IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN

INDIA
 OBJECTIVES:
 intimidate the state and the civil population;
 to demonstrate the inability of the State to
protect its civilian population;
 generate pressure on the State from its
population to settle with the terrorists; and
 create feelings of battle fatigue in the State
as well as its population.
OLD OR ‘CLASSICAL’ TERRORISM:

 REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

 SEPERATIST MOVEMENTS

 ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

ON HUMAN LIVES:

Toll on the casualties suffered

more than the casualties in the
four conventional wars fought by
India.
 ON THE POLITICAL SCENE

 India has lost two leaders to terrorist

attacks, in each case creating a
leadership crisis

 Undermining of democratic values and

democratic institutions.
 ON THE ECONOMY:

 Cost extracted by acts of terrorism on the

Indian exchequer estimated to be more
than Rs.45,000 crores

 Increase in budget on agencies involved in

fighting terrorism is 2600 per cent since
1980s

 Compounded by the loss to property and

impact on business environment
ON THE SOCIAL FABRIC

The assassination of Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi in 1984 by Sikh terrorists had
terrible reprisal on the Sikh community

The 1993 Mumbai blasts triggered

communal onslaught on the Muslim
population of the city
19 years to bring the insurgency-cum-
terrorism in Nagaland under control,

20 years to restore normalcy in

Mizoram,

14 years to put an end to terrorism in

Punjab.

J&K complicated
“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same
place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as
that!” [The Queen]

“It was much pleasanter at home, when one wasn’t always growing larger and
smaller, and being ordered about by mice and rabbits.”
[Alice]
 PREVIEW
• SOFT STATE
• STRATEGY. DO WE
HAVE ANY OR DO
WE NEED ONE?
• STRUCTURES
• ISSUES
 NATIONAL
APPROACH
OF TOLERANCE
PAN INDIA STRIKES POST
2003

Pre 26/11

26/11

Post 26/11
 INDIA’S COUNTER TERRORISM
APPROACH
• INADEQUATE
RESPONSE
• SYSTEMIC
FAILURE
• LACK OF
COHERENT
STRATEGY
• SOFT STATE
 SYSTEMIC FAILURE
• LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS
• MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES REPORTING TO
DIFFERENT AUTHORITY @
• MULTIPLICITY OF POORLY TRAINED
AND EQUIPPED FORCES &
• AMORPHOUS MARITIME &
COASTAL SECURITY
• NON COLLABORATIVE ATTITUDE
 SYSTEMIC FAILURE
• AIR SPACE AND
AVIATION SECURITY
• CYBER SECURITY
• NARCO TERRORISM
• MEDIA ANARCHY
• GLOBALISED
TERROR NETWORKS
• ANTI TERROR LAWS
AND ENFORCEMENT
SOFT STATE
SOFT STATE
 NATIONAL
STRATEGY
DO WE NEED
ONE?

NEXT TIME,
DOUBLE THE
TH
NUMBER OF
THREATS !
 UN COUNTER TERRORISM
STRATEGY
• ADDRESSING THE
CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO
THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM

• PREVENTING TERRORIST
ACTS

• DEVELOPING STATE
CAPACITY TO COUNTER
TERRORISM

• DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS

 UK COUNTER TERRORISM
STRATEGY (CONTEST)
THE AIM OF THE STRATEGY
IS

“ TO REDUCE THE RISK TO

THE UK AND ITS INTERESTS
OVERSEAS FROM
INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, SO THAT
PEOPLE CAN GO ABOUT
THEIR LIVES FREELY AND
WITH CONFIDENCE”
 STRATEGIC
•
FRAMEWORK
PURSUE: TO STOP
TERRORIST ATTACKS

• PREVENT: TO STOP PEOPLE

BECOMING TERRORISTS OR
SUPPORTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM

• PROTECT: TO STRENGTHEN
OUR PROTECTION AGAINST
TERRORIST ATTACK

• PREPARE: WHERE AN
ATTACK CANNOT BE
STOPPED TO MITIGATE ITS
 US DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY 2008
STRATEGIC PLAN
• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM
DANGEROUS PEOPLE
• PROTECT OUR NATION FROM
DANGEROUS GOODS
• PROTECT CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
• STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S
PREPAREDNESS AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES
• STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY DHS
OPERATIONS AND
 COMPONENTS OF US
STRATEGY
• COUNTER
TERRORISM
• BORDER SECURITY
• PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE AND
RECOVERY INCL FOR
NATURAL DISASTER
• IMMIGRATION.
• CYBER SECURITY
 SALIENT STRUCTURES
• NCTC REPORTING TO PRESIDENT , DNI AND
DHS
• UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND
OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT
2001/2005 (PATROIT ACT)
• FOREIGN INT SVL ACT ( FISA
1978/2008)
• JUSTICE DEPT CAN INVESTIGATE ALL CASES
• MIL COMMISSIONS ACT AGAINST ALIENS
DEPT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
 PROPOSED INDIAN COUNTER
TERRORISM STRATEGY
• Prevent ( EQUALITY; HEARTS
AND MINDS; ROOT CAUSE; IDEA
OF INDIA)
• Disrupt (CAPABILITY TO
ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND AT
HOME AND ABROAD)
• Secure ( TARGET HARDENING)
• Citizen as Stake Holder (PPP)
• Prepare ( FOR THE INEVITABLE)
• Unity of Approach ( PLURALISM,
DIVERSITY NOTWITHSTANDING)
 COMPREHENSIVE COUNTER
TERRORISM STRATEGY ( SMART
POWER)
• HARD POWER
HARD POWER
– PRO ACTIVE DEFENSE ( APPROPRIATE FORCE,
STRUCTURES AND TOUGH DECISIONS)
– SURGICAL DISCRIMINATORY STRIKE CAPABILITY
– ABILITY TO WAGE WAR AND WIN IT
– ESPIONAGE/COVERT OPS
• SOFT POWER
– PEOPLE (MULTI CULTURE, MULTI RELIGION,
MULTI ETHENIC, MULTI LINGUAL, RULE
OF LAW -A NEW MELTING POT)
– INTERNATIONAL CLOUT AND COOPERATION
– KNOWLEDGE, MEDIA AND ICE
• TECHNOLOGY
– WPNS AND ARMAMENT
– SPACE, NUCLEAR AND CYBER
STRUCTURES
 GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE
• UAPA 2008
• NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIA).
• NTRO
• NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE
(NCTC)
• THE MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)
• NATIONAL INT GRID ( NATGRID).
• CRIME & CRIMINAL TRACKING NETWK
(CCTNS).
• OPERATIONS DIVISION
• STRENGHTEN COASTAL SECURITY
OTHER MEASURES
 CRITIQUE OF NEW
STRUCTURES
• DE – POLITICISE TERRORISM.
APPLICABILITY OF LAWS.
• NCTC MAY NOT HAVE BEST OF
TALENT. USA HAS EST IT UNDER AN
ACT OF CONGRESS, Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA)
• COMBAT ARM. CRPF REMAINS THE
WEAKEST LINK AND LARGEST FORCE.
LEADERSHIP IS THE KEY.
• CYBER SECURITY
ISSUES
 RESTRUCTURING/POLICY
ISSUES
• MINISTER FOR INTERNAL
SECURITY
• ROLE OF NSA/ CS.
REQUIREMENT OF DNI. CAN
A DIPLOMAT DO JUSTICE TO
IS OR TWO NSAs?
• NIA AND CBI TO BE
STAUTORY BODIES LIKE CEC
AND CAG ETC. NEED FOR
YOUNG TALENT AND NOT
TO BE HEADED BY ‘DUE TO
RETIRE (SR)’ OFFRS.
OFFRS
 RESTRUCTURING/POLICY
ISSUES
• COASTAL COMMANDS
• CYBER COMMAND
• DEDICATED OFFR CADRE
FOR CRPF: DELINK FROM
IPS
• IMP CL B CITIES TO HAVE
INF UNITS EARMK ,
TRAINED & EQUIPPED
FOR URBAN TERRORISM
TO SP LOCAL POLICE.
 CONCLUSION
• BUILD CAPABILITY AND PREPARE FOR A
LONG DRAWN CAMPAIGN FOR
SUPERMACY
SUN TZU’S ADVICE, “IN PEACE PREPARE FOR WAR. THE
ART OF WAR IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE STATE. IT IS
MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH, A ROAD EITHER TO SAFETY
OR TO RUIN. HENCE UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN IT BE
NEGLECTED.”

