SUMMARY

#4CONSTI TAGS: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

AGUSTIN VS EDU (G.R. No. L-49112 dated February 2, ISSUE: WoN LOI No. 229 as amended
1979) violated the constitutional provision on
undue delegation of power.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National
Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as
Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in
his capacity as Minister of Public Highways,
respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant

Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor
Amado D. Aquino for respondents.
FACTS RULING
1. On December 2, 1974, No, the Court ruled that LOI No. 229 as amended falls within the
President Ferdinand State's police power, and President Marcos' issuance of the same
Marcos issued Letter of was clearly an exercise of such power. The intent of the law can be
Instruction (LOI) No. 229, clearly seen in the WHEREASes of the assailed LOI (to prevent
which required all motor accidents, safeguard the safety of the public, and adhere to the
vehicles to secure early State's commitment to public international law). The Court later
warning devices (EWD) went on a lengthy discourse in defining what police power is:
consisting of a pair of
triangular, collapsible,  "Nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent
reflectorized plates in red in every sovereignty." (Chief Justice Taney, US Supreme Court
and yellow to be Chief Justice, 1847)
purchased from the Land
Transportation  "The State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
Commission. The purposes personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
of this LOI were to prevent welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all
accidents caused by kinds of restraints and burdens in order to achieve the general
vehicular obstructions and comfort, health, and prosperity of the State." (Calalang v.
to adhere to the road Williams)
safety standards outlined
in the 1968 Vienna  "The power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
 Convention on Road Signs morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
and Signals, which the the people." (Primicias v. Fugoso)
Philippines had ratified as
per PD No. 207.  "Inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
2. LOI No. 229 was later (Justice Malcolm)
amended by LOI No. 479
issued on November 15,  "The totality of legislative power." (Morfe v. Mutuc)
1976. Unlike before where
owners of motor vehicles  "A dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
were required to purchase defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the
the reflectorized plates state and imposing upon its government limitations to
from the Land safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
Transportation an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
Commission, LOI No. 479 unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
now made it possible for calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and
said owners to buy early welfare."
warning devices anywhere
so long as they adhere to
the standards prescribed
by the Land
Transportation
Commissioner.

3. President Marcos issued a

six-month suspension of
said LOI, after which he
issued another LOI lifting
its suspension. On August
29, 1978, Land
Transportation
Commissioner Romeo Edu
issued Memorandum
Circular No. 32, which
contained LTC
Administrative Order No. 1
or the rules and
regulations in the
implementation of LOI No.
229 as amended.

4. Leovilo Agustin, a private

citizen and owner of a
Volkswagen Beetle Car,
filed a petition before the
SC, assailing the
constitutionality of both
LOI No. 229 as amended
 and LTC Administrative
Order No. 1. Among
others, Agustin claimed
that LOI No. 229 was
violative of the provisions
and delegation of police
power, an oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, and
unconstitutional order
that was contrary to the
precepts of the New
Society. Pending its final
resolution, the Court
issued a temporary
restraining order
preventing agencies
concerned from
implementing both LOI
No. 229 as amended and
LTC Administrative Order
No. 1.
DISCUSSION/PRINCIPLES
The validity of a letter of Instruction providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
1

assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo
L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear
2

that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on
is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued
on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of
fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas],
the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of
safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby
direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor
vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on
any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver
thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away
to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described,
to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers,
charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such
rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby
concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to
carry into effect then instruction. Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of
3

Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended
to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle
owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized
early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate
to effectively implement this order.'" There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the
4

implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. They were not enforced as President
5

Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation
of early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. Then
6

on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction the lifting of such suspension and directed the
7

immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. It was not until August
8

29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance
of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction
No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning
Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC
Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that
the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the
EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that
every motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered
stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The
EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of payment
of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda
in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. It was for
9

immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works,

transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned
in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," alleged that said
11

Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police
power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." He contended
12

that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;" are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
13

make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per
set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New
14

Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWD's." He therefore prayed for a judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and
15

Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo
C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or
mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an answer thereto
within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further
Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by this Court. 16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on
November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual
allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations and stating
they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a
Volkswagen Beetle Car, they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including
17

its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended
by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation Commission
Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional
provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power,
and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral
unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis
and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer." Unlike18

petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely
invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the
assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and
regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of
legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation
of what respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for
application. They are Calalang v. Williams, Morfe v. Mutuc, and Edu v. Ericta. Reference was
19 20 21

likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs,
and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. Solicitor
22

General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous,
at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the
implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its
highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As
noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and
equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by
Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty" was stressed in the
23

aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.' Shortly after independence in
1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as 'the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice
Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it
could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of
legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of
government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table
powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope,
ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs
that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of
the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a dynamic
agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that
character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest
decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
25

conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads * * *. As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
26

nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
27

failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules
and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual
foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. The rationale was clearly set forth in an
28

excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the
opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in
overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of
validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the
necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and
such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that early warning
devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only
390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end
collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on
record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there
being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the
statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity
of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more
Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled
vehicles?" It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in
30

the armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged
repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even
the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction
was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement
is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped
with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-powered blinking lights
inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,"
or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the
signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of
the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled
or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees
any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not
immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all
about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the
danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer
of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to
purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle
owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning
device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of
industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this
early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down
in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it
make manufacturers and dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning
device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * *
is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said
requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same
illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and
implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on
lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say
negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that this Court,
in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency
of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible objection then to the observation of
Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts
merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they,
according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to
be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority
of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion
not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be,
the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on
the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid
and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is

equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v.
Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the
recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " It cannot
35

be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance:
"The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land * * *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
36

such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is,
moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and
categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more
appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in Santiago v.
Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered
37

unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." "Equal protection"
38

is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect
that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.