Name Sankalp S Ramteke

Roll no 97

Class LLB 3 yrs V SEM

Assignment of Professional Ethics

In Re: D An Advocate Of The Supreme ... vs Unknown - AIR 1956 SC 102

Case Name: An Advocate of the Supreme Court of India v. Unknown Citation: AIR 1956 SC 102

Parties:

An Advocate of the Supreme Court of India

Unknown
Facts: The Advocate of the Supreme Court of India filed a complaint against an unknown person
who had sent a defamatory letter to the Chief Justice of India. The complaint stated that the
unknown person had sent a letter containing false and malicious statements regarding the
Advocate's professional conduct and reputation, which had caused harm to his professional
standing.

Facts in Issue:
The issue in this case was whether the complaint filed by the Advocate of the Supreme Court of
India was maintainable against an unknown person.

Order:
The Supreme Court of India held that the complaint was maintainable as the Advocates of the
Supreme Court of India are entitled to maintain actions for defamation of their professional
reputation, even if the identity of the person who made the defamatory statements is unknown.
The court stated that a complaint can be made against "Unknown" if the circumstances of the case
make it impossible to discover the name of the person who made the defamatory statement.

Explanation:
In this case, the Supreme Court of India considered the question of the maintainability of a
complaint for defamation against an unknown person. The court held that the Advocates of the
Supreme Court of India are entitled to maintain actions for defamation of their professional
reputation, even if the identity of the person who made the defamatory statements is unknown.
The court further stated that a complaint can be made against "Unknown" if the circumstances of
the case make it impossible to discover the name of the person who made the defamatory
statement.

This case is significant because it recognizes the right of Advocates of the Supreme Court of India
to maintain actions for defamation of their professional reputation, even if the identity of the
person who made the defamatory statement is unknown. This ruling serves as a protection for the
professional reputation of lawyers and helps ensure that they are able to effectively defend their
reputation in cases of defamation.

. J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikaram and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 244

 Subsequently, matter was heard by a three judge bench of the HC and they held that the charge
against the appellant i.e. that he did not pay over the money was clearly made out and held him
guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him from practise.

Appellant (lawyer) preferred a SLP under Article 136 challenging the decision.

Issues and Decision

Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for
inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against the appellant.
Section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act lays down that upon receipt of a complaint, by a court,
or Bar Council or any person, as to the conduct of an Advocate, the HC (if it does not summarily
reject such complaint) refer the case for inquiry to the Bar Council, or after consultation with the
Bar Council to the Court of the District Judge.

Held – matter is a question of fact; the matter was not agitated before the HC at the time of hearing
or at the time of applying for certificate to appeal before the SC under Article 136. Thus Court
declined to look into the factum of whether or not such a consultation had taken place, and if it
did not then why it did not etc. even if the section was

mandatory. Presumption of legality of judicial and official acts – absence of explicit statement in
the order of reference u/s 10(2) to the Dist. Judge about consultation with Bar Council did not
automatically prove that there was no consultation.
Complaint filed by respondents – not signed or properly verified per relevant HC rules –
dissimilarity of signatures of respondents – the petition was not filed by the
respondents but by someone inimical towards the Appellant.

Held – objection considered frivolous and dismissed

As the complaint against the lawyer was misappropriation of money, the court should have asked
the complainants to prosecute the appellant for the same and not initiated action against the
lawyer u/s 10.

Held – without going into the substantive law presented, the court stated that the object of a
proceeding in respect of professional misconduct differs from others – proceedings under the Bar
Councils Act are taken to ensure that the highest standards of professional conduct are maintained
at the Bar – such proceedings designed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure
that a person does not continue in practice who by his conduct has shown that he is unfit to do so.
Other proceedings for the purpose of enforce the law and punish the offender. Although court
accepted that if ordinaryproceedings were initiated against the erring lawyer and he was acquitted,
there would be no scope for a charge of professional misconduct on the same facts.
Discretion in deciding how to treat such complaints – not beyond the jurisdiction of the court to
proceed with enquiry for professional misconduct when the charge against him is an offence under
ordinary criminal law – misconduct in this case intimately connected with duty of lawyer to his
client in his professional capacity.

Stephens v. Hill - if the attorney has been guilty of something indictable in itself but not arising out
of the cause (in which he is engaged professionally) the Court would not inquire into that with a
view to striking him off the roll but would leave the party aggrieved to his remedy by a criminal
prosecution.

Procedural irregularity - mode in which the case against the appellant was

conducted - evidence on behalf of the complainants was permitted to be led after the appellant
had examined himself and it was urged that thereby the complainants had been afforded an
opportunity of filling up any lacuna in their case.

