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A history of Shifta War between Somalia and Kenya 1963-1968
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400 views137 pagesBandits On The Border
A history of Shifta War between Somalia and Kenya 1963-1968
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© © All Rights Reserved
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/ 137
BANDITS ON THE BORDER
The Last Frontier in the
Search for Somali Unity The Red Sea Press Inc.
Publishers & Distributors of Third World Books
P.O. Box 48
P.O Box 1982 c
Frenion, NJO8607 ~~ Asmara, ERITREA 1
Copyright © 2005 Nene Mburu
First Printing 2005
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechani-
cal, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission
of the publisher.
Book design: Sam Saverance
Cover design: Roger Dormann
Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Select Chronology
1.
Introduction
Figure 1: Northern Frontier Districts
Figure 2: Ethnographic Map Of The NFD
The Imperial Partition
Figure 3: Kenya International Boundaries: 1899, 1902, and 1925
British Administration of the NFD, 1900-63
Figure 4: Parts of the NFD offered in exchange for the Haud
Figure 5: Northern Frontier District’s Tabal Grazing Areas
Self-determination: The Somali Question
The NED: Civil D 960 Preface
omalia today is notorious for violence and factionalism. Order and
democracy only exist in the northern breakaway republic of Somaliland
(formerly British Somaliland). Elsewhere division and disunity are the order
of the day. It is difficult to recall that more than twenty years ago Somali
affairs were dominated by nationalism and the Somali unification struggle to
achieve independence for the Somali in Kenya and in eastern Ethiopia (the
Ogaden) so they could join theit kinsmen in Somalia to form a united state
based on Somali ethnic nationalism.
Although this stirring rhetoric has not entitely disappeared, today the
chief political reality is division rather than unity, with Somalia militias
fighting for whatever they can grab of the Somali state rather than securing
the unity of the whole.
Nene Mburu’s study takes us back to that earlier, happy period of
omali nationalism when insurgents in northern a ae to sep: Bandits on the Border
All in all, this is a most valuable tion to the literarure on Somali and
African nationalism, to the sociology of banditry, and to the s aciology of
of this kind of in is particularly well
ot all serious students of the
ginal reflection, that Somalis appear
n in unity. Not a surprise to students of
thropological genus of which the Somali people
mple.
I.M. Lewis
London School of Economics,
Acknowledgements
Tam indebted to many academics for my intellectual scaffolding and
A wish to acknowledge support from Professor Godfrey Muriuki (History
Department, University of Nairobi) for invaluable academic advice during
my fieldwork in Kenya. I thank him most sincerely. In London, I was able to
hold unofficial consultations with Ioan Myriadis Lewis (Professor Emeritus,
Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political
Science), for which I am very grateful. His scholarly work on the Somali people
and detailed knowledge of the Horn of Africaand the subject under study made
his advice on this project and my refereed publications extremely valuable. I
wish to thank my main academic advisor Professor Christopher Dandeker
(Wat Studies Department, Kings College, London), whose encouragement
particularly during the master’s degree program boosted my self-confidence
and enabled me to focus on a suitable topic for the doctoral degree.
Many thanks go to my family: Irene Nene, Bond Nene, and Buddy Nene
eir invaluable moral support and understanding when my investment
the project interfered with family matters. Special mention is due Bandits on the Border
London), the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the
School of Oriental and African Studies (London).
Lastly, this project could not have been completed without the
information offered freely by respondents who are too many to be thanked
individually. Their desire that I should establish facts to the highest level of
certitude was unmistakable. My payment to them rests in the hope that based
on the information available at the time of research; I have given a balanced
interpretation, analysis, and presentation of a credible account of the Shifta
conflict in Kenya.
Nene Mburu
2005.
1878
1881-85
1884-85
1885-1900
Select Chronology
The Ajuran immigrate into the NFD.
The Galla settle in the Tana River basin.
Construction of the Suez Canal makes the Red Sea a main
seaway.
Italy occupies Assab port on the Danakil coast of Eritrea.
The sultan of Turkey, through his Egyptian viceroy, extends
Turkish rule from the port of Massawa inland to Harar and
down along the Gulf of Aden to Guardafui.
Congress of Berlin following Russo-Turkish war. Turkish
possessions in Africa shared by the European powers.
French Somaliland is established around the port of Djibout.
Berlin conference partitions Africa among West Europeans.
Italy, with Britain’s consent, occupies Massawa (previously
belonging to Turkey since the sixteenth century and Benadir
alian Somaliland).
aalli betwe taly 1919
1924 (July)
1925 (29 June)
1926
1934
1935
1939
1941
1941-48
1943 (13 May)
Bandits on the Border
Wajir occupied by the British but abandoned in 1916 following
Somali raids in Serenli (northern Juba).
Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia dies.
World War I.
Treaty of London between Britain and Italy. They agree that
Britain will expand its colonial possessions at Germany's
expense and later will compensate Italy.
Britain effectively establishes military administration in the
NED after stationing permanent troops in Wajir and Moyale.
Treaty signed to formalize Juba’s cession to Italy.
Jubaland given to Italy for its assistance to the Allies during
World War I.
NED declared a “closed district” and virtually insulated from
the rest of Kenya.
Special Districts Ordinance implemented to restrict movement
in and out of the NFD.
(October), Mussolini's Italy invades Ethiopia.
World War II.
Britain invades Ethiopia to “liberate” it from Italy.
All areas inhabited by ethnic Somalis are under Britain except
French-occupied Djibouti.
Formation of the Somali Youth Club in Mogadishu
advice of British Military Administration.
Lord Ernest Bevin (Britain’:
MONE ELS,
Select Chronology
1952
Eritrea is placed under Ethiopian administration pending the
determination of its sovereignty but the emperor annexes it to
become part of Ethiopia.
Britain hands over the Somali-occupied Haud to Ethiopia.
Ban on political patties lifted in the NFD.
Lancaster House Conference (London) discusses the futute of
Somali enclaves.
(21 June) British Somaliland becomes independent.
(1 July) Italian trusteeship becomes independent and joins
former British Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia.
Kenyatta visits Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa
(Ethiopia).
Kenya Constitutional Conference in London attended by
delegates from the NFD. Britain’s colonial secretary, Richard
Maudling promises to send a commission to the NFD to
ascertain the people’s wishes and then to implement the
findings before Kenya attains self-government.
