causes of rising extremism on university campuses in Pakistan
and why higher education failed to prevent violent extremism? Top three?
- Your view on how extremism can be prevented through education. What do we
need in our education system to prevent/ mitigate/counter violent extremism?
- Do you think critical thinking ability helps in countering extremism? How?
- What is critical thinking in your view?
- Our education system focuses more on compliance or critical thinking in your
view?
- What blocks critical thinking in our education system?
- What viable alternatives (policies/practices) can you suggest to counter violent
extremism on campus?
Policy Papers 33

04
Countering Violent Extremism through
Community Resilience in Southern Punjab
A case study of university students and professionals
Dr Muqarrab Akbar

Abstract
Pakistan in general and Southern Punjab in particular faced extremism and
intolerance during war on terror. Although the successive governments have framed
multiple countering violent extremist strategies, they failed due to various reasons. A
comprehensive countering violent extremist approach needs to be adopted to make
Pakistan a peaceful and tolerant state. The youth is considered the most important part
of the society that can play an effective role in achieving this goal. This study aims to
identify opinions and attitudes regarding countering violent extremism among varsity
students and professionals. A sample size of over 600 respondents was taken to know
about their perception on violence, extremism and countering violent extremism. An
overwhelming majority think that killing of civilians to achieve some political objectives
is an act of terrorism whereas division prevails on the opinion that ‘strikes to achieve
a goal is terrorism’. Their perception has helped in understanding the community
resilience among the people of Southern Punjab. The study suggests keeping a strict
check on teaching environment and students’ activities on the university premises to
maintain a discipline and ban all the websites being run by extremist groups.

Keywords: CVE, Community resilience, extremism, militancy, radicalization,

university students, professionals

Introduction
Terrorism, extremism, violence as well as radicalization are the terms that are
sometimes used interchangeably. However. radicalization is supposed to be the first step
towards extremism and terrorism. Extremists tend to be closed-minded supremacists
and radicals tend to be open-minded egalitarians (Schmid 2014). Pakistan has been the
victim of extremism since the start of war on terror and lost precious lives and properties
in addition to receiving great dent to its social norms and cultural values. The attacks
1
Salman Taseer, the then Governor of Punjab, who was assassinated in January 2011 by his official bodyguard for his
outspoken defence of a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi, who was in jail on charges of committing blasphemy;
2
Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi, a Sunni cleric known for his anti-terrorist views, was assassinated in June 2009;
3
Maulana Hassan Jan Madani, an Islamic scholar and Sheikhul Hadith, was assassinated in September 2007;
34 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

on Salman Taseer1, Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi2, Maulana Hassan Jan Madani3 and Malala
Yousafzai4 are the clear-cut manifestations of extremism. The study mainly focusses on
southern Punjab, which constitutes about17 districts with major cities as Multan, D.G.
Khan, Rajanpur, Bahawalpur and Rahim Yar Khan. It comprises about 32 per cent of
the total population and 52 per cent of the total area of the Punjab province. Saraiki is
the major language of this region, which is considered a deprived and underdeveloped
area due to its feudal economy and lack of resources. These factors compel the people
of this region particularly the youth to join terrorist and extremist outfits. Almost every
terrorist organization such as Pakistani Panjabi Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), and Jaish-e-Muhammad have strong support bases there (Nawaz 2020) in the
form of madrasas. These organizations are allegedly using religion to weaken the state
narrative of tolerance and interfaith harmony. Once the bulwark of Sufi traditions and
mysticism, the region is now vulnerable to radicalization and extremism. That’s why
many extremist outfits find it a breeding ground for extremist elements by manipulating
the religious feelings and sentiments of locals. It is a soft target for sectarian violence
and religious extremism (Nawaz, 2020; Khalid & Leghari 2014; Hansen, 2012; Basit,
2015), but literature on extremism among university students and professionals is
almost non-existent. Only Khalid and Leghari (2014) discuss the tendency of youths of
Southern Punjab towards radical Islamist ideology and explain multiple social, political,
and economic reasons as catalysts behind turning the youth towards extremism. Hansen
(2012) describes that there is an increasing tendency of shifting traditional Barelvi (Sufi)
sect towards orthodoxy and radicalization. Nawaz (2020) claims that different terrorist
organizations have got the opportunity to use religion as a tool to attract people towards
religious extremism.
In such an extremist and intolerant environment, Pakistan needs an effective and
long-term policy to counter violent extremism. The youth in Pakistan is considered as
the most vulnerable segment of the society and it is easy to radicalize them whether they
are the students of a university or madrasa.
A theoretical framework of collaboration between government and individual can
create community resilience against violent extremism. The resilience against violent
extremism can be made through different actions such as resilience as recovery, resilience
as prevention, resilience as adaption or resilience as resistance. To create community
resilience, a group level approach is always adopted to counter violent extremism in a
society. This research is based on such empirical questions that clearly help to conceive
the role of group in creating resilience among community in Southern Punjab.
This study aims to answer the questions based on the perception of university
students and professionals. It is a general perception that extremism gripped the area
4
Malala Yousafzai, an activist and advocate of female education and Nobel Peace Prize winner, survived a bullet
attack in October 2012;
Policy Papers 35

due to the indifference and alienation among the educated youth and professionals.
The study highlights their opinion about reasons behind extremism in the region. It
addresses the following questions.
• What is the attitude of university students as well as professionals towards violence,
extremism, countering violent extremism (CVE) and community resilience?
• How do the two groups differ from each other in explaining the causes of
extremism and what remedies they propose to overcome violent extremism?
• What effective measures can be taken with respect to CVE and community
resilience in Southern Punjab?

Literature Review
Resilience in countering violence and extremism tends to create and build systems
of recovery from the effect of violent extremism by supporting each other within a
community (Ungar 2021). Created in 2017, the Global Engagement and Resilience Fund
aimed to counter violent extremism through community engagement. Government-led
community resilience strategies can play an inclusive role in this regard. Both individual
and community can devise resilience strategies to counter it.
Basit (2015) narrates that the culture of violence and extremism in the society has
deformed the peaceful and tolerant face of Pakistan. He suggests that Pakistan should
introduce a comprehensive de-radicalization program with long-term CVE policy. The
community resilience can be developed by introducing different de-radicalization
techniques.
Shah (2020) highlights the role of different madrasas, casts, militant groups and
terrorist networks of southern Punjab in the proliferation of radicalization in the region.
Khalid and Leghari (2020), claiming militancy and extremism as primary issues of
Southern Punjab, say that political, social, and economic grievances are leading the
youth towards radicalization which will have severe implications for the state. They see
more deprivation, poverty and disparity in the region in terms of enrolments, health
facilities and industrial development. They conclude that monitoring of madrasas and
redressal of socio-economic grievances are important steps to address the issue of
radicalization. So, the community resilience can be developed by reforming madrasas
and resolving the socio-economic problems of the community.
Aziz (2015) sees religious factor behind radicalization in addition to weak social
cohesion, corruption, absence of rule of law, economic inequality, absence of local level
governance institutions, etc. To deradicalize the society, community resilience needs
to be developed by establishing social cohesion, economic equality, grass roots level
democracy and rule of law.
Nawaz (2020) points out that post US invasion of Afghanistan created opportunities
36 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

for various terrorist outfits to use religion to attract people towards religious extremism.
He suggests banning hate speech and hate literature to stop the spread of religious
extremism and radicalization.
Afzal (2020) while identifying the nexus between madrasas and Islamists that helps
provide breeding ground to extremist elements, says that reforms in overall education
system in Pakistan can create community resilience.
Hasnen (2012) describes that there is an increasing tendency of shifting from
traditional Barelvi (Sufi) Islam to orthodox and radical interpretation of Islam, which
could be a factor in the spread of extremism. Pointing out that extremist interpretation
by different religious groups is causing radicalization, he concludes that authorities
are ignoring the growing trend of extremism since there is a common perception that
terrorist attacks have decreased.
Williams, Taza & Prelis (2016) highlight different ways to collaborate between the
youth and government in CVE that, they believe, can create community resilience. Khan
(2015) argues that CVE is considered as a soft approach to counter extremism and
terrorism through different engagements.
Akbar and Yaseen (2020) elaborate that hardly any religion teaches to use violence
against other religion but unfortunately there are some elements that spread hatred and
violence among people. The state must take action against such elements to counter
extremism and to maintain peace. The resilience can be developed in community by
controlling the religious radicalism, they suggest.

Methodology
The study is based on the comparative analysis of university students and
professionals. An online questionnaire was sent to around 500 university students
and 150 professionals, including doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists, government
officers, university teachers and businessmen. The questionnaire was developed keeping
in view the different demographic and socio-economic issues to get the respondents’
opinion about extremism and countering violent extremism. The convenient sampling
technique has been used. Around 467 university students and 138 professionals
responded our questionnaire. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) has
been used for the analysis. The responses have been described in percentage. The chi-
squared (x²) test was used to analyze the correlation between variables as per need.
Among total number of respondent students, 51.3% were male and 48.7 were females.
The ratio of male among professional respondents was 98%. The alpha value less than
0.05 was considered statistically significant.
Policy Papers 37

Discussion and Analysis

Data shows that a large number of respondents are inclined towards religion; either
they are moderately religious or very religious. Their social status also varies based on
the information provided by the respondents based on their monthly income. While
responding to different questions, their perception about extremism and Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) can be observed. Their perception is compared with the
students of southern Punjab to analyze whether there is some difference in perception of
students and professionals regarding CVE. The study shows that all these questions are
significantly associated with society (students vs professionals) (Annexure 1).
An overwhelming majority of both students and professionals agree that killing of
civilians to achieve political objective is an act of terrorism. Whereas the respondents
were divided about the opinion that ‘strikes to achieve a goal is terrorism’. A large
number of both students and professionals also consider the robbery (if someone is
killed there) an act of terrorism. The opinion of professionals is divided regarding the
statement that terrorism is a modern-day phenomenon. However, a large number of
students consider it modern-day phenomenon. There is a unanimous agreement that
terrorism is a serious global problem and is illegal and unethical in all respects and
all times. This shows that any act of terrorism is not acceptable for the society in any
form or in any case. A large number of professionals is of the opinion that terrorism
is not justified as an act to take revenge whereas 39% of the students justify this. The
professionals were divided on the question that terrorism is an act against Muslims. 59%
students consider terrorism an act against Muslims whereas only 12% disagrees to it. A
large number of professionals rejects the perception that terrorism is an act against non-
Muslims whereas students are confused as 21% agrees and almost 34% disagrees and
45% does not have any idea. Majority of the professionals do not agree with the notion
that terrorism is an act of Muslims against Muslims whereas the opinion of students
is divided over it. Interestingly, a large number of both student and professional
respondents are of the opinion that students are targets of extremist/ radical teachings.
The opinion of both sides is divided about the perception that universities can be a
breeding ground for the spread of extremism.
A community resilience approach is needed to create such an environment in
the universities so that these might be stopped from becoming breeding grounds. A
sizeable number of respondents are of the view that they don’t mind visiting a known
militant/extremist website. A large number of professionals do not want to interact with
extremist elements whereas students seem to be confused on this question as 16.5%
agrees, 44% disagrees and 39% have no idea. Very few from both sides say they do not
mind being in company of those having extremist views. An overwhelming majority
of the professionals agree that a monetary benefit instigates the young people to
38 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

become extremists, 36% students agree with it and 52% students have no idea about
it. The professional respondents almost unanimously agree that economic deprivation
promotes extremism among the youth whereas 55% students agree with this notion. It
shows that economic inclusion and economic equality can create community resilience
among the society. A large number of professional respondents say that political
exclusion is a cause of extremism whereas 51% students also agree with this and 42%
have no idea. The professionals almost unanimously agree that global discriminatory
policies are one of the major causes of extremism; however 51% students agree whereas
45% have no idea about it. Effective mechanism to counter global discriminatory
policies can be helpful in promoting community resilience. On the role of religious
ideas in promoting extremism, the professionals have a divided opinion whereas 51%
students think that religion has a role in extremism and 42% does not have any idea.
A large number of professionals think that avoidance is the most effective tool to deal
with the extremist views whereas 50% of the students agree with it and 36% have
no idea. In South Punjab, a sizeable number of professionals thinks that people are
extremists due to their religious beliefs and 48% students also agrees with it. It shows
that proper knowledge of religion can create community resilience. A large number of
professionals do not think the absence of student unions a reason behind extremist
views whereas 42% students think so and 44% have no idea. A unanimous approach can
be seen regarding the use of peaceful means to protest instead of violence to address
grievances among professionals whereas 46% students agree and 44% have no idea.
The peaceful means are more appropriate for creating community resilience against
violent extremism because violence begets violence. The role of friends is considered
crucial in making an individual violent, according to the research. It means that your
near and dear ones are the most important source of creating community resilience
against violent extremism. There is almost consensus among professional respondents
that a young person could easily become extremist or radical by joining a group having
extremist ideas whereas 58% of the students agree with this. Almost all respondents from
both sides agree that parents and university teachers can play an important role to stop
breeding extremism among students. This research shows that community resilience
among youths against violent extremism can be generated by the teachers and parents.
The opinion of professionals is divided regarding more religious people have extremist
views whereas 64% of the students agree with this notion. A large number of both sides
do not want a person having extremist view in their neighborhood. A large number
of people in Pakistani society do not mind of having a neighbor from other religion,
according to the results of the survey. However, they are divided on the opinion that if
their friends become extremists, they would not like to continue friendship. Almost half
of the professionals still have their friendship with those having extremist views whereas
only 28% of the students think in the same manner.
Policy Papers 39

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The research shows that extremism is still a crucial issue for Pakistan in general
and for the people of southern Punjab in particular. The failure of countering violent
extremism may result in the societal degradation at large. The research shows that a
large number of population is still unaware of the problem and is unable to identify
the cost they will have to pay in case the problem persists. The research data collected
through the university students clearly shows the confusion among them. They are
not clear about ideas and issues related to violence and extremism because of either
absence of a counter narrative or lack of proper guidance. Their responses manifest the
confusion in their minds about extremism. In such situations, the community resilience
will not work effectively and any step towards countering violent extremism will not
be fruitful. The parents, teachers and friends can collectively play an effective role in
creating resilience against violent extremism. However, the professionals’ responses,
to some extent, are encouraging. Therefore, they have developed community resilience
against violence and extremism. In Pakistan, the youth, particularly students, remained
more inclined towards extremism during the past two decades. Following measures are
proposed to stop the way of extremism.
• The educational institutions especially universities should promote the concept
of resilience and an overall tolerance among students in respect of others’
ideologies, opinions, belief systems, cultures, behaviors, etc. which make them
able to free themselves from any biases, discriminations, prejudices, etc.
• There is a dire need to keep a continuous vigil on teaching environment and
students’ activities on the university premises to maintain a discipline by
restructuring their security systems.
• The government must ban all the websites being run by extremist groups and
trace those who show hate material and extremist ideas through social media.
• Economic incentives and monetary benefits are considered the biggest
attractions that instigate the youth to become extremists. There is a need to
identify such financial transactions to stop financial assistance to extremist
elements.
• Thousands of university graduates are roaming around to find jobs. The state
needs to think seriously and formulate policies to provide them jobs and
resolve the economic grievances of people.
• Political exclusion can be considered a cause of extremism. The government
must bring all factions of the society into mainstream politics by reviving local
governments and addressing their political grievances.
• The government should instigate a campaign through embassies and state
actors to make the world realize that global discriminatory policies are the
40 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

major causes of extremism and terrorism, so the powerful and developed

states must treat the weak and least developed nations on equal basis.
• There is a need to promote interfaith harmony by engaging different school of
thoughts so that the role of religion in promoting extremism can be minimized.
For this purpose, Islamic Ideology Council should play a pro-active role by
bringing ulema and religious scholars on one-point agenda of non-violence.
• Orthodoxy has a major role in promoting extremism, so it is the responsibility
of the state to use different religious platforms to present a true interpretation
of religion. Intellectual and philosophical debates should be designed to keep
the youth away from religious, political, social, and ethnic violence groups.
• Parents must keep an eye on the friends of their children to avoid any untoward
situation. Parents should establish a friendly relationship with their kids and
spend sufficient quality time with them.
• Educational institutions need to incorporate chapters on tolerance in
textbooks, which teach students that terrorism is not justified to take revenge
from anyone and how they can prevent themselves from radicalization.
• A more rigorous campaign to counter extremist narrative needs to be launched
by the state through media, academia, clergy, NGOs and civil society with
special focus on the youth, as they can be influenced easily.
• Parents and teachers must be trained to teach their children and students as
how to maintain peace, tolerance, and harmony in the society.

References
Afzal, M 2018, Pakistan under siege: Extremism, Society and the State, The Brookings Institution, Washington
DC.
Akbar, M & Yaseen, H 2020, ‘Interfaith Harmony in Pakistan: An Analysis’, Global Political Review, V(I), pp.
9-18
Aziz, K 2015, Country Paper on Drivers of Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan, December, Fried-
rich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Basit, A 2015, ‘Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan’s Counter-Radicalization and De-radicaliza-
tion’, IPRI Journa,l vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 44-68.
Hansen, D 2012, The threat of growing extremism in Punjab, NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Centre.
Khalid, I & Leghari, ME 2014, ‘Radicalization of Youth in Southern Punjab’, South Asian Studies, vol. 29, no.2,
pp. 537-551.
Khan, MM 2015, ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan: An Appraisal of Pakistan’s CVE Initiatives’,
Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 23-44.
Nawaz, S 2020, ‘Countering Religious Violence, Extremism and Terrorism in South Punjab; Challenges and
Achievements, Journal of Research & Reviews in Social Sciences Pakistan’, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 639-657
Shah, N 2020, Saraiki Region Roots of Radicalization, Takhleeqat, Lahore.
Schmidt A P 2014, “Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” ICCT Research
Paper, May 2014, viewed 15 June 20121, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extrem-
ism-May-2014.pdf
Unger, M 2021, Multisystemic Resilience: Adaptation and Transformation in Contexts of Change, Oxford,
London.
William M, Taza, RW & Prelis, S 2016, Working Together to Address Violent Extremism: A Strategy For
Youth-Government Partnership, US Department of State.
Policy Papers 41

Annexure 1
42 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Policy Papers 43
44 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Policy Papers 45
46 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Policy Papers 47

05
Developing a National Narrative: University
Faculty’s Perception of Violent Extremism
Dr Faryal Razzaq, Amna Siddiqui and Sana Ashraf

Abstract
Viewing faculty as an influencer in shaping the values and attitudes of students
is a well-researched phenomenon. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence
on the effectiveness and need assessment of screening extremist tendencies during
faculty hiring in Pakistan. Similarly, the lack of training to mitigate extremist views or
addressing sensitive and controversial issues raised by students in the classroom is a
matter of grave concern. Literature implies that the faculty in Pakistani universities
has substantial inclination towards extremist ideologies. This study aims to generate
data from the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) to reach an understanding about
terrorism, its causes, and find a way forward for a unified counter terrorism narrative.
Assessing the faculty’s violent extremist beliefs, their understanding of emotions, and
violent risk ideation is an important starting point to formulate policy recommendations
for developing an academia-informed anti-terrorism narrative. The data was collected
through qualitative and quantitative means by conducting interviews. Using frequency
and correlation analyses and T-Tests, results indicate that 69.6% of the faculty has
violent and extremism views, 33.3% has extremist tendencies while 82.6% showed
higher tendencies of risk-taking and impulsive behaviours.

Keywords: HEIs, faculty hiring, students radicalization, CVE, emotional intelligence,

PVE approach

Introduction
In Pakistan, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) have often been accused of
harbouring extremist views whenever incidences of terrorism centred on these institutes
occur. When faculty and staff are hired in HEIs, their experience and qualifications are
properly assessed, and in some cases, certain personality tests are also conducted.
However, people from different backgrounds join the faculty with their religious beliefs
and political affiliations. No apparent screening is done to stop their way to join the
faculty so that the impressionable minds of students might be protected from extremist
or violent ideologies.
This study aims to assess the extremist and radical tendencies of the faculty and
48 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

staff and suggests specific interventions for their capacity building. It also provides a
framework for screening during the hiring process.
The current research is significant in the sense that not much attention has
previously been paid to the possibility of presence of disruptive elements in academia
that generate the idea of violent extremism (VE). Mechanisms for screening faculty
and staff have also been suggested to assess their violent tendencies and extremist
inclinations. The study shows red flags for those faculty members who are inclined
towards extremism due to their radical views and how can these views be mitigated
through their capacity building.
The findings gathered by intervening and assessing the faculty’s understanding and
perspective of extremism, their beliefs, tendencies and concurrent emotional regulation
capacity, it is imperative to devise a national narrative framework. Keeping in mind the
results, the study proposes a model for the screening of faculty to downplay the effect
of radicalization stemming from within the HEIs.