Held – dismissed

Pl. No. 4 (Kagga Veeraiah) had admitted that he and the other Pl.’s had received the proceeds of
the cheque and the HC was wrong in finding against the appellant Held – case of the complainants
that 4th Pl. (Kagga) died in 1957 – man produced as Court Witness No. 7(CW 7) claiming to be
Kagga and stating that the money had been paid was an impersonator – death certificate of Kagga
produced – cross examination of

the CW 7 was unsatisfactory; either CW 7 was an impersonator or being the real Kagga he was lying
– SC did not interfere with the HC’s appreciation of this fact.

Punishment of 5 years too harsh

Held – punishment given too lenient in view of misappropriation of client’s money and bringing
false evidence - refused to change the punishment.

Bar Council of Maharashtra v/s M.V. Dabholkar: A Conundrum of Professional Misconduct

Bar Council of Maharashtra v/s M.V. Dabholkar: A Conundrum of Professional Misconduct
By Ashish Dash | Views 30043
Case Facts:
The State Bar Council, referred to as the local Appellant, has lodged a complaint with the Bar
Council of India, which is one of the respondents. The roots of this complaint can be traced back
to the time when the staff meeting was evacuated by potential defendants to enter the
Magistrate's Court, to seize their files, which often led to a physical dispute, and to plead guilty.

This misconduct has shocked the public that the Maharashtra High Court has filed a complaint with
the Bar Council of Maharashtra. The disciplinary committee of the Maharashtra Legal Council, as
provided under Section 35 (1) of the Advocates Act, 1961, recommended that the case be
dismissed. By examining the matter, and because of its multiplicity, all 8 cases files were tried
simultaneously as a unified process and were rejected by the same decision by the Disciplinary
Committee of the Legislative Council of India.

One such respondent, A. K. Doshi argued that:

the decision of the Legislature did not mean that we had reason to believe that the lawyers
involved were guilty of misconduct in the workplace.

The Court argued that:

the need for a 'reason for believing' could not be construed as a legal necessity, as it is a barrier to
dealing with trivial questions. It is clear from the decision of the Legislative Council, in which he
said that he had considered the complaint and decided to refer the matter to the disciplinary
committee, that he had reason to believe, as prescribed by law.

The Disciplinary Committee of the State Legislature considered the nature of the acts as
misconduct in the workplace, suspending the students for three years. An application was lodged
with the appellate court, the Bar Council of India, which, in terms of Section 37 (1), referred the
matter to the Disciplinary Committee for further investigation. The Bar Council of India amended
the order passed by the State Bar Council on the grounds that the alleged acts "do not cross the
line of misconduct in the workplace". This decision was based on a three-point formula that
attorneys must have:
the application function;
to another person and (iii) in respect of a case.
It would not be an understatement to think that all three of these things would be enough to justify
one's actions or behavior. Released by a decision of the Bar Council of India, the State Bar Council
went to the Supreme Court to make amends for the loss, under the conditions set out under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. This is why the current appeal took place.

Main Issues raised

Whether the prosecuted practitioners are guilty of professional misconduct?
Whether the State Bar Council is considered an aggrieved party since it has suffered any legal
grieving and since the Bar Council of India has not deprived the State Bar Council of anything?
Analysis:
Before I begin with the analysis of the case, it will be appropriate to quote a paragraph from Clause-
25 of the Contract, which reads as follows:
There is a decision by the Judiciary to consider the appeal and then decided to refer to the
disciplinary committee, that it had reason to believe that, as determined by the proclamation, such
a tribunal, which has so far been concerned, is fully compliant with the defendant in a joint case
against the common disciplinary proceedings. [1]

A strategy that is confusing and discriminatory as we will explain later in the course of this judgment.
Respondents within the various applications before us were found guilty of misconduct in the eyes
of the public eye and that they were suspended from serving as Attorneys for a period of three
years. Appeals were referred to the Legislative Council of India and in accordance with the law, said
the Disciplinary Committee appointed by it under Section 37 (2) of the Act.[2]

The Disciplinary Committee heard appeals from applicants for exempt from misconduct in the
workplace. Disappointed by the decision to amend, the Maharashtra Legal Council appealed to the
current Court. The first barrier to locus standi has been reduced as mentioned earlier, subject to
controversy over the suitability of Shri V. S. Desai on behalf of the applicant.

He chose the accuracy of the findings of the case in each case despite having varying degrees of
diversity, but changed his criminal view with the alarming sense of professional misconduct
adopted by the Disciplinary Tribunal to continue to present each complaint separately so far
because the true cost basis is concerned but only discuss legal issues later. They became
respondents but Bar in India and therefore the community within the country.

The deep remorse of such cases is not only in the rebellious view of the disciplinary court of the
professional ethics law that attempted to solicit snatches and arrest clients has no time to behave,
or to violate appropriate provisions, but also on the innocence of the proper and speedy procedure
shown by the State Disciplinary Tribunal cases of 16 attorneys in one case, mixing evidence against
many, recording evidence of an omnibus declaration, not keeping a record of daily procedures,
examining witnesses internally in the absence of other respondents, it takes eight years to
complete an effort involving 4 witnesses and a crown, the omission of the consideration of
evidence against each individual criminal offender in the sentencing process.