British White Paper (Command 1700) issued on the NFD.
Members of the Regional Boundaries and Constituencies
Commission and the Northern Frontier Districts Commission
visit Kenya.
Jomo Kenyatta and Ronald Ngala visit Somalia to discuss the
NED.
Britain’s colonial secretary Duncan Sandy’s announces that the
NEP will be carved out of former NED.
British army exercise in the NFD code-named Operation 1963
(November)
1963
(December)
1964
1964
1964
1965
1967 (October)
1967
1968 (January)
Bandits on the Border
Guerrilla war begins with the assassination of District
commissioner Daudi Debaso Wabera of Isiolo and Boran
Senior Chief Haji Galma Dida.
Kenya’s Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta declares a state of
emergency in the NFD and deploys the military to aid of civil
power: the Rules of Engagement (ROE) given legitimacy by
the Kenyan Parliament after initial opposition from the Kenyan
African Democratic Union (KADU).
Army mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; and a
revolution takes place in Zanzibar.
China’s Premier Chou En-Lai visits Somalia and declares Africa
ripe for revolution.
Counterinsurgency in the NFD; nomads restricted in protected
villages.
Mine warfare adds to the attrition of daily skirmishes,
Turning point in the conflict — the Arusha Agreement.
The Arab-Israeli war severely damages Somalia’s banana
industry due to the closing of the Suez Canal, hence the
country is unable to continue financial support for the Shifta
Diplomatic relations reestablished between Kenya and
Somalia.
CHAPTER 4
Introduction
Pp this: “There is one half of Kenya which the other half knows
nothing about, and seems to care even less”.’ Negley Farson formed
the above opinion of the NFD in 1949, but the observation is as valid now
as it was then. Although internecine conflicts in postcolonial Africa remain
a common focus of academic research, the Shifta conflict in Kenya has
suffered neglect in the vast literature of war despite its significance in the
political history of the Horn of Africa. This study is a detailed analysis of
the struggle for self-determination by the Somali ethnic community of the
Northern Frontier Districts of Kenya (hereafter the NFD). By focusing on
the fighting in the NFD and its geopolitical context in the Horn of Africa,
the project addresses significant lacunae that emerge from a review of the
ailable literature on the subject. Farah’s study, From Ethnic Response to Clan
pounds on how pristine cleavages of the Somali have been used
edium of sociopolitical and economic change.’ The Shifta
tral to his inquiry despite popping up briefly as the scholar
for the rise and decline of Somali nationalism in the post-
i ji ris dera. My study establishes
ae sor to the Soma ethni
S Bandits on the Border
such a proposition is not remotely plausible, as the frontier has suffered too
much deprivation to attract commando contingency operations,
The Earl of Lytton has based The Stolen Desert on a wealth of experience
gained as a colonial administrator to elucidate the indifference of Kenyans
of the political center towards the pastoral nomads of the state’s periphery!
Nevertheless, the study emerges as the Somali view, for it concentrates
more on adulation than scrutiny, thus failing to give a balanced analysis,
For example, the author discards the argument for the inviolability of the
inherited colonial boundaries and repeatedly describes as political folly the
central government’s retention of the NFD, which he consistently refers
to as “Kenya’s Somali Colony”. In addition, his work is limited in time and
space, as it only covers the stage of incipient insurgency, which is before
1964, and he ends his study before investigating the fighting.
A few other scholarly texts have enriched our understanding of Somali
nationalism: Drysdale’s The Somali Dispute, Touval’s Somali Nationalism,
Markakis’, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa, and several soci
of LM. Lewis’s A Modern History of Somalia being of particular importance
to my study.> These texts are not dedicated to the study of the Shifta conflic
in the NFD, although each explores how Somali nationalism influenced 1
attempted secession of the Kenyan-Somalia frontier. The I
above lends weight to the view that the Shifta conflict has 1
in sufficient depth despite the fact that various scholars
significance. The aim of this research therefore is
available body of literature, by historically analy
aftermath of the Shifta conflict. Conceptualizati
mainly a critical historical analysis.
IAL AND PHYSICAL SETTING
ection explores the human
because 0
Chapter 1: Introduction
This study advances two views. First, the Galla were in the Horn
around the tenth century, but the Somalis came from the Gulf of Aden
and drove them south and southwest. Yet, another view, based in part on
aditions of the Somali, claims the cradle
atchacological evidences and oral tr:
8 Oral evidence
of the Somali people is the northeastern tip of the Horn.
from the frontier inhabitants reinforces the view that the Boran came to the
NED through Somalia before the Somali community.” Boran oral sources
claim they (the Boran) settled in the NI D after migrating due south and
southeast into the Horn of Africa from Ethiopia.'” Despite this claim, some
Boran particularly the Muslim vaunt their Arabic descent, claiming they
originated from the Middle East and migrated due south first to Ethiopia
then to Somalia"! It would be misleading to assert that any of the above
claims are historically and scientifically indisputable. However, there is
evidence of Boran terms in most parts of Somalia, some of which describe
the prevailing flora and fauna such as Hargeisa, Lugh, and Baidoa in Somalia.
Anthropological evidence also supports the view that the Boran community
is an offshoot of the southern Ethiopian Galla who entered Kenya following
Galla migrations.”
THE BORAN OF KENYA
Otal sources from northern Kenya link the cradle of the Boran to
“Liban” in southern Ethiopia.” Long before the partitioning of Africa
by West Europeans, the Boran of Kenya split from the main ethnic group
b expanding population and ecological pressures, and migrated
arch of water and green pastures for their livestock."*
| along the Tana River and formed Kenya’s Ormo
er group remained in Wajir, but because of their
ali easi hed them
a extending fro! est of Waj Bandits on the Border
In
A fron Boran
man abor at the frontier ¢
chicfs possess executive authority bevond the mandate
for Addis Ababa. Insecurity and administrative neglect
a precarious existence in Ethiopia's Mega province
and in the area of Kenya’s Moyale district. Although they previously pursued
an apropastural economy, their choices then fell between accepting a pure
sedentary lifestyle, in which case the Somalis would absorb them, or a life of
constant geographical displace!
