CHAPTER 16

GLOBALIZATION AND NATION-BUILDING IN THE

PHILIPPINES:

Introduction
When the Philippines acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the
country demonstrated its determination to face the challenges of globalization.
Recognizing that globalization is the buzzword of the 21 st century and inevitably
affects the growth and governance of many nation-states, the Philippines bravely
entered the WTO to prepare itself for global competitiveness and reap the benefits
that globalization may bring.
Despite its great optimism on joining the WTO, the Philippines is still lagging
behind its Southeast Asian neighbors in terms of economic performance. Whereas
Philippine economic growth was second only to Japan’s in the 1960s, the
Philippines at present is viewed as one of the sick men of Asia.
This chapter argues that the difficulties encountered by the Philippines in
meeting the challenges of globalization stem from the nature of the Philippine
state. The Philippines entered the global economic arena with its domestic political
economy unprepared. The Philippine state has failed to create the kind of fertile
socioeconomic environment that would have prepared the country for global
competition.

The Nature of the Philippine State

The state that developed after the declaration of Philippine independence in 1945
may be described as both a “premature” and “weak” state. It is a premature state
because it was born before reaching the full term of statehood. That is, it became a
state not through the development of a cohesive national consciousness, but
through the actions of its former colonial masters. As a result, the state’s legitimacy
is contested in some regions. The Philippine state’s weakness, meanwhile, stems
from its lack of relative autonomy from the parochial interests of dominant Filipino
social classes, powerful political families and clans, an influential landed elite, and
wealthy Filipino capitalists.1
The Philippines lacks the following characteristics of a mature and strong state:

1 See Temario C. Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family and State in Philippine Manufacturing (1994).
203
 1. The ends and purposes of government have become settled and
founded on a significant ideological consensus;
2. Most social groups (ethnic, religious, linguistic, and the like) have
been successfully assimilated, or have achieved protection,
equality, or self-determination through autonomy, federalism, or
other special devices;
3. Secessionism no longer constitutes a major goal of minorities.
Territorial frontiers have become legitimized and sanctified through
legal instruments;
4. Leaders are selected on the basis of a regular procedure like
elections. No group, family, clan or sector can hold power
permanently;
5. Military and policy organizations remain under effective civilian
control;
6. The mores of governance preclude personal enrichment through
various political activities.2

A Premature State
The Philippine state is a premature state because its claim to statehood is
predominantly based on anti-colonial sentiment rather on the “natural” bonds
formed through common historical experience, consanguinity and identification
with a common language or a common religion. 3 The anti-colonial sentiment in the
Philippines was not even anchored on a popularly accepted notion of “nationalism”
but rather on a limited or narrow elite conception articulated by 19 th century
Filipino thinkers initially spearheaded by Jose Rizal. 4 Anti-colonial sentiments
developed in the Philippines not as a result of a natural blossoming of “national
consciousness” but as a result of overwhelming exasperation with the three
centuries of oppression under the Spanish colonial administration and a half-
century of resentment under American rule with a four-year colonial interruption
during the Japanese occupation.5
Another characteristic of a premature state is that its legitimacy is challenged.
The Philippine state is considered legitimate by virtue of international recognition
and “popular” support. However, as in other premature states in the world,
resistance groups such as local communists and Muslim secessionist groups are
contesting the legitimacy of the Philippine state. 6

2 See K. J. Holsti, “War, Peace and the State of State”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 16, No. 4
(1995), pp. 33233.
3 Ibid., p. 327.
4 See Floro C. Quibuyen, Rizal, American Hegemony and Philippine Nationalism: A Nation Aborted (Quezon
City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1999). Also see Leon Ma. Guerrero, The First Filipino: A Biography of Jose Rizal
(Quezon City: Guerrero Publishing, 1998) and John N. Shumacher, The Making of a Nation: Essays on
Nineteenth-Century Filipino Nationalism (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1991).
5 See Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volumes 1 and 2 (Quezon City: Aklahi Foundation,
Inc., 1989).
6 C.B. O’Briend, “The Show of State in a Neo-Colonial Twilight: Francophone Africa,” in J. Manor (ed),
Rethinking Third World Politics (London: Longman, 1991), p. 145.
204
 The premature nature of the Philippine state may also be attributed to the fact
that it derives its legitimacy from the actions of its erstwhile colonial master, the
United States. The Philippine state is a colonial creation supported by a minority of
people constituting the elite who, in turn, utilizes the apparatus of a weak state to
get the needed “legitimacy” from the people through a defective electoral and party
system.7
The Philippine state also is premature because the concept of a “Filipino
national identity” is contested by some Filipinos, especially those from the
Muslim, Cordillera, and Cebu areas. Some Filipinos identify more with their
regions or ethnic origins than with the “Filipino nation.” The sense of Filipino
regionalism seems to be greater than the sense of Filipino nationalism. One
Filipino writer even laments:

