In Partial Fulfillment of the

Public International Law

and
In Lieu of the Asynchronous Session
dated 14 October 2023

Respectfully Submitted to:

ATTY. RODDEL PARANOS

Sincerely Submitted by:

PIL Students
9:00 PM - 12:00 MN
SESSION 7: IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
Chapter 10, Bernas

GENERAL RULE: The jurisdiction of a state within its territory is complete

and absolute.
EXCEPTIONS: Two Categories

(1) sovereign immunity - covers both a head of the state and the state itself

Doctrine of State Immunity

The State may not be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art. XVI, 1987
Constitution)

Act of State Doctrine

A State should not inquire into the legal validity of the public acts of another
State done within the territory of the latter.
(Nachura, 2009)

Nature of the Act of State Doctrine

It is a rule not of international law but of judicial restraint in domestic law
whereby courts refrain from making decisions in deference to the executive
who is the principal architect of foreign relations. (Bernas, 2009)

Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other

sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
 to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. (Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250)

NOTE: Act of State Doctrine is similar to but different from the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.

What characterized Act of State Doctrine as a rule not of international law but
of judicial restraint in domestic law whereby courts refrain from making
decisions in deference to the executive who is the principal architect of foreign
relations. (Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 22 Oct. 1963)

(2) Diplomatic/consular immunity - covers the representative of state or diplomatic or

consular.

Diplomatic immunity is a principle of international law by which certain foreign

government officials are not subject to the jurisdiction of local courts and other
authorities for both their official and, to a large extent, their personal activities.

Exequatur (1991 Bar)

An authorization from the receiving State admitting the head of a consular post
to the exercise of his functions. Thus, an appointee cannot start performing his
function unless the receiving State issues an exequatur to him. (Art. 12, Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations)
B. Privileges and Immunities
1. Immunity from jurisdiction: Diplomatic agents, such as ambassadors, are
immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving state. This means
they cannot be prosecuted or sued in the host country's courts for actions
performed within the scope of their official duties.
2. Inviolability of diplomatic agents and premises: Diplomatic agents, as well as
their official residences and embassies, enjoy inviolability. This means they are
protected from intrusion, search, and arrest by the authorities of the receiving state.

C. Requisites
1. Appointment as a diplomatic agent: To qualify for diplomatic immunity, an
individual must be officially appointed as a diplomatic agent by their sending state,
typically holding the rank of ambassador, envoy, or minister.
2. Functions carried out in an official capacity: Immunity is granted for actions
performed within the scope of official diplomatic functions, such as negotiating
international agreements, representing the sending state, and conducting
diplomatic activities.

D. Exceptions
1. Limited immunity for certain acts outside official functions: Diplomats may not be
immune from the jurisdiction of the receiving state for actions unrelated to their
official functions. For example, if a diplomat commits a serious crime or gets
involved in a civil dispute unrelated to their diplomatic duties, they may face legal
consequences.
2. Immunity waivers by the sending state: The sending state can choose to waive
the immunity of its diplomats, allowing them to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
host country's legal system. This is often done when the sending state believes it
is in its best interest to allow prosecution in the receiving state.
Diplomatic Immunity vs. Consular Immunity

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY CONSULAR IMMUNITY

SCOPE AS TO BUILDINGS AND PREMISES

Premises of the mission includes the Consular premises include the

building or parts of building and the buildings or parts of buildings and the
land irrespective of the ownership land irrespective of ownership used
used for the purpose of the mission exclusively for the purposes of
including the residence of the head consular posts.
of mission.

ON ENTRY OF AGENTS OF THE RECEIVING STATE

GR: The agents of the receiving state GR: The agents of the receiving state
may not enter the premises of the may not enter the consular premises.
mission.
XPN: Consent of the head of the
XPN: Consent of the head of the consular post. Consent is assumed
mission. in case of fire or other disasters
requiring prompt
protective action.

AS TO INVIOLABILITY OF BAGGAGE

Personal baggage of a diplomatic Consular baggage shall not be

 agent shall not be opened. opened. It may be requested that the
baggage be opened in their
presence by an authorized
representative of the receiving state
if they have serious reason to believe
that the baggage contains objects of
other articles,
documents, correspondence, or
articles.

AS A WITNESS BEFORE THE COURT

Not obliged to give evidence as a May be called upon to attend as a

witness. witness; if declined, no coercive
measure or penalty may be applied.

A. Immunity of the head of state

- Heads of State
The head of State represents the sovereignty of the State and enjoys the right
to special protection for his physical safety and the preservation of his honor
and reputation.