Today, as in the previous centuries, the bulk of the Boran community
stil] lives in Ethiopia. They are divided into the moieties of Gona and
Sabho under which a complicated network of clans and subclans similar
to the Somali community emerges.’ Despite each clan clinging jealously to
its totem, which other clans recognize, it is important to observe that the
Boran treat al] their kith and kin as equal. This is so, except for the Warta,
who are described as the “Dorobo,” a subethnic group that may be called
a “stock of travelers”. The gall (the high priest) only exists in three clans
and is comparable to the O! Laibon of the Maasai who is a cultural and
ful G
cessor of
pas Britain, whee
to take over the
THE SOMAL] COMMUNITY OF KENYA
Somali people can b< found im the Zepuibh< of sonst 3
Somaliland and Italian Somnlifasc, de Bac peor of Eshuopra, the
Republic of Dybous, and in the cx dienes of preimeleperdence Kenya
known then as the Nocthem Frosier Dimetra Ther business sane
has led them to major towns of Basen A where they Herve @ retail
wrasinek night sccunty guards (waechmen} ane! ee form
cowering 20. syaeee eras
aah el the Horn of Aine. ~ petees the 1977-78 Bandits on the Border
later drove out. For example, before 1800 the major nomadic residents
of northern Kenya were the Orma people, descendants of the Galla of
southern Ethiopia. They have been described as people living a precarious
life either hunting the weak or themselves being hunted by the strong*
The misfortunes of the Galla began with a smallpox epidemic that almost
annihilated them in 1865.°> Their feebleness and small numbers enabled
the Somali to push westwards in early nineteenth century from the Juba
province through El Wak and Wajir, across the Lorian swamp towards
the Ewaso Ng’iro River. In this way, Somali settlements created a physical
buffer between the Orma of southern Ethiopia and their relatives who wete
pushed south of the Tana River into Kenya. These new comers, the Ogaden
Somalis in particular, were called Aji which translated to wearers of white
garments. Geographically the buffer extends approximately 300 miles (482
kilometers) north to south.
It is claimed that the Somali people derive their name from Somale
(Samaale), their eponymous ancestor.’ Being predominantly pastoral
nomads, they expanded southwards and westwards mainly through armed
conquest campaigning for water and for physical control of grazing land.
However, in the sixteenth century the Abyssinians (Ethiopians) tepulsed
and deflected their movement southward. Over the next 300 years, Somali
continued to roll southwest, subjugating all who lay in th
nineteenth century, some Somali subclans crossed south
traveling into northern Kenya from the Horn of Afric:
rivalry intensified in the early 1880s amongst Somali
her immigrants who traveled to Wajit to trade in clot!
JFD, Somali westerly expansion had been acco
d by 1880, forcibly driving the Bor:
ajir regions of Keny:
Aulihan,
Chapter 1: Introduction
debilitating social phenomenon and often resulted in weaker clans being
absorbed by the stronger ones through intermarriage and subjugation or
being geographically displaced.
The population of the frontier region can be clustered into: Muslims,
Christians, and pagans. It is also possible to study the area in terms of
livelihoods, that is; pastoralists, sedentary cultivators, or by ethnolinguistic
classifications. Despite the existence of other cultural groups such as the
Rendille and the Gabbra, the Somali are more dominant, thus making the
history of the NFD indistinguishable from the history of the Somali of
Kenya. It is a matter of contention as to whether Somalis and kindred
communities of the NFD are true pastoralists. Jacobs defines pastoralists as
“people making their living wholly of their focks without settling down to
plant or people who are chiefly dependent on their herds of domesticated
stock for subsistence”. Using this definition Somalis may be described as
semipastoralists, considering that they depend on their livestock not only
as a source of food and transport (i.e, camel), but as a commodity for
social exchange for agricultural produce. According to 1959 estimates, 80
percent of NFD Somalis were pastoral nomads and 20 percent sedentary
cultivators on the riverine area of the Dauwa along the Kenya-Ethiopia
border and the Tana River in the south.” The presence of other livelihoods
is acknowledged, but these tend to be subsumed by the more conspicuous
nomadic pastoralism.
PHYSICAL SETTING
T lorn of Aftica is a harsh physical environment bounded by the
, the Indian Ocean to the east, and the Great Rift Valley
he habitat is hot and dry and is known to the Somali
nt land”.*! When rain comes it is in brief storms
igh evaporation caused by heat an
of the rain on the flora and faur
gh N
hon 7 eaiy Bandits on the Bordey
and southeastern Ethiopia with different Boran names, that is, Adolessg
Ganna, Hageaya, and Bonagaya.* Somalia has three permanent rivers; the Ta
the Juba, and the Shebelle, all flowing eastward. The Shebelle disappears i
a swamp southwest of Mogadishu, while the Tana and the Juba empty their
waters into the Indian Ocean. The riverine area of the Juba and the Shebelle
form the breadbasket for the small portion of the Somali community that
makes do with subsistence farming. The larger percentage of the Somalj
community is nomadic in the large tract of their semiarid homeland.
The NED, which may be desctibed as a legendary land that is still desolate
and economically underdeveloped, is quite eye-catching for the casual visitor
hankering for the exotic and freedom from the stress of modern “civilization”,
In 1948, the sparsely populated province covered an area measuring 116,782
square miles (187,942 square kilometers), which represents more than half of
Kenya’s landmass totaling 223,478 square miles (359,652 square kilometers),
It was composed of the following districts: Turkana 22,000 square miles
(35,405 square kilometers), Marsabit 27,000 square miles (43,452 square
kilometers), Moyale 6,000 square miles (9,656 squate kilometers), Mandera
10,000 square miles (16,093 Square kilometers ), Isiolo 9,000 square miles
(14,484 square kilometers), Wajit 20,000 square miles (32,186 kilometers) and
Garissa 23,000 square mile (37,014 kilometers). The frontier’s distinctive
physical characteristics are aridity and low relief, and its human characteristic
is the nomadic pastoralism practiced by Cushitic people of whom the Galla
(Boran and le and the Somali are the majority. The area
ge temperatures ranging between 86° (
Chapter 1: Introduction
landmarks to relate to, the inexperienced stranger becomes disoriented to
the point of not being able to determine which direction is forward and
which is backward. With its low-lying topography, Chalbi experiences violent
sandstorms. Most of these occur in the late afternoon from March to May
and from October to December. In sharp contrast, Marsabit which lies on
a lava plateau has a cool climate that gives it the semblance of an oasis. The
plentiful and consistent rainfall nurtures tall acacia trees and other native
flora species that instantly catch the eye. Also of note is a large mass of
extinct volcanic crater rising to 4,600 feet (1,402 meters) above the sea level.
