REPORT

ET Docket No. 02- 135

November 2002

Federal Communications Commission

 Spectrum Policy Task Force

Paul Kolodzy, Director

Peter Tenhula, Co-Director
Lauren Van Wazer, Deputy Director
Mike Marcus, Senior Technical Advisor
Maureen McLaughlin, Special Counsel

Richard Engelman, International Bureau

David Furth, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
Kathleen O’Brien Ham, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
Evan Kwerel, Office of Plans and Policy
Keith Larson, Media Bureau
Chris Murphy, International Bureau
John Williams, Office of Plans and Policy
John Wong, Media Bureau

Spectrum Policy Executive Committee

Ed Thomas, Chief, Office of Engineering & Technology

Thomas Sugrue, Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
Robert Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy
Ken Ferree, Chief, Media Bureau
Donald Abelson, Chief, International Bureau

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 Spectrum Policy Task Force Working Groups

Interference Protection
Keith Larson, Chair Joe Levin Ron Repasi
Lisa Cacciatore Bill Luther Bruce Romano
Susan Crawford Mike Marcus Tom Stanley
Thomas Eng Tim Maguire John Williams
Ed Jacobs Bob Nelson John Wong
Jay Jackson Sankar Persaud

Spectrum Efficiency
Rick Engelman, Chair Trey Hanbury Jerilyn Payton
Kwaku Abrokwah Charlene Lagerwerff Jennifer Tomchin
George Dillon Wayne Leighton John Williams
Gardner Foster Mike Marcus Allen Yang
Gordon Godfrey Roger Noel

Unlicensed Devices & Experimental Licenses

Mike Marcus, Chair
Jim Burtle
Bruce Franca
Ahmed Lahjouji
Neal McNeil

Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities

David Furth, Chair
Diane Conley Evan Kwerel
Lloyd Coward Arthur Lechtman Bruce Romano
Howard Griboff Sara Mechanic Priya Shrinivasan
Karl Kensinger Chris Murphy Martha Stancill
David Krech Paul Murray Scot Stone
Doug Webbink

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 Table of Contents:

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
II. Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 3
III. Current State of U.S. Spectrum Policy .................................................................................. 7
A. Regulatory Background...................................................................................................... 7
B. Spectrum Use ................................................................................................................... 10
C. Spectrum Reform Considerations..................................................................................... 11
IV. Spectrum Policy Reform: The Time is Now ....................................................................... 11
A. Explosive Demand for Spectrum-Based Services and Devices ....................................... 12
B. Technological Advances: Enabling Changes in Spectrum Policy.................................... 13
C. Increased Access: Mitigating Scarcity of Spectrum Resource ......................................... 14
V. Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy .............................................................................. 15
A. Maximizing Flexibility of Spectrum Use ......................................................................... 16
B. Clear and Exhaustive Definition of Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities ..................... 17
C. Accounting for All Dimensions of Spectrum Use............................................................ 19
D. Promoting Efficiency ....................................................................................................... 21
E. “Good Neighbor” Incentives ............................................................................................ 22
F. Periodic Review of Rules ................................................................................................. 22
G. Enforcement ..................................................................................................................... 23
VI. Interference Avoidance........................................................................................................ 25
A. Interference Challenges .................................................................................................... 25
B. Adopting Quantitative Standards: Interference Temperature.......................................... 27
C. Additional Methods of Interference Control .................................................................... 31
D. Transition ......................................................................................................................... 33
VII. Spectrum Usage Models ...................................................................................................... 35
A. Comparison of Alternative Spectrum Usage Models ....................................................... 35
B. Application of Exclusive Use and Commons Models...................................................... 38
1. Factors Favoring Exclusive Use Model ....................................................................... 38
2. Factors Favoring Commons Model.............................................................................. 39
C. Limited Use of Command and Control ............................................................................ 41
1. International and Satellite Issues.................................................................................. 41
2. Public Safety ................................................................................................................ 42
3. Broadcasting ................................................................................................................ 44
D. Transition Issues............................................................................................................... 46
1. General Transition Considerations............................................................................... 46
2. Available Transition Mechanisms................................................................................ 47
3. Factors Affecting the Choice of Transition Mechanism .............................................. 49
VIII. Promoting Access to Spectrum............................................................................................ 54
A. Designating Spectrum Bands for Unlicensed Use............................................................ 54
B. Secondary Market Rights and Easements ........................................................................ 55
C. Access to Spectrum in Rural Areas .................................................................................. 58
D. Experimental Licensing.................................................................................................... 60
E. Transition Issues............................................................................................................... 61
IX. Policy Recommendations .................................................................................................... 64
A. Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy Recommendations ............................................ 64
B. Interference Avoidance Recommendations...................................................................... 64
C. Spectrum Usage Models Recommendations .................................................................... 65
D. Promoting Access to Spectrum Recommendations.......................................................... 67
Appendix A: Legislative Recommendations ....................................................................... 69

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I. Introduction
The Spectrum Policy Task Force is pleased to report to the Commission its
findings and recommendations with regard to improving the way that the electromagnetic
radio spectrum is “managed” in the United States. Chairman Powell established the Task
Force in June 2002 to assist the Commission in identifying and evaluating changes in
spectrum policy that will increase the public benefits derived from the use of radio
spectrum. The creation of the Task Force initiated the first ever comprehensive and
systematic review of spectrum policy at the FCC.

The Task Force is a team of high-level, multi-disciplinary professional FCC staff

– economists, engineers, and attorneys – from across the Commission’s Bureaus and
Offices. The Task Force’s mission is to:
¾ Provide specific recommendations to the Commission for ways in which
to evolve the current “command and control” approach to spectrum policy
into a more integrated, market-oriented approach that provides greater
regulatory certainty, while minimizing regulatory intervention; and
¾ Assist the Commission in addressing ubiquitous spectrum issues,
including interference protection, spectral efficiency, effective public
safety communications, and international spectrum policies.

As Chairman Powell stated when announcing the formation of the Task Force, the
government has an almost impossible task in trying to keep pace with the ever-increasing
demand for spectrum and the continuing advances in wireless technology and
applications. In this fast-moving world, the Commission cannot rely on outmoded
procedures and policies. While the Commission has recently made some major strides in
how spectrum is allocated and assigned in some bands, principally through flexible rules
and competitive bidding, spectrum policy is not keeping pace with the relentless
spectrum demands of the market. The Task Force has begun the process of reexamining
90 years of spectrum policy to ensure that the Commission’s policies evolve with the
consumer-driven evolution of new wireless technologies, devices, and services. The
Task Force hopes and expects that this Report will serve as a catalyst for further
advancement of spectrum policy at the FCC.

Process. On June 6, 2002, the Spectrum Policy Task Force released a Public
Notice seeking comment on existing spectrum policies and recommendations for possible
improvements.1 The Public Notice set forth specific questions related to spectrum policy
to give detailed information to the public about the issues the Spectrum Policy Task
Force planned to review. Commenters were not limited to responding to these questions,
however, and were encouraged to comment on all spectrum-related issues.

1
“Spectrum Policy Task Force Seeks Public Comment on Issues Related to Commission’s Spectrum
Policies,” Public Notice, ET Docket No. 02-135 (rel. June 6, 2002).

1
 The questions raised in the Public Notice were divided into five categories: (1)
Market-Oriented Allocation and Assignment Policies; (2) Interference Protection; (3)
Spectral Efficiency; (4) Public Safety Communications; and (5) International Issues.
Specifically, with respect to market allocation and assignment policies, the Task Force
requested comment on the relative effectiveness of the approaches the Commission has
employed for facilitating optimal spectrum use and their applicability across different
bands with different incumbents’ rights. Questions on interference protection addressed
the ramifications of technological limits on radio operation, particularly with regard to
control of the interference between radio systems and what constitutes acceptable
interference. Spectral efficiency questions focused on how to promote and measure
efficiency. The Task Force also sought comment on how best to preserve and protect the
ability of public safety entities to do their important jobs in light of the increasing
spectrum demands. Finally, with respect to international issues, the Task Force sought
guidance on the international spectrum coordination process and what role international
considerations should play in spectrum policy. ET Docket No. 02-135 was established to
collect comments in response to the Public Notice.

Parties filed over 200 comments. These comments were submitted by numerous
types of entities, including: manufacturers of electronics, software, infrastructure, and
wireless technology; wireless Internet service providers (WISPs), including those
providing wireless broadband to rural areas, and other unlicensed spectrum operators;
radioastronomy; satellite/broadcast; consumer groups and individual consumers; other
wireless providers, including fixed wireless and land mobile; academics, economists, and
scientists; commercial mobile radio services (CMRS) providers; radio (including private
radio operators, public, and commercial radio) and TV; public safety and government;
consultants, journalists, and telecommunications services brokers; engineers;
energy/transportation; and telecommunications companies, including rural telephone
companies.

The Task Force held numerous information meetings as well as four public
workshops: Experimental Licenses and Unlicensed Spectrum, August 1st; Interference
Protection, August 2nd; Spectrum Efficiency, August 5th; and Spectrum Rights and
Responsibilities, August 9th. Approximately 75 panelists and outside moderators
participated. These panelists represented a cross-section of interested parties:
manufacturers/product vendors; think tanks, academia, consulting, and financial services;
wireless CMRS carriers, other licensed operators, and frequency coordinators;
satellite/broadcast; attorneys; WISPs and other unlicensed wireless services; government;
public safety; radio/TV; and consumer groups.

The Task Force created the following four working groups: Interference
Protection, Spectrum Efficiency, Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities, and Unlicensed
and Experimental. The working groups reviewed and analyzed all of the comments and
statements made in the workshops. From this information, the Working Groups drafted

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reports summarizing the comments submitted and setting forth findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.2

The Task Force’s web site, http://www.fcc.gov/sptf, contains information related

to the proceedings, including: the Task Force’s mission statement, a link to all public
comments, transcripts of the four public workshops and agendas, a calendar of spectrum
policy events, spectrum policy speeches, links to government-sponsored spectrum-related
web sites, and contact information (including telephone and e-mail address) for the Task
Force.

II. Executive Summary

Task Force Major Findings and Recommendations

• Advances in technology create the potential for systems to use spectrum more
intensively and to be much more tolerant of interference than in the past.

• In many bands, spectrum access is a more significant problem than physical

scarcity of spectrum, in large part due to legacy command-and-control regulation
that limits the ability of potential spectrum users to obtain such access.

• To increase opportunities for technologically innovative and economically

efficient spectrum use, spectrum policy must evolve towards more flexible and
market-oriented regulatory models.

• Such models must be based on clear definitions of the rights and responsibilities
of both licensed and unlicensed spectrum users, particularly with respect to
interference and interference protection.

• No single regulatory model should be applied to all spectrum: the Commission

should pursue a balanced spectrum policy that includes both the granting of
exclusive spectrum usage rights through market-based mechanisms and creating
open access to spectrum “commons,” with command-and-control regulation used
in limited circumstances.

• The Commission should seek to implement these policies in both newly allocated
bands and in spectrum that is already occupied, but in the latter case, appropriate
transitional mechanisms should be employed to avoid degradation of existing
services and uses.

Spectrum Use

• Preliminary data and general observations indicate that many portions of the radio
spectrum are not in use for significant periods of time, and that spectrum use of

2
Each Working Group has submitted a report in ET Docket 02-135. These reports can be found at
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/.

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 these “white spaces” (both temporal and geographic) can be increased
significantly.

• Additional information and measurement is needed in order to more accurately

quantify and characterize spectrum usage.

The Case for Spectrum Reform

• Increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices is straining

longstanding and outmoded spectrum policies.

• As a result, it is important to evolve from current spectrum policies, which reflect

an environment made up of a limited number of types of operations, to policies
that reflect the increasingly dynamic and innovative nature of spectrum use.

• The Commission should also strive, wherever possible, to eliminate regulatory

barriers to increased spectrum access.

Common Elements of Spectrum Policy

• No single regulatory model can or should be applied to all spectrum, but there are
certain common elements that the Commission should incorporate into its
spectrum policy regardless of the regulatory model that is used.
• Maximum feasible flexibility of spectrum use by both licensed and
unlicensed users.
• Clear and exhaustive definition of spectrum users’ rights and
responsibilities.
• Policies that account for all potential dimensions of spectrum usage
(frequency, power, space, and time).
• Incentives for efficient spectrum use.
• Policies that encourage grouping of spectrum “neighbors” with technically
compatible characteristics.
• Periodic review and revision of spectrum rules to account for
technological advances and other changes.
• Efficient and reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure regulatory
compliance by all spectrum users.

Interference Avoidance

• Interference management has become more difficult because of the greater

density, mobility and variability of radio frequency (RF) emitters. Interference
management becomes even more problematic when and if users have been
granted increased flexibility in their spectrum use. As a result, the complexity of
predictive interference models has increased dramatically, and is expected to
increase even more in the future.

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 • The Commission should adopt, where feasible, a more quantitative approach to
interference management based on the concept of “interference temperature.”
• The interference temperature metric would establish maximum
permissible levels of interference, thus characterizing the “worst case”
environment in which a receiver would be expected to operate.
• Different threshold levels could be set for each band, geographic region or
service.
• These thresholds should be set only after review of the condition of the RF
environment in each band. To that end, the Task Force recommends that
the Commission undertake a systematic study of the RF noise floor.

• The Commission should consider applying receiver performance requirements for

some bands and services, either through incentives, regulatory mandates, or some
combination of incentives and mandates.

Spectrum Rights Models

• Based on the principle that “one size does not fit all” in spectrum policy, the
Commission should consider a balance among three general models for assigning
spectrum usage rights:
• “Exclusive use” model. A licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive
and transferable flexible use rights for specified spectrum within a defined
geographic area, with flexible use rights that are governed primarily by
technical rules to protect spectrum users against interference.
• “Commons” model. Allows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to share
frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by technical standards or
etiquettes but with no right to protection from interference.
• “Command-and-control” model. The traditional process of spectrum
management in the United States, currently used for most spectrum within the
Commission’s jurisdiction, in which allowable spectrum uses are limited
based on regulatory judgments.

• The Commission should expand the use of both the exclusive use and commons
models throughout the radio spectrum.
• The exclusive use model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in
bands where scarcity is relatively high and transaction costs associated with
market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively low.
• The commons model should be applied primarily but not exclusively in bands
where scarcity is relatively low and transaction costs are relatively high.
• The commons approach also has potential applicability in the creation of
“underlay” rights in spectrum for low-power, low-impact applications, e.g.,
for operations below an established interference temperature threshold.

• Command-and-control regulation should be reserved only for situations where

prescribing spectrum use by regulation is necessary to accomplish important
public interest objectives or to conform to treaty obligations.

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 • Dedication of spectrum in conformity with international harmonization
considerations is sometimes appropriate to foster internationally ubiquitous
services and economies of scale.
• Spectrum currently set aside for public safety use should remain subject to the
command-and-control model to ensure provision of essential life-and-safety
services. At the same time, because of the variability of public safety use,
public safety users should have flexibility to lease spectrum capacity during
lower-use periods to commercial users.
• Broadcast spectrum should remain subject to the current regulatory model,
which is based on statutory public interest objectives. Over the longer term,
the Commission should periodically reevaluate its broadcast spectrum
policies.

• With the exceptions noted above, existing spectrum that is subject to command-
and-control regulation should be transitioned to the more flexible exclusive use
and commons models to the greatest extent possible. In determining whether and
how to transition legacy command-and-control bands to more flexible rights
models, the Commission should consider several alternative approaches, and
should focus first on initiating transition in those bands where additional
flexibility will provide the greatest benefits at the least cost.

Promoting Access to Spectrum

• The Commission should, where feasible, seek to designate additional bands for
unlicensed spectrum use to better optimize spectrum access and provide room for
expansion in the fast-growing market for unlicensed devices and networks.

• In licensed spectrum bands, the Commission should pursue secondary markets

policies that encourage licensees to provide access for “opportunistic” uses above
the interference temperature threshold through leasing of spectrum usage rights.
• The Commission should also explore the possible use of government-granted
“easements” for some opportunistic uses in new spectrum bands, but should
be sensitive to the potential impact of this approach on planning and
investment by licensed users.

• The Commission should explore ways to promote spectrum access and flexibility
in rural areas, including flexible regulation of power levels, secondary markets
mechanisms to encourage leasing of spectrum usage rights in rural areas, and
consideration of rural issues in defining geographic licensing areas.

• Experimental spectrum uses should be encouraged through improvements to the

experimental licensing frequency coordination process and dissemination of more
information identifying bands that are particularly suitable for experimental
applications.

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III. Current State of U.S. Spectrum Policy

A. Regulatory Background
Statute. Domestic U.S. spectrum policy and regulation began 90 years ago.
Largely as a consequence of the communications failures associated with the sinking of
the Titanic, the Federal government established control of the electromagnetic spectrum.3
The Radio Act of 1912 established the principle that no one could use spectrum without a
federal license and a series of spectrum policy principles that continue to the present.
The Radio Act of 1927 established the Federal Radio Commission and set forth as its
intent to “maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and
foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the
ownership thereof.” The 1927 Act provided that the new Commission shall, “as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires” classify radio stations, prescribe the nature of
the service, assign bands of frequencies or wave lengths and determine the power, time,
and location of stations and regulate the kind of apparatus to be used. Licenses were to
be granted by the Commission for a limited duration (three years for broadcast licenses
and five years for all others), but all federal government stations were to be assigned by
the President.

Seven years later, the Communications Act of 1934 abolished the Federal Radio
Commission and transferred the authority for spectrum management to the newly created
Federal Communications Commission.4 The 1934 Act brought together the regulation of
telephone, telegraph, and radio services within a single independent federal agency. The
1927 Radio Act was absorbed largely intact into Title III of the 1934 Act.

From 1934 to the early 1990s, Congress enacted many amendments to Title III,
but there were no fundamental changes to the core provisions that can be traced back to
the 1912 and 1927 Acts. However, two noteworthy additions to the 1934 Act inserted in
1983 by Congress are section 75 and section 307(e).6 Section 7(a) establishes that it is the
policy of the United States “to encourage the provision of new technologies and services
to the public” and that anyone who opposes a new technology or service will have the
3
The first international radio conference took place in 1903, followed by another in 1906. The second
conference adopted a convention requiring receipt of priority distress calls from ships and created the first
two radio frequency service categories: general public service in the 187-500 kHz band and long-range or
other services for assignment in other frequencies. Additional international spectrum conferences have
been held under the auspices of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on a regular basis and
are now called World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC). From a domestic spectrum policy
standpoint, the outcome of the WRCs have a direct impact on U.S. allocation issues as the WRC Final Acts
constitute treaty agreements requiring ratification by the United States Senate. The Commission
implements the Final Acts through the rulemaking process.
4
47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
5
47 U.S.C. § 157.
6
47 U.S.C. § 307(e).