Literature Review
Terrorism, as described by Sun Tzu, is to end one life and frighten thousands –
it is a psychological war which intends to publicize and internationalize key political
motives, intentions and objectives (Bartley 2005). After the 9/11 attacks, the term
‘violent extremism’ (VE) has also got popularity. Since then, efforts to mitigate extremist
ideologies and terrorist activities are being made by the successive governments.
Terrorism lacks a unified definition (Schmid 2013), and is often seen in the light
of religious extremism in countries like Pakistan where the blame is often placed on
Islamist extremist groups, whereas the underlying motives could be social and political
(Daraz 2012). Most theorists agree that the factors influencing radicalization that lead
to VE are an individual’s belief system, which is shaped by economic and political
marginalization as well as psychological and process-oriented factors like religiosity
(Peracha et al. 2017). As a result of terrorist activities, countries like Pakistan have to face
huge economic losses, destruction of physical infrastructure, and drastic upheavals in
the socio-political fabric of the society (Daraz 2012; Nizami et al. 2018).
Using approaches to prevent violent ideation and tendencies at the ‘breeding’
stage of radicalization is termed as Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE); Pre-emptive
approaches like education and awareness programs are launched to target vulnerable
communities (Davies 2011; Davies 2018; Stephens et al. 2021). One of the PVE
approaches focusing on the psychological ‘push’ factors of extremist tendencies
(Mirahmadi 2016) is the use of emotional intelligence (EI) to mitigate violent behavior
(Porche 2016). An individual, who is good at understanding, regulating and managing
his own and others’ emotions (i.e. having higher EI), has a greater propensity to be
Policy Papers 49

adjusted psychosocially, and can flexibly navigate conflicting situations (Mayer et al.
2008, Zeidner & Matthews 2018). Enhancing EI can lower the fear of terrorism and
ability to apply a better perspective (Shah et al. 2020).
PVE approaches hold a significant importance in the political and military backdrop
of Pakistan, considering that the war on terror has cost economy $118 billion loss in
the last 15 years (Orakzai 2019). Despite this, due to a plethora of political reasons
and the government’s seemingly ineffective policies, the element of radicalization and
extremist ideologies have succeeded to make inroads in the mainstream educational
institutes of Pakistan, and radicalize the youth (Ismail et al. 2020). Of note here is also
the widespread intolerance, popularization of ‘conspiracy theories’ and rise of sectarian
sentimentalism, which further complicates a ‘unified’ approach to tackle extremism
(Feyyaz 2016).
While observing the HEIs in Pakistan, it has been learned that students are involved
in assisting, facilitating, and participating in terror-related activities. Some are even
supported by the employees of these HEIs (Buzdar et al. 2018). In a study conducted
to assess teachers’ view on extremism in Pakistani universities, Nauman and Saeed
(2016) concluded that the faculty agrees on the mitigating role of education in handling
extremism among the youth in its present state. Religious extremism, a diversified
stream of education resulting in class and social division leading to extremist elements,
sectarianism in different HEIs, being extremely rigid in one’s views, intolerance,
overriding of merit and unfair means of subjugating rules – all are the forms of
extremism observed by the faculty (Nauman, &Saeed 2016). A look into the educational
background of most-wanted terrorists in Pakistan shows that they are relatively well-
educated when compared with their peers, but at the same time their lower socio-
economic status juxtaposed with higher education pushes them towards extremist
means to achieve their goals (Saeed & Syed 2018). Buzdar, Tariq and Ali (2018) say
that there is no unified stance on terrorism, and even their definitions were in conflict
and influenced by media. The authors suggest that there should be a proper system of
screening for extremist tendencies which are prevalent in HEIs, and that there is a dire
need for capacity building of the faculty to counter extremist and terrorist ideologies,
which make them able to handle the situations in classroom discussions.
This raises the questions about Pakistan’s strategy with respect to a nationally
accepted counter-terrorism narrative. Lack of a unified approach, and certain loopholes
lead to a scattered framework without genuine progress. Organizations concerned lack
ability to overcome the psychological warfare by handling the situation sensitively with
deliberation. The terrorist outfits utilize ideologies based on reality, but a good chunk
of it is also rooted in fiction, sentimentalism, and conspiracy theories. To counter this
psychological oppression, there needs to be nuance in experts’ methodology to be
able to add an educated perspective to the counter-terrorism narrative. An in-depth
50 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

investigation into specialized abilities and creating a more objective stance is needed
both in terms of scholarship, state-sanctioned narrative as well as support from the
common public (Feyyaz 2015). Another critique is the lack of awareness about the
ground realities. The government has progressively ignored the public sentiment, the
importance of institutionalized strength and force, acquiring a long-haul approach
instead of making rushed policies, a comprehensive plan which is agreed on from
all stakeholders and not achieving underlying dependability from the ground up to
develop a national narrative on counter-terrorism (Cheema & Shamil 2017). The lack
of a national narrative which is an all-rounded understanding of the extremist ideology
and their psychological oppression, is still evident as all previous efforts for counter-
terrorism have more or less been military in nature (Habib 2018).
At the end of 2014, when the Army Public School in Peshawar attacked, the
government responded with a 20-point National Action Plan (NAP). It aims to counter
psychological warfare through transcendently non-mobilized approaches. The NAP
focuses on, among different perspectives, handling illegal intimidation by destroying
fear-mongering monetary organizations, forbidding fanatic madrasas (with strict
theological andragogy), partisan outfits, and fighting the disdain discourse against strict
and ethnic minorities (Mahmood 2016). In spite of this, unless Pakistan’s Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) measures gain a more organized and wise approach, the
efforts to control local radicalism and illegal intimidation will remain futile. As CVE
efforts dispatched by the military and the common society are underway, an appraisal
of their difficulties and accomplishments will help Pakistan incorporate the changes
relevant to the current requirements (Zahid 2017).

Methodology
The faculty members of HEIs were interviewed to assess their violent beliefs and
extremist tendencies, EI capacity and perspective on counter-terrorism efforts. Keeping
in view the scope of the study, following research questions have been addressed.
a. What are the factors that define the construct of anti-terrorism comprehensively?
b. How HEIs can help build the capacity of faculty regarding teaching and
handling of sensitive interactions in classrooms in connection with anti-
terrorism narrative?
c. How can faculty screening and staff hiring in HEIs be made more effective by
assessing their extremist tendencies?
In accordance with the study parameters, faculty in HEIs were assessed using a
mixed-method approach to collect both quantitative as well as qualitative data from
faculty members after initial screening. To gauge the faculty’s beliefs about extremism,
their violent tendencies and EI, three different measures were used in the quantitative
Policy Papers 51

phase. Indigenously developed Extremism and Violence Risk Identification Scale

(EVRIS) (Hassan et al. 2021) was used to quantify the faculty members’ risk factors that
are associated with extremist and violent tendencies. For assessing their emotions, the
Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT) (Schutte et al. 1998) was used
which is a freely available scale to measure EI capabilities with different subscales. Lastly,
to measure the faculty’s beliefs on extremist values and violence, another indigenous
measure of Violent Extremism Beliefs Scale (Peracha et al. 2017) was used. All authors of
the indigenous scales were informed of the study and provided consent for the current
project.
A quantitative questionnaire was developed and circulated online in the first
phase to get responses (response rate 13.2%) from the HEI faculty members who were
accessible online. In the second phase, to get the maximum responses, the authors
also collected data by conducting field visits of six different public and private sector
universities in Islamabad/Rawalpindi region. For the qualitative part, due to COVID-19
protocols and Standard Operating Procedures, Focus Group Discussions could not be
arranged, so data was collected online and in-person.
All participants, who consented to provide their opinion, were briefed about the
study design and parameters and the purpose to conduct this research. Their privacy
was not compromised, and their responses were coded in numbers before data analysis
to maintain anonymity. The selection of participants was made on the basis of being part
of a private or public sector HEI, in any teaching discipline or administrative position.
All ethical protocols of the Declaration of Helsinki were adhered to.
The faculty that took part in the survey were from 31 different universities across
the four provinces. There were 27 different ethnicities from 50 different areas of
specialization. The highest number of respondents were from Punjab (N=67, 73.6%),
followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (N=14, 15.4%), Sindh (N=6, 6.6%), and Balochistan
(N=4, 4.4%).
52 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Particulars N (%)
Gender (N=93)
Male 60 (64.5)
Female 31 (33.3)
Prefer not to say 2 (2.2)
Age (N=90) 20-30years 16 (17.8)
31-40years 43 (47.8)
41-50years 22 (24.4)
51-60years 4 (4.4)
61 and Above 5 (5.6)

Marital Status (N=93) Single 13 (14.0)

Married 77 (82.8)
Divorced 3 (3.2)
Job Position (n=92) Research Assistant 2 (2.2)
Lecturer 28 (30.1)
Assistant Professor 35 (37.6)
Associate Professor 12 (12.9)
Professor 5 (5.4)
Others 11 (11.8)
Teaching Experience (N=90) < 1 yr 7 (7.8)
1 – 2 yrs 11 (12.2)
3 – 4 yrs 11 (12.2)
4 – 5 yrs 3 (3.3)
> 5 yrs 58 (64.4)
Religious Beliefs (N=93) Muslim 92 (98.9)
Prefer not to say 1 (1.1)
Table 1: Study participant’s demographics
To get qualitative data, an additional 11 (M=8, F=3) faculty members from HEIs
who had an interest in the social aspects of the study and were willing to give the
interview took part in our detailed qualitative interviews (Annexure 1). The researchers
additionally interviewed 36 (M=21, F=14, Undisclosed=1) faculty members for a
short version of qualitative interview (Part A in Annexure 1). The qualitative interview
was created keeping in mind the research criteria; some questions were adapted from
previously generated interview protocol as outlined by Peracha et al. (2017), to assess
the faculty’s perspective on what makes a terrorist and what are their views on our anti-
terrorism narrative as a country and being part of academia. The full interview protocol
is given in Annexure. 1.
Discussion and Analysis
Both the quantitative and qualitative data was collected and subsequently analyzed
by using SPSS (IBM Corp. Released 2017. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 25.0.
Policy Papers 53

Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.), and NVivo (12) for the thematic and qualitative analysis.
For the quantitative analysis, the total number of respondents (N=93) were
assessed by using Extremism and Violent Risk Ideation Scale (EVRIS), their EI scores
(SREIT) and Violent Extremism Beliefs Scale (VEBS) as previously outlined. Each scale
also had their own dimensions as outlined by the authors.
Extremism and Violent Risk Ideation
A total of 93 respondents (M=60, F=31, Prefer not to say=2) were assessed and
their data was analyzed against their Extremism and Violent Risk Ideation (EVRIS). The
scale had 26 items with Likert-type responses ranging from strongly disagree (1) to
strongly agree (5), with the statements in the questionnaire evaluating the respondent’s
extremist and violent tendencies. The scale items were also grouped into factors
measuring the respondent’s uncertainty in life (7 items), lack of social support (6 items),
violent aggression tendencies (9 items), as well as religious intolerance (4 items). The
total EVRIS Score (N=93) had a mean of 47.87 (± 16.30). The 93 respondents had
a mean score of 14.44 (± 5.77) for the Uncertainty in Life subscale, a mean score of
11.15 (± 5.32) for Lack of Social Support subscale, the Violent Aggression subscale
had a mean score of 15.10 (± 5.77), and a mean score of 7.18 (± 3.18) for Religious
Intolerance. Table 2 shows the total EVRIS scores along with the sub-scores of its factors
in male and female respondents (N=91). There was no significant differences between
the male and female mean scores (all p>0.05).
54 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Table 2: Gender stratified total mean score and sub-scores of EVRIS factors
*p<0.05 considered significant. SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval
All subscale scores were positively correlated with each other and the total EVRIS
score (all p < 0.05, Suppl. Data), with the highest correlation of the total EVRIS score
with lack of social support (r=.855, p=.000).
Assessing Emotions Scale
The same cohort was also assessed on the Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test
(SREIT) with 33 total items and 4 subscales (Palmer et al. 2009) of Perception of Emotion
(10 items), Managing Own Emotions (9 items), Managing Others’ Emotions (8 items),
Utilization of Emotions (6 items). As with EVRIS, the SREIT scale also had Likert-type
responses to statements with responses ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (5). The total mean score of the SREIT in 93 respondents was 126.85 (± 15.49),
with the Perception of Emotion subscale mean score at 37.15 (± 6.12), respondents
Policy Papers 55

scoring a mean of 35.59 (± 5.28) in the Managing their Own Emotion subscale, a mean
score of 30.66 (± 4.08) in the Managing Others’ Emotions subscale while the Utilizing
Own Emotions subscale had a mean score of 23.45 (± 3.35). Table 3 shows the total
mean scores and mean scores of the subscales stratified by gender (N=91). There were
no significant differences between the male and female mean scores (all p>0.05).

Table 3: Gender-stratified total mean score and subscores of SREIT factors

*p<0.05 considered significant. SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval
All subscale scores were positively correlated with each other and the total SREIT
score (all p < 0.05, Suppl. Data), with the highest correlation of the total SREIT score
with managing others’ emotions (r=.881, p=.000).
Violent Extremis m Beliefs Scale
The faculty scores on the Violent Extremism Beliefs Scale (30 items) were also taken
56 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

to assess their beliefs about VE. The VEBS measure also had four subscales, namely
Religious Power, Violence & Extremism, Lack of Positive Thinking, Power Politics and
Risk-Taking and Impulsive Behaviour (Peracha et al. 2017). The respondents answered
the statements ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The respondents
(N=92) scored a total mean score of 69.05 (± 19.59) on the VEBS scale, with a mean
score of 27.54 (± 10.17) in the Religious Power, Violence and Extremism subscale,
a mean score of 16.04 (± 7.39) in the Lack of Positive Thinking subscale, the Power
Politics subscale had a total mean score of 13.01 (± 4.61), while Risk-Taking and
Impulsive Behaviour subscale had a total mean score of 12.46 (±3.63). Table 4 shows
the gender-stratified total mean scores and mean scores of the subscales for the VEBS
scale (N=90). There were no significant differences between males and females in the
VEBS scale dimensions.

Table 4: Gender-stratified total mean score and subscores of VEBS factors

*p<0.05 considered significant. SD = Standard Deviation, CI = Confidence Interval
**Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was significant (F=5.463, p=.022), equal
variances not assumed.
Policy Papers 57

All subscale scores were positively correlated with each other and the total VEBS
score (all p < 0.05, Suppl. Data), except Lack of Positive Thinking and Power Politics
subscales (r= -.030, p= .779), which had a negative correlation but was not statistically
significant. The Religious Power, Violence & Extremism subscale had the highest
correlation with the total VEBS score (r=.922, p=.000).
Correlation Analysis between Scales
In order to determine the correlation between the constructs of the EVRIS, SREIT
and VEBS scale, we conducted Pearson’s Product Correlations between the total mean
scores. It was found that EI is negatively correlated with EVRIS but not significantly
correlated with the VEBS total mean score. Meanwhile, EVRIS and VEBS are positively
correlated with each other (Table 5).

Table 5: Correlations between EVRIS, SREIT and VEBS constructs (N=93)

r = Correlation Coefficient, p<0.05 considered significant.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Furthermore, as the total mean scores of EVRIS and SREIT are correlated, we also
performed correlation analysis between their subscales (Table 6). Uncertainty in Life was
negatively correlated with all dimensions of EI except Utilizing own eEmotions. Lack of
Social Support was also negatively correlated with all EI dimensions but Perception
of Emotions and Utilizing own Emotions were not significantly correlated. Moreover,
Violent Aggression was negatively correlated with all EI constructs (all p < 0.05), but
Religious Intolerance was not significantly correlated with any EI dimensions.

Table 6: Correlations between EVRIS and SREIT constructs (N=93)

58 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan
r = Correlation Coefficient, p<0.05 considered significant.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Correlation analysis of the subscales between EVRIS and VEBS constructs was also
performed as the total scores were positively correlated (Table 7). Uncertainty in Life,
and Lack of Social Support (as EVRIS dimensions) were not significantly correlated
with any VEBS dimensions (all p > 0.05). However, Violent Aggression was positively
correlated with all VEBS dimensions with the highest correlation with Religious Power,
Violence & Extremism (r= .528, p= .000). Religious Intolerance was also positively
correlated with all VEBS dimensions except Lack of Positive Thinking.

Table 7: Correlations between EVRIS and VEBS constructs (N=93)

r = Correlation Coefficient, p<0.05 considered significant.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Cut-Off Scores
For the Extremism and Violent Risk Ideation Scale (EVRIS), a cut-off score was
calculated by taking the mid-point of the highest possible score and lowest possible
score (midpoint score being 52). As many as 31 out of 93 respondents (33.3%) had a
higher EVRIS score indicating extremist tendencies and the risk of developing them.
However, 66.7% (N=62) had a lower score indicating lower tendencies.
The SREIT total score has ranges indicating unusually low EI (score below 111),
better than average EI (score above global mean of 124) and unusually high EI (score
above 137). This cut-off score range has been indicated by the scale authors. 12.0%
of the respondents had unusually low EI (N=11) while 29.3% has unusually high EI
(N=27), leaving 58.7% of the respondents having better than average EI (N=54).
In order to determine the severity of violent extremist beliefs, the total VEBS
Policy Papers 59

score and its subscales also come with cut-off scores as indicated by the authors. It was
observed that 69.6% of the respondents had a higher than average violent extremism
belief. An astounding number of the respondents (82-6%) showed higher tendencies of
risk-taking and impulsive behaviours. Among all the VEBS dimensions, power politics
had the lowest percentage (53.3%), but still more than half of the respondents inclined
towards higher scores (Suppl. Data).
Qualitative Interviews
Out of the total 93 respondents, who participated in the quantitative survey, 36
also provided their short qualitative responses. They were asked about their perception
regarding extremism, their beliefs, and stance on anti-terrorism. A more detailed
qualitative interview was also conducted wherein 11 additional faculty members from
HEIs participated.
Thematic analyses of the short qualitative interview revealed important themes
demonstrated word clouds (N=36; Annexure 2). Some additional questions revealed
lack of training in HEIs with respect to addressing sensitive issues in the classroom.
No one reported having any formal narrative or policy regarding anti-terrorism by
one’s institution. However, 50% said that their institution has mitigating strategies like
security programs, zero tolerance to violence and that they try to work on personality/
psychology and spiritual development of students. Some respondents suggested that
indulging in sensitive issues is best avoided altogether as it can result in disagreements,
dispute, and quarrelsome behaviours.
The longer, more detailed qualitative interviews revealed some important themes
in the thematic analyses in terms of future directions and policy-making decisions
regarding the anti-terrorism narrative. Annexure 2 demonstrates thematic analyses
using word clouds generated from representative questions in the qualitative interview
(as outlined in the methodology section before).
50% of the faculty said that they have encountered extremist persons and identified
their traits. Interestingly, when asked how the extremists look and act like to whom they
met, the faculty said people having extremist views look normal until you challenge
their views. When asked: ‘Do you think extreme (even violent) actions are justified if
someone disrespects your religious beliefs?’ three out of 10 respondents, said: “Yes, it
is justified.” However, the majority said: “it is unjustified.” It is worth mentioning that
both the responses should be seen in the backdrop of religious and legislation factors
respectively. To a question that do you believe in promoting your sect by highlighting
the ‘wrongs’ in other sects or degrading other sects? As many as eight respondents
showed disagreement saying that there should be a mutual respect between sects;
we can highlight good deeds, make comparisons, but cannot criticize their religious
ideology. On the contrary, the respondents, who agreed to the statement did so due to
their ideology. On blasphemy laws, most of them thought it requires amendments as it
60 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

is being misused, 1/3rd said they are not sure what it entails but they know what the law
was about: death penalty for anyone who will insult prophets.
Lastly, to a question that can you engage yourself in controversial or divisive
discussions that are a threat to your belief system without getting emotionally charged?,
three respondents showed disagreement, saying that it is harmful & useless to be
engaged in such discussions Whereas, the remaining respondents said they like logical
and evidence-based discussions.
Our detailed thematic analysis of the qualitative interviews (Annexure 2) from the
academia of Pakistan directs us to propose the following definitions to make a national
narrative:
Terrorism: Terrorism is the execution of extreme ideologies pertaining to social,
political, and religious domains. It has a devastating impact on people and communities
through violating human rights, and disturbing peace and social norms.
Anti-Terrorism: Anti-terrorism means taking hard measures to stop terrorism
through laws enforcement, making strict anti-terror laws, and using soft measures to
develop tolerance especially religious tolerance. It means having systems in place to
curb violence, radicalization, and extremism while maintaining peace and upholding
human rights through speedy justice.
The following measures need to be taken to counter terrorism:
Enlightenment of youths through awareness drives, advocacy, and dialogues)
Equitable enforcement of law
Inculcating religious tolerance, political inclusivity, and social cohesion among youths
Strict laws for anti-terrorism that violates human rights
Alleviation of poverty and social disparity.
Breaking social isolation.
Developing a peaceful counter narrative
Strengthening family ties
End to injustice
Launching de-radicalizing programs

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The potential of HEIs to fight terrorism on intellectual grounds is thus significant.
After the attack on Army Public School in Peshawar in 2014, the then government
formulated 20-point National Action Plan to stabilize the country and engaged all the
civil society actors to play their part in curbing terrorism. There are many instances of
religious, political and ideological clashes that resulted in VE in the HEIs. This serious
issue calls for the investigation of employees, their affiliations and belief systems. The
power of impressionable youth and mobilization of university students cannot be
Policy Papers 61

undermined. Therefore, it requires careful screening of current faculty and staff and
assessment of capacity building against radical/VE tendencies. The way a teacher can
influence their class in a wrong direction could be a ticking bomb, as most HEIs lack any
mechanism that monitors what is discussed in the classroom. Moreover, after decades
of war on terror and being a highly vulnerable country, most institutions in Pakistan
still do not have a formal stance or policy on anti-terrorism and violent extremism. This
study is an effort to highlight that a careful evaluation and collective wisdom of academia
should be channelized to reach fruitful conclusions so that Pakistan might move in the
right direction, and control terrorism and its spread through educational institutions.
Institutional Policy: A clear-cut institutional policy specifically for HEIs based
on progressive and enlightened moderation needs to be devised as per the
national narrative to counter terrorism/extremism. For this purposes, broad-based
deliberations should be organized by engaging academia, think tanks and state
institutions concerned. Ministry of Education and Higher Education Commission
(HEC) can play a major role in this regard.
Capacity building and grooming: There is a dearth of training or capacity
building programmes for handling controversial and sensitive issues in the
classroom. Faculty needs to be imparted formal trainings to tackle sensitive
issues such as: how to take up violent extremism through moral reasoning; how
to counsel students who have extremist tendencies and beliefs; and how to de-
escalate the hostile situation on the university premises. Training need assessment
and the capacity building program for faculty should be done on regular basis.
Besides, faculty’s intellectual grooming programmes should be introduced. For this
purpose, faculty exchange programmes and working with international think tanks
would be helpful.
Capacity building of faculty through andragogy, i.e. how to engage students and
handle difficult classroom interactions related to religion, politics, and ethnicities,
should be conducted at least once a year.
Screening for extremist tendencies before hiring and admissions: Keeping
in mind the responses of faculty, seemingly normal persons may have violent and
extremist tendencies which need to be screened out. A mandatory screening of
students should be done to check their extremist beliefs and violent tendencies
before admission. Special week should be observed after every semester by
organizing seminars and workshops to promote interfaith harmony, peace,
emotional resilience, etc.
Screening of faculty: Our findings show that the current faculty should also be
screened to identify the disruptive and potentially extremist elements in HEIs. It
will help mitigate the extremist and terrorist activities that may originate within the
educational institutions.
62 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Trainings on Emotional Intelligence: Moderation in beliefs, inclusion of

diversity, Emotional Intelligence (especially empathy and ethics) should be
incorporated in curriculum and reinforced in different disciplines as a separate
module. Inter-university consortium should meet at least once a year to promote
ethics, civility, and emotional intelligence through skill & knowledge sharing &
setting benchmarks for the best practices.