Semidesert conditions are to be found on the periphery of the district. The
lava terrain found to the west is impassable to vehicles of any description.
Its evergreen vegetation provides Marsabit good pasturage for Boran and
Gabbra livestock as well as for the large herds of elephants. Mount Kulal is
one of the numerous volcanic landmasses in the northwest rising to 7,250
feet (2,209 meters) above sea level. It has deep forests that provide ample
grazing ground to the Gabbra and Rendille communities. Moyale to the east
experiences on average a cool climate due to its numerous mountains. Further
east from Mandera and south to Wajir and Garissa one finds semiarid and
monotonously flat land that is sparsely covered by grass and short shrubs.
Grazing here is influenced by nomadism. In general, the geography of the
NED is a boring story of flat relief with occasional dry mountains.
Three perennial rivers, all running west to east serve the NFD; and
except for boreholes, no other sources of water exist.” The River Dauwa
(Dawa, Daua) is in the north, having its origin in the Ethiopian highlands.
The Tana and Ewaso Ng’ito are approximately four hundred miles (six
hundred and forty-three kilometers) to the south, and their source is in the
pa highlands There are countless dry waterways, colloquially known Bandits on the Bordey
abound, but there is no hard evidence despite the talk of the 1939 discovery
of coal and oil near Lake Stefanie.‘ .
Maps of the area are usually unreliable and may only depict essential
terrain features. Human geography in particular is imprecise due to
epicyclical patterns of pastoral movements. Small settlements, which will
be referred to as “town centers” are few, far between, and so basic by west
European standards they do not even qualify to be called villages. These
town centers are home to the business community where the “townsfolk”,
who include immigrant business people from down Kenya, engage in all
sorts of trade. The most popular that is almost exclusively by the Somali
people is trade in Ahat (Lat. Catha edulis), known in the local dialect as miraa
ot mairungi, which is sold in small bundles colloquially known as a kilo. The
plant is grown in the cool high altitude region of Meru bordering the NFD
to the south and is transported throughout the NFD and Somalia by air or by
land, drive-by-night four-wheel jeeps traveling at high speeds. Local people
refer to khat as Somali gold in view of its high income in hard currency for
exports to Somalia and to Britain. By chewing the green leaves, the drug is
extracted and the user swallows the juice while spitting out the chaff. This
researcher found khat too bitter and gave up any empirical investigation of
its efficacy but nevertheless noting that regular users have b
teeth. It is unclear whether their dental decay is caused b
from the twigs and bark or from fizzy drinks and sweets take
its bitter taste. Many stereotypical myths surround the
human body. While some claim it dispels sleep,
r nocturnal tasks like night security jobs or long
akes the user aggressive and ine
hat khat is a mi
Chapter 1: Introduction
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
[tis crucial that the meaning and usage of the term Shiffa be understood,
as previous scholars have inadvertently misused it. One example is Hurd’s
sweeping usage in his monograph that narrates his ordeal as a prisoner of
bandits. Two categories of scholars have emerged. Earlier scholars tend
to use the term to refer to social bandits dominating the Kenya-Ethiopia,
Ethiopia-Sudan, Ethiopia-Somalia, and Kenya-Somalia borders.” This
type of Shifta is apolitical brigands common in the periphery of many a
precolonial polities, where the leaders were forever struggling to establish
their legitimacy. An example is the Amharic concept of Shifta as: “One
who stits up trouble, while taking to the forest or bush, departing from the
King, the government, rule (gezat), instituted order (Ser’at) and the law”.*!
This concept concurs with the Tigrinya definition “One who is a rebel, an
outlaw who lives in the forests and exists by force and robbery”.” Oral
evidence from the NFD region reinforces the same view.”
President Jomo Kenyatta’s own 1963 definition of the term confirms
that banditry was a common phenomenon in the African tural milieu
when he said: “There are, as in any other country, I am told, a number of
hooligans or atmed guards or youths called ‘Shiftas’. Those are the people
who go raiding here and there”.* The existence of Shifta in Abyssinia’s
border region may be explained by the fact that Addis Ababa’s bureaucracy
was too rudimentaty to competently control the ever-expanding empire.
onsequently, administrative neglect of the state’s periphery naturally
lessness; especially as years of slave trading also left a legacy of
along Ethiopia’s borders and introduced firearms to replace
apons.®* The Shifta of nineteenth century Ethiopia were
d thieves” but defiant folk heroes whose exploits were
arratives of their families and ethnic communities.
of the poor who Bandits on the Bordey
Ethiopia in 1936 and in post-World Wat Il Eritrea. During the British
Military Administration of Etitrea, the Shitta were detined as “lawless men
whom nobody was in a position to control or influence”. Their numbers
increased after the Second World War because of the availability of weapons
abandoned during the war after the ineffective demobilization of the Italian
colonial army, economic depression following Italian defeat, and patriotic
fervor created by political uncertainty of Eritrea’s future.
Nationalist guerrillas existing in areas of Kenya and Ethiopia inhabited
by the Somali ethnic community have also been called Shifta. Evidence links
this type to the formation of the Somali Youth Club in Mogadishu on 13
May 1943; it became the Somali Youth League later in 1947.°! Ethiopian and
Kenyan authorities referred to Somali guerrillas as Shifta bandits purposely to
dilute their nationalistic appeal. Conversely, the Republic of Somalia referred
to the Somali fighting in the NFD and in the Ethiopia-controlled regions of
| Ogaden and Haud as nationalists in an attempt to convey an air of legitimacy
and political respectability. For example, in 1967, the Somali ambassador to
Ethiopia renounced the use of the word Shifta as hostile propaganda, noting
that Somalis of the region referred to the guerrillas as Mujabheddin.*
In this study, the term Shifta guerrillas will refer to the insurgents fig ghting
for the secession of the NFD from Kenya between December 19 |
April 1968. It is important to recognize that some former lea
Shifta refer to the guerrilla fighters as the Northern Fro:
Liberation Army (NFDLA) and their political wing as
ronter Districts Liberation Movement (NFDLM), w
e dissenting political parties led by the Northert
(NPPPP) and sympathizers from the
ghti Babee nie * popalaty
Chapter t: Introduction
te pT d fl rration of the
Republic ot Sor
CONCEPTUAL / THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study is designed on t ary th J COSSIONISt War
depends on sustainable strategic initiat relentless support
from the resident masses within the contested region not outside it. It
applies theories of nationalism and guerrilla warfare subject under
investigation, but docs not purposely intend to formulat tal concepts
ot to prescribe a panacea for subnational contlicts based on the diverse
arguments it raises. Generalizations are omitted for fear that crying out
theories borrowed from foreign subnational wars may confine the study
into a straightjacket of paternalism. Furthermore, such a bold step is taken
because the area of study has suffered intellectual neglect. It is only reasonabie
that the seatch for knowledge prioritizes on the identification, analysis, and
establishment of historical facts, which later scholars could build upon to
propagate general theories and concepts. Repetition is inevitable, because
various strands of arguments recur and shed light to matters raised eagles in
a different way.