7
burden of demonstrating that the proposal is inconsistent with the public interest. In
addition, section 307(e) provides that the Commission, “notwithstanding any licensing
requirement established in this Act,” may “by rule authorize the operation of radio
stations without individual licenses” in certain services.

In 1993, Congress amended Title III of the 1934 Act to authorize the Commission
to assign licenses through competitive bidding.7 The 1993 Act also required the transfer
of certain amounts of spectrum from federal government use to commercial use,8
amended Section 332 of the 1934 Act with regard to the regulatory treatment of
commercial and private mobile radio services, and required the Commission to collect
regulatory fees from licensees and other Commission regulatees.9

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 added Section 336 to the 1934 Act to
provide for broadcast spectrum flexibility and authority to collect certain additional
fees.10 The 1996 Act also eliminated the cap on license terms for non-broadcast licenses
in Section 307(c) of the 1934 Act. In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress
expanded the Commission’s auction authority, provided for the transfer of additional
spectrum from federal government use and granted the Commission explicit authority to
allocate electromagnetic spectrum so as to provide flexibility of use.

Administrative. Although the communications statutes (and treaties) discussed

above are generally implemented and enforced by the FCC, other federal agencies,
including the Department of Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), and the Department of State, also play important
roles in developing spectrum policy. Until recently, spectrum policy at the administrative
agency level, especially at the FCC, was generally formulated on a band-by-band,
service-by-service basis, typically in response to specific requests for particular service
allocations or station assignments. This ad hoc approach has garnered criticism over the
years.

It does not appear that any general spectrum management review or

comprehensive planning has taken place at the FCC. It was not until the 1990s that
specific efforts were made to examine policies surrounding spectrum management in the
United States on a more comprehensive basis. First, in December 1989, NTIA began a
“Comprehensive Policy Review of Use and Management of the Radio Frequency
Spectrum.” This review was the first major examination of fundamental spectrum policy
objectives and issues by NTIA since its organization in 1978. In 1991, NTIA issued its
Report, “U.S. Spectrum Management Policy: Agenda for the Future,” which made a

7
Section 309(j) was further amended in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. In the Open-Market
Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act of 2000 (ORBIT Act), the
Congress passed legislation excluding spectrum used for international and global satellite services from
assignment through auctions.
8
See 47 U.S.C. § 923.
9
See 47 U.S.C. § 159.
10
47 U.S.C. § 336.

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number of significant recommendations, some of which ultimately led to legislation
being enacted as part of the 1993 Budget Act.

In the 1990s, while the FCC continued with an ad hoc approach to spectrum
allocations and policy, significant efforts in the area of broader spectrum policy review
by the Commission took three forms: (1) implementation of competitive bidding
authority; (2) en banc hearings before the full Commission; and (3) policy statements.
As noted above, Congress provided the Commission authority to use competitive bidding
for licensing certain classes of spectrum users and uses. While much of the
implementation of these statutory changes took place on a service-by-service basis, in
1994 the Commission established the general framework for auctions across all
services.11 The Commission also completed other more comprehensive proceedings to
implement changes to Sections 332 and 309(j) of the Communications Act.12

In March 1996 and April 1999, the Commission held two en banc hearings on
Spectrum Management.13 Information presented at the hearings provided insight from
industry and academia on their views of how the Commission’s spectrum management
responsibilities should evolve. Two key focus areas emerged: (1) promoting greater
efficiency in spectrum use and (2) making more spectrum available. Flexibility was also
emphasized for both allocations and service rules. Other key suggested initiatives
included: negotiated interference; new spectrum efficient technologies; innovative and
streamlined assignment mechanisms; a more active secondary market; and more
unlicensed spectrum.

In November 1999, the Commission issued a Policy Statement on “Principles for

Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development of Telecommunications
Technologies for the New Millennium.”14 The Commission has also convened a
Technological Advisory Committee to provide expert advice to the Commission on how
to respond to rapid advances in technology, with a particular focus on spectrum
management.15

In November 2000, after holding a public forum on secondary markets in radio

spectrum usage rights, the Commission concurrently adopted a Policy Statement,
“Principles for Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of

11
See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No.
93-253, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 2348 (1994).
12
See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act Regulatory Treatment of
Mobile Services, GN Docket No. 93- 252, Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 1411(1994).
13
See “Commission Announces Panelists, Agenda for En Banc Hearing on Spectrum Policy,” Public
Notice, DA 96-190 (rel. Feb. 14, 1996) and “FCC Announces Panelists for En Banc Hearing on Spectrum
Management,” Public Notice (rel. Apr. 1, 1999).
14
“Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development of Telecommunications
Technologies for the New Millennium,” Policy Statement, 14 FCC Rcd 19868 (1999).
15
See “Report of First Meeting of the Technical Advisory Council” (April 30, 1999), which can be found
at: http://www.fcc.gov/oet/tac/report990430.pdf.

9
Secondary Markets,”16 and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, “Promoting Efficient Use
of Spectrum through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary
Markets.”17 The Policy Statement enunciated general goals and principles for the further
development of secondary markets in spectrum usage rights, while the Notice proposed
concrete steps the Commission might take to implement that policy with respect to
wireless radio services and satellite services. Other countries have undertaken similar
reviews of spectrum management policies and practices.18

B. Spectrum Use
Preliminary data and general observations indicate that portions of the radio
spectrum are not in use for significant periods of time. To assess actual spectrum use, the
FCC’s Enforcement Bureau measured spectrum use below 1 GHz in Atlanta, Chicago,
New Orleans, San Diego, and in a Washington, DC suburb during various periods in July
2002.19 These preliminary measurements indicate that, while some bands are heavily
used – such as those bands used by cellular base stations – many other bands are not in
use or are used only part of the time. Thus, there may be opportunities for spectrum-
based devices to operate in both the temporal white spaces – those resulting from
variability in the operations of existing spectrum users over time – and the geographic
white spaces – those resulting from the geographic separation of existing spectrum users.

These data offer a useful starting point, and, indeed, confirm some long-held
views regarding actual spectrum usage. More information, however, is needed in order to
quantify and characterize spectrum usage more accurately so that the Commission can
adopt spectrum policies that take advantage of these spectrum white spaces. Currently,
no federal agency or other organization systematically measures temporal spectrum use.

Also, it is generally understood that certain types of spectrum users, such as the
public safety community, have significant variability in their spectrum use and, as such,
much of their allocated spectrum lies fallow during non-peak periods. For example, the
Task Force received some usage data regarding a particular police dispatch channel in

16
“Principles for Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum By Encouraging the Development of Secondary
Markets,” Policy Statement, 15 FCC Rcd 24178 (2000).
17
“Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary
Markets,” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WT Docket No. 00-230, 15 FCC Rcd 24203 (2000).
18
For example, Canada and administrations in Europe have recently carried out extensive and
comprehensive reviews of their spectrum policies. In the United Kingdom, the government commissioned
an “independent review” of radio spectrum management in the U.K. by Professor Martin Cave, who
participated in one of the Task Force’s workshops. Professor Cave’s report was published in March 2002
and made 47 wide-ranging recommendations on the future management of radio spectrum. The U.K.
government published its response to the report on October 15, 2002, accepting nearly all of the report’s
recommendations. See http://www.spectrumreview.radio.gov.uk.
19
The Spectrum Efficiency Working Group Report contains a more detailed discussion of these
preliminary measurements.

10
New York State.20 These data indicate that, for the measurement period, typical channel
occupancy was less than 15%, while the peak usage was close to 85%.

Spectrum above 50 GHz is also not heavily used because, until recently, radio
technology has not been sufficiently advanced to use this portion of the spectrum. For
example, developments in millimeter-wave technologies – that is, technologies that can
effectively propagate pencil-beam like signals – have made higher spectrum bands, such
as those above 70 GHz, possible for use.21 The potential uses for these technologies
include high-speed wireless local area networks, broadband access systems for the
Internet, point-to-point communications, and point-to-multipoint communications.

In light of the preliminary FCC measurements, the acknowledged variability of

some types of licensed spectrum users, and the recent advances in technology, the Task
Force concludes that there is evidence to suggest that spectrum use can be increased
significantly.

C. Spectrum Reform Considerations

Over the years, as it considered various allocation and service proposals for parts
of the spectrum, the Commission has taken into account any number of “public interest”
considerations. For example, in determining whether to reallocate spectrum for another
use or to change particular service rules, the Commission has considered the reliance
interests of existing spectrum users, including their investments and reasonable
expectations, in order to make sure any transition to new uses is equitable. Other
important factors that have come into play are the benefits (and harms) of allocations to
national security and emergency preparedness. It is important to ensure that critical
defense systems do not risk exposure to harmful interference and to provide adequate
spectrum resources to public safety entities. In making spectrum policy in certain
proceedings, especially those involving spectrum used for global satellite systems, the
Commission also has ensured that spectrum coordination among countries allows for
adequate domestic and international operations. Access to specialized services for
persons with disabilities has also been an important concern addressed in numerous
proceedings. As a final example of its public interest considerations, the Commission’s
policies surrounding spectrum allocated for broadcasting service, especially in the
context of the conversion from analog to digital television, have taken into account
localism and access to free-over-the-air television.

IV. Spectrum Policy Reform: The Time is Now

The Spectrum Policy Task Force believes that the time is ripe for spectrum policy
reform. Increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices are straining
longstanding, and outmoded, spectrum policies. The overarching goal of effective

20
See Comments of Statewide Wireless Network, New York State Office for Technology.
21
See In the Matter of Allocations and Service Rules for the 71-76 GHz, 81-86 GHz and 92-95 GHz
Bands, WT Docket No. 02-146, 17 FCC Rcd 12182 (2002).

11
spectrum policy is to maximize the potential public benefits to be derived through
spectrum-based services and devices. The Task Force believes that the Commission can
and should modify current spectrum policy through increased flexibility in order to
achieve this goal. This section of the Task Force’s report discusses why spectrum policy
reform is needed.

A. Explosive Demand for Spectrum-Based Services and Devices

There has been a dramatic increase in overall demand for spectrum-based services
and devices, accompanied by particular demand for mobile and portable spectrum-based
applications. This is true for both traditional, licensed services and for services offered
through unlicensed devices. This increased demand is propelled by a host of factors: the
economy has moved towards the communications-intensive service sector, the workforce
is increasingly mobile, and consumers have been quick to embrace the convenience and
increased efficiency of the multitude of wireless devices available today.

While the Task Force recognizes the societal trends that have contributed to the
increased demand for spectrum-based services and devices, it is also difficult to make
accurate projections of future demands. Historically, both industry and Commission
projections for spectrum use have significantly and consistently underestimated the need
for additional spectrum and the public’s utilization of new technologies and applications.
One illustrative example is the explosive growth in consumer demand for mobile wireless
services. In 1994, the Commission allocated spectrum based on a projection of 54
million domestic mobile services users for the year 2000. By the year 2000, however,
there actually were approximately 110 million mobile services users.22

Advances in technologies have significantly increased the diversity of service

offerings and have also qualitatively improved existing services, thereby increasing
consumer demand for spectrum-based services and devices. For example, advances in
spread spectrum techniques have spawned significant consumer demand for associated
applications. Spread spectrum technology – which spreads the energy of a radio signal
over a bandwidth that is greater than that required to transmit a particular signal23 – was
originally developed for military applications and the Commission first approved its use
for commercial applications was first approved by the Commission in 1985. While this
technology has been used for cordless telephones for some time, advances in this
technology, coupled with developments of industry protocols for its use, such as
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, have contributed to the surging demand for wireless devices that

22
See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1994, Annual
Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services,
Sixth Report, FCC 01-192, 16 FCC Rcd 13350 (2001) at 21.
23
The Commission’s rules define “spread spectrum systems” as follows: “A spread spectrum system is an
information bearing communications system in which: (1) Information is conveyed by modulation of a
carrier by some conventional means, (2) the bandwidth is deliberately widened by means of a spreading
function over that which would be needed to transmit the information alone. (In some spread spectrum
systems, a portion of the information being conveyed by the system may be contained in the spreading
function.)” See 47 C.F.R. § 2.1.

12
enable computer and data networking through wireless local area networks (WLANs).
Consumers are increasingly demanding wireless computer and data networking because
most businesses and many homes now have multiple computers, and, as a result, users
often find it desirable to install local area networks to share resources, such as printers,
scanners and broadband or dial-up Internet connections. Indeed, developing a local area
network using wireless unlicensed devices can be a cost-attractive mobile alternative to
wired networks.

New technologies also often enhance existing spectrum-based services and

devices, thereby contributing to increased consumer demand. Third generation, or
advanced wireless services, will have better packet data control and higher-speed
transmission rates than current second generation technologies. For consumers, these
technological advances translate into a wider diversity of potential service offerings,
particularly Internet and wireless data services, which can be delivered at faster rates.
The projected growth in this area is significant – some analysts predict that wireless
mobile data traffic will eventually eclipse mobile voice traffic.

Not only is the overall demand for spectrum-based services and devices steadily
increasing, because the applications are increasingly dynamic, they are adding even more
strain to current spectrum policies. Among other things, they present increasingly
complex interference management issues. For example, the same frequencies are used by
cordless phones and 802.11b Wi-Fi devices. Because these devices often change
locations during their operations and their use is often in close proximity to one another,
the technical geometries or parameters that determine interference vary accordingly as
well. Using typical worst case predictive interference models would significantly reduce
the potential of these devices to operate. As a result, it is important to evolve from
current spectrum policies, which reflect a spectrum world made up of a limited number of
types of operations, to policies that reflect the increasingly dynamic and innovative
nature of spectrum use.

B. Technological Advances: Enabling Changes in Spectrum Policy

While technological advances are contributing to the increased diversity of
spectrum-based consumer applications and, consequently, their use is resulting in more
demand for spectrum, technological advances are also providing some potential answers
to current spectrum policy challenges. Some recent and significant technological
advances include the increased use of digital technologies and the development of
software-defined radios.

Growth in the use of digital spectrum-based technologies not only increases the
potential throughput of information, it also has potentially significant ramifications for
interference management. Digital signals are inherently more robust, and resistant to
interference, than analog signals. Moreover, digital signal processing techniques, such as
coding and error correction, are more effective at rejecting interfering signals. Thus,
spectrum policies can and should reflect this increased ability to tolerate interference.
Moreover, given the increased ability of new technologies to monitor their local RF
environment and operate more dynamically than traditional technologies, the predictive

13
models used by the Commission can be updated, and perhaps eventually replaced, by
techniques that take into account and assess actual, rather than predicted, interference.

Software-defined radios are a significant technological advancement illustrating

how technological advances can enable more intensive spectrum use. Unlike traditional
radios, in which technical characteristics are fixed at the time of manufacture and cannot
subsequently be modified, operating parameters in software-defined radios (such as the
operational frequency and modulation type) are determined by software. The fact that
these parameters are determined by software means that a software-defined radio can be
programmed to transmit and receive on many frequencies and to use any desired
modulation or transmission format within the limits of its hardware design. A software-
defined radio can also be programmed to receive different types of radio signals on
varying frequencies. Often technologies such as software-defined radios are called
“smart” or “opportunistic” technologies because, due to their operational flexibility,
software-defined radios can search the radio spectrum, sense the environment, and
operate in spectrum not in use by others. By operating in so-called white – or unused –
spaces in the spectrum, software-defined radios can enable better and more intensive use
of the radio spectrum.

Historically, due in large part to technological limitations in radio performance,

the Commission’s spectrum policies have parceled – or assigned – spectrum according to
particular operational frequencies and geographic areas of operations. Smart
technologies, such as software-defined radios, potentially allow operators to take
advantage of the time dimension of the radio spectrum. That is, because their operations
are so agile and can be changed nearly instantaneously, they can operate for short periods
of time in unused spectrum. The Commission’s current policies do not take into account
the time dimension of spectrum use. In addition, the Commission’s current policies do
not allow new technologies to take advantage of geographic white space. In order to be
responsive to these increased technological capabilities, the Commission’s spectrum
policies can and should remain technology agnostic, but they should not be technology
antagonistic. As a result, the Commission should strive, wherever possible, to eliminate
regulatory barriers to increased spectrum access.

C. Increased Access: Mitigating Scarcity of Spectrum Resource

Due to the growth in demand for spectrum-based services, many spectrum users
seek additional spectrum and it now appears as though spectrum demand is outstripping
spectrum supply. Indeed, most prime spectrum has already been assigned to one or more
parties, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to find spectrum that can be made
available either for new services or to expand existing ones. As noted above, in
connection with its spectrum policy inquiry, the Task Force reviewed preliminary data
regarding spectrum usage. While additional, and more comprehensive, spectrum
measurements can and should be undertaken to improve the understanding of actual
spectrum use, preliminary measurements show that significant spectrum capacity remains
untapped. Thus, if the Commission were to permit greater access to the radio spectrum,
the effects of the physical scarcity of the spectrum resource could be minimized.

14
 Improving access to the spectrum can be achieved through permitting current
licensees greater flexibility. Often a licensee has variable needs and therefore does not
use its spectrum for particular periods of time. At the same time, due to restrictions based
in Commission policies, licensees are usually unable to make their spectrum available to
others, even if a market exists to do so. While this concept will be addressed in greater
detail, see infra Section VIII, granting licensees additional flexibility to make their
licensed bands available to others would increase access to the spectrum and,
correspondingly, minimize the impact of spectrum scarcity.

Another significant reason that spectrum may be underutilized, as noted earlier, is

that the Commission’s regulations do not reflect and capitalize upon the significant
advancements made in spectrum-based radio technologies. Because new, smart
technologies can sense the spectrum environment and because they have the agility to
dynamically adapt or adjust their operations, increasing access to the spectrum for smart
technologies, such as software-defined radios, can improve utilization, through more
efficient access, of the radio spectrum without detriment to existing spectrum users.

In the near term, the Commission should consider adopting policies that increase
opportunities for access to the radio spectrum through granting additional flexibility. The
Commission also may want to consider options for increasing the benefits derived from
the radio spectrum by providing incentives for technologies that improve the throughput
of information.

Eventually, it may be possible that spectrum access is fully optimized for certain
bands and locations (that is, that the spectrum is not only fully licensed but also heavily
used.) At that point in time, the Commission may need to focus solely on promoting
improved throughput of information. In the interim, however, to ensure that existing
services can continue to grow to accommodate marketplace needs, and that new services
have a chance to take hold and grow, it is important that the Commission continue to
optimize and facilitate access to and use of the radio spectrum.

V. Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy

To facilitate the Commission’s goal of promoting access to and use of radio
spectrum, the Task Force recommends that the Commission evolve its spectrum policy
toward more flexible and market-oriented spectrum policies that will provide incentives
for users to migrate to more technologically innovative and economically efficient uses of
spectrum. As discussed below, there is no single regulatory model that can or should be
applied to all spectrum to accomplish these goals, but there are certain common elements
that should be incorporated into the Commission’s general approach to spectrum policy
regardless of the regulatory model that is used. These elements also inform the Task
Force’s approach to interference, spectrum rights, and spectrum access discussed in
subsequent sections of this report. Specifically, the Commission should seek to meet the
following fundamental objectives in spectrum policy:

• Allow for maximum feasible flexibility of spectrum use by both licensed

and unlicensed users;

15
 • Clearly and exhaustively define spectrum users’ rights and
responsibilities;
• Account for all potential dimensions of spectrum usage (frequency, power,
space, and time);
• Provide incentives for efficient spectrum use;
• Encourage grouping of spectrum “neighbors” with technically compatible
characteristics;
• Provide for periodic review and revision of spectrum rules to account for
technological advances and other changes; and
• Establish efficient and reliable enforcement mechanisms to ensure
regulatory compliance by all spectrum users.

A. Maximizing Flexibility of Spectrum Use

As a general proposition, flexibility in spectrum regulation is critical to improving
access to spectrum. In this context, “flexibility” means granting both licensed users and
unlicensed device operators the maximum possible autonomy to determine the highest
valued use of their spectrum, subject only to those rules that are necessary to afford
reasonable opportunities for access by other spectrum users and to prevent or limit
interference among multiple spectrum uses. Flexibility enables spectrum users to make
fundamental choices about how they will use spectrum (including whether to use it or
transfer their usage rights to others), taking into account market factors such as consumer
demand, availability of technology, and competition. By leaving these choices to the
spectrum user, this approach tends to lead to efficient and highly-valued spectrum uses.
In most instances, a flexible use approach is preferable to the Commission’s traditional
“command-and-control” approach to spectrum regulation, in which allowable spectrum
uses are limited based on regulatory judgments.

Of course, as discussed further below, there are some necessary limits to the
degree of flexibility that can be afforded to any single spectrum user. For example, clear
technical rules (e.g. power limits, interference standards) remain necessary in all
spectrum bands in order to facilitate co-existence of multiple spectrum uses in common
and adjacent bands.24 In addition, there are limited instances in which regulating
spectrum use on a command-and-control basis may continue to be necessary to achieve
certain public interest objectives.25 Finally, the degree of flexibility that is afforded to
particular spectrum users should take into account the importance of promoting
reasonable access to spectrum for other potential users. 26

Even with these limitations, however, the potential exists for the Commission to
significantly increase the amount of flexibility that is afforded to spectrum users in much
of the spectrum that it regulates. The Commission should seek to avoid rules that restrict
spectrum use to particular services or applications, so long as the user operates within the

24
See Section VI, infra.
25
See Section VII, infra.
26
See Section VIII, infra.

16
technical parameters applicable to the particular band in question. Furthermore, these
technical parameters should themselves be limited to those that are necessary to define
the user’s RF environment in terms of maximum allowable output and required tolerance
of interference.

Such flexibility can be implemented under more than one regulatory model for
defining spectrum usage rights. As discussed further below, the Task Force advocates
expanding the future use of two alternative regulatory models – one based on awarding
exclusive spectrum usage rights and the other on creating unlicensed spectrum
“commons” – both of which are premised on the concept of flexible use.27 Under either
model, the Commission should give spectrum users maximum possible autonomy in the
following areas:

• Choice of uses or services that are provided on spectrum. Spectrum users should
have the maximum possible flexibility to decide how spectrum will be used, e.g.,
whether to provide commercial services or to use spectrum for private, internal
needs, so long as they comply with the general parameters applicable to the band
(including any applicable power limits or interference limits).

• Choice of technology that is most appropriate to the spectrum environment.

Spectrum users should be allowed to choose the technology that is best-suited to
their proposed use or service. They should be allowed adapt their technology to
their particular spectrum environment, e.g., to use lower power in spectrum-
congested areas and higher power in less-congested (e.g., rural) areas.

• Right to transfer, lease, or subdivide spectrum rights.28 An efficient secondary

markets regime should be in place to facilitate the negotiated movement of
spectrum rights from one party to another. In more narrowly-defined services
(e.g., public safety), spectrum users should have the ability to lease excess
capacity for other uses through time sharing of spectrum or other mechanisms.29

B. Clear and Exhaustive Definition of Spectrum Rights and

Responsibilities
While commenters and workshop participants were vocal about their desire for
more flexible rights, they were equally interested in firmness and clarity in the rules they
are required to follow. Most commenters and workshop participants also agreed with the
proposition that spectrum users’ rights and obligations are often not defined with
sufficient clarity under the FCC’s current rules. An overarching principle eventually

27
See Section VII, infra.
28
Where spectrum is made available on a commons basis, spectrum usage rights are non-exclusive, and
therefore new users do not depend on the transferability of such rights to obtain access to the spectrum.
Nonetheless, there is no reason to restrict the transferability of such rights.
29
See Section VII.C.2, infra.

17
emerged: all spectrum users require clear rules governing their interactions with the
Commission and other spectrum users. Regardless of how or to whom particular rights
are assigned, ensuring that all rights are clearly delineated is important to avoiding
disputes, and provides a clear common framework from which spectrum users can
negotiate alternative arrangements.

To provide this framework, the Commission must clearly define the following
basic spectrum rights parameters for all licensed and unlicensed spectrum uses:

1. Designated frequency range and bandwidth;

2. Geographic scope of right to operate;
3. Maximum RF output, both in-band and out-of-band; and
4. Interference protection, i.e. the maximum level of
noise/interference that the spectrum user must accept from other
RF sources.30

Also, to ensure that rights are exhaustively assigned, the rules should be written to define
spectrum rights in terms of spectrum uses that are excluded, prohibited, or limited. Thus,
the Commission’s approach should be that licensees and unlicensed users are allowed to
do anything not explicitly prohibited by the Communications Act, the Commission's
rules, Commission orders, licenses or authorizations, rather than the presumption being
that anything not affirmatively authorized requires a rule change or waiver before it can
be done.

The first three of the parameters listed above essentially define the scope of the
maximum allowable RF output of a given spectrum use in terms of frequency,
bandwidth, space, and power. These are typically defined with relative clarity in the FCC
rules using objective criteria, e.g., licensing area borders, antenna height, and transmitter
power limits, etc.31 However, the fourth criterion (interference protection) is distinct
because it pertains to the universe of outside RF sources (in band and out-of-band) that
may cause interference to the spectrum user. Because all of these sources may not be
known or anticipated, capturing this variable is more difficult. Indeed, commenters and
workshop participants almost uniformly cited the FCC’s interference rules as the prime
example of rules that are not clearly defined. A common refrain was that the FCC rules
speak of the right to be protected from “harmful interference,” but this term is not defined
in technical terms, making objective measurement difficult.32 To address these issues, the

30
In the case of unlicensed uses and in some shared licensed bands, interference protection rights are
“defined” as a nullity, i.e., spectrum users have no interference protection rights.
31
As discussed in the next section, however, there are ways in which the rules governing these dimensions
of spectrum use can be refined. See Section V.C, infra.
32
Obviously, this is not an issue for bands in which spectrum users have no interference protection, e.g.,
unlicensed bands. Moreover, in licensed bands, the establishment of maximum power and emission levels
at the geographic and spectrum borders of each licensed spectrum block provides a form of interference
regulation, because each licensee knows in advance the maximum output that it is required to accept from
co-channel and adjacent channel licensees that are subject to these rules. This approach only works,
however, if all of the potential RF emitters are known and subject to defined RF output limits. It works less

18
Commission needs to define interference rights more clearly on a prospective basis. The
Task Force discusses possible ways to accomplish this in Section VI below.

C. Accounting for All Dimensions of Spectrum Use

The Task Force also analyzed the benefits of parceling out spectrum using
variations in frequency, space, power, and time to maximize the use of spectrum. In the
past, the Commission has recognized and licensed spectrum primarily by defining
spectrum rights in terms of the first three dimensions. The Task Force found that new
technological developments are changing the way in which each of these spectrum
dimensions is used. In addition, new technology now permit the Commission to
increasingly consider the use of time, in combination with frequency, power, and space,
as an added dimension that could permit more dynamic allocation and assignment of
spectrum usage rights.
Frequency or bandwidth requests have long been the mainstay of the spectrum
allocation and licensing process. Parties file applications with the Commission seeking
allocations for a particular service and licensing in a specific bandwidth based on the type
of service they envision providing. This process requires all interested parties to evaluate
the applicant’s proposal through filings at the Commission. The Commission is then
required to make a determination as to the desirability of the allocation and rules for the
service, including the appropriate bandwidth for a particular licensee. Several
technological trends are now affecting this traditional paradigm, however. First, the
development of spread spectrum technology has increased demand for contiguous
broadband spectrum allocations. Second, technology is making increased use of higher
frequencies, e.g., bands above 50 GHz, that previously were considered to have limited
utility. Finally, the development of frequency-agile technology has created the potential
for development of services and uses that are not tied to specific frequency bands.
Space and power are related but slightly different dimensions that define the
geographic scope of spectrum use for spectrum management purposes. The Task Force
found that the Commission should expand the ability of spectrum users to partition their
geographic service areas, or space, so that portions of their service areas that would
otherwise lay fallow could potentially be put to use.
The Task Force also found that spectrum use can be improved is by permitting
transmitter power levels to be adjusted to match the environment of the transmitter and
the intended service area. For example, maximum power levels could be increased in
rural areas so that service can be provided over larger areas at lower cost. In congested
urban areas, where high transmitter power levels on one frequency can often adversely
impact the use of other frequencies, the Commission should look towards enabling the
use of lower power transmissions. For example, high-power digital television
broadcasters could be permitted to operate single frequency low-power distributed

well where output rules for different spectrum uses are established at different times or the rules do not
account for unanticipated technologies.

19
transmission systems within their present service areas. Other site-licensed services
could be provided similar flexibility. The Commission could also consider whether it
should offer incentives for reducing transmitter power (such as an increased interference
protection).
The Task Force also recommends that the Commission seek methods for fostering
technologies, such as advanced antennas and system design techniques, that maintain as
close to uniform power flux density signal levels as possible throughout a service area.
As discussed in the Spectrum Efficiency Working Group and Interference Protection
Working Group Reports, these technologies could avoid interference between users, and
could provide for greater spectrum reuse.
Finally, with respect to power, the Task Force concluded that the Commission
also should promote the co-location of high power transmitters. In general, interference
between services is often less likely when the signal strengths from the services are
similar; co-location of high power transmitters helps ensure comparable signal strengths
throughout the service areas.
To better account for use of spectrum in the time dimension, the Task Force also
recommends that the Commission examine methods for promoting technologies that will
facilitate time-sharing of spectrum between multiple users. For example, the
Commission should consider permitting traditionally-narrow services, such as public
safety, to lease excess capacity to other services. The Commission should also consider
whether the use of trunking technology, where several users automatically share
frequencies, should be expanded, Time divided or aggregated use of spectrum is
becoming a necessity in order to meet the burgeoning demand with limited opportunities
for allocating new services. The Task Force also recommends that the Commission
consider methods for allowing access to spectrum with typically low utilization on an
interruptible basis, i.e., allowing the interruptible use of otherwise authorized spectrum
when it is not being used by the primary licensee but requiring the user to suspend
operations when the primary licensee is transmitting. This type of opportunistic use
along with the technology for such use should be studied to determine whether it can be
authorized without interfering with the established rights of licensees or whether
licensees are in the best position to evaluate such use.
Cutting across the four dimensions of spectrum management discussed above is
the concept of whether to allow spectrum licensees to lease access to other spectrum
users in one or more of these dimensions under a secondary markets approach, or
whether to create regulatory “easements” in one or more of these dimensions that allow
users access on a conditional, non-interfering basis. One possibility discussed below is to
permit unlicensed systems or devices to operate at very low power up to a defined
interference temperature limit 33 Another issue discussed below is whether and how to
facilitate access to spectrum by “opportunistic” frequency-agile devices that can take
advantage of spectrum “holes” in time and frequency without interfering with other

33
See Section VI, infra.

20
operations in the bands they utilize.34 The Task Force recommends that the Commission
investigate these concepts and the possible parameters for allowing such increased use of
the spectrum.

D. Promoting Efficiency
The Task Force identified three variations on and definitions for the term
“efficiency,” as applicable to spectrum management: spectrum efficiency, technical
efficiency, and economic efficiency. Spectrum efficiency occurs when the maximum
amount of information is transmitted within the least amount of spectrum. Technical
efficiency occurs when inputs, such as spectrum, equipment, capital, and labor, are
deployed in a manner that generates the most output for the least cost. Economic
efficiency occurs when all inputs are deployed in a manner that generates the most value
for consumers. The Task Force found that spectrum and technical efficiency are
components of economic efficiency, but that measuring spectrum and technical efficiency
does not necessarily provide any meaningful information with respect to economic
efficiency.

The Task Force also attempted to develop a methodology for measuring spectrum
efficiency. It concluded that while it is generally easiest to assess technical efficiency on
a per-device basis in terms of bits/seconds/hertz, after reviewing the comments and the
record, it was neither possible nor appropriate to select a single, objective metric for
comparing spectrum efficiency across different radio services. Any metric would,
inherent in its assumptions, provide advantages to one service or another. In addition,
measuring technical efficiency does not provide any information with respect to
economic efficiency.

The Task Force concluded that the Commission can best promote economic
efficiency by providing spectrum users with flexibility of spectrum use and ease of
transferability in order to allow maximization of the value of the services provided.
Flexibility provides incentives for economically efficient use and discourages
economically inefficient use by ensuring that spectrum users will face the opportunity
cost of their spectrum use. In most instances, the application of flexible service rules and
efficient secondary market mechanisms are the best means of achieving this goal. The
Task Force recognized that there may be situations where the Commission finds it
necessary to promote spectrum or technical efficiency (as opposed to economic
efficiency) in order to promote particular public interest goals. However, in those
instances, where marketplace forces may be inadequate, e.g., in spectrum that is allocated
for government use, alternative mechanisms such as user fees should be considered to
stimulate improvements in efficiency. In addition, to the extent that wireline or hybrid
technologies may be efficient alternatives to existing use of radio spectrum in some
instances, Commission policy should promote the use of such alternatives whenever
appropriate. It should be noted that the Task Force recommends that the Commission
conduct a cost-benefit analysis as part of the spectrum management process and that,

34
See Section VIII.B, infra.

21
while the analysis will often favor market-oriented approaches, there are instances where
the analysis will support regulation.

E. “Good Neighbor” Incentives

In addition to improving access to spectrum through flexible use policies, as
discussed above, it may be desirable, where possible, to group technically compatible
systems and devices in close spectrum proximity. One of the challenges presented by
permitting additional flexibility within assigned spectrum is the potential for
incompatible adjacent systems. For instance, low-power systems or devices with a high
sensitivity to interference could be grouped with similar systems, and systems or devices
with high power could be placed elsewhere. System or device spectrum incompatibility
can require additional constraints in the form of guard bands, consuming valuable
spectrum, or expensive filtering systems to avoid adjacent band interference. The Task
Force believes that the Commission should consider making spectrum policy decisions
encouraging like systems or devices to be grouped in spectrum “neighborhoods” with like
systems. At the same time, it is important to be mindful of the importance of allowing
flexible use of spectrum.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission rely primarily on its general
spectrum management authority to consider whether future allocations should be grouped
based on mutually-compatible technical characteristics. Specifically, such a “good
neighbor” policy would group future systems or devices by specifying comparable
maximum levels of power and compatible interference protection levels. For existing
services, flexible use policies could create the incentive for spectrum-based systems or
devices to migrate to compatible bands based on marketplace forces. In some limited
instances, however, there may be particular types of systems or devices, public safety for
example, that require more direct regulatory intervention (e.g., through creation of guard
bands or other direct regulation of out-of-band interference) because the marketplace may
not independently encourage such compatibility. In addressing those issues, however, the
Commission should be careful not to compromise or undermine the overall concept of
flexible use. Over time, the Commission could consider whether the tightening of out-of-
band emission limits in services would obviate the need for allocations to be grouped.

F. Periodic Review of Rules

The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider adjusting its
regulations on a periodic basis to prevent rules that are calibrated to older technologies
from inhibiting access by newer, more efficient technologies that develop over time. For
instance, as discussed below, it may be possible to adjust interference standards over time
based on technological advances. Public Workshop participants, as well as parties that
commented on the Public Notice, generally agreed that it would be useful to set term
limits on Commission rules so that the rules would be revisited automatically on a
periodic basis.

While the Task Force concludes that the Commission should subject spectrum
regulations to periodic re-evaluation, it is also important that such reevaluation occur at

22
sufficiently spaced intervals so as not to undermine the stability of current spectrum
users’ business plans and investment. The Task Force continues to believe that a level of
certainty regarding one’s ability to continue to use spectrum, at least for some foreseeable
period, is an essential prerequisite to investment, particularly in services requiring
significant infrastructure installation and lead time. Therefore, any periodic reevaluation
of rules, and any resulting implementation of new rules, should be on a predetermined
schedule, e.g., every 5 to 10 years. Specific timetables for review of rules need not be the
same for all services, devices, and spectrum bands, but can vary based on such factors as
service provider and customer investment requirements, apparent public expectations,
and anticipated speed of technological development. In addition, periodic review of rules
to accommodate new technologies should be distinguished from the license renewal
process, which focuses on licensee qualifications and compliance with Commission rules.
Thus, licensees in bands that are subject to periodic review should nonetheless be entitled
to a strong renewal expectancy if they meet the renewal criteria set forth in the
Commission’s rules.

G. Enforcement
The Task Force believes that in order for the Commission to be able to meet the
increasingly complex spectrum management demands being presented by the enormous
growth in spectrum use, the Commission must devote sufficient resources to monitoring
spectrum use and enforcing the spectrum management rules. The Task Force
recommends that the Commission undertake an examination of its field offices’ and
monitoring facilities’ needs and consider providing additional funding and resources to
accommodate the spectrum management proposals made in this Report. In addition, the
Commission should ensure that it has sufficient resources to independently obtain critical
spectrum management data for decision makers and the ability to implement the
proposals discussed in this Report. In addition, the Commission may want to seek a
review and possible increase in its statutory forfeiture authority in order to provide
additional incentives for spectrum users to comply with the Commission’s rules.

