Dariusz Miszewski
Dariusz Miszewski
Dariusz Miszewski*
War Studies University, Warsaw-Rembertów, Poland
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3821-8844
Introduction
The national consciousness of Byelorussians was not born in opposition to Poles and the
traditions of the First Republic, as it was for Lithuanians (Żołędowski, 2003: 104-109).
In the 19th century in the Russian cultural circle, the terms Belarus, Byelorussians, and
Byelorussian language were used to denote a geographic and cultural area (Buczyński,
2010: 11-22; Gordziejew, 2010: 69; Michaluk, 2010: 30-33; 45-48). The Russian admin-
istration considered the people in the Belorussian lands to be part of the Russian nation,
which had become Lithuanianized or Polonized. Poles identified by the administration
as Catholics were considered to be an immigrant population on these lands (Micha-
luk, 2010: 33-36; Mironowicz, 2007a: 11-12). Orthodox preachers of Belarusian nation-
al consciousness believed that together with the Ukrainian, the Belarusian population
was part of the Russian nation. In the second half of the 19th century, Belarusian Cath-
olics also distanced themselves from the Polish cultural and Lithuanian political circles
(Błaszczak, 2017: 23; Michaluk, 2010: 40-45). The Belarusian national movement in the
Catholic circle emphasized the national separateness of Belarusians from Poles and Rus-
sians and the ethnic separateness of Belarusian lands from Polish, Lithuanian and Rus-
sian lands. It demanded the sovereignty of Byelorussian lands in a federated, democrat-
ic Russia (Mironowicz, 2007a: 15-16).
From the beginning of the 20th century, Belarusian political parties, national-cul-
tural organizations and the press were established. A barrier to national development
was the lack of Belarusian economic layer and widespread illiteracy (Radzik, 2012: 70;
Michaluk, 2010: 104). The Russian government and Russian nationalists were hos-
tile to the Belarusian national movement (Siemakowicz, 1997: 23-25). The autochtho-
nous Poles regarded it as an anti-Polish inspiration of the Russian authorities to russify
the local population. They perceived it as a threat to Polish land ownership (Mirono-
wicz, 2007a: 22-23; Żołędowski, 2003: 109). During World War I, the Belarusian na-
tional movement developed its activities, especially from August 1915, when Germans
entered Belarusian lands. On Russian lands under their occupation, national activity
* Correspondence address: Instytut Historii Wojskowej, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, al. gen. A. Chruściela
“Montera” 103, 00-910 Warszawa-Rembertów, Polska, e-mail: [email protected].
186 Dariusz Miszewski
1 In 1915, in Vilnius, Belarusian politicians prepared a project for the confederation of Lithuania and
Belarus to recreate the GDL (Lutskevich brothers). The Lithuanian side distanced itself from this project
(Ponarski, 1998). In January 1916, Lithuanian politicians in Kaunas proposed the establishment of the
GDL as a joint state of Lithuania and Latvia (autonomy). Belarusians were allowed to join it. According to
Zenowiusz Ponarski, the Lithuanians did not intend to create a federative state on the historic lands of the
GDL, but only a national Lithuanian state. This is important because the Byelorussians and Lithuanians
believed that the Poles sought hegemony in the former lands of the First Commonwealth in their Union
projects. In response to these projects, the Bolsheviks established in January 1919 Lithuanian-Belarusian
Socialist Republic of Councils. In January 1915, the Polish Democratic and Independence Bloc in Lithuania
and Byelorussia (Polish Socialist Party, Democratic Union, Group of Democratic Intelligentsia and Union
of Independence Youth) issued a proclamation (by Aleksander Zasztowt and Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki), in
which socialists and so-called nationalists announced the creation of Lithuanian-Belorussian state in union
with Poland. In December 1916, socialists in Vilnius advocated a Lithuanian-Belarusian federation with
autonomy rights for national minorities. It would form a legal-state union with Poland for economic and
defense reasons (Ponarski, 1999).