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Annexures
Annexure 1: Qualitative Interviews Protocol
Part A – Short Qualitative Interviews
What is your definition of extremism?
How would you define anti-terrorism?
What do you feel are the important factors for countering terrorism?
What is the official stance and definition of your institution regarding anti-terrorism?
Have you received any training regarding teaching methodologies to tackle sensitive
issues like religion, sectoral or political views in classrooms?
If the answer to above question is affirmative, please explain the details of the training
If the answer to above question is negative, then what is your strategy and techniques
to handle these issues in class interactions?
Part B – Detailed Qualitative Interviews
What do think are the traits of an extremist?
Have you encountered/known any people you would consider extremists? What kind
of people have you found them to be in their daily life?
Describe your detailed view on the anti-blasphemy law in your country.
What do you feel are the important factors for countering terrorism?
Why do you think people become extremists and how they justify their actions?
How do you think extremism affects individuals and communities?
What differentiates an extremist from a criminal?
Do you think education can eliminate extremism? If yes, how?
What do you think are the most leading motives of a) religious extremism, b) political
extremism, and c) sectarian violence?
Do you think extreme (even violent) actions are justified if someone disrespects your
religious beliefs?
Do you believe in promoting your sect by highlighting the wrongs in other sects or
degrading other sects? Please explain why or why not?
Can you engage in controversial or divisive discussions that are a threat to your belief
system without getting emotionally charged? Please provide details on why or why
not.
64 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Annexure 2: Thematic Word Clouds for representative

qualitative questions

In the short qualitative interview, the respondents also answered some personal
questions which can help in understanding the quantitative part of the questionnaire
better. The respondents were asked to describe how well they were treated during
their childhood. The majority of the respondents (n=14) replied that they grew
up under extreme care. However, there were few respondents (n=2) who stated
that they grew up as carefree and some were even abused (n=2). Whereas some
replied that their childhood was just okay (n=7) and for some it was extremely
happy (n=3). A question also gauged the incidence of domestic violence faced by
the respondents i.e. ‘Have you ever experienced domestic violence?’ The majority
(n=23) respondents indicated that they have never experienced domestic violence.
In contrast, 6 respondents who did experience it outlined their primary reasons were
due to disciplinary measures, economic factors, backwardness, and physical abuse.
Policy Papers 65
66 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Supplemental Data
EVRIS Scale Correlations

Table: Correlations between total mean score and sub-scores of EVRIS factors
r = Correlation Coefficient, p<0.05 considered significant.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

SREIT Scale Correlations

Table: Correlations between total mean score and sub-scores of SREIT factors
r = Correlation Coefficient, p<0.05 considered significant.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Policy Papers 67

VEBS Scale Correlations

Table: Correlations between total mean score and sub-scores of VEBS factors
r = Correlation Coefficient, p<0.05 considered significant.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

VEBS Cut-Off Scores

Table: Total VEBS score and subscale scores (all N=93) with cut-off value percentages
Policy Papers 69

06
Engendering Counter-Extremism Behavior
through Model Female Vocational-cum-
Educational Institutions in Southern Punjab
Dr Iram Khalid and Dr Asiya Mukhtar

Abstract
The study identifies the gap between policy and its execution against violent
extremism in Pakistan. It highlights that most of the efforts to root out extremism
remained focused on the use of military force, violence, and rehabilitation work (hard
power) which was insufficient. To get qualitative data, a survey and key informant
interviews were conducted. By applying the Attitudes-Behavioral Corrective (ABC)
approach, the paper contends that there is a need to use soft power approach to mitigate
extremism by educating the women population of underdeveloped areas, including
Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Bahawalpur in southern Punjab. Moreover, special efforts
are needed to invest on the capacity building and empowerment of women so that they
might raise their kids without financial limitations and educate their next generation
against the ills of terrorism.

Keywords: Counter-Extremism, Vocational Training, Education, Models of CVE

Introduction
Several models and approaches have so far been proposed to counter violent
extremism, however there is an ambiguity in their modus operandi and efficacy. While
analyzing Pakistan’s strategies and approaches, confusion surrounds the number of
government-funded efforts made so far or still underway, and the mechanism under
which the government, other partners and stakeholders can work together in order to
obtain desirable objectives. This study is an attempt to bridge such gaps by locating a
general framework so as to understand the type of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
program needed for a specific region. It proposes an eclectic approach towards CVE via
education model in the deprived, conservative, and far-flung areas like southern Punjab
where female population is excluded of all the policies and plans for development and
social change.
Generally, Pakistan has been facing violent extremism since long, which resulted
in continuing dismal socio-economic conditions in the less developed areas. In
these areas, a strong anti-west and anti-liberal sentiment prevails, which is the major
70 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

motivational force behind converting masses into a violent mob by the radical elements.
These elements have a social and political dominance there. In this backdrop, the study
aims to:
• evaluate the level of awareness about terrorism in southern Punjab
• find reasons behind the failure of successive governments and NGOs’ in
curbing extremism
• explore the parameters of change required in that area
• analyze existing policies for the prevention of Violent Extremism in particular
regions
• provide a workable solution to bring about a change in the behavior of masses
at grass roots level

Literature Review
This section will mainly explicate the major existing discourses related to Pakistan’s
terrorism milieu and the possible strategies to counter them. The existing data would be
utilized for developing an operational framework to eliminate terrorism from southern
Punjab.
Pakistan has a unique position in the international terrorist scenario because
it is simultaneously a victim of terrorism (Institute of Social and Policy Sciences 2016)
and accused of harboring terrorism by acting like a safe haven for terrorist outfits (US
Department of State 2019). Despite the fact that Pakistan has been making efforts to curb
terror-financing and has also tried to play a mediating role in the Afghan peace process,
it is still accused of nurturing extremist groups and terrorism (Kaltenthaler et al. 2010).
The report, ‘Countering Violent Extremism: Mapping Perceptions, Practices and Potential
of Private Sector and Local Business’ indicates a sharp incline in violent extremism in
Pakistan, that at times is very intricately intertwined with the religious discourse and
rhetoric thus making it more complicated and complex to deal with (Institute of Social
and Policy Sciences 2016). This precarious situation makes Pakistan’s ability and possibility
to eliminate terrorist tendencies from the society both challenging and impossible.
Some social scientists also provide a critique of the National Internal Security Policy
and subsequent National Action Plan of the Government of Pakistan. For instance, a
report of United States Institute for Peace (USIP) highlights certain communicational
and policy gaps between the civil and military authorities and finds no clue of working
on bridging these gaps through the participation of stakeholders.
Experts have also identified the Pakistan’s geographical locations, which are most
volatile in terms of rising extremism and violence. Southern Punjab is unfortunately
one of those dominions. The Crisis Group Asia Report N°279 (2016) titled: ‘Pakistan’s
Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab’ provides an apt picture of Southern Punjab’s
extremist milieu and discusses dense pockets of extremist groups being nurtured in
Policy Papers 71

traditional religious schools called madrasas. One very significant observation of this
report is that ‘madrasas are the main hub of terrorist activities’.
In 2018, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) formulated the CVE
policy for Pakistan in the name of ‘National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines’.
This policy identifies the main factors behind radicalization, violence, extremism, and
terrorism. It highlights the following six broader areas (NACTA 2018) where policy
interventions could bring about substantial results in CVE.
i) Rule of law for the protection of people’s lives, liberty and property.
ii) Citizen engagement by bridging the gap between government and public,
iii) The role of media in promoting a soft image of Islam and national culture,
(Media can also be used for the promotion of inter-provincial harmony and
can play a substantial role in women empowerment.)
iv) Educational reforms by introducing an integrated curriculum in schools,
universities, colleges and madrasas that minimize disparity,
v) Enhancement of procedures of parole and probation for the release of people
from jails who are not guilty, and
vi) The promotion of culture can be understood as a soft policy to prevent and
counter violent extremism.
Pakistan is a country which is fighting against illiteracy, poverty, corruption,
political instability, deprivation, and militancy, “An uneducated Muslim population has
persistently been duped and robbed of its rights in the name of a religious utopia.
Therefore, it is essential to provide basic health facilities, education, and economic
security to the masses. Rule of law and development projects are necessary to provide
them legal and economic relief. Religious militias need to be neutralized and reintegrated
into society by diverting extremist tendencies towards social work (Khan 2005, p. 47).

Methodology
This study applies a behavioral model approach towards the elimination of
terrorism. Both the qualitative and quantitative data have been collected and used
to analyze the study. There are two types of powers which are utilized to eliminate
extremism, i.e. ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ (Nye Jr. 2003, 2009, 2011). Hard power
implies the use of military, rule and law, and coercive tactics. For Nye Jr. (2003), “soft
power encompasses the range of civil society instruments.”
To see the validity of soft power approach, this study employs Attitudes-Behaviors
Corrective (ABC) model of violent extremism proposed by James Khalil, John Horgan
and Martine Zeuthen in 2019. This model has been chosen because it emphasizes the
need to “ask right questions” related to “drivers of violent extremism” (Khalil et al.
2019).
72 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

By taking cue from ABC model, a questionnaire (Annexure A & B) was designed to
“ask the right” question. Mostly educated men and women were chosen to fill up the
questionnaires mostly have MCQs. These questions mainly assess the level of awareness
in southern Punjab about the drivers behind terrorist activities, their behaviors and
opinions about the efficacy of government and NGOs efforts to mitigate extremism, their
point of view about the major reasons behind extremism in their area, and the value of
females’ educational cum vocational involvement in the overall process of eliminating
terrorism from this region. For the analytical part of the research, academia, regional
politicians and local elite were consulted to conceive the ground realities.

Discussion and Analysis

Qunatitative Data Analysis
The questionnaire designed for collecting data from the field was aimed at knowing
the opinion of the youth, who are associated with the socialization process and can
understand the gravity of extremist situation prevailing in the region. The demographics
of the sample population are depicted in the graph below:

‘DEMOGRAPHICS’
78.90%
73.70%

n Boys

n Girls
47.40%

n 20-22
36.80%

n 23-25

26-28
26.30%

n 29-31

n FA
10.50%
10.50%

BA
5.30%

5.30%

n
5.30%

n MA

n MPhil
Boys Girls 20-22 23-25 26-28 29-31 FA BA MA MPhil

GENDER AGE QUALIFICATION

Figure 1. Demographic Information of the Respondents

The sample population is a mix of both male (73.70 %) and female (26.30 %).
Well-educated respondents were carefully chosen so that their responses can provide
a logical direction for developing a policy framework. Keeping in mind the objectives
of the study, all the participants were chosen from different areas of southern Punjab,
for instance, Bahawalpur, Multan, DG Khan (Figure 1). Majority of them fall in the age
group of 26-28 years. Most of the respondents (47%) have BA degrees followed by MA
(36.80%) and MPhil (5.30 %).
Policy Papers 73

Figure 2: Recurrence of the word ‘extremism’

M a j o r i t y
Recurrence of the word ‘extremism’ in
respondents (42.1%)
daily life
could find the
meanings of the word
‘extremism’ either
through media or other
sources while only a 42.1 42.1

few (15.8%) denied the

presence of any issues
15.8
related to extremism.
As the hypothesis
suggests, the extremist Yes No Occassionally on Media
and aggressive norms
are socially accepted to the extent that the level of retaliation against them is less than
required. This scenario suggests that there is a need to create awareness among masses
and make them realize the drastic impact of extremism in their region.

Figure 3: Major Reasons of Rise of Extremism

Figure 3 denotes
the major causes of Major reasons behind the rise extremism
rise of extremism. in South Punjab
Majority (31.6%)
considers ‘negligence
of government’ as the 31.6 26.3
major cause behind
the rise of extremism; 15.8
26.3% believe that 26.3

‘less opportunities’
and ‘social barriers’
are to be blamed for Less Opportunities Education
extremist issues in Social Barriers Negligence of Government
southern Punjab; only a
small group of sample population (15.8%) believes that ‘lack of education’ is the cause
of spread of extremism. As the diagram suggests, it is being seriously realized by the
masses that patronization of the government is seriously required. As a matter of fact,
there is a need to work on all barriers mentioned in the survey that require practical
solutions. In nutshell, unless a long-term strategy with an eclectic approach is adopted,
it is impossible to root out violent extremism in this region.
74 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Figure 4: Benefits of Female Education in Southern Punjab

While identifying
the benefits of female Benefit of female Education in
education in the South Punjab
region, Figure 4 21.1
shows that majority
36.8
of respondents (42%)
consider female
42.1
education a big
‘general economic
benefit for the region’.
Domestic life empowerment
37% believe that female
General economic benefits of the region
education would bring
about ‘domestic life empowerment’ by a majority. 21% are of the view that it would be
helpful for ‘future development prospects for this region. If it is a matter of women
empowerment, the sample population of the survey ardently supports it. The results
presented in Figure 4 suggest that if female education project is pursued in Southern
Punjab, the violent extremism situation can be altered considerably. It is the women
empowerment that can bring betterment in the socio-economic fabric of the entire
region.

Figure 5. Impact of Female Vocational

Training on Society and Economy
Figure 5 presents
Impact of female vocational training on the
the impact of female
society and economy of Southern Punjab
vocational training on
society and economy 15.8
in southern Punjab. 26.3
According to it, a majority
(58%) believe that ‘it can
generate social change’. 57.9

However, a small number

of participants (26%) think
It can contribute power elevation
that ‘it can bring down the
It can generate social change
extremist behavior pattern It can bring down the extremist behavior
in the region. However, pattern in the region
only a few of them (16%)
are of the view that ‘it can contribute to power elevation’. The field survey endorses
the implementation of women empowerment projects through educational cum
Policy Papers 75

vocational institutes. Female population can play a vital role in bringing about change
in the extremist behavior patterns of the society. Many ills of the region are associated
with the gender disparity, economic conditions, and negligence of the government. This
grim situation makes the social environment conducive for the extremist elements to
fill the gap and propel their negative agenda in the society. This study suggests that if
all stakeholders join hands and create a long-term educational and vocational training
setup in the region, the room for extremist elements can surely be reduced effectively.
The field survey also verifies this research hypothesis.

Figure 6: Benefits of NGOs

Figure 6 illustrates the benefits
Benefit of already existing NGOs
gained through the already existed
NGOs. A majority of respondents
15.8
(47.4%) consider that there are
no benefits at all; 36.8% feel a 36.8

‘substantial improvement’ as a
benefit of NGOs, and only 15.8% say 47.4

it will ‘pave the way for the future

welfare of the region’. Most crucial
part of the survey was to measure n Substantial improvement n Nothing
the level of effectiveness of NGOs n Paved way of future walfare of the region
and their field work. As the support
and security system is not as effective as required, the performance of these NGOs is not
taken by the masses as effective as is required. This study suggests that the current socio-
economic conditions prevailing in southern Punjab seek an all-encompassing policy
that is backed by all the stakeholders so that it might ensure viable counter extremism
parameters. Such parameters must be interwoven in the socialization process of the
region, which could consequently provide economic benefits as well, especially via
women empowerment by setting up institutions of educational cum vocational training.

Views of Academia and Regional Politicians

In order to understand the ground realities of the region, a detailed interview of
social and political figures of the area, Jaffer Khan Leghari and his wife, Mina Ehsan
Leghari, was conducted. Mina Leghari pointed out some bureaucratic and political
hurdles in establishing educational and vocational institutions in the region. She said:
the process of recruitment of teachers as well as their transfer and posting is so intricate
that it is rather impossible to continue with the educational system; there is no system
to recruit the local educated applicants in their local institutions. Lack of livelihood
opportunities, poor recruitment policies and lack of practical approach in the education
76 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

has seriously amassed the entire developmental scenario.

It is easier to open a madrasa in the area than a formal educational institution
because it costs almost nothing to the parents, requires a nominal infrastructure and
employees, and runs on donations. Sometimes one clergyman is enough to run the
entire setup (Mina Leghari, personal communication, 31 July 2021). Tribal associations,
power struggle and lack of governmental interest have messed up the entire educational
process of the region (Jaffer Khan Leghari, personal communication (31 July 2021).

Findings and Conclusion

Since the war on terror, debate over the difference between terrorism and extremism
continues. Extremism is mainly associated with some ideology or belief system. Some
of the ideologies and beliefs are structured in such a way that a follower can adopt
the extreme versions. Extremism is not necessarily violent but can surely contribute to
terrorist tendencies and acts. This requires a huge change in the formulation of policy
and plan. Immediately after 9/11, steps were taken against terrorists and terrorism, but
the serious intellectual work, policies and plans against extremism came a bit later.
Now, after two decades of war on terror and after experimenting military and security
models, the need to work on beliefs and ideologies (both ethnic and religious) is being
realized.
Earlier, we have discussed that how military and defense models are applied and
how local approaches to prevent CVE are studied? There has been one visible gap in
almost all models and approaches and that is the lack of executional plan on long-term
basis (especially for women and poverty-stricken areas of the country). Unless these
extremist thoughts are not alternated by moderate educational plans and skill learning,
the exploitation of the poverty-stricken and illiterate population cannot be stopped.