23
 Recommendations:

• Permit broad, highly flexible use within technical parameters of the allocation.
• Permit traditionally narrow services to lease excess capacity to other services.
• Investigate rule changes that enable the lowering of permitted power in urban areas and
the increasing of permitted power in rural areas.
• Permit high-power digital television broadcasters to operate single frequency low
power distributed transmission systems within their present service area.
• Promote the co-location of high power transmitters.
• Foster technologies for uniform signal strength generation throughout a service area
• Consider user fees or other steps to stimulate improvements in efficiency when
marketplace is inadequate.
• Promote shift to hybridizations with wireline delivery whenever appropriate.
• Group future allocations based on mutually-compatible technical characteristics (power
flux density and sensitivity to interference), and improve the out-of-band interference
performance of transmitters and receivers over time so as to reduce the need for this kind
of grouping.
• Conduct periodic evaluations of allocation parameters with respect to evolving
technology and uses.
• Time-limit spectrum rights and subject them to periodic review.
• Every 5 to 10 years, review spectrum rights and obligations, interference
criteria, and definitions, and modify if appropriate.
• But spectrum users should be entitled to rely on rules remaining constant
between periodic reviews.
• Licensees should still have strong renewal expectancy.
• Ensure that the Commission has sufficient resources to independently monitor and
enforce spectrum management rules, including possible increase in statutory forfeiture
authority.

24
VI. Interference Avoidance

A. Interference Challenges35
As the Commission considers how to provide opportunities for an ever-increasing
array of spectrum-based technologies and services, one recurring and often thorny issue
is how to protect users against harmful interference.36 Ensuring adequate interference
protection has been a key responsibility of the Commission since inception and continues
to be one of its core functions. Section 303(f) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, directs the Commission to make regulations “it may deem necessary to prevent
interference between stations” as the public interest requires. Sufficient interference
protection is a necessary and fundamental building block in any spectrum policy. Indeed,
without adequate interference management, new spectrum-based services could be
prematurely thwarted and, correspondingly, mature services might not be able to reach
their full potential.

Managing interference has always been challenging. Despite the fact that the
Commission has had extensive, and generally successful, experience in managing
interference issues, these issues have been increasing in technical difficulty and
prevalence due to the changing RF environment generated by new devices and new
technology. Interference management requires more than determining the ways in which
to engineer around potential degradation to a radio signal. Rather, interference
management necessarily involves technical and economic tradeoffs. For example,
although requiring licensees to use more selective rather than more sensitive receivers
may improve interference management because such receivers are less vulnerable to
adjacent channel interference, it may also increase the cost of the communications
systems by requiring more infrastructure.37

This already challenging issue has become even more difficult as a result of the
increasingly intensive use of the radio spectrum. There are now fewer and fewer
opportunities to allocate unused spectrum for new services and, correspondingly, fewer
and fewer bands in which interference is not a significant issue. Interference
management has become more difficult because of the greater density, mobility and
variability of RF emitters and because users have been granted increased flexibility in
35
For a more extensive discussion, see Interference Protection Working Group Report section entitled
“Future Challenges Warranting Consideration of New Interference Protection Paradigms.”
36
“Interference” is defined as follows, according to the Commission’s rules: “The effect of unwanted
energy due to one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radio-
communication system, manifested by any performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of
information which could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy.” 47 C.F.R. § 2.1. “Harmful
interference” is defined as follows: “Interference which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation
service or other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a
radiocommunication service operating in accordance with these [international] Radio Regulations.” 47
C.F.R. § 2.1.
37
Generally, selectivity is achieved by adding filters to the front end of a receiver, and these usually
increase the receiver noise figure – decreasing its sensitivity to RF signals.

25
their spectrum use. As a result, the complexity of predictive interference models has
increased dramatically. Whether a user operates a fixed or mobile communications
system affects the technical variables required to assess interference. Many types of
mobile emitters have very low signal levels. Although the energy radiated by a single
emitter might not be likely to cause harm, the cumulative emissions of
secondary/unlicensed emitters and out-of-band emissions of primary licensed emitters
and emitter types (radio telemetry, unlicensed devices, cell phones, etc.) could result in
interference and, thus, must be considered. Technological changes in a communications
system – for example, the type of waveform used to transmit a particular signal – also
affect assessments of interference. As a result, comprehensive interference predictive
analyses are not always possible, calling into question the adequacy of the Commission’s
current interference framework to manage increasingly congested RF environments in the
future.

Commenters and participants in the public workshop were divided on the need for
new definitions of what constitutes acceptable interference and harmful interference.
Some appreciated the flexibility attendant with the Commission’s current case-by-case
approach. Others, frustrated by what they see as the uncertainty associated with such an
ad hoc approach, advocate the adoption of more quantitative measures for interference
management. These parties contend, for example, that the current definition of harmful
interference is subjective and does not reflect modern technology and communications
markets. On balance, the Task Force concludes that the current general definitions of
interference sufficiently address the broad operational and technical characteristics of the
many communications services contained in the Commission’s Rules. Rather, in lieu of
suggesting that the Commission change or refine its definitions related to interference
management, the Task Force believes that quantitative metrics can be used to augment
and clarify the application of existing definitions.

The Task Force believes that, although the Commission’s rules and processes for
managing interference have historically been effective in many bands, current
interference management approaches and tools need to be reexamined. As supported by
the record and described in greater detail in the report of the Interference Protection
Working Group, the rapidly changing technology and RF environment will challenge the
continued effectiveness of such current approaches as predictive interference modeling,
technology compatibility testing, and spectrum use decisions based on a qualitative
knowledge of the local environment. Moreover, given the increasing flexibility in the
types of spectrum-based services and, correspondingly, more intensive use of the radio
spectrum, the Task Force believes that the Commission should adopt, wherever feasible,
a more quantitative approach to interference management or quantitatively augment its
existing rules. Quantitative standards reflecting real-time spectrum use would provide
users with more certainty and, at the same time, would facilitate enforcement.

26
 B. Adopting Quantitative Standards: Interference Temperature
The Task Force recommends that, as a long-term strategy, the Commission shift
its current paradigm for assessing interference – based on transmitter operations – toward
operations using real-time adaptation based on the actual RF environment through
interactions between transmitters and receivers. In general, it is the ability of a receiver
to select and receive a particular signal that determines whether the signal has been
degraded by interference. The environment in which the receiver operates should be
considered; i.e., the total amount of undesired power – generated by other emitters and
noise sources – that is present at the receiver. Thus, the Commission’s rules should
specify a more accurate measure of interference that takes into account the cumulative
summation of all the undesired RF energy available to be captured by a particular
receiving antenna for delivery to the receiver.

To achieve this objective, as well as to transition interference management to

more accurate real-time measurements, the Task Force recommends that the Commission
adopt a new metric, “interference temperature,” to quantify and manage interference.
The interference temperature measures the RF power available at the receiving antenna
per unit bandwidth.38 Conceptually, as illustrated in Figure 1, interference temperature

38
The idea of an interference temperature as a measure of the “noise” power in a particular band and
location is synonymous with the concept of antenna temperature: the “equivalent temperature of the power
received at an antenna.” See, for example, Wolfram Research at
http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/physics/AntennaTemperature.html. Antenna temperature is a component
of the total noise temperature of a receiver system, which also includes the thermal noise generated within
the receiver.
Interference temperature, expressed in units of degrees Kelvin, can be calculated as the power received by
an antenna in watts divided by the associated RF bandwidth in Hertz and a term known as Boltzman’s
Constant (equal to 1.3807 watt-sec/ºKelvin). Alternatively, interference temperature can be calculated as
the power flux density available at an antenna in watts per meter squared multiplied by the effective capture
area of the receiving antenna in meters squared divided by both the associated RF bandwidth in Hertz and
Boltzman’s constant. An “interference temperature density” can also be defined as the interference
temperature per unit area, expressed in units of ºKelvin per meter squared, and calculated as the
interference temperature divided by the effective capture area of the receiving antenna. This quantity could
be measured for particular frequencies using a reference antenna and, thereafter, would be independent of
receiving antenna characteristics.

27
 It doesn’t matter what the signal level is here!

Interference
Temperature

It matters what the signal level is here!

Figure 1

measurements would be taken at various receiver locations to estimate the real-time

condition of the RF environment. The degree of certainty of the estimate of the
environment would depend on such factors as transmitter signal ranges, uniformity of
signal levels over an area, the density of temperature measuring devices and the sharing
of the data taken by nearby devices; e.g., through “ad hoc cooperative wireless
networks.” Measuring devices could be designed with the option to include or exclude
the energy contributions of particular signals with known characteristics; for example, the
emissions of subscribers of licensees assigned the spectrum on an exclusive basis in a
particular geographic area.

The Commission could use the interference temperature metric to establish

maximum permissible levels of interference, thus characterizing the “worst case”
environment in which a receiver would be expected to operate. Different threshold levels
could be set for each band, geographic region or service, and these thresholds should be
set after the Commission has reviewed the condition of the RF environment in each band.
This review should include actual spectrum measurements of the RF noise/interference
floor. In addition to obtaining better data regarding the noise floor, the Commission
should adopt a standard methodology for measuring the noise floor. Further, the Task
Force recommends that the Commission create a public/private partnership for a long-
term noise (interference temperature) monitoring network and for the archiving of data,
for use by the FCC and the public.

28
 Licensed signal Aggregated
Signals Reducing
Coverage

Design to Original
Power at
Receiver

Noise Floor

Noise Floor
Current Part 15 Limits
Distance from licensed transmitting antenna
Figure 2

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate significant benefits of capping the permitted interference

temperature. Figure 2 depicts a possible scenario resulting from the current open ended
nature of the RF noise floor. A communications system has been designed to operate to a
distance from the transmitting antenna at which the signal strength approaches the level
of the noise floor that existed when the system was established. Over time, the noise
floor can rise unpredictably – this due to additional interfering signals, perhaps including
out-of-band emissions from new users and further aggregation of unlicensed devices. As
a result, signal coverage can be degraded without warning. Additional interfering signals
will progressively worsen coverage. Figure 3 modifies the scenario by placing an
interference temperature cap over the service area.

Prevent Aggregation
Above Interference
Temperature Limit

New Opportunities
Licensed signal
Power at
Receiver

for Spectrum Access

Noise Floor
Current Part 15 Limits

Distance from licensed transmitting antenna

Figure 3

The Task Force believes that two key benefits will result from the application of
the interference temperature metric: First, licensed spectrum users will obtain certainty
with regard to the maximum permissible level of aggregated noise, or interference, in
their band. The interference temperature would quantify the level of acceptable

29
interference in a particular band. For example, any transmissions from other sources that
increase the noise level above the interference temperature would be considered “harmful
interference” in accordance with Commission rules. Second, to the extent that the
interference temperature in a particular band is not reached, other users (e.g., unlicensed
devices) could operate in the same band – with the interference temperature serving as
the maximum cap on the potential RF energy they could introduce in the band. This
would thus increase access to the band for other users or devices.

Interference temperature sensory and control mechanisms could be used to

maintain both in-band and out-of-band emissions within permissible limits. For example,
a low power unlicensed RF device could be designed to scan its particular frequency
band before transmitting. Its built-in “thermometer” would record interference
temperature data and compute the appropriate statistical aggregate value. The device
would then project the increase in interference temperature due to its operation over its
nominal range. This value would be compared with the permissible limit. If its operation
would exceed the limit, the device’s controller could execute an appropriate response
such as reducing power, switching to a different transmit frequency (if available) or,
perhaps, continuing the scanning/sensing process to locate an opportune time to transmit.
The technology now exists to build such sensory control systems. Automated transmitter
power control, for instance, is used in certain types of wireless and satellite
communications systems. Cordless telephones also adapt to the environment by selecting
an unused frequency.

Interference temperature mechanisms would serve in conjunction with existing

out-of-band emissions on adjacent frequencies. In the future, however, it is possible that
interference temperature mechanisms could serve as an alternative to out-of-band
emissions limitations. Indeed, depending on spectrum use characteristics and the severity
of emission limits, some users might find the temperature sensory control approach to be
more economical than expensive transmitter filtering. It could also permit operation at
higher power levels in areas or frequency bands with low interference temperature levels.

In sum, where it could be applied, the interference temperature metric, in

conjunction with sensory control systems, could significantly enhance interference
management. Incumbents would be provided greater certainty regarding the maximum
permissible level of interference in their particular bands. Interference temperature limits
would also provide a “worst case” characterization of the RF environment and, thus,
establish benchmarks for communications equipment and system designers; i.e., the
limits could assist designers in balancing the numerous technical and economic tradeoffs
involved in radio system planning. Effective enforcement of these interference
temperature limits is also an essential component of this concept, in order to ensure
successful interference management. Finally, continuous monitoring of the interference
temperature would enable the Commission to maintain current data on the RF
environment.

30
 C. Additional Methods of Interference Control
In addition to interference temperature, there are several other ways in which the
Commission can improve interference management. As noted earlier, Commission
regulations for controlling interference set forth permissible technical operational
parameters for transmitters. Receiver robustness generally has not been taken into
account in Commission regulations. On those occasions when it has been necessary to
consider receiver quality, the Commission either applies a set of worst case receiver
parameters or uses general receiver characteristics for its analyses.39 This transmitter-
centric policy is not necessarily efficient in today’s spectrum environment.

Most parties support the need for the development of receiver standards or
guidelines, or, in the alternative, minimum receiver performance requirements. Indeed,
many of the parties asserted that, from a purely technical standpoint, interference
susceptibility, as well as increased spectrum efficiency is highly dependent on the quality
and selectivity of the receiver used. Parties supporting receiver standards assert that such
standards would promote spectrum sharing and system interoperability, and would
provide common performance parameters that all equipment manufacturers must achieve.
A few opposing parties assert that receiver standards could stifle innovation and could
present administrative and enforcement challenges. Even those parties opposing receiver
standards support, in varying degrees, the adoption of minimum receiver performance
requirements.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider applying receiver
performance requirements, either through incentives, regulatory mandates, or some
combination of incentives and mandates. The Task Force generally prefers the use of
voluntary receiver performance requirements, over mandatory standards. Thus, while
receivers could be manufactured that do not meet the voluntary performance
requirements, the Commission would not protect users of such receivers against
interference resulting from failure to meet the performance requirements. Voluntary
receiver performance requirements could be promoted through industry groups, or
incentives could be developed for the use of advanced receivers. Receiver performance
requirements may be particularly appropriate when the marketplace does not adequately
promote receiver performance (e.g., when the service provider does not control the
manufacturing of the receivers). Receiver performance requirements also may serve as a
useful transition mechanism for interference management until the Commission is able to
implement interference temperature thresholds for particular bands. While the Task
Force believes that the Commission currently has the requisite statutory authority to
promulgate receiver performance standards, it also recommends that legislation more
explicitly granting such authority be enacted. Also, it would be useful to conduct a study
to evaluate receiver performance in the current RF environment.

39
For example, the Commission adopted provisions for interim interference protection of analog signals in
the Multipoint Distribution and Instructional Television Fixed Services from a new service in an adjacent
frequency band. In so doing, the Commission assumed a typical numerical value for a key interference
rejection characteristic of the receiving equipment, based on information provided by a manufacturer of
that equipment. See Memorandum Opinion and Order in GN Docket No. 96-228 (1997).

31
 With the coming advances in technology, the Task Force does not believe that
minimum receiver performance requirements would necessarily stifle innovation. In the
future it is expected that, to a considerable extent, interference problems will be
eliminated or adequately mitigated by flexible software solutions built into the receiver;
for example, software-controlled filter responses. Further, it is likely that, in the future,
manufacturers will design receivers with a more reliable expectation of the environment.
On balance, the Task Force believes that the potential benefits of minimum receiver
tolerances – whether through Commission mandates or incentives – outweigh the risk
that such actions could stifle innovation.

There are many other steps that the Task Force recommends that the Commission
should take to control interference. These include:

o Promoting the increased use of automated transmitter power and frequency

control – such as the long-term sensory control mechanisms suggested in
conjunction with the interference temperature metric and, in the near-term,
increased use of automated transmitter power control that would adjust the power
to match the amount that is actually needed to provide service; for example, in
point-to-point microwave systems.

o Promoting the use of advanced antenna technology and system design techniques
that would enhance the uniformity of transmitted signal strength levels through a
service area.

o Consider the tightening of out-of-band emission limits over time, so that widely
disparate uses of the spectrum can have less interference impact on each other.

o Harmonizing the references to interference in the Commission’s regulations:

ƒ to ensure a consistent understanding of the impact of interference

qualifiers such as harmful, and to remove or clarify undefined
terms such as objectionable;

ƒ to improve the consistency of technical terms and units related to

interference management.

o Developing technical bulletins that explain the Commission’s interference rules

for all radio services – with web site access to not only a particular service’s
interference rules, but also with links to related information contained elsewhere
in the Commission’s rules.

o Developing a “best practices” handbook – a compendium of available information

broadly relating to interference management, which could include, for example:

o current industry guidelines for coordinating spectrum use;

32
 o steps that could be taken to resolve interference problems;

o a discussion on how to best use FCC databases and related tools.

D. Transition
As an additional interference management paradigm for the long-term, and to
augment current approaches, the Commission should pursue use of the interference
temperature metric, in conjunction with self-enforcing sensory control mechanisms. The
Commission should also consider developing a program to test the concept on a limited
basis. The Task Force recognizes that there are hurdles that must be overcome before the
interference temperature metric could serve as a useful management tool. Foremost
among these is the need to acquire data on the RF noise floor for different frequency
bands and geographic regions. To that end, the Task Force recommends that the
Commission undertake a systematic study of the RF noise floor.

Moreover, in addition to obtaining requisite data regarding the noise floor, there
are many factors that the Commission would need to consider before setting an
interference temperature for a particular band. Some potential factors that may be
considered are: (1) nature and extent of incumbency; (2) the nature and types of the
services (for example, the criticality of services like public safety); (3) the susceptibility
of services and existing equipment to interference; (4) state of development of
technology; and (5) propagation characteristics.

In the near term, the Commission should consider establishing receiver

performance requirements to supplement its transmitter-centric interference management
approaches. Use of modern receiver filtering and related digital system processing
techniques could enhance interference management in the near-term, while the
interference temperature concepts are being developed. Receiver improvements could
also facilitate interference mitigation and more efficient spectrum use in situations in
which the interference temperature approach would be inapplicable; e.g., as a safeguard
against “blanketing” interference.40 The Task Force recommends that the Commission
pursue receiver performance issues in a Notice of Inquiry.

40
Blanketing interference occurs when an undesired signal on a frequency different than that of the desired
signal is sufficiently strong to overpower the front end amplifier stage of a receiver, thereby preventing
proper operation of the receiver.