The project is torn between the case for self-determination and the
inviolability of the inherited colonial borders. At the height of Somalt
n ism in the NED and several months before the outbreak of the
flict, Kenya’s then Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta stared that
o Xenyan Somalis “were free to pack their camels and join
e contradiction in the prime minister's statement concedes
e: fight to live in.the, comntry of choice but denies them
c ial sovereignty. Kenyatta should have known
attachment to land, which is evidenced by his Bandits on the Bordey
and, ipso facto, self-determination for them automatically entailed their
choice of the sovereignty of their NPD home.
The term ethnic community implies homogeneity characteriz
:d by shared
customs, territory, language, and common ancestry. Constant transhumance
and intermarriage among pastoral nomads causes substantial amount of
fusion and fission of identity and cast doubt on any common index such
as language or culture. All this being so, the terms “ibe, and nation used
in this study are bound to generate a plethora of arguments and opinions
regarding the primacy and criterion for differentiation, i.e., from a linguistic,
cultural, geographical, or political-historical context. For example, the west
European concept of nationalism seems to avoid the terms tribe and ethnic
unless pejoratively referring to minorities, immigrant populations, or those
unsophisticated inhabitants of a foreign land. Broadly speaking, today’s
concept of nationhood implies an ideal polyglot nation-state in terms of
an orderly entity that remains coherent despite housing divergent peoples in
culture, ancestry, religion, and language.
The subject under study analyzes one people characterized by common
ancestry, language, religion, culture, shared historical experience, viable
pastoral economy, and their common pursuit of the liberation of “lost”
Somali lands and their unification into one greater Somalia. In this resp
Somali national consciousness is acceptable a priori for not d
single school of thought but uniquely blending all possible ir
ationalism. While still examining the attributes of a natio
n Muriuki’s finding that no single factor can satisfz
e of nationalism in Kenya.” What is inco
of the Somali “nation” by artificia
ruction of a state as conceive
gnizable bureaucra
Se
Chapter 1: Introduction
CONCLUSIONS
Th 1 ace for mes that
will be explored Somali but
has onutted a disc n of oft
tendency ot the ‘0 domina f NFD as well as the
subject under investigation. The aim i asier to understand
the specific community referred te in a low. The aim
has also been to identify tt Listing controversy ai lars as to the
aboriginal residents of the NPD, be th Son ir the Boran. This issue
becomes important later as the study attempts te te ontradictions
of sovereignty and self-determination, whether secession meant ceding the
Northern Frontier Districts to the Republic of Somalia or allowing Kenyan
Somalis to live in the country of their choice. Given that ethnic Somalis had
lived in the NFD for a long time as natives and not visitors, thei claim to
the territory is as justified as that of the Boran Gala or Rendille. In any case,
irrespective of their pattern of migration, Somalis had her populass
than any other ethnic community in the NFD. Lastly, this chapter has
illustrated that the communities of the NFD inhabit an extremely harsh
environment; as a consequence, to ensure survival, there is competition and
conflict between different groups over scarce water and pasrurage sources.
Similarly, inclement environmental demands and expanding population have
led the people of the frontier to practice nomadism over a wide area, because
no exclusive rights to pasturage or water other than in exceptional
s. Armed with this background it should now be possible to
¢ interplay berween this physical and human environment and
powers analyzed in the next chapter. Bandits on the Border
N York: Praeger, 1964), 7-23; John Markaki
5 . . Sy : J :
‘Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ie Poe
| ‘
| Somala (London: West View Press, | pe Da Wigeenmar reance of Borana, Southern
| 5 Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for \ ae F alk
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963). It dy concurs with ct fid nor ive a tradition of chaeftainey; see
i. yn of the Galla in the Cushitic Language Group” Gunter Schtee, Identities on the Mawes ¢ vtleem in Narthern Keays Glanchester,
5
U.K: Manchester University Press,
5-8; Bernd Heine “The Sam Languages: A History
dille, F Somali,” Afroasiatic Linguistics 6 No. 2 (1976): 8-9; HJ, Sasse, 24. Author's imervice in Isiois in 1996
Rese Cust Language Family in East Africa,” in Recent Research on Africa: KNA; ISO/I, Isiolo District Annual Reperas fer ind Garbatalla Adadal Report
eds, Bernd Heine (Bonn:1982), 28-33; Lewis, A Modern History, 4; for 1924
un M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia, Guide to History and Soctal Institutions (London: Haan, 26. See fig, 2
I
27. Irving Kaplan, Area Handiaok of Stwmalia 2d ext Washingtoe (0: Government Prnung
7. HS. Lewis, “The Origins of the Galla and Somalis,” Journal of African History 7 n0.1 Office, 1977}, 8, 45-46, 57-58 LM. Lewis, «1 Mader Hiitmey chap. 1: Tonval, Semel
166): 27-46. | Nationalism chap. |.
j 28. Kenya Government Central Bureau of Stanstcs, 1979 Popaladon Census (Nairobe
Government Printer 1942), CD ROM Micrasopt CD Emcor 97 Emcpelapelia, Wisrid Eaglich
Editon 0896, part No. 91092.
29, Lewis, “Somali Conquest”.
30. KNA: AA/7/704, V.G. Glenday, “The Ongyns of Somalis with Special Reterence 1b
coe Cand Their Political Development in Kenya.” a 1938 private study.