Of course, a court of law may regulate its proceedings without much difficulty, depending on the
'principles of natural justice,[3]' but the widespread disregard for the known justice system makes
us consider whether respondents are not disabled and whether justice would be dangerous if the
court was not informed of its travel activities.

Respondents appealed the Court's decision in the case of Adi Pheroz Shah Gandhi[4] AIR 1971 SC
385 that the Bar Council of the State is not an aggressive person to pursue an appeal against the
decision of its disciplinary committee on these grounds.
They said that first of all, the Bar Council of a State is not a victim because the Bar Council has never
dealt with legal complaints, and the decision of the Bar Council of India has nothing to do with the
Bar Council of State.

Second, the allegations that the order of the disciplinary committee of the Indian Legislative
Council was improperly filed are not appealing to the Legislative Council. One should be offended
by the order and not by the consequences.

Thirdly, it is not the job of the State Legal Council to try to rectify any alleged wrongdoing of the
disciplinary committee of the Indian Legal Council. The reason is that no such work is prescribed
or regulated by law in the State Legislature.

Fourth, a person can be said to be upset about an order that could harm him, that is, to make
money or something else or that causes him to be prejudiced in some way or another.
Fifth, the Bar Council of a State is subject to the Legislative Council of India and, therefore, cannot
lodge an appeal against any order of the higher body. Finally, an appeal may have been lodged by
the Attorney-General or the Attorney-General of India who is entitled to appeal but have chosen
not to do so.

They went on to say "we have written recommendations for the State Court and for appeals in the
further stages of this judgment[5]. However, we find it easy to lose complaints in evidence, in the
belief that if, in fact, there is a snatch and a fight and as an exercise persuaded by any of the
respondents, that behaviour is a serious violation of professional performance and calls for
punishment. Criminal convictions are appealing and started with Dabholkar who came out of
nowhere to defend himself. In addition, one of the witnesses who testified against him swears:
I have never seen him snatch the papers. I did not hear Mr Dabholkar's speech with the people '.

In addition, he was a senior lawyer. We also record the very fact that you have expressed concern
because the arguments have continued. Aside from the weak and compelling evidence against him,
there is a case that he is 68 years old. With a true hoop, he revealed that he was too old to continue
doing his job in this profession and decided to retire into a defeated valley of life.

He openly admitted that however the evidence was that, if there had been past sins, he would not
have followed in the footsteps of misconduct at work, after this he had decided to leave the Bar
without a Limited Purpose. He had only four cases left to decide. He also stated that he failed to
highlight any new documents or appear in any Court other than the lesser degree Bombay Paints
& Allied Products.

Conclusion:
The term victim has a broad meaning and may not be construed as limited translation. They dont
include, of course, a busy person who interrupts things that dont affect him; but they do include a
person who is lodging a real complaint because an order has been improperly applied to his or her
intentions. Does the Attorney-General have sufficient interest in this purpose?

Their kingship thinks they have it; the Attorney General in the extreme colony represents the crown
on behalf of the general public interest. It is his duty to bring before the judge any misconduct of
the attorney or attorney who has a dragging force for disciplinary action. The Bar is not a private
organization, such as that of barber, butcher and candle makers but, by comparison, a public
institution committed to social justice and unpaid public service.

The granting of a private license to practice law is based on three assumptions:

There is a public service to be performed by an attorney.
An attorney may be an expert in the profession and
His or her professional experience is controlled by him or her and legally, by the employee in full.
The medium function to be performed in the bar is nothing but the management of. To oversee
the activities of the Legislative Council, and it will be seen that the rainbow of civil society
organizations, including legal aid to the poor, seeks these bodies in the national hope that the
members of this state will serve the public and maintain good ethical standards.
Because, in the end, can't we all be alone at the same time in the 'internal bencher and bar republic'?

The favorite rebels are lawyers working in criminal courts in Bombay City. Their work sets high
moral standards for the highest value within the means as at the end. Justice cannot be achieved
without broadcasting being a pellucid throughout its course of great concern to the public, not just
professional care. In short, these workers, according to the evidence; Recorded by the State
Disciplinary Tribunal, they stopped at the entrance of the Magistrate's Courts, awaiting the arrival
of the plaintiffs.

V.C. RANGADURAI VS. D. GOPALAN AIR 1979 SC 201

Petitioner: V. C. Rangadurai
Vs.

Respondent: D. Gopalan and Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION: 1979 AIR 281 1979 SCR (1)1054 1979 SCC (1) 308

ACTS/RULES/ORDERS USED IN THE CASE

Section 30, Section 35, Section 35(3), Section 35(3)(c), Section 35(4), Section 36, Section 37,
Section 37(2), Section 38 of Advocate Act, 1961 and Article 19, Article 38, Article 39A of
Constitution of India.