33
 Recommendations:

• Quantify acceptable levels of interference through “interference temperature” concept

(long-term objective).
• Obtain better data regarding noise floor:
• Adopt standard method for measuring noise floor.
• Create a public/private partnership for long term noise (interference temperature)
monitoring network and archiving of data for use by FCC and public.
• Include minimum receiver performance requirements in regulation (either through (1)
additional incentives, (2) mandates, or (3) some combination of incentives and mandates)
to be used until can migrate to “interference temperature” regulatory scheme and to be
used for the long term where use of interference temperature would be inapplicable; e.g.,
for systems in which licensees do not have control over receivers.
• Move to interference-limited policies.
• Issue Notice of Inquiry to characterize current and future receiver environments and to
explore issues to consider, such as, minimum performance parameters and protection for
legacy receivers.
• Award contractual study to evaluate receiver performance in current environment.
• Promote voluntary receiver performance requirements through industry groups.
• Consider incentives for use of advanced receivers.
• Promote transmitter enhancements for interference control: (a) foster technologies that
enhance uniform signal levels throughout a service area; (b) promote greater use of
automated transmitter control systems; and (c) consider tightening out-of-band emission
limits over time.
• Improve communications on interference issues with public.
o Harmonize interference language in FCC rules and affected international
rules.
o Ensure consistent and appropriate use of interference terminology.
o Develop technical bulletins that explain interference rules for all radio
services.
o Develop best practices handbook.
• Add language to the Act expressly allowing the Commission to establish rules or
performance requirements for receivers.
• “Interference temperature” concept should form the basis for better defining interference
rights.
• Accompany clearer interference definition with effective enforcement.

34
VII. Spectrum Usage Models

A. Comparison of Alternative Spectrum Usage Models

The Task Force examined the Commission’s spectrum policies and rules in
relation to three general models for assigning spectrum usage rights:

• “Command-and-control” model. The traditional process of spectrum

management in the United States, currently used for most spectrum within the
Commission’s jurisdiction, allocates and assigns frequencies to limited
categories of spectrum users for specific government-defined uses. Service
rules for the band specify eligibility and service restrictions, power limits,
build-out requirements, and other rules.

• “Exclusive use” model. A licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive

and transferable rights to the use of specified spectrum within a defined
geographic area, with flexible use rights that are governed primarily by
technical rules to protect spectrum users against interference. Under this
model, exclusive rights resemble property rights in spectrum, but this model
does not imply or require creation of “full” private property rights in
spectrum.

• “Commons” or “open access” model. Allows unlimited numbers of

unlicensed users to share frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by
technical standards or etiquettes but with no right to protection from
interference. Spectrum is available to all users that comply with established
technical “etiquettes” or standards that set power limits and other criteria for
operation of unlicensed devices to mitigate potential interference.

There is, of course, some overlap among these models as well as variations that combine
elements of each. For example, spectrum users that are regulated on a command-and-
control basis may have some of the same rights as spectrum users who are subject to the
exclusive use model (e.g., exclusive and transferable rights, interference protection).
Moreover, spectrum that is subject to the exclusive use or commons model may
nonetheless be subject to some degree of command-and-control restriction (e.g., limiting
usage based on international allocation restrictions). Nonetheless, the key distinction
between the command-and-control approach and the other two models is that the former
typically imposes significantly greater usage restrictions on spectrum (and sometimes on
the eligibility of spectrum users), thereby restricting flexibility of spectrum use to a far
greater degree than either of the other two models.
Commenters and participants in the workshops generally criticized the costs and
inefficiencies imposed on spectrum users and the public by command-and-control
regulation, and argued that these costs could be substantially reduced by moving from

35
command-and-control regulation to more flexible, market-oriented approaches, whether
under an exclusive use model, a commons model, or a combination of the two. Some
commenters, however, argued in favor of retaining a command-and-control approach for
certain services (e.g., public safety) on the grounds that exclusive reliance on market-
based spectrum usage models would undervalue or thwart the provision of such services.
Moreover, while most commenters and workshop participants favored expanded
application of flexible, market-oriented spectrum policies, there was a significant split
between those who favored an exclusive use approach and those who favored a commons
approach.

Commenters who favored the exclusive use model argued that it promotes
economic efficiency because its key characteristics – clearly defined rights, exclusivity,
flexibility, and transferability – are necessary for efficiently allocating any scarce
resource among competing uses. They also argued that without exclusive rights and
interference protection, spectrum users would face uncertainty and would lack the
incentive to invest in new technologies or services. These parties also tended to express
skepticism regarding the commons approach, contending that a spectrum commons
would result in overuse, interference, and underinvestment.

Supporters of the commons model argued that this approach leads to greater
technological innovation and spectrum efficiency than an exclusive use approach.
Because no spectrum is exclusively held, spectrum commons users have incentive to
create spectrally efficient frequency-hopping technologies, whereas licensed spectrum
typically sits idle when the license-holder is not transmitting. Furthermore, proponents of
an open, commons approach claimed that spectrum scarcity might actually be reduced
under such a regime because of the efficiency-enhancing possibilities and fundamentally
different spectrum demands of new system architectures such as mesh networks.
Commenters also contended that even in spectrum that was otherwise subject to an
exclusive use approach, a commons approach should be used to create “underlay” rights
for low-power, non-interfering devices.

Despite this split, most commenters and workshop participants supported the
proposition that in spectrum policy, “one size does not fit all,” and that the Commission
should therefore strike a balance between the exclusive rights and the commons models.
For example, many commenters suggested that granting flexible exclusive use rights to
spectrum users did not preclude the Commission from imposing some regulatory
limitations on use, analogous to zoning restrictions that are placed on property owners by
local governments. Other commenters argued that unlicensed spectrum should not be
seen as a complete replacement for licensed spectrum, but that some spectrum should be
set aside for unlicensed use in the same manner than some land is set aside for public
parks.

The Task Force agrees with the consensus view expressed by participants in this
process that “one size does not fit all” in spectrum policy. An examination of the
exclusive use and commons models as they have been applied to date suggests that each
model has encouraged different equally beneficial types of technical and economic

36
efficiencies. In broadband PCS, for example, licensees have developed centrally
managed wireless networks that cover large geographic areas and accommodate large
numbers of mobile customers. The licensing of multiple users has also led to significant
competitive benefits in the CMRS market. More recently, the designation of bands for
open access by Part 15 devices has fostered the emergence of “smart” low power devices
that can support sophisticated applications such as peer-to-peer networking. This has
resulted in a significant surge of economic investment in these services or devices use
over the last several years.

The Task Force therefore recommends that the Commission base its spectrum
policy on a balance of the three basic spectrum rights models outlined above: an
exclusive use approach, a commons approach, and (to a more limited degree) a
command-and-control approach. It is further recommended that the Commission
fundamentally alter the existing balance among these models – which is dominated by
legacy command-and-control regulation – by expanding the use of both the exclusive use
and commons models throughout the radio spectrum, and limiting the use of the
command-and-control model to those instances where there are compelling public policy
reasons. Thus, to the extent feasible, the Commission should identify more spectrum for
both licensed and unlicensed uses under flexible rules, and should transition existing
spectrum that is subject to more restrictive command-and-control regulation to these
models to the greatest extent possible, as discussed in Section D below.

In proposing to reshape the balance among the three models, the Task Force
recognizes that the models themselves are not pure and mutually exclusive approaches to
spectrum management, but rather are representative approaches on a broader continuum
that may be subject to variation in particular instances. Thus, for any given spectrum
band or proposed use, the Commission may find it beneficial to incorporate elements
from more than one model. For example, as discussed further below, spectrum that is
licensed under an exclusive use approach could also be subject to an “underlay” easement
that is available to low-power unlicensed devices using a commons approach. Similarly,
services that require some dedication of spectrum on a command-and-control basis (e.g.,
public safety) may benefit from partial application of the exclusive-use model to enable
them to lease spectrum capacity to others when it is not otherwise needed. As a general
matter, however, the Task Force believes that there is considerable room to move from
the largely ad hoc regulation of particular bands that has evolved historically to a more
consistent and comprehensive application of these models across the radio spectrum as a
whole. If these models are consistently applied in all Commission spectrum policy
decisions, it has the potential to significantly reduce the artificial scarcity of spectrum that
currently exists as a result of barriers to access. This approach will have the beneficial
effect of reducing the cost of obtaining exclusive spectrum rights in the market and will
also help to alleviate congestion of spectrum that is made available on a commons basis,
thus mitigating the risk of the “tragedy of the commons” – oversaturation resulting in
inefficient use.

37
 B. Application of Exclusive Use and Commons Models
The recommendation to move towards greater reliance on exclusive use and
commons models requires that the Commission determine the appropriate balance
between these two models. Ultimately, wherever there are competing uses for a resource
– that is, wherever there is scarcity – some mechanism must exist for allocating that
resource. A mechanism based on markets, such as an exclusive use model, will be most
efficient in most cases. However, government may also wish to promote the important
efficiency and innovation benefits of a spectrum commons by allocating spectrum bands
for shared use, much as it allocates land to public parks.

There are a number of variables that may be relevant to this determination with
respect to any particular band, but the Task Force believes that the key factors to be
considered are (1) spectrum scarcity, and (2) transaction costs associated with moving
spectrum from less efficient to more efficient use. In this context, “spectrum scarcity”
means the degree to which particular spectrum is subject to competing demands for use
so that the demand exceeds the current supply; and “transaction costs” means the
expenditure of time and resources required for a potential spectrum user to obtain the
spectrum access rights from one or many parties necessary to its proposed spectrum use.
1. Factors Favoring Exclusive Use Model
The exclusive use model should be applied to most spectrum, particularly in
bands where scarcity is relatively high and transaction costs associated with market-based
negotiation of access rights are relatively low. The exclusive use model is appropriate
because where spectrum is subject to competing demands, and therefore more likely to
have a high market value, this approach creates the strongest incentives for parties to put
spectrum to its highest valued use. In addition, where rights and responsibilities are
clearly defined and effectively enforced, the characteristics of this model – e.g.,
exclusivity, flexibility, and transferability – generally provide a clear framework for
market-based assignment and negotiation of access rights among spectrum users, thereby
limiting transaction costs.

These variables suggest that in the lower portion of the radio spectrum,
particularly bands below 5 GHz, the Commission should focus primarily, though not
exclusively, on using the exclusive use model. The propagation characteristics in this
portion of the spectrum (which can support a wide variety of high- and low-power, fixed
and mobile uses), combined with the high level of incumbent use (including government
as well as non-government uses), result in a large number of competing demands for a
relatively small amount of available spectrum. These factors tend to weigh in favor of an
exclusive use approach with flexible rules because it provides a mechanism for spectrum
users to choose among the full range of technically feasible spectrum use options based
on market forces. Moreover, the typical transaction costs associated with negotiation of
access rights tend to be relatively low in relation to the value of this spectrum.

Even in situations where usable spectrum is scarce but transaction costs are
potentially high, the exclusive use model still may be most appropriate, though other

38
variables may also come into play. The presence of high transaction costs means that
some transfers of spectrum will not occur, and some valuable uses therefore will not
appear in the market. However, wherever scarcity exists, there will be competing claims
to the resource, and the exclusive use model is most effective at balancing these
competing claims. Moreover, the greater the scarcity, the greater will be the incentive for
parties to find ways to overcome these high transaction costs. In contrast, as discussed
below, a commons approach may be less effective in cases of high scarcity, despite its
advantages in addressing high transaction costs.

Finally, while these factors weigh in favor of applying the exclusive use model
under the above-described circumstances, it should be emphasized that they do not
preclude the introduction of unlicensed “underlays” into exclusive use bands. As
discussed below, the criteria that favor use of the commons model apply to potential
underlay uses of spectrum below the interference temperature threshold, and may apply
in some cases to opportunistic uses above the threshold, depending on the nature of the
proposed use.
2. Factors Favoring Commons Model
The commons model should be applied to significant portions of the spectrum,
particularly in bands where scarcity is low and transaction costs associated with market
mechanisms are high. The commons approach makes increased access possible by
replacing the negotiation of spectrum access rights among rights holders and prospective
users with a commons model governed by user protocols and etiquette. These protocols
promote efficiency through spectrum sharing, typically by requiring commons to operate
at low power for a short time in limited areas, which allows multiple users to operate on
the same spectrum. This approach also promotes technological innovation by providing a
spectrum environment in which to develop new technologies. Users do not pay for
access to the spectrum, so they will channel their investment exclusively into developing
robust technology that can function in this environment and continue to function as the
environment grows more congested.

Where both spectrum scarcity and transaction costs are low, the commons model
again may be the most appropriate, though this situation is less clear. Under these
circumstances, the presence of low transaction costs would add to the efficiency-creating
characteristics of the commons. On the other hand, it also is possible that the exclusive
use model would provide comparable benefits, as the price will be close to zero if
spectrum is abundant. With low transaction costs as well as low price, interested users
should have unrestricted access to the spectrum they need.

The variables described above tend to tilt in favor of expanded use of the
commons model in higher spectrum bands, particularly above 50 GHz, based on the
physical characteristics of the spectrum itself. In these bands, the propagation
characteristics of spectrum preclude many of the applications that are possible in lower
bands (e.g., mobile service, broadcasting), and instead favor short-distance line-of-sight
operation using narrow transmission beams. Thus, these bands are well-suited to
accommodate multiple devices operating within a small area without interference.

39
Moreover, administering these uses on an individualized licensed basis would involve
very high transaction costs.

The Task Force does not advocate the wholesale conversion of all spectrum to a
commons approach as some commenters appear to advocate. Although the commons
model is in many ways a highly deregulatory “Darwinian” approach, as its proponents
point out, productive use of spectrum commons by unlicensed devices, particularly in
lower spectrum bands, typically requires significant regulatory limitations on device
transmitter power that preclude many other technically and economically feasible
spectrum uses that rely on higher-power signal propagation over longer distances, or that
require greater protection from interference. In addition, some commons proponents
themselves state that setting aside additional spectrum for use on a commons basis is not
essential to the continued success of unlicensed technology because the technological
capability exists to prevent congestion from occurring in existing unlicensed bands.

This does not, however, mean that only higher band spectrum should be subject to
a commons approach. The record shows that the Commission’s dedication of some lower
band spectrum to unlicensed uses, e.g., 2.4 GHz, is yielding significant technological and
economic benefits in the form of low-power short-distance communications and
emerging mesh network technologies that should be further encouraged. The Task Force
therefore recommends that the commons model continue to be applied selectively to
other lower spectrum bands.

In addition, the commons approach has potential applicability in the creation of

underlay rights across the entire range of spectrum for low-power, low-impact devices.
To the extent that the Commission establishes “interference temperature” rules for
particular bands, as discussed in Section VI above, the spectrum environment that is
created below the temperature threshold has the characteristics that weigh most heavily in
favor of the commons approach: low scarcity due to technical restrictions on the power
and operating range of devices and high transaction costs associated with negotiating
access. Therefore, the commons approach should presumptively be used for operations
below the interference temperature threshold. In addition, the commons model may be
appropriate for some opportunistic, non-interfering uses of exclusively licensed spectrum
above the interference temperature threshold, although this approach raises more
significant challenges. These issues are presented in greater detail in Section VIII.B.,
below, in the discussion of secondary markets and government-granted easements.

An important caveat must accompany any recommendation for a commons

model: although there are indications that technology can go a long way to forestall
scarcity concerns, if scarcity eventually does arise in particular spectrum bands in the
future, then the commons model may need to evolve to address the problem. Because
there is no price mechanism in the commons model to use as a tool for allocating scarce
resources among competing users, there is always the risk that free access will eventually
lead to interference and over-saturation, i.e., the “tragedy of the commons.” These
problems can be overcome to some extent through regulatory guidance, requirements
such as power and emission limits, and sharing etiquettes. But if actual spectrum scarcity

40
still occurs, rights may need to be redefined and market mechanisms (e.g., band
managers) introduced because without them there are insufficient incentives to avoid
overuse.

C. Limited Use of Command and Control

The command-and-control model should be applied only in situations where
prescribing spectrum use by regulation is necessary to accomplish important public
interest objectives or to conform to treaty obligations. With respect to the command-and-
control model, as noted above, the Task Force recognizes that continued use of this
approach may be required in situations where prescribing spectrum use by regulation is
necessary to accomplish compelling public interest objectives. However, such objectives
should be carefully defined, and the amount of spectrum subject to a command-and-
control regime should be limited to that which ensures that those objectives are achieved.
Many spectrum users will claim that they warrant special consideration and thus deserve
exemption from any reform of their service allocation rules. It is therefore critical to
distinguish between special interest and the public interest, establishing a high bar for any
service to clear prior to receiving an exemption.

In general, command-and-control regulation should be reserved only for spectrum

uses that provide clear, non-market public interest benefits or that require regulatory
prescription to avoid market failure. For example, radioastronomy may need to have
dedicated, protected spectrum bands for the foreseeable future, due to its highly sensitive
applications and the fact that its benefits accrue to society as a whole and only over the
long run. Public safety and critical infrastructure may also require dedicated spectrum at
particular times to ensure priority access for emergency communications. Other areas
where limited use of command-and-control may be justified include
international/satellite, public safety, and broadcasting, which are discussed in greater
detail below.

Subject to these exceptions, the Commission should eschew command-and-

control regulation, and legacy command-and-control bands should be transitioned to
more flexible rules and uses to the maximum extent possible (whether under the
exclusive rights or the commons model). The Task Force’s recommendations with
respect to transition mechanisms are discussed in greater detail in Section D, below.
1. International and Satellite Issues
A number of commenters stressed that the United States should make a better
effort to harmonize its spectrum management policies and allocations with those of the
rest of the world, when possible. To the extent domestic policies and allocations
complement international decisions, U.S. consumers and businesses will reap important
benefits such as more international roaming and better economies of scale with regard to
equipment manufacturing. These commenters also pointed out that while the satellite,
maritime, aeronautical, public safety and radioastronomy services have long required and
benefited from extensive international coordination, terrestrial services like third
generation wireless and radio local area network (e.g., Wi-Fi) services are also becoming
increasingly ubiquitous requiring the same level of international coordination.

41
 Other parties commented on the importance of the Commission considering how
spectrum-based services and devices using spectrum that has international treaty
implications are affected by spectrum use models, often reducing the amount of
flexibility available to users domestically. It was stated, for example, that the
Commission should take account of the effect that interference caused by licensees
offering newly flexible services would have on existing cross-border interference
agreements with Canada and Mexico. The Task Force also noted that spectrum used for
satellite services typically requires extensive international and global coordination under
the International Telecommunication Union’s Radio Regulations, inherently limiting a
licensee’s flexibility. Commenters asserted that a broader regional perspective on
spectrum management by the Commission could speed deployment of services to U.S.
consumers by resolving cross-border coordination and regional policy issues earlier.

The Task Force also noted that in the Open-Market Reorganization for the
Betterment of International Telecommunications Act of 2000 (ORBIT Act), the Congress
passed legislation excluding spectrum used for international and global satellite services
from assignment through auctions. In order to provide more flexibility in allocating and
licensing spectrum used for satellite services, the Task Force recommends that the
Commission consider a statutory proposal for Congress that would assess and re-examine
Section 647 of the Orbit Act to consider permitting, but not requiring, the Commission to
utilize competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive applications for global and
international satellite services.