We are a paradox even to ourselves. The cliché question of

identity, for instance, bedevils many of us, not because we are
unsure of ourselves but because we cannot, to our own
satisfaction, define ourselves.8

Before the colonial period, a Filipino identity never existed. Pre-colonial

inhabitants of the archipelago viewed themselves as Ilocano, Bicolano, Cebuano,
Tausug, Maranawan, Maguindanaons, etc. The “Filipino” concept came from the
Spanish name “Felipe” in honor of King Philip. During the Spanish period, the use
of “Filipino” was an elitist concept with racial connotations. It was used to
describe the Creoles, Spaniards born in the Philippines. The natives were called
“Indios.”9 As a result of intermarriage between Creoles and wealthy Indios and the
emergence of Spanish and Chinese mestizos, the term Filipino eventually acquired
a larger area of application in the 19th century.
Commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the Philippine Revolution showed
that the quest for a Filipino national identity still preoccupies many writers. 9 The
Philippines remains a political community in search of a national identity in an
“imagined community.”10

A Weak State
The Philippine state is a weak state because its apparatus has constantly been under
the control of a powerful family, clan or prevailing group for the primary purpose

7 Rommel C. Banlaoi and Clarita R. Carlos, Political Parties in the Philippines: From 1900 to the Present
(Makati City: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 1997). Also see Clarita R. Carlos and Rommel C. Banlaoi, Elections in the Philippines:
From Precolonial Period to the Present (Makati City: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1997).
8 F. Sionil Jose, We Filipinos: Our Moral Malaise, Our Heroic Heritage (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing
House, 1999), p. 2. 9 Renato Constantino, The Making of a Filipino: A Story of Philippine Colonial Politics
(Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1969), pp. 5-9.
9 Elmer Ordonez (ed), Nationalist Literature: A Centennial Forum (Quezon City: University of the Philippines
Press and the Philippine Writers Academy, 1995).
10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1983). 12 Ibid., p. 332.
205
of personal aggrandizement.12 The Philippine state continues to fail to insulate
itself from the parochial interests of traditional families, clans and groups that have
dominated and benefited from Philippine politics. These forces compete with the
Philippine state in exercising effective control over its diverse population. 11
As a result of the weakness of the Philippine state, “preferential access to state
resources and state-conferred economic opportunities have traditionally been given
to political elite, friends and relatives of the regime in control of the state power.” 12
A weak Philippine state results in the “politics of privilege,” a rent-seeking activity
causing corruption and mismanagement of the Philippine political economy. 15 One
scholar describes this as “booty” or “crony” capitalism in which private interests
are pursued using public resources and in which economic and political oligarchs
abuse the apparatus of the state.13
A premature and weak Philippine state has produced weak institutions of
governance; thus, it is unable to manage the ethnic, religious and socioeconomic
diversities in its society. The advent of globalization not only aggravates these
diversities but also makes the Philippine state and its institutions of governance
even weaker for their failure to forge a national consensus necessary for nation-
building and socioeconomic development.

Diversities and Tensions in the Philippine Society

The Philippines is a highly diverse society. With an archipelago of more than 7,100
islands, its geographical setting has caused considerable ethnic, religious and
socioeconomic fragmentation. Although some Filipino scholars argue that the
waters connecting these islands unite Filipinos, in reality they serve merely as
channels of transportation facilitating inter-island commerce and migration rather
than transmitters of national unity and propagators of national consciousness.
These waters can even be the source of inter-island conflict due to ambiguous
coastal boundaries and ineffective government policies. Aggravating the situation
is the mountainous Philippine terrain, which makes intra-island interaction
similarly problematic. The Philippines’ physical geography has produced a highly
diverse society, as shown by the presence of at least five major languages spoken in
the country with more or less 80 distinct ethnic dialects.

