Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

Thinking about Counter Terrorism in Indias National Strategy

My presentation today is in three parts. First, I will make the case for carrying out a comprehensive and periodic net assessment of the threat of terrorism facing India as an essential prerequisite for designing a counter terrorism strategy. Second, I will highlight, what I think are, the root causes of terrorism in the North East, in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Indian hinterland comprising several states in northern and western India; and I obviously exclude the Maoist challenge, which has been already dealt with ably by Col. Vivek Chadha. And finally, I will posit a broad framework for thinking about a counter terrorism strategy for India. The Imperative of a Net Assessment A critical prerequisite for designing a counter terrorism strategy is a comprehensive net assessment of the threat of terrorism confronting India.1 Such an assessment should include the nature and scope of the threat as it exists today and as it is likely to evolve in the future, the groups posing the threat both domestic and foreign the ideologies, motives and grievances that drive these groups to resort to terrorism, and a forecast of their capabilities, changing tactics, possible future targets, etc. We in India have not yet carried out such an assessment in spite of the constant refrain that India has been a victim of terrorism for a long time at least since the 1980s, which makes it 30 years. Is this because of a lack of political will or political direction?

I have drawn on the ideas of Dr. Bruce Hoffman to make this case for a periodic comprehensive assessment of the threat of terrorism. See his testimony titled "Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy," before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, March 27, 2001, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391924&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed February 24, 2009).

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

Or is it because the security establishment simply does not have the resources in the form of dedicated personnel and an agency or department to carry out such an assessment? Or is it simply because such an assessment is not considered necessary? Whatever be the reason or combination of reasons, it is imperative that we immediately and as a first step carry out such a net assessment as a prerequisite for evolving or perfecting a counter terrorism strategy. If we do not know who the terrorist actors are, what motivates them, what capabilities they possess and what capabilities they are in the process of acquiring, what their sources of funding are, who their supporters are, whether there are factions within terrorist groups, the proclivities of its top leaders, whether terrorist groups have popular support or do they see themselves as vanguards preparing the populace for a mass uprising, and several other questions, how can we even begin the process of designing a comprehensive strategy to deal with this challenge? Moreover, an assessment of this kind has to be made periodically. Firstly, because, otherwise, we are likely to remain and operate within the framework of understanding of the threat as it existed and not as it constantly evolves. A good example here is the way in which Indian security agencies and political leaders went about characterizing the several terrorist attacks in the Indian hinterland a few years ago as the activities of Pakistan-based jihadist groups like the Jaish-eMohammad and the Lashkar-e-Taiba or those based in Bangladesh like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami. It was only after the first email was received in November 2007 from a group which called itself the Indian Mujahideen claiming responsibility for some of these attacks that it became evident that radical Indian Muslim youth were directly involved in such terrorist violence. In addition, because of the lack of a comprehensive periodic assessment of the nature and scope of the terrorism challenge confronting India, the security establishment was also blind

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

to the emergence of another set of terrorist actors in the form of radical Hindu youth who had actually carried out some terrorist attacks during this time and which at that time had been attributed to foreign jihadists or Indian Islamists. Here Im referring to the bomb attacks at the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad and at the Ajmer Sharif. Given this, it is imperative that a periodic comprehensive assessment of the threat of terrorism is carried out within the Indian security establishment. A second reason for the necessity for such a periodic net assessment is to take into account the changing tactics, weaponry and capabilities of terrorist groups. A periodic assessment will enable security agencies to respond more effectively and also prevent them from continuing to function on the basis of preconceived notions. Here, the example of what happened in Mumbai in November 2008 comes to mind. Yes, nobody can get everything right or anticipate every move of the adversary. Admitted, surprise, especially the adversary taking us by surprise, is a major fact of life. But, the fact that Pakistan-based jihadist groups had carried out a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 should have led to a reassessment of the capabilities of these groups, their likely targets, and the likely form their future attacks may assume. We knew or should have made an effort to become aware that the attack on parliament was a part of the larger jihad against India that groups like the Lashkar have unleashed. In June 1999, for instance, the chief of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafeez Sayeed, had declared publicly that the mujahideen are waging jihad not only for the liberation of Kashmir but also for the independence of Indias 200 million Muslims, and he went on to note significantly that the jihad will continue till Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Hyderabad, Uttar Pradesh and Junagadh are liberated from Indian rule. Sayeed had also subsequently declared that his mujahideen will unfurl the Islamic flag on Delhis Red