Conclusions/recommendations. International considerations must be taken into

account in two ways:

• First, because regional and world wide harmonization of band use can have
significant advantages both in terms of truly ubiquitous services and
economies of scale, in developing domestic spectrum policies and allocations,
the Commission should consider the potential impact on international
objectives, among other objectives.

• Second, U.S. consumers could benefit from improved (i.e., quicker and more
flexible) spectrum management coordination with the United States’ regional
neighbors, especially Canada and Mexico.

• In addition, the Commission should assess and re-examine Section 647 of the
Orbit Act to consider permitting, but not requiring, the Commission to utilize
competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive applications for global and
international satellite services.

2. Public Safety
The Task Force sought information regarding what spectrum use models the
Commission should employ to ensure public safety access to spectrum. Most

42
commenters and workshop participants who addressed this issue agreed that there are
some important differences between the spectrum needs of commercial systems, which
require high system capacity to support large numbers of users and applications, and
those of public safety systems, which require less average capacity but need very robust
and reliable communications, particularly for emergencies. Public safety spectrum users
also typically have different funding mechanisms, are inherently more budget-
constrained, and have longer equipment replacement cycles than commercial users.

But commenters and workshop participants also suggested that changes in

spectrum policy could encourage greater efficiency on the part of public safety providers.
For example, some public safety agencies indicated that they are becoming more
innovative through creative licensing schemes, such as forming partnerships between
state and local agencies and utilities and federal agencies. By sharing costs and spectrum
with others, public safety entities have the potential to obtain more technologically
advanced wide-area systems than they could afford on their own.

Some spectrum should continue to be dedicated on a command-and-control basis

for public safety use. In light of the above considerations, the Task Force recommends
that spectrum currently set aside for public safety use remain subject to the command-
and-control model. Eventually, if the cost of spectrum is driven down by enhancing
access and reducing scarcity, it is possible that public safety users could acquire spectrum
in the market on the same basis as non-public safety users, but these conditions do not
exist currently and should not form the basis for meeting the core spectrum needs of
public safety entities.

At the same time, there is considerable potential for introduction of market-

oriented policies that would help rather than burden public safety, and that would allow
for more efficient use of spectrum to meet both public safety and commercial spectrum
needs. The Commission therefore should explore mechanisms for meeting public safety
needs other than through dedication of spectrum on a command-and-control basis.

Public safety users should have flexibility to lease their dedicated spectrum
capacity that is available during lower-use periods to commercial users with a “take-
back” mechanism when public safety use increases. Public safety spectrum use is
typically highly variable, with periods of low traffic and occasional usage “spikes” during
certain times of the day or week or during emergencies. Accordingly, there is benefit to
be gained from permitting public safety entities to lease some of their spectrum capacity
to commercial users during low-use periods, under an arrangement whereby the spectrum
can be reclaimed immediately when needed for public safety use. The potential for this
type of shared use will increase as smart transmitters and receivers are developed that can
be shut down immediately upon command.

43
 Data Services Public Safety CMRS

1% 10% 100% 10% 1% Duty Cycle

s
ce 100%
r vi CM
Se RS 10%
a
at
D Public Safety 1%

Figure 4

For major regional or national emergencies, additional public safety spectrum

needs could be addressed through enhanced easement rights to non-public safety
spectrum. In extraordinary national or regional emergencies (e.g., terrorist attack, major
natural disaster), public safety providers may require priority access to spectrum
resources significantly beyond the amount of spectrum required to handle their normal
emergency workload. Because of the extraordinary nature of these events, permanent
dedication of spectrum to public safety to meet these contingencies is likely to be highly
inefficient. An alternative would be to address these needs through an easement
mechanism that would enable public safety users to operate on non-public safety
spectrum in such extraordinary emergencies, but to revert to operations on public safety
dedicated spectrum when the emergency subsided. See Figure 4.
3. Broadcasting
The Commission has traditionally allocated spectrum specifically for broadcast
use, based on statutory public interest considerations and the free over-the-air nature of
broadcast service. Many commenters argue that these characteristics distinguish
broadcasting from other market-based uses of spectrum, and that the Commission should
therefore continue to dedicate some spectrum specifically for broadcast use on a
command-and-control basis. Other commenters contend that the continued dedication of
spectrum for broadcasting, and particularly for commercial broadcasting, is increasingly
anachronistic as the public gains access to alternative sources of programming and
information from cable television, satellite services, the Internet, and other outlets.

The Task Force concludes that for the time being, there are valid reasons to
continue applying the “command-and-control” model to existing broadcast spectrum.
Broadcast service is traditionally not subscriber-based; rather, it provides “universal”
news, information, and entertainment services to the general public. As such,
broadcasting has consistently been a central focus of Congress and the Communications
Act, which regulates broadcast content and behavior by placing certain public interest

44
obligations on broadcast licensees.41 In addition, localism and diversity of ownership are
two important public interest objectives that have been associated with broadcasting to a
greater degree than other spectrum uses. Finally, the broadcaster’s relative lack of
control over receiver equipment affects the rapidity with which technological advances
can be introduced into the marketplace and assimilated by consumers – a factor that has
complicated the DTV transition.

The transition of broadcast to a digital world, which is already under way, should
help to increase the efficiency and flexibility in use of broadcast spectrum. As
broadcasters convert to digital, some broadcast spectrum can be recovered for
reallocation and reassignment to more flexible uses, as in the case of the 700 MHz band.
The Commission has also allowed for some flexible use of broadcast spectrum,42 and
should consider additional ways to allow greater flexibility consistent with broadcasters
continuing to meet their core public interest responsibilities. In addition, the Commission
can take steps to make “white space” in the broadcast bands available for other uses.

Over the longer term, the Commission should periodically reevaluate its broadcast
spectrum policies to determine whether they remain necessary to accomplish the public
interest objectives they are intended to promote. In particular, such reevaluation should
consider the extent to which the public interest benefits provided by dedication of
spectrum to broadcasting under a command-and-control regime can be provided through
the application of more flexible, market-oriented spectrum policies. It is likely that there
will be a continued need to set aside some spectrum for non-market based broadcast uses,
such as non-commercial and educational broadcasting. Assuming that technological
advances continue to occur and that scarcity of access to spectrum resources decreases,
however, it is equally likely that the continued application of command-and-control
policies to commercial broadcasting spectrum could be substantially relaxed, or may not
be needed at all, to ensure the public availability from multiple sources, including
alternative technologies, of the types of information and programming that commercial
broadcasters provide.
41
These include requirements that broadcasters provide “reasonable access” to candidates for federal
elective office and afford “equal opportunities” to candidates for any public office, children’s educational
programming requirements, restrictions on airing of indecent programming, and provisions relating to the
rating of video programming, and equal employment opportunities rules. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7), 47
C.F.R. §73.1944 (reasonable access); 47 U.S.C. § 315, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (equal opportunities); 47
U.S.C. § 303(b), 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.671, 73.673, 73.3526 (children’s educational programming); 18 U.S.C. §
1464; 47 U.S.C. § 303, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (indecent programming); 47 U.S.C. § 303(w) (rating of video
programming); 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (equal employment opportunities).
42
Broadcast spectrum can be used for ancillary or supplementary services that do not interfere with the
primary broadcast signal, e.g., through use or leasing of the vertical blanking interval to provide
telecommunications services. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.646. In the digital context, broadcasters may provide
ancillary and supplementary services such as subscription television programming, computer software
distribution, data transmission, teletext, interactive services, and audio signals so long as such services do
not interfere with the required provision of free over-the-air programming. See In the matter of Advanced
Television Systems and Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and
Order at para. 29 (citations omitted). See also 47 U.S.C. § 336.

45
 D. Transition Issues
As discussed above, this report recommends that the Commission move towards
assigning flexible usage rights in spectrum within its jurisdiction, whether under an
exclusive rights or a commons model. However, the practical reality is that most
spectrum within the Commission’s jurisdiction is already occupied by incumbent
spectrum users. Moreover, most of these incumbents are governed by legacy command-
and-control regulations that substantially limit allowable uses of the spectrum.
Therefore, successful implementation of the recommendations in this report requires the
Commission to consider how to migrate away from restrictive legacy licensing regimes to
more flexible rights models that create opportunities for new, more efficient and
beneficial uses. Specifically, the Commission must determine which bands should be
transitioned to expanded flexible rights models and how the transition should be
accomplished.
1. General Transition Considerations
In determining whether and how to transition legacy command-and-control bands
to more flexible rights models, the Commission should focus first on initiating transition
in those bands where additional flexibility will provide the greatest benefits at the least
cost. In general, the greatest benefits will be realized in those bands in which the current
regulatory regime has led to significant underutilization or inefficient use of the
spectrum. However, the Commission must also weigh the potential cost of transition,
both in terms of its impact on incumbents and on the public.

Assessing these potential costs and benefits, the Task Force notes that there are
some bands where the Commission has already taken steps to implement a flexible rights
approach. These include exclusive-use bands that are already licensed under flexible use
rules or are allocated for such use (e.g., broadband PCS), and bands that are dedicated for
use by Part 15 unlicensed devices (e.g., 2.4 GHz). Because many of the benefits of
flexibility have already been realized in these bands, and spectrum uses have developed
accordingly, there is not a significant need for fundamental regulatory changes in these
bands in the near term. However, to the extent that the Commission enhances flexibility
in the long-term as recommended in this report, such changes are potentially applicable to
these bands and would likely not impose significant costs in light of the regulatory steps
the Commission has already taken.

The Task Force also does not recommend fundamental regulatory changes in the
near term with respect to spectrum that is currently dedicated for public safety use, or
with respect to currently allocated broadcast spectrum. In the case of public safety,
attempting a sweeping transition of existing public safety spectrum to an exclusive use or
commons model could be highly costly and disruptive to existing public safety uses, and
does not appear to offer countervailing public interest benefits. Nevertheless, the Task
Force does recommend consideration of measures discussed above to empower public
safety users to make their existing spectrum available for other uses when it is not in use
for public safety purposes. In the case of broadcasting, evolution towards greater
flexibility is governed for the time being by the statutorily-mandated DTV transition

46
process, making additional regulatory changes impractical at least until that process is
complete.

Implementing a transition may also be difficult in spectrum bands that are currently
shared with the federal government, because the Commission cannot regulate federal
spectrum uses, and the presence of federal users in such bands may limit the benefits of
any flexibility that would be afforded to non-federal spectrum users. However, the Task
Force recommends consideration of these bands for transition purposes to the extent that
transition would be beneficial, and recommends that the Commission work with NTIA to
consider alternatives for introducing greater flexibility and efficiency into federal
government uses of spectrum.

In bands that fall outside these categories, the Task Force recommends that the
Commission initiate proceedings to begin the transition of its spectrum regulations to
allow more flexible uses. Moreover, in the long term, the Commission should consider
transitioning to a flexible rights model in all bands throughout the spectrum where such
action would further the Commission’s spectrum policy goals.
2. Available Transition Mechanisms
Once the Commission identifies particular bands that are suitable for transition, it
will need to identify appropriate transition mechanisms. Historically, the Commission
has used a number of different transitional mechanisms to move spectrum from narrowly-
defined legacy uses to more flexible new uses. In addition, other mechanisms that have
not previously been used are also available. Generally, the core issue for all of these
transition mechanisms is the treatment of incumbents: Do they remain in the band or are
they cleared or relocated? If incumbents are cleared or relocated out of the band, what
mechanisms are used? If incumbents remain in the band, does the Commission grant
them expanded rights outright or does it use a new licensing vehicle to award expanded
rights?

Transition options generally fall into the following categories, though variations
and combinations of each are also possible: (1) reallocating a particular band to the
flexible rights model, with assignment of the expanded rights to new licensees and the
mandatory relocation of incumbents to other bands; (2) allowing incumbents to remain as
licensees for those portions in a band that they currently occupy, while assigning
“overlay” licenses for additional rights and/or unoccupied “white space” not assigned to
incumbents; (3) reallocating and assigning spectrum to new licensees under the flexible
rights model, and using voluntary market-based band-restructuring incentives, such as a
two-sided auction, to encourage incumbents to clear or restructure the band; or (4)
granting expanded, flexible rights to the incumbent licensees already occupying the band.
Each of these options is discussed in general below.

47
 a) Expanded rights “overlay” licenses combined with
mandatory relocation of incumbents
Under this option, the Commission reallocates a particular band of spectrum to
allow for more flexible uses, grants the expanded usage rights under new licenses
(generally via auctions) and requires incumbent licensees and the services they provide to
clear the band and either cease operating or relocate to other bands. The Commission has
used this option in several instances, including broadband PCS.

There are several variations of this option, depending on the conditions that must
be met in order for mandatory relocation of incumbents to occur. Under one approach
(which was used for broadband PCS), new spectrum licenses are issued under flexible
rules while incumbents are required to clear, relocate, or retune to alternative bands by a
specified date. In addition, the new licensees may be required to pay the costs of
relocating incumbents. Under a more conditional approach (which was adopted for 700
MHz DTV spectrum), incumbents are required to clear or relocate only if and when
certain external conditions are met, such that there is no fixed time frame for clearing and
relocation. Under this approach, while new licensees are not required to pay the costs of
clearing and relocating incumbents, they may pay for voluntary early clearing by
incumbents.
b) Expanded rights “overlay” licenses combined with
grandfathering of incumbents
Under this option, the Commission grants expanded usage rights under new
licenses, which are “overlaid” on top of the incumbent licenses. Incumbents retain their
existing rights (including interference and renewal rights) on a grandfathered basis, and
are not subject to mandatory band-clearing or relocation.

The overlay option has been used in services such as paging and SMR where the
Commission is converting from site-based to geographic-area licensing, there is
unlicensed “white space” (geographic areas where incumbents are not currently
authorized), and incumbent and potential new uses are generally compatible. Under this
option, incumbents can only acquire expanded rights, including the ability to expand their
systems beyond their existing site-based contours, by obtaining overlay licenses.
Alternatively, new overlay licensees must protect incumbents’ existing systems unless
they buy the incumbents out.
c) Expanded rights “overlay” licenses combined with
voluntary band-clearing/restructuring incentives for
incumbents
Under this option, the Commission reallocates restricted spectrum to more
flexible use, grants the expanded usage rights under new licenses, and establishes a
simultaneous market-based exchange mechanism to encourage voluntary band-clearing
or restructuring of the band by incumbents. This mechanism is designed to create
incentives for incumbents either to relinquish their licenses and clear the band for new
users or to exchange their restricted-use licenses for the expanded rights available under
the new license.

48
 The Commission has not employed this option to date, but a number of potential
mechanisms have been proposed that could facilitate this type of exchange. For instance,
one mechanism that has been suggested is a “two-sided” auction, in which the
Commission would auction expanded usage rights to spectrum under new licenses, and
incumbents would voluntarily make their spectrum rights in the band available for
auction at the same time. Under this approach, incumbents would be eligible to
participate in the auction for expanded rights only if they offered their own spectrum
licenses for sale in the same auction. Moreover, incumbents would be allowed to “bid”
on their own spectrum in addition to spectrum offered by other incumbents and by the
FCC. Incumbents who chose not to offer their licenses would retain their incumbent
rights, but would not be granted expanded rights. This mechanism provides several
incentives to incumbents to offer their spectrum rights for possible exchange. First, if
incumbents voluntarily participate, they would immediately have their licenses converted
to expanded flexible rights licenses, thus increasing the value of their spectrum usage
rights. In addition, incumbents would not be forced to sell their spectrum usage rights to
others, although they would face the opportunity cost of not doing so. Finally,
incumbents would be able to keep any proceeds from the sale of their rights to others, and
could, as well, potentially obtain rights to relocate to other parts of the auctioned band (or
other bands altogether) that might be more advantageous to them.
d) Expanded rights granted to incumbent licensees under
existing licenses
Under this option, the Commission grants expanded flexible rights directly to
incumbents through modification of their existing licenses. Potential new entrants are not
able to bid for or otherwise obtain these expanded rights, except by acquiring the licenses
from incumbents through the secondary market. This option has been used by the
Commission in several bands. For example, in the CMRS Flexibility proceeding, the
Commission granted CMRS providers the right to provide fixed in addition to mobile
services under their existing licenses.
3. Factors Affecting the Choice of Transition Mechanism
The Commission must consider a number of factors when deciding which
transition mechanisms to implement. These factors may vary significantly from band to
band, suggesting possible advantages to taking different approaches in different bands.

Major factors in the Commission’s evaluation of options include:

• The restrictive nature of licensee rights currently afforded incumbents in the

band when compared with the flexibility that would be gained by transitioning
to an expanded flexible rights model;
• The types of services currently offered in the band and the potential consumer
impact of transitioning to an expanded flexible rights model of licensing;
• The number of incumbents in the band;

49
 • The likelihood that expanded flexibility would lead to rapid changes in the use
of the band or instead would have only a gradual impact on existing systems
and uses;
• The practical effect on incumbent systems of providing expanded flexibility
under a new licensing model (e.g., the potential for new users to co-exist in
the band with incumbents);
• The nature and extent of investments made by incumbents in their acquisition
of licenses and the building of systems, including whether incumbents have
had the opportunity to recoup their investments; and
• The time and transaction costs associated with developing and implementing
any particular transition mechanism in a particular band or bands, compared to
other transition mechanisms.

New overlay licensing with mandatory relocation. As a preliminary matter,

consideration of this option depends on the availability of alternative spectrum that would
be suitable for use by incumbent licensees required to relocate. Assuming that alternative
spectrum is available, this option may be preferred in cases where band-clearing is likely
to be critical because of the technical incompatibility between existing uses by
incumbents and prospective uses. However, it is important that the benefits to be
obtained through mandatory band-clearing outweigh the costs and time required to
complete the relocation of incumbents, and that the relocation be consistent with the
Commission’s broader spectrum goals for the relocation band.

In order to ensure maximum efficiency gains in the near term and avoid holdout
problems, it is preferable under this option for there to be a fixed timetable for mandatory
relocation. Furthermore, this option is likely to work best when there are market
incentives for new licensees and incumbents to negotiate voluntary relocation
agreements, although it may also be appropriate to develop mandatory compensation
mechanisms in the event that the voluntary ones prove inadequate.

New overlay licensing with incumbent grandfathering. The “overlay option”

generally requires the presence of a significant amount of unlicensed “white space” that
would lend itself to an overlay licensing scheme. This option also is likely to work best
where there is a limited need to relocate incumbents to other bands and where incumbents
have incentives to acquire rights to the surrounding white space, e.g., in bands that are
being converted from site-based to geographic area licensing and where incumbent uses
and potential new uses are generally compatible. In considering use of this option, the
Commission needs to assess the degree of risk that incumbents will hold out against
transitioning to more flexible use, which could hinder the Commission’s goals of
enabling more efficient use of the spectrum.

