Lecture 3

Chemical Process Safety Management

Engineering 16– July – 2022
In
Oil & Gas Ahmed Mohamed Shafik Ali Attia

Industry Process & Operations Engineering Expert

[email protected]
 Safety Moment
Friday 15th of July 2022

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goSEyGNfiPM

Updated BP Texas City Animation on the 15th Anniversary of

the Explosion
Objective Digest Process Safety and its vital aspects that
influence your life and investments.
 1- Introduction
2- Process Safety Management
3- Zoom in - Process Safety Elements
HAZOP
HIRA
Agenda PSSR
4- Risk Management
5- Safety-Critical Elements
6- Identification.
7- Barrier Management
 Process Safety:
Control and containment of a situation to reduce the risk of loss
of control and containment as well as mitigating their effects
where there is a need to highlight the hazards in the chemicals
industry and the possible risks related to explosives, fires, and
toxic releases

Process Safety Management:

Process Safety Management (PSM) is a concern in any of the
Introduction industries that store, handle and process hazardous chemicals &
gases. The risks related to process safety are often managed in an
isolated way.

What is Process Safety Management System?

The Process Safety Management System is a comprehensive
management system that proactively avoids incidents in hazardous
industries like chemical plants, oil and gas installations, fertilizer,
pharmaceuticals, and explosives and that handle, store, or process
toxic or flammable chemicals.
 Process Safety vs. Personal Safety
The key differences between occupational health and safety and process safety are:
• The mechanism of action. While process safety and occupational health and safety
both refer to the potential loss of control of hazardous energy, process safety is
usually about managing higher levels of energy.
• Potential severity of consequences meaning process safety incidents are less common
but more severe.
• Occupational health and safety are primarily about the safety of those who interact
with systems while engineering and design are about the safety of the system.
The failure to identify and manage these differences has played a considerable role in the
failure of several process safety disasters to appear as a result of ineffective management
practices.
Process Safety vs. Personal Safety

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 Process Safety Management - Standards

There are 3 key guidelines for process safety management with the same
scope of elements but differs in structure and integration.
• OSHA (14 elements).
• CCPS Risk-based process safety approach (20 elements).
• EI – Energy Institute (20 elements).
 Elements Of Process Safety
• Element 1: Employee participation
• Element 2: Process Safety Information
• Element 3: Process Hazard Analysis

14
• Element 4: Operating Procedures
• Element 5: Safe work practices
• Element 6: Contractor control
• Element 7: Training
• Element 8: Pre-Start up Safety Review
• Element 9: Mechanical integrity
• Element 10: Management of Change
• Element 11: Emergency response planning
• Element 12: Trade secrets
• Element 13: Incident Investigation
• Element 14: Compliance audits
Elements Of Process Safety
Process Hazards Analysis - PHA
 Process Hazards Analysis - PHA
Definition:
• Identifying, evaluating, and controlling the hazards of processes involving highly hazardous chemicals

Methodologies:
1. What-if/checklist
2. Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
3. Hazards Identification Study (HAZID)
4. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
5. Fault tree analysis
HAZardous OPerability - HAZOP
 Hazard and operability
study (HAZOP)

What Do You Think the HAZOP definition will be?

 Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)

Definition:
• It is a structured and systematic examination of a complex planned or
existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems
that may represent risks to personnel or equipment.

Dig Deeper to find any inherited risks that were not

identified previously
 HAZOP Methodolog y
• The intention of performing a HAZOP is to review the design to pick up
design and engineering issues that may otherwise not have been found.

• The technique is based on breaking the overall complex design of the process
into a number of simpler sections called 'nodes' which are then individually
reviewed.

• It is carried out by a suitably experienced multi-disciplinary TEAM (HAZOP)

during a series of meetings.
HAZOP TEAM
 HAZOP GUIDE WORDS
• In order to identify deviations, the team
applies a set of Guide Words to each node
in the process.
• To prompt discussion, or to ensure
completeness, it may also be helpful to
explicitly consider appropriate parameters
which apply to the design intent.
• These are general words such as Flow,
Temperature, Pressure, and Composition.
• A fairly standard set of Guide Words is as
follows:
 HAZOP GUIDE WORDS