FACT BRIEF

In this case, the parties involved were an advocate named V. C. Rangadurai, a 70-year-old deaf man
named Devasenapathy, and an elderly woman named Smt. D. Kamalammal. They had provided
Rangadurai with two promissory notes and had also paid the advocate's expenses (the values of
15000 rupees and 5000 rupees.). Nonetheless, the lawyer did not submit the lawsuit on time. The
restriction was lifted.

After spending a considerable amount of time strolling about the advocate's office, the elderly man
realized that the lawyer had dumped him by failing to file the cases on time despite being paid. He
filed a complaint with the disciplinary committee of the Tamil Nadu State Bar Council, which
penalised the attorney by suspending him for six years following an investigation.

JUDGEMENT

In this case, V. C. Rangadurai (hereafter referred to as the Appellant) was found guilty of
professional misconduct but his ban from practice was reduced from six years to one year. When
a lawyer was entrusted with a brief to handle, he was supposed to adhere to professional ethical
standards to safeguard the interests of his clients. However, the Appellant had entirely violated the
complainants' faith in him. However, to unlawfully withhold a client's money from a lawyer was a
breach of integrity and lack of probity, and such serious professional misconduct required condign
punishment. The State Bar Council determined that the Appellant deserved to be disbarred and
suspended him from practice for six years, which was reduced to one year by the Disciplinary
Committee. As a result, no restrictions could be put on the advocate's rights to appear before any
court or body, as provided for in Section 30 of the Act. As a result, the sentence imposed by the
Disciplinary Committee of the BCI did not require further intervention. The appeal was therefore
denied.

When an advocate is prohibited from practising under section 35(4) cl.(c) of subsection (3), he is
prohibited from doing so in any court or before any authority or person in India for the duration of
the prohibition. If the issuance of such a direction implies the termination of the order of
suspension upon the fulfilment of the requirements set above, "I am of the considered opinion
that no restriction on the advocate's right to appear before any court or authority, which he enjoys
under Section 30 of the Act, may be imposed."

As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary committee's decision to suspend the
advocate for six years.

on the advocate's right to appear before any court or authority, which he enjoys under Section 30
of the Act, may be imposed."

As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary committee's decision to suspend the
advocate for six years.

ANALYSIS

What constitutes professional ethics are the obligations that the advocate must uphold? A lawyer
is considered to have violated professional ethical standards if they fail to fulfill these obligations.
These are the moral obligations that all members of society, not only advocates but also those in
other professions, are required to uphold since ethics and morality are essential to every member
of society.

The appellant was forbidden from practising as an advocate for six years after being found guilty
of gross professional misconduct in this matter by the Disciplinary Committee II of the State Bar
Council of Tamil Nadu. In response to an appeal, the Bar Council of India affirmed the
aforementioned conclusions but shortened the suspension to one year. The court dismissed the
appeal, concluding that punishment serves two purposes: deterrence and correction. But when
looked at from a reformatory perspective, traditional punishments have their own limits and
shortcomings. If only courts were allowed to experiment in unconventional ways while still
adhering to the rules of the law, a therapeutic touch, a correctional twist, and a locus poenitentiae
may have had a rehabilitative effect

Chandra Shekhar Soni v/s Bar Council Of Rajasthan

Case Citation:
Chandra Shekhar Soni vs Bar Council Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 20 July, 1983
Equivalent citations:
AIR 1983 SC 1012, 1983 (2) SCALE 384, (1983) 4 SCC 255

Bench: A Sen, E Venkataramiah, R Misra

In the Chandrashekar Soni versus bar Council of Rajasthan case, the lawyer Mr Chandrashekar Sony
indulged in bribery and tried to switch sides.

Facts of the case:

The petitioner of this case was an advocate.
The respondent is the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council
The advocate took the case of the complainant Bania and his wife, Smt. Galki, who was being
harassed by the accused, had a hurt on the head. His wife's skull was damaged
The advocate approached the accused and offered to get him a favourable x-ray report if he paid
300 to the doctor and appointed him as counsel
Changing sides was tantamount to misconduct, and bribing was severe.

Arguments on behalf of the petitioner

In the Supreme Court, the advocate said that this was Rs.20 and not Rs.300 on offer, and this was
offered to someone else for advertisement and promotion and was not a bribe.

Arguments on behalf of the respondent

The State Bar Council of Jodhpur held Advocate Chandrashekar George Soni guilty of professional
misconduct and suspended him from practice for three years under section 30 5(c) of the
advocates act through the order of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council on July 21

Judgment.
The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs. This was mentioned in the order that we
strongly deprecate the appellant's conduct but take a lenient view because he was an
inexperienced member of the bar.

in re an advocate air 1989 sc 245

An Advocate V.B.B. Haradara-1989 Air 245: Advocate Acted Without Consent Of A Client
By Mohd Aqib Aslam | Views 10236
The Advocates Act and professional misconduct were both issues in the case. An advocate had
been suspended for three years by a disciplinary committee due to allegations of professional
misconduct. The lawyer's longtime client Gautam Chand hired him to file a lawsuit against Shri S.
Antanaraju in order to recover the sum of Rs. 30,098. The Advocate directed his assistant to bring
the lawsuit.