11. Author’s interviews in Moyale and Wajir in 1996. 31. Historically, the term “Gall” unpbed a non-believer (son Muslim); bur in its
12. Peter TW. Baxter, “Social Organization of the Boran of Northern Kenya,” Ph.D. the contemporary usage, it refers to descendants of the Southern Ethiopian Harutes,
Lincoln College, Oxford University, 1954; HJ. Blackhurst, “A Commun S chiefly the Boran Gabbra and the Orma of the Tana River basim See KNA: PC/
Galla Settlers in South Ethiopia,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Manche NED4/1/1, “The Impact on East Africa of the Galla and Sexnals”; and “Some Notes
The evidence in the above scholarly works is collaborated by early r on the History of the Degodia up to 1912,” Northern Frummer Reports tor iz
administrators; see Kenya National Archives (hereafter KNA): PC / Also consult Peter TW. Baxter, “Acceptance of sm Among the Boran ntl Norbern
on the Boran of Southern Ethiopia,” Political Records for Moyale, \ = / Frontier District of Kenya.” Inkew ar Trepecal lfrics ed. LM. Lewis (Oxford UK: Oxford
Gurte from 1902 to 1928. by ess 1966), cea _. ay 7 . s Gale
WB, Huntingford, The Galla of Ebiopia, The Kingdon of Kaf = ndet Davies, “The Native Tribes of Eass Afneas"t@ Fast pes a
"es . Fi ondon, Privately published, 1908), 56.
4frica, North-East Africa vol. 2 (London: Internatio ole Fe re A * information is colisborased:
he Origins of the Galla & Somalis,” Jou in Isiolo and Wajir in 1996. The same -
I's, The Daarad Imnasion, (London: privately published, 1955).
in 1996.
London,
8. LM. Lewis, “The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa,” Journal of African History 1
no. 2 (1960): 213-29. I am grateful for one-to-one discussions with Prof. Lewis on the
subject.
9. Author's interviews in Wajir in 1996.
», National’ Data Trade Bank (NTDB)
W4 reference commis Bandits on the Border
Some General Remarks”
0 e writer cites the anthropological
om research conducted by A.L. Kroeber and 1.M. Lewis in 1958 of pastoralisny
See also |. Silberman, “Somali Nomads,” International Socal Sctence
According to these findings, only the Maasai of East Africa fit the
alist
“Report by M.ER. Mahoney, District Commissioner
al Reports for 192.
omali Conflict,” unpublished
Author's interviews in Isiolo and Wajir in 1996.
“Intelligence Report compiled by seventieth Infantry Brigade
f tier Intelligence Handbook, 1948.
FF. Ojany and RB. Ogendo, Kenya, A Study in Physical and Human Geography (Nairobi:
Longmans, 1981), 49.
KNA: PC/NFD2/1/3, “Frank Dixey, Hydrological Survey of the NFD Kenya, 1934”
and “Dixey’s Scheme for Improving Water Supply and Pasture Control,” Northern
Province Handing-over Reports, 1934-1948.
KNA: PC/NFD4/2/6, “Confidential Memo A. XAE42/3/3/1V/64 dated 18 Janu
1939,” Northern Frontier Reports, 1939. At the time of printing there was no e
of mineral discovery in the region. Also see KNA: PC/NFD5/2/8, F
“Geology of Wajir-Mandera District Northeast Kenya of 1952,”;
SE. Quarters, “Geology of the Takaba Wargedud Area, Mandera
and P. Joubert, “Geology of Wajir, Wajir Bor Area of 1960”, all b
surveys of the NFD region.
Apparently Hurd only survived the harrowing encount
government official but a poor man who survived by sh:
of Kenya's north coast. See, David Hurd, Kidnap
1965).
One peamale: is Hodson, who uses the terms S
: se of Representauves), Motion Kenya/
alia t 2 sitting at Parliament Buildings
Nuirobi on
Nuthor’s intervi in Isiolo and Movale in (96. The theme of the periphery being
neglected by the central g toment of Exhiopia is well explored in Hodson, Serer
Yeur!
So far, a most fitting definition of sactal bandit can be found im Pirie |. Hobsbawn's
Bandits (London: rmonsworth Penguin Books, 196!) See alse John Markakis,
Ethuopia: Anatomy of Traditional Polity (Oxford UK: Oxtord University Press 1974), 380.
Author's interviews in Isiolo and Moyale in 196 reinforce this message.
Richard Greenfield, Ethiqpia: AA New Political History (omdeme Clarendon Press, 1965),
19, 73, 254.
Robert L Hess, Edhiapia: The Modernization of Anstncracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1970),
119, 186, Sce Footnote 13 above.
FO 371 /90319, “From Asmara to Foreign Office,” letter dated 5 furwary
The problem is analyzed in detail by Nene Mburu, “Patnots or Bandits? Britain’
Strategy for Policing Entrea, 1941-1952.” Nondic Journ! of Studies ror. 2
85-104.
Author's interviews in Isiolo in 1996. See a detailed discussion in chap. 4.
“The Warfare Will Move from the Bush to the Doorsteps of Kenyan Political Leaders,”
Africa (Paris) 10 February 1967.
For details consult Nene Mburu, “Contemporary Banditry in the Hoen of Africa:
Causes, History and Political Impticagons,” Nordic Jeurmal of Ajncan Simadiet, 8 0. 2:
(1999): 89-107.
“NED Future: Somalia Wants the Lot,” Reporter (Nairobi) 19 January 1963.
omo oe eae meets Reape cocks Vintage Books}, 1962, Figure 1; No
a
rthern Frontier Districts
tn
XY ee te. a.
NY Meyals aANDema
Chapter 1: Introduction
Figure 2: Ethnographic Map Of The NFD
1
\
l ETHIOPIA
feces?
? = Orems ss
hom<. je
Yeeees, Babbra wore
S.Tttse, Boren) Sporn -
‘ : * Sekuye
N=, El lolo"**., Seems
oivendad viivNos B = cHAPTER D
The Imperial Partition
Our neighbors are our Somali Kinsmen whose citizenship has been
falsified by indisctiminate boundary ‘arrangements’. They have to move
across artificial frontiers for pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain
and pursue the same language. We share the same traditions. How can
we regard our brothers as foreigners?"
—Abd-ar Rashid Ali Shirmarke, prime minister of Somalia, 1960.
espite building the discussion of colonial boundaries on West
Europeans’ subjugation of Africans in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, this study does not disregard the existence and significance of
the history of social oppression that predates the European invasion?
