Traditionally, China and Pakistan have cooperated closely at the strategic and political levels.

Now the two nations are making efforts to expand their bilateral collaboration economically as
well. The construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a milestone that
signifies this shift.
At its core, the CPEC is a large-scale initiative to build energy, highway, and port infrastructure
to deepen economic connections between China and Pakistan. This initiative has been well-
received in both countries, although it is not without its problems.1 Nevertheless, China and
Pakistan regard the CPEC as a new source of potential synergy between their respective national
development strategies, which may help the two countries translate their close political
cooperation into multifaceted economic cooperation, attain mutual benefits, and achieve win-win
outcomes. For the economic corridor to reach its potential, however, there are security and
political challenges in Pakistan that must be addressed.
China first proposed the corridor project in May 2013. Chinese President Xi Jinping then visited
Pakistan in April 2015, and both sides agreed to elevate their relationship to an “all-weather
strategic partnership.”2 During Xi’s visit, the two countries signed fifty-one agreements at an
estimated value of $46 billion.3
The CPEC is now moving into the implementation phase. On May 6, 2016, there was an opening
ceremony held in the city of Sukkur in Pakistan’s Sindh Province, as construction began on a
section of highway between Sukkur and the city of Multan—it will be part of a network of
highways that will connect the cities of Peshawar and Karachi.4 This network is a major
component of the CPEC’s plans for infrastructure expansion, which highlights the progress the
two nations have achieved thus far in the area of transportation. In addition, on November 13,
2016, the first large shipment of Chinese goods went through the port of Gwadar, a flagship
CPEC project in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan.5
China considers these development initiatives a potential source of stability and prosperity for
both countries. From a Chinese perspective, cooperation in the areas of security and economics
are closely intertwined, and improvements on one side can improve the other. It is almost as
though security and economics are two separate wheels on the same vehicle, and both need to be
spinning to move things forward. China believes economic development can strengthen
Pakistan’s internal stability, thus reinvigorating the latter’s economy through investment in
infrastructure projects as well as the construction of oil and gas pipelines. China hopes this will
create a certain level of stability within Pakistan and in turn stabilize China’s western periphery,
particularly the province of Xinjiang.
More broadly, the CPEC has to be understood in the context of China’s strategic interests in East
Asia and the way the United States has challenged them. Faced with such difficulties, China
hopes it can expand its strategic space by heading west. Pakistan serves as a crucial bridge
between China and Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Security and stability in
Pakistan will make it possible for China to exercise greater influence in these regions and to
ensure security at home. This is why China is willing to pour vast amounts of resources into the
economic corridor—based on the logic of improving security through economic development.
Likewise, Pakistan has realized that no other country places such high strategic importance in its
economic relationship with Pakistan as China does. Pakistan also greatly values the economic
corridor and views it as mutually beneficial in terms of politics and economic development.
According to Pakistan 2025—a blueprint for economic development published in 2014 by
Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform—Pakistan aims to advance from
being a lower-middle-income nation to an upper-middle-income nation by 2025.6 To achieve this
goal, Pakistan hopes to attract increasing amounts of foreign investment. The country is working
to improve its overall economy by constructing energy projects and other forms of infrastructure,
to create employment opportunities for its populace, and to improve its governance.
The logic behind this strategy is that fundamentally improving Pakistan’s economy will help
alleviate the challenges posed by political extremists, radicals, and jihadists. China and Pakistan
share the belief that economic development can help stabilize Pakistan and improve its domestic
security situation. However, China also recognizes that the security, political, and cultural risks
and uncertainties facing the economic corridor cannot be overlooked.
Islamic Republic of Pakistan has a long and cooperative relationship with
People’s Republic of China. A close attractiveness of perceptions and
common interests remain the sign of two-sided relations. Since the 1962
Sino-Indian War, Pakistan has upheld China on most issues of significance to
the last mentioned; particularly those identified with the topic of China's
sway like Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet and other delicate issues. Islamabad
helped Beijing in reestablishing formal relations with the West. The helped
make possible the 1972 Nixon visit to China. Pakistan has teamed up with
China in comprehensive military and financial ventures, considering China to
be a stabilizer to India and the United States. China additionally has a reliable
record of supporting Pakistan in all issues. Pakistan's military needs hugely
Chinese warfare hardware, and joint tasks of both financial and combat areas.
China has provided hardware to help Pakistan's nuclear program and she has
been also blamed for giving Nuclear Technology to Pakistan.
The bilateral relations began in 1950 when Pakistan was among the
first countries to recognized PRC and break relations with the ROC
(Taiwan).The 1962 Sino-Indian War two countries have put significant
cooperation on the upkeep to a close and compassionate relationship. PRC
has given financial, military, and specified support to Pakistan and both consider a close strategic
partner. Appeasing relations were established in