• The following table gives an overview of commonly used guide word -

parameter pairs and common interpretations of them
 HAZOP – Data Requirement
The following data will be available to the HAZOP team for review or for reference as needed:
• Lessons Learned from previous experience.
• Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs), including Heat & Material Balances
• Process & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)
• Cause & Effect Diagrams
• Piping Specs
• General Arrangement Diagrams
• Electrical Area Classification Drawings
• PRV Documentation (datasheets and/or sizing basis)
• Control Narratives / Operating Envelopes
• Any relevant engineering studies such as Flare/Relief/Blow-down, Brittle Fracture, etc.
• Alarm List
 HAZOP – Data Requirement
• Critical Operating Parameters
• Interface Agreement (tie‐ins to/from plant)
• Previous HAZOP / SIL Study Items
• Project HAZOP Findings and Close‐Out Reports
• MOCs completed before HAZOP
• Historical Safety and Operational Data
• Incident Notification Reports (INRs)
• Major downtime events and associated RCFA studies if available
• List of Standing Instructions and Procedures with High Criticality
• Plant SHE Case
HAZOP – Working Sheet
HAZOP – Close Out Sheet
Risk Assessment
 Formal Risk Assessment - FRA
• Risk management requires a systematic use of appropriate analyses and studies in order to support
decisions that could be significant for the risk associated with the activity.

• The risk assessment is intended to help establish the risk picture. This will then be used in part to
assess the need for barriers in order to reduce risk to an acceptable level and allow specified
requirements to be met

• Risk Assessment is NOT a ONE-MAN SHOW, It is a TEAMWORK Brainstorming session where

the concern is being discussed thoroughly from all perspectives to ensure that the concern is well
digested by the team, risks are fully comprehended, and the path forward is SMART
SMART – Specific / Measurable / Achievable / Reliable / Timely
FRA – Risk Matrix
 • The steps applied are shown below and were discussed with the participants.
• The recommendations identified in this risk assessment shall be verified closed by the action
party and FRA requestor/initiator to send a copy of the completed action closed out sheet to
PSE via the FRA facilitator.
• Risk assessment should not be viewed as the decision itself. The output of risk assessment is
an input to the decision-making process by the Facility owner and Job owner.
• No risk assessment can substitute for sound decision-making consistent with Company
covenants.

FRA • FRA should not be considered as the basis to justify similar work in the future. Particular
activity and relevant conditions shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Methodolog y
FRA Template
FRA – Action sheet template
Pre-Start-Up Safety Review - PSSR
 What is the PSSR?
• An investigation into the process in question prior to introducing a highly hazardous
chemical to that process is a systematic and thorough examination of that process.

• This PSSR requires the following:

1. Construction and equipment are in accordance with the design specifications.
2. Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate.
3. Process hazard analyses and recommendations have been completed for new facilities,
and they have been resolved or implemented before startup.
4. Modified facilities meet the requirements of management of change.
5. Training has been provided for each individual involved in the operation of a process.
 Why PSSR is a vital Process Safety Element?

• PSSRs are designed to minimize the possibility of workplace incidents

and the related damage to equipment, or the harm caused to employees,
and if they are not properly implemented, PSSRs could cause major
disasters or even death.
• According to records, there have been a number of incidents involving
improper PSSR at the BP Texas City refinery, for example, which
resulted in 170 injuries and five deaths in 2005.
• Hence, there is no doubt that this is an important process that you
should take seriously and make sure that you get right.
 What could be the immediate consequences
if a proper PSSR is not conducted?

• Human injury/fatality due to lack of the required knowledge to operate and

maintain the processing unit.
• Prolonged facility outage.
• Prolonged outage of equipment.
• Inability to start up the processing unit due to incorrect installation.

There are many other consequences of an unavailable or poor PSSR.

 PSSR Flow Regime

PSSR Scope
Contractor
Report
Leader Involvement

PSSR KoM &

Checklist Punches
Team WD
 PSSR Flow Regime
1- Assign PSSR Leader
• A leader should be assigned to the PSSR team so that it is able to function
effectively.
• When a team identifies a significant deficiency, the PSSR leader should have
adequate authority to postpone the startup process.
• It is fair to say that there would be a strong pressure to allow the start-up of a
deficient process in the face of serious financial loss in the case of a delay.
• Thus, to resist such pressures, a leader must possess the personality
characteristics, skills, knowledge, resolve, and authority in the organization that
will enable him or her to handle them.
 PSSR Flow Regime

2- Assemble the PSSR Team

In order to complete the PSSR and the additional follow-up activity, the
leader is responsible for assembling a multi-disciplinary team that includes
personnel from all disciplines (design and construction, engineering,
instrument and control, maintenance, operations, safety, and supervisors).
 PSSR Flow Regime

3- Ensure the availability of a standardized PSSR Checklist

• It is important to note that there are several types of Checklists, and
each is designed to manage a specific area.
• There are checklists for process areas, buildings, substations, etc,.
• In order for the PSSR team to confirm that all the required parts of the
PSSR have been completed, they should use a checklist or another
appropriate PSSR form.
 PSSR Flow Regime
4- Define the scope
• The group should ensure that they have a thorough understanding of all the
process equipment that is subject to the PSSR.
• Scope of PSSR has to be defined clearly and fixed before triggering PSSR
activities.
• Among the items that should be included in this process are tanks, vessels,
reactors, mixers, connecting piping and components, as well as any associated
instrumentation or controls, including the digital control system or program
controller, as appropriate.
 PSSR Flow Regime