2 During World War I, Belarusian activists in Vilnius, brothers Anton and Ivan Lutskevich, wanted
to recreate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a federation of Lithuania and Belarus or a federation
consisting of Lithuania, Belarus, Latvia and Ukraine (United States from the Baltic to the Black Sea)
(Michaluk, 2010).
Belarus in Polish eastern policy during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920) 187
3 The BPR was to include: Mogilev region, Minsk region, Vitebsk region, Grodno region (Białystok,
Sokółka), parts of Vilnius region (Vilnius, Trakai, Vileyka), Smolensk region and Chernihiv region, as well
as Pskov (Velikiye Luki) and Tver gubernias (Toropets, Rzev, Ostashkov, present-day Russia), further the
district of Iluksha from Semigallia and Dyneburg from Latgale (present-day Latvia). The BPR claimed Pole-
sie, which the Treaty of Brest of February 1918 granted to Ukraine (Ukraine claimed Brest, Biała Podlaska,
Kobryń, Pinsk, Mozyrz, Rzhechitsa, Gomel; to the Pripyat River compact Ukrainian settlements, above it
mixed Belarusian-Ukrainian). The BPR border with Poland was as follows Włodawa on the Bug River, to the
mouth of the Nurca River on the Bug, further on the Nurca River, Braniesk, Suraz, the Narew River to the
mouth of the Biebrza River, the Augustów Canal (without Augustów), Druskininkai on the Niemen River,
where the borders of Poland, Lithuania and Belarus converged (Michaluk, 2010).
4 Active since January 1919, Green Oak was in favour of the BPR’s alliance with Poland. It formed
partisan units to fight the Red Army alongside Poland. After 1921, cooperation with Poland was to give him
support in building Belarusian state. He promoted the cooperation of the Belarusian minority with Poland
in the 1922 parliamentary elections. After his electoral defeat, he ceased his activities. During the period of
the existence of Central Lithuania (1920-1922), active since December 1920, Belarusian Borderland Union
promoted the idea of unity of Poles, Belarusians and Lithuanians in the reconstituted GDL in union with
Poland. In 1921, the party disbanded. In March 1922, the Union of Belarusian Nonpartisan Activists was
188 Dariusz Miszewski
Poles in the Belarusian lands opposed the nationalization of land and agrarian re-
form envisioned by the BPR authorities and the tying of Belarus to Russia (Gierowska
‑Kałłaur, 2010: 94-96; 119; Mironowicz, 2005: 34-35)5. They wanted participation in its
authorities in proportion to their numbers and alliance with Poland (Michaluk, 2011:
114-115; Gierowska-Kałłaur, 2009: 46). Nationalists were in favour of the restoration of
the GDL and its division into Lithuanian, Polish and Belarusian cantons and union with
Poland (Kirwiel, 2011; Michaluk, 2010: 94-100; 340-341; Zakład Narodowy im. Osso-
lińskich, Papiery Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego [later ZNIO], sign. 16543/II/t.1.: 78-80;
Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie [later AAN], Wileńska Koncentracja Demokra-
tyczna, sign. 211/16: 17)6.
In the former territories of the First Republic with a Polish majority, National De-
mocracy intended to build a national Polish state, and to polonize the Lithuanian, Be-
larusian and Ukrainian populations (Mironowicz, 2010: 45-49; Mironowicz, 2007b).
The Polish Socialist Party saw the territorial organization of the Second Republic as
a peacefully constructed federation of equal nations on the territory of the former First
Republic (Gursztyn, 2001: 55-56)7. Józef Piłsudski, on the other hand, did not rule out
their military integration with Poland (Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian state in close alli-
ance with Ukraine) (Nowak, 2015: 575-576, 581-585; Madera, 2004: 65; Nowak, 1999:
333-343; Boruta, 1995: 31-36; Juzwenko, 1994: 109-113; Miedziński, 1975: 4-46). He
combined the Jagiellonian idea with Prometheism (detachment from Russia of all non-
formed. It was in favour of granting national and cultural rights and improving the material existence of the
Belarusian minority. It opposed Belarusian diversionary activity in Poland. It went to the 1922 elections with
the slogan of Belarusian cultural autonomy, suffering defeat (Gomółka, 1997).