1950, military assistance started in 1960s, a strategic unification was formed

in 1972, and financial cooperation started in 1979. China is the Pakistan's
largest arms supplier and third largest trading partner. Beijing also assisted
Islamabad nuclear program. The Pressler Amendment in 1990s suspended all
American military support and concerns that Pakistan was to build up a
nuclear weapon. Beijing has since 1990 blown out into military and financial
cooperation owing to of Pakistan's opinion that America's impact and support
in the area should be countered with Beijing help.
China has been a stable source of military hardware to the Pakistani
Army, establishing ammunition factories, giving mechanical assistance, and
modernizing existing facilities. Both are engaged with the joint wander of
several projects to upgrade military and weaponry systems, like JF-17
Thunder, K-8 Karakorum propel preparing air ship, space technology,
AWACS systems, Al-Khalid tanks and the Babur cruise missile. China is the
largest investor in the Gwadar Deep Sea Port.The port is strategically situated
at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(PEC) which is the key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
another major cooperation between two states. CPEC will connect Asia,
Africa and Europe. The initial cost of CPEC was $ 46 billion but later it
reached $62 billion and it will connect 67 states.

Historical Background of Pak-China relations

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan recognized the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in 1950s and she became the first Muslim and third non
Communist State to recognized PRC as an independent State. The diplomatic
relations between Karachi and Peking was started in May 1951 (Khan R. M.,
2011). Since the formation of diplomatic relations both Islamabad and
Beijing were enjoyed all weather tested friendship and became the virtue of
best neighborhood relation in World. In historical context both states shared
very best cooperation so, the brief overview of the historical background
Pakistan and China are explore in following steps;Pak-China Relations in 21st Century: a Critical Appraisal
Recognition of China and dawn of diplomatic ties (1949-1960)
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 under
the leadership of Mao Zedong while the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was
became independent state in 1947. Pakistan recognized PRC as an
independent state in 1950s instead of Taiwan. The diplomatic relations
between Beijing and Karachi were established in May 1951 (Khan R. M.,
2011). In the initial age of the establishment of diplomatic relations the trade
relation buildup between Pakistan and China. Due to the issue of the
devaluation of currency trade relation between Pakistan and India suffered
hugely. Pakistan needed coal to run her industries and wanted to export
cotton and Jute but due to currency issue India refused to import Cotton and
Jute, at that crucial time China offer coal in exchange of Cotton and that was
called “Coal for Cotton barter deal” (Javaid & Jahangir, 2015).
Pakistan joined American security pact SEATO and CENTO initially
to counter external threat due to which the bilateral relations not gained
proper place. Later in the Bandung Conference of 1955 in Indonesia
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammod Ali Bogra successfully convinced the
Chinese counterpart Chou En-Lai that Pakistan is not against China under
SEATO and CENTO. (Javaid & Jahangir, 2015) The Bandung Conference
seeded the cooperation and mutual trust between Beijing and Karachi. In the
mid of the 1950 Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy visited China and he
openly explain that Pakistan joined Capitalist not means total ban on Pakistan
friendship with Communist states. Later in 1956 Chinese Primer Zhou Enlai
visited Karachi and meet with his counterpart. In that visit both leaders
agreed that the political difference between Pakistan and China should not
prevent to strengthening the friendship. In late 1950s the issue of Tibet raised
and PLA took strong action to crush the Tibetan people. Dale Lama the
spiritual leader of Tibet flees to India and in that issue Pakistan was not in
favored China (Grare, 2017).
Crisis and Cooperation between Pakistan and China (1961-1970)
In the initial age of the era Ayub Khan introduced new policy and
wanted to have good and friendly relations with three big powers China,
Soviet Union and United States. While in the beginning of era the bilateral
relations faced some challenges and issues due to border issue between
Pakistan and China. The Sino-India war leads two countries more closely.
Pakistan condemned the act of India after the Indo-China war. Later this
issue was solved by border agreement in March, 1963. In 1963 China also
gave $50 million interest free economic support to strengthen Pakistan
economic bond. In this border agreement Pakistan gifted the area of 5180
square kilometers and gained the area of 1942 square kilometer from China.
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This agreement was critiqued by both India and America. The United States
postponed the point four $3 million loan for the construction of Dacca
airport. Then China provided the financial assistance to Pakistan. In that year
China and Pakistan also signed air transport agreement. According to that
agreement Both PRC and Pakistan’s airline could operate in each other
territory (Javaid & Jahangir, 2015).
In the war of 1965 PRC provided military, economic and political
support to Pakistan against India. China also supported Pakistan’s stance on
Kashmir and criticized on India. In that war Soviet Union not participated
while United States placed sanctions on both states. China provided all type
of assistance to Pakistan and this war becomes the traumatic event that