Proposed Model for Preventing and Countering Terrorism

Deprived areas of Southern Punjab are often used by the radicals as nurseries and
the bulk of recruits is taken from these areas. Keeping in view these dismal circumstances,
following initiatives have been taken by the successive government.
• Check on the growth of the terrorist organizations
• Building community resilience against extremism
• Hindering local recruitment in the radical organizations
These initiatives have been mainly deployed because of security concerns. ‘Defence
and security model’ of CVE definitely curbed the immediate hostile state of affairs but
the attainment of long-term societal basis for undermining extremism in the southern
Punjab remained unfulfilled.
All around the world, soft power through women engagement is being promoted
Policy Papers 77

to counter terrorism. The USA has successfully employed the soft power of education to
bring an ideological change in Africa (Aldrich 2014). There is an increasing focus on the
need to incorporate psycho-social dimensions to counterterrorism (Baak et al. 2020).
For instance, one study argues that schools and education system have a pivotal role
to deescalate terrorism in Gulf States (Lawale 2020; Syed et al. 2015). Another angle to
tackle extremism is through developing “sustainability and capacity building” (Cherney
2016). Moreover, there is an emphasis on women engagement n the peacemaking
process. There is a need to understand the women potential in curbing terrorism as
suggested by Skjelsbæk et al. (2020).
“Many terrorist groups have women wings and women-oriented publications and
other outreach programs because they understand the important role that mothers,
wives, and sisters play in a male family members’ decision to take up arms with a terrorist
group. We find that females are significantly more likely to support the sectarian group
with a women’s outreach-wing.” (Fair & Hamza 2018, p. 962)
The study stresses the need to employ soft power in order to curb extremism
from southern Punjab. But, the question arises that what kind of soft power should be
employed, who should be the stakeholders, drivers, and actors of this approach.
Here comes the gap which seriously calls for substantial plans of mitigating
extremist elements from this tribal/conservative society. By taking clues from the
available models and studies as well as the ground realities in terms of poverty, illiteracy,
gender disparity, unemployment, and fundamentalist ideologies, this study proposes
a female educational cum vocational model to eliminate terrorism from the region by
implementing ‘soft power’ in the form of education followed by vocational training.
Moreover, since women’s potential role in countering terrorism has been neglected
in Pakistan, the model includes female population to bring innovation in the already
available paradigms and include the marginalized groups in counterterrorism efforts.
Based on the already available models to study the reasons behind terrorism and
the ways to prevent it, this study proposes a unique and eclectic approach to curb
extremism from Southern Punjab. It argues that three already available models should
be taken under consideration to propose a multidimensional model which is actually
needed.
First Model is presented by the United Nations. This model focuses on the most
relevant outcomes and is based on three basic things, i.e. policy framework, plan of
action, and mobilization of resources. Good governance, mechanism of engaging
community in social and political process, and education and gender equality are the
much sought after demands of this study with additional suggestion of skills learning
and vocational education arrangement for females.
Second model is taken into consideration because it is a study which helps
understand the behavior patterns of the criminals associated with violent extremism. The
78 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

research has revealed that most of these extremists have criminal history, commitment to
some extremist ideology, lack of education and belong to lower socio-economic strata,
Although first model’s utility and application is different from the second one, still there
is much similarity in the elements of the sample communities’ behavior pattern and
socio-economic conditions. This similarity makes this model more close to the study.
Third model is even more elaborative than the previous two. This model sufficiently
leads towards the rehabilitation and reintegration of those communities entrapped
in extremist thinking. This model presents theoretical explanation of elements of
influence that generate extremist social behavior patterns. The prominent feature of the
study is that there is a notable work on the preparation of such an environment where
proper social reintegration of extremist elements could be taken place. This very feature
makes it close to this study as it also suggests the plan of reintegration and rehabilitation
of the deprived communities through skill-based education and creation of economic
opportunities that could lessen the economic dependency of the poorest communities
on others.
Here is the table given on the next page which further explains the complete
features of these models as explained above.
Policy Papers 79

These models provide an ample justification for the further work on the new social
vistas for further improvement in the societies mired with violent extremism. Moreover,
significant fieldwork was conducted in order to show that how this community of the
Southern Punjab reflects the indications of violent extremism and in what manner
intends to take rehabilitation work a step forward than the programs already being
undertaken by the NGOs and the agencies.
80 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Policy Recommendations
There are certain recommendations which can contribute to viable outcomes in
CVE:
• Establishment of alternative educational cum vocational institutes for
madrasa students, especially for the women of under-developed areas, which
should impart training free of cost. Usually, women population is destined to
be dumped to these madrassas, which destroyed their academic and personal
grooming.
• As military and security models (hard power) are excessively used, now it
is prime time to make combined efforts of NGOs and ‘civil society’ backed
by ‘government agencies’ (soft power) to contribute to diminish violent
extremism.
• There is a need to run media campaign to have an educated and well-trained
female population to deal with the poor economic conditions and social
change.
• Model educational cum vocational institutions should be set up under the
supervision of independent Board of Governors.
• Small businesses or cottage industry should be promoted in remote and
starved-hit areas so that the women might get employment or set up their
own businesses to stop the way of extremism in these areas.

Vital Policy Implications

There are multiple views, models and narratives of violent extremism presented by
the global intelligentsia. Each narrative and each model is characterized by the type and
realities of extremism prevailing in that particular region. The case of Pakistan is unique
due to its distinct geographical location and its ethno-religious patterns of society. As
a matter of fact, this country has been facing extremist elements since the decade of
1980s. War on Terror was merely a new version of the previous extremist episode under
the title of jihad. Since two decades have elapsed and the ultimate withdrawal of the
US forces from Afghanistan is taking place, there is likelihood of another episode of
extremism which is hard to avoid at least for Pakistan. In the present circumstances,
Pakistan is in dire need of an effective counter violent extremism plan with a complete
executional preparation. This is prime time to devise a proper mechanism for CVE on
grass-root level. As this research suggests that poverty, illiteracy and lack of socialization
process is providing a chance to the extremist elements to exploit the dilapidated social
conditions and attracting youth towards their sanctuaries.
Policy Papers 81

Final Assessment
The educational-cum-vocational model of counter extremism offers an effective
alternative to conventional religious centers. As a matter of fact, this model is even
more effective than these madrasas as it will not only promote moderate trends in
the female population but also equip them with skills. The skillful and well-trained
moderate youth would definitely feel stronger and contribute towards a meaningful
social change. This process of enlightenment would further facilitate the assimilation
of this female population in the society as a useful and effective part of the population.
Change is a process which takes its time but its outcomes are solid and long-lasting.
Many models are previously used based on security and defense strategies. Many
organizations are working on the social front. This is time for joint efforts of civil society,
Government Agencies and intelligentsia to plan and execute a simple and workable
model of CVE focusing on the education and skill learning of female population of the
under-developed areas like Southern Punjab and set it as an example for other areas of
the country to fight out the evil of extremism effectively.
In the case of southern Punjab, poverty and illiteracy have been identified as the
fuel for the recruitment in terrorist organizations. For this, the recommended solutions
in the report are: the increase in employment opportunities, adequate and efficient
provision of public utilities such as clean drinking water, and investment in local culture,
heritage and sports. The involvement of the corporate sector could act as a catalyst in
supporting and progressing CVEs (I-SAPS 2016).
Solution to extremism in southern Punjab is not militarized counter-terrorism but
to control gender, racial, and religious prejudices by educating the masses. There is
a need to allocate special budgets to spend on people’s welfare and development. At
the same time, there is a need to eliminate rampant impunity, gender disparity, and
educational reforms are direly needed.

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Policy Papers 83

07
Countering Violent Barelvi Extremism
in Pakistan: Challenges, Implications and
Way Forward
Dr Naeem Ahmed
Abstract
The recent rise of Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) on the political horizon of the
country is being viewed as a new form of violent activism of the Barelvis, who used
to be the non-violent and peace-loving people. The country-wide violent protests
and sit-ins, which the TLP has so far organized, aimed at preventing the government
from introducing any reforms in the blasphemy laws, and pressuring the government
to break diplomatic ties with France for defending the publication of caricatures of
the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). The militancy manifested by the TLP not only
impacted the socio-political landscape of the country, but also has severe international
implications for Pakistan. Against this backdrop, this policy brief analyzes the origin of
Barelvi extremist discourse with a particular reference to the rise of TLP, the challenges
faced by the government in countering it and the scale of support to TLP’s ideology
in the Pakistani society in addition to its implications for Pakistan at the domestic and
international levels. The primary data has been collected by conducting FGDs and one
on one interviews by using open-ended questions. The study proposes to stop the
policy of marginalizing the mainstream political parties to keep the extremist parties
away from power corridors. It further suggests the government to abandon the project
of patronizing Sufi Islam.

Keywords: Barelvi extremism, Sufi Islam, Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan, blasphemy

laws, Faizabad dharna.

Introduction
Pakistan has been witnessing sectarian violence, perpetrated by both Sunni
(Deobandi) and Shiite militant groups since the mid-1980s. After the 9/11 incident, the
Deobandi groups-led religious terrorism overpowered the state narrative of peace and
interfaith harmony and continued till the military operation in Swat. After it went into
background, Barelvi extremism surfaced. So, it is a decade-old phenomenon, which is
growing rapidly.
In April this year, Pakistan witnessed an anarchy-like situation when Tehreek-i-Labbaik
84 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Pakistan (TLP), a radical Barelvi group of Muslims established in 2015, staged violent
protest demonstrations demanding the implementation of an agreement signed
earlier between the government and the Tehreek. The agreement called for French
ambassador’s expulsion from Pakistan and boycotting French products in retaliation
to the French government’s defense of publishing the caricatures of Holy Prophet
Mohammad (peace be upon him) in the name of freedom of expression (Khan 2021).
As a matter of fact, the TLP has been protesting on the issues of introducing any
reforms in the country’s blasphemy laws, particularly section 295-C that became the part
of the Constitution during Zia regime in 1986 by an Act of Parliament, and defending the
honor and finality of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) since long. On the other
hand, the government has adopted a policy of appeasement by signing an agreement
with the TLP, and at the same time allowing the outfit to blackmail the government by
employing violent methods of agitation time and again. TLP has now become a political
force to be reckoned with.
Currently, Pakistan has been witnessing a sudden new form of violent activism
of Barelvis, who were known for their apolitical, non-violent, and peaceful thoughts
and were least violent as compared to Deobandis1, Wahabis2, and Ahl-e-Hadith3. On 15
April 2021, the government banned the group under Anti-Terrorism Act (Jamal 2021),
and the federal cabinet, in its July 13 meeting, kept the decision intact. However, in
Pakistan, it is a general practice that the proscribed outfits re-surface with a new name
as it has happened in the past with Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jamaát Dawa (JuD)
and Tahreek Ja’afria Pakistan.
The unprecedentedly violent assertion of the Barelvis in the political arena of
Pakistan has not only greatly impacted the socio-political landscape of the country, but
also brought severe international implications. Against this background, this study will
focus on:
• Origins of the violent Barelvi extremist discourse with a particular reference to
the rise of TLP,
• Challenges faced by the government in countering it,
• Scale of support to TLP’s ideology in the society, and
• Implications for Pakistan at the domestic and international level.
The outcome of this study will provide possible insights to understand the narrative
of the Barelvi outfits, particularly the TLP, as well as a way forward as how to
counter it.
Research questions
• Why have the Barelvis opted for a violent discourse for the acceptance of their

1
A Sunni sect formed in 19th Century in Deoband, India as an Islamic revivalist movement
2
A Sunni sect formed in 18th Century by an Islamic scholar named Muhammad Ibn-Abd al-Wahaab in central Arabia
3
A Sunni Salafi reform movement emerged in North India in the mid of 19 Century.
Policy Papers 85

demands?
• What are the challenges and policy options for Pakistan in countering violent
Barelvi extremism led by TLP?
• What will be the implications for Pakistan at the domestic, regional, and
international level, if Barelvi extremism goes unchecked?

Significance for policy makers

The main objective of the study is to provide a succinct information to policy makers
about the impending TLP-backed violent Barelvi extremism so that they, by realizing
the severity of the situation, may formulate effective and long-lasting policies to avoid
future chaos that could cause internal political instability and international isolation.
The recommendations, both short-term and long-term, will provide a way forward to
the government and its various institutions to revise and reform their existing policies
and programs.

Methodology
The research is qualitative in nature and the data has been collected from both the
secondary and primary sources. For the collection of primary data, ethnographic tools,
such as direct observations, were employed. In this regard, two Focus Group Discussions
(i.e. one each with the members/sympathizers of the TLP/Barelvi organizations in
Karachi, and government officials) were conducted. Keeping in view the COVID-19
situation and the consent of the respondents, online interviews were preferred through
open-ended questions. Secondary data was collected through a vast literature review of
government acts, policies, and programs in addition to studying journal and newspaper
articles as well as speeches and media interviews of national leadership.

Literature Review
Pakistan’s Barelvi Landscape and rise of TLP
Although there are several Barelvi groups and organizations, which are active
in Pakistan on religious and political fronts, the most important are: Jamiat Ulema-
e-Pakistan (JUP); Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT); Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC); Sunni
Tehreek (ST); Dawat-e-Islami (DI) and Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). Except TLP,
others are relatively moderate Sunni-Barelvi organizations. Similarly, all the other
groups except DI actively participate in the country’s general elections.
The origin of the recent wave of TLP militancy could be traced back after the
assassination of Salman Taseer4 for being critical to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, who had
4
Salman Taseer, the then governor of Punjab, was gunned down in January 2011 by his official bodyguard namely
Mumtaz Qadri, who was reportedly a member of Dawat-e-Islami, however, Dawat along with other Barelvi outfits
condemned the act.
86 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

also called for amending the law in order to avoid any misuse, particularly against the
minorities. He had also stood for the acquittal of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman who was
sentenced to death by a court of law for committing blasphemy. He not only visited Asia
Bibi in jail, but also pledged at a media briefing on 21 November 2010 to personally take
her clemency appeal to the then President Asif Ali Zardari. (Taseer to take Asia Appeal
2010)
Taseer’s murder gave a new dimension to Barelvi militancy in terms of actors,
issues, target and scope. Hitherto, the Barelvi militancy has been carried out by the ST
against the Deobandi outfits for protecting and re-taking of mosques from the Deobandi
groups in Karachi and other urban centers of Pakistan. Since the Deobandis were the
target, the scope of the Barelvi militancy was very limited with no ambitious agenda
of establishing a caliphate or taking over the state apparatus. (Syed 2016). In contrast,
the post-Mumtaz Qadri Barelvi militancy, carried out by the TLP, is different from that
of Sunny Tehrik. While highlighting the issues of blasphemy and honor of the Prophet
Mohammad (peace be upon him), the main target of TLP militancy is the government
and officials, who intend to bring any change in the country’s blasphemy laws. In other
words, the current religio-political activism of TLP is not against the Deobandis or Salafis
rather it is meant to pressure the government to refrain it from making any change in
the blasphemy laws.
Initially, TLP launched a campaign for the release of Qadri in the name of Tehreek
Rihai Mumtaz Qadri (Movement for the release of Mumtaz Qadri) and later after Qadri’s
execution in the case, it turned into Tehreek-e-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah, which again
renamed as the TLP when it decided to participate in the 2018 general elections.
The TLP’s agitational politics gained its currency when at the time of Qadri’s
Chehlum5 in March 2016, a Barelvi mob entered Islamabad’s red zone and staged a
dharna (sit-in). Their demands were to ‘declare Qadri a hero, convert his prison cell
into a national heritage site, dismiss members of Ahmadi community from government
jobs and hang Asia Bibi.’ (Ali 2016). However, the protest ended in the aftermath of
negotiations with the government.
Street power is the major tool in the hands of TLP, which it often uses effectively
to keep the government under pressure. For example, in November 2017, when the
PML-N government intended to bring a change in the Election Bill, TLP staged a second
sit-in in Islamabad, popularly known as Faizabad dharna, by blocking and paralyzing the
capital city. In the Bill, the wording was changed from ‘I solemnly swear’ to ‘I declare.’
Finally, amid pressure, the government refrained itself from bringing any change in the
bill, however, the then Law Minister Zahid Hamid had to resign. The sit-in ended when
the government and TLP signed an agreement, brokered by the Army. (Basit 2020). The
5
Muslims, especially the Barelvis, observe a ceremony on the 40th day after the death of their kith and kins and pray
for the departed soul to rest in peace.
Policy Papers 87

Supreme Court, in its detailed February 6, 2019 judgement by Justice Qazi Faez Isa’s suo
moto case, clearly highlighted the role of Armed Forces and various security agencies in
the following words: “The Armed Forces, and all agencies manned by the personnel of
the Armed Forces, including ISI, Military Intelligence (MI) and ISPR serve Pakistan, and
thus all its citizens. They must never be perceived to support a particular party, faction,
or politician.”
In November 2018, TLP had also showed its street power when the Islamabad High
Court released Aasia Bibi. Consequently, the TLP-led protests and sit-ins started across
the country, particularly in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi.
The latest violent agitation was held by TLP in October 2020 against the French
President’s defense of Charlie Hebdo Magazine to re-print the caricature of Prophet
Mohammad (peace be upon him) in the name of freedom of expression and secularism.
It led to a worldwide unrest and protests by the Muslims. Although this act of France
was condemned by Pakistan, the TLP leadership demanded to boycott the French
products and expel the French Ambassador from Pakistan. The protests later ended
on the government’s surety that the matter would be tabled in parliament within three
months. As the time approached, the government gained more time till April 2021 to
implement the agreement. However, before the deadline reached, the government
started crackdown on the TLP and arrested its leader, Saad Rizvi, who took over the
party after the death of his father, Khadim Hussain Rizvi, in November 2020. The
situation unfolded in a very violent manner with the death and injury of several people,
including law-enforcement personnel as well.
TLP’s Political Triumph
The existing literature reveals that after the 9/11 incident, Pakistan decided to
promote a rather soft image of Islam, which is inclusive, non-violent, and advocate of
peace, justice, love, and compassion. In order to counter radicalization and terrorism,
the then president Gen. Pervez Musharraf, under his ‘enlightened moderation’ move,
established the National Council for Promotion of Sufism in 2006. Later, the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) government (2008-2013) renamed it as Sufi National Council in
2009 and put it under a seven-member committee dominated by the Barelvi School
of Thought. (Basit, p. 11). However, Taseer’s assassination compelled the PPP to stop
supporting Barelvi groups.
After Salman Taseer’s assassination in 2011, TLP presented Qadri as a hero to gain
political legitimacy in which violence is justified. This aspect was further exploited by
its firebrand leader (late) Khadim Hussain Rizvi, who used to attract large gatherings
through his sermons. Two other main factors which further led to the rise of TLP are:
the effective use of social media; and the role youth belonging to the lower middle class.
Another factor which further contributed to the TLP popularity is the unabated media
coverage to its protest demonstrations and sit-ins across the country. This also provoked
88 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

the public sentiments on the very sensitive issue of blasphemy.

Entry into Electoral Politics
In order the secure its political stakes in the Pakistani politics, TLP participated in
the 2018 general elections. Although it failed to win any National Assembly seats, it won
only two provincial assembly seats in Sindh, bagged 2.2 million votes, emerged as the
fifth largest political party at the national level and the third in the Punjab in terms of
popular votes it gained (Zaidi 2020).
It is a fact that Faizabad dharna (sit-in) has changed the whole dynamics of the
Barelvi politics from peace-loving people to those aggressively vying for their rights.
In a very important policy statement after the 2017 Faizabad dharna, Rizvi had said:
“Barelvis have been subjected to suppression for over a century and the reverse to that
phenomenon has started. Though it will take time, eventually the voice of the majority
will prevail.” (Ali, 2017).
Although Rizvi is no more, his narrative would not only continue to provide
a political and religious support-base to TLP, but also pose major challenges to the
government in order to counter this narrative.