• INTERNAL SECURITY IS A NATIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY THAT CAN NOT BE WISHED
AWAY, DELEGATED OR OUT SOURCED

• ARUN SHOURIE ON MONEY WHEN HE SAID,

“FOR GOD’S SAKE DON’T KEEP RUNNING TO

COASTAL SECURITY

48
 Mitigation Efforts taken by Government of
India Post 26/11

• Assigning responsibility for coastal security and maritime

security.
• Designation of Coastal Command.
• Strengthening of marine police stations.
• Sanctioning of additional assets and manpower for the
Coast Guard.
• Creation of Sagar Prahari Bal for the Navy.
• Automatic Identification System (AIS) for fishing vessels
• Chain of coastal radars.
• Joint Operations Centre (JOC).
 Responsibilities for Various Maritime
Stakeholders
• IN –Overall Maritime Security including Coastal
Security & Offshore Security.
• CG – Coastal Security in Territorial Waters
including areas to be patrolled by Marine police.
• Director General Coast Guard – Cdr Coastal
Command.
• FOC-in-C – C-in-C Coastal Defence.
 Responsibilities of Various Agencies
Prior 26/11
High Seas - Navy

EEZ (200 NM)

Security – Coast
Offshore Guard
Security –
Navy/CG

Territorial Waters
(12 NM)
Marine Police

No specific responsibility assigned to the IN

Responsibilities of Various Agencies
Post 26/11
Overall Maritime
Security - Navy
Offshore
Security
- Navy

Coastal Security –
Territorial Waters

Coast
Guard
Limitations of New Security Apparatus
• Overlapping Responsibilities.
• Responsibilities without transfer of authority.
• Coastal Command a misnomer. Responsible for only
co-ordination. No command & control function.
• Replication of responsibility dilutes the accountability.
• Distinction between coastal security & coastal defence.
 Limitations of New Security Apparatus
(Contd)

• Undue focus on shallow waters.

• Does not leverage expanse of sea.

• Coast Guard structured for EEZ Charter.

• IN back to brown water navy!

 Limitations of New Security Apparatus
(Contd)

• Unregulated nature of Indian fishing.

• Absence of legal regulatory mechanism.

• Fishing Community – a political vote bank.

• Compulsions of fisheries being state subject.

 Co-ordination

• Numerous maritime agencies like major & minor

ports, customs, fisheries, DG Shipping, ONGC, IB
and Marine Police under various ministries.
• Each agency has specific charter but bearing on
security.
• Co-ordination between centre & state agencies.
 Recommendations
• Clear demarcation of responsiblity,
accountability & jurisdiction for various
agencies.
 Recommendations (Contd)
• Legal regulatory mechanism for Indian fisheries
permitting measures like
- Making crossing of IMBL illegal.
- No fishing corridor.
- Prohibited fishing zones around off shore platforms,
VAs/VPs.
- All legal provisions with penalties.
- AIS/transponders for less than 20 mtrs.
- RFID for fishing boats. (Storage of GPS track).

• Centre to exercise powers of regulating fishing beyond 12

nm.
 Recommendations (Contd)
• Maritime Domain Awareness.
- Networking of all concerned agencies.
- Integration of surveillance data of
 LRIT – DG Shipping.
 PANS – Port authorities.
 AIS - National AIS network (DGLL)
 Coastal Radar Chain – ICG
 Tracking Devices Fishing boats – DG shipping/ Fisheries
 Data base of registration of fishing boats
 Data base of other stake holders, Int, marine police, ports etc.

• Maritime Security Advisor.

Question!
 ISSUE
• The current arrangement for Coastal Security suffers
from shortcomings such as:-
– Coast Guard (CG) made responsible to coordinate between
various agencies without authority over them.
– Coastal Security responsibility of the CG has been limited to
territorial waters (12NM) while it has the Statutory Charter &
capability to operate up to the EEZ (200NM).
– Indian Navy has been made overall responsible with the CG
responsible for territorial waters leading to issues of Command
and Control.
• How can the issue of Command and Control between
various agencies be resolved to bring in better efficiency
and accountability?