5- Contractors / Vendors Involvement

• To provide the necessary information or technical expertise on the
equipment or process under review, third-party contractors, vendors and
consultants may be able to provide you with the necessary information
or expertise if need be.
 PSSR Flow Regime

6- PSSR KoM and Walk down

• The kick-off meeting should be conducted with the positive
participation of the PSSR integrated team in order to provide everyone
with a clear understanding of the scope of the project, confirm the
P&IDs that have been marked up, and decide on the checklist that
should be used.
• Following KoM, the team conducts the PSSR walk-down to review and
fulfill the checklist requirements.
 PSSR Flow Regime
7- Punch list consolidation & Categorization
• All gaps identified during the PSSR walk-down, poor design or wrong
installation, must be recorded by a focal point from the team assigned by the
PSSR leader.
• Post the site walk-down, team assemble to review the list of punches and apply
categorization criteria on each punch to decide whether it is a Pre-Start-Up
Punch or a Post-Start-Up punch.
• The difference is that the post-start-up punch can exist while plant start up
activities is ongoing, however, the pre-ones’ should be closed/cleared firstly
before energizing the system.
 PSSR Flow Regime
8- PSSR Report and closeout process
• Following the clearance of all the pre-start-up punches, deciding the path forward for all the post-start-up
punches (action party – target date), PSSR report to be issued for the management endorsement.
• PSSR Report has to include:
• Executive summary.
• Introduction
• Purpose
• Scope
• Team Members
• Methodology
• Observations / Punches
• Conclusion.
Risk Management
 Risk Management
• It is the identification, evaluation, and prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economical
application of resources to minimize, monitor, and control the probability or impact of unfortunate
events or to maximize the realization of opportunities.

• In ideal risk management, a prioritization process is followed whereby the risks with the greatest loss
(or impact) and the greatest probability of occurring are handled first.

• Risks with a lower probability of occurrence and lower loss are handled in descending order.

• In practice the process of assessing overall risk can be difficult and balancing resources used to
mitigate between risks with a high probability of occurrence but lower loss, versus a risk with a high
loss but lower probability of occurrence can often be mishandled.
 Risk Management

Process of Risk Management as per ISO 31000

Risk Management Process
 Methodolog y
For the most part, these methods consist of the following elements, performed,
more or less, in the following order.

1. Identify the threats

2. Assess the vulnerability of critical assets to specific threats
3. Determine the risk (i.e., the expected likelihood and consequences of
specific types of attacks on specific assets)
4. Identify ways to reduce those risks
5. Prioritize risk reduction measures
 Process 1 – Establishing Risk Context
1. Observing the context
• the social scope of risk management
• the identity and objectives of stakeholders
• the basis upon which risks will be evaluated, constraints.

2. Defining a framework for the activity and an agenda for identification

3. Developing an analysis of risks involved in the process

4. Mitigation or solution of risks using available technological, human and organizational resources
 Process 2 - Risk Identification
• After establishing the context, the next step in the process of managing
risk is to identify potential risks.

• Risks are about events that, when triggered, cause problems or benefits.

• Hence, risk identification can start with the source of our problems and
those of our competitors (benefit), or with the problematic
consequences.
 Process 3 - Risk Assessment
• Once risks have been identified, they must then be assessed as to their potential
severity of impact (generally a negative impact, such as damage or loss) and to the
probability of occurrence.

• These quantities can be either simple to measure, in the case of the value of a lost
building, or impossible to know for sure in the case of an unlikely event, the
probability of occurrence of which is unknown.

• Therefore, in the assessment process it is critical to make the best educated decisions
in order to properly prioritize the implementation of the risk management plan.
 Process 4 – Potential Risk treatments
• Once risks have been identified and assessed, all techniques to manage
the risk fall into one or more of these four major categories:

1. Avoidance (eliminate, withdraw from or not become involved)

2. Reduction (optimize – mitigate)
3. Sharing (transfer – outsource or insure)
4. Retention (accept and budget)
 Process 5 – Risk Management Plan
• Select appropriate controls or countermeasures to mitigate each risk.

• Risk mitigation needs to be approved by the appropriate level of management.

• The risk management plan should propose applicable and effective security controls
for managing the risks.

• Mitigation of risks often means selection of security controls, which should be

documented in a Statement of Applicability, which identifies which particular control
objectives and controls from the standard have been selected, and why.
Layers of Protection
Safety Critical Elements
 Important Terminologies
• Safety Critical Elements are any part of the installation, plant or
computer programs whose failure will either cause or contribute to a
major accident, or the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect
of a major accident.