Ethnic Diversity
Filipinos are products of an ethnic mix composed of Malay, Chinese and
indigenous groups with Muslim, Spanish and American influences. Of the three
external influences, the mark left by the Americans is regarded as the most
11 The author’s use of a weak state concept is heavily influenced by Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak
States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
12 Franciso A. Magno, “Weak State, Ravage Forests: Political Constraints to Sustainable Upland
Management in the Philippines,” Philippine Political Science Journal, Numbers 33-36 (June 1991-December
1992), pp. 81-82. 15 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption,
and Clientelism on Philippine Development,” Institute for Popular Democracy Occasional Paper No. 1
(February 1997).
13 Paul D. Hutchroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo de
Manila Press, 1998).
206
pervasive and visible.14 It is even argued that because of the great impact of
American culture, it almost succeeded in replacing Filipino native cultures. 15 This
prompted one American writer to describe Filipino culture as a “damage culture.” 16
Filipino scholars, of course, vehemently denounce this.17
While the Malay group may dominate this ethnic mix, the most influential
group is that of Chinese descent. Ethnic-Chinese Filipinos represent around 1.2
percent of the total population, and more than half can be found in Metro Manila
(primarily because the greater number of Chinese associations are in Metro
Manila).18 Most of the leading families controlling the Philippine economy and
politics have Chinese blood, including Jose Rizal, the Philippine national hero, and
former President Corazon Aquino. Her cousin, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., once
viewed as a crony of the former president Ferdinand Marcos crony, chairs one of
the biggest corporations in the Philippines—the San Miguel Corporation. Lucio
Tan, identified as a crony of former president Joseph Estrada, is one of the
wealthiest Filipino Chinese businessmen, having owned Philippine Airlines, Air
Philippines, Asia Brewery, Tanduay Distillery, and Fortune Tobacco Company.
The ethnic diversity of the Philippines is exemplified by the distribution of
Filipino indigenous ethnic communities, called the Lumad. These indigenous
groups are generally marginalized. The total number of indigenous ethnic
communities in the country has not yet been accurately reported (party due to their
relative geographical isolation which makes them inaccessible to census takers). 19
But there are at least 106 ethnic groups. 20 Most of these are found in peripheral
areas of the Philippines living in abject poverty and, more often than not, victims
of government developmental projects.21

Religious Diversity
While the dominant religion in the Philippines is Christianity (which is split into
Roman Catholicism and Protestantism with its various denominations), the rise of
Islam in the Philippines is a serious security concern not only because of the surge
of Islamic fundamentalism being propagated by the minority but also because of
14 F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Prehistory: Rediscovering Precolonial Heritage (Metro Manila: Punlad Research
House, 2000), p. 37.
15 Ibid.
16 James Fallows, “A Damaged,” Atlantic Monthly (November 1987), pp. 49-58.
17 See Paz P. Mendez and F. Landa Jocano, Culture and Nationhood: A Philosophy of Education for Filipinos
(Manila: Centro Escolar University Research and Development Center, 1991), pp.1-6.
18 Teresita Ang See, “The Ethnic Chinese as Filipinos” in Leo Suryadinata (ed), Ethnic Chinese as Southeast
Asians
(Singapore and London: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 174. For additional readings on Filipino
ethnic
Chinese, see Chinben See, “The Ethnic Chinese in the Philippines” in Leo Suryadinata (ed), The Ethnic Chinese
in the ASEAN States: Bibliographical Essays (Singapore and London: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989),
pp. 203-220.
19 F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Ethnic Indigenous Communities: Patterns, Variations, and Typologies (Metro
Manila: Punlad Research House, 1998), p. 21.
20 Ibid.
21 See F. Landa Jocano, Problems and Methods in the Study of Philippine Indigenous Ethnic Cultures: A
Preliminary Overview (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Asian Center, 1994).
207
the increasing confidence of Filipino Muslims in asserting their identity as a
Bangsa Moro, or Moro Nation. Many Muslim Filipinos refuse to call themselves
Filipinos, viewing themselves more as members of the Bangsa Moro. But the term
“Moro” itself, like “Filipino,” has alien roots. Spanish colonizers introduced the
term in the 16th century when they confused the Muslim people of Mindanao with
the “moors.”22
Were it not for the Spanish colonization of the Philippines for 333 years and
introduction of the Roman Catholic religion, the country would have been a
Muslim state like its Southeast Asian neighbors. 23 As early as the 15th century, the
Islamic religion already existed in the Sulu Archipelago in the southwest
Philippines. By the mid-16th century, two sultanates had been established as far
north as Manila.24 The
Spanish arrived in the midst of this wave of Islamic proselytism. 25
Filipino Muslims are more active now in the politics of the Philippine
“nationstate.”26 They are more vocal because of the global and regional trend of
Islamic resurgence.27 The increase in “democratic space” as a result of the demise
of authoritarianism in the Philippines is also enabling Muslim Filipinos to
articulate more boldly their causes. The revolt in Mindanao is a function of the rise
of Islam in Philippine politics.28
There are three major Muslim resistance groups, not to mention the various
ethnic Muslim groupings such as the Tausugs, Maguindanaons or the
Maranawans. These resistance groups call themselves Philippine Mujahideen. 29
The oldest major Muslim secessionist group is the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) founded by an ethnic Tausug leader, Nur Misuari. In 1974, the
MNLF declared the establishment of the Bangsa Moro Republic.30 It has also
received recognition from the Organization of Islamic Conference as the “sole and
legitimate representative” of the Bangsa Moro people. The MNLF has since
concluded peace talks with the Philippine government. 31 But at present, the MNLF
is split into three factions: the Anti-Nur Misuari MNLF faction, the Pro-Nur

22 Peter Gowing, Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: Federation of Christian
Churches, 1964).
Also see Cesar Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973).
23 John Pelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959).
24 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1988), p. 2.
25 Ibid. Also see Peter Gowing (ed), Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New
Day Publishers, 1988).
26 Patricio N. Abinales, “Mindanao in the Politics of the Philippine Nation-State: A Brief Sketch,” Philippine
Political Science Journal, Numbers 33-36 (June 1991-December 1992), pp. 120-141.
27 Mehol K. Sadain, Global and Regional Trends in Islamic Resurgence: Their Implications on the Southern
Philippines (Pasay City:
Foreign Service Institute, 1994).
28 See T. J. S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics (New York, Melbourne,
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980).
29 Alvaro Andaya, Philippine Mujahideen, Mandirigma (Manila: Published by the author, 1994).
30 Cesar A. Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985).
31 See Abraham S. Iribani, “GRP-MNLF Peace Talks: 1992-1996” (MA Thesis: National Defense College of the
Philippines, 2000).
208
Misuari MNLF faction and the MNLF Integrees. The Pro-Nur Misuari faction is
alleged to be the main culprit in a massacre in Sulu in 2002 that led to the arrest of
Nur Misuari.
The second major group is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which
claims to be the vanguard of the Islamic movement in Mindanao. Hashim Salamat,
supported by the ethnic Maguindanaons of Mindanao, founded the MILF in 1977
when he and his supporters split from the MNLF. 32 The MILF also has a splinter
group engaged in various kidnapping and extortion activities. The Philippine
government was in peace talks with the MILF as of this writing.
The third group is the extremist Abu Sayyaf, believed to have links with the
AlQaida network of Osama Bin Laden. The fundamentalist Abu Sayyaf aims to
establish an Iranian-style Islamic state in the southern Philippines. 33 Like the
MNLF, Abu Sayyaf is also factionalized. Khadafy Janjalani, brother of slain
founder Abduragak Abubakar Janjalani, is heading a fundamentalist Islamic
resistant movement in Basilan. The other faction is headed by Galib Andang, alias
Commander Robot, who is operating in Jolo. The government has been in hot
pursuit of Abu Sayyaf due to the group’s criminal activities, such as kidnapping,
extortion and murder, and its suspected Al-Qaida links.

Socioeconomic Diversity
Pervasive poverty is the main security problem of the Philippines. 34 According to
the latest Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) conducted by the National
Statistics Office (NSO), of the 14.37 million Philippine families in 1998, 5.75
million belonged to the lower 40 percentile on the income scale, while 8.62 million
belong to the upper 60 percentile. Families in the upper 60 percentile on the
income scale scored best in almost all socioeconomic indicators. But in terms of
the number of families belonging to each income strata, families in the lower 40
percentile are almost as numerous as those in the upper 60 percentile. 35 These
figures indicate that a significant number of Filipino people are living below the
minimum basic needs framework, which states that:

32 See Margarita Cojuangco, “The Role of the MILF in the Mindanao Problem” (MA Thesis: National Defense
College of the Philippines, 1988).
33 Jukpili M. Wadi, “Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand,” in Carmencita C.
Aguilar
(ed), Cooperation and Conflict in Global Society (Quezon City: International Federation of Social Science
Organization, 1996).
34 For an excellent conceptual l and practical reading of Philippine poverty, see Arsenio M. Balisacan, “What
Does it
Take to Win the War Against Poverty in the Philippines?” in Eduardo T. Gonzales (ed), Reconsidering the East
Asian Economic Model: What’s Ahead for the Philippines (Pasig City: Development Academy of the Philippines,
1999), pp. 83-109.
Also see Anna Marie A. Karaos, “Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation in the Philippines”, in Emma Porio
(ed), Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Southeast Asia: Trends and Prospects (Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University, 1997).
35 NSO Website, “Annual Poverty Indicators Survey” of the National Statistics Office.
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/ap98.html.
209
 x In order to sustain life, the family needs to be healthy, to eat the
right kind of food, to drink safe water and to have good sanitation.
x To protect the family from any harm or danger, it needs to be
sheltered in a peaceful and orderly environment and it should have
a livelihood that can support its family members to acquire their
basic needs such as food, shelter, etc. x To be able to attain the
survival and security needs of the family, its members should be
educated and be functionally literate in order to participate
actively in any community development and to take care of its
psycho-social needs.36
Filipinos were severely affected by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. In the
latest survey, about 94 percent of all Filipino families reported that they were
affected by the crisis. In response to the crisis, one in every two families in the
lowest 40 percent income bracket changed their eating patterns while three out of
ten families increased their working hours.37

The Impact Of Globalization On Nation-Building

The advent of globalization is compounding the already complicated problem of
nation-building in the Philippines. One reason is that globalization has not
produced the same benefits for all ethnic and interest groups in Philippine society.
Combined with the lack of a strong and effective “safety net,” globalization is
exacerbating poverty and thereby intensifying the country’s ethnic, religious and
socioeconomic divisions. Globalization, therefore, is challenging an already
premature and weak state’s ability to manage its ethnic, socioeconomic and
religious diversities. This constricts the capacity of the Philippine state to develop
and to build the Filipino nation and to achieve economic development.
One product of this is the persistent separatist clamor by Filipino ethnic groups,
particularly Muslim groups that feel they are being neglected in the process of
globalization and that they would be better off independent from the central
Philippine government. Since colonial times, Filipino Muslims have searched
constantly for the kind of leadership that will transform their hopes and aspirations
into economic and social reality.38
Other interest groups have also expressed concern about the negative effects of
globalization. In a study by the International Forum on Globalization, it was found
that globalization policies have contributed “to increased poverty, increased
inequality between and within nations, increased hunger, increased corporate
concentration, decreased social services and decreased power of labor vis-à-vis
global corporations.”39

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 See Romulo M. Espaldon, “Towards a National Muslim Development Policy” (undated manuscript). Espaldon
was a Minister of Muslim Affairs and Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
39 Jerry Mander, Debi Baker and David Korten “Does Globalization Help the Poor?”IFG Bulletin (San Francisco,
California: International Forum on Globalization), Volume 1, Issue 3m (2001).
210
 Globalization has led to the widening of socioeconomic disparities in the
Philippines as some social actors are given greater opportunities than others. 40 It
has favored the more mobile, the more adaptable, and the globally scarce
commodities and human skills, as opposed to immobile, self-contained, and
globally abundant ones. Traditional Philippine agriculture, for instance, has been
unable to cope with globalization and, because of the relatively high price of
Philippine agricultural products, “increasingly represents a drag on manufacturing
and the more dynamic and globally tradable parts of the economy.”44
There are countries in which globalization has had a positive effect on the
economy and politics. It has been noted that “effective adaptations to globalization
are well under way in a number of developing countries.” 41 As a result of
globalization, some developing countries “have increased their share of trade in
goods and services, and new technologies have created jobs and stimulated
dynamic local economies.”42 Globalization is also said to have facilitated the
spread of democratic governments in developing countries and helped sustain “the
legitimacy of those that have been created in recent years.” 43 As a consequence of
global integration brought by the process of globalization, improvements in the real
incomes of people in developing economies can be expected.44
Globalization is not the root cause of the tensions in Philippine society. Poverty
causes these tensions, and poverty is the result of weak institutions of
governance.45This weakness stems from the premature and weak nature of the
Philippine state.

Globalization and the Philippine State

If globalization has intensified socioeconomic divisions and conflicts, this is due to
the inability of the Philippine state to implement policies preparing the country for
global competitiveness. The Philippines finds it hard to cope with the globalization
process because its weak institutions of governance have failed to create suitable
socioeconomic and political conditions that will attract more capital and
technology from both domestic and foreign sources necessary for economic
growth. To overcome these challenges and reap the benefits of globalization, the
weak and premature Philippine state needs to be reinvented through institutional
reforms aimed at strengthening its institutions of governance and creating a
suitable environment for growth.

40 Emmanuel S. De Dios, “Between Nationalism and Globalization” in Filomena S. Sta. Ana III (ed), The
State and the Market: Essays on a Socially Oriented Philippine Economy (Quezon City: Action for Economic
Reforms, 1998), p. 28. 44 Ibid.
41 Merilee S. Grindle, “Ready or Not: The Developing World and Globalization,” in Joseph Nye and John
Donahue (eds), Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 178.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Frankel, pp.45-71.
45 This assertion is contrasting the argument of James Petras, “Globalization: A Critical Analysis,” Journal of
Contemporary Asia, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1999), pp. 3-37.
211
Reform of the Bureaucracy
The Philippines has a very inefficient bureaucracy, especially its revenue-
generating agencies. The Philippine bureaucracy “has suffered from the limited
technical skills and low moral of its personnel and has to live with recruitment
rules and promotion procedures heavily tainted by patronage politics.” 4647 Under a
premature and weak state, Philippine bureaucracy is marred by rampant corruption
favoring the families and friends of the bureaucrats.48
Inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy intensifies the socioeconomic, religious and
ethnic tensions in the Philippines as it hampers the delivery of needed services to
the people. It also leaves the Philippines unprepared to cope with the challenges of
globalization.
Reforming the Philippine bureaucracy is a gargantuan task requiring
implementation of a merit-based recruitment system and a clear-cut career
incentive scheme to attract and sustain the best and brightest into the civil service. 49
The World Bank suggests the following measures:

1. Limit the scope of patronage in public employment by

depoliticizing the civil service and strictly regulating the use of
casual and contractual workers;
2. Decompress the government pay scale to provide competitive
salaries up to senior levels;
3. Strengthen performance evaluation, implement related awards
and sanctions, and enhance meritocracy in appointments and
promotions.50

Electoral Reform
Philippine elections are characterized by irregularities, fraud, manipulation, vote
buying, intimidation and violence. 51 The prevalence of election fraud during the
counting of ballots, the use or threat of force by political warlords to compel
people to vote in their favor, and vote buying among politicians are undermining
the democratic process. Although the Philippines is among the few Asian countries
with a long historical experience in electoral politics, Philippine elections are
nothing more than overt expressions of competing personal interests and ambitions
46 Temario C. Rivera, “Democratic Governance and Late Industrialization” in Filomena S. Sta. Ana III (ed), The
State and the Market: Essays on a Socially Oriented Philippine Economy (Quezon City: Action for Economic
Reforms, 1998), p.
47 .
48 Alfred McCoy (ed), An Anarchy of Families: State and Families in the Philippines (Madison: University of
WisconsinMadison Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).
49 Rivera (1998), p. 257.
50 See World Bank, “Combating Corruption in the Philippines.”
http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/library/corruption.htm.
51 See Carlos and Banlaoi (1997). Also see Luzviminda Tangcangco, The Anatomy of Electoral Fraud
(Manila: MJAGM, 1992) and Ma. Aurora Catillo, et. al., Manipulated Elections (Quezon City: University of
the Philippines, 1985). 55 Renato S. Velasco, “Campaign Tactics in the 1987 Legislative Elections” in Renato
Velasco and Sylvano Mahiwo (ed), The Philippine Legislature Reader (Quezon City: Great Books Publishers,
1989), p.62.
212
of party leaders belonging to or allied with dominant families, clans, landlords and
business groups.55
Despite the introduction of a Party-List Law to allow more room for sectoral
representations in the House and to encourage small political parties to participate
in local elections, marginalized sectors are still underrepresented because of
patronage politics and a strong kinship system in the Philippines. Ironically, many
“small parties” participating in the party-list system are “satellite” parties of
traditional politicians.52 Among the measures needed to reform Philippine elections
are:

1. Allowing absentee voting;

2. Computerizing the election procedure and the counting of votes;
3. Implementing stiffer penalties for election offenses;
4. Regulating campaign finance;
5. Making electoral fraud a serious crime under the law.
Political Party Reform
Philippine political parties are ideologically undifferentiated, except for the
underground communist party. There is only one ideology guiding all electoral
parties in the Philippines, the liberal ideology. As a result, Philippine political
parties are highly personalistic rather than programmatic.
The most notable features of Philippine political parties are the minimal
intraparty solidarity, endemic interparty switching, and party similarities in terms
of programs, organizations and campaign strategies. 53 Filipino political party
leaders are usually political patrons from wealthy families and clans. These
politically undifferentiated and oligarchic parties have created a party environment
characterized by “political butterflies,” or party turncoats. Despite the
constitutional mandate allowing a multiparty system in the Philippines, political
parties in the Philippines, in general, are either administration parties or opposition
parties.
As such, Philippine political parties are weak. Their weakness mirrors that of
the Philippine state, which prevents the effective management of ethnic, religious
and socioeconomic tension in the country. Without a strong party system with a
clear program of government, the Philippines will continue to be plagued by
persistent national crises.
Since political parties are vital instruments in the articulation of the demands
and desires of the people and important vehicles to mobilize the people to achieve
successful economic growth and effective governance, there is a move to reform
and strengthen the Philippine party system. The suggested measures include:

1. Increasing party discipline by implementing the concept of a

52 See Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “The Philippine Tries the Party-List System: A Progressive Approach” and David
Wurfel, “The Party-List Elections: Sectoral or National? Success or Failure?” both in Kasarinlan: A Philippine
Quarterly of Third World Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fourth Quarter, 1997).
53 Banlaoi and Carlos (1997), p. 34. Also see Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of
Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 6, 1964).
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 “party whip” and penalizing “political butterflies”;
2. Requiring political parties to build a reliable mass political base;
3. Adopting measures to monitor the continuity of party organization so
that a party’s life span is not dependent on the life span of its leaders;
4. Implementing measures that penalize political parties that cannot
sustain their organizational set-up.

Socioeconomic Reform
To bridge the gap between the rich and poor, the Philippine government has
formulated a series of medium-term development plans with socioeconomic reform
packages. The Philippine government even accepts the view that successful
economic growth and effective governance cannot be achieved without a strategy
for socioeconomic reform. However, the weakness of the Philippine state is
preventing implementation of socioeconomic reform programs. Thus,
implementation of socioeconomic reform programs is a function of institutional
reform, which has been discussed above.
Conclusion
The Philippine state is in the predicament of having to face globalization while at
the same time undergoing the painful process of nation-building in a highly diverse
society. The weakness of the Philippine state in facing these challenges is causing
the pervasive poverty that results in ethnic, socioeconomic and religious tension.
To overcome these challenges, there is a need to strengthen the Philippine state and
its institutions of governance through bureaucratic, electoral, party, and
socioeconomic reforms.

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