Discussion and Analysis

Challenges in Countering Barelvi Extremism
It is a fact that countering the TLP-led Barelvi extremist narrative is an uphill task.
There are four big challenges ahead of the government.
First, TLP has raised a very sensitive issue of blasphemy and defending the honor
of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), therefore, keeping in view the
political instability in the country, no government or even institution would dare to
touch upon or make any minor change or constitutional amendment in the existing
laws.
Second, Barelvis constitute more than 50 to 60 per cent of the Muslim population
of the country (Mahmood 2018), and the TLP has succeeded in presenting itself as the
guardian of their rights while it has also succeeded in marginalizing other major Barelvi
groups and political parties.
Third, another challenge faced by the government to counter the TLP-led political
activism is the use of social media by the party. It is a fact that the TLP derives its
support mainly from the youth belonging to middle-middle and lower-middle classes,
that are very much exposed to social media. The frequent and easy use of social media
apps, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube and Twitter, have not only brought the
Barelvis much closer to each other, but also made it easy for them to propagate their
narrative through speeches and lectures, thus enhancing the TLP’s support-base at
grass roots level.
Lastly, the lack of any official narrative to counter the Barelvi extremism and
Policy Papers 89

the ‘sensitive’ issues embarked upon by TLP, has further weakened the government
to take any action. The ‘Paigham-e-Pakistan’ initiative, which the PML-N government
had announced in January 2018 under the ‘National Peace Narrative’, only deals with
a unanimous fatwa of condemning suicide bombing, Takfir, and armed struggle as well
as rebellion against the state. However, it is silent on mob vigilantism and violence
perpetrated by any non-state actor in the name of blasphemy and upholding the sanctity
of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).
Domestic Implications
Although one may not build a link/connection between state’s support to Barelvi/
Sufi Islam and the affiliation of Salman Taseer’s murderer with a Barelvi group, the TLP’s
increasing popularity and agitational politics have severe domestic and international
implications for Pakistan. Following are the four major domestic implications:
First, at the domestic level, the effective use of street power by highlighting very
sensitive religious issues has generated a culture of mob vigilante and violence in the
country. A country like Pakistan which is gradually struggling to deal with countering
violent Deobandi and Salafi militancy, perpetrated by Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
and Al-Qaeda as well as the Islamic State (IS), this new kind of TLP-led fiasco with
highlighting very sensitive religious issues has made Pakistan’s task extremely difficult.
In an alarming move, the TTP extended its support to the TLP. In a letter published in a
section of press, TTP spokesman Mohammad Khurasani said:
“We stand by those who sacrificed their lives for the honour of the Holy Prophet
(Peace Be Upon Him) in this hour of grief, pay tributes to them and remind
the military forces of their worth. We reassure them that we will take account of
every drop of bloodshed of these martyrs…We want to remind them that these
governments and military institutions have always been unreliable, unprofessional
and lying. Therefore, they should not be trusted and rather (waging) armed struggle
against them is the only solution.” (TTP puts its weight 2021).
Second, the rise of ideologically-driven organization has not only undermined the
popular notion of Barelvi moderation, but also raised new concerns over Pakistan’s
battle against hardline Deobandi/Salafi militancy. This has also shattered the notion that
majority of the population in the country ‘is more moderate than militant.’
Third, the TLP’s rise in 2018 general elections has severely impacted the Punjab
politics. Although it failed to win any seat, it orchestrated a significant role in ensuring
the political defeat of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in the Punjab. Sevea
(2018) quoted Gallup Pakistan poll as:
“46 per cent of voters in the Punjab, who voted for the TLP had previously voted
for the PML-N. The survey further demonstrated that the PML-N’s defeat was due to
it losing nine per cent of its vote share; four per cent of these votes swung towards
the TLP.”
90 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

It must be noted here that the state’s direct or indirect support was purely on
political grounds, i.e. to counter PML-N in the Punjab, where the former has failed to
counter the latter’s popularity, amid several attempts, e.g. by also using Pakistan Awami
Tehreek as well.
Lastly, the religio-political narrative of the TLP has not only further sharpened the
inter-sectarian divide but also created division within the ranks of Barelvi sect, thus
severely affected the multicultural and pluralistic social fabric of Pakistani society.
Two major Barelvi organizations, Dawat-e-Islami and Pakistan Awami Tehrik, not only
disowned Mumtaz Qadri, but also distanced themselves from the TLP. However, the
lower cadre of these organizations have been strongly attracted to the TLP’s narrative
as well as the demands made by the TLP. TLP has not only succeeded in occupying
the religio-political space, but also TLP-led Barelvi radicalism has moved away from its
traditional “image of being apolitical, and peace-loving spiritualists.” (Paracha, 2018).
Therefore, the ‘competition in piety’ approach would be an effort on the part of TLP not
only to discredit the other fellow Barelvi organizations, but also outbid the Deobandis
as well as the Salafis and Ahl-e-Hadith, to promote their version of religious values in
Pakistan.
International Implications
The TLP-led extremism has also severe international implications for Pakistan.
Following are three significant implications:
First, the TLP-led anti-France protests and the agreement which the government
signed with the group under which it had to bring the resolution in parliament on
the matter of whether or not to expel the French ambassador seems to have its dire
international implications for Pakistan. For instance, at the international level, it will
increase Pakistan’s isolation as France is the permanent member of UN Security Council
as well as a leading member of the European Union and Financial Action Task Force
(FATF).
Second, it would directly impact the dismal state of Pakistan’s economy. For
instance, in April 2020, on Pakistan’ Prime Minister, Imran Khan’s appeal to the
world’s wealthy nations under a Global Initiative on Debt Relief, a group of 20 major
economic giants and the Paris Club has frozen the debt payments of developing
countries, including Pakistan. Pakistan’s US$1.1 billion debt was deferred. It must be
noted that presently Pakistan owes more than 11 billion US$ to the Paris Club, of which
the French loan is the second highest after Japan’s. (Raghuvanshi, 2021). Pakistan is
a major debt-relief country from the Paris Club. It is a forum of major creditor states
which also provide various solutions to the countries that are in extreme debt-burden.
It must be noted that France has a major influential role in the Paris Club. Therefore, if
Pakistan’s relations with France deteriorate, it would directly impact Pakistan’s already
deteriorated economy. Moreover, it would directly impact Pakistan’s trade relations
Policy Papers 91

with the European Union, especially under the ambit of GSP-plus status. For example,
in April 2021, a strong reaction came from the European Parliament, of which France
is a very active and strong member, in the form of the adoption of a resolution, calling
for the review of GSP+ status to Pakistan for increasing number of blasphemy cases in
the country. The resolution not only called for Pakistan to “unequivocally condemn”
incitement to violence and discrimination against religious minorities, but also showed
deep concern at the ongoing anti-French sentiments in the country. (Rehman 2021).
Lastly, being the main victim of the war on terror, Pakistan has been making efforts
to build its soft image as a hub of regional economic connectivity, while at the same time
highlighting India’s gross violation of human rights in Kashmir as well as its intervention
in Pakistan and its role as a spoiler in Afghanistan. In this regard, Pakistan needs a
huge international support, particularly of the powerful and persuasive western states.
Therefore, the actions of groups like the TLP, with whom the government also happens
to sign an agreement, would sabotage all the efforts of image-building at the global level.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The recent rise of TLP’s violence-prone religio-political activism has made Pakistan’s
political landscape more radical and militant. There is a dire need on the part of the
government to devise a coherent strategy. In order to save Pakistan from any far-reaching
consequences, the TLP power needs to be curtailed at the earliest. Following are some
short-term and long-term policy recommendations:
Short-term:
• The government needs to immediately abandon the project of patronizing
Sufi Islam. The disastrous lesson of such a project could be learnt from the
previous experiment when the state patronized various Deobandi groups and
madrasas to fight in Afghan jihad. Therefore, any official patronization and
support to one ideology will not only result in the weakening of the state’s
writ, but also lend power and authority to groups like TLP.
• The unabated media coverage to the TLP dharnas gave too much publicity
to the group and aroused public sentiments on the very sensitive issue of
blasphemy. Therefore, media, especially the electronic media, should be
barred from conducting any program on sensitive issues. Taseer’s murder is a
case in point. For the sake of increasing program’s rating, anchors deliberately
asked provocative questions, and wrongly dubbed Taseer as a blasphemer
(Syed 2016).
• In order to establish the writ of the state, the incumbent government needs to
abandon the TLP activities and ensure that such groups should not be allowed
to propagate their narrative by challenging the legitimate coercive power of
the state.
92 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

• The National Action Plan (NAP) needs to be implemented in letter and spirit.
For this, use of hate speeches as well as the funding sources of TLP should be
sternly scrutinized.
• National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) needs to be reformed and
restructured in line with resilient development and its role should be enhanced
by giving more powers so that it could penetrate at community level. For this
purpose, there is a need to establish a policy think tank to conduct research
on issues related to CVE and how to control future radicalization of the youth
to save the society from further religious conflicts.
Long-Term
• The policy of marginalizing mainstream political parties should be abandoned,
and the liberal political forces should be given space to join hands to keep the
extremists and fundamentalists away from power corridors.
• In 2017, Faizabad dharna had exposed the skewed civil-military relations at
that time. The military, which initially refused to intervene in the situation,
later brokered the deal between TLP and the government. A relentless civil-
military friction severely affected the state’s ability to counter extremist groups.
There is a dire need to create a balance between civil-military relations.
• The professional and institutional responsibilities of the intelligence agencies
must be ensured by ending their implicit or explicit support to groups like
TLP as was mentioned in Justice Qazi Faez Isa’s report.
• Pakistan’s anti-terrorism legislation is silent on ensuring security of the
witnesses, judges, and the state prosecutors. Therefore, it is necessary to
provide security and protection to those who conduct the trial of cases of
such far-right groups, particularly related to blasphemy. For example, the anti-
terror court judge who convicted Taseer’s murderer, Mumtaz Qadri, to death,
had to leave the country (Siddiqa 2013).
• Although it is a good sign that the government has banned TLP and the
Ministry of Law and Justice is working on getting its election symbol cancelled
(Yousafzai 2021), the government has to ensure that the organization should
not re-surface with a new name. In the long run, politics and political activities
in the name of religion should be completely banned.

References
Ali, I 2016. ‘Nearly 2,000 pro-Qadri protesters continue sit-in outside parliament’, Dawn, 27 March.
Ali, I 2021, ‘PPP emerges victorious in NA-249 Karachi by-poll’, Dawn, 29 April.
Ali, K 2017, ‘Who’s Khadim Hussain Rizvi’, Dawn, 3 December.
Basit, A 2020, “Barelvi Political Activism and Religious Mobilization in Pakistan: The Case of Tehreek-e-Labaik
Pakistan (TLP), Politics, Religion & Ideology, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1-16.
Rehman, A 2021, ‘EU Parliament move to review trade ties with Pakistan’, DAWN, 1st May.
Khan, AF 2021, ‘TLP demands to be placed before parliament: PM’, DAWN, 12 February, https://www.dawn.
Policy Papers 93

com/news/1606919.
Jamal, S 2021, ‘Government officially bans ultra-right TLP under anti-terrorism law’, Gulf News, 16 April.
Mahmood, S 2018, The Barelvis’ Tilt towards Extremism in Pakistan, South Asian Voices, June 8, viewed 10
August 2021, https://southasianvoices.org/the-barelvis-tilt-towards-extremism-in-pakistan/
TTP puts its weight behind TLP, calls for joint struggle against govt 2021, Pakistan Today,
Paracha, N F 2018, ‘Smokers’ Corner: The Rise of the Militant Barelvi’, Dawn, 9 September.
Raghuvanshi, K 2021, ‘Fundamentalism: A Growing Political Ideology’, The Kootneeti, 17 May.
Supreme Court of Pakistan 2019. ‘Suo Moto Case No. 7/2017 (Suo Moto action regarding Islamabad-Rawal-
pindi Sit-in/Dharna)’, 6 February
Sevea, IS 2018. ‘The Rise of Barelvi Political Activism in Pakistan’. ISAS Insights, Institute of South Asian
Studies, National University of Singapore, October, pp. 1-6.
Siddiqa, A 2013, ‘Countering terrorism’, The Express Tribune, 31 July.
Syed, J 2016, “Barelvi Militancy in Pakistan and Salman Taseer’s Murder” . In: Faith-Based Violence and
Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan . London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 240-241.
Taseer to take Aasia’s clemency appeal to president 2010, The Express Tribune, 13 July
2021. ‘Cabinet approves keeping TLP banned, Fawad Chaudhry says’, s.l.: s.n.
Zaidi, HH 2020, ‘The rise of the TLP’, The News,, 5 December
Policy Papers 95

08
Exploring post-Conflict Community Resilience
Options for Reintegrated Individuals of Swat
Noor Saba and Hamayun Khalid

Abstract
The re-integration of former combatants is a complex, exhaustive, and multi-tiered
process, which demands a unified approach through a steady process of mainstreaming.
While community resilience is vulnerable and sensitive to re-integration processes, there
is a whole host of factors that impact the psychological transformation of individuals and
their families alike. The study, by using the primary and secondary data, explores the
post-conflict reintegration of ex-combatants of Swat and identifies the vulnerabilities
of community resilience in effectively concluding the integration process. The main
findings contain, reintegrated individual’s marginalization, exclusion from communal
activities, limited arrangement of secondary rehabilitation, no legal coverage resulting
in unwarranted arrests, delayed legal procedures, and identity challenges. In the
absence of any specific re-integration and community resilience model, the literature
review of case studies on similar subjects enables us to craft of a suitable model for
Swat. The study mainly recommends partnership between community members and
reintegrated individuals so that the former might invite the latter in their communal and
social activities as equal stakeholders.

Keywords: Extremism, Community resilience, post-conflict re-integration, social

mainstreaming, religious counselling

Introduction
Understanding the different facets of a conflict eventually leads to effective
peacebuilding (Marchetti & Tocci 2009). Writing something on Swat conflict would
require a comprehensive understanding of the militants’ narratives, drivers of insurgency,
societal impact, and evaluation of present, past and future responses. The conflict was
deeply embedded with radicalization, violent extremism (VE), and an intent to establish
a government by implementing Sharia in Swat valley. These efforts were spearheaded
initially by Sufi Muhammad in 1992 under Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
(TNSM), which continued till his arrest and banning of Tehreek in 2002. His mandate
was furthered by Fazal Hayat, the son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad and popularly known
as Maulana Fazlullah, who later joined the ranks of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
96 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

During this time violent attempts were made to enforce Sharia. Consequently, the
military launched a kinetic operation against the TTP militants and ousted them from
Swat. This has also resulted in mass migration. In the initial post-conflict reconstruction
phase, the military, assisted by the government and civil administration, were devoted
to the maintenance of peace. Soon after the physical threat of militants was contained,
the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were rehabilitated, and infrastructure was
reconstructed. Meanwhile, efforts for deradicalization, reintegration, and reconciliation
of militants in captivity were also initiated.
The militants, who either surrendered or arrested, were divided into four
categories, i.e. Jet Black, Black, Grey, and White. The categorization of detained militants
was determined by their position, role and engagements in the organization. With the
containment of physical threat of militants, the challenge of widespread radicalization
and extremism among the detained militants was met with deradicalization programs.
These programs focused on militants of grey and white categories, since they were
not involved in additional criminal activities and had no “blood on their hands” (Azam
& Fatima 2017). Moreover, their role, position, and engagements in the organization
were lower in comparison to the other categories. The first deradicalization program,
launched in 2009, was Sabaoon (Morning light). It focused on juveniles and young
adults, followed by Mishal Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in 2010,
which was for adult detainees. Mishal is a Pashto word, which means ‘Light’). Other
deradicalization programs included Sparlay (Spring) and Rastoon (Right Path). These
deradicalization programs operated on a model similar to the deradicalization model of
Saudi Arabia. They consisted of the following five modules:
• Psychological Counselling and Assessment,
• Religious Counselling,
• Formal Education,
• Vocational Training, and
• Family Counselling
After the successful assessment of militants as beneficiaries of these programs, they
were reintegrated into their respective societies.
Resilience for the scope of this research refers to adaptation and ability of a
community, state, or region to adopt new strategies, norms, and practices in response to
violent shocks and episodes of aggression to prevent and recover from the said violence.
To establish a new peace equilibrium after violent episodes, communities undergo a
transformation of self-organization to eliminate facets that either remain irrelevant or
pose serious threats to the community.
While over a decade has passed and the valley has been secured, the current
position of the reintegrated individuals serves as an area of inquiry. This study aims
to investigate the issues faced by the reintegrated individuals and the Swat society
Policy Papers 97

as a whole. Moreover, it also aims to explore suitable policy options to strengthen

community resilience to violent extremism in the valley.

Methodology
To explore the post-conflict issues of reintegrated individuals of Swat, its impact
on community resilience, qualitative research methods were employed. For the
collection of primary data, key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted. These
interviews drawn up to acquire data were semi-structured. Respondents included civil
society members, social workers, social welfare organizations directors, academicians,
government officials, Secretary (Village Defence Committees) Swat, and a journalist.
Reintegrated individuals could not be interviewed due to several considerations. Since
the study is grounded on primary sources, respondents were sampled and selected
closely based on:
a) the role and level of engagement in Swat deradicalization process,
b) role in reintegration process,
c) position in civil society, and
d) the level of engagement with reintegrated individuals
Access to respondents and sampling was done through the Chain-Referral
Sampling method. Sampling, Selection, and personal interviews with the respondents
were conducted over a period of 13 days (From 07 June 2021 to 19 June 2021). In
these semi-structured interviews, respondents were asked questions on the initial
phase of reintegration process, challenges to reintegration process, and community
resilience, and what measures were taken to overcome these challenges. Since the
study aims to explore suitable policy options for strengthening community resilience,
the respondents’ perspective was also inquired while taking under consideration their
locality. During the sampling, For respondents selection, only those localities were
focused that had higher density of reintegrated individuals. These localities included
Charbagh, Sara China, Rorhya, Qambar, Mingora, Saidu Sharif, Kabal, and Khwazakhela.
To authenticate the qualitative data acquired through the semi-structured interviews,
informal discussions with individuals from diverse social groups were also carried out.
Thematic analysis tools were applied to the data collected to identify common themes
and patterns. Secondary sources of data, including research articles, reports, and book
chapters were consulted for the study.

Discussion and Analysis

The terms deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration are at times used
interchangeably as a reference to cognitive disassociation from extremist ideologies
and violent extremist group identities. Deradicalization refers to deconstruction of
98 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

an individual’s radical and extremist views, disengagement from violent activities,

and renouncing association with violent extremist groups. Rehabilitation refers to
an individual’s return to normal life while reintegration refers to the reestablishment
of an individual’s familial, societal, and communal ties where the individual exhibits
positive and constructive participation in the society. The development of successful
reintegration programs is indispensable not only for averting and containing recidivism
among reintegrated individuals but also for allaying further radicalization.
The journey from violent extremism to reintegration involves the transformation of
ideas of identity, viewpoints, ideology, social inclinations, and practical considerations.
Various factors may abet an individual towards radicalization such as individual traits,
psychosocial dynamics, and external enabling. The concept of reintegration is contextual,
and it is only recently that the concept of reintegration for religious violent extremists
has been introduced. To elucidate the contextual essence of reintegration, two clusters;
the European Exit Programs, and 1st Generation Deradicalization programs, have been
discussed.
European Exit Programs
The European Exit Programs or Off-Rank Programs in different countries like Exit
Deutschland Germany, Slotevaart in Netherlands, Aarhus model in Denmark, Fryhuset
in Sweden, and similar programs like the Violence Prevention Network and Hayat were
designed for criminal offenders (Holmer & Shtuni , 2017). These programs in Europe
focused essentially on Neo-Nazis, Biker gangs, violent criminals, and quasi-criminal
groups having a strong social presence and distinct identities (Holmer & Shtuni , 2017).
During the emergence of violent religious extremist groups, these programs were
tailored to prevent threats. The modalities of these programs are psychosocial, relying
on personalized interventions, individual mentoring, vocational and technical training,
and efforts to repair personal, family, social, and communal ties (Butt & Tuck, 2014).
1st Generation Deradicalization Programs
Deradicalization programs were developed in response to the September 2001
attacks in the United States by Al-Qaeda and October 2002 bombings in Indonesia by
Jammeh Islamia (JI). The programs were launched in Southeast Asia and the Middle East
as part of a soft counter-terrorism approach. Yemen launched its program (Committee
for Dialogue) in 2002, Indonesia in 2003, Singapore (Religious Rehabilitation Group) in
2003, and Saudi Arabia in 2004 (Cilluffo, Cardash & Khor 2014). These programs were
incorporated in the prison systems of the aforementioned countries initially, but later
segregated since the risk of radicalization inside prisons was escalating. A three-pronged
approach was adopted that aimed to a) break an individual’s physical commitment with
an organization, b) reconstructing the individual’s ideology, and c) a pragmatic plan for
the individual’s re-entry into the society. Pakistan’s deradicalization programs reflect
significant similarities with the Saudi Deradicalization Model. However, Pakistan’s
Policy Papers 99

deradicalization programs have been tailored per the country’s needs and resources.
An individual’s reintegration may vary as the cause of incarceration is silent to
reintegration. A criminal’s reintegration into society varies significantly from that of
a violent extremist enthralled by radical views. Reintegration of criminal offenders
includes their access to employment, consistent support system, secure environment,
fulfilment of basic needs, a care system, and a vision to look forward to in life (Chan,
2018). The aforementioned factors are also fundamental in the reintegration of a
militant; however, a militant’s reintegration is more complex. Different violent militant
organizations have complex structures encompassing criminal activities too, but their
members qualify as combatants too and cannot be categorized as common criminals. A
militant’s reintegration includes repairing personal and social ties, moderate religious
and worldly viewpoints, reconstructing social modalities since the reintroduction of
members of the militant’s former life may risk recidivism. Also, the attitude of the social
infrastructure towards a reintegrated militant differs drastically from that of a common
criminal.
From De-radicalization to Reintegration: A Softer Approach to CVE
Deradicalization programs are implemented through different modules around
the world. Cultural and traditional factors along with resources steer the design of
the modules of different deradicalization programs. Since the working of different
deradicalization programs is beyond the scholarship of the research, therefore,
comprehensive details of the programs would not be included.
Country Counselling Education Family Finance Society Religious Online
Malaysia / / / / / /
Indonesia / / / /
Singapore / / / /
Yemen / / /
Saudi Arabia / / / / / / /
Germany / /
Table 1.1. Comparative Global Deradicalization Programs in Selected Countries (Aslam &
Abu Bakar 2020)
Table 1.1 illustrates deradicalization programs of different countries, where they
have incorporated different modules..
Counselling Education Family Finance Society Religious Online Vocational
Training
/ / / / / /
Table 1.2. Deradicalization Programs in Swat
The tables above illustrate different areas that the deradicalization programs have
been incorporated as modules.
100 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

• Counselling: includes the psychological assessment and counselling of a

beneficiary.
• Education: includes both formal and technical education of beneficiaries
focusing on the development of skills.
• Family: focuses on the assessment and counselling of the beneficiary’s family
member to identify and eliminate radical tendencies in family members
followed by training of post-release care of the beneficiary.
• Finance: providing beneficiaries with financial assistance for living
expenditures and assistance in setting up financial income sources.
• Society: social training of societies and communities for acceptance and
interaction with beneficiaries after reintegration.
• Religious counselling: deconstructing misinterpreted concepts and extremist
viewpoints of beneficiaries to assist them to adopt tolerant and moderate
religious and worldly viewpoints.
• Online platform: identification of online radicalization sources, deconstruction
of misinterpreted religious ideologies over online platforms, and spreading
awareness to beneficiaries and the mass public about online radicalization
strategies and sources.
• Vocational training: Providing beneficiaries with technical and vocational skill
training that could be applied by the beneficiary post-release as an income-
generating source.
Pakistan’s deradicalization model while exhibiting similarities with that of
Saudi Arabia unfortunately lacks resources that the Saudi model has at its disposal.
Therefore, it has been crafted under the means available. While the deradicalization
process itself requires dedicated allocation of resources, the post-care of beneficiaries
after reintegration being an extensive process requires continual allocation of capital.
The post-care reintegration model of Saudi Arabia includes, initial financial assistance
for living expenditures, searching for suitable jobs for the reintegrated individual,
secondary counselling, and even finding spouses for the reintegrated individual. post-
release monitoring of a reintegrated individual is also part of the post-release process.
Pakistan’s deradicalization model, implemented in Swat is not as advance as the Saudi
model due to limited resources. Limited financial assistance to the beneficiary is provided
upon reintegration, moreover, individuals with no access to financial resources nor
having anyone to rely upon are prioritized. However, financial assistance is not the
only parameter that the post-care process must be assessed by. The living conditions
of a reintegrated individual, mental and physical health, barriers to family, societal and
communal repair of relations, personal security, and measures to prevent recidivism,
are among the parameters to assess the reintegration process in Swat valley.
Reintegration and Community Resilience
Policy Papers 101

Before proceeding to explain the relation between reintegration and community

resilience, defining a community is crucial. The definition of a community is context-
specific since it is dependent on conditions like social, economic, political, and
cultural aspects. International Organization for Migration (2019) defines community
as: “a number of persons, who regularly interact with one another within a specific
geographical territory, and tend to share common values, beliefs, and attitudes.”
To further elaborate on the relation of community and reintegration, the Ecosystem
Approach would be introduced. The ecosystem approach emphasizes the role of the
system of actors in a reintegrated individual’s environment and how it may either
play a supporting role or cause hindrances to the reintegration process (International
Organization for Migration 2019). This only magnifies the role of a community in the
reintegration process.