Following this, the respondent makes the claim that, without his knowledge, the appellant filed a
document notifying the court that the dispute had been resolved amicably and obtained the case's
dismissal. The respondent further asserted that he was not given dates related to the matter.
Although there was no accusation that specifically described the type and scope of professional
misconduct, the State Bar Council contacted the appellant for comments.

The State Bar Council filed a case, but it couldn't be resolved in time, thus it was forwarded to the
Bar Council of India. He was found guilty by the disciplinary committee, which decided that a three-
year practice ban was appropriate. The advocate filed an appeal in response to this disciplinary
committee ruling.

The Supreme Court ruled that the disciplinary committee had failed to provide the advocate a fair
hearing and that the facts had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Since it deals with the
ethics of the legal profession, the case is a landmark one. The case discusses professional
misbehaviour and concerns professional honour.

Primary Details Of The Case

Case No.: Writ Petition (Criminal) 316 of 1987
Jurisdiction: Supreme Court
Case Decided On: September 29, 1998
Legal Provision Involved: Advocates Act, 1961, Section 38
Judges: Justice M. P. Thakker, Justice B. C. Ray

Brief Facts Of The Case

The case was filed in 1989 and in this case the appellant was an advocate. The suit dealt with the
matter of recovery of Rs. 30,098/-. The complainant left the responsibility of the case to the
advocate (appellant) who had given the responsibility for the matter at hand to his junior colleague.
There are two versions to the story. As per the version of the complainant, the Respondents has
failed to inform him and without taking his due consent pulled back the case.

They did also inform him that his presence would be needed in court and without giving him the
following information they got the suit dismissed through court. The complainant believed his legal
needs were infringed. The version of the appellant advocate and his junior colleague (respondent
2) where quite different. The appellant contended that he came to know the complainant through
an old acquaintance Gautam Chand. On Gautam Chands request the case of the complainant was
taken up by the advocate and passed on to his colleague.
That time the colleague worked with the appellant advocate but during the dismissal of the suit
the junior advocate had his own office. Gautam Chand was in business with Haradara (the plaintiff)
and the defendant in the suit initiated by them through the appellant was Anantaraju. Anantaraju
was a common adversary for both Gautam Chand and Haradara. Gautam Chand had paid earnest
money to Antaraju for the execution of a sale deed of property in his name.

However, the sale deed was not executed during the required time. Gautam Chand sent
instructions to the advocate (appellant) and his colleague (respondent no 2 Ashok) to get the suit
dismissed as the sale deed was achieved. Initially the court denied the request, post which Gautam
Chand published a notice stating that he has dealt with the property matter and the object of the
suit is achieved and no one should interfere as it's the personal matter of Anantaraju and Gautam
Chand. RW 3 (Gautam Chand) and the complainant acted in complete concert and had common
interests.

The court dismissed the suit in 1981 on December 10. The complainant Haradara gained
knowledge the suit in which he was the plaintiff which was against Anantaraju had been dismissed
by the court he made no attempts to restore the suit or to meet the appellant. The appellant
contended that Haradara the complainant has knowledge of the dismissal and yet failed to
immediately act upon it. Also, that he only acted on the claims made by Gautam Chand who was a
close friend of Haradara and they filed the suits together towards the common adversary
Anantaraju.

Issues Involved In The Case:

Should the appellant have been informed and apprised of the particular and specific charge and
allegation made against him regarding the true nature and content of the professional misconduct?
It also questioned whether the doctrine of benefit had been utilized. Did the disciplinary authority
establish the basic allegations against the appellant while deciding on the question of the
punishment to be inflicted on him?
Will the appellant be punished under misconduct rules on absence of any dishonesty or intentional
motives? Would it amount to non-culpable negligence or would it be professional misconduct?

Legal Provisions Involved In The Case

The appeal was instituted as per Section 38 of the Advocates Act. On looking at the legal landscape
in the area of disciplinary proceedings this scenario emerges:
"In exercise of powers under section 35 contained in Chapter V entitled conduct of Advocates, on
receipt of a complaint against an Advocate (or suo moto) if the State Bar Council has reason to
believe that any Advocate on its role has been guilty of professional or other misconduct.
Disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against him."

Neither Section 35 nor any other provision of the Act defines the expression legal misconduct or
the expression misconduct. The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council is authorized to
inflict punishment, including removal of his name from the rolls of the Bar Council and suspending
him from practice for a period deemed fit by it, after giving the Advocate concerned and the
Advocate General of the State an opportunity of hearing.
The disciplinary committee under Section 42(1) of the Advocates Act is vested in the same power
as a civil court for summoning and enforcing attendance of a person and also the rights to examine
him on oath. The procedure to be followed in an Enquiry under Section 35 is outlined in Part VII of
the Bar Council of India Rules (1) made under the authority of section 60 of the Act.

