O

NET ZERO
BY 2050:
FROM WHETHER
TO HOW
ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS
TO THE EUROPE WE WANT

SEPTEMBER 2018
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to the following organisations for their expertise and insight.

Model testers - the following organisations supported the analytical team in testing the model,
CONTENTS
which is itself derived from the ClimateWorks Foundation’s Carbon Transparency Initiative (CTI): 4 FOREWORD
6 METHODOLOGY & SCENARIOS OVERVIEW
8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
18 INTRODUCTION

20 1. REACHING NET-ZERO GREENHOUSE GAS

EMISSIONS IN 2050 IS FEASIBLE
but requires robust action across all sectors, widening the range
of low-carbon options used for the transition

Agora-Energiewende, Climate Strategy, The Coalition for Energy Savings, Friends of the Earth (FoE) UK, Grantham Research Institute - 30 2. NET-ZERO GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN 2050
London School of Economics, Iberdrola, Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), Institute for Sustainable Development and
International Relations (IDDRI), Third Generation Environmentalism (E3G), UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy REQUIRES RAISING THE 2030 AMBITION LEVEL
(BEIS), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) European Policy Office.
to leverage the no regrets options and
Members of these organisations tested the model during the summer of 2018 and explored a variety of decarbonisation pathways. These set Europe on the right trajectory
scenarios have informed our conclusions but were not used directly.

Other organisations were consulted on sector specific discussions: 36 3. NET-ZERO PATHWAYS CAN COST
Agora Verkehrswende, Aviation Environment Federation (AEF), Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), the Energy and Climate
Intelligence Unit (ECIU), Ecofys, EuroACE, the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC), the European Federation for Transport & LESS THAN BUSINESS-AS-USUAL
Environment (T&E), FERN, Fraunhofer ISI, International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements – EU (IFOAM-EU), International and build a more prosperous, resilient society
Institute for Systems Analysis (IIASA), Öko-Institut, Imperial College London (ICL), Open Exp, Stefan Scheuer, and Vrije Universiteit
Brussel (VUB) – Institute for European Studies (IES).

Grateful thanks also to the many members of staff from the European Climate Foundation (ECF) who have provided input throughout the 48 CONCLUSION
process, and to ClimateWorks Foundation for their support and encouragement.
What does this mean for the European Union?
The views expressed in this paper are attributable only to the authors, and not the organisations that have supported or advised on
its development.
50 APPENDIX:
The analytical team (Climact):
Julien Pestiaux, Michel Cornet, Quentin Jossen, Benoît Martin, Vincent Matton, Jerome Meessen, Emily Taylor, Pascal Vermeulen 52 Short overview of the key assumptions and implications by Sector
Project coordination (European Climate Foundation): 56 Brief methodology description
Erica Hope, Agathe Kuhn

Design: 64 ABOUT THE PROJECT

www.lindsayynobledesign.com
66 ENDNOTES

DISCLAIMER
This report has been commissioned by the European Reports in the series seek to enhance understanding
O Climate Foundation (ECF). It is part of the Net-Zero
2050 series, an initiative of the ECF with contributions
of the implications and opportunities of moving
to climate neutrality across the power, industry,
from a consortium of experts and organisations. buildings, transport, agriculture, Land Use, Land-Use
Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sectors; to shed light
The objective of Net-Zero 2050 is to start building a on some of the near-term choices and actions needed
vision and evidence base for the transition to net-zero to reach this goal, and to provide a basis for discussion
emission societies in Europe and beyond, by mid- and engagement with stakeholders and policy-makers.
century at the latest. The Paris Agreement commits
us to making this transition, and long-term strategic With acknowledgement of the source, reproduction of
planning shows that many of the decisions and actions all or part of the publication is authorised, except for
needed to get us on track must be taken imminently. commercial purposes.

For more information, please contact Erica Hope,

[email protected].

/3
 The 2015 Paris Agreement marked the Net-zero is technically and economically
moment when the global community possible. But the key driver of
committed to decisive climate action success will be political will, creative
to keep warming well below 2°Celsius policy implementation, and societal
(°C). This will require transformational understanding and ambition. This
change – all countries, rich and poor, project shows that there are many
must reach carbon neutrality. Net-zero compelling reasons to expect that a
needs to be our goal, our direction of net-zero world will be cleaner, healthier,
travel, and our rallying cry. more prosperous, more equitable, and
happier – not least because it will avoid
This is a challenge, but also an opportunitythe massive costs of large-scale climate
– for the EU and its Member States, it impacts on food, infrastructure, health,
is an opportunity to demonstrate global and migration. The costs of transition
leadership by charting a path to reach are dwarfed by the costs of dealing with
carbon neutrality by 2050. But in order climate impacts in a scenario where we
to reach our goal, we need a plan – we fail to reach net-zero by 2050. Setting
need to know the pathways to net-zero, net-zero as a clear direction of travel
including the growth and innovation will help to achieve many of the societal
opportunities it presents, the trade-offs goals we have set ourselves.
that may need to be made, and the policy
designs we will need to get there. The “Europe we want” is one that
protects its citizens from global threats
The European Climate Foundation’s such as climate change, which no one
collaboration on the CTI 2050 Roadmap country can tackle on its own; and
Tool shows that while it is not easy, creates a safer, cleaner world. Net-
Europe can design these pathways – zero is a path to a sustainable Europe
and the advantages far outweigh the in which prosperity and well-being are
difficulties. The project seeks to answer delivered alongside a clean and healthy
the question of ‘how’ we achieve the environment.

FOREWORD
required transition.
The research makes it clear that the
move forward must be holistic – all
Laurence Tubiana sectors must play their part in reducing
emissions. The good news is that there
CEO, European Climate Foundation are interdependencies that can and must
be used to deliver maximum speed and
efficiency of mitigation. There are major
opportunities and need for technological
innovation and investment, and enabling
policies – this will be fundamental
to achieving the required reductions
quickly.

/4 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /5

METHODOLOGY THREE MAIN NET-ZERO GHG EMISSIONS
SCENARIOS ARE USED IN THE REPORT
AND AVAILABLE ONLINE

& SCENARIOS More than 10 scenarios were modelled by the organisations who supported the
model testing, while other scenarios were elaborated by the project team to
explore the net-zero opportunities and trade-offs. Out of these scenarios, three
typical pathways were selected to illustrate the conclusions of this report. All
three reach net-zero emissions by 2050.

OVERVIEW 1. The “Shared efforts” scenario: A comparable level of effort is maintained

across sectors and levers, i.e., there is no emphasis on any specific mitigation
option. Where conclusions are illustrated in the text with only one scenario, it
is the Shared efforts scenario unless otherwise indicated.
2. The “Technology” scenario: Emphasises efficiency and innovative
technological options by raising their ambition to the highest levels (e.g.,
This project has developed and used a simulation of buildings to reduce their energy consumption, energy efficiency, electrification, hydrogen, carbon capture, and storage
model of European emissions and the mitigation enhancing the circular economy with longer-lived (CCS) ). It leads to -41% energy demand in 2050.
options available now and in the future, analysing assets, shifting to renewable forms of electricity 3. The “Demand-focus” scenario: Demand-side levers are used here to reduce
possible pathways to reach net-zero greenhouse gas production, and shifting to healthier diets to free up the overall demand further, e.g., for energy (-64% by 2050), products, or
(GHG) emissions. The emissions scope of the model land for increasing forest covers. meat, which implies that technological levers can be reduced compared to
encompasses all sectors of the economy and all GHG the Shared efforts scenario.
emissions sources covered by national inventories, Rather than calculating optimal pathways, the
including international aviation, shipping, and Land model allows the user to choose the ambition level
of each individual lever (from a reference level up to These scenarios are used in the graphics of the report, but they can also be
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF).
maximum technical ambition) and thereby explore explored in more detail online. Additional scenarios are also available on the
It is a techno-economic simulation model; pathways different scenarios or pathways to 2050. The costs website.
illustrated in this report are designed as a combination of each pathway are estimated by adding the annual
One of the objectives of this work is to increase the analytical basis available to
of ambition levels across all GHG emitting sectors capital expenditures (e.g., new infrastructures or
define the adequate political framework for the low-carbon transition, increasing
and mitigation options. The model was extensively assets), operational costs (e.g., maintenance) and
model transparency, ease of use, the comparability of existing scenarios, and
discussed and tested with the wide range of fuel costs. Other externalities (such as improved air
ultimately the access of policy makers to the most useful information for decision
stakeholders listed above. It relies on an extensive quality, reduced noise, climate change damages, or
making. In this logic, a version of the model directly based on the full simulation
literature review and stakeholder consultation. biodiversity conservation) are not accounted in the
model is accessible online. This allows for the pathways used in the analysis to be
cost estimates but discussed based on a literature
For each sector of the EU economy that emits explored in much greater details, as well as to test additional pathways.
research (see Section 3, p.14).
GHGs (Power production, industry, buildings,
The webtool can be found at: https://stakeholder.netzero2050.eu
transportation, and Agriculture, Forestry and Land- More details on the modelling and its scope can be
Use (AFOLU)), the GHG emissions drivers and means found in the Appendix. Hyperlinks are included as just above in the report text where relevant, so that
of reducing them – referred to as ‘levers’ – were readers can easily navigate between the report and the three main scenarios
modelled. Examples of levers include shifting from online.
cars to softer modes of transport, deep retrofits

/6 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /7

EXECUTIVE Impacts of climate change are already being felt today
around the globe, including in Europe, and urgent action is
now required by all countries. The Paris Agreement1 states

SUMMARY
an objective of limiting global warming to “well below 2°C”
above pre-industrial levels, but also of making all possible
efforts to achieve the goal of 1.5°C climate stabilisation.

On the basis of the scientific underpinning of these goals

provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), signatories to the Paris Agreement also
committed to ensure that global GHG emissions fall to net-
zero as early as possible in the second half of this century,
before going negative. This means developed economies
such as the European Union’s (EU), will need to achieve
net-zero emissions by 2050, or even earlier. Numerous
countries have already set goals consistent with this.2

This is the starting point taken by the CTI 2050 Roadmap

Tool project, which seeks to explore the feasibility and
implications for the EU of reaching net-zero GHG emissions
by 2050 at the latest. It finds that not only is it technically
possible, but that the net-zero future is likely to be both
economically beneficial, and desirable on many other
grounds. However, it requires a collective commitment to
transformational action and without delay.

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 REACHING NET-ZERO GHG
Planning to reach net-zero by 2050 at the latest means no sector can be left
aside. We need to widen the range of options being used, including by putting
1 more focus on how we operate as a society. Innovation in our consumption

EMISSIONS BY 2050 IS FEASIBLE patterns and increasing potential natural carbon sinks need to be combined
with the more typical technical options such as energy efficiency, fuel shift,
zero-carbon power production and electrification.
BUT REQUIRES ROBUST ACTION ACROSS ALL Figure 1 illustrates the contribution of the various lever groups to reducing
SECTORS, AND WIDENING THE RANGE OF LOW- emissions over time and shows that actions of many types are involved in
delivering the required emission reductions. This includes actions related to
CARBON OPTIONS USED FOR THE TRANSITION technology choices, but also about how society is organised, consumption
Planning for net-zero GHG emissions requires a new way of thinking – more patterns, and the impact of the circular economy principles, with better and
innovative, cross-sectoral, and beyond business-as-usual. It means ensuring that more innovative product design leading to longer lifetimes and greater recycling
GHG emissions are reduced close to zero in all sectors, and that these remaining and reuse of raw and processed materials. All these demand-side choices have
emissions are compensated by carbon sinks like forest growth or sustainable a major trickle-down effect on the entire value chain.
biomass coupled with carbon capture and storage (CCS).
While Figure 1 illustrates the “Shared efforts” scenario, which leverages all levers
to a similar ambition, other pathways with different focuses can also lead to net-
zero. Figure 2 shows how the key lever groupings differ across the three studied
Social patterns, societal organisation and energy efficiency are key scenarios. This also connects to large differences across European countries in
their approaches to the low-carbon transition. Our research shows that there is
to make it easier to reach net-zero (the contributions of each lever not one way to decarbonise: each country, region, city or local authority has to
group relate to how ambitious the reference is (EU-REF16)). define its own transition with the global objective in mind.
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])

The impact of key lever groups differs significantly across the three scenarios
1990 (GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])
5,411

SHARED EFFORT TECHNOLOGY DEMAND

2018
3,963
2030
2,138

EU-REF16

Social patterns

Societal organisation

Process improvements
and energy efficiency

Fuel switch and electrification

EU-REF16
Zero-carbon power production 3.074
CCS/BECCS
Land use sinks ocial patterns Fuel switch and electrification
Societal organisation Zero-carbon power production
NET ZERO 2O5O Process improvements CCS/BECCS
and energy efficiency Land-use sinks
(See the detailed grouping of all levers in the Appendix: Brief methodology description)

F I G U R E 1 . GHG emission reductions by lever types in a Shared efforts (See the section on the
“Analytical basis” p.7 to read on the various scenarios used in this report.) net-zero scenario [MtCO2e] F I G U R E 2 . Impact of each lever group on GHG emissions reductions for each scenario in 2050 [MtCO2e]

/10 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /11
 This transition means using all the best practices that are already being applied Setting a firm and clear direction of travel, which is required to ensure that near-
across Europe, and applying them at a much greater scale, as well as increasing term choices are aligned with long-term goals, will help to ensure the required
investment and putting policies in place to ensure widespread uptake of more investment in scaling up these solutions. It is likely to also unleash further
transformational solutions – in technical, business model, societal, and governance creativity regarding technologies and social developments, which can widen the
arenas. A review of the scenarios points to the fact that commercially available range of options available for reaching net-zero.
solutions can already take us about 75% of the way to net-zero if deployed at
scale. The remaining 25% can be achieved based on known approaches and Our work also highlights the importance of deploying all mitigation actions
technologies for which further scaling up and commercialisation is needed. possible including land-use sinks and other options for removal of GHG from
This includes the wider implementation of innovative business models that the atmosphere. In our three scenarios, improved land-use practices could
frontrunners are already starting to use.3 support around 600 megatonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) per year of GHG
sinks, which amounts to about 10% of 1990 emissions and can help us reach
net-zero by 2050. Other options to remove GHG from the atmosphere (e.g.,
biomass use combined with CCS) have significant limitations as well. However,
Net-zero requires increased deployment of efforts and solutions the European carbon emissions budget is very tight and reaching net-zero by
as well as upscaling the commercialisation and deployment of 2050 is unlikely to be sufficient. Europe will need to compensate for some of
new technologies, and innovation in business models its emissions by going net-negative after 2050. Therefore these limited natural
sinks and other carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options will not be an alternative
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e]) for the emitting sectors. Each sector needs to reach close to zero emissions
around mid-century or shortly after.
-75%
I N CR E ASI N G
EX IST I N G EF F O RTS

IMPACT
OF
EU-REF16

1990
5,411 -
INCREASED
EFFORTS -25%
ADDI T I ONAL
I NNOVAT I ON
NET
- ZERO
1.335 2O5O

15% 10%

18%

44% 12%

ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL FROM INCREASED

INNOVATION ACROSS SECTORS

F I G U R E 3 . GHG emission reductions split between increased efforts and additional innovation (see end note3)

/12 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /13
2 NET-ZERO GHG EMISSIONS This finding contradicts the current EU target4 which leads to only 40% GHG
reductions (including LULUCF, 35% excluding it) in 2030. It also contradicts the
latest adopted EU legislation that gives targets of 32.5% on energy efficiency and

IN 2050 REQUIRES RAISING 32% for renewables, which is estimated to lead to about 46% excluding LULUCF
(or 50% reductions including them) in 2030. This would keep us still far from the
range of reductions needed to set Europe on the required trajectory to net-zero
THE 2030 AMBITION LEVEL just 20 years later.
Our findings, as well as the latest scientific evidence, tell us that the next 10
TO SET EUROPE ON THE RIGHT TRAJECTORY years are crucial if Europe and the world are to avoid the worst consequences
of climate change. Our analysis identifies a set of “no-regrets” actions5, which
2050 matters because of the guide it provides for near-term choices. It need to be taken in this time span. “No regrets” actions are those required in
evidences the need to increase action now in order to leverage all the no- all zero emissions pathways, regardless of the emphasis they set on the various
regrets options available and to avoid locking-in to the wrong technologies and levers or sectors, and regardless of the 2030 ambition level:
processes. Not doing enough, or not anticipating correctly by 2030, will limit our
options in the future and simply ‘doing a bit more’ after 2030 will not work since
not all pathways will remain open. This study finds that to be on a trajectory to TRANSPORT POWER
net-zero by 2050, GHG emissions will need to be reduced from about 55–65%
compared to 1990 levels (including LULUCF) by 2030. By 2030, the focus must be to ensure transport Close to complete phase-out of coal. Wind
demand is stabilised to today’s levels, and that and solar should reach at least 50% of power
the modal shift away from cars has started in production by 2030, around 60% by 2050,
earnest. Car share should be down to 70% from and 75% of the demand-side management
The 2030 ambition needs to be increased to be in line with net-zero scenarios around 80% today. After stabilisation of demand (DSM) potential is being exploited by
and modal shift, vehicle efficiency is the third key 2050. About half of the flexibility needed
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])
lever in the short term, with efficiency needing to to compensate seasonal and daily
improve by at least 15% for cars and even beyond intermittency is covered by a mix of zero-
20% improvement for trucks. The support for carbon flexibility options (storage, inter-
1990 Zero-Emission vehicles (ZEVs) must be reinforced connections, biomass-firing), which reduces
5,411 so that Europe innovates in ZEV production and the the role of gas even as coal phases-out.
actual penetration in the fleet starts to increase at
a fast pace after 2030. Note that several countries,
including those with relevant automotive sectors, AGRICULTURE,
have announced bans on sales of new conventional FORESTRY
2018 2030 internal combustion cars, notably Ireland and
3,963 Slovenia (2030), and France and the UK (2040). The AND LAND USE (AFOLU)
Netherlands aims to have all new cars emission Before 2030 land-use must fully integrate
free by 2030. These can be effective policies to drive climate change considerations: policies
this shift. Charging infrastructure investment and and business models must be convincing
deployment is also crucial to drive the shift toward to restore degraded forests and to reforest
ZEVs. most surplus and abandoned land6.
Incentives should effectively support a
BUILDINGS change of agriculture practices to boost
land multi-use, stopping land degradation.
Significantly renovating 3% of the buildings each On average, in 2030, meat consumption
year with deep retrofits to improve energy efficiency must be reduced by 25% (and at least
to near-zero energy levels, and fully decarbonising halved by 2050) without increasing
Range of -55% to -65% in 2030 compared EU-REF16 heat by 2050 at the latest. Current annual consumption of dairy products. Trends are
to around -50% in the latest legislation renovation rates are below 1%. New constructions already going in this direction.*
EUCO30/30
(including LULUCF) must be energy-positive “smart” buildings already
-32,5 EE / in the decade to 2030 to avoid having to renovate
32 RES LEGISLATION* those again until 2050. FINANCE
Sufficient investments in innovation is a

€
INDUSTRY fundamental requirement for this economy-
wide decarbonisation, to accelerate lab-to-
By 2030, significantly reducing the demand market for innovative net-zero technologies
for materials and products (5-10% by 2030, and the co-development of new products,
above 40% by 2050) by boosting the functional businesses and services. These investments
economy(Increase the products lifetime by 5%), the can be shaped by the public sector
circular economy(Increase product utilisation by 5%, through flagship research and innovation
NET ZERO 2O5O switch to more efficient material (e.g., 8% of steel programmes like Horizon Europe, but also
switched to carbon fibres in automotive), reduced require the strong engagement of European
material intensity, increased share of recycled businesses.
F I G U R E 4 . GHG emission reduction range in net-zero scenarios compared to the EUCO materials), and associated innovation. While
scenario and the impact of the latest 32.5% energy efficiency and 32% renewables targets deploying best practices in industrial processes
(electrification, fuel switching) is expected to begin *https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/13.2-
based on the non-paper by the EU Commission development-in-consumption-of-2/assessment-1
soon, the adoption of new innovative technologies
is currently mostly expected in the 2030-2050 time
* This scenario is based on the latest « Non paper on complementary economic modelling undertaken by DG ENER regarding different energy policy
scenarios » and is using the 33% RES / 33% EE figure for 2030, with a linear interpolation from 2016, so it slightly overestimates the latest legislation horizon.

/14 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /15
 NET-ZERO PATHWAYS CAN COST
Many of the ‘net-zero’ choices will also take us closer to other goals Europeans
3 have set for themselves. A net-zero society can bring an attractive quality of life to
its citizens, with a wide range of additional benefits and lower costs – e.g., cleaner

LESS THAN BUSINESS-AS-USUAL air, less traffic and city congestion, better living environments, less money spent on
fuels and more on infrastructure and innovation in Europe, leading to a more resilient
economy with more and better jobs, more durable goods, higher biodiversity, and
AND BUILD A MORE PROSPEROUS, RESILIENT SOCIETY better forests.

Reaching ambitious GHG emissions reductions is economically attractive. If all Figure 6 shows how the latest estimates in the literature indicate that the difference
available levers are actioned, particularly on the demand side, the total energy in potential climate damages in a 2°C scenario compared to a 1.5°C scenario are
system costs (Investment costs + operational expenditures + fuel costs) will be foreseen to be much higher than the total costs of any scenario, low-carbon or not,
lower than in a business-as-usual scenario (here taken as the EU-REF16 scenario and whether more technology-focused or not. The many co-benefits identified are
from the EU Commission). Essentially a net-zero society uses its resources much also higher than the cost delta of the Technology scenario compared to the EU-
more efficiently across all sectors: products with longer lifetimes and increased REF16. Clearly the low-carbon transition is attractive “on average”, which does
asset utilisation (e.g., using fewer cars but using them more than the 5% of the not take away the complexity of the substantial investments required, nor the
time that is currently the case). Figure 5 illustrates these system costs in the strong variations in cost impacts across sectors. This can be addressed by having
Shared efforts scenario grouped by action type. It shows how strong the impact a vision and planning for a climate-proof, resilient and future-oriented society.
of improving the way our society is organised can be.

Total energy system costs are lower than climate damages Higher
Net-zero pathways can cost less than business-as-usual, and their difference to business-as-usual is lower than the than 3000
with a strong impact from the demand-side levers co-benefits that are reaped
Undiscounted cumulated total energy system costs by lever category [x103 billion €] [bn€/year]
150 See
clarifications
350 in footnote

EU-REF16
€79 BN
x103
IN 2050 2,260 1,910 2,410

NET 120

€64 BN
x103 EU-REF16 Delta Shared efforts Delta Technology
ZERO
Yearly monetised
(CTI reproduction) net-zero scenario net-zero scenario impact of
climate damages
2O5O AVERAGE UNDISCOUNTED YEARLY TOTAL
SHARED EFFORTS
COSTS BETWEEN 2015 AND 2050
SCENARIO

625
UNDISCOUNTED CUMULATED TOTAL ENERGY SYSTEM COSTS BY LEVER CATEGORY
X10 3 BILLION € 180 Health
Delta in yearly total
costs from EU-REF16 to 69 Energy security
+ €0, 8 B N +€2,5BN + €0, 5 B N €0, 2 B N Shared efforts and 131 Resources
Technology scenarios
Source: Yearly costs are from the EU-CTI 2050 Roadmap project,
co-benefits are derived from the COMBI project https://combi-
245 Economy project.eu/ and they are focused on buildings, transport and
150 industry efficiency so they should be taken as a minimum amount.
- € 9, 2 B N - € 9, 7 B N Figures specifically for health are from a study by DG Energy
(2018), and the impact from climate damages is based on EEA
report on “Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe
Social Societal Process Fuel switch Z o-carbon CCS/BECCS Yearly monetised 2016” and finally the article by Burke et al. in Nature « Large
patterns Organisation improvements and power potential reduction in economic damages under UN mitigation
-350 impact of various targets” comes to potential damages of US$ 20 trillions globally.
and energy electrification production
efficiency
co-benefits Taking today’s share of Europe in global GDP of ~17% this would
lead to a figure around EUR 3000 to 4000 billions, significantly
above the costs and investment requirements.

F I G U R E 5 . Difference in total system costs by lever group between the EU-REF16 and the Shared
efforts net-zero scenario F I G U R E 6 . Costs and investments compared to the potential impact of co-benefits and climate damages

/16 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /17
 The European project is about promoting peace and
European values, and supporting the wellbeing of its citizens.
It also seeks to contribute to global security, sustainable
development, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples7.

Climate change is a major threat to these aspirations. Rising

sea levels, melting ice, heavier precipitation and increased
coastal flooding, more frequent and intense heatwaves,
longer and more damaging wildfire seasons, droughts,
destruction of coral reefs and an increase in extreme weather
events are all already happening. The higher the global
temperature increase, the stronger will be these effects, and
the greater the consequences in terms of damage to homes
and infrastructure, disruptions to food supply, new threats
to health, destruction of biodiversity, geopolitical instability,
migration, to name just some. Scientists also warn of
dangerous tipping points.

Fortunately, it is still within reach to avoid the worst impacts

of dangerous climate change. The 2015 Paris Agreement8
set a collective goal of holding the increase in global average
temperature to ‘well below 2°C’ above pre-industrial levels,
but also making all possible efforts to achieve the goal of
1.5°C climate stabilisation.

Science increasingly confirms that achieving climate

stabilisation and avoiding catastrophic impacts of climate
change requires a peak in global greenhouse gas emissions
in the very near term, accelerated reductions to reach net-
zero by mid-century, and then to go negative, removing more
greenhouse gases (GHG) than we emit.

INTRODUCTION Pathways to net-zero emissions by mid-century (or even

earlier) in industrialised countries are a therefore pre-
requisite for meeting the Paris goals. Numerous countries
have already set goals consistent with this9, recognising
that the low carbon transition offers exciting possibilities for
positive economic and societal transformation.

The Carbon Transparency Initiative (CTI) 2050 Roadmap Tool

project takes the need to reach net-zero emissions by 2050
at the latest as its starting point, and explores the feasibility
and implications for the EU of reaching this objective.
Please see the preceding pages and Annex for details of the
methodology taken. The key conclusions are elaborated
below.

/18 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /19
 Several contrasted pathways lead to net-zero
GHG emissions by 2050.
The various scenarios developed with the model – both by the authors and by the
various organisations who tested and used the model – highlight that a variety of
routes exist to reach net-zero:

1 • Some scenarios rely on innovative technological or business model shifts, while

others emphasise changes to living and working patterns, enabled by political
incentives and societal innovation, including improving the way we use our land
and consume food and products.
• Some low-carbon pathways show a higher reliance on electrification, while

REACHING
others rely more on biomass.
• Some are more focused on leveraging the sinks available in the soil and forests,
while others rely more on sustainable bio-energy with carbon capture and
storage (BECCS), assuming large amounts of CCS can and must be deployed by

NET-ZERO GHG
mid-century.

EMISSIONS IN THREE MAIN NET-ZERO GHG EMISSIONS SCENARIOS

ARE USED IN THE REPORT AND AVAILABLE ONLINE

2050 IS FEASIBLE
More than 10 scenarios were modelled by the organisations who supported model
testing, while other scenarios were elaborated by the project team to explore the net-
zero opportunities and trade-offs. Out of these scenarios, three typical pathways were
selected to illustrate the conclusions of this report. All three reach net-zero emissions
by 2050.

BUT REQUIRES ROBUST ACTION 1. The “Shared efforts” scenario: A comparable level of effort is maintained across
sectors and levers, i.e. there is no emphasis on any specific mitigation option.

ACROSS ALL SECTORS, AND Where conclusions are illustrated in the text with only one scenario, it is the Shared
efforts scenario unless otherwise indicated.
2. The “Technology” scenario: Emphasises efficiency and innovative technological
WIDENING THE RANGE OF options by raising their ambition to the highest levels (e.g. energy efficiency,
electrification, hydrogen, CCS). It leads to -41% energy demand in 2050 (vs 2010).

LOW-CARBON OPTIONS USED 3. The “Demand-focus” scenario: Demand-side levers are used here to reduce the
overall demand further, e.g. for energy (-64% by 2050), products or meat, which
implies that technological levers can be reduced compared to the Shared efforts

FOR THE TRANSITION scenario.

These scenarios are used in the graphics of the report, but they can also be explored in
more details online. Additional scenarios are also available on the website.
One of the objectives of this work is to increase the analytical basis available to define
the adequate political framework for the low-carbon transition, increasing model
transparency, ease of use, the comparability of existing scenarios, and ultimately the
access of policy makers to the most useful information for decision making. In this
logic, a version of the model directly based on the full simulation model is accessible
online. This allows for the pathways used in the analysis to be explored in much greater
details, as well as to test additional pathways.
The webtool can be found at: https://stakeholder.netzero2050.eu
Hyperlinks are included as just above in the report text where relevant, so that readers
can easily navigate between the report and the three main scenarios online.

/20 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /21
 Even across these differences in focus, all pathways show many elements in Figure 8 complements the GHG emissions view with the impact on energy
common with clear no-regret actions across all sectors. Reaching net-zero GHG consumption of the net-zero scenarios for the various sectors, showing that the
emissions logically means that no sector can be left aside: all sectors will need industrial sector is the one with the largest variety of pathways to decarbonisation
to reach (close to) net-zero at some point before or shortly after 2050 to be in in terms of energy demand reductions versus supply-side solutions. However, all
line with the ambition stemming from the Paris Agreement. The reductions per scenarios rely on a significant reduction of energy consumption in all sectors.
sector in the analysed scenarios (based on the potential for all the abatement Figure 9 shows how these reductions are split across lever groups in the Shared
options identified) range from a minimum of about 65% reduction for the Efforts scenario, highlighting strong differences between sectors with societal
Agriculture and Waste sector to 100% for Buildings, Power, and Transport (see organisation levers being especially relevant in industry (circular economy) and
Figure 7). transport (modal shift).
Figure 7 also shows that if the natural sinks in the land-use sectors are properly
managed, they can remove some remaining emissions in 2050. With significant
efforts, the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) total carbon All scenarios highlight large energy demand reductions
sink could double by 2050 compared to 1990. An average net natural sink of [TWh/year]
around 584 megatonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) is reached in the scenarios
modelled by combining changes of agriculture practices, restoration of degraded
forests, and massive biodiverse afforestation of land spared by reduced livestock 2005 energy BUILDINGS*
and conservation policies. In our scenarios, this more than counterbalances the consumption levels INDUSTRY
remaining 138 and 235 MtCO2e respectively from the industry and agriculture TRANSPORT
Range of the 4.403
sectors. While this allows the industry and agriculture sectors to reach zero
3 net-zero 3.921 3.970
emissions a little later than the others, negative emissions will be required after
2050, which means the ultimate objective must be to reduce emissions to near scenarios in 2050
zero for these two sectors as well.

High ambition is required in all sectors, whatever the chosen pathway

-45% to -75% -51% to -68%
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e]) -57% to -62%
* Buildings is focused on the scope from
the Energy Performance Buildings Directive.
Taking into account the energy capture 1.695 to 2.648
from the ground or the air with heat pumps
the actual required demand for energy in 974 to 2144 1.273 to 1.951
Buildings is even down by -77% in the Shared
efforts scenario.

INDUSTRY F I G U R E 8 . Final energy consumption reductions by sector between 2005 and 2050 in the 3 net-zero
1.784 scenarios (Shared efforts, Technology, Societal organisation)
POWER
1.440
AGRICULTURE Key drivers of energy consumption reductions show
AND WASTE significant differences across sectors
TRANSPORT BUILDINGS
-89% 887
-99% 782 776
-68%
-92% BUILDINGS
-98% TRANSPORT INDUSTRY BUILDINGS EPBD-RELATED END USES

158 to 235 240 to 331 1% 8%

13%
2 to 47 0 to 127 0 to 30 -232 30% 25%
35%
37%
+135% 22%

-584 to -511 75%

1990 35% 92%
28%
Range of the ambition
in the 3 scenarios in 2050
LULUCF uel switch
Social Societal Process & 

patterns organisation Energy efficiency & electrification

See the detailed grouping of all levers in the Appendix: Brief methodology description

F I G U R E 7. GHG emission reductions (1990 to 2050) in the three scenarios

(Shared efforts, Technology, Demand-focus) F I G U R E 9. Share of the energy reduction in the Shared efforts scenario w.r.t. EU-REF16 in 2050

/22 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /23
 Figure 11 complements the sector view by showing the contribution to net-zero
of different lever groups. It highlights that widening the range of options being
used is key, putting more focus on changing the way we function as a society on
top of the more typical technical levers of efficiency, fuel shift and electrification,
as well as shifting to low-carbon energy supply and increasing potential sinks.
While more innovative technology-focussed pathways are shown to be feasible
(not illustrated here), this work brings forward the significant impact of citizens’
and political choices in terms of consumption patterns and the way society is
organised. It also shows clearly the large impact of circular economy principles,
The two figures below depict the GHG emissions reduction contributions in the with better product design leading to longer lifetimes, and the major trickle-down
Shared efforts scenario. It shows GHG emission reduction contributions starting effects these innovations have on the entire value chain. This makes reaching
from the 2016-EU REF scenario, with the impact by sector in Figure 10, and by net-zero in 2050 easier and more attractive as the energy system costs are lower,
type of lever in Figure 11. and the co-benefits increase, as will be highlighted in Section 3.

All sectors need to contribute to the objective, but their Social patterns, societal organisation and energy efficiency
contributions vary over time and depend on how ambitious are key to make it easier to reach net-zero
the business-as-usual is in these sectors (GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])

1990 1990
5,411 5,411

2018 2018
3,963
2030 3,963
2030
2,138
2,138

EU-REF16
EU-REF16
Power production

Social patterns
Transport
ocietal organisation
Oil & gas

Buildings Process improvements

and energy efficiency
Industry
Fuel switch and electrification
AFOLU Zero-carbon power production
CCS/BECCS
Land use sinks

NET ZERO 2O5O NET ZERO 2O5O

F I G U R E 1 0 . GHG emission reductions by sector in a Shared efforts net-zero scenario F I G U R E 1 1 . GHG emission reductions by lever types in a Shared efforts net-zero scenario

/24 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /25
 Figure 12 gives another view of the impact of lever groups by sector, and shows Increased innovation investments are essential
how the sectors differ in their focus. Transport and Industry leverage all types,
while Buildings is more focused on efficiency improvements and electrification. to bring key technologies and practices to
The figure also highlights the important impact each of the lever groups has on readiness and scale. (See below for a definition
the power sector.
of ‘innovation’.)
Beyond existing practices and solutions, a certain share of GHG emissions
All sectors rely on a variety of levers to reach net-zero, but the focus shifts reductions requires additional innovation. When we look at the abatement options
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])
in each of the sectors one by one and assess how advanced each technology
is and the readiness of society to implement them, our study finds that some
options still require further technical and societal innovation to bridge the gap
from about 75% reductions (versus 1990) to net-zero. There are grounds to
Buildings believe that it will be entirely possible to close this gap with the right commitment
as all solutions used in the scenarios are already beyond the labs and tested at
5,411 2,337 Transport
pilot scale, typically with Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) halfway to large
Power scale commercialisation. Some examples include: reaching a factor 10 in energy
3.074
efficiency in buildings is technically feasible but requires further innovation to
439 Industry
reach the massive scale required; e-fuels in transport are also technically feasible
970 -780 AFOLU today but it will only be scaled when their wider application in the relevant
-386
All sectors transport areas is clarified; and CCS-leveraging solutions exist today but need
433
to be scaled to reach commercialisation stages. Given the long lead times of
764 -851 innovation cycles, it is vital to set the right conditions to push these solutions
0
468 -516 -119 -75 from research and development through innovative product design and business
-274 model innovation, and then to be deployed at scale in EU economies.
1990 Impact of EU-REF16 Social Societal Process Fuel Zero- CCS/BECCS Land Net zero
EU-REF16 in 2050 patterns organisation improvements switch carbon use Shared efforts
and energy and electri- power sinks scenario in
efficiency fication production 2050

F I G U R E 1 2 . GHG emissions reductions in the Shared efforts scenario split by lever group and by sectors. DEFINING INNOVATION AND CONCRETE EXAMPLES
OF THE TECHNOLOGIES USED IN THE MODEL
• Innovation is understood as the concrete application of ideas that are
novel and useful for the low-carbon transition. Research and creativity
The transition is ambitious but technically feasible: can generate novel and useful ideas, processes, technologies, services, or
many initiatives are already taking place across techniques, but unless they are applied and scaled they remain at the idea
Europe but need to be stepped up significantly. level.
• This work does not address the research element, but focuses more on the
Many initiatives are already taking place across Europe in line with a very low-
Key initiatives across scaling of solutions that currently exist, either at niche or pilot level, or that
carbon society. Our model runs show that about 75% of necessary emissions
Europe are highlighted require further scaling to reduce costs.
reductions can be achieved by scaling up existing initiatives and best practices.
for each sector in
Strong and coherent political support to those initiatives, efficient experience- the section: “A short • Examples of the increased innovation required include: autonomous vehicles,
sharing, and increased European cooperation can clearly speed up the process overview of the key electric catenary systems for truck-based highway transport, large-scale
and help to reach the goals that have been set. The scenarios put forward are assumptions and deep retrofits (renovation reducing energy demand by a factor of 10),
based on expanding best practices that are already underway with incremental implications by Sector” extended functional economy, wide application of CCS across industrial sites,
improvement to make them more effective and cheaper. (Appendix) the management of variable renewable energy sources, and the extension of
vegetable alternatives to meat.
• Table 1 details further some of the key areas where increased investments
are required to unlock the GHG reduction potential in all sectors all the way
to net-zero.

/26 /NET ZERO BY 2050: Z

 SSIS ATHWAYS  



AI /27
 Initiatives such as “Mission innovation”, which seeks to significantly increase
clean energy research and development (R&D) in transformative clean energy
Net-zero requires increased deployment of existing efforts technologies, plus net-zero mission-orientation from both governments and the
and solutions, as well as upscaling the commercialisation and private sector, are a step in the right direction but require a solid legal and policy
deployment of new technologies and innovation in business models framework and joint follow-through from public and private entities together. In a
context where the EU should strive for 3% GDP dedicated to R&D, strengthening
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])
EU leadership on climate innovation appears essential.
-75% Recent work by the Stockholm Resilience Center supports the idea that the digital
INCRE ASING
E XISTING EFFO RTS revolution can support the transformation at hand. “Technology can directly
influence 30% of the emissions cuts needed by about 2030, and indirectly affect
the rest through influencing consumer habits, scaling up a sharing economy and
supporting business transformation to a circular economy.”10

IMPACT
OF
EU-REF16 Table 1. Examples of the increased innovation that
is required to reach net-zero in each sector
1990
5,411 -
INCREASED TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
EFFORTS -25%
Some transport modes do not have good The industry sector must reinvent itself,
A D D ITIO NA L
INNOVATIO N solutions that emit little or no carbon and the concepts of the circular economy
yet, such as air and sea transport. Levers
NET like biokerosene and e-fuels are still
must be converted to tangible innovation,
facilitating a functional economy and
- ZERO in development phases and it will be
extremely difficult to decarbonise transport
the reuse of material components and
raw materials. In addition, innovation
1.335 2O5O fully without them. Electrification of is required in production processes.
shipping and aviation is assumed to be at Biomass and hydrogen are good example
a very early stage, and will only take off of technologies that require additional
after 2040. Hydrogen alternatives for all research and support to become a reliable
vehicles also require further up-scaling and and competitive energy vector. CCS can
commercialisation. also have a huge impact, and net-zero
pathways not using CCS could go negative
Societal innovation needs to be encouraged
15% 10% to reduce the demand for transport,
later on with support of technology.
which requires changes in the way our
societies are organised, improvements
18% in shared transport systems and office
ENERGY SUPPLY
infrastructure (distributed work places), While renewables are on the rise in power,
as well as strong political signals to reduce it is clear that managing increasing levels
passenger aviation demand and favour of variable sources will require further
44% 12% local consumption. innovation, as well as a much stronger
energy systems perspective, linking the
Autonomous and shared vehicles are partly
electrification of demand to its supply.
technological and partly societal in nature,
System integration of demand and supply
with citizens needing to embrace these new
ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL FROM INCREASED variability needs to be researched further
alternatives without massively increasing
INNOVATION ACROSS SECTORS as the penetration of electric vehicles, heat
travel demand.
pumps, and variable renewable energy
sources will increase.

F I G U R E 1 3 . GHG emission reductions split between increased efforts, BUILDINGS

and additional innovation (see Table below) The key in this sector is to continue to bring AFOLU
down the cost of deep-retrofits – with
Meat consumption, particularly from
innovative and “people-centric” business
ruminants, is leading to significant
Some net-zero innovation will be technological and product-related, but much of it models (i.e., based on individual needs
emissions. New dietary options must be
will need to be focused on innovative business models, and some will be of a more for a building as a starting point rather
made available to increase the switch to
societal nature. Governments will need provide investment support for this, as well than carbon reduction as a starting point)
lower ruminant meat diets, with alternative
as put in place policies to ensure the legal framework and social fabric is there to and industrialisation – and to improve
sources of protein. Land multiuse must
its productivity by incorporating digital
support and receive these innovations. Societal innovation to be encouraged includes be further developed to improve soil
platforms and finding other ways to
ensuring that the potential of the shared economy is fully exploited; reducing the quality and spare land. This will leave
improve coordination in a fragmented
demand for transport through improvements in shared transport systems, and room for afforestation, which will again
sector. Innovation is also required for mass
improving office infrastructure (distributed work places). Other examples include require a significant shift from agricultural
heat sector decarbonisation.
to forestry practices. Large-scale
supporting changing diet patterns and reducing meat and dairy consumption,
afforestation will require societal changes.
requiring innovation in protein alternatives; or deeply coupling land-use and carbon
capture (massive afforestation + preservation of grasslands).

/28 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /29
 This study finds that reaching net-zero by 2050 requires
reducing GHG emissions in Europe by -55% to -65% from
1990 levels (including LULUCF) (Compared to 1990 level) by
2030. This means a significant increase in ambition from the
current 2030 target.
The 2030 emissions milestone of each pathway depends on its activated abatement levers in

2 terms of their nature (technological, societal, commercial) and implementation timing. This
leads to a range of 55–65% reduction versus 1990.
This compares to the current EU trajectory which leads to only 40% emissions reductions
(including LULUCF, 35% excluding it) in 2030. This means over 1 gigatonne of CO2 equivalent
(GtCO2e) in excessive emissions that year relative to the EU Reference scenario. It also implies

NET-ZERO GHG
an upgrade on the latest political ambition, with targets of 32,5% on energy efficiency and 32%
for renewables, which is estimated to lead to about 50% emissions (including LULUCF, 46%
excluding it) in 2030. That is 40 years after 1990, and still very far from what is required to set
Europe on the required trajectory to net-zero just 20 years later, and after the low-hanging fruits
will have been reaped.

EMISSIONS IN The 2030 ambition needs to be increased to be in line with net-zero scenarios

2050 REQUIRES
(GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])

1990

RAISING THE 2030 5,411

AMBITION LEVEL 2018

3,963
2030

TO LEVERAGE THE NO REGRETS

OPTIONS AND SET EUROPE
ON THE RIGHT TRAJECTORY Range of -55% to -65% in 2030 compared EU-REF16
to around -50% in the latest legislation EUCO30/30
(including LULUCF)
-32,5 EE /
32 RES LEGISLATION*

NET ZERO 2O5O

F I G U R E 1 4 . GHG emission reduction range in net-zero scenarios compared to the EUCO scenario and the impact
of the latest 32.5% energy efficiency and 32% renewables targets based on the non-paper by the EU Commission
* This scenario is based on the latest « Non paper on complementary economic modelling undertaken by DG ENER regarding different energy policy
scenarios » and is using the 33% RES / 33% EE figure for 2030, with a linear interpolation from 2016, so it slightly overestimating the latest legislation

/30 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /31
 The scenarios under consideration point to a set Delaying these “no regret” actions will increase the
of common short-term choices that need to be pace of emissions reduction required after 2030
prioritised without delay to keep the net-zero in order to reach net-zero by 2050, and result in
ambition within reach. higher total emissions over the period.
Examples of “no-regrets” options to prioritise between now and 2030 include: Figure 15 shows the trajectories required to reach net-zero based on various
ambition levels in 2030, which also has implications for the total emissions
emitted over the period, i.e., the carbon budget. Sticking to the EU-REF16
TRANSPORT POWER trajectory would emit about 131 GtCO2e between 2015 and 2050, while the
Shared efforts scenario would only emit 64 GtCO2e for the same period.
By 2030, the focus must be to ensure transport Close to complete phase-out of coal. Wind
demand is stabilised to today’s levels, and that and solar should reach at least 50% of power
the modal shift away from cars has started in production by 2030, around 60% by 2050,
earnest. Car share should be down to 70% from and 75% of the demand-side management
around 80% today. After stabilisation of demand (DSM) potential is being exploited by
and modal shift, vehicle efficiency is the third key 2050. About half of the flexibility needed
lever in the short term, with efficiency needing to to compensate seasonal and daily The latest legislation reaches ~-50% below 1990 GHG emissions in 2030
improve by at least 15% for cars and even beyond intermittency is covered by a mix of zero-
20% improvement for trucks. The support for carbon flexibility options (storage, inter-
(incl. LULUCF)* but falls short of the range of the 3 net-zero scenarios,
Zero-Emission vehicles (ZEVs) must be reinforced connections, biomass-firing), which reduces and emits more cumulatively
so that Europe innovates in ZEV production the role of gas even as coal phases-out. (GHG emissions, [MtCO2e])
and the actual penetration in the fleet starts to
increase at a fast pace after 2030. Note that
several countries, including those with relevant AGRICULTURE,
automotive sectors, have announced bans on FORESTRY 6,000
sales of new conventional internal combustion
cars, notably Ireland and Slovenia (2030), and AND LAND USE (AFOLU)
France and the UK (2040). The Netherlands Before 2030 land-use must fully integrate 5,000
aims to have all new cars emission free by climate change considerations: policies -31% -50% -55%
2030. These can be effective policies to drive and business models must be convincing
this shift. Charging infrastructure investment to restore degraded forests and to reforest 4,000 -60%
and deployment is also crucial to drive the shift most surplus and abandoned land11. -65%
toward ZEVs. Incentives should effectively support a
change of agriculture practices to boost 3,000
BUILDINGS land multi-use, stopping land degradation.
On average, in 2030, meat consumption
Significantly renovating 3% of the buildings must be reduced by 25% (and at least 2,000
each year with deep retrofits to improve energy halved by 2050) without increasing
efficiency to near-zero energy levels, and fully consumption of dairy products. Trends are
decarbonising heat by 2050 at the latest. Current already going in this direction.* 1,000
annual renovation rates are below 1%. New
constructions must be energy-positive “smart”
buildings already in the decade to 2030 to avoid FINANCE
having to renovate those again until 2050. Sufficient investments in innovation is a

€
fundamental requirement for this economy- 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
wide decarbonisation, to accelerate lab-to-
INDUSTRY market for innovative net-zero technologies
and the co-development of new products, CUMULATED GHG EMISSIONS
By 2030, significantly reducing the demand
businesses and services. These investments FROM 2015 TO 2050
for materials and products (5-10% by 2030,
can be shaped by the public sector [GtCO2e]
above 40% by 2050) by boosting the functional
through flagship research and innovation
economy(Increase the products lifetime by 5%), 131
programmes like Horizon Europe, but also EUREF16 until 2030, then linear to NZ
the circular economy(Increase product utilisation
require the strong engagement of European
by 5%, switch to more efficient material (e.g., 8% 82 32.5 EE / 32 RES, then linear to NZ *
businesses.
of steel switched to carbon fibres in automotive), 73 Technology
reduced material intensity, increased share of Modelled net-zero
68 Shared efforts
recycled materials), and associated innovation. *https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/13.2- scenarios
While deploying best practices in industrial development-in-consumption-of-2/assessment-1 64 Demand focus
processes (electrification, fuel switching) is
expected to begin soon, the adoption of new
innovative technologies is currently mostly
expected in the 2030-2050 time horizon.
* And -46% excl. LULUCF. This scenario is based on the latest « Non paper on complementary economic modelling undertaken by DG ENER regarding different energy
policy scenarios » and is using the 33% RES / 33% EE figure for 2030, with a linear interpolation from 2016, so it slightly overestimating the latest legislation

F I G U R E 1 5 . Required emissions reduction effort between 2030 and 2050 under various net-zero scenarios

/32 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /33
 Delaying these “no regret” actions also risks
creating lock-ins, stranded assets, and reducing
the set of emissions reduction options available.
Besides the climate science aspects, we also need to move fast practically
speaking. Some of the required investments have intrinsically long lead times,
so delaying them will mean some reduction options are lost in the required time
frame – risking that reaching net-zero by 2050 will not be possible. As much of
the relevant infrastructure has only one or two investment cycles still to come
before 2050, not taking firm action now in some sectors can reduce the impact of
certain options in the future, and risks locking in high-carbon options. Examples
include:
• Major investments are required in electricity infrastructures to produce,
transport and distribute renewable (and variable) energy sources. They also
need to facilitate further demand-side management. Major investments are
also required in hydrogen and biofuel distribution networks.
• Renovation of existing buildings should aim at making individual buildings or
clusters of buildings positive energy to avoid lock-in of the savings potential
and to reduce the overall cost of energy renovation programmes. Renovation
strategies should be sequenced appropriately such that energy efficiency
measures are targeted first, allowing appropriate sizing of the energy system,
for example, to reduce the scale of the challenge of decarbonising heat
supply.
• Similarly, GHG removal technologies need to be researched and scaled
further, otherwise the scope for negative emissions will be much reduced.
• Forests need to be restored and made more biodiverse/resilient before
temperatures rise further and fire risks threaten the carbon sinks.
The need for immediate action is true for levers requiring significant innovation
like CCS, but it also true for the societal organisation – or what are also called
“energy sufficiency” levers – that constitute a large part of the abatement potential
(as illustrated in Figure 11). For example, developing a large-scale functional
economy based on services instead of products, and designing innovative forestry
business models, will require significant policy intervention and investment. So
too will organising our mobility with the required infrastructure for reducing the
need for transport: enhancing the use of bikes and shared transportation will
certainly take more than 20 years to reach the scale required all over Europe,
unless energy sufficiency policies are put in place starting from now.
Clearly, the earlier and faster we move, the broader the options will be. The
more we wait, the higher the risks of locking in infrastructure and societal
organisation incompatible with reaching net-zero, except at the cost of
large write-offs of stranded assets. This highlights again how EU ambition is
disconnected with a net-zero trajectory: reaching net-zero in 2050 requires
much more ambition in 2030.
Moving faster is also a way to reap faster a large range of multiple benefits, and
open new opportunities. The next section will look at these co-benefits in more
detail, but many of these co-benefits are urgently needed.
Other reports commissioned by the ECF are producing higher levels of
granularity on certain sectoral issues and will complement the messages in this
report, particularly on some sectoral choices that were not explored in detail.
For example, the choice between a hydrogen or an electric infrastructure in
transport, heat pumps compared to district heating in buildings, pushing for a
higher solar- or wind-based electricity production mix, increasing demand-side
management at the expense of other flexibility solutions, etc. Forthcoming work
commissioned by the ECF includes the Energy 2050 project, the Agriculture
Vision, and the Industrial Transformation 2050 project. Photo by Bilfinger SE / CC BY 2.0

/34 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /35
 For the energy system, net-zero GHG emissions
pathways can be cost-negative in the medium to
long term, particularly if social and business model
innovation can be channelled to increase asset
utilisation.
In a “Shared efforts” net-zero scenario, investments increase by 20% up to 2030,
compared to an 8% increase in the EU-REF16. However much of that increase
is compensated by lower spending on fuel. Later, investment requirements
decrease below those in the EU-REF16 as the significant technical and societal
innovation that the low-carbon transition requires leads to lower requirements.
An overall net reduction in total system costs of around 20% is reached by 2050
(versus 2016).

3 The Technology-driven scenario, which has lower ambition on the more demand-
focused levers such as reducing transport demand, increasing vehicle utilisation,
and increasing the lifetime of products is shown below, and leads to a much
starker increase in investments of 68% in 2030 compared to 2016 (+55% versus
the EU-REF16), which is only partly compensated by fuel-cost reductions.

NET-ZERO EU-REF16 scenario

[bn€/year]
Shared efforts scenario
[bn€/year]

PATHWAYS CAN 3000 3000

COST LESS THAN

2000 2000

1000 1000

BUSINESS-AS-USUAL 0
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050
0
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050

AND BUILD A MORE PROSPEROUS, EU-REF16 scenario

[bn€/year]
Technology scenario
[bn€/year]

RESILIENT SOCIETY 3000 3000

2000 2000

1000 1000

0 0
2016 2020 2030 2040 2050 2016 2020 2030 2040 2050

Total FUELS OPEX CAPEX

For a clearer comparison of the impact of the levers, the same fossil fuel prices are assumed in the three scenarios shown in
Figure 16, while it is usually assumed that low-carbon scenarios should lead to lower fossil fuel prices.

F I G U R E 1 6 . Evolution of annual total system costs in the EU-REF16 (left)

and in Shared efforts and Technology net-zero scenarios (right)

/36 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /37
 Figure 17 illustrates the energy system costs in the “Shared efforts” scenario Discounting these figures does not lead to a change in the message, even if it
grouped by lever type. It shows how strong the impact from the demand-side does reduce the cost difference as discounting has a stronger impact on future
levers can be on the costs, particularly the impact of improving the way our society cash flows like later fuel expenditures in the reference scenario.
is organised, on the transport sector, and on the important investments required
in buildings energy efficiency. It also clarifies the impact of fuel switching (i.e.,
ZEVs, heat pumps, and some industrial processes)

Net-zero pathways can cost less than business-as-usual, Discounting shows a reduced delta as future fuel expenditures are
with a strong impact from the demand-side levers discounted more strongly than early investments, but the message
Undiscounted cumulated total energy system costs by sector and lever category [x103 billion €] on lower costs remains the same
[Cumulated total energy system costs, x103 billion €]

Buildings
Transport 79 -1 9%
Power
79
Industry 64
17
-9,2 0,8 2,5 0,5 0,2 64

-9,7 17

41

29
-1 1 %
25
6
6
22
15 11

EU-REF16 Social Societal Process Fuel Zero- CCS/ Net zero 2050
in 2050 patterns Organisation improvements switch and carbon BECCS - Shared
and energy electrification power efforts
efficiency production scenario
No discount 8% discount No discount 8% discount

EU-REF16 (CTI reproduction) Shared efforts net-zero scenario

F I G U R E 1 7. Total system costs evolution by lever group in the Shared efforts net-zero scenario F I G U R E 1 8 . Impact of discounting on total system costs in the Shared efforts and EU-REF16 scenarios

/38 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /39
 Beyond the lower overall energy system costs, the energy Many of the ‘net-zero’ choices will also take us closer to other goals Europeans
have set for themselves, and which are encapsulated in the SDGs (see box). A
transition supports the achievement of many of the United net-zero society is a positive and innovative society that can bring an attractive
Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to quality of life to its citizens, with cleaner air, less traffic and city congestion,
better living environments, less money spent on fuels and more on infrastructure
which the EU has signed up. These have significant positive and innovation in Europe. In turn this can lead to a more resilient economy with
economic impacts and all cost calculations must also be more and better jobs, more durable goods, higher biodiversity, and larger and
compared to those of avoided climate damages. healthier forests and forest ecosystems.

First, there is a major shift from spending outside of the EU to domestic spending. This is
one of the key drivers of the positive impact the net-zero transition will have on Europe in the
medium and long term. This is naturally related to an increase in energy sovereignty, with
important implications for the EU’s strategic position in the world.
On 25 September 2015, the UN General Assembly formally adopted the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, along with a set of 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Climate action features in it as a stand-alone goal,
Oil production, consumption and imported balance Goal 13, but most of the others are also intrinsically related with the actions
[TWh] proposed for moving towards a net-zero emissions society – for example
affordable and clean energy, health and wellbeing, decent work, industrial
innovation and infrastructure, sustainable cities and communities, natural
resource management and democracy.
0
The EU has committed to implement the SDGs both in its internal and external
policies.
-2000

-4000 EU oil production

EU oil consumption
Net imported balance for oil
-6000

-8000
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Gas production, consumption and imported balance

[TWh]

2000

1000

-1000

-2000 EU gas production

EU gas consumption
-3000 Net imported balance for gas

-4000
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

F I G U R E 1 9. Evolution of oil and gas imports in the Shared efforts net-zero scenario

/40 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT /41
 The required costs also always need to be compared to the cost of damages
caused by increased temperatures. The pathways highlighted would strengthen
Total energy system costs are lower than climate damages and their difference European leadership and bring us closer to avoiding some of these damages.
to business-as-usual is lower than the co-benefits that are reaped Figure 6 shows how the latest estimates in the literature indicate that the
difference in potential climate damages in a 2°C scenario compared to a 1.5°C
[bn€/year] scenario will be much higher than the total system costs of any scenario, net-
zero or not, and whether more technology focused or not. In summary, the costs
of climate impacts resulting from not taking action are far greater than the costs
of taking action.
Higher In addition to these potentially avoided climate damages, the many co-benefits
than 3000 identified are also higher than the cost delta of the Technology scenario
compared to the EU-REF16. In other words, investments in the energy system
are not only compensated by reduced fuel costs, they also bring a whole series of
co-benefits, which can arguably be said to be coming “for free”.12
150 See
clarifications
Clearly the low-carbon transition is attractive “on average”, which does not take
350 in footnote away the complexity of the substantial investments required, nor the strong
variations in cost impacts across sectors.

Implementing circular economy principles implies

2,260 1,910 2,410
significant changes in industry, but ultimately
brings added-value and resilience to the economy.
The choices in how we decarbonise the transport, buildings, and industry
120 sectors will define whether the total energy system bill increases or decreases,
EU-REF16 Delta Shared efforts Delta Technology Yearly monetised in both the short and long term. Indeed, changes in the way society is organised
(CTI reproduction) net-zero scenario net-zero scenario impact of and functions (together called “societal innovation”) will support a cheaper
climate damages technical transition:
• In transport, lower transport demand, autonomous vehicles, car sharing,
higher modal share, and occupancy rates in public transport all significantly
AVERAGE UNDISCOUNTED YEARLY TOTAL reduce the number of cars and road infrastructure required (See Figure 21),
COSTS BETWEEN 2015 AND 2050 which in turn leads to significant reductions in the investments required
in transport. It is worth noting that much of this reduced fleet is based on
autonomous vehicles, a trend that will increase with or without the low-
carbon transition. Co-benefits are also expected on well-being, traffic
625
congestion, and air pollution as described above.
180 Health • The circular economy and the functional economy bring costs down for
consumers while offering large innovation potential for EU industry. When
69 Energy security assets are provided “as-a-service”, their costs for the user are limited to
131 Resources when they are actually being used. For example, consumers will pay for their
car when they use it and avoid paying for it when it sits idle in a parking space
(as well as avoiding paying for the parking). The circular economy typically
245 Economy increases the lifetime of goods, thereby reducing the asset cost per year even
150
if maintenance costs can increase. For the producers, it will decrease the
production capacity requirements, while keeping similar revenues with higher
Yearly monetised valued-added assets.
-350 impact of various
co-benefits • Innovative business models need to emerge to ensure the focus is on the
Source: Yearly costs are from the EU-CTI 2050 Roadmap project, increased added value of products through services, lowering the volumes of
co-benefits are derived from the COMBI project https://combi-
project.eu/ and they are focused on buildings, transport and
goods sold while still supporting the European economy. There is tremendous
Delta in yearly total costs from industry efficiency so they should be taken as a minimum amount. room for an economy to develop in the design of products, in their
Figures specifically for health are from a study by DG Energy
EU-REF16 to Shared efforts and (2018), and the impact from climate damages is based on EEA maintenance and in the facilitation of a functional use of products.
technology scenarios report on “Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe
2016” and finally the article by Burke et al. in Nature « Large
potential reduction in economic damages under UN mitigation
• Coherent policies can shift capital from unnecessary to other longer-term
targets” comes to potential damages of US$ 20 trillions globally. infrastructure investments like in buildings energy efficiency or renewable
Taking today’s share of Europe in global GDP of ~17% this would
lead to a figure around EUR 3000 to 4000 billions, significantly energy electricity production.
above the costs and investment requirements.

F I G U R E 2 0 . Investments in the Shared efforts scenario compared to the impact of co-benefits

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 Table 2. Circular economy impacts on the industry
Impact of societal changes on the transport sector
Assumptions in the balanced scenario
NUMBER OF MATERIAL USE EMISSIONS AND VALUE PER MAINTENANCE
PRODUCTS AND COSTS ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT & SERVICES
COSTS & RISKS

TREND
Total transport passenger demand
[Bn km.passengers]
8,000

6,000 Number and technology mix of private cars (LDVs) in the Shared efforts scenario
Transport demand for LDVs [Mios of vehicles]
[Bn km.vehicles]
4,000 +1%
Fewer new Less material per Lower emissions More value per More revenues
2,000 4,000 400 products product and waste costs product (last
0 3,000
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
2,000
per product longer, better
1,000 utilisation)
Share of LDVs in transport passenger demand -51% 300
[Bn km.passengers] 0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
5,000
4,000
RATIONALE Changes in social Better product Less materials, less More R&D More maintenance
3,000
-27% 200 patterns and design, less emitting materials, investments per revenues
2,000 the impact of waste less emitting product
1,000 LDV utilization
the functional manufacturing More services to
[km per vehicle]
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 25,000 100 economy Less factory technologies Higher added increase asset
Evolution of LDV occupancy
20,000 capacity required value materials utilisation
+100%
[passengers per car] 15,000
3 10,000
5,000 0
2 0 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
+48%
1
The industry’s low-carbon transition will reorganise the competitive landscape,
0
Total by creating some markets and reducing other ones. Here are three examples,
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles with the first one illustrated in Table 3 below:
Electric vehicles 1) Interface is today the world leader of carpet tiles. It was originally a manufacturer
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles of fossil-based carpets, but set its “mission zero” strategy to include the switch
Gasoline and diesel vehicles towards selling a ‘carpet service’ providing carpet repair services, but also
manufacturing new carpets from more sustainable materials and less impacting
processes.
F I G U R E 2 1 . Number of private cars and their mix in the Shared efforts scenario,
2) Umicore made a complete turn around and developed markets by recovering
with the detailed model drivers
and recycling several metals.
3) Several European car manufacturers currently have a higher margin on
Ambitious decarbonisation options have a large impact on the whole value maintenance than on selling cars. In addition, European cars are repaired and
chain. They enable major benefits through better welfare, GDP, and employment maintained in Europe, while their components are not always manufactured in
outcomes. Net benefits are estimated at €1.8 trillion by 203013. Circular economy Europe. Negative trends are also expected in the automotive sector, especially
companies are already estimated to have a higher economic performance for the equipment suppliers of the car manufacturers. This is because a better
on average14 than their less efficient competitors. The major implications for design means not all the car needs to be replaced when one component has
manufacturers are summarised below. defects.

The lower materials requirements will require a transformation of industries but

does not have to translate into a loss of economic activity. Rather, economic
flows will reallocate to improve asset utilisation, reduce resource depletion,
and finance waste collection. It also enables industrial actors to shift to models
that are more resilient to fundamental trends: the need for cleaner industrial
production with less impact on the planet and human health, and the clear need
to price externalities like carbon emissions and other pollution. The front-runners
who manage that transformation properly will increase their market share and
reduce the burden of environmental taxes.

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 Table 3. Detailing how the levers in the CTI Industry sector The European industrial production is expected to decrease
are linked to circular economy principles, and illustrating by 2050 as a result from new consumption patterns, Steel
them with the Interface company example. business models and production technologies Chemical
Production volumes per sector [Mtonnes of production] Cement
9 11 Other industries
CTI INDUSTRY LINK WITH THE CIRCULAR INTERFACE COMPANY 492
LEVER ECONOMY PRINCIPLES15 EXAMPLE15 16
26 34
FUNCTIONAL Through the functional economy, the exchanges between Interface switched from product to 138 -22 12
ECONOMY consumers are facilitated, increasing asset utilisation. service by renting its carpets, with 46 -54%
This covers the following dimensions: Share, Re-use, operations to share, re-use, and 1
28
Redistribute, Refurbish, and Remanufacture. redistribute -93
36
Digitalisation trends supports theses exchanges. 31
138 15 7
LIFETIME The product lifetime can be increased through a better As part of its renting services, -110 21 4 0
8 0 2
design as well as through maintenance and prolonging Interface repairs its carpets to -40 53
-3
services. prolong their lives

MATERIAL Less finite resources are used through a better design. 167 79
INTENSITY
60
MATERIAL Use of materials which are less finite or which minimise Interface made carpets from
SWITCH the systematic leakage and negative externalities. biomaterials. 49 33
Interface recycles ocean waste to -225
RECYCLED Increased recycling, in case it is associated with a higher make carpets. 2015 EU-REF16 Social Product Process Fuel Production
value for raw materials, to lead to extracting waste (as modelled in and lifetime improvements switch and level in the
materials from the environment to create new products EU CTI) consumption /functional and energy electrification net-zero
(e.g. plastic carpets from ocean fishnets). in 2050 patterns economy efficiency scenario in 2050

PROCESS These are the levers which are furthest away from a pure Use of efficient technologies.
F I G U R E 2 2 . Production volumes per sector, in megatonnes SOURCE: (1) EURef, CTI2050, Climact analysis
circular economy principle but are still essential to reduce
ENERGY energy consumption and emissions further. High energy efficiency in processes.
EFFICIENCY

FUEL SWITCHES Use of renewable energy and Concretely, categories of levers 1b and 2 above correspond to a change of
biofuels. business model, not a loss of added value.
• Products with a longer lifetime have more added value and can be sold
CCS Currently not applied.
at a higher price. To facilitate the longer lifetime, more operations and
maintenance activities are foreseen. They also cause lower societal costs to
handle end of life waste and recycling.
• A functional economy delivers products with a higher utilisation rate. While
this reduces the number of products manufactured, it can also translate into
The EU CTI 2050 model used in the context of this study focuses on the first
a higher price per product. In addition, the functional economy will create
two columns of this table. It shows we can significantly reduce the amount of
service activity to handle the utilisation of the products.
materials that need to be manufactured. Figure 22 shows the cumulative impact
the demand side levers have across the whole value chain leading to significant • A lower material intensity is a process improvement that requires less
reductions on production volumes. materials per product, both through a better design and through a
manufacturing process generating less material waste.
• Material switch is a process improvement which covers the switching from
a more carbon intensive material to a less intensive one (over the product
lifecycle). Less carbon intensive materials typically have more added value
per tonne (e.g., carbon fibres).
The share of recycled materials increases by 70% to 36% of total material
production. This enables allocation of financial flows towards waste management,
instead of depleting further natural resources which are often imported from
outside of the EU. This in turn brings back the added value to Europe.

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CONCLUSION This project has explored different pathways to reach net-
zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest and finds that, not
only is it possible, but the future thus created may be very
desirable. The options put forward in this report have the
WHAT DOES THIS capacity to strengthen Europe’s economy, enhance wellbeing,
and give EU citizens the opportunity to move towards a more
MEAN FOR THE EU ? resilient society.

A goal as clear as net-zero can helpfully galvanise the

minds of policy-makers, businesses and citizens to unleash
creativity in terms of business models, working patterns,
lifestyle choices and urban design, as well as scaling up the
deployment of low-carbon technologies. Many of these shifts
may offer exciting possibilities for competitive edge, cleaner,
healthier cities and lifestyles, and enhanced quality of life.
Such a goal also reinforces the idea that this is a collective
challenge, to which all sectors and citizens must contribute.

With its Roadmap to a Low Carbon Economy from 2011,

the EU has already demonstrated the power of setting a
long-term, economy-wide vision to guide near-term policy
choices, and to help identify milestones for infrastructure
investment and other key decisions. Its existing 2030
targets are, however, derived from an 80% reduction in GHG
emissions by 2050. This will not be sufficient to achieve the
Paris Agreement’s goals.

The EU is currently preparing a revised long-term vision,

which it will need to submit to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by 2020. This is
therefore the right time to review this ambition, for which we
hope this project can offer a guide and inspiration.

/48 /NET ZERO BY 2050: ZERO EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO THE EUROPE WE WANT Photo by Jes / CC BY 2.0 /49
APPENDICES
SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE
KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS BY SECTOR

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 APPENDIX: INDUSTRY Product
design
For a same European activity, 26% fewer products need to be manufactured each year.
The products are of higher added value with a better design lasting on average 13%
longer. In addition, the use of functional economy enables to manufacture 13% fewer
products.

SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE A major material switch is undertaken: in land vehicles, 10% of steel is replaced by
carbon fibres, and 25% in airplanes; in buildings 10% of cement is replaced by plastics;
in appliances 5% of steel is replaced by plastics.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND The improved design and the use of more efficient materials enables reducing the
material use per product by 14% in steel, 26% in high value chemicals (HVC), 12% in

IMPLICATIONS BY SECTOR
cement, and 6% in other industries.

The share of recycled materials in new products increases to 60% for steel, 16% for
HVC, 45% for cement, and 44% for the other industries (These shares exclude the
The diversity of the scenarios tested by the authors and by the model testers shows that manufacturing waste recycling flows).
different emphasis and trade-offs are possible, be it across sectors or across change
drivers within sectors.
Processes New technologies are deployed: 25% of primary steel is manufactured through HIsarna,
The table below summarises the efforts required by the “Shared-effort” net-zero scenario. 18% of primary cement is manufactured through polymers.
The characterisation and definition of the drivers was itself the result of extensive
Within existing technologies, energy efficiency is improved by 5-45%.
consultation with experts. 2015 is the baseline year to compare with ambition levels.
Processes are further electrified, assuming a major use of resistive heating. 56-66% of
More information on this scenario can be explored online: The “Shared efforts” scenario. fossil fuels processes are substituted by electrification in steel, chemicals and other
(smaller industries).

Fuel switches are major. First 28% of the remaining coal and oil are replaced by gas
in HVC. Second, of the remaining fossil fuels, 22-48% are substituted by hydrogen (in
Table 4. Key actions in sectors to reach net-zero in the Shared efforts scenario oxygen steel, ammonia nitrogen and other chemicals, and other industries). Third, fossil
fuels processes are substituted at 15-62% by biomass (in in oxygen steel, chemicals
(HVA, ammonia, nitrogen), cement, and other materials).
TRANSPORT Passenger The car share decreases from 80% of passenger kilometres (km) to 56%. The passenger Emissions captured on manufacturing sites reach 53% for oxygen steel, 55% for HVC,
distance per vehicle doubles to 24,000 km/year, while the occupancy rate increases by 60% for ammonia and nitrogen, 60% for clinker cement, and 34% for other industries
20%. (assuming a capture rate of 85% on sites equipped with CCS).
82% of new cars are ZEV by 2050. Around three quarters of cars are fuel cell vehicles.
ENERGY Electricity Coal is phased out by 2035.
Freight The truck share decreases from 50% to 36% in 2050. SUPPLY production RES production reaches 75% of the power production by 2030 and 94% by 2050.
85% of new trucks are ZEV by 2050. 70% of the remaining gas (66% lower than 2015 level) is substituted by hydrogen.

From 2030 onward, 70% of new biomass plants and the remaining natural gas plants
BUILDINGS Envelope By 2025, people renovate their buildings at a rate of 3%/year compared to 1% today. are equipped with CCS.
and heating The average renovation depth (energy efficiency) reaches 75% on average by 2030.
efficiency Heat is fully decarbonised by 2050 at latest. Intermittency Variable renewable energy source production reaches 57% of the total by 2030 and 79%
and DSM by 2050. This is capped by the available network flexibility.

75% of the demand-side management potential is captured from 2025 onward.

Appliances Demand for electricity-dependant services is 13% lower in 2050 than in 2015 and
energy efficiency is improved by 46%. Several zero-carbon flexibility options cover the daily and weekly flexibility needs
& consumer (storage, inter-connections, biomass-firing). Seasonal flexibility is answered by zero-
goods The use of appliances increases by 70%. carbon dispatchable generation.

AFOLU Diets Diet must be improved and become healthier: calories consumption in 2050 should
be 8% lower than 2015 level, with the meat consumption per person halved without
increasing dairy products consumption. The share of ruminant meat decreases to
around 10% of the consumed meat (versus 20% in 2015)

Agriculture Maximum potential of waste collection is achieved: 50% on-farm food crops waste and
practices 80% of post-farm food waste are collected.

Yields increase by 28% in the same time period while minimising the use of nitrous
fertilisers.

Land use Maximum effort is done to stop land degradation.

24% less land is required to produce food thanks to multi-cropping and other changes
in agriculture practices (2050 versus 2015).

76% of all surplus land is afforested and 20% is dedicated to grasslands.

The forest harvesting intensity is lowered by 25% (2050 versus 2015) corresponding
either to an average intensity reduction or the set-aside preservation of 25% of EU
forests. The 2050 demand for sustainable bioenergy is met.

No additional dedicated biofuel/energy crops are necessary

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 Net-zero is possible - highlighting the feasibility by INDUSTRY Industry has already evolved to improve its process efficiency. To reach net-zero it must
sector. take a product lifecycle perspective, continue improving its process efficiency, and
deploy innovative technologies.
Our report highlights the feasibility of reaching net-zero but it does not dispute
the challenges that are inherent to all sectors if they are to fully decarbonise. We Most of the lifecycle reduction potential is behavioural. It is a) dependent on the
cover these two dimensions in the two tables below, the first highlighting the activities in the other sectors, leading a lower demand for products mainly in transport,
elements encouraging the feasibility of the required changes, and the second buildings, and consumer goods; b) relative to how the functional economy is embedded
detailing the additional elements of innovation required to reach all the way. in the norms, with a shared economy requiring less new products; and c) relative to a
more sustainable product design and access to a better maintenance, leading to longer
The transition is ambitious but feasible: reaching net-zero lasting, higher added value products, manufactured with less material and a higher share
does not mean we have to reinvent the wheel or fully disrupt of recycled materials.
all sectors A large potential also remains in the process efficiencies, mainly the technological
changes, the energy efficiency, electrification, and fuel switches.
There are many challenges to reach net-zero, but a large number of initiatives
are already taking place across Europe in line with a very low-carbon society. As we will highlight in the innovation section, three innovative technologies require major
These lessons and practices must be transferred to other areas and scaled up breakthroughs prior being rolled out: the transition to hydrogen processes, the use of a
to reach European scale. Sharing these and increasing European cooperation major and reliable biomass supply, and the use of BECCS and CCS.
can help achieving 75% of the needed GHG emissions reduction without any
breakthrough innovation. Most of the scenarios therefore require leveraging all We do not assume changes in the trade balance, because relocating the production
these best practices. The table below provides a short selection of them. outside Europe would reduce emissions in Europe, only to increase them in the other
regions.

ENERGY The net-zero scenarios show that power emissions must be reduced by between 90%
Table 5. Illustrating the feasibility across sectors based on existing initiatives SUPPLY and more than 100% with regards to 1990.
Renewables are on the rise in many European states and building new wind and solar
TRANSPORT A wide variety of new mobility initiatives is on the rise across Europe, with new fleets of has become cheaper than new conventional sources in most of them. Big market players
shared bike, electric scooters, and cars, with multi-modal apps supporting modal shift believe in and are re-structuring their business model around zero-carbon power
and autonomous electric vehicles putting a significant boost to this trend if the right production technologies. There are no investments planned in coal in the EU. Its phase-
conditions are met. out is a matter of timing, dependent on political ambition to design and reinforce the
appropriate policy instruments.
Beyond specific mobility initiatives, there are also other trends supporting working
from home and increasing the amount of smaller regional offices to avoid traffic jams. Solutions to deal with the variable nature of wind and solar are scaling up, in particular
Therefore, the assumption is that stabilising transport demand to today’s levels does not demand-side management solutions. From market players, zero-carbon flexibility
require massive social innovation. solutions to deal with variability are available. The challenge is on the appropriate market
design to allow these technologies to scale up. Seasonal storage remains the area where
What will require further technological innovation is to reach large decarbonisation in technology innovation is required. There too, small-scale initiatives are demonstrating
freight and particularly in air transport as described in Table 1 (p. 29) that hydrogen-electrolise can be combined with the deployment of wind, and the first
hydrogen-ready gas plants have already be proposed.
BUILDINGS The net-zero scenarios show that the total – i.e., not limited to the end uses scoped by
the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) – final energy consumption in Achieving the massive deployment of renewable energy sources allows to limit betting
buildings must to be lowered by 50–60% in 2050 with regards to. 2005, and emissions on new technology disruption, e.g., massive deployment of CCS. However, as we will
must be reduced by at least 90% or even 100% with regards to 1990. highlight in the innovation section, reaching negative emissions in the power sector
would require BECCS, and therefore both biomass and CCS deployment.
Energy efficiency ambition is fully aligned with some existing national renovation
strategies, e.g., the French and Walloon renovation strategies target the renovation of
AFOLU There is a rising trend towards healthier diets, and the levels we use in our ambition
all the buildings stock at low-consumption levels by 2050. Examples of factor-10 energy scenarios match World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations. Also, meat
renovation are rising on all buildings typologies and in all countries. To help scale this consumption is already decreasing in several EU Member States, and vegetarian
up, many cities are experimenting with deep building retrofits initiatives, testing new alternatives to meat and dairy are appearing.
business models and industrial practices to make this cheaper and less cumbersome for
citizens. Land multiuse is a key lever of land-use, but with the increasing pressure on polluting
fertiliser alternatives, there are a lot of promising agro-ecology experiences taking place.
Besides energy efficiency, many cities have already pledge for zero-carbon heat. The
region of Upper Austria has pledge for 100% reneable energy sourced heat by 2030, and As for the large afforestation and forest restoration required, no significant technical
Denmark targets it by 2050. innovation is required, and, when based on biodiverse species, it brings several co-
benefits (biodiversity, landscape, recreation, flood, fire, and erosion prevention,
harvested wood products).

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 Scenarios based on levers with ambition levels
APPENDIX: To simulate a pathway, users change the inputs to the calculator by making
choices using a number of “levers” (six macro levers that can be decomposed

BRIEF METHODOLOGY into more than 100 sub-levers). These levers typically make a change in either the
supply or demand of energy in a particular sector, for example building nuclear
power stations, or reducing the distance people travel by car. We can take as an

DESCRIPTION example the table below for the proportion of people travelling by car. The levers
are described transparently, are exclusive, and can be moved freely by the user
within the defined range.
BACKGROUND OF THE CARBON TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE (CTI) MODEL Table 6. Ambition definition – example for buildings renovation depth
The Carbon Transparency Initiative (CTI) helps decision makers within the
climate community project and track progress toward a low-carbon economy by AMBITION -2 Minimal abatement
analysing the drivers of emissions trends. It has three components: a) models, b)
tracker, and c) advisory services. We only describe the models in this appendix. Current depth: application of low cost or easy to implement
measures resulting in a 20% average energy savings versus
The CTI models determine GHG emission pathways up to 2050 across all sectors
consumption before renovation.
of the economy for select geographies. The analyses in this report are built on the
European component of the CTI, which has been developed by the ECF with the
AMBITION -1 Mildly ambitious
support of Climact.
Factor 2 energy renovation observed in current initiatives
OVERVIEW OF THE CTI MODEL is deployed. This results in a 50% average energy savings
versus consumption before renovation.
Sectors and links between them
The European model covers the following sectors, as illustrated on Figure 23 : AMBITION +1 Ambitious
Lifestyles, Food production, Transport, Buildings, Manufacturing, Energy supply,
Factor 4 energy renovation corresponding to best-practice
Land-use, Fossil fuels-use, and Trade balance outside the EU. In addition to GHG
policies and initiatives is deployed. This results in a 75%
emissions, it covers Energy, Resources & Costs pathways. The model is driven by
average energy savings versus consumption before
‘lifestyle’, ‘technology’, and ‘physical’ changes and allows a high flexibility in the
renovation.
simulation of pathways. The model can be classified as a directed graphs model
(a simulation model without optimisation) calibrated with effort ambitions.
AMBITION +2 Very ambitious
Factor 10 energy renovation achieved in pilot projects is
scaled up. This results in a 90% average energy savings
versus consumption before renovation.

Demography, economy and lifestyle assumptions

Economy, fuel prices Lifestyle Demography
Diet To determine the ambitions of each lever, the model provides two interfaces. In
Fossil fuel prices Travel demand, mode & occupancy
Model core
Demography the simple interface, one single slider (lever) enables to choose one of the four
Economy evolution Compactness of buildings Urbanization trends
Appliance use, product demand ambitions, or an intermediary position. In the Expert mode, we enable to specify
independently 1) a target, 2) a start period, and 3) an implementation duration.
Demand activity input
A combination of all the lever choices creates a scenario. The model outputs for
Technologies, Energy & Resources Trans-boundary effects,
Trade, & Flows a given input scenario are named “pathways” because the focus is on the final
Food Energy requirements by sector Energy supply impact and overall evolution trend (we would name the scenarios “trajectories”
production Buildings Manufacturing
Transport if the milestones were detailed and the trajectories were operationalised in more
Pa s senger Commerci al Res idential Commercial Product Design Electricity production
Outside the EU
Livestock Tra ns port Technologies Hea ting technologies Ma teri als production Heat production depth). For each pathway, the calculator displays the implications over time (for
Crops Appl iance efficiencies Transport & Distribution
Storage
Food example, in terms of energy, emissions, resource use, job creation, and land-use).
Energy
GHG
Impact on resources Materials & resources

Land Fossil fuels

Land allocation Fossil fuel reserves
Forestry
Biomass

F I G U R E 2 3 . Impact of the lever groups on the energy system costs

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 PROJECT SCOPE
Coverage
The model assesses the following dimensions: Emissions, Energy, Resources
such as land and materials, and Trade balances. It also provides a good view on
the direct cost implications (capex/fuels/other opex).
The model supports the development of scenarios based on realistic and
transparent assumptions. It is based on an open and dynamic model, with an
online version to increase reach and use.
The assumptions and interpretations result from the engagement of a wide
group of experts on sector findings. The sector findings include the identification
of the key decision points, and of timing implications.
The emissions scope encompasses all sectors of the economy and all GHG
emissions sources covered by national inventories (including international
aviation, shipping, and LULUCF).

Exclusions
The model does not leverage an equilibrium models nor an optimisation engine. It
does not cover macro-economic analysis or climate change co-benefits. Societal
cost could not be covered, nor the allocation of taxes and subsidies to certain F I G U R E 2 4 . CTI tool web interface (available on stakeholder.netzero2050.eu )
actors.
Scenarios are not projections, and the project does not include the choice of an
ideal scenario.
Robustness and development process
Why it is helpful The model results from a large co-construction process. Sectorial workshops
have been conducted with experts. In addition, workshops have been performed
It provides a recent and credible analysis of net-zero scenarios across multiple on the scope validation, on the architecture and usability. Finally, workshops have
sectors. been conducted to collect feedback from beta-testing organisation. To make this
There is currently only a limited amount of net-zero pathway analysis. The traceable, key assumptions have been transparently documented.
project is backed by numerous experts and recognised organisations. The model Links to other existing scenarios. The model’s robustness is also ensured
provides a common discussion framework and several of organisations even by providing the output of scenarios from other models such as the Regional
proposed their scenarios. Reference Frame Sub-Commission for Europe (EUREF).
The model brings value to the current debate by linking all emitting sectors and
clearly highlighting high level trade-offs between sectors.

It provides a complementary approach to PRIMES or TIMES

Compared to PRIMES or TIMES, the CTI model:
• Is more open and transparent, and simpler to use. The model is accessible
either through an Excel file or through the web interface (see Figure 24). Both
provide instant results. All key assumptions have been detailed.
• Can reproduce existing scenarios and compares the outputs and ambitions.
• Provides a harmonised logic across all sectors; starting from 1) behaviour
activities, to 2) product demand, to 3) material & resources demand, to 4)
energy, and to 5) emissions. This leads to novel links, like the impact of eating
habits on land requirements, or buildings renovation on material demand.
This also leads to novel action points, like the impact of a functional economy
or material shifts.
• Addresses land-use and other sinks, clarifying their joint impact directly.

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 LEVER GROUPINGS RESIDENTIAL Compactness

Floor area requirements 1.a Social patterns

Table 7. Full list of levers with the related group it belongs to
Household size 1.a Social patterns
Residential buildings efficiency
TRANSPORT Energy efficiency
Renovation depth 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
GENERAL Cars 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
LEVERS Renovation rate 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Trucks & Buses 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Demolition rate 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Rail 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Decarbonising heat
Navigation 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
In new built 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Aviation 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
In renovated 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Biofuels
In remaining buildings 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Road transport 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Mix of low-carbon heating technologies
Aviation 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Heat district technologies 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Shipping 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Individual RES-based technologies 3. Fuel switch and electrification
E-fuels (if not electrified or shifted to H2) 3. Fuel switch and electrification
… of which individual heat pumps 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Shipping electrification 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Appliances utilisation and efficiency
Short-haul flights electrification 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Appliance utilisation growth rate 1.b Societal organisation
PASSENGER Land transport demand 1.a Social patterns
Appliance standards 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
TRANSPORT Aviation transport demand 1.a Social patterns
Electrification of cooking 3. Fuel switch and electrification
LEVERS Modal share
SERVICES Floor area requirements 1.a Social patterns
LDV 1.b Societal organisation
Services buildings efficiency
2W 1.b Societal organisation
Renovation depth 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Bus 1.b Societal organisation
Renovation rate 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Passenger vehicles utilisation and occupancy
Demolition rate 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Utilisation rate 1.b Societal organisation
Decarbonised buildings
Occupancy 1.b Societal organisation
Decarbonising heat in new built 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Technology evolution
Decarbonising heat in renovated 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Technology share LDV - ZEV 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Decarbonising heat in remaining buildings 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Share of FCEV in ZEV 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Mix of low-carbon heating technologies
Technology share LDV - LEV 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Heat district technologies 3. Fuel switch and electrification
FREIGHT Freight transport demand 1.b Societal organisation
Individual RES-based technologies 3. Fuel switch and electrification
TRANSPORT Modal share
LEVERS Trucks 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
… of which individual heat pumps 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Appliances utilisation and efficiency
Rail 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Appliance utilisation growth rate 1.b Societal organisation
Aviation 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Appliance standards 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Maritime and IWW 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Electrification of Other uses in services 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Freight vehicles utilisation and load factor
Utilisation rate 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Load factor (ton.km/vkm) 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Technology evolution
Technology share HDV - ZEV 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Technology share HDV - LEV 3. Fuel switch and electrification

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 INDUSTRY EU Activity (consumer goods) 1.a Social patterns POWER EU coal phase out 4. Zero-carbon power production
Product lifetime/Functional economy EU nuclear context 4. Zero-carbon power production
Transport 1.b Societal organisation vRES framework 4. Zero-carbon power production
Buildings 1.b Societal organisation Zero-carbon flexibility options 4. Zero-carbon power production
Power 1.b Societal organisation Biomass contribution 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Agriculture and Others 1.b Societal organisation Natural gas to H2 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Share of product manufactured in EU Carbon Capture & Storage 5. CCS/BECCS
Transport 1.b Societal organisation AFOLU
Buildings 1.b Societal organisation DIET Calories consumed 1.a Social patterns
Power 1.b Societal organisation Quantity of meat 1.a Social patterns
Agriculture and Others 1.b Societal organisation Type of meat 1.a Social patterns
Product material switch EFFICIENCY Crop yields 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Transport 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency Livestock intensification(grains/residues fed) 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Buildings 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency Livestock (pasture fed) 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Material intensity Bioenergy yields 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Steel 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency Wastes and residues 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Chemical 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency LAND Solid or liquid 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Cement 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency Surplus land (forest & bioenergy) 6. Land use sinks

Other industries 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency Land multiuse 6. Land use sinks

Recycled materials ratio Land degradation 6. Land use sinks

Steel 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency EU self-sufficiency in food 1.b Societal organisation

Chemical 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency EU self-sufficiency in meat 1.b Societal organisation
Add dedicated energy crops ? 6. Land use sinks
Cement 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Forestry intensity 6. Land use sinks
Other industries 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Share of materials manufactured in EU
Steel 1.b Societal organisation
Chemical 1.b Societal organisation
Cement 1.b Societal organisation
Other industries 1.b Societal organisation
Processes (incl. EE, switch to gas & electric)
Steel 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Chemical 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Cement 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Other industries 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Switch to hydrogen
Steel 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Chemical 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Other industries 2. Process improvements and energy efficiency
Switch to biomass (incl. CCU)
Steel 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Chemical 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Cement 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Other industries 3. Fuel switch and electrification
Carbon Capture & Storage
Steel 5. CCS/BECCS
Chemical 5. CCS/BECCS
Cement 5. CCS/BECCS
Other industries 5. CCS/BECCS

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 ABOUT THE PROJECT
PROCESS
This paper is the outcome of a year-long effort of deep analytical work and
active stakeholder engagement. It builds on the model developed as part of
the Carbon Transparency Initiative (CTI) by the ClimateWorks Foundation and
has been extended and upgraded for Europe with the support of the European
Climate Foundation (ECF), in consultation with other experts in the field. This
consultative process took place between September 2017 and September 2018,
and was concluded over the summer of 2018 with the testing of the model by a
range of experts who have developed their own low-carbon scenarios to explore
and develop the policy options under consideration.

OUTPUTS
The CTI 2050 Roadmap Tool project has two major outputs:
This Report and Summary for Policy Makers, which provide a perspective on the
feasibility and the implications of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 at the
latest. It describes the key changes required and highlights potential net-zero
trajectories and their implications in terms of both costs and co-benefits. This
is intended as an input to the preparation of the European Union (EU)’s Long
Term Strategy, as required under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. It also gives
a perspective on near-term actions needed to get on track to net-zero, which
has relevance for ongoing discussions on EU Member States’ National Energy
and Climate Plans required under the EU Governance Regulation, and the EU’s
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.
A webtool version of the model featuring:
• A range of scenarios that online users can explore to better understand the
results.
• An option to switch to a live version of the webtool, which stakeholders are
invited to use to explore, design, and propose their own pathways.
• These are available at: https://stakeholder.netzero2050.eu
• Sectoral presentations to explain the assumptions and model logic in more
detail.
• These can be found at: https://europeanclimate.org/net-zero-2050/

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 ENDNOTES
1. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
2. Including: Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden, New Zealand, Norway,
and Portugal. Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Portugal – as well as
thirty-two cities – have signed up to a statement to develop long-term pathways to transition
to net-zero emissions as part of the carbon neutrality coalition.
3. Note on innovation: According to formal definitions, the points discussed above – scaling
up deployment of existing commercially available solutions and increasing the uptake and
technology readiness of other known solutions – can be referred to as ‘innovation’, and as
requiring ‘innovation support’. An informal understanding of the word ‘innovation’ may however
risk misinterpretation that the solutions required to reach net-zero are as yet unknown. Our
research finds that this is not the case. To avoid possible confusion, the concept of innovation
is not used extensively in the Executive Summary but detailed further in the body of the text.
We refer readers to the text around Figure 13 p21 where there is a more thorough and precise
discussion of what is implied.
4. See the details of the EU Reference Scenario 2016 and the EUCO scenarios at https://
ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-analysis/energy-modelling, and the non-paper on increased
energy efficiency and renewables targets as summarised and downloadable in the following
Euractiv article https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/leaked-eu-analysis-makes-
case-for-higher-renewables-energy-saving-goals/
5. In this report, ‘no-regret actions’ are defined as emissions reduction actions that are common
to all our net-zero scenarios and hence appear as “must do” irrespective of chosen pathway.
This definition may differ from other studies where “no-regret” means having a short financial
payback or a negative marginal abatement cost.
6. Afforestation/reforestation being based on a mix of species guaranteeing high biodiversity.
New forests must also not lower the albedo of the land in order to avoid a negative net climate
impact.
7. Article 3, Treaty of Lisbon: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT&from=EN
8. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
9. Including: Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden, New Zealand, Norway,
and Portugal. Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Portugal – as well as
thirty-two cities – have signed up to a statement to develop long-term pathways to transition
to net-zero emissions as part of the carbon neutrality coalition.
10. Exponential climate action roadmap : http://exponentialroadmap.futureearth.org/report/
11. Afforestation/reforestation being based on a mix of species guaranteeing high biodiversity.
New forests must also not lower the albedo of the land in order to avoid a negative net climate
impact.
12. It is worth mentioning here that the Calculating and Operationalising the Multiple Benefits of
Energy Efficiency in Europe (COMBI) project was focused on energy efficiency, which means it
is a conservative estimate of the co-benefits that the full low-carbon scenarios would lead to.
13. From McKinsey, Europe’s circular economy opportunity, September 2015. The EU Commission
also published a report on “The Circular Economy, a win-win situation” highlighting savings of
€600 billion for EU businesses, equivalent to 8% of their annual turnover, creation of 580,000
jobs, and reduction of EU carbon emissions by 450 million tonnes by 2030.
14. Wageningen University, Business performance in the Dutch Circular Economy, 2017
15. Interface is a carpet manufacturer. Carpets were originally made from fossil fuel plastics and
generated a large amount of waste. Source: Ellen McArthur, Interface

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 O
https://europeanclimate.org/net-zero-2050/
[email protected]