New overlay licensing with voluntary band-clearing/restructuring. This option

has potential advantages when (1) the new flexible rights regime being implemented
represents a significant increase in flexibility over the legacy rules, and (2) this expanded
flexibility is likely to lead to rapid changes in the market value and the actual use of the
spectrum. In such cases, a simultaneous exchange mechanism may be the fastest and

50
most efficient means of enabling incumbents and potential new spectrum users to
restructure and reassign spectrum rights within the band to facilitate new uses. In
determining whether to employ this option, the Commission should compare the
administrative costs and efficiency of implementing a simultaneous exchange mechanism
with that of employing other transition options, particularly the option of granting
expanded rights to incumbents discussed below.

Expanded rights granted to incumbents. This option has potential advantages

where the practical impact of granting incumbents additional flexibility is limited or is
likely to be gradual rather than immediate, in which case it is likely that the operation of
secondary markets over time can effectively distribute these flexible rights so that
efficiency gains can be achieved. As a practical matter, this option also requires that
there be no “white space,” i.e., that all spectrum in the band be previously assigned to
incumbents (to avoid ambiguity as to who is entitled to additional rights). While granting
incumbent licensees additional flexibility may allow for more immediate expansion of
the availability of flexible rights licensing models, it also may raise equity issues relating
to possible windfalls or unjust enrichment. The larger issue is whether such a policy
would encourage parties to make future bids on presumably low-cost spectrum that is
allocated for low-value uses and that has no flexibility, then petition for an expansion of
those rights after acquiring the license. Accordingly, in considering this option, these
equity issues will need to be balanced against the potential gains in administrative
efficiency and the potential public benefits of providing additional flexibility to
incumbents in the band.

Conclusions/recommendations. The Task Force recommends that the

Commission undertake the following:

• Identify encumbered bands licensed under legacy command-and-control

regimes that are suitable for transitioning to expanded flexible rights licensing
models within the next five years –
ƒ Set a goal of identifying 100 megahertz of spectrum below 5 GHz
for this transition phase.
ƒ Develop processes for determining which bands provide greatest
opportunity for improving efficient use through adoption of
expanded flexible rights licensing schemes.
ƒ Look for band “defragmentation” opportunities (i.e., consolidating
narrowband spectrum “slices”).

• Choose appropriate transition mechanisms for the different bands being

transitioned –
ƒ Look for bands in which to test different transition mechanisms.
ƒ Promote policy and legislative changes to facilitate the conducting of
two-sided auctions.
ƒ Encourage migration of compatible technologies into common band
groupings.

51
 Recommendations:

• Expand the use of both the exclusive rights and commons models, and move away from
the command-and-control model, with limited exceptions.
• Transition legacy command-and-control bands to more flexible rules and uses to the
maximum extent possible (whether under the exclusive rights or commons model), with
only limited exceptions.
• Assess and re-examine Section 647 of the Orbit Act to consider permitting, but not
requiring, the Commission to utilize competitive bidding to resolve mutually exclusive
applications for global and international satellite services. Take into account
international concerns, including frequency coordination with Canada and Mexico and
global harmonization of uses.
• Continue to dedicate some spectrum on a command-and-control basis for public safety
use.
• Address additional public safety needs through alternative “safety valve” mechanisms to
make spectrum is available to public safety in emergency situations when more capacity
is needed.
• Because some public safety spectrum use is characterized by intermittent
“spikes,” public safety users should have flexibility to lease spectrum capacity
that is available during lower-use periods to commercial users with a “take-back”
mechanism when public safety use increases.
• For major regional or national emergencies, additional public safety spectrum
needs should be addressed through enhanced easement rights to non-public safety
spectrum.
• Develop more flexible policy for addressing public safety spectrum needs, including
leasing/take-back arrangements with commercial users and easement rights to non-public
safety spectrum in major emergencies.

52
 Transition Recommendations:

• For new spectrum allocations and the associated spectrum assignments, apply the
following basic framework:
• Base choice of exclusive rights, commons, or command-and-control model
in particular bands on factors previously identified.
• Make underlay rights based on interference temperature a component of
new spectrum allocations and assignments.
• This does not require a constant interference temperature definition
across all bands.
• Clearly define access rights for opportunistic devices whether based on
secondary markets, easements, or a combination of the two.
• For encumbered spectrum, identify bands that are suitable for initiating transition
within the next five years and develop a transition plan for each band.
• Set a goal of identifying highly valuable 100 megahertz of spectrum for
this transition phase.
• Look for band “defragmentation” opportunities (consolidating narrowband
spectrum “slices” and encouraging migration of compatible technologies
into common band groupings).
• Interference temperature should be specified for most new allocations and
associated assignments, and underlay operations.
• Address underlay/easement rights in transition bands on a going-forward
basis (avoid retroactive easements).
• Develop mechanisms to improve efficiency of secondary markets in facilitating
transition.
• Move forward with the Secondary Markets proceeding.
• Facilitate use of leasing, band managers, and similar mechanisms to
promote transition, particularly in multi-use bands.
• Address spectrum access issues in rural areas.
• Recommend that Congress amend Section 309(j) of the Act to include an
express grant of authority to the FCC to conduct two-sided auctions and
simultaneous exchanges.
• Recommend that Congress amend the Act to authorize the use of auction
funds to pay relocation expenses to incumbents.
• Recommend that Congress eliminate the 2007 expiration date on the
Commission's statutory auction authority and grant the Commission
permanent auction authority.

53
VIII. Promoting Access to Spectrum

A. Designating Spectrum Bands for Unlicensed Use

The currently available spectrum for unlicensed operations has spawned a
significant market for unlicensed devices and, as a result, the Commission should
consider designating additional bands for unlicensed use to better optimize spectrum
access. It is estimated that sales of unlicensed consumer devices are more than $2 billion
per year. In addition, the growing popularity of computer networking has stimulated a
heightened interest in unlicensed technology and one of the fastest growing applications
of unlicensed devices is for WLANs. Among the more popular wireless data services
are devices that operate in the 2.4 GHz band in accordance with the 802.11b or “Wi-Fi”
standards and protocols developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
Unlicensed devices are also being developed to provide very short-range wireless
“personal area” networks (WPANs), such as Bluetooth. The wireless LAN market posted
its eighth consecutive quarter of double-digit growth; total growth from 2000 has been
over 150 percent.

Much of the spectrum below 50 GHz is available for low-powered unlicensed use.
Higher-powered operations are permitted in several bands, however.43 A significant
number of parties stated that additional spectrum should be made available for unlicensed
use. And, based on the record, it is generally perceived that the creation of unlicensed
bands has been very successful in allowing the rapid introduction of new technology and
that additional unlicensed bands would create more such opportunities. However, there
was a general lack of information on how the Commission should create such unlicensed
bands and what priority they should be given relative to other spectrum requests.

The Task Force finds that, while it is not practical at this point to develop
estimates of the optimal amount of spectrum that should be provided for unlicensed
operations, it appears that additional spectrum is needed for unlicensed devices. This is
particularly true in light of recent trends towards increased use of short distance wireless
systems, which use fixed infrastructure to provide end-to-end connectivity. In large area
wireless systems, it has been difficult to control mutual interference without entry and
technical regulation. As radio ranges become smaller, this justification for licensing
becomes less universal. An ever increasing fraction of today’s radio applications have
ranges measured in yards rather than miles. For new unlicensed bands, access should be
controlled by a new type of band manager or frequency coordinator selected by the FCC.

In addition, while there is great interest in making available additional unlicensed

spectrum, there is no consensus on how such spectrum should be obtained, especially at
frequencies in the lower regions of the spectrum, i.e., at 5 GHz and below. The
Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM)/spread spectrum bands were relatively easy to

43
These bands include: 902-928 MHz; 1910-1930 MHz, 2390-2483.5 MHz, 5150-5350 MHz, 5725-5825
MHz, and 57,000-64,000 GHz.

54
designate for unlicensed use because the microwave ovens and other ISM equipment
using them made these bands of little value to most traditional spectrum users. However,
having used this opportunity, there is little “low-hanging fruit” left for unlicensed band
use. As it considers any expansion of unlicensed use, the Commission will have to pay
careful attention to legitimate concerns of other spectrum users and consider untraditional
approaches to obtaining spectrum use. In spectrum above 50 GHz, however, the Task
Force recommends that future rulemakings routinely review de novo whether licensing is
in fact necessary.

The record also indicated that wireless ISPs (WISPs) often experience difficulty
in tailoring their communications systems to meet particular needs due to the lack of
flexibility in equipment authorizations. For example, WISPs may be unable to change
antennas to suit a particular application, even though such change does not alter the
operating parameters of the system. In addition, WISPs (and point-to-point systems)
should be permitted to increase their power limits in rural areas. The Task Force
recommends that the Commission facilitate increased flexibility for both systems and
power limits, to the extent possible.

B. Secondary Market Rights and Easements

The record also suggests that the there are ways to improve access to licensed
spectrum by new entrants. As technological advances have increased the potential for
spectrum to accommodate multiple non-interfering uses, two alternative and possibly
complementary approaches have been suggested to facilitate access in licensed bands.
Some commenters and Workshop participants advocated reliance on “secondary
markets” arrangements involving the lease of spectrum usage rights. Under this
approach, licensees would hold the rights associated with determining which potential
entrants could have access to the spectrum and under what conditions. Other commenters
and Workshop participants advocated allowing open access to licensed spectrum for non-
interfering devices through expanded use of government-defined “easements.” In the
latter case, the Commission, and not the licensee, would establish conditions for user
access to the spectrum, and the consent of the licensee would not be required so long as
the non-licensee user complied with the conditions.

Commenters disagreed, however, on how to balance these approaches.

Proponents of secondary market arrangements asserted that the market can solve most
types of access problems if licensees have flexibility and exclusive rights. Secondary
markets proponents were also skeptical of the easement approach, arguing that (1) “non-
interfering” operation tends to work better in theory than in practice, and (2) even where
spectrum is otherwise not being used by the licensee, creating easements for third party
access without the licensee’s consent could lead to squatter’s rights problems. Some
commenters also argued that easement rights should not be created on spectrum that has
already been licensed by the Commission, contending that incumbent licensees have
already built out their systems and made other technical decisions in reliance on being
able to control access by third parties that could possibly create harmful interference.

55
 Proponents of easements asserted that requiring negotiation of access rights in the
market would not facilitate, and might even inhibit, access by the very technology that is
revolutionizing efficient spectrum use, i.e., smart, frequency-agile devices. They pointed
out that the Commission currently allows some unlicensed devices to operate in licensed
spectrum without the users of those devices obtaining permission from the licensee.
Easement proponents also contended that exclusive rights holders will prefer to block
access by such devices to protect their investment, and that the only way to open
spectrum to new uses is to vastly expand the use of the easement model. They also
contended that new technology is sufficiently sophisticated to overcome concerns
regarding interference with the licensed user’s operations.

The Commission has already taken some steps to initiate and expand access to
spectrum. For example, in the Secondary Markets proceeding, the Commission has
begun to explore possible market arrangements that would give licensees greater
flexibility to authorize others to use otherwise unused portions of their licensed spectrum.
The Commission has also used an easement approach in cases such as UWB, but this is
still a very limited application compared to the type of easement access that some
commenters advocate. As discussed above, developments in new technology such as
SDR, frequency-agile radios, and spread spectrum have heightened the importance of the
access issue by making multiple dynamic uses of spectrum possible that were not
technologically feasible in the past. The Task Force therefore recommends that the
Commission develop access models that take this new technological potential into
account. At the same time, these models must take into account the need for licensed
spectrum users to have flexible and clearly-defined spectrum usage rights that promote
efficient and beneficial spectrum use.

Going forward, the Task Force believes that there is room for the balanced and
expanded use of both the secondary market and easement approaches to facilitate
spectrum access. First, as discussed above, the Task Force recommends that in bands
where an interference temperature threshold is established, the Commission use an
easement approach to create spectrum usage rights for unlicensed devices that operate
below the threshold.44 An easement approach appears appropriate for these operations
because by definition, the licensee is required to accept any RF energy that is created by
such devices so long as the threshold is not exceeded.

Second, the Task Force recommends looking primarily at the use of secondary
markets, but possibly at some limited use of easements as well, to facilitate access to
licensed spectrum for opportunistic, non-interfering devices that operate above the
temperature threshold. Under the secondary markets approach, licensees would have
broad flexibility to allow secondary uses of their spectrum by devices operating above the
interference temperature threshold. Such devices would operate as secondary users based
on an agreement with the licensee, which can be negotiated directly with the licensee or
through a private intermediary (e.g., band manager or frequency coordinator) that
manages the secondary uses on the licensee’s behalf.

44
See Sections VI and VII.B, supra.

56
 In most cases of potential opportunistic use of spectrum, efficient secondary
market mechanisms can be developed that would allow negotiated access at reasonable
transactions costs. The secondary markets model takes advantage of the flexibility and
adaptability of the market to solve access problems. Because licensees have economic
incentives to use spectrum in ways that will yield the highest return to them, they will
generally find it advantageous to allow others to use unused portions of their spectrum if
they are adequately compensated.

The Task Force does not agree with commenters that contend that making an
exclusive licensee the access “gatekeeper” (i.e., requiring potential spectrum users to
obtain licensee consent) will inhibit access by new technology, although there may be
occasional instances of this type of restrictive behavior. If the rights afforded to licensees
are sufficiently well-defined and flexible, and the secondary market mechanism is fast
and efficient with low transaction costs, licensees will have ample incentive to negotiate
with potential secondary users for such access. It is also important to realize that a
secondary markets approach to access by opportunistic devices does not necessarily
require the prospective opportunistic user to negotiate individually with each affected
licensee: band managers, clearinghouses, and other intermediaries such as
clearinghouses can facilitate these negotiated transactions. Thus, the secondary market
approach has significant potential to foster opportunistic technologies, such as agile-
frequency-hopping radios, software defined radios, and adaptive antennas, at reasonable
transaction costs. In fact, it is anticipated that as the access-enhancing potential of these
technologies continues to improve, exclusive licensees will often wish to encourage and
even develop such technologies in order to provide new services and devices and serve
more customers.

To facilitate use of the secondary markets model, it is essential to have in place a

flexible and efficient regulatory regime that allows for the negotiation of the necessary
access rights and keeps the transaction costs of negotiation low. To further this goal, the
Task Force recommends as an essential first step that the Commission take action to
adopt rules in the ongoing Secondary Markets proceeding, and that it take additional
steps to implement secondary markets to the extent that its current statutory authority
allows. In addition, to the extent that statutory constraints continue to exist, the Task
Force recommends legislative changes that would provide explicit authority for the
Commission to implement a fully flexible approach to secondary markets.

While the Task Force generally recommends that access rights for devices
operating above the interference temperature threshold be negotiated through the
secondary market, there may be instances where secondary markets work less well
because they impose such significant transaction costs on parties that negotiations will
not occur. In such cases, the easements model may offer a viable alternative approach.
Under this approach, unlicensed devices operating above the interference temperature
threshold would be allowed to operate on licensed spectrum on a non-interfering basis
subject to specified conditions and with no negotiation with the licensee required. Non-
interfering operation would be ensured by allowing operation at a higher power on a not-

57
to-interfere basis using standard protocols. The FCC or a frequency coordinator would
administer and resolve harmful interference issues. By definition, the easements model
allows for efficient and low-cost access to spectrum, because the government establishes
overall rules and protocols under which any user would be allowed access to the
spectrum, and negotiations with individual licensees are not required. The easements
model also bears greater consideration than in the past because the increased
sophistication of technology allows for the possibility of enhanced spectrum use by third
parties on a non-interfering basis with the licensee.

Nevertheless, broad application of the easement approach to operations above the

interference temperature threshold presents significant challenges. Because the easement
model inherently limits the flexibility afforded to the licensee to some degree, and relies
on government to define the scope of the easement, it should be applied cautiously. For
example, currently all Part 15 devices are limited to extremely low power levels in order
to minimize the possibility of interference. If opportunistic devices are to be authorized
at higher powers in the future, this will require regulations or protocols to ensure that
such devices have the ability to “listen” before they transmit and to cease transmitting
instantly when continued transmission would cause interference. In addition, there is the
concern that once unlicensed devices begin to operate in an easement, it may be difficult
legally or politically to shut down their operations even if they begin to cause interference
or otherwise limit the licensed user’s flexibility. Thus, as proponents of the secondary
market model note, the potential for “squatter’s rights” issues to arise is another potential
downside of the easement model that must be addressed.

To address these concerns, the Task Force recommends that in the first instance,
the Commission focus on use of the secondary markets model to facilitate access above
the interference temperature threshold. Once there has been an opportunity to evaluate
the effectiveness of this approach, the Commission can then assess whether there is a
need to pursue an easement approach for some types of access. Even then, any decision
whether to use an easement approach will require careful consideration of the time,
space, and frequency-agility dimensions of the proposed spectrum use. In addition, in
making such decisions, the Commission will need to be sensitive to the potential impact
of allowing easement-based access by opportunistic devices on the expectations, business
plans, and investment made by licensed spectrum users.

C. Access to Spectrum in Rural Areas

The Task Force addressed the issue of whether the Commission’s approach to
spectrum management should vary in different portions of the spectrum, in different
geographic areas, or for different types of uses. Many commenters focused considerable
discussion on the issue of rural areas, where spectrum is almost uniformly uncongested
even in the most heavily used bands below 3 GHz. Although some parties indicated that
the Commission should not adopt different spectrum allocation and assignment policies
for different portions of the spectrum or different geographic regions, it was generally
recognized that the economic and technical considerations in rural areas are different than
in urban areas, and there is some support in the record for applying different rules to
spectrum usage in urban and rural areas.

58
 Some advocates for rural interests asserted that rural carriers have difficulty
gaining access to spectrum, even though spectrum in rural areas is typically the least
congested. Specifically, rural carriers argued that the Commission’s tendency to use
large geographic licensing regions that encompass both urban and rural areas discourages
rural carriers from seeking to acquire licenses. In addition, rural carriers contended that
the Commission’s partitioning and disaggregation rules do not benefit rural providers
because they must incur significant transaction costs to negotiate access to rural spectrum
with multiple large carriers that may prefer in any event to retain such spectrum for future
use. It was further argued that licensing build-out requirements that are based on
population coverage tend to lead to build-out only in urban areas, with rural spectrum
going unused.

