FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 229372, August 27, 2020 ]

MARYVILLE MANILA, INC., PETITIONER, VS. LLOYD C. ESPINOSA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LOPEZ, J.:

The reasonable link between the seafarer's illnesses and nature of work is the main
issue in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Court of
Appeal's (CA) Decision[1] dated September 1, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 138222, which
reversed and set aside the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).

ANTECEDENTS

On September 12, 2010, Maryville Manila, Inc. (Maryville Manila), a local manning
agency acting for and in behalf of its principal Maryville Maritime, Inc. (Maryville
Maritime), deployed Lloyd Espinosa (Lloyd) as a seafarer on board the vessel M/V
Renuar. On December 11, 2010 to April 23, 2011, the Somali pirates held hostage the
vessel and its entire crew. On May 5, 2011, Lloyd was repatriated. [2] On January, 10,
2012, Maryville Manila re-hired Lloyd to work on board M/V Iron Manolis for a period of
nine months. However, Lloyd was repatriated after seven months or on August 29,
2012.[3]
On July 15, 2013, Lloyd filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits
against Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime before the labor arbiter (LA). Lloyd
alleged that he was repatriated after suffering flashbacks of the hostage incident and
experiencing mental breakdown. Yet, Maryville Manila refused to give him medical
assistance when he arrived in the Philippines. He then sought on February 12, 2013 the
advice of a clinical psychologist who diagnosed him with "Occupational Stress Disorder
(Work-related); Hypomanic Mood Disorder, to consider; Bipolar Condition; R/O
Schizophrenic Episode; and [Post-traumatic] Stress Disorder." [4] This work-related and
work-aggravated condition rendered him permanently incapacitated to work as a
seafarer.[5] On the other hand, Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime claimed that
Lloyd voluntarily disembarked from the vessel without any medical incident or accident.
Moreover, Lloyd did not immediately report to the company-designated physician after
his repatriation. It was only in July 2013 that Lloyd visited Maryville Manila asking for
another contract of employment.[6]
On February 28, 2014, the LA granted Lloyd's claim for total and permanent disability
benefits. It explained that Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime failed to prove that
Lloyd voluntarily requested his repatriation. Likewise, Lloyd's failure to immediately
report to the company-designated physician will not prevent him from claiming disability
compensation. The reportorial requirement is only a condition sine qua non for
entitlement to sickness allowance,[7] thus:

At the outset, while it may be conceded that the instant complaint was only filed
several months after the complainant's repatriation and that there was no record at
all that shows that complainant was repatriated due to his present illness, this
Office, however, cannot help but consider the glaring fact that complainant, for one
reason or another, had failed to finish his last contract with respondent, x x x [T]his
Office finds the respondents' allegation that it was complainant who requested for
his early repatriation bereft of any evidentiary support. As correctly pointed out by
the complainant, respondents could have easily presented pertinent evidence, [i.e.]
master's report, to prove such an allegation. This notwithstanding, respondents, for
no apparent valid reason, lifted no finger to do so, thus, renders their stance, highly
suspect, x x x

xxxx

In addition, anent the respondents' contention that complainant failed to

report within three days after his repatriation, be that as it may, this, albeit
assailed by complainant, does not detract from the complainant's entitlement to
full disability compensation. It should be stressed that compliance with the
provision of the POEA Contract on the reportorial requirement is a condition [sine
qua non] only for claiming sickness allowance and not for a total permanent
disability benefits, x x x

Thus, granting that complainant had failed to report within three days, albeit
he insisted that he indeed reported but respondents refused to
accommodate him, complainant had merely waived, in effect, his right to sickness
allowance and never his complaint for total and permanent disability.

xxxx
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
complainant entitled to total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of
USD 60,000.00 under the POEA Contract, [sic] and attorney's fee equivalent to ten
percent of the said amount.

However, all other claims, including the claim for moral and exemplary damages
are denied for lack of factual basis.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphases supplied.)

Dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the NLRC. Maryville Manila and Maryville
Maritime maintained that Lloyd is not entitled to any disability benefit. In contrast, Lloyd
argued that the LA should grant him double compensation benefit due to disability in
high risk areas.[9] On August 29, 2014, the NLRC reversed the LA's findings and
dismissed Lloyd's complaint. It ratiocinated that Lloyd failed to establish that he was
repatriated for medical reasons. Also, it held that the reportorial requirement applies to
claims for disability compensation. Lastly, there was no reason to relax the requirement
absent evidence that Lloyd was incapacitated to submit himself to post-employment
medical examination before the company-designated physician or that he had submitted
a written notice to that effect,[10] viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' appeal is GRANTED and the

Labor Arbiter's Decision dated February 28, 2014 is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
A new one is hereby entered DISMISSING complainant-appellant's complaint for
total and permanent disability benefits. Accordingly, his partial appeal is DENIED
for lack of merit

SO ORDERED.[11]
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration,[12] Lloyd elevated the case to the CA through a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138222. On September 1, 2016, the
CA set aside the NLRC's Decision and reinstated the LA's award of total and permanent
disability benefits. The CA cited Baron, et al. v. EPE Transport, Inc., et al. [13] and Barros
v. NLRC[14] and ruled that the burden rests upon Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime
to prove that Lloyd was not medically repatriated. It also cited Career Philippines
Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. v. Serna[15] and held that Lloyd sought medical
examination but was refused, thus:

There is no dispute that the Petitioner was repatriated before the end of his contract
with the Private Respondent. The parties, however, cannot agree on the reason for
such repatriation. As there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for
the Petitioner's repatriation, the issue will, therefore, be resolved in like
manner as claims for illegal dismissal, which means that the burden is on the
employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.

xxxx

As for the post-employment medical examination requirement, both the Petitioner

and the Private Respondents failed to present supporting evidence of their
contrasting claims. On the part of the Petitioner, he failed to show proof that he was
refused medical examination while, on the part of the Private Respondents, the latter
failed to present proof that the Petitioner made such a request. Pertinent on this
score is the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Career Philippines
Shipmanagemeni, Inc., et al. v. Serna, viz.:

xxx While Serna's verified claim with respect to his July 14, 1999 visit to the
petitioner's office may be seen by some as a bare allegation, we note that the
petitioners' corresponding denial is itself also a bare allegation that, worse, is
unsupported by other evidence on record. [In contrast, the events that transpired
after the July 14, 1999 visit, as extensively discussed by the CA above,
effectively served to corroborate Serna's claim on the visit's purpose, i.e., to seek
medical assistance.] Under these circumstances, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC when it affirmed the labor arbiter ruling and
gave credence to Serna on this point. Under the evidentiary rules, a positive
assertion is generally entitled to more weight than a plain denial.

We note on this point that the obligation imposed by the mandatory

reporting requirement under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC is not
solely on the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act on the report,
and in this sense partakes of the nature of a reciprocal obligation.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and where
each party is effectively a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the
obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. While the
mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer to be present for the
post-employment medical examination, which must be conducted within
three (3) working days upon the seafarer's return, it also poses the
employer the implied obligation to conduct a meaningful and timely
examination of the seafarer.
 Using the foregoing as baseline, it could thus be concluded that, first, as between
the Petitioner and the Private Respondents' contrasting claims, the
Petitioner's positive assertion that he sought, but was refused, medical
examination is entitled to more weight than the Private Respondents' bare
denial and, second, the lack of a post-medical examination in this case cannot
be used to defeat respondent's [Petitioner, in this case] claim since the failure
to subject the seafarer to this requirement was not due to the seafarer's fault
but to the inadvertence or deliberate refusal of petitioners [Private
Respondents, in this case]. Needless to stress, the time-honored rule that, in
controversies between a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from
the evidence should be resolved in the former's favor in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor finds
application at bench.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed dispositions are REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.[16] (Emphases supplied.)

Maryville Manila moved for a reconsideration but was denied. [17] Hence, this recourse.
Maryville Manila argued that the CA erred in evaluating the parties' evidence in
certiorari proceedings and insisted that Lloyd was neither repatriated for medical reason
nor refused medical treatment.[18]
RULING

The petition is meritorious.

Foremost, we cannot fault the CA in reviewing the parties' evidence in certiorari

proceedings. In labor cases, the CA is empowered to evaluate the materiality and
significance of the evidence alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarded by the NLRC in relation to all other evidence on record. The CA can grant
the prerogative writ of certiorari when the factual findings complained of are not
supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the
LA; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. [19] To make this finding,
the CA necessarily has to view the evidence to determine if the NLRC ruling had
substantial basis.[20] Contrary to Maryville Manila's contention, the CA can examine the
evidence of the parties since the factual findings of the NLRC and the LA are
contradicting. Indeed, this Court has the same authority to sift through the factual
findings of both the CA and the NLRC in the event of their conflict. [21] This Court is not
precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting findings by the
CA, the NLRC and the LA.[22]
Here, we find that the CA erroneously concluded that Lloyd was medically repatriated
and that Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime have the burden to establish
otherwise. The CA misread the rulings in Baron and Barros which involved cases for
illegal dismissal. In Baron, the petitioners, who are taxi drivers, asserted that they were
unceremoniously dismissed after they charged respondents of violating the collective
bargaining agreement. The respondents did not refute such absence from work but
averred that it was petitioners who abandoned their jobs. However, the theory of
abandonment was unsubstantiated. In that case, we ruled that the Labor Code places
upon the employer the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for a
valid or authorized cause. It does not distinguish whether the employer admits or does
not admit the dismissal.[23] In Barros, the petitioner, a seafarer, claims illegal dismissal,
recovery of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract,
repatriation expenses, unauthorized deductions and payments, damages and attorney's
fees. In that case, we denied the private respondents' argument that the petitioner
voluntarily terminated his employment on the claim that he himself requested
repatriation. The private respondents did not dispute that petitioner was repatriated prior
to the expiration of his employment contract. As such, it is incumbent upon the employer
to prove that the petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was
not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified.

Notably, Lloyd's cause of action is for total and permanent disability benefits and not
illegal dismissal or pre-termination of his overseas employment contract. The fact that
the petitioner in Barros is a seafarer like Lloyd and that voluntary repatriation was put in
issue are immaterial. The rule on burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases cannot be
unduly applied in proving whether a seafarer was repatriated for medical reasons. At
any rate, Lloyd's claim that he was medically repatriated is an affirmative allegation and
the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts and not upon he who denies it.
The nature of things is that one who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of it. [24]
Admittedly, Lloyd failed to discharge this burden and did not present substantial
evidence as to the cause of his repatriation.

Likewise, we observed that the CA heavily relied in Career Philippines

Shipmanagement, Inc., in ruling that Lloyd was refused medical treatment. In that case,
the CA, the NLRC and the LA speak as one in their findings that the seafarer reported
to the company-designated physician within three working days from arrival in the
Philippines. Also, it discussed instances where the award of disability benefits was
sustained even if the seafarer had been assessed by a personal physician, thus:

The labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are one in finding that on July 14, 1999,
or two days after his repatriation, Serna reported to the office of Career Phils,
specifically to report his medical complaints, only to be told to wait for his referral to
company-designated physicians. The referral came not on the following day, but
nearly three (3) weeks after, on August 3, 1999.

We see no reason to disturb the lower tribunals' finding, x x x

xxxx

The petitioners failed to perform their obligation of providing timely medical

examination, thus rendering meaningless Scrna's compliance with the
mandatory reporting requirement. With his July 14, 1999 visit, Serna clearly
lived up to his end of the agreement; it was the petitioners who defaulted on theirs.
They cannot now be heard to claim that Serna should forfeit the right to claim
disability benefits under the POEA-SEC and their CBA.

The Court has in the past, under unique circumstances, sustained the award of
disability benefits even if the seafarer's disability had been assessed by a personal
physician. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, we affirmed the grant
by the CA and by the NLRC of disability benefits to a claimant, based on the
recommendation of a physician not designated by the employer. The "claimant
consulted a physician of his choice when the company-designated physician
refused to examine him." In Cabuyoc v. Inter-Orient Navigation
Shipmanagement, Inc., we reinstated the NLRC's decision, affirmatory of that of
the labor arbiter, which awarded sickness wages to the petitioner therein even if
his disability had been assessed by the Philippine General Hospital, not by a
companydesignated hospital. Similar to the case at bar, the seafarer in
Cabuyoc initially sought medical assistance from the respondent employer
but it refused to extend him help.[25] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)

Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. is far different from Lloyd's case. Here, there
is no unanimous and definite finding that Lloyd timely reported to the company-
designated physician. The LA even brushed aside this issue and held that compliance
with the reportorial requirement applies only to claims for sickness allowance and not to
disability benefits. On the other hand, the NLRC found that Lloyd "failed to substantiate
his allegations that he sought respondent-appellants' help for his purported medical
condition and that the same was refused.'"[26] On appeal, the CA ruled that Lloyd's
"assertion that he sought, but was refused, medical examination is entitled to more
weight than the Private Respondents ' bare denial x x x." [27] In these circumstances, we
agree with the NLRC that Lloyd did not report to the company-designated physician.
Again, it is Lloyd who has the duty to establish his affirmative allegation that he
submitted himself to post-medical examination after his repatriation. Nevertheless, Lloyd
failed to present substantial evidence to prove this assertion. In contrast, Maryville
Manila, which denies such allegation, has no burden to produce such proof.

Absent evidence of medical repatriation and refusal to give treatment, it can be

reasonably deduced that Lloyd suffered illnesses after the term of his contract. To be
sure, Lloyd consulted a clinical psychologist on February 12, 2013 or after almost six
months from his repatriation on August 29,2012. The psychologist declared Lloyd
permanently unfit for further sea service. Thereafter, Lloyd filed a complaint for total and
permanent disability benefits.

In resolving claims for disability benefits, it is imperative to integrate the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)
with every agreement between a seafarer and his employer. [28] Lloyd's latest
employment contract with Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime was executed on
January, 10, 2012 and is covered by the 2010 Amended Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Ships.[29] In Ventis Maritime Corporation v. Salenga,[30] we clarified that
Section 20-A of the POEA-SEC is irrelevant if the seafarer did not suffer an illness or
injury during the term of his contract. Rather, it is Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC which
will apply if the illness manifests or is discovered after the term of the seafarer's
contract, to wit:

[S]eafarer's complaints for disability benefits arise from (1) injury or illness that
manifests or is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which is
usually while the seafarer is on board the vessel or (2) illness that manifests or is
discovered after the contract, which is usually after the seafarer has disembarked
from the vessel. As further explained below, it is only in the first scenario that
Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC applies.
 xxxx

Accordingly, it was an error for the CA to rely on Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC.
Section 20(A) applies only if the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during
the term of his contract, i.e., while he is employed. Section 20(A) of the POEA-
SEC clearly states the parameters of its applicability:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury
or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, if the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during
the term of the contract, the process in Section 20(A) applies. The employer
is obliged to continue to pay the seafarer's wages, and to cover the cost of
treatment and medical repatriation, if needed. After medical repatriation, the
seafarer has the duty to report to the company-designated physician within
three days upon his return. The employer shall then pay sickness allowance
while the seafarer is being treated. And thereafter, the dispute resolution
mechanism with regard to the medical assessments of the company-designated,
seafarer-appointed, and independent and third doctor, shall apply.

xxxx

In instances where the illness manifests itself or is discovered after the term
of the seafarer's contract, the illness may either be (1) an occupational
illness listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is
categorized as a work-related illness if it complies with the conditions
stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an illness not listed as an occupational illness
under Section 32-A but is reasonably linked to the work of the seafarer.

For the first type, the POEA-SEC has clearly defined a work-related illness as
"any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of
this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." What this means is that to
be entitled to disability benefits, a seafarer must show compliance with the
 conditions under Section 32-A, as follows:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described therein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the
described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

As to the second type of illness — one that is not listed as an occupational

disease in Section 32-A — Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel, instructs that
the seafarer may still claim provided that he suffered a disability occasioned by
a disease contracted on account of or aggravated by working conditions. For this
illness, "[i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease
suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that
his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least,
aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had." Operationalizing
this, to prove this reasonable linkage, it is imperative that the seafarer must prove
the requirements under Section 32-A: the risks involved in his work; his illness
was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks; the disease was
contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to
contract it; and he was not notoriously negligent.

xxxx

More importantly, the rule applies that whoever claims entitlement to

benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial
evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not
merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the
test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the
conclusions of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just
inferences and speculations. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)

In this case, Lloyd was diagnosed with "Occupational Stress Disorder (Work-related);
Hypomanic Mood Disorder, to consider; Bipolar Condition; R/O Schizophrenic Episode;
and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder"[31] after the term of his contract. These conditions
are not listed as occupational illnesses under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. As such,
Lloyd is required to prove the reasonable link between his illnesses and nature of work.
Lloyd must establish the risks involved in his work, his illnesses were contracted as a
result of his exposure to the risks, the diseases were contracted within a period of
exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract them, and he was not
notoriously negligent. Yet, Lloyd failed to pass the reasonable linkage test.

In his complaint, Lloyd alleged that from December 11, 2010 to April 23, 2011, the
Somali pirates held hostage M/V Renuar and its entire crew. However, the clinical
psychologist reported a different date of piracy which transpired in February 2012, thus:

This is to certify that LLOYD C. ESPINOSA, x x x was seen and treated by the
undersigned because of the following:
NOI: Occupational Stress Disorder (Work-related);
Hypomanic Mood Disorder, to consider
Bipolar Condition
R/O Schizophrenic Episode;
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder;

DO: On repeated and persistent episodes in a series of

[e]xacerbations after a traumatic incident in 2012;

TOI: Persistent episodes from aforesaid period;

PO: MV Renuar, that sailed from Brazil and was in the

seas of Iran in February 2012 when sometime during
aforesaid period above-named seaman and fellow
seamen on board above-named ship were hostage [sic]
by Somalian pirated; [sic] and

incurring the following: History points out that from above-mentioned dates, above-
named patient suffered the following signs and symptoms of palpitations, accompanied
with chest pains and tachycardia; tremors, muscle tension, and tingling in the
extremities; light-headedness and dizziness; upset stomach; feeling of weakness and
fatigue; irritability; restlessness and feeling of being on edge; difficulty concentrating and
feeling blank; and wakefulness or total lack of sleep. The condition started when above-
named patient and his co-seafarers suffered from punishments, including deprivation
from food, water and liberty from Somalian pirates. He was repatriated and had
undergone treatment sessions with the undersigned for the following diagnosed
conditions, x x x32 (Emphases supplied.)

At any rate, there is no substantial evidence on the link between Lloyd's supposed
illnesses and nature of work. Foremost, piracy is a risk confronting all seafarers while in
voyage, but the clinical report only made general statements on punishments and
deprivation of food, water and liberty. The relationship of the risk and the diseases was
not fairly established. There was no proof or explanation as to how Lloyd acquired the
illnesses as a result of the hostage incident. The psychologists hastily concluded that
Lloyd's conditions started after the piracy. Moreover, Lloyd's actions after the hostage
incident are incompatible with the clinical psychologist's findings. Lloyd was repatriated
from M/V Renuar on May 5, 2011 but he applied again and was deployed on January,
10, 2012 on board M/V Iron Manolis. There is no indication, during the intervening
period of eight months from repatriation to deployment, that Lloyd experienced any sign
of the alleged diseases. In fact, Lloyd passed the pre-employment medical examination
and was cleared for re-employment. Lloyd even claimed that he "more than fully and
ably discharged his duties and responsibilities expected of him on board the vessel." [33]
Verily, it would be improbable for Lloyd to properly perform his tasks as he claims if he
had palpitations, chest pains, tremors, muscle tension, dizziness, upset stomach,
fatigue, irritability, restlessness and total lack of sleep. Quite the contrary, these
symptoms were belied since Lloyd lasted for seven months in M/V Iron Manolis.

All told, Lloyd is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for failure to prove
that he was repatriated for medical reasons and that a reasonable link exists between
his illnesses and nature of work. Absent substantial evidence as reasonable basis, this
Court is left with no choice but to deny Lloyd's claim for disability benefits, lest an
injustice be caused to his employer. The award of compensation and disability benefits
cannot rest on speculations, presumptions and conjectures. [34] Although labor contracts
are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be
construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable
law, and existing jurisprudence.[35]
In a number of cases, this Court granted financial assistance to separated employees
for humanitarian reason and compassionate justice.[36] Taking into consideration the
factual circumstances obtaining in this case, and the fact that Lloyd, in his own little
way, has devoted his efforts to further Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime's
endeavors, we deem it proper to grant P100,000.00 as financial assistance.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeal's Decision
dated September 1, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 138222 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated August 29, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission is
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that Maryville Manila, Inc. is ordered to pay
Lloyd Espinosa the amount of P100,000.00 as financial assistance.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo at 20-B-25-B; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of this Court)
and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.

[2]
Id. at 21-A.

[3]
Id. at 21-A.

[4]
Id. at 42-B-43-A.

[5]
Id. at21-B.

[6]
Id.

[7]
Rollo, pp. 115-122.

[8]
Id. at 119-122.

[9]
Id. at 22-A.

[10]
Id. at 124-135.

[11]
Id. at 134.

[12]
Id. at 137-139.

[13]
765 Phil. 866(2015).

[14]
373 Phil. 635(1999).

[15]
700 Phil. 1 (2012).
[16]
Rollo, pp. 23-25.

[17]
Id. at 26-A-27.

[18]
Id. at 10-B-16-B.

[19]
Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines., Inc., et al., 769 Phil. 418, 434 (2015),
citing Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, 711 Phil. 516, 525 (2013).

[20]
Id., citing Diamond Taxi, et al. v. Llamas, Jr., 729 Phil. 364, 376 (2014).

[21]
Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines., Inc., et al., 769 Phil. 418, 435 (2015),
citing Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon, 704 Phil. 120 (2013).

[22]
Id., citing Plastimer Industrial Corporation, et al. v. Gopo, et al., 658 Phil. 627, 633
(2011).

[23]
Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp./Samir Maddah & Travellers Insurance & Surety
Corp., 408 Phil. 570,583-584(2001).

[24]
Sambalilo, et al. v. Sps. Llarenas, 811 Phil. 552, 568 (2017). See also Princess
Talent Center Production. Inc., et al. v. Masagca, 829 Phil. 381 (2018).

[25]
Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al, v. Serna, 700 Phil. 1, 14-16 (2012).

[26]
Rollo, p. 131.

[27]
Id. at 24-B.

[28]
C.F. Sharp Crew Mgm'l., Inc., et al. v. Legal Heirs of the late Godofredo Repiso, 780
Phil. 645, 665- 666(2016).

[29]
See POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, dated October 26, 2010.

[30]
G.R. No. 238578, June 8,2020.

[31]
Supra note 4.
[32]
Rollo, pp. 42-B-43-B.

[33]
Id. at 49.

[34]
Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., et al, 698 Phil. 170, 184 (2012). See also
Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Yamson, et al., 830 Phil. 73 1, 746 (2018).

[35]
Auza, Jr., et al. v. MOL Phils, Inc., et al., 699 Phil. 62, 67 (2012), citing Sime Darby
Pilipinas, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (2nd Div.), 351 Phil. 1013,
1020(1998).

[36]
In Panganiban v. TARA TradingShipmanagement, Inc., et al., 647 Phil. 675 (2010),
this Court affirmed the award of P50,000.00 financial assistance. In Villaruel v. Yeo Han
Guan, 665 Phil. 212, 221 (2011), this Court granted financial assistance of P50,000.00.
In Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Yamson, et al., supra note 34, this Court
awarded P75,000.00 financial assistance. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Antonio,
618 Phil. 601, 614-615 (2009), this Court gave financial assistance of P100,000.00.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: February 10, 2021

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