shaped the friendly relations. In 1966 China supplied the weapons worth of $
250 million to Pakistan in which Chinese mad F-6 Fighters, T-9 Tanks and
anti- aircraft guns are included (Jetly, 2012). Than Pakistan realized China’s
importance and she gave Most Favorite Nation status to China and signed
trade agreement. China provided economic assistance of worth 15 million
Rupees to Heavy Mechanical complex (HMC) Taxila. In response Pakistan
supported one China policy and Chin’s membership in United Nations
(Javaid & Jahangir, 2015). At the end of 1960s Pakistan and China jointly
started the Karakorum highway project. The major shift in China’s policy
was occurred when the border skirmishes were broke out between Soviet
Union and China. China tilted her policy towards west specially United
States and Pakistan played the vital role. The United States was also in the
favor of China and she wanted to established relations with PRC. US needed
the help of Pakistan in this regard and US President Nixon requested Pakistan
to established China-US channel to buildup relations.
Recognitions of China in World politics and strategic cooperation (1971-
1990)
The era of 1970s was the most important era of friendship between
Pakistan and China. Pakistan was playing vital role to established relations
between US and China. In this regard Pakistan fully supported her best friend
China and her ally America and the US National Security Advisor Hennery
Kissinger secretly visited China with the assistance of Pakistan (Xie T. , 2009
). Kissinger met with different leaders in China and furnished the Chinese
land for President Nixon visit. In October 1971, China got membership in
UN and also permanent membership in UN Security Council which was due
to the overtly support of Pakistan. In the Pak-India War of 1971 China
supported Pakistan and provides ammunitions and arms. In that particular
year China got permanent membership in UNSC and Chinese representative
criticized on India for the crisis. China fully supported Pakistan in UN
General Assembly and UN Security Council.Pak-China Relations in 21st Century: a Critical Appraisal
Later in February 1972 the United States President Richard Nixon
visited China and meet Mao Zedong and other leaders. He spent eight days in
China and Nixon was the first US President who visited China after 1949 (Ali
S. M., 2005). President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique0f 1972.
Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited China and meet with his
counterpart in May 1972. China provided MiG-19 fighter and 100 T-54 and
T-59 tanks to Pakistan (Jetly, 2012). China also approved $300 million
economic and military aid to Pakistan. In August 1972 China vetoed against
the membership of newly state Bangladesh in the United Nations. Later
Pakistan gained $600 million economic and military aid and China provided
500 T-59 tanks, 25 naval vessels, and 300 F-6 combat aircraft. Pakistan also
constructed a tank repair factory at Taxila and air force repair factory near
Kamra with the assistance of China (Javaid & Jahangir, 2015).
Pakistan signed a protocol on defense cooperation and production
with China in 1974. The relations between Pakistan and China became more
reliable and strong in this era. On the other side Islamabad became the center
of cooperation between US and China. Later at the end of the era Soviet
Union invaded in Afghanistan and Pakistan became the front ally of US to
fight American War with Soviet army. Due to the Soviet invasion in Kabul
the Washington, Beijing and Islamabad axes was launched to sabotage the
Soviet intervention. China condemned the act of Soviet and considered the
invasion as a serious threat for the peace and security of Asia.
The era of 1980s was the most important era of Cold War due to
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and US, China and Pakistan’s collaboration
against Soviet Union. This was the era of triangular detent and entente
between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Where Pakistan’s was play
significant role as an instrument in Afghan War against Soviet. United States
and China both provide military as well as economic support to Pakistan to
surplus the evil. In 1986 China signed comprehensive nuclear cooperation
agreement with Pakistan (Khan R. M., 2011). In that agreement China agreed
to export four nuclear reactors to Pakistan to full fill the energy requirements.
The 2 reactors are installed initially while remaining two was installed in
2010 (Khan R. M., 2011). In mean time of crisis of Tiananmen Square
incident Pakistan favored China. Pakistan also favored one China policy and
recognized Tibet and Taiwan as a part of mainland China. China also
provided military support to Pakistan to strengthen her defense and military
capability (Gilani, 2011). Furthermore in the era of 1980s Pakistan officials
and Chinese officials several times visited Beijing and Islamabad and several
MOUs were signed. The last visit of the era was the visit of Pakistani Prime
Minister Banazir Bhutto to People’s Republic of China and Chinese Primer
Li Ping visited Pakistan. This era was also full of cooperation and
coordination between the followers of two different ideologies.
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Political Crisis in Pakistan and Pakistan Nuclear Explosion (1990-2000)
In the initial years of this era Pakistan faced a serious political crisis
but behind all issues and crisis the relations between People’s Republic of
China and Islamic Republic of Pakistan never concerned. But due to ups and
downs in Pakistan politics the relation not flourished as much as required
(Khan R. M., 2011). In this era all the West and pro-democratic States were
against China for the violation of human rights but time tested friendship and