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

Fort and a year after this declaration the Lashkar demonstrated its intent and ability in this regard by carrying out an attack against the Red Fort in December 2000. This lacuna in our understanding of the evolving nature of the threat posed by the Lashkar and for that matter by other groups, domestic and foreign, could have been avoided if only periodic net assessments of the threat of terrorism had been made. A third related reason for carrying out periodic net assessments of the threat of terrorism is to ensure that a well thought out counter terrorism strategy and counter terrorism measures are adopted proactively instead of reacting in knee jerk fashion in the aftermath of an attack. Thinking through the issue and framing a suitable counter terrorism strategy and adopting counter terrorism measures will help prevent needless panic and excessive reaction, which is precisely one objective of terrorist groups. Counter measures taken under such circumstances will moreover only result in the adoption of ad hoc measures that are not subsequently fine-tuned or followed up to deal with the evolving situation. Some examples illustrate this aspect. The 1993 terrorist attacks in Mumbai by the Dawood Ibrahim syndicate led to the initiation of joint patrolling termed Operation Swan along the Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts to prevent the smuggling in of arms and explosives through the coast as had been done by the Dawood gang. But given the absence of any subsequent comprehensive periodic assessments and consequently the need to improve the counter measures adopted or to imagine the nature and scope of threats to anticipate, the infiltration by the Lashkars 10-member team could not be prevented in spite of some intelligence being available. Again, after the 26/11 attacks, there has been a flurry of activity in terms of a renewed emphasis on coastal security and a reorganization of the coastal security set-up. But this is clearly not

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

enough. What we need to do is think ahead about future attacks, the form they could take, how they may be executed, and the evolving capabilities and tactics of terrorist groups. And for this, the basic prerequisite is periodic assessments of the evolving nature of the terrorist threat. Another example of ad hoc measures taken in the heated atmosphere of the aftermath of an attack is the decision after 26/11 to establish NSG hubs in some cities to enable a quicker response. But the fact remains that it will still take these teams a few hours to reach the target spot, unless of course the target happens to be in the same city where the NSG hubs are located. This has of course been a stop-gap response taken in the immediate aftermath of the heat and emotions generated by 26/11. Instead, doesnt it actually make sense to begin the process of training and establishing SWAT teams within the police forces of major cities, and in particular in the four metropolises as well as in major urban centres like Ahmadabad, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Lucknow, Pune, etc. where terrorist attacks have occurred in the recent past? Will this not enable a response in a matter of minutes instead of hours? Here, it is pointed out that the police force is a state subject under the Constitution and that the Centre can only advice the states to adopt proactive measures and that it has been doing so. Well, is anything happening in Delhi? After all the Delhi police comes under the charge of the Central government! This speaks volumes about the lack of political will to initiate the reform of police forces which are the first responders to an event and which moreover should be the main source of intelligence about the activities of suspicious individuals and groups. As is the norm, a number of committees over the years have been appointed in the aftermath of a particularly outrageous incident and these have pointed out to the imperative of initiating the necessary reforms and have mapped these in great detail. But there has been very poor follow-up. We are all aware that Indias

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

police-to-population ratio is well below international standards. It stood at 125 per 100,000 people in 2007, and as Ajay Sahni has pointed out, this figure actually fell from 126 per 100,000 in 2006. The international standard is between 225 and 500 per 100,000. In addition, there is an acute shortage at the leadership level; a 15.3 per cent deficit against sanctioned strength at the level of DGPs and DIGs; and a 35 per cent deficit at the level of SSPs and DSPs.2 It is universally acknowledged that counter terrorism is best carried out by police and intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Bureau has a grand total of 300 personnel who are actually involved in generating counter terrorism intelligence from the field. And the number of personnel in the organisation and those deployed in the field are also estimated to be much smaller than what is required. This is the state of affairs nearly a decade after the Girish Saxena Committee submitted a report on intelligence reforms in 2001. Just to remind, the Saxena Committee was established after the intelligence failure in Kargil. While some of the Committees recommendations were implemented like the establishment of the Multi Agency Centre, it appears that this Centre did not perform its function adequately and it was reestablished with a renewed mandate in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks. All these reinforce the fact that measures are taken only in the panic and sense of failure generated by an incident, only to be followed by a lack of adequate follow-up and a return to the usual quiescence and the regular forgetfulness till of course the next attack after which again a mad scramble ensues briefly. And the cycle goes on.