5 The Polish Council of the Minsk Territory formally accepted the ideas of the Chief of State Józef
Piłsudski, while in practice it was in favour of the National Democratic Party. The defeat of the federation idea
during the existence of the Civil Administration of the Eastern Lands (ZCZW) was influenced by differences
in the understanding of concepts. For Minsk Poles, society was Polish society. For Piłsudski, the ZCZW was
“the authority in the Eastern Territories”, while for the Poles and representatives of other nationalities from
Minsk it was “the Polish authority”. The paradox of history is that only the realization of the federation idea,
which was not understood in Minsk, or was considered not without basis as a utopia, could save this Polish
community from extinction (Gierowska-Kałłaur, 2010). The majority of Poles east of the Bug River wanted
to combine Piłsudski’s plans for territorial acquisitions with the assimilation policy proposed by Roman
Dmowski. In a memorial dated March 19, 1919 addressed to the Sejm and the Polish government, the United
Councils of the Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk and Inflants territories demanded that these lands be incorporated
into Poland. The national camp renounced them in its territorial programme (Mironowicz, 2005).
6 Michaluk (2010), “Krajowcy”, Polish socio-political movement, were formed in the 1870s. They wanted
to reconcile conflicting national, social and political interests in the historic lands of the GDL – a community
of the GDL residents (Michaluk, 2010).
7 Leon Wasilewski was in favour of separating non-Russian nations from Finland to the Black Sea and
the Caucasus from the Russian empire. He saw in this, like Piłsudski and his supporters, the security of Poland
and Europe. The problem was the establishment of Poland’s eastern border on the territory of the former First
Republic. Wasilewski considered it unrealistic to return to the 1772 border. During World War I, the state
aspirations of Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians became apparent. After its end, the self-determination
of the nations gained prominence. Annexation of their lands threatened international isolation and Poland’s
internal problems. Because of the low awareness of the Belarusian population, Wasilewski believed that
a Belarusian state would not be created. He was in favour of the federation of Belarusian lands with Poland,
so that Soviet Russia would not take advantage of the Belarusian cause against it (Gursztyn, 2001).
Belarus in Polish eastern policy during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920) 189
Russian nations and their alliance with Poland) (Kornat, 2012: 41-43; Wandycz, 2003:
13-14; 22-23; Dziewanowski, 1969: 350-353 Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Londynie
[later IJPL], sign. 709/148/2 7-21). The differences in the implementation of the Jagiel-
lonian idea were due to the different degree of development of national consciousness
among Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (Okulewicz, 2001: 20; Nowak, 1999:
331-332). Over time, the Polish federation was to attract Central European states locat-
ed between Germany and Soviet Russia.
At the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), the Polish National Committee demand-
ed the following for Poland: the governorates of Vilnius, Grodno, Minsk (Minsk, Slutsk
without the district of Vytautsk, Polotsk). Pilsudski envisioned federation with Lithua-
nia and autonomy of Belarusian lands within Poland (Michaluk, 2010: 344-345; Pisko-
zub, 1997: 104-106)8.
The Bolsheviks had been taking over Belarusian lands from Germans since late No-
vember 1918. Considered by them as a German creation, the BPR authorities fled from
Minsk to Vilnius because they had neither the Belarusian army nor popular support.
The majority of the Belarusian population wanted to maintain ties with Russia and land
reform (Radzik, 2012: 91; Michaluk, 2010: 330-332). The BPR authorities sought co-
operation with Lithuania and the Ukrainian People’s Republic (Czarniakiewicz, 2008:
28-29). In December 1918, preparing for the conquest of Europe, the Soviet authori-
ties formed the Communist Party of Belarus and the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic (BSSR). It included the former Russian gubernias of Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk, Mo-
gilev, Gomel and Smolensk, while the Lithuanian SSR included Kaunas and Vilnius. In
January 1919, Smolensk, Vitebsk and Mogilev gubernias were incorporated into Sovi-
et Russia. Moscow’s goal was a centralized Soviet state, not a Belarusian one. The Con-
gress of the Councils of Belarus incorporated on February 16, 1919. The BSSR was in-
corporated into the Lithuanian-Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was to take part
in the conquest of Europe and prevent the emergence of nation-states of Poles, Lithua-
nians, Belarusians and Ukrainians (Michaluk, 2011: 121-125).
The BPR government sent a memorandum in January 1919 to Paris Peace Confer-
ence President Georges Clemenceau on the establishment of Belarusian state. The de-
liberating powers regarded the Belarusian lands as part of anti-Bolshevik Russia. The
BPR did not have state structures and an army in the Belarusian lands, which at the time
were occupied by Poland and Soviet Russia (Czarniakiewicz, 2008: 29). Poland and Lith-
uania challenged the right of the BPR government to represent Belarusians (Michaluk,
2010: 411-412; 418-420). At the conference, Lithuania submitted memoranda question-
ing the existence of the Belarusian nation and the rights of Poland and Russia to Bela-
rusian lands (Michaluk, 2010: 443-445; Czarniakiewicz, 2008: 58).
8 Eastern border: Kalusz-Bug (Krasne) - upper Styr, Lutsk (all of Polesie to Poland), Styr, Horyń to the
mouth of the Pripyat, Berezina, Bobruisk, Slutsk, Dvina, Lepel district (Michaluk, 2010).
190 Dariusz Miszewski
In April 1919, A. Lutskevich met with President Tomáš Masaryk. A BPR outpost was
established in Prague, but Masaryk unofficially supported the BPR independence, the
Czechoslovak-Belarusian alliance and the Lithuanian-Belarusian-Ukrainian federation.
The Czechoslovak side pursued a two-pronged policy in the East and hostile to Poland.
Pro-Russian Prime Minister Karel Kramář was for an undivided and democratic Rus-
sia. Foreign Minister Edward Beneš was said to have supported the BPR delegation at
the Paris Conference against Poland (Michaluk, 2010: 437-438).
In the face of Soviet expansion in the former lands of the First Republic, Poland
proved to be the only real power (Gierowska-Kałłaur, 2016: 99). The occupation of Lith-
uanian and Belarusian lands by the Red Army led to a war with Poland. In April 1919,
Polish troops drove the Bolsheviks out of Grodno and Vilnius, where Piłsudski issued
a proclamation “To the population of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania”, announc-
ing its peoples; self-determination in union with Poland (Błaszczak, 2017: 141-142;
Darski, 1993: 20). However, the Polish administration – the Civil Administration of the
Eastern Territories (ZCZW; Novogrudok, Grodno and Vilnius regions were to be part
of Poland) – was established in the lands occupied by Polish troops in the East. In June
1919, Belarusian troops (Belarusian Military Organization) began to be formed along-
side Polish troops (Czarniakiewicz, 2008: 55). In order to win over the Belarusian pop-
ulation, the Polish authorities allowed the Central Belarusian Council of Grodno and
Vilnius (CBCGV) in June 1919 to convene in Vilnius as a representation of Belaru-
sians headed by Bronisław Taraszkiewicz. Referring to Piłsudski’s April proclamation,
the CBCGV supported the BPR government, which protested against the activities of
the CBCGV in Belarusian lands (Michaluk, 2010: 389-390). After Polish troops entered
Minsk in August 1919, Piłsudski spoke of the right to self-determination in a speech to
the population in September. The Marshal believed that Minsk could become the cen-
tre of Belarusian life to the east (“Belarusian Piedmont”). Realistically, however, he en-
visioned autonomy for Byelorussian lands within Poland (Siemakowicz, 1997: 31-35).
Ignacy Paderewski’s government proposed to the BPR government an alliance against
Soviet Russia, cooperation at the Paris Conference, a Polish-Belarusian union, and the
incorporation of Grodno, Novogrudok and Vilnius regions into Poland. Otherwise,
he was not going to recognize it (Gierowska-Kałłaur, 2016: 106-108; Michaluk, 2010:
390-393; Gierowska-Kałłaur, 2009: 24). In May 1919, Prime Minister Paderewski met
with the BPR Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Arkadz Smolicz, who
proposed close cooperation with Poland for its assistance in the creation of Lithuanian
‑Belarusian or Belarusian state (administration and military). Paderewski was interested
in resolving eastern affairs in agreement with the nations there. In the course of meet-
ings with the BPR Prime Minister A. Lutkevich in Paris in mid-1919, the Polish Prime
Minister agreed on a draft of a federation agreement between Poland and Belarus as in-
dependent states, but with a common foreign and military policy. However, in Septem-
ber 1919 in Warsaw, in a conversation with Piłsudski, A. Lutkevich heard that Poland
Belarus in Polish eastern policy during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920) 191
did not intend to recognize an independent Belarus without first resolving the Ukraini-
an problem. At the same time, Piłsudski ordered the ZCZW to dissolve the BPR Coun-
cil in Minsk, as it opposed its orders and sought independence for Belarus. Moreover,
there was a split in the BPR Council. Most of its members, who did not agree to fed-
eration with Poland, went to Kaunas and there formed a new anti-Polish BPR govern-
ment. Faced with the Kiev expedition in March and April 1920, in Minsk, in talks with
the pro-Polish Supreme Council of the BPR, the Polish side proposed cultural autono-
my for Belarusian lands within Poland (Gomółka, 1995: 109-110).
The problem in Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian relations were the Vilnius and Grod-
no regions inhabited by Poles, Belarusians and Jews. The union with Lithuania, Latvia
and Ukraine was supposed to provide the BPR with economic development and secu-
rity vis-à-vis Russia and Poland. Belarusians did not fear the less numerous Lithuanians
in a common state. However, in the historic lands of the GDL, the Lithuanians want-
ed a nation-state. On them, they considered Poles and Belarusians to be a denational-
ized Lithuanian population (Błaszczak, 2017: 45; Michaluk, 2010: 350-358; Tarka, 1998:
41-42; AAN, Komenda Główna Armii Krajowej, Oddział Informacyjno-Wywiadowczy,
sign. 203/III/37: 3-4; ZNIO, sign. 16543/II/t.1: 85; WBH-CAW, Sztab Naczelnego Wo-
dza sign. II.52.168: 4-6; 11)9. Unlike the Lithuanians and Poles, the Belarusian national
movement was unable to organize an administration and army in the Belarusian lands
without outside help (Michaluk, 2007: 36-38; Łatyszonek, 1996: 113-117; Łatyszonek,
1995). Preparing for mutual confrontation, Poland, Lithuania and Soviet Russia did not
support Belarusian state and territorial aspirations.
In the Byelorussian lands occupied by the Polish army in 1919, Soviet Russia orga-
nized communist partisan units. It promised Belarusians the creation of a Soviet Belar-
usian state (Grzybowski, 2006: 40; Mironowicz, 1994: 23-24). The Byelorussian popu-
lation perceived the stay of the Polish and Bolshevik armies as an occupation because
of the requisitions made by force and the creation of an administration (Mironowicz,
2005: 34-36). Until the end of the war with Soviet Russia, Poland did not intend to rec-
ognize the BPR government, which had no real power in the Belarusian lands (Micha-
luk, 2010: 451-454; 562-465). After the failure of talks with Lithuania, Czechoslovakia
and Poland and the failure to recognize the BPR government at the Paris Conference,
Prime Minister A. Lutskevich was replaced in December by the anti-Polish Waclaw
Lastowski (Gierowska-Kałłaur, 2016: 109-110; Michaluk, 2010: 484-486; Mironowicz,
9 Lithuanians did not recognize the Belarusian nation. They considered the Byelorussian language to be
Old Church. They strove to rebuild the GDL (Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus) in connection with Ukraine, which
they intended to dominate (Błaszczak, 2017). During World War II, the clandestine nationalist “Nepriklausoma
Lietuva”, in an article titled There are Lithuanians who cannot speak Lithuanian, wrote that in the historic
Lithuanian lands, all Germanized, Polonized, Ruthenized Lithuanians had to return to the Lithuanian people
(AAN, Komenda Główna Armii Krajowej, Oddział Informacyjno-Wywiadowczy, sign. 203/III/37).
192 Dariusz Miszewski
1998: 52-53; Darski, 1993: 20)10. He recognized the Curzon Line of December 8, 1919
as Belarus’ border with Poland. In 1920, he moved his government to Kaunas, where
he received the means to carry out underground activities under Polish administration
(Błaszczak, 2017: 188; Michaluk, 2010: 492; 514-515). Lithuania established a Minis-
try of Belarusian Affairs under its government and allowed Belarusian representation
in parliament (Taryba). Internationally, it used this to obtain permission to incorpo-
rate lands inhabited by Belarusian Catholics, primarily Grodno and Vilnius, into the
Lithuanian state. The BPR government, on the other hand, expected Lithuania to rec-
ognize the autonomy of ethnic Belarusian lands equal to Lithuanian autonomy within
the framework of a common state (Michaluk, 2010: 472-473; Michaluk, 2007: 39-43).
Therefore, Prague became the second foreign centre of the BPR authorities (Błaszczak,
2017: 199; Michaluk, 2010: 495).
Soviet Russia concluded a deal in July 1920 to hand over Vilnius and Grodno regions
and Suwałki region to Lithuania with about one million Belarusian population after vic-
tory with Poland. Again, in July, Moscow announced the creation of the BSSR with the
intention of annexing Lithuania to it. In the war against Soviet Russia, General Stani-
slaw Bulak- Balakhovich’s troops fought alongside Poland (the 3rd Army of the Polish
Army of General Edward Rydz-Smigly). In October 1920, he concluded an agreement
with the Warsaw-based Belarusian Political Committee to take over civilian authority in
Minsk to rebuild the Belarusian People’s Republic. In November, Gen. Bulak-Balakho-
vich’s army, numbering some 20,000 soldiers, took up arms in Belarus against the Red
Army (Belarusian troops occupied Gomel, Mozyrz, and Rzhechytsya) (Gierowska-Kał-
łaur, 2017: 146-150; Michaluk, 2010: 496). This undertaking, carried out in consultation
with the Supreme Command of the Polish Army, was coordinated with Gen. Lucjan Że-
ligowski’s military operation on so-called Central Lithuania (Januszewska-Jurkiewicz,
2001: 197-203)11. Their goal was to establish a Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian federal state.
In early November 1920, the Belarusian National Committee took over civilian au-
thority in Slutsk and the district from the Polish army, the 4th Army of General Leopold
Skierski. In mid-November, the Byelorussian Congress of Slutsk (at which the options
of building Belarus on the basis of Poland – the supporters of Gen. Bulak Balakhovich –
or Lithuania – the Byelorussian Eserists – clashed) elected the Supreme Byelorussian
Council as the authority. In its November declaration, it called on Byelorussians to fight
10 In 1919, there was a split in the BPR Council. It emerged from the Supreme Council, which advocated
federation with Poland - Vatlav Ivanovsky, Paval Aleksyuk, Ivan Sereda, Shimon Rak-Mikhailovsky, Bronislav
Tarashkevich, Kuzma Tereshchenko, Anton Lutskevich, Father Adam Stankevich. They regarded the 1921
Treaty of Riga as the partition of the Belarusian lands. In 1920-1922, they entered the authorities of Central
Lithuania. From Poland, they expected the right to national development of the Belarusian minority.
They considered the USSR an enemy of Poland and Belarus. The BPR Council and the BPR government
recognized Poland and the USSR as occupiers of Poland and called on Belarusians to fight for independence
(Mironowicz, 1998).
11 The Central Lithuania project involved pro-Polish Belarusian circles (Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, 2001).
Belarus in Polish eastern policy during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920) 193
for an independent Belarus within ethnographic boundaries. The Polish military sup-
ported the development of the Belarusian army (1st Slutsk Rifle Brigade of the Army of
the Belarusian Peopl’’s Republic – 4,000 soldiers). According to the October 1920 peace
preliminaries with Soviet Russia, the Polish army was to leave the Slutsk region. A sep-
arate local Polish-Soviet agreement set the Polish evacuation for the third decade of No-
vember. A 15-kilometer neutral strip was created between Polish and Soviet troops, from
which Belarusian troops attacked the Red Army. After they were broken up, they pro-
ceeded to partisan fighting. By the end of December 1920, the Red Army broke the re-
sistance of the Belarusian troops in the Mozyr and Slutsk areas (Karpus, Rezmer, 1996:
75-81; Darski 1993: 21). After the defeat against the Red Army, Gen. Bulak-Balakho-
vich’s troops were interned in Poland. The Polish army moved Belarusian diversion-
ary groups into Soviet Belarus before the signing of the peace treaty in March 1921 in
Riga. At the end of April 1921, Poland banned Belarusian military units and indepen-
dence organizations on its territory. Deprived of its support, the Belarusian partisans
were broken up by the end of July 1921 (Karpus, Rezmer, 1996: 75-81) by the Red Army.
Between 1918 and 1920, Lithuania, Poland and Soviet Russia exploited the Belaru-
sian cause for their own interests (Michaluk, 2010: 497; WBH-CAW, Sztab Naczelnego
Wodza, sign. II.52.168: 11). Latvia, Estonia, the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Finland
supported the BPR authorities (Michaluk, 2010: 466-470)12. No country recognized the
Belarusian People’s Republic and its government.
12 Dorota Michaluk believes that the BPR was recognized by Latvia and Finland.
194 Dariusz Miszewski
ity. They heralded its liberation and unification with the Belarusian people in the BSSR
(Gordziejew, 2010: 69; Romanek, 2009: 118). In 1927, the Soviet authorities ended “na-
tional democratism” and announced a return to “Bolshevik nationality policy”. Support-
ers of the Belarusian cultural face of the BSSR (bourgeois nationalism) were considered
chauvinists and counter-revolutionaries. Those who were not murdered were relocated
deep into the USSR (Gordziejew, 2010: 66-68; Darski, 1993: 23). During the Soviet pe-
riod, the theory of the separateness of Belarusians from the Russian people and Russia
was fought against in Belarus (Gordziejew, 2010: 69-70).
The Treaty of Riga (1921) derailed the creation of an independent Belarusian state.
Apart from Chief of State Piłsudski and his supporters and the Polish Socialist Party
(PPS), no one in Poland at the time supported an independent Ukraine and Polish-Lith-
uanian-Belarusian federation. In the Polish delegation to the peace negotiations with So-
viet Russia in Minsk and Riga in 1920-1921, supporters of the incorporation concept of
Polish state, i.e., the direct incorporation into Poland of the eastern lands of the mixed
nationalities of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, had the advantage. The
Sejm negotiators representing the national democracy and the people’s movement out-
voted the members of the delegation appointed by the Head of State, rejecting the So-
viet proposal to hand over all of Minsk Land with Minsk to Poland (most of the lands
with Belarusian population would have been in Poland) (Wyszczelski, 2013: 449-453;
Borzęcki, 2012; Gursztyn, 2001: 56)13. This proved to be a strategic mistake for Poland’s
security from the USSR (Jurkowski, 2010: 163-166; Mironowicz, 2007a: 62-63; Podla-
ski, 1990: 35)14. In Minsk, the Soviet authorities established a base to support militant
diversionary groups into Polish lands inhabited by the Belarusian minority (Śleszyński,
2008: 188; WBH-CAW, Kolekcja Prasy Konspiracyjnej, sign. II.46.38: 6-8; WBH-CAW,
Sztab Naczelnego Wodza, sign. II.52.168: 13)15.
The Polish lands with Byelorussian population were not Byelorussian Piedmont
vis-à-vis the BSSR (Mironowicz, 2005: 40-43; Gursztyn, 2001: 57, 60-61)16. The Polish
13 During the Riga peace negotiations, Leon Wasilewski was in favour of annexing Minsk to Poland, as
were Norbert Barlicki and Witold Kamieniecki. This was opposed by Stanislaw Grabski. Minsk became the
capital of the BSSR and the main centre of the Soviet authorities’ diversionary activities against the Polish
northeastern lands (Gursztyn, 2001).
14 This ruled out the possibility of the creation of a Belarusian state by the Piłsudski’s followers within the
framework of Poland on a federal basis (Mironowicz, 2007). He believed that the surrender of Minsk in 1921
to the USSR’s Riga was a mistake by Poland (Podlaski, 1990).
15 The entire Soviet diversion against the eastern lands of the Second Polish Republic was directed by
the Foreign Department of the GPU in Moscow through the Secret Operations Department at the GPU in
Minsk (northeastern lands of the Second Polish Republic) and the GPU in Kharkov (southeastern lands of
the Second Polish Republic) (Śleszyński, 2008).
16 According to Piotr Gursztyn, for the Soviet authorities, the BSSR became a Belarusian Piedmont, albeit
a facade one, vis-à-vis the eastern lands of the Second Polish Republic inhabited by the Belarusian minority.
Wasilewski believed that Poland should, by developing culture and education among Polish Belarusians,
draw them away from the influence of Russian culture and Soviet communist propaganda. He opposed the
National Democracy’s policy of forced Polonization of eastern lands. He claimed that without economic
support from the Polish government and drawing Belarusians into self-government, they would not be loyal
Belarus in Polish eastern policy during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920) 195
186-187; Mironowicz, 1998: 54). The goal of the Communists in Poland was to detach
the Polish eastern lands and annex them to the BSSR and the USSR (Krzak, 2010: 64-65).
The Communist Workers’ Party of Poland (from 1925, KPP) had an autonomous Com-
munist Party of Western Belarus since 1923, which was to unite all Belarusian organi-
zations in Poland (Czarniakiewicz, 2007: 252-253). The Polish police and army fought
against Belarusian separatism. To this end, the Polish authorities also created the Bor-
der Protection Corps in 1925 (Darski, 1993: 25; Podlaski, 1990: 39; WBH-CAW, Sztab
Naczelnego Wodza, sign. II.52.168: 19-20).
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Abstract: The late 19th century saw a national awakening of the Belarusian people. During World War I,
under German occupation, the Catholic Belarusian national movement intended to create a sovereign
Belarusian state (the Belarusian People;s Republic) or in union with Lithuania (a revived Grand Duchy
of Lithuania). After the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Orthodox national activists wanted
a sovereign Belarus within a federal and democratic Russia. The Belarusian People’s Republic, estab-
lished in March 1918, was not recognized by any state. Poland, Lithuania and Soviet Russia intended to
incorporate the Belarusian lands on an autonomous basis. As a result of the Riga Peace Treaty (1921),
the Belarusian lands were divided between Poland and Soviet Russia.
Keywords: Belarusian minority, Polish eastern policy, the Polish-Soviet war, Poland, Soviet Russia