cooperation between Pakistan and PRC were developed (Price, 2011). The
United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan due to her nuclear program but
China was the only state who supported Pakistan in mean times. China
provided all assistance and support to Pakistan regarding her nuclear program
as well as economic support. The People’s Republic of China also provide
assistant in the manufacturing of Pakistan missile technology in this era. The
Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Pakistan in 1996 and met his
counterpart and other officials in Islamabad.
Pakistan tested her nuclear weapon in May 1998, in the response of
Indian nuclear explosion. China fully supported Pakistan nuclear program
and provided full assistance to become nuclear state. However, China not
vetoed against the resolution of UN Security Council 1172 (Rakisits, 2012).
The resolution was basically condemning the nuclear test of India and
Pakistan. The second most important event of this era was the Kargil War
which was fought between Pakistan and India on Line of Control (LOC).
China forced both states to solve the issue by peaceful negotiation while she
remained neutral in this crisis (Rakisits, 2012). After the War the democratic
government was takeover by military General Pervez Musharraf while the
cooperation and friendly relations with China remain his first priority. After
the few month of Musharraf took office he visited China, meet with his
counterpart and assured for cooperation and friendly relations (Rakisits,
2012).
Golden Age to Strengthen Economic, Military, Strategic Cooperation
and Bilateral Comradeship (2001-2008)
This era of the 21st Century become very fruitful age for Pak-China
relations in all fields prominently in defense, economic and strategic fields.
The military government under General Pervez Musharraf became more
cooperative than previous governments. He visited China several times to
China and Chinese officials also visited to Islamabad. The year 2001 was the
50th anniversary of Pakistan-China friendship and this year was celebrated
with great zeal and zest in both countries. The Chinese officials and
Pakistan’s officials visited to Beijing and Islamabad. One of the most
important initiative take by Musharraf was that he took over the operation of Pak-China Relations in 21st
Century: a Critical Appraisal
Gwadar deep Sea Port to China. The Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited
Pakistan in May 2001. He urged the two sides to increase cooperation in
agriculture, infrastructure, information technology and other fields under the
principle of mutual benefit for achieving common goals (Fazal-ur-Rahman,
2002). During this visit Islamabad and Beijing signed 6 Agreements and 1
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The six agreements comprised on
Economic and Technical Cooperation, Tourism Cooperation, Lease
Agreement on Saindak Project, Supply of Trains engine, Supply of Passenger
Coaches to Pakistan Railways, White Oil Pipeline and MOU between
Pakistan Telecommunications and China's ZTE.
In 2002, Chinese Premier Wu Bangguo visited Pakistan to attain the
ground breaking ceremony of Gwadar deep Sea port. China provided 80%
finance to the Gwadar project phase one. The total coast of the project was
about $248 million (Fani, 2009). In the fiscal year of 2002 bilateral trade
between Islamabad and Beijing reached at the level of $1.8 billion (Price,
2011). Furthermore in this particular Pakistan called foreign investors to
invest in the Saindak project. A Chinese company Metallurgical Corporation
of China (MCC) showed her interest in this project and signed deal for ten
year lease (Khan & Kasi, 2017).
In 2003 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali
visited China and meet with his counterpart (Gilani, 2011). In that visit both
states agreed to develop bilateral trade and cooperation. In that particular year
President Musharraf also visited Beijing and met with his Chinese
counterpart (Gilani, 2011). In 2004 Pakistan and China conducted joint army
exercise in Xining province (Jetly, 2012). That exercise was basically for
counter terrorism and friendly exercise and named it as “Friendship 2004”
(Jetly, 2012, pp. 9-10). In 2005 China agreed to provide four Frigate ship to
Pakistan Navy (Jetly, 2012). The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Good Neighborly Relations was also signed in 2005 (Rakisits, 2012).
In the fiscal year of 2006, in November Chinese President visited
Islamabad and signed China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement which was
come into force since July 2007 (Rakisits, 2012). The Chinese President also
invited 500 Youngsters from Pakistan to visit China (Gilani, 2011). China
also introduced Urdu department in Peking University (Gilani, 2011). In
Hu’s visit Pakistan and China both agreed to improve trade volume from $5.2
billion to $15 billion by 2010 (Rakisits, 2012). The second Anti-Terrorism
Military exercise was also took placed in 2006 (Jetly, 2012). In the year of
2007 China-Pakistan joint ventured multirole fighter air craft JF-17 Thunder
was publically rolled out and the first delivery was released. The first phase
of Gwadar deep Seaport was completed and inaugurated in 2007 with the
assistance of China (Jetly, 2012). The total coast of the first phase was about
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$248 million while China provided 80% of the coast (Jetly, 2012). China also
provided $200 million for the construction of Coastal Highway connecting
Gwadar to Karachi (Jetly, 2012). In the era of President Pervez Musharraf
the bilateral relations become stronger and reliable as compared to previous
periods. Pakistan and China also signed extradition treaty in 2007 (Mazari,
2013).
Pakistan Relations with China in Obama’s Era (2009-2016)