Fig.1.1: Reintegrated Individual’s Ecosystem

(International Organization for Migration 2019)
Fig1.1. illustrates the
systems of actors that a Macrosystem: Attitudes
and culture of society.
reintegrated individual interacts
with upon reintegration. There Exosystem: Private
Sector, public sector,
is a direct correlation between service provider.

reintegration and community. Mesosystem

Civil cociety,
Furthermore, it is important community-based
organizations, Neighbours.
to define a community’s
Microsystem:
resilience. While there is no Home, friends,
family, peers.
single agreed-upon definition
of community resilience, a
generalized definition would
be: “a measure of the sustained Returnee

ability of a community to utilize

available resources to respond
to, withstand, and recover from
adverse situations.”1
Though there is no single definition of community resilience, the study finds nine
core elements which are common in literature. These are: local knowledge, community
networks and relationships, communication, health, governance and leadership,
resources, economic investments, preparedness, and mental outlook (Patel, Rogers,
Amlot & Rubin 2017). The ‘adverse situations’ mentioned in the definition entail
situations of natural disasters (earthquake, floods, hurricanes), limited and full-scale
1
Definition by RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/topics/community-resilience.html
102 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and violent extremism. Since the study focuses on
community resilience to violent extremism in Swat valley, therefore, community
resilience to post-conflict structures in Swat to radicalization and violent extremism
would be discussed.
Swat Deradicalization Model and Reintegration
The Swat deradicalization model is based on five modules, i.e. i) Psychological
Assessment and Counselling, ii) Religious Counselling, iii) Family Counselling, iv)
Vocational Training, and v) Formal Education. The first module that the beneficiary of
deradicalization program is exposed to is the psychological module.

Figure 1.2: The figure shows five different modules of Swat

deradicalization model.
Through a series
of one-to-one session
with a therapist, the
beneficiary’s inclination
towards militancy,
supporting factors in
inclination, ideological
orientation and
behavioural evaluation
is assessed. The families
of the beneficiaries are also included in the therapeutic sessions. The family counselling
module assesses the families of beneficiaries to identify any factors that could have
negative implications on the beneficiaries. The family members are also trained on
their interaction with the beneficiary in the initial period of integration. Through the
psychological module, the beneficiary’s religious standing, perspective on religion,
and Jihad are also identified. These religious misconceptions are then addressed in the
religious counselling module where through weekly religious sermons misinterpreted
religious concepts are explained by religious clerics. The religious clerics also induce
tolerant and moderate religious viewpoints in the beneficiaries, while providing civic
education, “to help them transform their old lives, to assist them to lead meaningful
lives” (Nisar-ul-Haq, personal communication 18 August 2021). Along with cognitive
transformation, the beneficiaries are also provided with formal education and vocational
training. Since the beneficiaries of the Sabaoon programs were juveniles and young
adults, they were provided with formal education up to 12th Grade (F.Sc, F.A). The
beneficiaries of Mishal programs were adults, who were provided with vocational
training. Vocational training was provided in honey farming, carpentry, tailoring, wood
designing, carpet making, and handicrafts. The idea behind the vocational training was
Policy Papers 103

that to provide beneficiaries a certain skillset upon reintegration so that they might
finance their living and refrain themselves from exploring any illegal means of income
(Azam & Fatima 2017).
After completing the aforementioned modules, the next step for the beneficiary
is reintegration into society under a controlled environment.In the initial phase of
reintegration, the individual undergoes monitoring. It mainly includes the individual’s
report to local police on a weekly, fortnightly, or monthly basis, restrictions on traveling.
After a certain period of time, when the reintegrated individual is allowed to travel, a
formal application requesting permission followed by a travel plan is submitted with the
local police station.
Community Resilience to Violent Extremism
This section provides a more detailed account of community resilience that
would help formulate a model for community resilience to violent extremism in Swat.
Community resilience in relevance to the scope of the study would be discussed in the
light of the literature available. The concepts of strong social bonds against violence and
prevention of violence have been central to debates for long now. The Social Control
Theory suggests that strong bonds between families, societies, and communities are
cardinal in the face of violence and its prevention. These strong bonds further channel
social norms and the motivation to abide by these norms (Hirschi 1969). These
channelized norms further construct community resilience. Similarly, an examination
of different violent extremists in the United States found the commonality of weak social
and communal bonds that existed due to marginalization over different grounds (ethnic,
racial, etc.) (Doosje, Loseman & Bos 2013). On the current situation of the reintegrated
individuals in Swat community, Bacha (personal communication 20 June 2021) said:
While the reintegrated individuals may be continuing to lead their lives, they are
aware of the negative and unwelcoming attitudes of most community members.
These negative attitudes attribute to the reintegrated individuals being left out,
resultantly weakening social bonds. Ellis & Abdi 2017 focus on a community’s existing
social relations and connections, and how these existing relations are central to a
community’s resilience to violent extremism. They appraise the enhancement of
existing social connections in a community and identify and eliminate the risk factors
that may damage and eventually diminish these connections. Among the risk factors
to social connection in Swat case, the disapproval of the reintegrated individuals may
be of concern. Regarding disapproval of the reintegrated individuals, Sahaab (personal
communication, 20 June 2021) said:
One of the reintegrated individuals in our community, after securing loans, opened
his own restaurant. People refer to it as Taliban’s Restaurant. People do not go
there and discourage others to visit the restaurant since they have d not accept him
as part of their community so far. As the business is not running well, so the man
104 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

is thinking to close it.

In the US and Canada, studies conducted to explore the Somali immigrants’
inclination towards violence also highlight the impact of social bonds. Through a
sample of 465 Somali immigrants, it was identified that the participants with close
social bonds within their respective communities were less open to violence and violent
extremism (Ellis et al. 2016). Furthermore, Ellis & Abdi (2017) identified three social
conections that they deemed critical for community resilience to violent extremism.
These are illustrated in Table.1.3.

Social Connections Risk factors for Violent Examples of How

that Contribute to Extremism Addressed Communities can
Community Resilience by Social Bonds Promote Resilience
Bonds: sense of Weak social identity, Support for ethnic-based
belonging and searching for belonging community organizations
connection with others and meaningful identity promoting community
who are similar self-help
Bridging: sense Social marginalization, Community-wide/school-
of belonging and lack of identification with or based antibullying/youth
connection with people attachment to nation mentoring programming
who are dissimilar in
important ways
Linking: connections Lack of trust, lack of Establishing
and equal partnership collaboration and equal advisory boards
across vertical power access to resources, or multidisciplinary
differentials, e.g., systems that lack the team with community
government and knowledge to serve/ membership
communities engage communities

Table.1.3: Types of social connection and how they relate to community resilience to VE
Table.1.3 illustrates social connections contributing to community resilience,
risk factors, and examples of how resilience can be promoted by communities. Norris
aet al. (2008) proposed a model for community resilience to disasters highlighted
four key capacities: i) Information and Communication, ii) Economic Development,
iii) Community Competence, and iv) Social Capital.. While all four capacities serve a
purpose in community resilience, the latter capacities of community competence and
social capital garner the most relevance to community resilience to violent extremism.
Porte (1998) defined social capital as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue
of membership in social networks or other social structures.” Key dimensions in
social capital in reducing risk to violent extremism include: trust of belongingness
Policy Papers 105

within one’s community that elevates the sense of community, sense of attachment to
one’s community, and civic engagement with institutions (Norris et al. 2008)On civic
engagement with institutions, Khwarzakhela (personal communication, 20 June 2021)
said:
They [authorities] want us to be fine with every decision they make and every policy
that they draft. They are ignorant and unaware of the implications it would have on
the common people. If policies are being implemented on us, we do have a right
to be part of the process.

Pfefferbaum, Pfefferbaum & Van Horn 2015) suggest that building social capital and
strengthening social connections is central to strengthening community resilience. They
also suggest the engagement of diverse community members in communal activities,
especially marginalized facets of the community, and building partnerships. However,
the reintegrated individuals in Swat may not have been readily accepted and therefore
remain marginalized. A respondent expressed concern over the reintegrated individuals
“turning invisible” in the community because of exclusion and the concern of their
recidivism if they are not accepted as part of the community. While social connections
may not be the only contributors to community resilience, they are critical capacities
to consider, since structural and political contexts may either affect or shape the
aforesaid social connections. Moreover, a community’s resilience can be determined
by their community competence, which is the ability of the effective collaboration of
the members of a community to accomplish goals. This collaboration in competent
communities is spread over different power differentials of the community to include
and engage all members including less represented and marginalized members (Norris
et al. 2008).
The study also identifies the gaps in reconciliation efforts, resulting in the
marginalization of reintegrated individuals from communal and social activities.
While the negative and unwelcoming attitudes of some community members may be
understandable due to losses and grievances, reconciliatory efforts among the two
parties are fundamental. While assessing the drivers of the conflict in Swat, a category of
deprived individuals was identified who joined the ranks of militancy for the attainment
of power, sense of inclusion in a progressive movement, sense of accomplishment and
achievement, improving their living conditions through incentives from the militants,
and elevating their social status.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Religious militancy that shaped the conflict in Swat valley along with radicalization
and violent extremism in its aftermath gave birth to an array of diverse social,
106 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

communal, and economic issues. These issues are mainly encountered by the
reintegrated individuals. The study identifies these underlying issues: the reintegrated
individual’s marginalization, exclusion from communal activities, limited arrangement
of secondary rehabilitation, no legal coverage resulting in unwarranted arrests, delayed
legal procedures, and their possible identity crisis. Since the study is equally concerned
about analysing community resilience to violent extremism in Swat, therefore policy
options recommended are in relevance to strengthening community resilience in Swat.
Key elements extracted from literature for the conceptualization of a model included;
Building Partnerships, Confidence Building Measures, Community Competence, and
Social Capital.
Following policy measures are suggested to build and strengthen community
resilience in Swat.
• Building Partnerships Among Community Members
The reintegrated individuals of Swat are facing various social, political and economis
issues. The completion of their deradicalization process and reintegration into society
shows that they have been deemed fit to re-join the society. However, in some subsets
of the community, the reintegrated individuals still haven’t been accepted. Efforts for
reconciliation, backed with pragmatic inclusiveness would increase the community
competence. Strengthening community competence would further elevate the ability
of the members to achieve shared goals. But the pre-requisite requires partnerships
between community members, and reintegrated individuals so that the former might
invite the latter to participate in their communal and social activities. Building
partnerships among community members would strengthen social bonds, which have a
direct relation with community resilience.
• Community Members as Stakeholders
When the community members are not treated as equal stakeholders in either
decision-making or policy-making, it adversely affects community resilience.
It has a direct impact on the linking of social connections that contribute to
community resilience. The reintegrated individuals and the local populace
should be seen and treated as equal stakeholders in communal activities,
policy-making, and decision-making to increase community competence.
• Averting Identity Crisis
The reintegrated individuals in some subsets of the community are
marginalized. that has compelled them to re-evaluate their position in the
community.The marginalization and segregation of reintegrated individuals
from the community would eventually create an identity crisis where they
would question their standing in the society. The identity crisis can be averted
by inviting reintegrated individuals in the communal and societal activities.
Policy Papers 107

• Secondary Measures of Assistance

For some reintegrated individuals, return to normalcy is a long process.
The aforementioned challenges may affect the physical and mental health of
the reintegrated individuals. Although the Swat model includes secondary
rehabilitation and assistance, field research indicates that the secondary
measures are not much effective since they are not operating in full capacities.
Furthermore, since no free legal counsel is provided, the reintegrated
individuals at times were arrested without any warrants. Legal counsel for the
reintegrated individuals for safeguarding their rights should be introduced as
a measure for their assistance. Secondary measures need to be realized and
operationalized for thir mental health.
• Community Education
Some of the community members, who are reluctant to accept the reintegrated
individuals, are ignorant of the concept of reconciliation. There is a need
to educate community on reconciliation and its application. by organizing
dialogues and seminars through different platforms in schools, colleges,
universities, public halls, etc.

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Policy Papers 109

09
Community-based Rehabilitation Program for
Ex-Combatants: Policy Options for
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Dr Ilam Khan

Abstract
Rehabilitation of ex-combatants is a process in which they pass through a process
to make themselves able to re-assimilate in the society. Rehabilitation in Swat district
was started soon after the conflict ended in 2009 through an army operation. The
program is considered successful, however it is criticized for the least involvement of
community in the process, therefore, there are hurdles for ex-combatants to re-settle in
community after undergoing their rehabilitation process. After in-depth interviews with
the community members, ex-combatants, government officers and other stakeholders,
this study suggests a community-based rehabilitation where ‘restorative-jarga’ will take
the responsibility of rehabilitation of ex-combatants with the support of government.

Keywords: Ex-combatants, jarga, post-conflict reintegration, Swat, community,

rehabilitation

Introduction
Post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration is a process which helps in building
peace in post-conflict situations. A rehabilitation program is the direct determinant
of prolonged and sustainable peace. In many districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the
security forces launched rehabilitation and reintegration programs for ex-combatants,
who underwent violent conflicts. One such example of it can be witnessed in Swat
district. Though it is considered a successful practice, the program has been criticized
by the community as well as the ex-combatants, who were rehabilitated. After a long
experience with the community and engagements with the rehabilitated persons, it is
leant that community was ignored in the process of rehabilitation instead of giving it the
responsibility to look after the reintegrated ex-combatants. The community is not ready
to accept them considering them the enemies, who destroyed their livelihood. On the
contrary, rehabilitated people complained of being stigmatized by the community which
created hurdles in their assimilation and reintegration process. The cases of recidivism
have also been surfaced. During discussions with the ex-combatants, it was learnt that
they were not fully rehabilitated, as their desire for fighting was still there. For instance,
110 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

many of them said that they were wrong while fighting against Pakistan Army, and now
after rehabilitation, they will fight along Pakistan Army.
The issue of reintegration is of paramount importance in post-conflict situation in
Swat and other areas where the conflict has now ended. If the ex-combatants are not
properly rehabilitated, they could be a potential threat to peace in the region and easily
manipulated by the anti-state actors.
The study suggests a community-based rehabilitation program in which the
community members should be the prime stakeholders. The locale under study already
follows an established local tradition known as Pakhtunwali1. The norms of Pakhtunwali
could be borrowed for the rehabilitation program. In restorative justice, the community,
offender and victim sit together to control the damage done by the offender. Similarly, a
‘restorative-jarga’ could be set up in every village for the rehabilitation and reintegration
of ex-combatants.
The members of this restorative-jarga will be the community, ex-combatants
and government officials, who will find the best possible reintegration options for ex-
combatants. In this regard, this study aims to highlight the policy options how to engage
community in the rehabilitation program for ex-combatants in a Pakhtun society

Methodology
In order to understand the vivid picture of rehabilitation program of ex-combatants,
this study uses ethnographic tools (such as direct observations). To collect primary data
from the field, around 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted through an open-
ended questionnaire.
The target population was divided into four strata; first strata is composed of the
members, who have been associated with the phenomenon of rehabilitation (i.e. mainly
the government officials ); second strata is concerned with the local population residing in
Swat district, or in other words, the local population who has firsthand information about
the rehabilitation program; third strata comprises the academicians, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other humanitarian bodies which were engaged in one way
or another with the rehabilitation program in the district; and fourth strata is the ex-
combatants, who have been rehabilitated and reintegrated in the society.
The above-mentioned respondent categories are followed through snowball
‘sampling’ method. The sample is a convenient random sample as residents in post-
conflict areas are reluctant to give interview to any outsider. The study will also rely on
the local sources in order to establish the respondents’ network.

1
Pakhtunwali is an informal code which is embedded in every aspect of Pakhtun’s life, i.e from war and peace to
grief and happiness.
Policy Papers 111

Literature Review
Why a Community Based Approach?
In contemporary times, the international community and humanitarian
organizations stress the need for bottom-up or community-based approaches as the
best possible way to resolve societal issues, ranging from health to business, to peace
and conflict (Khasnabis et al. 2010). Rehabilitation of ex-combatants through a civilian
agency or community-based approach is a new idea. However, the critics are of the view
that this is a risky job and only military can deal with ex-militants in either way (Col.
Javed, personal communication, June 02, 2021). However, some available literature
disclosed that such programs which are run by military have not yielded positive results,
as witnessed in Afghanistan (Bahman, Zuhra & Torjesen 2012) and Democratic Republic
of Congo (Shepherd 2012). In opposition to this, where civilians are participating in the
process of rehabilitation, these programs are relatively mores successful as witnessed
in Columbian (Sanin & Pena 2012) and Lankan (Dharmawardhane 2013) rehabilitation
programs respectively. It does not mean that military is incapable of doing rehabiliation,
but military imparts trainings in dedicated cells where the community is having close
to zero access. In fact, military is having its own perspective of engagement, and thus,
examines the rehabiliation process in its own perspective. Rehabilitation is not possible
at a fenced area where military surrounds the facility with guns to normalize the
extremists’ narrative (Mehran Wazir, personal communication, 25 May 2021). In such
an environment, only the direction of engagement of ex-combatants can be changed; for
example, an ex-combatant said:
“I was wrong while fighting against Pakistan army, now, after rehabilitation I will
fight along Pakistan Army.” (Ibraheem, personal communication, 23 June 2021).