A triumph of form over content," Seminar, no. 593, January 2009, http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/593/593_ajai_sahni.htm (accessed 19 December 2010)

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

Instead, what we need to do is to proactively think about the evolving threat of terrorism and how to tackle it instead of adopting knee jerk and ad hoc measures during a period of crisis marked by heightened emotions, and then forgetting all about it in the assumption that the steps taken will suffice. Given that there has been no reduction in terrorist attacks even after some of these recommended measures have been implemented, it is clear that they are clearly inadequate and that they need to be refined and reinforced through additional measures in the face of the evolving nature and scope of the threat. And for this the essential prerequisite is periodic net assessments of the threat. Having emphasized the imperative of periodic and comprehensive net assessments of the threat of terrorism, let me also point out that it cannot be carried out in a presentation of this sort. Nor is it simply possible for an individual to attempt something of such a magnitude in a limited period of time, given the multiplicity of groups engaged in terrorism and more importantly the lack of access to intelligence data that only government agencies are privy to. Hence, this task necessarily has to be carried out by a designated government agency or department and by a dedicated team. All that we on the outside can do is to provide an overview of the root causes of terrorism and sketch out the contours of a counter terrorism strategy in the broadest of broad terms. And this is what I will do in the next few minutes. Terrorism in India There are three theatres or regions where India confronts the threat of terrorism at present, albeit in varying degrees of intensity the North East in general and Assam and Manipur in particular, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indian hinterland.

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

The North East is home to several tens of militant groups, though this region has now become relatively quieter because of the various ceasefires in place between the Indian government and many of the groups operating in the region. The only prominent groups that have not entered into a ceasefire at present are based in Manipur. The principal motivating factor for the resort to terrorism by rebel groups in the region stems from their sense of their ethnic community being distinct from mainland Indians, from their understanding that these territories were never part of India before the advent of British rule, and based on which they demand independence. In essence, the root cause of terrorism in the North East is the assertion of distinct identities; and in many cases this assertion of identity is not only vis--vis India and mainland Indians but also with reference to other tribal groups in the North East itself. Thus the fundamental challenge before India as far as the North East is concerned is to reconcile the sense of a distinct identity that these groups represent and articulate with that of the broader identity of India as a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic polity and equalitarian society. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the question of a distinct identity and the states distinct place in the Indian Union have become intertwined with political disenchantment caused by the repeated interventions of the Centre in the states political process. Of course, the Centres repeated interventions have been driven by the fear of the state otherwise spinning out of Indian control. A critical point in such interventions was reached in 1987 when electoral malpractices led to the denial of victory to several contestants of the Muslim Conference in those elections, many of whom subsequently took up arms to achieve azadi or to merge with Pakistan. It cannot be denied that there continues to be a substantial degree of popular support for the cause of azadi, as has been evident during the last three summers. Instead of misreading this demand as a vague

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

and anguished expression of disenchantment with governance and the inability of elected state governments to offer the people better socio-economic prospects, we need to understand it as an issue of identity. Some assert that identity in the context of autonomy for the state, others in the context of independence, and some others in the context of a merger with Pakistan. But the fact remains that the assertion of each of these groups is of Kashmirs distinct identity. Thus, the challenge once again before us is reconciling the Kashmiri sense of a distinct identity with that of the broader identity that the idea of India represents. In Jammu and Kashmir as well as in the Indian hinterland, there is also the additional challenge of dealing with Pakistans sponsorship of terrorist violence through jihadist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. From one perspective, we can actually understand the India-Pakistan conflict as a clash of distinct identities. Pakistans claims for Kashmir has always stemmed from the position that the latter is a Muslim-majority state, notwithstanding the fact that this norm of Partition was not applicable to the princely states. And Islamist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are simply the radical face of Pakistans very conception as an Islamic state. In the words of Hussein Haqqani, it is the ideological commitment to this idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state that gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to exporting jihadist ideology; in this sense militant Islam is essentially a state project gone awry.3 Thus, even the challenge posed by Pakistan and the radical terrorist forces it exports to India boils down to the issue of identity. The third theatre where terrorist groups are active is the Indian hinterland, several states across northern and western India. Three different sets of actors are engaged in terrorist violence in this theatre and we can see a process of action-reaction here. A group like the Indian Mujahideen,
3

The Role of Islam in Pakistans Future, The Washington Quarterly, 28:1 (Winter 2004-05), pp. 89-90.