The relations between Islamic Republic of Pakistan and People’s
Republic of China in the era of 2009-2016 were more successful and it turned
into strongest relationship of the World. There is no permanent friend and
permanent enemy in international relations but the bilateral relations between
Pakistan and China is second to none (Kataria & Naveed, 2014). From the
beginning of relations their ties were strong and all weather tested friendship.
Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani expressed the Pakistan-
China relations in these words that “Pak-China relations is sweeter than
honey, stronger then steel, higher then mountains and deeper then Ocean”
and in the words of Chinese former President Hu Jintao that “China can leave
gold but not friendship with Pakistan” (Jetly, 2012). The bilateral relations
between two states in Obama era (2009-2016) was consisted on two parts as
ruling parties in Pakistan, the first tenure was the Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) government under President Asif Ali Zardari and the second tenure is
Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) government. But our focus is the
era of 2009 to 2016 and the bilateral relations of this tenure is enlighten in
following key notes.
Economic and Strategic Cooperation
In 2009 China became second largest trading partner of Pakistan and
is also the second great hope of Pakistan after United States (Riedel & Singh,
2010). China and Pakistan signed the first free trade agreement in 2006 and
the second free trade agreement in 2009 (Malik D. A., 2013). Pakistan is the
first South Asian state having free trade agreement with China. In 2013 the
operation of Gwadar deep Sea port was given to Chinese state run company
while before that port was operated by Singapore’s PSA international. In
May 2014, Islamabad and Beijing signed another most important project of
Metro Bus in Lahore and the Orange Line train project is also included
(Javaid & Javaid, 2016).
In April 2015, the Chinese President came into Pakistan and signed
51 MOUs and 11 projects in which China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) is one the most important project (Ahmar, 2015). The CPEC is the
combination of different projects with the initially estimated cost of $46 Pak-China Relations in 21st
Century: a Critical Appraisal
116
billion later it reached $52 billion then $55 billion and then $62billion
(Siddiqui, 2017). CPEC is one main part of Chinese ‘One Belt One Road’
(OBOR) policy. CPEC is the combination of road networks, highways,
railways and power generation plant from the China-Pakistan border to
Gwadar deep sea port (Ahmar, 2015). CPEC is the game changer for Pakistan
and the whole region (Sial, 2014). CPEC will be able to establish trade
relations with China and landlocked Central Asian states.
The trade volume between Pakistan and China was about $2 billion
in 2006 and it reached $16 billion in 2015 (Javaid & Javaid, 2016). The
development in trade relations is about 12% annually increased and it is
expected to further increase to $25 billion by coming two or three years. The
trade relations were developed day by day and the massive export was done
by Chinese traders. Pakistan’s imports from China in 2008 were about
$3774.1 million and her export to China was $915.5 million. PRC’s export
towards Pakistan in the fiscal year 2014-15 was $ 14573 million and her
import from Pakistan was $ 2509 million. The details of import, export of
bilateral trade and the trade deficits are mention bellow in the following table.
Counter Terrorism and Military Cooperation
China and Pakistan shared a long history of military and defense
cooperation. The beginning of military cooperation was started in 1960s and
the reliability of this cooperation boom up day by day. According to
RajshreeJetly, (A research fellow of South Asian Studies in National
University Singapore) China sold about $7 billion worth of military
equipment to Pakistan from 1978-2008.
In November 2009 China agreed to sell J-10 advanced fighter jets to
Pakistan and the deal was about $1.4 billion worth (Riedel & Singh, 2010).
China gave 50 JF-17 to Pakistan after a month of Osama dead. China alsoORJSS
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launched a communication Satellite for Pakistan in August 2011 (Mazari,
2013). Pakistan and China are conducted joint military exercise every two
years since 2004 to counter terrorism. In 2011 China and Pakistan signed
three MOUs to strengthen military cooperation, communication and
intelligence sharing to counter terrorism (Mazari, 2013). Furthermore in that
particular year Pakistan tested short range surface to surface range missile
Hataf-II which was completed by Chinese cooperation (Rakisits, 2012).
China was the only state that supported Pakistan after the Ben Laden
operation and taken supportive stance (Gilani, 2011). Islamabad and Beijing
are working on several projects to strengthen Pakistan’s defense capability. In
these projects K-8 Karakoram advance training aircraft, production of Al-
Khalid tank, Babar cruise missile, airborne warning and control system and
JF-17 thunder. The JF-17 will minimize the Pakistan’s dependency on US F-
16 (Mazari, 2013). China also supported Pakistan to strengthen her naval
forces and she supplied four frigates to the Pakistan’s Navy. China also
upgraded the Karachi dockyard.
China has many concerns over Muslim Uighur populations in
Xinjiang province due to their strongest affiliation with terrorist organizations
such as East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Since the incident of
9/11 Pakistan and China are sharing strategies to counter terrorism. In those
actions the joint military exercise of Pakistan and China since 2004 is more
prominent. China allowed any foreign army first time in 2004 to drill military
exercise since her birth (Khan R. A., 2012). China and Pakistan conducted
several military exercise since 2004 and the basic aim of the joint exercise is
to counter terrorism (Jetly, 2012).
Energy and Infrastructure Cooperation
In 2009 Pakistan and China signed several MOUs but one of the most
important MOU regarding to energy that was the construction of Bunji Dam
in GilgitBaltistan. In that MOU both states are agreed to construct a Dam on
Bunji which can generate 7000 megawatt electricity (Dawn, 2009). In 2014
China approved a loan of $ 6.5 million for the construction of nuclear power
project at Karachi. In this project China National Nuclear Corporation
(CNNC) financed two reactors of 1100 megawatt each (Khan & Ahmad,
2015). This project can individually generate more power than the whole
projects functioning in Pakistan.
Another most important project for energy and infrastructure
cooperation is CPEC. The CPEC is the one major project of Chinese OBOR
policy (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015). Initially the cost of CPEC was estimated $ 46
billion and later it reached $ 52 billion (Memon). CPEC is the network of Pak-China Relations in 21st
Century: a Critical Appraisal
118
roads, air ports, sea ports and railways line which connect the Gwadar Sea
port with Chinese city Kashgar via different routes. CPEC will provide way
for the landlocked Central Asian states and Afghanistan. It will connect
China with Middle East, Africa and other European states (Sial, 2014).
Pakistan is facing the shortage of energy, due to this specially Pakistan
industrial sector and other all fields of life is disturb. The China Pakistan
Economic Corridor will resolve this issue (Ahmar, 2015). There are more
than 15 energy projects under CPEC to fulfill the energy requirement of
Pakistan some of them are 2×660MW Coal-fired Power Plants at Port Qasim
Karachi, SukiKinari Hydro Power Station, Naran, KPK, Sahiwal 2x660MW
Coal-fired Power Plant, Punjab, EngroThar Coal fired Power Plant, 300 MW
imported Coal Based Power Project at Gwadar, Quaid-e-Azam 1000 MW
Solar Park Bahawalpur and SSRL Thar Coal Block-I 6.8 mtpa & SEC Mine
Mouth Power Plant (2×660MW) (Ashraf, 2017).
Cultural Exchange Programs
China and Pakistan shared a friendly and eternity relations due to
whom they are introduced several cultural exchange programs. China and
Pakistan signed their first agreement on bilateral cultural exchange agreement
in 1965 and till now they signed more than 9 agreements and MOUs on
cultural exchange. Both states cultural delegations are performing different
cultural programs in both states. More than six thousands Pakistani students
are studying in China (Hussain M. , 2012). In 2008 Pakistan and China
signed MOUs to established campuses of Pak-China University in both states
(Kataria & Naveed, 2014). In that year Pakistan culture and communication
center was established in China Tsinghua University China. Later in 2009
Pakistan study center was established in Fudan University. In 2010 the Pak-
China Center Islamabad was inaugurated by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gilani and China’s Primer Wen Jiabao. In that ceremony Jiabao
announced that China would be providing contract treatment of 2000
Pakistanis free of charges every year (The Express Tribune, December 18,
2010). In 2011 Sindh government announced that Chinese language a
necessary subject in school level. China also introduced several scholarship
programs for Pakistani students and researcher. In 2013 the number of
students in China was approximately 8000 and the number of Chinese
technicians in Pakistan was about 15000 (Siddique, 2014).
The
establishment of Pak-China Institute in Islamabad is another most important
trigger and more than 3000 student are learning Chinese language (Siddique,
2014). Furthermore Government of Pakistan sent numbers of students to
China under cultural exchange program under the supervision of Higher
Education Commission Pakistan.ORJSS
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Conclusion
China-Pakistan relations were started in 1950s. Pakistan is the first
Muslim state who recognized People’s Republic of China. Since the
establishment of diplomatic relationship both states are enjoying all weather
tested friendship. Pakistan and China are cooperated with each other in all
joys and sorrows. China helped Pakistan in different wars with India like
1965, 1971 and 1999 war. Islamabad also supported Beijing in United
Nations and she also supported one China policy. China also helped Pakistan
to become nuclear power. China provides technological assistance and
technical support to Pakistan nuclear program. China moreover provided
missile technology to strengthen Pakistan defence and security. Pakistan and
China jointly launched different type of tactical weapon manufacturing
industries in Pakistan.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and People’s Republic of China
entered in a new era of brotherhood relationship in the initial age of the 21 st
century as this century is marked for regional integration. China and Pakistan
signed Free Trade Agreement and Islamabad became first South Asian State
that signed Free Trade Agreement with Beijing. Pakistan and China also
jointly launched several other projects regarding defence and security.
Pakistan also became the first country who jointly operates military drill with
People’s Liberation Army. Furthermore both countries are cooperating in
defence, strategic, economic, social, trade, energy, and health fields since the
beginning. The CPEC and JF-17 Thunder is one of the most prominent
symbols of friendship. Owing to the strategic and reliable relationship of
Islamabad and Beijing the US-India partnership grew up to counter Pak-
China friendship. India and US signed nuclear deal with India although she is
not member of any non-nuclear organization.