MAJOR ACCIDENTS
• Major accidents are fires, explosions or releases of dangerous substances that
will cause death or serious injury; major damage to the structure or plant or loss
of stability; the collision of a helicopter; failure of life support systems for
diving operations; or any other event involving death or serious injury to five or
more people.
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
• A Performance Standard is a qualitative or quantitative statement of the
performance required of a system or item of equipment for it to satisfactorily
fulfill its purpose.
• It is a requirement that Performance Standards should be established for all
SCEs.

VERIFICATION SCHEMES
• Verification schemes are written schemes implemented to confirm, or
otherwise, that SCEs are suitable and remain in good repair and
condition.
INDEPENDENT COMPETENT PERSONS
• Independent Competent Persons (ICPs) are required to carry out various functions under the
verification scheme to ensure that the process of managing risks associated with Major Accident
Hazards is working effectively.
• It is a requirement that ICPs must be sufficiently independent so as to be impartial and objective in
their judgment such that safety is not compromised.
• The role of the ICP can either be undertaken by a single organization or by a number of different
individuals or organizations considering separate aspects of the installation.
• In the latter case, however, greater coordination will be required by the duty holder to ensure that
all parts of the scheme have been adequately addressed and that interfaces are effectively managed.
• Although not mandatory, it is generally recommended that where multiple ICPs are employed, one
has an overseeing role.
 IDENTIFICATION OF SCEs
Step 1

Step 2

PFEER:
Step 3 Prevention of Fire and
Explosion and
Emergency Response
Regulations

Step 4
 Step 1 - Identify the major accident events on the installation
• This is carried out using a series of hazard identification techniques, involving both
qualitative and quantitative methods.
• The results from this process are generally recorded in a Hazard Register which
documents all of the potential major accident event scenarios on an installation and should
be documented in the safety case for the installation.
Step 2 - Identification of structures and plants which can cause, contribute
to, prevent or help recover from a major accident
• Duty holders will generally utilize lists of plant and equipment, extracted from their computerized
maintenance management systems, as the starting point for assessing which of the items on the list are
safety-critical.
• Approaches vary, but SCEs need to be defined at an appropriate level such that they have a direct
linkage to MAHs, and it is also clear whether or not an equipment item forms part of one or more
SCEs.
Step 3 - Identify PFEER Specified Plant
• Specified Plant is any of the plants of an installation that is provided:
1. To comply with Regulations 11(1)(a), 13, 15 and16 of the PFEER Regulations.
2. As a means of detecting fire and for detecting and recording accumulations of
flammable gases (as required by Regulation 10 of the PFEER Regulations).
3. Measures to combat fire and explosion as required by Regulation 12 of the PFEER
Regulations.
Step 4 - Prepare a record of items identified as SCEs
• It is important that the record of SCEs is maintained up to date, therefore the major
accident analyses and the list of SCEs should be reviewed periodically.
• The list should also be reviewed prior to the addition of new equipment or modification
of the existing plant.
Barrier Management
 Important Terminologies
• Barrier: Technical, operational, and organizational elements that are intended individually
or collectively to reduce the possibility for a specific error, hazard, or accident to occur, or
which limit its harm/disadvantages.
• Barrier element: Technical, operational, or organizational measures or solutions which
play a part in realizing a barrier function.
• Barrier function: The task or role of a barrier. Examples include preventing leaks or
ignition, reducing fire loads, ensuring acceptable evacuation, and preventing hearing
damage.
• Barrier strategy: Result of a process that, on the basis of the risk picture, describes and
clarifies the barrier functions and elements to be implemented in order to reduce risk.
Important Terminologies
• Barrier management: Coordinated activities to establish and maintain barriers so that they
maintain their function at all times.
• Performance requirements: Verifiable requirements related to barrier element properties to
ensure that the barrier is effective. They can include such aspects as capacity, functionality,
effectiveness, integrity, reliability, availability, ability to withstand loads, robustness, expertise, and
mobilization time.
• Performance influencing factors: Conditions that are significant for the ability of barrier
functions and elements to perform as intended.
• Context: External and internal frame conditions must be taken into account in barrier
management.
Important Terminologies

• Risk management: Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with

regard to risk.

• Major accident: A major accident means an acute incident such as a major spill, fire,
or explosion which immediately or subsequently entails multiple serious personal
injuries and/or loss of human lives, serious harm to the environment, and/or loss of
major financial assets.
Purpose Of Barrier Management
• The main purpose of barrier management is to establish and maintain barriers so that
the risk faced at any given time can be handled by preventing an undesirable incident
from occurring or by limiting the consequences should such an incident occur.
• Barrier management includes:
1. The processes
2. Systems
3. Solutions
4. Measures
Which must be in place to ensure the necessary risk reduction through the implementation
and follow-up of barriers.
Example for Barrier Functions at Different Levels
Barrier Management Model
THANK YOU