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

comprised of radical Indian Muslim youth, is resorting to terrorism driven by the grievance that the organs of the Indian state including the police and the judiciary as well as the political system at large have failed to safeguard Muslims and their interests. They specifically cite the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the widespread communal violence that occurred in its wake as well as the more recent targeting of Muslims in the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 as reasons for waging a jihad against India and a war for civilisation. In essence, these occasional lapses in the political process coupled with the rise of radical Islam in the region appear to have forced open the issue of the identity of Indian Muslims. For their part, radical Hindu youth who have become mobilised on the issue of a Hindu India (remember the 1990s slogan garv se kaho, hum Hindu hai!), are incensed by the repeated terrorist attacks unleashed by the Indian Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and seek vengeance against the perpetrators of these attacks and their sympathisers. Thus, this cycle of violence also ultimately boils down to one of assertion of new identities.

A Framework for thinking about a Counter Terrorism Strategy Based on this understanding, let me attempt to sketch out a framework for thinking about a counter terrorism strategy. And I will do this at three levels long term, medium term and short term. If we are to understand the threat of terrorism confronting India in terms of assertions of distinct identities and contestations over identity, then a counter terrorism strategy has to necessarily

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

involve the strengthening and propagation of the idea of India as a multicultural society and a democratic polity where all groups are equal stakeholders and where there is enough space for all groups to celebrate their particular identities. In addition, especially given the reality of the mobilisation of the Hindu Right which has upset the earlier political equilibrium, a new political consensus needs to be forged to promote communal harmony and maintain the strict rule of law. This will have to unfold and be sustained over the long term. However, these steps are unlikely to cater for the challenge posed by Pakistan and the jihadist groups it sponsors against India, though Pakistan itself has become a victim of the ideology it has fostered and the radical forces that it has nurtured and continues to nurture. The options before India to bring about fundamental changes within Pakistan are rather limited and we can even say non-existent. India does not have the capability to force a change within Pakistan through an allout war and a regime change, especially given Pakistans possession of a nuclear deterrent. Nor is the option of a limited war or the calibrated use of military strikes likely to force a change in Pakistan. Exercising these options will neither deter Pakistan nor the groups operating from its territory. In any event, the limits of military coercion were clearly demonstrated during the crises of 2001-2002. Moreover, any such action would only strengthen the hands of the military establishment, whose very raison detre is anti-Indianism built on the foundation of the pressing threat posed by India to Pakistans very survival. We clearly saw an attempt to orchestrate such a threat perception in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks by the Pakistan military by citing a possible Indian military response. Under these circumstances, the only available practical option before India appears to be one of encouraging Pakistan in tandem with the international community to weed out the jihad culture that has taken root in its territory and which has been

Draft paper Presented at IDSA International Workshop on National Security Strategy, December 2010 Not to be cited without permission

exacting a heavy price upon the country, and to move towards becoming a moderate democracy. This is again a long-term approach. In the medium term, India needs to enhance the strength and capabilities of its police forces and the intelligence apparatus, as well as fine-tune mechanisms for the flow of information and coordination of action. And in the short term, the fight needs to be taken to domestic terrorist groups through a concerted police- and intelligence-led campaign. These efforts should focus on arresting terrorist cadres and leaders and bringing them to justice. At the same time, international cooperation needs to be fostered to deny safe havens to terrorist groups and choke off their funding and sources of weaponry. Last but not least, potentially vulnerable targets need to be identified and protected. In conclusion, I will once again emphasise the imperative of carrying out periodic and comprehensive net assessments of the threat of terrorism confronting India, so that short-term measures in particular, which lie within the domain experience of police and intelligence forces, can be perfected and constantly fine-tuned to deal with the evolving nature and scope of the threat.