Arnel P. Misolas vs. Honorable Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (En Banc)

The document summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms committed in furtherance of rebellion or subversion. The Court held that: 1) P.D. No. 1866 does not violate due process; 2) It is not a bill of attainder as it does not inflict punishment without trial; 3) The possibility of double jeopardy does not arise as there was no previous conviction. The Court upheld the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866.

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Arnel P. Misolas vs. Honorable Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (En Banc)

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NAVALES. Kurt Derhen B.

15. Arnel P. Misolas vs. Honorable Panga

G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (En Banc)

FACTS:

After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's
Army were resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili,
Camarines Sur, elements of the Philippine Constabulary raided said house where three
persons were found inside petitioner and two women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and
"Ka Menchie" but the women were able to escape in the confusion during the raid. The
house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag under a pillow allegedly used by
petitioner a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and four live rounds of ammunition. Petitioner
was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters.

An information charging petitioner with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition

under PD No. 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal, which alleged that the firearm and
ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the offense under par.3,
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1866.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded "not guilty". However, a few days later, his counsel
filed a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was basis for the filing of a
motion to quash. Respondent judge gave petitioner time to file a motion to quash.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the following grounds:

(1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the information does not
charge the proper offense since from the allegations the offense that may be charged
is either subversion or rebellion; and

(2) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because of
violations of his constitutional rights, i.e, his arrest and the seizure of the firearm and
ammunition were illegal.

Motion to quash was denied for lack of merit. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether par.3, Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1866, which penalizes illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition committed in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection, or subversion, should be stricken down as unconstitutional,
because:

1. it is violative of the due process clause, particularly substantive due process

against arbitrary laws, on the doctrine of absorption of common crimes in
rebellion and subversion.
2. it constitutes a bill of attainder
3. of the possibility of a second jeopardy
NAVALES. Kurt Derhen B.

HELD: NO.

1. Violation of Due Process - NO

In the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under P.D6. No. 1866. He is NOT
being charged with the COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Neither is he being SEPARATELY CHARGED for
SUBVERSION and for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.

The Legislature had deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses:
(1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. No. 1866) and
(2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. No.
1700), which the Legislature has the power to do. The practical result of this may be
harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused in instances similar to those that
obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of
its power to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into as it would be
in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.

That P.D. No. 1866 was enacted by deposed former President Marcos (pursuant to
his law-making powers under the 1973 Constitution) is not by itself a legal argument
for its invalidation. Art. XVIII, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that
"[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instruction,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

Quashal of the information cannot be had, as it was not disputed that the facts
charged comply with the elements of the offense penalized in par.3, Sec. 1, P.D. No.
1866.

2. As a Bill of Attainder - NO

In this separate opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento espouses the view that P.D. No. 1866
should be struck down as unconstitutional for being a bill of attainder.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or

members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Elements are:

(a) a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals,

(b) the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and
(c) the lack of judicial trial.

This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the
determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential

P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of
guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to
NAVALES. Kurt Derhen B.

define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the
qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense.

There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing
whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of
illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying
circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as
the Constitution and judicial precedents require.

3. For the possibility of a Second Jeopardy - NO

It must be pointed out that at the time this petition was filed, there had been no
previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal. Hence, the question of a second or double
jeopardy does not arise.

Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has

been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

The right against double jeopardy is a matter which the accused may raise in a
motion to quash [Sec. 3(h) Rule 117]. But, precisely, petitioner's motion to quash filed
in the trial court did NOT raise the issue of double jeopardy because it had not
arisen. The Court cannot anticipate that the opportunity for a second jeopardy will still
arise if he is acquitted or convicted as charged under P.D. 1866.

Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No. 1866
will not be rendered unconstitutional. That an accused will be exposed to double
jeopardy if he is prosecuted under another law is not a ground to nullify that law.
Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat a
subsequent prosecution or conviction for the same offense.