BRI PROJECT

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is one of
the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived. Launched in 2013 by President Xi
Jinping, the vast collection of development and investment initiatives was originally devised to
link East Asia and Europe through physical infrastructure. In the decade since, the project has
expanded to Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, significantly broadening China’s economic and
political influence.
Some analysts see the project as an unsettling extension of China’s rising power, and as the costs
of many of the projects have skyrocketed, opposition has grown in some countries. Meanwhile,
the United States shares the concern of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for
China-led regional development and military expansion. President Joe Biden has maintained his
predecessors’ skeptical stance towards Beijing’s actions, but Washington has struggled to offer
participating governments a more appealing economic vision.
President Xi announced the initiative during official visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013.
The plan was two-pronged: the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road.
The two were collectively referred to first as the One Belt, One Road initiative but eventually
became the Belt and Road Initiative.
How the United States Should Respond to the BRI
Xi’s vision included creating a vast network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and
streamlined border crossings, both westward—through the mountainous former Soviet republics
—and southward, to Pakistan, India, and the rest of Southeast Asia. Such a network would
expand the international use of Chinese currency, the renminbi, and “break the bottleneck in
Asian connectivity,” according to Xi. (In 2018, the Asian Development Bank estimated that the
continent faces a yearly infrastructure financing shortfall of over $900 billion.) In addition to
physical infrastructure, China has funded hundreds of special economic zones, or industrial areas
designed to create jobs, and encouraged countries to embrace its tech offerings, such as the 5G
network powered by telecommunications giant Huawei.
Xi subsequently announced plans for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road at the 2013 summit of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia. To accommodate expanding
maritime trade traffic, China would invest in port development along the Indian Ocean, from
Southeast Asia all the way to East Africa and parts of Europe.
China’s overall ambition for the BRI is staggering. To date, 147 countries—accounting for two-
thirds of the world’s population and 40 percent of global GDP—have signed on to projects or
indicated an interest in doing so.
Analysts estimate the largest so far to be the estimated $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), a collection of projects connecting China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port on the
Arabian Sea. In total, China has already spent an estimated $1 trillion on such efforts. Experts
have predicted that China’s expenses over the life of the BRI could reach as much as $8 trillion,
though estimates vary.
What does China hope to achieve?
China has both geopolitical and economic motivations behind the initiative. Xi has promoted a
vision of a more assertive China, even as the country’s outstanding loans have grown to the
equivalent of over a quarter of its GDP.
To date, 147 countries—accounting for two-thirds of the world’s population and 40 percent of
global GDP—have signed on to projects or indicated an interest in doing so.
Experts see the BRI as one of the main planks of a bolder Chinese statecraft under Xi, alongside
the Made in China 2025 economic development strategy. For Xi, the BRI serves as pushback
against the much-touted U.S. “pivot to Asia,” as well as a way for China to develop new trade
linkages, cultivate export markets, boost Chinese incomes, and export China’s excess productive
capacity. “China has had a fair amount of success in redrawing trade maps around the world, in
ways that put China at the center and not the U.S. or Europe,” says CFR’s David Sacks, an
expert on U.S.-China relations.
At the same time, China is motivated to boost global economic links to its western regions,
which historically have been neglected. Promoting economic development in the western
province of Xinjiang, where separatist violence has been on the upswing, is a major priority, as is
securing long-term energy supplies from Central Asia and the Middle East, especially via routes
the U.S. military cannot disrupt.
More broadly, Chinese leaders are determined to restructure the economy to avoid the so-called
middle-income trap. In this scenario, which has plagued close to 90 percent of middle-income
countries since 1960, wages go up and quality of life improves as low-skilled manufacturing
rises, but countries struggle to then shift to producing higher-value goods and services.
Finally, Beijing could seek geopolitical leverage over BRI countries. A 2021 study analyzed over
one hundred debt financing contracts China signed with foreign governments and found that the
contracts often contain clauses that restrict restructuring with the group of twenty-two major
creditor nations known as the “Paris Club.” China also frequently retains the right to demand
repayment at any time, giving Beijing the ability to use funding as a tool to enforce Chinese hot
button issues such as Taiwan or the treatment of Uyghurs. In January 2022, Nicaragua officially
joined BRI, one month after severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
What are the potential roadblocks?
The Belt and Road Initiative has also stoked opposition. For some countries that take on large
amounts of debt to fund infrastructure upgrades, BRI money is seen as a potential poisoned
chalice. China views BRI projects as a commercial endeavor [PDF], with loans close to a market
interest rate that it expects to be fully repaid. Some BRI investments have involved opaque
bidding processes and required the use of Chinese firms. As a result, contractors have inflated
costs, leading to canceled projects and political backlash.
Examples of such criticisms abound. In Malaysia, former prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad
campaigned against overpriced BRI initiatives and canceled $22 billion worth of BRI projects,
although he later announced his “full support” for the initiative. CFR’s Belt and Road Tracker
shows overall debt to China has soared since 2013, surpassing 20 percent of GDP in some
countries.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine roiled global markets, a
climbing number of low-income BRI countries have struggled to repay loans associated with the
initiative, spurring a wave of debt crises and new criticism for BRI. In Pakistan, for example,
imports required to build CPEC infrastructure contributed to a widening budget deficit,
ultimately resulting in a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). And in Ghana and
Zambia, high debt loads that partly consisted of BRI loans led to sovereign default. However,
many countries that sign on to BRI have few alternatives, Sacks says.
“If loans that you know are charging an exorbitant interest rate are the only way [to get
infrastructure financing], you still have to weigh that trade off and probably proceed with that,”
he says.
Other skeptics connect the BRI with climate change. Though China committed to stop building
coal-fired power plants abroad in 2021, nonrenewable energy investment has made up nearly
half of all BRI spending; ambiguity remains about whether the commitment applies to projects
already in progress or only to new projects, and if it restricts coal-fired power plant financing in
addition to construction.
How has the United States responded to China-led regional integration?
The United States has shared other countries' concerns about China’s intentions. Since the
Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia, the United States has spent billions of dollars and flexed
diplomatic muscle to build infrastructure and foster cooperation between low-income countries.
President Donald Trump passed the BUILD act, which consolidated Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), a U.S. government agency for development finance, with components of
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) into a separate agency (the
Development Finance Corporation) with a $60 billion investment portfolio.

