G.R. No. 128096.

January 20, 1999 ]

PANFILO M. LACSON, PETITIONER VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, AND
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., PETITIONERS-
INTERVENORS.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 – an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan – is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties’ pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission – Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of
May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolve from any
criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that
the said incident was a legitimate police operation.[1]

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and
intervenors. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the withdrawal of the charges against
Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations
for murder[2] before the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were
among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s action.[4]

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations[5] before
the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27
or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking
principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with
Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan
admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent
or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up
with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored
by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
“principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249[13]. The law is entitled, “AN ACT FURTHER
DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606,
AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” It took effect on February 25, 1997.13 by
the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution[14] denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it “stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996.”

On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

“After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr.
rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and
Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration.
Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

“Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson,
Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases – in fact, no order of arrest has
been issued – this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

“To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended
Informations in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.”[16] [Emphasis supplied]

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that
the said law “shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.”
Petitioner argues that:

“a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to
precisely suit the situation in which petitioner’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to
it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further,
from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the
transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such
resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
“b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in
which petitioner’s cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make
certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone
should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in
Criminal Case Nos. 23047 – 23057 to procedural due process

“c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid “innocuous” provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which
actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title-one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.”[17]

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that “while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously
appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Sections 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically
to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.”[18] They further argued that if their
case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer
avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality
of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be
dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten
(10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed
in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged
within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.[20] The
burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not
convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
“SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office
as may be determined by law."

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:

“Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486[21] created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No. 1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No. 8249.[27] Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

“SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

“b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution or orders of the
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

“The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent
the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx x x x” (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

“SEC. 7. Transitory provision. – This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of
the approval hereof.” (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

“SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

“a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of high rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

“b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section
in relation to their office.

“c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
“In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

“The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade ’27,’ or not otherwise covered
by the preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

“In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

x x x” (Emphasis supplied)

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

“SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.”

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word “principal” before the word “accused” appearing in the
above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word “principal”
that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying
on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject criminal cases
since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent[28] or higher. On
the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People
before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,[29] contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A.
8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee[32] holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under
Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph
b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in
relation to their office.” The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided
it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is
charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law[33]
because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.[34]

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1)

it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness
of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of
the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against them were
not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the
constitutional limitations,[37] it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily
affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner
and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving" certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not
affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the passage of the said provisions.
In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the
Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator.
Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the
67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word “principal” in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered
by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of
Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committee hearings,
the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation
in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft
court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary
legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it
decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]

Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
constitutes an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer
avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto
law is one –
(a)

which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes
such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or

(c)

which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed,

(d)

which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]

(e)

Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.[44]

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f)

that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful;

(g)

deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[45]

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive
law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations;[47] or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for
their punishment.[48] R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner’s and intervenor’s contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times[50] considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated
by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.[52] Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]

In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.[55]
On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the
presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome.[56]

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. Much
emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it “defines” the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it
allegedly does is to “expand” its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title[57]
is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is severally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the
general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all
the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.[59] The Congress, in employing the word “define” in the
title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative
body to “define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts”.[60]

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple
murder case against herein petitioner and intervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,[61] and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.[62]

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of
R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section
5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal
cases committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, “in
relation to their office as may be determined by law.” This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan "shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.”

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the
offense) is “intimately connected” with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of
his official functions.[65] This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties “must
be alleged in the Information.”[66]

As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

“SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.” (Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954, we pronounced that “the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts.”[67] The
real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information.”[68]

The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]

“The object of this written accusations was – First, To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as “he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”[70]

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations[71] for murder reads:

“AMENDED INFORMATION

“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4
VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON,
CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO,
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:

“That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent
to kill and using firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strengths did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

“That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY
NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime
herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted
by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

“CONTRARY TO LAW”

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder “in
relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories
after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concealed the
crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid
conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May
18, 1995.” The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused” surprises the reader.
There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
“raid.” Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted “at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila” but,
as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City.” How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in
two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that
the said accessories committed the offense “in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),” we, however, do
not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused’s official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe
that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in
relation to his office” is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused’s official duties.

In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at
issue, we ruled:

“It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial.

“In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960]), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandos
consisting of regular policemen and x x x special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power
guns and then established a camp x x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision and control where his
co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his
orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been
committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime, thus,
there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
“Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the
accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.”

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office”
does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over said cases.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.