This reveals that the ex-combatants still love for fighting. The securitized
environment isolates ex-combatants from the community which further widen the gap
between ex-combatants and community. Consequently, the grievances of community
remain unaddressed. To measure the success and failure of any rehabilitation program,
it will be crucial to see how an ex-combatant is reintegrated into society. Reintegration
is possible when community accepts the ex-combatants return to the community. Such
situations support the need for community involvement in rehabilitation programs.
For any intervention the nature of society is ought to be understood in advance. The
community engagement is likely to be successful in societies like Swat where traditions
are respected and followed. In such societies the community-based rehabilitation could
be managed with less resources and expenditure.
It is important to note that the community could be involved only in rehabilitation
and reintegration of ex-combatants, who belong to that specific community and not
112 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

the non-state actors who are outsiders to the land. In Swat district, majority of the
militants were from Swat where community involvement becomes imperative and
without involvement the outcome cannot be fruitful. Here the role of the state cannot
be ignored too where the state should follow the policy of ‘winning hearts and minds’
of the community. The strategy of winning hearts and minds was always adopted by
the militants for the purpose of strengthening their roots in the society (Spalek 2012).
The responsibility of the state is to break the bond developed between community
and militants as in post-conflict scenario there is always militants’ sympathizers and
ideological followers in the community.
The debate is highly concerned that whether attention for rehabilitation should be
given to ex-combatants only who pose threat to the security sector or to the community
or both at a time (Oluwaniyi 2018). Priority should be given to both ex-combatants and
community rehabilitation, as it is imperative for peace building (Oluwaniyi, 2018). This
is because both ex-combatants and community suffer equally, therefore their grievances
need to be addressed simultaneously. An example of World Bank (2018) project in
Central African Republic is focusing on rehabilitation of ex-combatants only which
argues for positive results in reducing threat to the overall security of the community.
However, states that give priority to ex-combatants over community are likely to end
up with a failed reintegration since the community gets disenchanted by the privileges
given to the ex-combatants. If the community is not taken into confidence, it harbors
misgiving towards the acceptance of the ex-combatants back into the society; meanwhile
less attention is given to the overall society, social issues, and revitalization of social
capital (Oluwaniyi 2018).
The states that give priority to (individual) ex-combatants over community result
in the formation of gangs and criminal groups, who get involved in drug trafficking,
crimes, weapons and kidnapping as witnessed in Congo, Liberia and Angola (Oluwaniyi
2018). Oluwaniyi further reveals that in societies where both (individual) ex-combatants
and community provided rehabilitation, the outcome was fruitful; for example, in Niger
Delta, where the ex-combatants underwent a proper rehabilitation process.
The community should not only merely help in rehabilitation, but should be
empowered enough to conduct the process of rehabilitation and reintegration by itself.
In this regard, giving ownership to the community in rehabilitation and reintegration
will also pave the way for overall de-radicalization. Leaderach (1997) is of the views
that prospects for durable peace lie in local culture. In a similar connotation, Barry
Buzan and Waever (2003) emphasize upon conflict management through indigenous
ways. They add that majority of the conflicts arise from the community, therefore, the
referred object should be the people and not the state. The United Nations (2006) also
encourages resolving conflicts through indigenous ways and argues that people are not
satisfied by the formal judiciary and justice system rather the demand for traditional
Policy Papers 113

practices is increasing. In this way, restorative justice offers some welcoming means of
resolving disputes and other post-conflict issues.
The importance of community engagement was realized by the Government of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP), with the note that Pakhtun society has an established
traditional system known as Pakhtunwali, which could be utilized for different
purposes. This strategy could save the government time and resources, and minimize
the job of police and judiciary. In this regard, police has introduced Dispute Resolution
Councils (DRCs) program in the province at community level In this chain, Parent-
Teacher Council (PTC), also known as school management committee has been set up.
PTC is an elected body comprising of eight members. Five of the eight are elected from
the vicinity of school, two are nominated by the elected five and the eight one is the
school principal, who usually serves as secretary of the council (Nasir et al. 2013). The
purpose behind highlighting the above examples was to demonstrate that the notion of
citizen participation is already prevailing in Pakhtunkhwa province in many programs
other than rehabilitation and reintegration.

Discussion and Analysis

Civilian Engagement by Employing the Theory of Restorative Justice in the
Context of Swat

Restorative Justice (RJ) is a transitional justice system where offender and victim
are sit together in the presence of community to sort out the damage done by the
offender. In RJ, both parties’ consent is necessary to bring them on the table of
negotiations (Gabbay 2005). The negotiations process is called ‘restorative process’
and upon conclusion may include restitution, reparation, and community services for
the offender. The purpose behind community services is to fulfil both the individual
and community’s responsibility for achieving reintegration of the victim and offender
(United Nations 2006).
Pakhtunwali and Restorative Justice
Pakhtunwali is the way of life of Pakhtuns. It is an umbrella term, covering all
codes and values of Pakhtun culture in it. The most relevant codes of Pakhtunwali
with restorative justice are: Jarga, Nanawati, Kushunda, and Lashkar. Jarga is the most
prominent and popular code of Pakhtunwali which is a community-based fact-finding
method that acts like a modern jury. It intervenes to halt violence, identify the issues,
resolve them through mediation or arbitration, and further works for reconciliation and
rehabilitation (Gohar 2014).
Jarga is of different types but the principles of all Jargas are same. Like RJ, Jarga
also seeks the consent of parties and the parties participate in the proceedings. Jarga
114 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

listens the claims of the parties and give decision in the light of Pakhtunwali. A similar
process is also adopted in RJ where the parties sit together, put forward their claims and
then community decide accordingly. The difference between Jarga and RJ lies in their
jurisdictions; the former simultaneously gives arbitration and mediation while in RJ, the
parties come to an agreement.
Formation of Restorative Jarga
Traditionally, Jarga constitutes elders (Maliks) of the vicinity or tribe(s). While
constituting a Jarga under the RJ, members are taken from the respective village
(community), ex-combatant’s nuclear family, a religious figure (Mullah/Imam) of that
village, Nazim (or any elected member of the local government), a police officer form the
respective police station and victim’s nuclear family. This body may be given a modern
name of ‘committee’ or a traditional name Jarga, or as described by John P. Leaderach
(1997) the ‘peace constituency’. However, it will be fruitful if given a contextual name,
i.e. ‘restorative Jarga’.
Upon arrest, an ex-combatant will be presented in front of this body which will
investigate the intensity of his involvement in militancy, what type of crime he has
committed against a specific family, community or the state. On the basis of investigation,
this body will decide in which category (black, grey or white) an ex-combatant fall. This
will be a reliable categorization as this restorative Jarga will comprise closed relatives
of the ex-combatant, who knows his level of involvement in the conflict. The final
jurisdiction of this body will consist of reparation, restitution, community service or
compensation (Anjum, personal communication, 20 June 2021).

The proceeding Jarga

Usually, Jarga decision includes Nanawati or Kushunda (only in case of
rehabilitation) in the following manner.

Nanawati: Nanawati or pleading for apology is a j decision of Jarga that the offender
will seek apology for his crime. The offender is bound to follow Jarga proceedings and
will plead for an apology. Then it depends on victims to accept or reject his apology,
traditionally it is accepted. There are many ways to seek apology or to go for Nanawati.
First, the offender along with community members and elders visits victims’ house,
or, secondly, the offender enters the grave when a member of victim’s family dies and
stay there till his apology accepted. Third, offender sends women to victim’s house
for seeking apology which is an extreme in Pakhtun society. If none of these adopted
methods work and the offender is not forgiven then Jarga decide to pay money or
land as restitution (Mehran Wazir, May 25, 2021). However, if victim agrees to give
apology then a public eating is arranged for entire community and all the expenses are
on offender. Through this way the victim and offender reconciliation and reintegration
Policy Papers 115

is done in indigenous way. Apology is one of the principles of restorative justice and,
thus, Nanawati can be employed rehabilitation and reintegration in a formal way.

Following is the story of Nanawati from South Waziristan:

There was a fight between some youngsters and Taliban in which some Taliban
were beaten. Taliban came and took many youngsters of the tribe in their custody
for nearly three days and maltreated them. The tribe was agitated and wanted
to take Badal (revenge) from Taliban. Other tribes of the area realized that the
conflict may escalate to a more violent scale. They intervened and formed a Jarga
of 120 members. The jurisdiction of Jarga was that Taliban will follow the code of
Nanawati (will seek apology for their act) and will compensate 12 buffalos to the
victims. As a result, the conflict was resolved and the victims were rehabilitated
(Mehran Wazir, 25 May, 2021).

Kushunda: Kushunda means ‘the expelled one’ in which the offender is asked to
leave the community for a specific time or for entire life. The rest of the family remains
in community peacefully. If an offender lives with his family, this means that family
is supporting him. In this case the victim considers whole family his enemy and the
conflict might escalate.
Following is a story from Bajaur district:
Nisar Khan is a Kushunda living in Islamabad since 2012. There was a 70 years
old enmity between two tribes in district Bajaur. A number of people were killed
from both sides. In 2012, Jarga resolved the enmity and decided to make one
person of the tribe Kushunda for its offense against the other. Nisar Khan, of the
offender’s tribe was made Kushunda to satisfy the victim tribe as its member was
killed. Now, Nisar Khan is living in Islamabad and the tribes are living in peace in
Bajaur (Nisar Khan, personal communication, Islamabad, May 08, 2021).

In Swat and tribal districts, there is a fear of communal conflicts, as a number

of ex-combatants were reintegrated into society without involving the community in
rehabilitation process and without addressing the grievances of the victims. The victims
are silent due to the presence of security forces, but soon the security forces vacate the
area, the community or victim will take badal (revenge) from the offenders.
Lashkar:
Lashkar (civil militia) is a standing body that consists of volunteers from the
community which executes the jurisdiction of Jarga. It is very difficult for an offender(s)
to violate Jarga’s decision. Jarga represents the entire community, and if its verdict is
violated, it means the individual offender or an offending tribe, becomes the enemy of
the whole community.
116 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

While in restorative-jarga, this standing force can be replaced by the police, as

suggested earlier that the body should include a police officer. The police officer will
execute the decision taken during restorative-jarga process.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In Pakistan, there are heavy losses of lives and properties during the protracted
conflicts in different districts. The state is trying to be responsive for which government
has assisted, and still assisting the victims. The assistance provided by the international
community has been distributed among the victims in different forms. The state should
form a ‘compensation fund’ for restorative jargas which will provide assistance to
the victims from that fund. Restorative jarga will also decide and assist the offender
in reintegration and will pay restitution on behalf of offender to the victims. The
restorative jarga should have a comprehensive policy in which the eligibility for this
fund should be clearly mentioned (Fazal Saeed, personal communication, 23 June
2021). The communal conflicts should not be included in this compensation fund since
the resources may be scarce. This compensation fund will be used to compensate the
social, political and economic losses of the community and offenders (ex-combatants).
Some critics say that restorative justice approach deals with the conflicts among
individuals whereas in Swat the conflict lies between state and individuals (Dr Arshad
Ali, personal communication, 22 June 2021). Restorative justice, like rehabilitation
and reintegration, are also concerned with individuals (ex-combatants) which try to
bring them back into the society. The issue with the existing rehabilitation program is
that it does not include the community in the process, therefore, is not productive. In
restorative jarga, the community will be the major stakeholder and if it allows for an
ex-combatant’s assimilation, there will be no issue at all. Secondly, in this restorative
jarga, the community will perform the job of the state. It will ease the burden on state
institutions by addressing grievances of both victim and offender and providing them
speedy justice in a less expensive way, which will also help reduce burden on economy.
Some critics are also concerned about security-related challenges, which the
community and rehabilitated ex-combatants will have to face. Restorative jarga may
be targeted by the militants (Shakirullah, personal communication, 16 June 2021).
State support (financial and security) will definitely be required from formation
to implementation of restorative jarga and its decisions. Moreover, lashkar or civil
militia can also be utilized for providing security to the community as well as for the
implementation of jarga decision.
The influence of militants’ narratives is always there in post-conflict societies. To
counter those narratives, formal and informal dialogues should be initiated to strengthen

2
Hujra is a building used as a guest house but is generally known as an institution, a place of social gatherings.
Policy Papers 117

community. Formal dialogues should be supervised by the government through its official
representatives while informal dialogues may include informal discussions in hujras2,
mosques, markets, social gatherings, media, and academia. However, there should
special focus in policy that these informal dialogues should counter different extremists’
narratives floating in community (Dr. Qibla Ayaz, conference discussion, Islamabad, July
21, 2016). The extremists’ narratives have spread through the dominant discourse in
society and must be countered through new narratives (or counter narratives). Prisons
or rehabilitation centers are not durable solutions; however, community engagement in
generating constructive informal dialogues can offer a durable solution to radicalization
and extremism.
Moreover, the community engagement and inclusion should be done in different
formal and informal ways. The ex-combatants after passing through restorative-jarga
process should provide space and participation in friends’ informal circles, work, sports,
associations and other social networks can provide a good platform for reintegration,
reunification and civic participation.

References
Bahman, Z and Torjesen, S 2012, Double Disillusionment: Disengaging from the insurgency in Afghanistan,
Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromso, Norway
Dharmawardhane, I 2013, Sri Lanka’s Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of
Conflict-affected Communities. Terrorism Research Initiative, vol. 7, no. 6.
Gabbay, ZD 2005, Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of Restorative Justice
Practices, Journal of Dispute Resolution, vol. 2005, no. 2
Gohar, A 2014, Jirga: An Indigenous Institution for Peacebuilding in the Pukhtoon Belt of Pakistan and Afghan-
istan. In J. J. Akanmu G. Adebayo, Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspective (pp. 183-193).
Maryland: Lexington Books.
Khasnabis et al. 2010, Community-Based Rehabilitation: CBR Guidelines. Geneva: World Health Organization
(WHO).
Leaderach, JP 1997, Sustainable Peace in Divided Societies, Washington DC: USIP.
Nasir, M, Farooq, MR and Ali, A 2013, Role of parents in strengthening of parents teachers councils (PTCs) in
schools in KPK, Pakistan, Educational Research International, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 128-133.
Oluwaniyi, O 2018, The Challenges of Reintegration in Post-conflict Peacebuilding: the Case of Nigeria’s
Niger Delta Region, Social Sceince Research Council
Sanin, FG and Pena, AG 2012, Columbia’s Paramilitary DDR and its Limits, In A. Giustozzi (ed.), Post-conflict
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In, (pp. 113-132), Routledge, London
Spalek, B 2012, Counter-Terrorism Community- Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime. Palgrave
Macmillan, London
United Nations Development Program 2007, The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-con-
flict countries, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Vienna
Unied Nations 2006), Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. United Nations,
New York
World Bank 2018, Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project. Washington DC: Not Published.
Policy Papers 119

10
Evaluating Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System
against Violent Extremism
Rana Saifullah Hasan and Dr Naeem Ahmed

Abstract
This study evaluates Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System against violent extremism. It
involves scrutinizing the role of investigation, prosecution, providing security to witness
and victim as well as other elements of criminal justice, including judicial system. World
Justice Project Rule of Law index observes that Pakistan has slipped six-position down
to 98th place in terms of criminal justice for the year 2020. Overall, Pakistan remained
at number 120 out of 128 countries in the report showing an analysis of variables that
include inadequate resources, poor judicial decisions, inadequate alternate dispute
resolution, inadequate criminal defence, delayed cases, excessive pre-trial detention,
biases against marginalized people, corruption and lack of judicial independence. Low
conviction rate in Anti-Terrorism Courts itself speaks of the performance of investigation
and prosecution. In many such cases, accused persons involved in heinous offences find
acquittal on account of lack of evidence and benefit of doubt. While defense counsel
enjoys a decisive leverage to gain an advantage of causing a single dent in the case of
prosecution to achieve benefit of doubt, the latter is confined to make the best use
of only those material collected by investigation. Resultantly, the rate of acquittal in
Anti-Terrorism Courts stands at more than 85%. This speaks volume of our criminal
justice system where the cases of terrorism and violent extremism are tried altogether,
as neither the law nor courts have identified terrorism as a different phenomenon
than extremism. The findings of this study comprehensively discuss the dynamics of
investigation, prosecution, policing and anti-terrorism courts to propose substantial
policy recommendations.

Keywords: Rule of Law, Criminal Justice System, Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, Violent
Extremism

Introduction
Effective Criminal Justice System is essential for the rule of law. The role of criminal
justice system in countering violent extremism is a challenging one. Indeed, the primary
objective of counter-extremism strategies must be to prevent drivers of violent extremism
and bring them into the court of law for trial. A report by United Nations Office on Drugs
120 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

and Crime (UNODC) in 2018, suggests that a forward-looking, preventive criminal justice
strategy against violent extremism requires a comprehensive system of substantive
offences, investigative powers and techniques and evidentiary rules. Criminal Justice
System has three basic components, i.e. Investigation, Prosecution and Courts.
An Effective Criminal Justice System is essential for good governance and indicates
rule of law. With respect to the cases of violent extremism, it is unfortunate that the
foundation of any case which is laid in the police station setting the law into motion
is the First Investigation Report (FIR), which is lodged by a person who is incapable of
understanding the scheme of jurisprudence as well as legislation behind the enactment
of such law under which accused persons are nominated in the FIR. In many such cases,
accused persons are not even nominated correctly in FIR. For example, in case of a mob
attacking a place of worship, FIR is lodged against a few identified persons and multiple
unknown persons. For instance, in Karak and Rahim Yar Khan worships attack cases,
more than 350 and 150 people were nominated In the FIRs respectively. In addition
to that, investigation is weak having inadequate expertise to collect material evidence,
preserve it and process it. So much so, there are only two forensic laboratories in entire
Sindh province, one in Sindh University, Jamshoro and another in University of Karachi,
to analyze and process the sophisticated data and forensic evidence. It takes weeks
and months to get results. In the case of Muhammad Noman v. the State and another,
reported as 2017 SCMR 560, it has been observed by the Hon’ble court that police had
failed to investigate the allegations made by the accused, rather had conducted a one-
sided investigation against the accused.
A study highlighted the lack of proper training of investigation officers in the cases
of terrorism as a major setback. This study hence argues that when the foundation
of any case is not laid properly, it cannot be expected that prosecution can make up
for the deficiencies left by the investigation (Research Society of International Law
2018). Similarly, prosecution many a times comes under fire for its performance due
to increasing number of acquittals in terrorism cases. Prosecution is also blamed for
being politicized and it is not clear, who exactly is responsible behind the failure of
criminal justice system. It is also correct to a great extent that prosecution department
lacks competence and requires training to plead cases of hardened criminals involved in
extremism and terrorism activities. In the same way, judicial system is the main pillar of
Criminal Justice System; all the players of criminal justice system must be evaluated and
their efficacy should be scrutinized in juxtaposition with the socio-political, cultural and
ethnic dynamics of our society to formulate effective criminal justice regime to combat
violent extremism.
Research Questions
(i) How effective is the role of investigation and prosecution in the cases of
violent extremism?
Policy Papers 121

(ii) What are the causes of high acquittal in the cases of violent extremism?
(iii) What challenges are faced by the courts, investigation, and prosecution in the
cases of violent extremism?
(iv) What is required to be done for an effective Criminal Justice System against
violent extremism?