In 2021, President Joe Biden, in collaboration with the Group of Seven (G7), launched the Build
Back Better World Initiative (“B3W”) an infrastructure investment program conceived to
compete with BRI. Though some supporters say B3W acts as a complement to BRI, many
acknowledge that its lack of financing prevents it from acting as a serious challenger to China’s
initiative. One year after B3W was announced, commitments under the initiative totaled only $6
million, and it had been renamed the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.
Rather than investing in infrastructure, where China holds an economic advantage (China won
more than eight times as many World Bank-funded infrastructure contracts as the United States
in 2020), critics say Washington should boost its aid-based lending through existing multilateral
institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF.

Others have argued that the United States might find a silver lining in the BRI. Jonathan E.
Hillman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says the United States could use
BRI projects as a way to have China pay for infrastructure initiatives in Central Asia that are also
in the U.S. interest.

What is the role for third countries?

Some countries have sought to balance their concerns about China’s ambitions against the BRI’s
potential benefits.

India. India has tried to convince countries that the BRI is a plan to dominate Asia, warning of
what some analysts have called a “String of Pearls” geoeconomic strategy whereby China creates
unsustainable debt burdens for its Indian Ocean neighbors in order to seize control of regional
choke points. In particular, New Delhi has long been unsettled by China’s decades-long embrace
of its traditional rival, Pakistan. Meanwhile, India has provided its own development assistance
to neighbors, most notably Afghanistan, where it has spent $3 billion on infrastructure projects.

Although India was a founding member of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
Indian and Chinese officials have since diverged on trade policy. Accordingly, the United States
views India as a counterweight to a China-dominated Asia and has sought to knit together its
strategic relationships in the region, most recently via the 2022 Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework.

Japan. Tokyo has a similar strategy to New Delhi’s, balancing its interest in regional
infrastructure development with long-standing suspicions about China’s intentions. Japan has
committed over $300 billion in public and private financing to infrastructure projects throughout
Asia. Together with India, Japan has also agreed to cultivate the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
(AAGC), a plan to develop and connect ports from Myanmar to East Africa, though little
progress has been made on the initiative since it was announced in 2017.

Europe. Over two-thirds of European Union (EU) member countries have formally signed on to
BRI with large Chinese infrastructure investment responsible for projects such as the renovated
port of Piraeus in Greece and the Budapest-Belgrade railway in Hungary. Beijing has also
funded a number of projects on the continent in non-EU countries. These investments have
“made it harder for the EU to craft a united approach to China,” and Greece and Hungary have
obstructed bloc-wide efforts to criticize China, CFR’s Jennifer Hillman and Alex Tippett write.

Some European countries have been more critical. French President Emmanuel Macron has
urged prudence, suggesting during a 2018 trip to China that the BRI could make partner
countries “vassal states.” In December 2021, the EU announced Global Gateway, a $300 billion
infrastructure investment program explicitly meant to rival BRI, which critics say is a “drop in
the ocean” compared to BRI. Others worry that China is using BRI funds to gain influence in
Balkan countries hoping to become EU members such as Serbia, thereby providing China access
to the heart of the EU’s common market.

Russia. Moscow has become one of the BRI’s most enthusiastic partners, though it responded to
Xi’s announcement at first with reticence, worried that Beijing’s plans would outshine Moscow’s
vision for a “Eurasian Economic Union” and impinge on its traditional sphere of influence.

As Russia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated, however, President Vladimir Putin has
pledged to link his Eurasian vision with the BRI. Some experts are skeptical of such an alliance,
which they argue would be economically asymmetrical. Russia’s economy and its total trade
volume are both roughly one-eighth the size of China’s—a gulf that the BRI could widen in the
coming years. And in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, some analysts have said that Beijing’s
refusal to condemn Russia has alienated Eastern European countries that are viewed as targets of
BRI.