Nevertheless, most of the problems pertaining to the obscene disruption of
Africa’s rhythm of life trace their roots to slavery and colonialism, making it
pertinent that we briefly revisit the efficacy of imperial frontiers in the area
of study. At the surface, the arbitrary partitioning of Africa by European
powers interrupted the tradition of transhumance of pastoral people in
the area of study by introducing restrictive formalities to movement and
interaction. In the case of the Somali maga imperial partitions often 636 HISTORY OF BANGLADESH Py
aac
ac
ac
ac
as
ac
ac
ac.
ac”
Oo
oebessebene
a0uvebOe o
Bebeubshevneona
DBOGRAHHHGGAd 9AHGagnagnec
Qa
noobobod beaeees
0
SRIMCIOICICTICIC III
BBB KBHHRBHHBA
Deconstructing t
Southeast Asia!'”
The discussion that fc
of ‘Indianisation’, “T
intelligentsia deve
the colonial consti
savagery’ and the
the approa a
imperialism’
Britannica beca
light on the
an “extend
This sectio
of ‘Grea
necessary
idea o:
theo
conscious! Bandits on the Bordey
from the Sultan of Zanzibar. Similarly, the Imperial British East Afticg
Compa TBEAC), which had established trading ties w the littoral
region and hinterland before the partition of the continent, preceded
Britain’s colonial presence in East Africa. Between 1
was shared by three European powers and Ethiopia. Britain and Italy defined
their respective territories through the Anglo-Italian protocol of 1891. After
British and Italian territorial possessions in East Africa were defined in the
Anglo-Italian protocols of 24 March 1891, a boundary was drawn along the
Juba River, placing Kismayu and the west bank of the river under Great Britain
while the eastern portion went to Italy.‘ In the same year, Britain took over
administration of Kismayu from the Imperial British East African Company,
The central part became British Somaliland, France acquired the northeast
(Djibouti), Italy controlled the southeast (Italian Somaliland), Britain also
took the remaining portion in the southwest (the Northern Frontier Districts
of Kenya). Ethiopia grabbed the Ogaden and the Emirate of Harar. Bach
colonial power followed a different course of development. Britain was not
interested in extending its hegemony into Somalia’s hinterland beyond what
was necessary to obtain cheap labor and quality mutton and beef for its
strategic garrison, Aden. Aden had been acquired through force of atms in
1839 as a logistical base for Her Majesty’s colonial troops en-route to India
and the Far East. Although measuring only seventy-five square miles (0
hundred and twenty square kilometers), Aden provided adequate
for Britain’s trade route and a safe anchorage.* When Britai
protectorate over British Somaliland in 1887, the motive ¥
itory. In contrast, Italy developed a
citrus fruit, and sugai
Chapter 2: The Imperial Partition
the affairs of what would later be called Kenya trace their roots to what had
ust taken place at the Hast African coast
the Impe
charter, and the territory it previously controlled was transferred to Her
Majesty’s government under the authority of the Foreign Office.” Behind
this transfer was the rationale that since HMG intended to retain control
d the hinterland, the relationship between Her Majesty’s
commissioner and the company had to be reviewed. If the IBEAC confined
its activities to the development of coastal trade alone, a conflict of
interest could ari n the Zanzibar sultanate and the company.’ The
company, by then bankrupt; was incompetent in guaranteeing peace to the
littoral region. Moreover, in spite of commissioning mercenaries, it could
not extend its authority to ensure perpetual domination or trade monopoly
of the East African coastal region or the interior. Certainly, their gunboat
diplomacy could not match that of the British Royal Navy in one of Britain’s
shortest naval battles when it subdued the sultan of Zanzibar in 1896 in
thirty-five minutes of bombardment.” Nonetheless, the major reason for
the transfer was Britain’s realization of the importance of controlling the
source of the Nile and not for any philanthropic purpose, as purported by
various missionaries and lobbyist groups. True, pressure was being mounted
on Her Majesty’s government to treat Uganda’s retention as key to the
total eradication of slavery.'? Nevertheless, Britain’s geostrategic interests
in the East African coast should be viewed in its wider context, focusing
on the Indian Ocean and involving the continued control of the strategic
Red Sea den, in addition to consolidating its in E T
strategic Bandits on the Bordey
In 1902, parts of nda’s Rudolf province were transterred to
Kenya, then called British guably, the conquest of the
itory between the East Afr nda was purely
f mmunication corridor, as evidenced by the construction
of administi e centers and military to ure the road and, later,
he rail to Uganda.'* Kenyan provinces that lay en route to Uganda came
under control atter treaty agreements made with gullible leaders or after the
military’s intimidation of the local people. Nevertheless, a properly defined
British administration policy began in 1900 when Sir Harry Johnston was
posted to Uganda and Sir Charles Eliot to Kenya. The two had to manage
the colonies with a meager subsidy from London. Annually, Uganda was
xpected to run on £.400,000 pounds sterling (US$600,000) and Kenya on
£227,000 pounds sterling (US$340,500) "’ In summary, Europe’s penetration
of the East African interior was relatively easy due to the calamitous
synthesis of; ()) the slave trade’s devastating disruption of African life, (ii)
the intruder’s superior military technology, and (iii) naive community leaders
territorial concessions. With this as background, it should now be possible
to appreciate the problems associated with the NFD’s colonial boundaries
which are traced here from west to east.
THE KENYA-ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY
Following the 1885 Berlin Conference that partitioned A
the European powers, respective spheres of influence bet
Britain and Italy were outlined in the protocols of 24
1891, and 5 May 1894.'° The substance was that unti
Chapter 2; The Imperial Partition
emperor claimed the entire hilly region north of Lake Ti hich had
not been occupied despite previous larg a editions by tk
Abyssinians in 1897. After establishing a militar ence in most of the
disputed territory in May 1899 and in 1900, Menelik proposed to settle the
boundary ordance with his proclamation of April 1891. Lf Mene
‘¢ implemented, Britain would lose an tending 200
suth of the boundary defined in the Anglo-Italian
delimitation of 1 July 1890. Britain’s rejection of Menelik’s proposal and its
lack of administrative presence in the disputed area allowed the emperor to
continue building his empire, which indeed entailed expanding southward.”