Literature Review
According to the report on Rule of Law Index published by World Justice Project, the
Criminal Justice System constitutes the conventional mechanism to redress grievances
and brings action against individuals for offenses against society. An assessment of
the delivery of criminal justice should take into consideration the entire system,
including police, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and prison officers. Substantial policy
framework to bring the cases of extremism under the net of criminal justice system is
never studied and analyzed. despite the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997
and, subsequently, the creation of 54 anti-terrorism courts, conviction rates in Pakistan
continue to be extremely low (Zaidi 2016). Numerous amendments to the law have
increased the severity of penalties for terrorism crimes, but little attention has been
paid to court administration and case management. Thus, Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs)
are overloaded with cases. In addition to long delays, procedural errors and antiquated
practices plague the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases; and exacerbating
the problem is that numerous special provisions of the ATA are not being applied.
(Manzar 2016).
In its country report, the State Department of the United States (2011) observed
that in Pakistan the acquittal rate of terror suspects remained 85%. Thereafter, a study
conducted by Shah (2016) states that despite so many amendments over the years, the
ATA has failed to secure a reasonable conviction rate for terrorists, who continue to slip
through the cracks. Iqbal and Shah (2018) observed that high acquittal rate in terrorism-
related cases in Pakistan (4% conviction ratio) has been a matter of serious concern.
Riddled with the same problems faced by the regular justice system — inadequate
funding, understaffing, trial delays, and corruption—ATCs cannot be relied on to ensure
that suspected terrorists are served justice (Yousaf 2010). MQM-P leaders are indicted
in 21 cases registered under hate speech case charges. MQM-P leaders and others were
charged for being facilitators in hate speeches done by MQM founder in August 2016.
(Farooq Sattar, Other MQM-P leaders 2021). In the year 2018, Peshawar High Court has
set aside a conviction by an anti-terrorism court for attempting to plant an improvised
explosive device and ordered his release. The Hon’ble court observed that the evidence
on record didn’t connect him with the commission of the offence. An anti-terrorism
court had convicted him on April23, 2018, and sentenced him to 10 years rigorous
122 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

imprisonment under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act and Section 5 of the Explosive
Substance Act. Hon’ble judges also observed that trial court had overlooked several
important points and erred while convicting the appellant despite no concrete evidence
was available on record. The Hon’ble Peshawar High Court (PHC) in its judgment in
the case of Abdur Rashid v. Federation of Pakistan through secretary Ministry of Interior
reported as PLD 2019 Peshawar 17 has set aside the conviction of terror suspects
convicted by the military courts. The court acquitted the prisoners convicted by military
courts on the grounds of admitted illegal detention of the petitioners, recording of
confessional statements after five to ten years long illegal detention and that too without
following the proper procedure, absence of evidence. More so, as published report
suggests, that in reply to a query of the bench regarding delay in recording confessional
statements, the deputy attorney general (DAG) admitted that the time was consumed
in brainwashing of the petitioners. Hon’ble High Sindh Court has also set aside the
conviction of five men in an illegal weapons and explosives case and ordered their
release. According to the prosecution, the police had arrested the men after a shootout
in the New Karachi Industrial Area and recovered illegal weapons and explosives from
their possession. (SHC sets aside 2017).
At another instance, the court had acquitted 20 people of charges that they were
part of a lynch mob who burned alive a Christian couple in 2014 for allegedly committing
blasphemy. Brick-factory workers Shahzad Masih, 26, and Shama Shahzad, 24, were
burned alive in an industrial kiln by a mob in the Punjab. After the attack, it emerged
that the couple had been falsely accused. Police arrested scores of villagers in that case.
Subsequently, an anti-terrorism court in Lahore in the year 2016 sentenced five men
to death and 10 others were given varying jail terms for playing a supportive role in
the killings. That court also acquitted 93 suspects in the case. Thereafter, as per the
prosecutor of the case namely Abdur Rauf, the court acquitted 20 other suspects who
had been indicted in the case at a later stage. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018).
Angry mob led by local clerics vandalized and set on fire a Hindu temple. The attack took
place in Karak district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Witnesses said the area police dispersed
the crowd of about 1,000 people, but they had demolished the minority community’s
worship place. The Hindu temple had previously been attacked and destroyed in 1997,
before it was reconstructed in 2015 on orders of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. The anti-
terrorism court in northeastern city of Lahore acquitted all 42 suspects, who had been
indicted in 2016 for their alleged involvement in the lynching after the twin attacks
on churches in the city’s Youhanabad area. Two of the suspects died in jail custody.
The court exonerated the accused persons, including those who passed away, after the
victims’ families confirmed that both sides have reached an agreement and they had no
objection. Recently in the August 2021 Rahim Yar Khan temple attack, Hon’ble Chief
Justice Pakistan took suo moto action after the failure of police and administration to
Policy Papers 123

perform and arresting an eight-year-old boy. This reflects the capacity of law-enforcement
agencies and also of the public administration and district management officers. The
same forms the argument of this study.
The anti-terrorism court acquitted former Sindh home minister, Dr. Zulfiqar Ali
Mirza, in the Badin rioting case in 2015. Announcing the verdict, the court observed
that the prosecution failed to prove the case The Punjab’s 14 Anti-Terrorism Courts had
acquitted people facing terrorism charges in 370 cases within the span of 11 months.
Acquittals in 255 cases were due to retracting / hostile witness on statements recorded
by them earlier before investigation officer. Whereas in rest of the cases, acquittals
were made due to lack of evidence or poor investigation. Major causes other than poor
prosecution in Pakistan are the absence of professional autonomy, poor training, lack of
access to basic data, in effective and old-fashioned investigation, absolutely ineffective
witness protection system, political appointments in police and prosecution and
unwillingness to deploy scientific sources for investigation, etc. (Hamid 2015).

Methodology
The methodology used in this study is purely qualitative and responses are collected
through interviews of important stakeholders including, senior police officers,
academicians, researchers on law and justice, practicing advocates of Anti-Terrorism
Courts, Hon’ble High Courts and Supreme Court of Pakistan, Presidents of High Court
Bar Associations, members of Pakistan Bar Council, human right activists / members
civil society, Former Chairman of the Senate, senior journalists and Secretary Law
and Justice Commission of Pakistan (Annexure A). Interviews are analyzed through
recordings and subsequently from transcriptions. However, few of the respondents did
not allow recording, however their opinions and views were taken down after seeking
their permission.

Discussion and Analysis

The study gathered responses from active stakeholders comprehensively to
formulate constructive policy recommendations. The respondents belonging from
multiple factions of law and justice sector hold a unanimous view when it comes to
investigation, including policing, as well as prosecution. There is no accountability
of either investigation officer or the prosecutor presenting the case nor there any
performance appraisal mechanism. A judgment of Anti-Terrorism Court can be
challenged by way of appeal in the Hon’ble High Court and further on in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Pakistan where a verdict can be maintained, set aside, or modified.
But there is no mechanism in place for poor investigation or if prosecution fails to
establish a case against hardened terrorist. There is no accountability whatsoever for
124 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

investigation and shady prosecution makes things worst resulting in acquittal. There is
no monitoring and scrutinizing mechanism over investigation officer submitting charge
sheet in the cases where provision of Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 is, prima facie, attracted.
Subsequently, prosecution department responsible for forwarding the charge sheet
as contemplated under section 173 Cr.PC, that final report to be submitted through
public prosecutor, in the court of law has proved to be ineffective. Even if there is no
substantial material against the accused person, the prosecution instead of directing I.O
to remove defects or simply declining to forward it to the court, rather sends the same
for trial. The prosecution in the cases of lack of evidence and malicious proceedings
may resort to what has been laid by the Hon’ble High Court of Sindh in its landmark
judgment in the case of Muhammad Haroon reported as PLD 2009 KARACHI 120. Failure
to observe what has been laid in law and judgments by the superior courts, results in
the failure of prosecution at the stage of trial and accused persons find acquittal on the
ground of lack of evidence or charges mentioned in FIR are not attracted to the accused.
This brings the entire criminal justice system under question. Throughout this time,
there is no check and monitoring over the investigation officer, nor on the prosecution
services. Low conviction rate itself reflects the performance of Investigation Officers
and prosecutors. It is disappointing to observe poor evidence and poor investigation
in the cases being tried by Anti-Terrorism Courts. Delay in collecting evidence, washing
the site of crime scene, tempering with the statement of witnesses under section 161
Cr. PC, foisting and not properly sealing the case property, inserting irrelevant section
of Pakistan Penal Code in final challan, delay in completing formalities for exhumation
of dead body to mention a few. So much so, in a high-profile case of Daniel Pearl, the
investigation officer did not bother to obtain a post-mortem report. It is also noted in
some of the cases, while narrating the incident, the complainant either himself or upon
the insistence of author of FIR creates a story in a way which invokes the provisions of
ATA 1997. Complainant also implicates more persons than just a perpetrator, including
the ones with whom he holds personal grudge. This takes his case far away from the
reality and merit. The entire case then stands on a false pretense which falls like a house
of cards at the time trial. This fact is supported by the respondents in media sector while
discussing the role of media. Respondents from media sector disclosed that in the press
conferences the version of the complainant or victim is different from the one in FIR and
then altered at the time of submission of the charge sheet in the court. This is mainly
to give hype to the case through media to exert pressure on judicial system and also
to implicate more persons from the locality against whom the complainant might hold
personal enmity. One such hyped famous case was of Rinkle Kumari and subsequently
the Mian Mithu saga that followed in 2012.
Besides, the respondents believe that defence counsel normally don’t work to
find out contradictions as the complainant and police have already damaged their own
Policy Papers 125

case to the extent that it will turn out to be a case of acquittal eventually. Training
of investigation office has been time and again questioned. The issue remains there
because normally FIR is lodged by head mohrar and investigation is conducted by
inspector. How can we expect a head mohrar to understand the jurisprudence behind
the legislation and interpretation thereof; once the basis of any criminal trial which is FIR,
setting a law into motion is wrongly laid, the entire structure of investigation is destined
to collapse. Most importantly, neither our legislation nor our courts have distinguished
terrorism from extremism. As far as interpretation of the statute is concerned, Hon’ble
Justice (retd.) Asif Saeed Khan Khosa has settled a much-needed yardstick to quantify
any act of violence whether qualifying to be tried under ATA 1997 or other scheduled
offences in the landmark judgment in the case of Ghulam Hussain and others v. The
State etc. in Criminal Appeals No. 95 and 96 of 2019, Civil Appeal No. 10-L of 2017 and
Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2013. However, extremism, as the study finds can be cultural
or linguistic as well and the present law has nothing to curtail such instances where
basis of extremism is laid through literature, academic or religious or through cultural
and on the basis of language.
Moreover, in the cases of violent extremism such as setting fire on places of
religious worship and practices, forced conversion, etc., neither investigation officer nor
prosecutor is sensitized or trained to handle the mob pressure, then pressure of feudal
lords and thereafter when the case is taken to the court of law. Until then, the entire
complexion of the case is changed. Inclusion of military courts in our criminal justice
system was an open admission by parliament through a constitutional amendment that
our courts are not effective against terrorism neither in handing over convictions to
hardened criminals nor putting them on trial. The result was even worst in the form
of more than 200 judgments of military courts being set aside by Peshawar High Court
on account of either extra-judicial confessions or confessions after a period of five and
six months in detention and also due to not extending an opportunity to defend his
case, violating Article 10-A of the Constitution. Reports show that many occasions,
Hon’ble High Courts of different provinces changed the sentence or simply set aside the
convictions given by the Anti-Terrorism Courts as well. This genuinely speaks of a serious
and certain issue with the existing criminal justice system and maximum blame is put
on investigation and prosecution services. There is no criteria on which Investigation
Officer is appointed. Witness Protection Act is not followed at all. How can witness is
protected for six months and for years when trial is not concluded within the span in
which witness can be practically given a protection. Term “benefit of doubt” should be
scrutinized. This term has extended maximum relief to the accused and due to minute
short comings of the prosecution the benefit of doubt is always extended to the accused.
It is said that the accused is a favorite or blue-eyed of law, but the courts have ignored
that exercising this notion in the heinous cases of terrorism and extremism, the victim
126 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

has become a neglected child of law and prosecution has become a disadvantaged
child of law. In many cases, it is observed that since the cases attracting sections of ATA
1997 are non-compoundable, the complainant or witnesses have started a practice of
retracting from their statements. Prosecution prays to the court to declare them hostile
and this result in the acquittal too. In addition, the standard of acquittal as discussed
earlier also is too below par. Prosecution is totally incapable of dealing with such cases.
At the same time, prosecution cannot do anything if the investigation is weak and
corrupt, i,e, as weak as non-existent, as stated by one of the respondents. Element and
instances of bribery during investigation is not unfamiliar. Besides being incompetent
and incapable, investigation officers are said to be corrupt too. It is observed that the
person, may it be a complainant or anyone who registers the FIR comes under massive
difficulty. So much so, he is pressurized to either retract from his statement or refuse
to identify the accused person. In both ways, the outcome is acquittal. In the cases of
attacks on temples and churches, investigation officer is so untrained that he is unable
to collect evidence properly. Name of abettors are normally deliberately not included in
the FIR upon the insistence of some clerics and feudal lords. Then no forensic evidence
is collected by IO. More so, where investigation officer tries to destroy the cases, he
will not let the statement of witness before the magistrate under section 164 Cr. PC be
recorded. It is not possible that in case of a mob attacking any religious place, there
was no eyewitness, but the statement of witness is normally tempered. A lot of learned
judges are not familiar with the difference between motive and intent. These two words
possess the power to change the entire case because after the judgment authored by
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khosa, it has to be ascertained that what was the motive
and what was the intent behind the offence to arrive at the point whether the offence
is an act of terrorism or not. It is an absolutely a specialized area demanding unique
set of expertise from learned judges of ATC. In addition to that, fake encounter cases
are also rampant in our society. Terms “half fried” and “full fried” is almost a normal
practice by so-called encounter specialist in police department. Half fired refers to
a situation where a gunshot is fired on arm and leg that leaves person injured only
whereas, full fried is a person who has been killed in an encounter. In such cases, ATC
has handed over punishments to police officials as well which leaves serious questions
on the integrity of police department and serious violation of human rights. One such
case was decided by Hon’ble XVIth Anti-Terrorism Court, Karachi in the year 2021 in
the case of The State v. ASI Tariq Khan in which a police officer was sentenced over fake
encounter. Unfortunately, in the cases of terrorism and violent extremism, a civil society
is denied all important locus standi to file an appeal and contest / plead the matter in the
court of law. One such instance happened in the matter of Shahzaib Murder case. State
refused to proceed the matter and for obvious reasons was not willing to keep the case
alive any longer, Pakistani civil society had moved Constitution Petition Leave to Appeal
Policy Papers 127

(CPLA) against the verdict of the High Court of Sindh, which was then turned into suo-
moto by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Another interesting factor which has surfaced
by way of this study is that the prosecution is absolutely politicized. Prosecutors are
appointed by provincial governments and hence paid and promoted by their respective
provincial governments. Uzair Baloch who has been allegedly called as a “Hit Man”
working for a political party, is on a winning spree with recent acquittal in 15th case of
all other cases against him and tried under Anti-Terrorism Courts. While the courts have
observed the reason of acquittal, primarily, being “lack of evidence”. It has also come on
record that investigation officer at times don’t even visit the site of incident and prepare
such formalities at police station. There is zero cooperation between investigation and
prosecution. while there should have been an ideal coordination between these two but
their non-support to each other also leads to acquittal.

Policy Recommendations
This study proposes multi-dimensional practical measures. It has now been
cleared that serious and determined efforts are required to be taken. Hence, same are
mentioned as follows:
• There should be a stern accountability/monitoring and performance appraisal
mechanism for every investigation officer which should be updated on daily
basis and maintained on a dashboard and the same should be available on
provincial police website.
• Name of each and every investigation officer deputed to conduct an
investigation should be mentioned against the number of cases in which he is
doing nvestigation, already completed and outcome of the investigation. And
that should be subject to reward or departmental displeasure/inquiry.
• Multiple respondents proposed heavy fines and penalties on investigation for
destroying evidence collected in the cases of terrorism.
• Similarly, the same procedure is required to be adopted for prosecution
services. When prosecutor knows that the case is not fit for conviction and
bears loopholes and lacunas, the same should either be removed before
submitting it in the court of law or simply declined. Still, if the same are left,
this clearly shows the incompetence of the prosecutor and he should be
transferred to ordinary trial courts or somewhere else but not retained in Anti-
Terrorism Courts. Name of each and every prosecutor deputed to conduct an
investigation should be mentioned against the number of cases categorically
in terms of pending cases and disposed of cases and the dashboard to be
maintained on the website of provincial prosecutor general.
• Most importantly, in the cases of violent extremism such as setting fire on
128 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

places of religious worship and practices, forced conversion, etc, investigation

officers and prosecutors should be sensitized and properly trained to handle
the mob pressure, pressure of feudal lords, religious factions etc. Exclusive
appointments of investigation officers and prosecutors should be made in the
cases of violent extremism and they should not be given any other case of
scheduled offences.
• Investigation officer in the cases of violent extremism should not be below the
rank of ASP.
• Third pillar of the criminal justice system is judicial system. It is proposed
that in case of judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court is being set aside, for the
reason other than lack of evidence or failure of prosecution to establish its
case beyond the shadow of doubt, such as failure in proper application of law
and interpretation of the statute by the court, departmental capacity building
measures may be devised for learned judicial officers.
• The courts too have to analyze the distinction between an act of extremism
and an act of terrorism. This will have a significant impact on “sentencing” of
the accused persons.
• It is strongly proposed that in every case of violent extremism, the investigation
team should be comprised of a special team formed by DIG police himself and
headed by SSP.
• Exclusive and comprehensive training of police, prosecutors and learned
judges of Anti-Terrorism Courts is imperative on the lines of UNODC and best
practices in the world.
• The interpretation of the term “benefit of doubt” has to be curtailed and
made clear by the courts. It is expected from the Hon’ble courts if this term is
quantified and interpreted, it will buffer the ratio of acquittal, rather misuse of
this term which extends advantage to the accused at the same time the victim
becomes disadvantaged. In such cases, courts have to raise the standard for
acquittal.
• If any witness or a complainant deliberately extends favor to the accused in
the form of retracting from his previous statement or giving false evidence, he
should be dealt with iron hands.
• Learned judges need to have progressive and modern approaches. For that
learned judges before their appointments in ATC should be identified before
their nominations and trained exclusively for certain years before handing
over charge to them. This is the time when judicial response against terrorism
and violent extremism should be taken as a serious concern than ever before.
• Prosecution department may be included in the investigation process
formally and then the performance appraisal system is deployed to ascertain
Policy Papers 129

the collective performance. Task of the prosecutor should not be started

from the time when final report under section 173 Cr.PC is brought to him
by investigation process. instead, he should also be formally and actively
taking part in collecting evidence and doing other substantial tasks to obtain
material necessary to produce in the court, and to remove the lacunas in the
investigation.
• For the cases of violent extremism and terrorism, the entire criminal
jurisprudence needs to be restructured. Courts have to develop or re-
interpret the law of sentencing. ATA 1997 holds a very minimal scope in
terms of punishment. In some cases, its either acquittal or straight away death
penalty. Therefore, courts are normally moved towards acquittal even if a
minor contradiction is created ignoring all other substantial material evidence
against the accused person. Judges should be given all important discretion
to decide the span of punishment in the cases tried by Anti-Terrorism Courts.
This will also rightly improve the rate of conviction.
• For every fake encounter in which ATC has announced a verdict against
police, not only the SHO concerned but also the entire chain of command till
DIG police should be scrutinized and inquired. Thereafter the departmental
dismissal of guilty officials should be intimidated to the court.
• In cases of terrorism and violent extremism, civil society should be given a
locus standi, i.e. opportunity to lodge FIR and contest the case on merits
especially when the state refuses or does not want to register FIR and proceed
the matter.
• The prosecution department should be de-politicized. It must not come under
any political influence. This is somehow near to impossible in the current
socio-political and ethnic dynamics of the country especially Karachi city.
However, unless the prosecution is not free from political prejudices, it will
remain ineffective in the cases of terrorism and violent extremism. That’s why
it has been proposed to have a stern performance appraisal and monitoring
mechanism for prosecution department.
• In the cases of violent extremism, media must play a responsible role as to
who should be allowed to hold press conference and people should not be
allowed in the media and legal heirs of the victim to give public statement in
a case which is sub judice in the court of law until its verdict is announced.
Certain information should be verified also before letting anyone do the press
conference.
• Appointments of public prosecutors should be apolitical, i.e. through proper
commission having members from judiciary, Law and Justice Commission of
Pakistan (LJCP), Prosecution Department and Police. Their preliminary test
130 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

should be conducted and only the qualifying candidates should be allowed to

appear for written test.
• Since the study proposes effective criminal justice system against violent
extremism for resilient communities, hence it is strongly proposed to
have a community policing model in some areas as pilot study and then
comprehensive mass scale community policing should be introduced to deal
with such cases. However, the investigation officer should not be less than ASP
and SSP to supervise the entire investigation.
• Civil administration can also be included in investigation process. This by
no means amount to influencing the investigation process but to assist the
entire investigation team to extract the truth and bring culprits to book in
accordance with law.
• Court and case management systems should be evaluated and monitored as
there are many issues with the case management system. There should not be
any adjournment granted by learned judges, in the cases of violent extremism
and terrorism.
• Cases may be fixed on daily basis until disposal and instead of long cause lists,
one case at a time should be decided saving time of witnesses and allowing
prosecution to contest the case exclusively before taking up another case.
• Witnesses are normally returned on the ground of adjournment, added to
their agony especially those appearing in court leaving their daily wages.
Witness should not be returned, therefore, only summoned when the matter
is ripe to lead their evidence.

References
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Farooq Sattar, other MQM-P leaders indicted in 21 hate speech cases 2018, Geo News, Oct 23, viewed 03
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Annexure A
1. Justice (Retd) Rehmat Hussain Jaffery (Former Judge, Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Pakistan)
2. Barrister Salahuddin Ahmed, President, Sindh High Court Bar Association,
Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
3. Barrister Abid S. Zuberi, Member of Pakistan Bar Council, Former President
Sindh High Court Bar Association, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
4. Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Former Additional Attorney-General-I, Punjab, Member of
Pakistan Bar Council, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
5. Mr Faisal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
6. Mr Salahuddin Gandapur, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
7. Dr Riaz Sheikh, Dean, Department of Social Sciences, SZABIST, Karachi
8. Dr Shabbana Fayyaz, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic
Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
9. Dr Farhan Hanif Siddiqui, Director & Associate Prof., Department of School of
Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
10. Dr Shafqat Munir, Research Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute.
Islamabad
11. Dr Rasool Bux Raees, Professor of Political Science, Department of Humanities
and Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences
12. Dr Shoaib Suddle, former IG Sindh, Visiting Criminal Justice Expert, United
Nations, Asia.
13. Dr Raheem Awan, Secretary, Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan
14. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, President, PILDAT
15. Javed Akhtar, District Public Prosecutor, Karachi East
16. Imdad Somroo, The News, Karachi
17. Riaz Ahmed, Correspondent, BBC
18. Abdul Qadir Lashari, Correspondent, KTN, Sindh
19. Imran Abbas, ATC Prosecutor
132 Policy Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan

20. Nasir Durrani, ATC Prosecutor

21. Mr Iqbal Khwaja – President, Thatta Bar Association
22. Nadeem Baig, Inspector, Station House Officer, Gharo, Thatta
23. Shoaib Sahab – Shahrukh – Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan
24. Mr Jibran Nasir, Advocate High Court, Social Activist
25. Kamila Hayat, Joint Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan