Criminal Law 1

SUPPLEMENTAL READING MATERIAL 7

Outline of the Effects of the Penalties under Articles 30-35

1. The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office produce the following effects:

a. Deprivation of pubic offices and employments, even if by election.

b. Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected.

c. Disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.

d. Loss of the right to retirement pay or pension for any office formerly held (Art. 30).

Note: Perpetual absolute disqualification is effective during the lifetime of the convict and even after the service of sentence.
Temporary absolute disqualification lasts during the term of the sentence, and is removed after the service of the same, except (1)
deprivation of the public office or employment and (2) loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly
held (see Art. 30, par following No. 3).

2. The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling produce the following
effects:

a. Deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

b. Disqualification for holding similar offices of employments perpetually or during the term of the sentence (Art. 31).

3. The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage produce the following
effects:

a. Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to any public office.

b. Cannot hold any public office during the period of disqualification (Art. 32).

4. The penalties of suspension from public office, profession or calling or the right of suffrage produce the following effects:

a. Disqualification from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.

b. If suspended from public office, the offender cannot hold another office having similar functions during the period of
suspension (Art. 33).
5. Civil interdictions shall produce the following effects:

a. Deprivation of the rights of parental authority or guardianship of any ward.

b. Deprivation of marital authority.

c. Deprivation of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos (Art. 34).

Note: But he can dispose of such property by will or donation mortis causa.

6. Bonds to keep the peace.

a. The offender must present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that the offender will not commit the offense sought to
be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court; or

b. The offender must deposit such amount with the clerk of court to guarantee said undertaking; or

c. The offender may be detained, if he cannot give the bond, for a period not to exceed 6 months if prosecuted for grave or less
grave felony, or for a period not to exceed 30 days, if for a light felony (Art. 35).

Note: Bond to keep the peace is different from bail bond which is posted for the provisional release of a person arrested for or
accused of a crime.

Effects of Pardon by the President

1. A pardon shall not restore the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage.

Exception: When any or both such rights is or are expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

2. It shall not exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity. The pardon cannot make an exception to this rule.

Limitations upon the exercise of the pardoning power:

1. That the power can be exercised only after conviction.

2. That such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.

Pardon granted in general terms does not include accessory penalty.

When the principal penalty is remitted by pardon, only the effect of that principal penalty is extinguished, but not the
accessory penalties attached to it.

For instance, a person is sentenced to prision mayor (which carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification from t he right of suffrage) is pardoned by the President. Such pardon does not restore to the ex-convict the right
to vote, unless such right is expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

Exception: When an absolute pardon is granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction.

Although the rule is that a pardon does not restore the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage, unless expressly
stated in the pardon, the exception is where the facts and circumstances of the case already show that the purpose of the Chief
Executive is precisely to restore those rights. For instance, when it appears that the respondent mayor-elect committed the
offense more than 25 years ago; that he was granted conditional pardon in 1915; that thereafter he exercised the right of suffrage,
was elected councilor for the period from 1918 to 1921; that he was elected municipal president three times in succession (1922
to 1931); that he elected mayor in 1940; it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon, after the election of 1940
but before the date fixed by law for assuming office, was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will
(Pelobello v. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441; Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34).

Suppose a pardon is granted upon a convict undergoing life imprisonment after serving 30 years. Is the convict likewise
pardoned for the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which is an accessory to life imprisonment?

No, because Art. 30 is silent as to the maximum duration of perpetual disqualification and Art. 36 expressly provide that a
pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.

Pardon by the Chief Executive Distinguished from Pardon by the Offended Party:

1. Pardon by the Chief Executive extinguishes the criminal liability of the offender; such is not the case when the pardon is given
by the offended party.

2. Pardon by the Chief Executive cannot include civil liability which the offender must pay; but the offended party can waive the
civil liability which the offender must pay.
3. In cases where the law allows pardon by the offended party (Art. 344), the pardon should be given before the institution of
criminal prosecution and must be extended to both offenders; whereas, pardon by the Chief Executive is granted only after
conviction and may be extended to any of the offenders.

What is subsidiary penalty?

It is a subsidiary personal liability to be suffered by the convict who has no property with which to meet the fine, at the rate
of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the rules provided for in Article 39.

Judgment of conviction must impose subsidiary imprisonment

An accused cannot be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay fine imposed upon him when
the subsidiary imprisonment is not imposed in the judgment of conviction.

No subsidiary penalty for non-payment of other pecuniary liabilities

As Article 39 is worded, there is no subsidiary penalty for non-payment of (1) the reparation of the damage caused; (2)
indemnification of the consequential damages; and (3) the costs of the proceedings.

“If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine”

Article 39 applies only when the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article
38.

It would seem that the convict, who has property enough to meet the fine and not exempt from execution, cannot choose to
serve the subsidiary penalty, instead of paying for the fine.

A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison
term. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of fine into a term of imprisonment.

Subsidiary imprisonment is not as accessory penalty

Therefore, the culprit cannot be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment unless the judgment expressly so provides.
Illustration:

A was convicted of bribery and sentenced to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum, to 1 year, 8 months and 21
days of prision correccional, as maximum, to pay the fine of Php40,000.00, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs.
Since the decision does not provide for subsidiary imprisonment in the event of inability of A to pay the fine of Php40,000.00, A
cannot be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment, if he appears to be insolvent.

Article 73 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that “Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty which, by
provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of this Code, it
must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.” Subsidiary imprisonment is not covered by
any of those articles.

Rules as to subsidiary imprisonment:

1. If the penalty imposed is prision correccional or arresto and fine – subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the term of
the sentence, and in no case to continue for more than one year. Fraction or part of a day, not counted.

2. When the penalty imposed is fine only – subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 6 months, if the culprit is prosecuted for
grave or less grave felony, and not to exceed 15 days, if prosecuted for light felony.

3. When the penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional – no subsidiary imprisonment.

4. If the penalty imposed is NOT to be executed by confinement, but of fixed duration – subsidiary penalty shall consist in the
same deprivations as those of the principal penalty, under the same rules as in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 above.

5. In case the financial circumstances of the convict should improve, he shall pay the fine, notwithstanding the fact that the
convict suffered subsidiary personal liability therefore.

Examples of the application of the rules:

(1)Rule 1 (applicable only when the penalty imposed is imprisonment not exceeding 6 years): A is convicted of falsification by
private individual (Art. 172) and sentenced to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty, and to pay a fine of Php4,000.00.
If A has no property with which to meet the fine, he will have to suffer subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for each
Php8.00 which he cannot pay, but not to exceed 365 days, computed as follows:

365 days in one year

x4 years
------
1,460 days in 4 years
270 days in 9 months
10 days
------
1,740 days in 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
------
580 days, which represent 1/3 of the penalty imposed
P8.00 P4,000.00 amount of fine
------
500 days, which are less than 1/3 of the penalty imposed (580 days)

Although the quotient of 500 days does not exceed 1/3 of the term of the penalty imposed, yet A can be made to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment only for 365 days, because “in no case shall it continue for more than one year”.

The subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed one-third of the penalty imposed and not to exceed one year.

When the quotient, after dividing the amount of the fine by P8.00, is one year or less and such quotient does not exceed 1/3
of the penalty imposed, the whole period of imprisonment represented by the quotient must be served by the convict as subsidiary
penalty.

Illustration:

A is convicted of a crime sentenced to 3 years of prision correccional, as the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty,
and to pay a fine of P2,000.00, which A could not pay. P2,000.00/P8.00=250 days. Since 1/3 of the penalty imposed is 1 year
and the quotient is 250 days, which does not exceed 1 year, all the 250 days imprisonment must be served by A for non-payment
of fine, in addition to the penalty of 3 years for the crime committed.

Where the defendant was sentenced to 21 days of imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00, the subsidiary imprisonment cannot
exceed 7 days. P1,000.00/P8.00=125 days. But since the subsidiary imprisonment cannot exceed 1/3 of the penalty imposed, he
cannot be required to serve all the 125 days of imprisonment for failure to pay the fine.

Subsidiary imprisonment is NOT imprisonment for debt.

 The laws which prohibit imprisonment for debt relate to the imprisonment of debtors for liability incurred in the fulfilment
of contracts, but NOT to the cases seeking the enforcement of penal statutes that provide for the payment of money as a penalty
for the commission of the crime.

Thus, the civil liability arising from the crime of libel is NOT a “debt” within the purview of the constitutional provision
against imprisonment for non-payment of “debt”. Insofar as said injunction is concerned, “debt” means an obligation to pay a
sum of money “arising from contract”, express or implied. In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in libel arises
from a tort or crime; hence, from law. As a consequence, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of said liability does not
violate the constitutional injunction.