To halt Menelik’s southward ansion of the Amharic Empire,
the country’s frontiers with Kenya were explored in 1902-03 by a British
expedition led by Archibald Butter, a surveyor and Captain Philip Maud
(Royal Engineers). The party marked a boundary, (commonly known as the
Maud Line), starting from the junction of the Genale and Dauwa rivers
following the thalweg of Dauwa westward, (i.e., a longitudinal meridian
running in the middle of the river), following the tribal limits between the
Gurre and the Borana to the south end of Lake Stefanie thence west to Lake
Rudolf (Lake Turkana) to the peninsula east of Sanderson Gulf and further
west to the mouth of the Kibish River (Sachi River) to latitude 5 * 23’ north
then due east to a point 35 ° 15' longitude east of Greenwich then along this
longitude to its intersection with latitude 5 ° 40' north. Later, on 6 December
Uh bc emperor signed an agreement with his Britannic Majesty’s charg’e
ol adopted the Maud Line a as the de facto Kenya: eign Bandits on the Bordey
descriptions of international boundaries 1¢ or they referred
to indeterminate objects, for example, a tree in the middle of a forest ora pile
of tocks. Consequently, the Gwynn Line had no legal consequences, thereby
the Maud Line as the de jure Keny pian boundary.
mphasized that Menelik I] was the architect of Ethiopia's
d his death slowed the possibility of an early settlement of
hiopian empire's southwestern border disputes. In 1908, he appointed
yasu, aged eleven, to succeed him but the boy was dethroned
‘ore he could be crowned.” Whereas Menelik had been keen on
any matters pertaining to Ethiopia’s external borders, his successor could
not fill his shoes as he was too young, too naive in international politics,
and at home, faced with a challenge to his legitimacy. For the residents
and admin ors of Kenya and Ethiopia, the two boundaries became a
source of confusion and antagonism. Indeed, this study shares the view that,
because of the lack of clear interpretation of the 1907 Agreement, officials
on neither side respected or showed setious concern for its administration.
To avoid unnecessary trouble, Britain’s unwritten and safe practice was to
patrol whichever of the two demarcation lines was most southerly.” The
treaty of 1907 provided for transfrontier grazing and watering but the
feeling in Ethiopia was that they had the rights to withhold these ni;
resources from their pastoral kinsfolk the arbitrary colonial boundary
just converted into foreigners. They were taking advantage o
and Maud lines that had placed inside Abyssinia the great
customary pastures and wells previously shared by many c
the dry season. The border is discussed here in terms of
the pastoral nomads of the Northern Fro
Chapter 2: The Imperial Partition
from using border communities such as the Dassanech as a pretext for
incursions into British East Africa. Consequently, the Red Line was established
which created the contested pastures known as the Elemi (Ilemi)
More attempts were made in 1952 to compromise on running
r along the southern edge of Dassanech cattle-grazing country
ith the intention of bringing the community under one administration, but
{ithiopia was suspicious for it appeared to them that allowing Dassanech land
comprising the Omo River delta to go to British East Africa, would mean
ceding an arca most fertile for cultivation without equitable compensation. In
Moyale, Ethiopia claimed the wells of Gurar, which, at the time of writing,
are one mile (one and a half kilometers) south of the Red Line and, had
always been in Ethiopia. When Britain put up a border post at Gurar in April
1914, Ethiopia laid claim to all the hills of Gurar down to Fugugo (inside
Kenya). The original post, constructed in 1912, was burnt down by irate
Abyssinians eager to claim the water points for their Boran community. To
the British administration, the wells of Gurar were important for winning
the hearts and minds of the pastoral communities of the NFD because they
were the most dependable source of water and green pasture for the Boran
and Gurre ethnic communities along the whole border south of the Red
Line.
Ethiopian officials were accused of imposing unofficial taxes on
Kenyan Boran who strayed across the porous border and of detaining some
of them for forced labor. To use the water they had to pay an informal Bandits on the Bordey
neither government was keen on paying reparation on behalf of their
brieand citizens to reduce the recourse to cross border organized violence
Another complication determining ¢
border, As observed by a district officer in the NPD, law enforcement officers
on both sides of the boundary could not be expected to know where the
boundary lay at all times.’ Demarcations did not always follow conspicuous
terrain features, which therefore allowed mischievous individuals and renegade
soldiers to turn some points along the border into inviolable hideouts for
cattle thieves. By 1917, Ethiopian authorities had lost control of the outlying
parts of the empire to the extent the Tigre of Ethiopia were described as “the
de-facto masters of the border”.¥ Appeals to Ethiopian officials for border
rapprochement were at times met with suspicions of British imperialism,
consequently persistent border tensions brought respective governments to
the brink of confrontation in 1921.°° Bandits seemed to profiteer from the
prevailing intergovernmental intransigence. At this early stage, the bandits
were the emperor's former soldiers who tracked Ethiopians immigrating fo
safety into British-administered territory. Their motive was self-sustenan
bearing in mind that Ethiopian soldiers did not receive formal sala
had to depend on the extortion they demanded of their fellow
happened that whenever the settlement allotted to them di
relocated into Kenya, the Ethiopian renegades lost their sout
They therefore took the law into their own hands and f
community on the British side of the border as compensa
of the Ethiopia-Kenya border and had a
e living on either side; the points of
i oo concentrated to be sul
Chapter 2: The Impertal Partition
not give
invisible
ach an
€ pastoral
from 1 ndred s ip Batish
tory close to the international
‘The castern boundary berween Ke Pp fewer
complications. The thalweg runs along the Daswa R
been a conspicuous natural resource sh ed by all communities in t
‘The Dauwa remains the only source of water for 100 miles (160 kilometers.
of the northern portion of the Kenyan fronuer wish 2 causeway that
traverses a tich grazing area. Curiously, it did not create-a sense of separation
or stimulate resource conflicts because one ethnic group tuverses ' at any
given point. As such, while government officials debated territorial limits,
the border did not alter the life of nomads significantly, for they maintained
and strengthened lateral bonding oblivious of the nver berween.
Itmay seem convenient to blame the border commissions for inefficiency,
yet, the surveyors faced some technical and administrative ditticuities: that
were not entirely of their own making To begin with, the modus operandi
for demarcating the borders needed to be defined and coordinated between
Ethiopian surveyors and their counterparts from Brush East Africa. On
the British side, there was an initial delay caused by the indecisiveness of
the Colonial Office over the emolument and the terms and conditions of
n litary 51
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