Commenters also discussed whether there should be different interference

standards for rural and urban areas. Certain parties advocated higher permissible power
levels for rural areas on the theory that where there is less congestion, higher permissible
power levels would allow for fuller usage of spectrum. Others objected to this idea,
arguing that having different rural and urban regimes is impractical because it is not a
simple matter to define urban versus rural, as many areas fall somewhere in between and
problems may arise when formerly rural areas undergo development. Thus, there was a
difference of opinion as to whether different technical rules for rural areas are feasible or
desirable.

The Task Force recommends that the Commission explore ways to promote
spectrum access and flexibility in rural areas. As a threshold matter, however, it is
important to note that the distinction between high- and low-congestion areas does not
necessarily require non-uniform rules for the latter, so long as the rules do not artificially
cause spectrum congestion or constrain the use of uncongested spectrum. Interference
and other technical rules should generally be calibrated to conditions in areas where
spectrum is likely to be in the greatest demand and the most congested, which will
typically be urban areas. Thus, the obligations of spectrum users to avoid interference
should be set at levels suitable for such areas, as should their obligation to accept
interference from others. However, these rules should also afford spectrum users the
flexibility to operate at higher power in less congested areas, which are typically rural, so
long as such higher power operations do not cause interference and do not receive
additional interference protection. These same principles should be applied to unlicensed
bands so that higher-power operation of unlicensed devices is permitted in less congested
areas.

To improve providers’ ability to gain access to spectrum in rural areas, the

Commission should promote the development of an efficient and flexible secondary
markets regime that, in addition to partitioning, facilitates the leasing of spectrum usage
rights in rural areas, which would significantly lower transaction costs. The Commission
could also consider expanding “easements” on licensed spectrum (as discussed in Section
VIII.B. above) in low-congestion areas to allow access, on a non-interference basis, by
other spectrum users. Such an approach, however, would require the use of technology

59
that is capable of measuring the level of spectrum congestion in the area and adjusting
power accordingly.

In addition, when licensing by geographic area, the Commission should consider

the impact of its rules on access to rural spectrum. In some instances, it may be
appropriate to use licensing areas that distinguish between rural and urban areas so that
rural interests can more readily acquire spectrum in the areas they serve. However, in
other instances, larger spectrum areas may be beneficial to rural interests by allowing
licensees to take advantage of economies of scale or scope based on regional or
nationwide footprints.

D. Experimental Licensing

Section 303(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, (the Act)

authorizes the Commission to provide for experimental use of frequencies and charges
the Commission with encouraging “the larger and more effective use of radio in the
public interest.”45 Experimental licenses provide the opportunity for manufacturers,
inventors, entrepreneurs, and students to experiment with new radio technologies, new
equipment designs, characteristics of radio wave propagation, and new service concepts
related to the use of the radio spectrum, which may not otherwise be permitted under
existing service rules. In order to encourage innovation, the experimental license rules
provide great flexibility with regard to allowable frequency range, power, and emission.
However, to protect previously-allocated services, experimental licenses are issued on
condition that experimental operations do not cause interference to existing services, and
experimental operations are not protected from interference from allocated services.
Only a few parties addressed the topic of experimental licenses. The principal
concern of these parties appeared to be potential delay involved in obtaining an
experimental license due to interagency frequency coordination and, in particular,
difficulties associated with testing systems being developed for government transfer
bands and for overseas markets with different allocation plans. Concerns were also
raised about the non-interactive nature of the coordination process from the point of view
of private entities seeking to experiment with new technologies.
Experimental license applications that request use of spectrum used exclusively
by the federal government or shared with the federal government must be coordinated
with NTIA to assess any potential interference issues. In practice, NTIA refers such
applications to the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), which is
composed of all federal agencies that are major spectrum users.46 Most coordination
requests are handled promptly, but some applications remain in the coordination process

45
See Section 303(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g). This
discussion is based in part on the NPRM in Docket 96-256, 11 FCC Rcd 20130 (1996). The rules addressing
experimental licenses are contained in Part 5 of the Commission’s rules. See 47 CFR Part 5.
46
NTIA coordination is actually carried out by the IRAC Frequency Assignment Subcommittee (FAS).

60
for a considerable period of time and, in some instances, are not resolved after periods in
excess of one year.47
The Task Force believes that a slight modification in the frequency coordination
process may effectively facilitate expeditious resolution of any potential interference
issues. A suggestion from the parties, that the Task Force supports, is to permit more
direct communications between parties who have applied for experimental licenses and
the federal government entities concerned about their pending experimental applications
on a more regular basis. The parties suggest that such contacts would allow them to
explore possible modifications in their experimental license applications that might lead
to mutually acceptable outcomes, such as restricting location, operating power, and
operating hours. Although the Task Force recognizes that classification issues related to
certain federal government systems may make direct communication impractical in all
cases, at least in some instances, communications between the parties is possible and that
new procedural and organizational mechanisms should be put in place to improve
communications between commercial parties desiring to implement experiments and
federal users of the spectrum. To this end, the Task Force recommends that the FCC and
NTIA consider implementing a new interface for non-federal government spectrum users
with IRAC members to help search for workable compromises for experimental license
applications. One possible approach, also suggested by commenters, would be to
consider appointing an advocate or ombudsman for the private sector.
In addition, the Task Force believes that it would be helpful to have more
information about the use of certain bands for experimentation – particularly government
transfer bands -- available to the public. To facilitate experimentation in bands that are
designated for transfer to the private sector, perhaps the FCC and NTIA could work
together to identify – or pre-clear – some location, frequency, and time combinations
where non-federal government spectrum users would be permitted to conduct
experiments. These joint FCC-NTIA efforts would greatly facilitate the ability of the
private sector to rapidly deploy consumer services in these bands after transfer from
federal government use.

E. Transition Issues
As discussed, there are many ways to increase access to the radio spectrum. The
Task Force recognizes, however, that these proposed changes cannot, and should not, be
implemented without giving serious consideration to the reliance interests of incumbent
spectrum users. Thus, for example, while the Task Force believes that it is important to
conduct a review to determine which bands may be feasible for unlicensed use, it is
equally important to assess and address the expectations of incumbent users in any
candidate band.

There are few transition issues implicated in using the general secondary markets
model to facilitate access to currently occupied spectrum, because access under this

47
OET’s Experimental Branch has recently instituted a procedure in which new applications that not
successfully coordinated in one year are dismissed without prejudice.

61
model is premised on negotiation with the licensee. Licensed spectrum users would gain
greater flexibility, and private negotiations would determine availability of particular
spectrum for use by others. To the extent, however, that government-defined easements
are contemplated as an alternative to the general secondary markets model, the issue of
incumbency would be among the many serious challenges in deciding whether such
easements would be appropriate.

62
 Recommendations:
• Consider methods for additional spectrum access for unlicensed devices, which include:
• Access to new band controlled by a new type of band manager or frequency
coordinator.
• Opportunistic or dynamic use of existing bands – through either cognitive radio
techniques to find “white space” in existing bands or use protocols to get out of the way
of primary users.
• Underlay beneath primary users:
(1) Unlicensed devices operate below acceptable interference level (that is, operate
on a non-interference basis with licensees); and/or
(2) Unlicensed devices can operate at higher powers if negotiate with licensee –
negotiations can either take place directly or through private band manager.
• In licensed spectrum bands, pursue secondary markets policies that encourage licensees to
provide access for “opportunistic” uses above the interference temperature threshold through
leasing of spectrum usage rights.
• At a later time, after evaluating the effectiveness of secondary markets approach, assess
whether there is a need to create government-granted “easements” for some types of access,
but consider the potential impact of this approach on planning and investment by licensed
users.
• Millimeterwave bands: all future rulemaking for terrestrial use above 50 GHz should include de
novo review of the merits of licensing.
• Wireless ISPs (WISPs) and point-to-point microwave systems:
• Facilitate greater flexibility by making it easier for operators to better tailor their
equipment for particular application.
• Increase power limits for WISPs (and point-to-point systems) in rural areas.
• In general, technical rules should be calibrated to areas where spectrum is in the greatest
demand and the most congested, which are typically urban areas.
• In less congested areas, the rules should not prevent licensees from operating at
higher power on a non-interference basis, but licensees operating in such areas
should not have expanded interference protection rights or reduced obligations to
avoid interference.
• In unlicensed bands, technical rules should allow for higher-power operation in less
congested areas.
• The Commission should increase incentives and reduce transaction costs on parties seeking
access to rural spectrum
• Geographic licensing areas that distinguish between rural and urban areas may be
appropriate in some bands to allow focused bidding on rural areas
• More important is the development of an efficient and flexible secondary markets
regime that facilitates leasing of rural spectrum in all licensed bands
• The Commission could also consider expanding “easements” on licensed spectrum
in rural areas to allow access by other spectrum users.
• Experimental Licensing: Recommend an interface with IRAC members to help search for
workable compromises for experimental applications and suggest that NTIA or DOC to appoint
an advocate/ombudsman for the private sector.
• Recommend that NTIA and FCC identify some (frequency, location, time) combinations in the
transfer bands for experiments that have low risk of interference to Federal systems, "pre-clear"
them and announce availability for experiments in a "broad area announcement"-like PN.

63
IX. Policy Recommendations
The following is a list of the Task Force’s specific policy recommendations,
which correspond to the recommendations listed at the end of each section. Specific
recommendations that would require legislative action are listed in Appendix A.

A. Key Elements of New Spectrum Policy Recommendations

1. Permit broad, highly flexible use within technical parameters of the allocation.
a. Permit traditionally narrow services to lease excess capacity to other services.
2. Investigate rule changes that enable the lowering of permitted power in urban areas
and the increasing of permitted power in rural areas.
a. Permit high-power digital television broadcasters to operate single frequency low
power distributed transmission systems within their present service area.
b. Promote the co-location of high power transmitters.
3. Foster technologies for uniform signal strength generation throughout a service area.
4. Consider user fees or other steps to stimulate improvements in efficiency when
marketplace is inadequate.
5. Promote shift to hybridizations with wireline delivery whenever appropriate.
6. Group future allocations based on mutually-compatible technical characteristics
(power flux density and sensitivity to interference), and improve the out-of-band
interference performance of transmitters and receivers over time so as to reduce the
need for this kind of grouping.
7. Conduct periodic evaluations of allocation parameters with respect to evolving
technology and uses.
8. Time-limit spectrum rights and subject them to periodic review.
a. Every 5 to 10 years, review spectrum rights and obligations, interference criteria,
and definitions, and modify if appropriate.
b. But spectrum users should be entitled to rely on rules remaining constant between
periodic reviews.
c. Licensees should still have strong renewal expectancy.

B. Interference Avoidance Recommendations

9. Quantify acceptable levels of interference through “interference temperature” concept
(long-term objective).
10. Obtain better data regarding noise floor:
a. Adopt standard method for measuring noise floor.
11. Create a public/private partnership for long term noise (interference temperature)
monitoring network and archiving of data for use by FCC and public.

64
12. Include receiver tolerances in regulation (either through (1) additional incentives, (2)
mandates, or (3) some combination of incentives and mandates) to be used until can
migrate to “interference temperature” regulatory scheme and to be used for the long
term where use of interference temperature would be inapplicable; e.g., for systems in
which licensees do not have control over receivers.
13. Move to interference-limited policies.
14. Issue Notice of Inquiry to characterize current and future receiver environments and to
explore issues to consider, such as, performance parameters and protection for legacy
receivers.
15. Award contractual study to evaluate receiver performance in current environment.
16. Promote voluntary receiver performance requirements through industry groups.
17. Consider incentives for use of advanced receivers.
18. Promote transmitter enhancements for interference control: (a) foster technologies
that enhance uniform signal levels throughout a service area; (b) promote greater use
of automated transmitter control systems; and (c) consider tightening out-of-band
emission limits over time.
19. Improve communications on interference issues with public.
a. Harmonize interference language in FCC rules and affected international rules.
b. Ensure consistent and appropriate use of interference terminology.
c. Develop technical bulletins that explain interference rules for all radio services.
d. Develop best practices handbook.
20. Add language to the Act expressly allowing the Commission to establish rules or
performance requirements for receivers.
21. “Interference temperature” concept should form the basis for better defining
interference rights.
22. Accompany clearer interference definition with effective enforcement.

C. Spectrum Usage Models Recommendations

23. Expand the use of both the exclusive rights and commons models, and move away
from the command-and-control model, with limited exceptions.
24. Transition legacy command-and-control bands to more flexible rules and uses to the
maximum extent possible (whether under the exclusive rights or commons model),
with only limited exceptions.
25. Assess and re-examine Section 647 of the Orbit Act to consider permitting, but not
requiring, the Commission to utilize competitive bidding to resolve mutually
exclusive applications for global and international satellite services. Take into
account international concerns, including frequency coordination with Canada and
Mexico and global harmonization of uses.
26. Continue to dedicate some spectrum on a command-and-control basis for public
safety use.

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27. Address additional public safety needs through alternative “safety valve” mechanisms
to make spectrum is available to public safety in emergency situations when more
capacity is needed.
a. Because some public safety spectrum use is characterized by intermittent
“spikes,” public safety users should have flexibility to lease spectrum capacity
that is available during lower-use periods to commercial users with a “take-back”
mechanism when public safety use increases.
b. For major regional or national emergencies, additional public safety spectrum
needs should be addressed through enhanced easement rights to non-public safety
spectrum.
28. Develop more flexible policy for addressing public safety spectrum needs, including
leasing/take-back arrangements with commercial users and easement rights to non-
public safety spectrum in major emergencies.
29. For new spectrum allocations and the associated spectrum assignments, apply the
following basic framework:
a. Base choice of exclusive rights, commons, or command-and-control model in
particular bands on factors previously identified.
b. Make underlay rights based on interference temperature a component of new
spectrum allocations and assignments.
i. This does not require a constant interference temperature definition across all
bands.
c. Clearly define access rights for opportunistic devices whether based on secondary
markets, easements, or a combination of the two.
30. For encumbered spectrum, identify bands that are suitable for initiating transition
within the next five years and develop a transition plan for each band.
a. Set a goal of identifying highly valuable 100 megahertz of spectrum for this
transition phase.
b. Look for band “defragmentation” opportunities (consolidating narrowband
spectrum “slices” and encouraging migration of compatible technologies into
common band groupings).
c. Interference temperature should be specified for most new allocations and
associated assignments, and underlay operations.
d. Address underlay/easement rights in transition bands on a going-forward basis
(avoid retroactive easements).
31. Develop mechanisms to improve efficiency of secondary markets in facilitating
transition.
a. Move forward with the Secondary Markets proceeding.
b. Facilitate use of leasing, band managers, and similar mechanisms to promote
transition, particularly in multi-use bands.
c. Address spectrum access issues in rural areas.

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 d. Recommend that Congress amend Section 309(j) of the Act to include an express
grant of authority to the FCC to conduct two-sided auctions and simultaneous
exchanges.
e. Recommend that Congress amend the Act to authorize the use of auction funds to
pay relocation expenses to incumbents.
f. Recommend that Congress eliminate the 2007 expiration date on the
Commission's statutory auction authority and grant the Commission permanent
auction authority.

D. Promoting Access to Spectrum Recommendations

32. Consider methods for additional spectrum access for unlicensed devices, which
include:
a. Access to new band controlled by a new type of band manager or frequency
coordinator.
b. Opportunistic or dynamic use of existing bands – through either cognitive radio
techniques to find “white space” in existing bands or use protocols to get out of
the way of primary users.
c. Underlay beneath primary users:
i. Unlicensed devices operate below acceptable interference level (that is,
operate on a non-interference basis with licensees); and/or
ii. Unlicensed devices can operate at higher powers if negotiate with licensee –
negotiations can either take place directly or through private band manager.
33. In licensed spectrum bands, pursue secondary markets policies that encourage
licensees to provide access for “opportunistic” uses above the interference
temperature threshold through leasing of spectrum usage rights.
a. At a later time, after evaluating the effectiveness of secondary markets approach,
assess whether there is a need to create government-granted “easements” for some
types of access, but consider the potential impact of this approach on planning and
investment by licensed users.
34. Millimeterwave bands: all future rulemaking for terrestrial use above 50 GHz should
include de novo review of the merits of licensing.
35. Wireless ISPs (WISPs) and point-to-point microwave systems:
a. Facilitate greater flexibility by making it easier for operators to better tailor their
equipment for particular application.
b. Increase power limits for WISPs (and point-to-point systems) in rural areas.
36. In general, technical rules should be calibrated to areas where spectrum is in the
greatest demand and the most congested, which are typically urban areas.
a. In less congested areas, the rules should not prevent licensees from operating at
higher power on a non-interference basis, but licensees operating in such areas
should not have expanded interference protection rights or reduced obligations to
avoid interference.

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 b. In unlicensed bands, technical rules should allow for higher-power operation in
less congested areas.
37. The Commission should increase incentives and reduce transaction costs on parties
seeking access to rural spectrum
a. Geographic licensing areas that distinguish between rural and urban areas may be
appropriate in some bands to allow focused bidding on rural areas
b. More important is the development of an efficient and flexible secondary markets
regime that facilitates leasing of rural spectrum in all licensed bands
c. The Commission could also consider expanding “easements” on licensed
spectrum in rural areas to allow access by other spectrum users.
38. Experimental Licensing: Recommend an interface with IRAC members to help search
for workable compromises for experimental applications and suggest that NTIA or
DOC to appoint an advocate/ombudsman for the private sector.
39. Recommend that NTIA and FCC identify some (frequency, location, time)
combinations in the transfer bands for experiments that have low risk of interference
to Federal systems, "pre-clear" them and announce availability for experiments in a
"broad area announcement"-like PN.

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 Appendix A: Legislative Recommendations

The Task Force recommends that the Commission consider the statutory proposals
detailed below for submission to Congress. These recommendations resulted from a
thorough examination of the current statutory structure contained in the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, as well as related laws. They are intended as a blueprint for
working with Congress to effectuate a more flexible spectrum policy regime.

• Initiate a review of the potential use of spectrum fees for non-market based
spectrum uses. See Section V.D.

• Request language in the Communications Act to clarify the scope of the

Commission’s authority to establish rules or performance requirements for all
receivers. See Section VI.B.

• Consider amending Section 309(j) of the Communications Act to provide the

Commission authority to conduct two-sided auctions and simultaneous spectrum
exchanges. See Section VII.D.

• Support existing legislative measures that would amend the Communications Act
to authorize the use of auction funds to pay relocation expenses to Federal
government incumbents and suggest expanding such measures to include non-
Federal entities. See Section VII.D.

• Undertake a review of Section 310 of the Communications Act to determine the

feasibility of providing the Commission with additional flexibility to improve the
operation of secondary markets and the processing of other transactions. See
Section VIII.B.

• Assess and re-examine Section 647 of the Orbit Act to consider permitting, but
not requiring, the Commission to utilize competitive bidding to resolve mutually
exclusive applications for spectrum used for global and international satellite
services. See Section VII.C.

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