Judgement In Brief
It was held that the advocate wasn't afforded a proper and reasonable opportunity to express his
side of the story. There were no specific charges devised against him and he wasn't informed of
the charges against him. The doctrine of benefit of doubt had not been reasonably established the
intentions of the advocate were not considered. The motives of the advocate weren't considered
while judging the case and its outcome by the disciplinary committee.

The court also felt that such a judgment before being given by the BCI had to have been discussed
properly and the judgment should leave no place for any reasonable doubt. The court held the
opinion that a detailed inquiry ought to be held as the discipline committee is giving a very heavy
sentence of removing the advocate from the bar. The conclusion cannot only be taken in terms of
evidence and has to be supported by a proper enquiry till the doctrine of benefit of doubt has been
reasonably established.

In Re Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995 (Vol-I) IBR 118.

The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who
belong to are its honorable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had acquiring
merely the qualification of technical competence, the honor as a professional has to be maintained
by its members, by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court.
The object and need of the contempt jurisdiction or contempt of Court the Court has held that the
object of the contempt power is not to vindicate the dignity and honor of the individual Judge who
is personally attacked or scandalized, but to uphold the majesty of law and administration of justice.
The foundation of the Judiciary is the trust and confidence of the people in its ability to deliver
fearless and impartial justice.

The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not the third pillar but the central
pillar of the democratic state. Misconduct: it is a sufficiently wide expression: it is not necessary
that it should involve moral turpitude. Any conduct which in any way renders a man unfit for the
exercise of his profession or is likely to hamper or embarrass the administration of justice maybe
considered to be misconduct calling for disciplinary action. It cannot be said that an advocate can
never be punished for professional misconduct committed by him in his personal capacity.

In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra

In this case an advocate was found guilty of criminal contempt of Court and he was sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six years and suspended from practising as an
advocate for a period of three years. The punishment of imprisonment was suspended for a period
of four years and was to be activated in case of his conviction for any other offence of contempt of
Court within the said period.

The Court held that the license of an advocate to practice legal profession may be suspended or
cancelled by the Supreme Court or High Court in the exercise of the contempt jurisdiction.

It was laid down that the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the contempt of High Court. Being
the Court of record the Supreme Court has the power to punish for the contempt of the courts
subordinate to it. Thus, the Supreme Court is fully competent to take cognizance of the contempt
of the High Courts or courts subordinate to it. It was also claimed that the Judge before whom the
contempt has been committed should be excluded. This claim was not sustainable in the view of
the Court. It observed further that its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 of the Constitution
cannot be restricted or taken away by a statute, be it the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The Court has also observed that the contempt jurisdiction of the superior
Court's is not based on the statutory provisions but it is inherent jurisdiction available to them on
account of being a court of record. As regards the procedure to be followed the Court has observed
that the Courts of record can deal with summarily with all types of contempt. With regards to
Article 142 of the Constitution the Court observed that the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme
Court which are supplementary in nature and are provided to do complete justice in any manner,
are independent of the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court under Article 129 which
cannot be trammeled in any manner by any statutory provision including any provisions of the
Advocates Act, 1961 or the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The Advocates Act, 1961 has nothing to do with the contempt jurisdiction of the Court, and the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 being a statute cannot denude the, restrict or limit the powers of
this Court to take action for contempt under Article 129.
The Supreme Court also held that it being appellate authority under Section 38 of the Advocates
Act, 1961 can impose punishment mentioned in Section 35 of the said Act. Thus, the Supreme
Court may suspend or cancel the license of an advocate to practice his profession for contempt of
Court.
It finally said that the threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against the
misconduct. They emphasized that the time factor was crucial and dragging the contempt
proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyzed the Court for
a long time.
This case was overruled by Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Another.

Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Another.

Facts
In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, this Court found the Contemner, an advocate, guilty of committing
criminal contempt of Court for having interfered with and "obstructing the course of justice by
trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and
threatening language".
Aggrieved by the direction that the contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an
advocate for a period of three years issued by the Supreme Court by invoking powers under Articles
129 and 142 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary
Secretary, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking relief by way of
issuing an appropriate writ, direction, or declaration, declaring that the disciplinary committees of
the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone have exclusive jurisdiction to inquire
into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for professional or other misconduct,
arising out of punishment imposed for contempt of court or otherwise and further declare that the
Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction has no such original
jurisdiction, power or authority in that regard notwithstanding the contrary view held by this
Hon'ble Court in In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra.
Issue For Consideration
The petition was placed before a Constitutional Bench for passing the appropriate direction, order
or declaration. The bench identified a single question and had to decide upon was whether the
Supreme Court of India can while dealing with Contempt Proceedings exercise power under Article
129 of the Constitution or under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution or under
Article 142 of the Constitution can debar a practicing lawyer from carrying on his profession as a
lawyer for any period whatsoever.

The petitioner's assailed the correctness of the findings in In Re:

Vinay Mishra submitted that:
# although the powers conferred on this Court by Article 142, though very wide in their aptitude,
can be exercised only to "do complete justice in any case or cause pending before it "and since the
issue of 'professional misconduct' is not the subject matter of "any cause" pending before this court
while dealing with a case of contempt of court, it could not make any order either under Article
142 or 129 to suspend the license of an advocate contemner, for which punishment, statutory
provisions otherwise exist.
# the Supreme Court can neither create a "jurisdiction" nor create a "punishment" not otherwise
permitted by law and that since the power to punish an advocate (for "professional misconduct")
by suspending his license vests exclusively in a statutory body constituted under the Advocates Act,
this Court cannot assume that jurisdiction under Article 142 or 129 or even under Section 38 of
the Advocates Act, 1961.The bench came to the conclusion that the Supreme Court under Article
129 and the High Court under Article 215 of the Indian Constitution declaring them court of records
has the power to punish the for contempt of itself. The Court observed that Parliament is
competent to make law in relation to Contempt of Court. After analyzing Article 246 and entry 77
of List I of the VIIth Schedule and entry 14 of List III of the said schedule it is evident that the
legislature can make a law regarding the same, but cannot take away contempt jurisdiction from
the Courts which flows from the Courts being deemed as Courts of record which embodies the
power to punish for the contempt of itself.
With reference to Article 142 of the Constitution of India the Court observed that when this court
takes cognizance of a matter of contempt of Court by an advocate, there is no case, cause or matter
before it regarding his professional misconduct even though in a given case, the contempt
committed by an advocate may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate
by virtue of the license to practice law. No issue relating to his suspension from practice is the
subject matter of the case.

The Court opined that power to punish in matters of contempt of Court, though quite wide, is yet
limited and cannot be expanded to include the power to determine whether the advocate is also
guilty of professional misconduct in a summary manner giving a go by to the procedure prescribed
under the Advocates Act, 1961.

The power to do complete justice, in a way is a corrective power which gives preference to equity
over law but it cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process of law, contained
in the Advocates Act, 1961, while dealing with a case of contempt of Court.

From a reading of Article 142 it is clear the statutory provisions cannot be ignored or taken away
or assumed by the Supreme Court. The Advocates Act, 1961, empowers the Bar Council to take
action against the advocate for professional misconduct. The Bar Council is empowered under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 to punish advocates for professional misconduct. The act
contains a detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking the license of an advocate.
A disciplinary committee hears the case of the advocate concerned and then order any of the
punishments listed in Section 35(3) (a-d). If the advocate is guilty of contempt of Court as well as
professional misconduct the Court must punish him for the contempt, whereas refer the
professional misconduct to the Bar. The Bar will then initiate proceedings against, this provides the
advocate with right to be heard and appropriate action is taken by the disciplinary committee.
After such proceedings if the advocate is aggrieved he may approach the Supreme Court. Section
38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court. This Section confers
upon the Court appellate jurisdiction. If once the matter has been reported to the Bar and it does
not take any action, the Court may take up the matter. This Section can in no way be construed to
give original jurisdiction to the Court.
The Court opined that the Supreme Court makes the statutory bodies and other organs of the State
perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible for
the Supreme Court to take over the role of the bodies and other organs of the State and perform
their functions.
There was an inherent fallacy in the case of Vinay Mishra, it was said once the matter is before the
court it can pass any order or direction. But the matter is that of contempt of Court not of
professional misconduct. The Court has jurisdiction on the matter of contempt but professional
misconduct vests with the Bar. As the Bar can suspend an advocate only after giving him an
opportunity to represent himself which is the requirement of due process of law, after the case of
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. The Court in Vinay's case vested with itself with the jurisdiction
that it never had.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court is vested with the right to punish those guilty of contempt of Court under
Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The power to punish contemners is
also vested with the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 also governs the punishments given by the High Court. This act in no way controls the
jurisdiction of the Apex Court. The Court in In Re: Vinay Mishra misconstrued Article 129 read with
142 and robbed the Bar to of all powers to try and punish those for professional misconduct. It
even assumed jurisdiction when Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 explicitly provides only
appellate jurisdiction to the Apex Court. The Court punished Shri Mishra by suspending him thus
the petition arose in the 1998 case, Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India.

Supreme Court of India

Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union Of India & Anr on 17 April, 1998

PETITIONER:
SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION

Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/1998

BENCH:
S.C. AGRAWAL, G.N. RAY, A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA,S. RAJENDRA BABU

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T DR. ANAND. J.

In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, this Court found the Contemner, an advocate, guilty
of committing criminal contempt of Court for having interfered with and "obstructing the course
of justice by trying to threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful
and threatening language", While awarding punishment, keeping in view the gravity of the
contumacious conduct of the contemner, the Court said:

" The facts and circumstances of the Present Case justify our invoking the power under Article 129
read with Article 142 of the Constitution to award to the contemner a suspended sentence of
imprisonment together with suspension of his practice as and advocate in the manner directed
herein. We accordingly sentence the contemner for his conviction for the offence of the criminal
contempt as under:
(a) The contemner Vinay Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for
a period of six weeks. However, in the circumstances of the case, the sentence will remain
suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in case the contemner is convicted for
any other offence of contempt of court within the said period; and
(b) The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate fro a period of three years
from today with the consequence that all held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand
vacated by him forthwith.
Aggrieved by the direction that the "Contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an
Advocate for a period of three years" issued by this Court by invoking powers under Articles 129
and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Honorary Secretary,
has filed this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following relief:

" Issue and appropriate writ, direction, or declaration, declaring that the disciplinary committees
of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone have exclusive jurisdiction to
inquire into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for professional or other
misconduct, arising out of punishment imposed for contempt of court or otherwise and further
declare that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
has no such original jurisdiction, power or authority in that regard notwithstanding the contrary
view held by this Hon'ble Court in Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 3 of 1994 dated 10.3.1995."
On 21.3.1995, while issuing Rule in the writ petition, following order was made by the Division
Bench:

" The question which arises is whether the Supreme Court of India can while dealing with Contempt
Proceedings exercise power under Article 129 of the Constitution or under Article 129 read with
Article 142 of the Constitution or under Article 142 of the Constitution can debar a practicing
lawyer from carrying on his profession as a lawyer for any period whatsoever, We direct notice to
issue on the Attorney General of India and on the respondents herein. Notice will also issue on the
application for interim stay. Having regarding to the importance of the aforesaid question we
further direct that this petition be placed before a Constitution Bench of this Court."
That is how this Writ petition has been placed before this Constitution Bench.

The only question which we are called upon to decide in this petition is whether the punishment
for established contempt of Court committed by an Advocate can include punishment to debar the
concerned advocate from practice by suspending his licence (sanad) for a specified period, in
exercise of its powers under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

Dealing with this issue, the three judge Bench in vinay Chandra Mishra's case (Supra), opined:

"The question now is what punishment should be meted out to the contemner. We have already
discussed the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. That
jurisdiction is independent of the statutory law of contempt enacted by Parliament under Entry 77
of List I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 129 is
sui generis. The jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt as well as to award punishment for
it being constitutional, it cannot be controlled by any statute. Neither, therefore, the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 nor the Advocates Act, 1981 can be pressed into service to restrict the said
jurisdiction.
The Court repelled the arguments advanced on behalf of the contemner, the U.P. Bar Association
and the U.P. Bar Council, that the Court cannot while publishing the contemner with any of the
"traditional" or "accepted" punishments for contempt, also suspend his licence to practice as an
advocate. Since that power is specifically entrusted by the Advocates Act, 1961 to the disciplinary
committees of the State Bar Council and/or the Bar Council of India. The Bench opined:

What is further, the jurisdiction and powers of this Court under Article 142 which are
supplementary in nature and are provided to do complete justice in any matter, are independent
of the jurisdiction and powers of this Court under Article 129 which cannot be trammeled.
Ex-Capt. Harish Uppalv. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 739.

Section 38: Appeal to the Supreme Court.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT -The Petitioner presented that strike as a method for collective
bargaining was perceived only in industrial disputes and lawyers who were officials of the Court
could not utilize strikes as a way to extort the Courts or the clients. They further contended that
the call for strike by lawyers was in actuality a call to break the agreements which lawyers have
with their clients. Then again, the legal fraternity presented that lawyers retained the right to strike
in uncommon cases to get their interests imparted in the case of improper treatment being given
to them. The Supreme Court stated that lawyers reserve no right to go on strike or give a call for
the boycott of court, not even on a symbolic strike. The protest, if any is required, must be made
by giving press explanations, TV interviews completing of the Court premises standards and
additionally notices, wearing dark or white or any shading arm groups, tranquil dissent walks
outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas or relay facts and so on. The Court on
acknowledging the fact that even those lawyers willing to go to the Court couldn't go to inferable
from the strike or the boycott asked the lawyers to intensely decline to submit to any call for strike
or boycott court. The Court also stated that no lawyer might be visited with any adverse
consequence by the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any nature including
that of expulsion are often held call at an occasion of his refusal to attend to the strike or boycott.
The Court also saw that an Advocate is an official of the Court and appreciates uncommon status
in the public arena. They have commitments and obligations to guarantee smooth working of the
Court and they additionally owe an obligation to their customer. Strikes are meddled with the
organization of equity, disturb Court procedures, and put the interest of their customers at risk.
Thus the Court has imposed a ban on strikes by lawyers.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of India concluded that the strike by an advocate is considered unlawful and
illicit. A strike might be allowed in the most extraordinary of the uncommon situations where
respectability, regard, and working of the courts are at the stake. A silent disappointment can be
showed or a meeting to the press and media can be given, till the time it does not affect the
working of the courts.

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