The head of State is immune from criminal and civil jurisdiction, except when
he himself is the plaintiff, and is not subject to tax or exchange or currency
restrictions. Based on the principle of extraterritoriality, his quarters, archives,
property, and means of transportation are Inviolate.
 Scope
1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same
inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission;
2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of
Article 31;
3. His property shall likewise enjoy inviolability [Art. 30, VCDR];
4. Personal baggage is exempt from inspection, except:
a. If there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains articles
which are neither for the official use of the mission or for the
personal use of a diplomatic agent or members of his family
forming part of his household;
b. If the import or export of the articles is prohibited by the law or
controlled by the quarantine regulations of the receiving State.

Such inspection shall be conducted only in the presence of the diplomatic

agent or of his authorized representative [Art. 36, VCDR].1
- Applies to both the Head of State and to the State itself
Immunity of the head of state
For a sitting foreign sovereign or head of state; his or her immunity is
absolute, regardless of the nature of his offense - be it private or state matter
- Where the suit against the heads of state is a private matter
- Effect (Mighell v. Sultan of Johore): The Sultan of Johore was sued
for breach of promise to marry in a British courts

1. The subject of the suit therefore was a private matter, not a state matter.
 2. Upon verification of his being a sitting foreign sovereign, the case was
dismissed.
3. The immunity that is recognized here is absolute for a sitting head of
state.
- Where the acts done relative to the suit against the head of state
was done when he was not yet a head of state

For an ex- head of state, immunity for official or government acts is

generally recognizable; however, if such an act was related to the
perpetration of serious international crimes such as those considered to be
jus cogens - such immunity may be pierced
- Immunity Ratione Materiae v Ratione Personae: Immunity ratione
materiae applies not only to ex-heads of state and ex-ambassadors but
to all state officials who have been involved in carrying out the functions
of the state. Such immunity is necessary in order to prevent state
immunity being circumvented by prosecuting or suing the official who,
for example, actually carried out the torture when a claim against the
head of state would be precluded by the doctrine of immunity.
*Immunity ratione materiae - It protects a state officials from foreign court
proceedings for official acts performed on behalf of the state and applies not only
to ex-heads of state and ex-ambassadors but to all state officials who have been
involved in carrying out the functions of the state.
-as a matter of general customary international law a head of state will
personally be liable to be called to account if there is sufficient evidence that
he authorized or perpetrated such serious international crimes.
B. State immunity (Doctrine of)
● The principle that the state may not be sued without its consent found
in the Philippine Constitution is both municipal law and also
international law applicable to foreign states. This is based on the
principle of equality of states: par in parent non habet imperium. (Latin
for 'equals have no sovereignty over each other')
● General Principle of international law, forming the basis of State
Immunity because of this Principle, A sovereign State cannot exercise
jurisdiction over another Sovereign State.
● The Schooner Exchange v. MacFaddon -States enjoy absolute
immunity. Despite the absolute territorial jurisdiction of states, one
sovereign, being bound to not degrade the dignity of his nation by
placing himself within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter into foreign territory in the confidence that the immunities
belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication and will be extended to him.
● Immunity came to be reserved only for acts jure imperii (governmental
acts) but not for acts jure gestionis (trading and commercial acts).
● The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
● The Supreme Court had the occasion to rule in numerous cases that
the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party
cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act
jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is
the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If
the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial
activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the
 particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an
act jure imperii.
● Jure Imperii, “ By right of the Sovereignty” . It refers to the public acts
that a nation undertakes as a sovereign state. These acts are usually
immune from legal action or liability in a Foreign Country.
● Jure Gestionis, “ By way of doing business' '. It refers to a Nation's
commercial or private acts, as opposed to its public or governmental
acts.
● Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and
unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We
find no such waiver in this case.

- “True, the doctrine not too infrequently is derisively called “the royal
prerogative of dishonesty” because it grants the state the prerogative to
defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.”
(Dept. of Agriculture vs. NLRC, Nov. 11, 1993)
- The States’ consent may be given expressly or impliedly- (Republic vs
NLRC, October 17, 1996)
- Express Consent to be Sued
- may be made through general law or special law.
- In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity the
immunity of the State from suit is found in Act. No. 3083, where
the Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon
any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express
or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil actions between
private parties. (Republic vs NLRC, October 17, 1996)
 - Under special law, consent to be sued may come in the form of a
private bill authorizing a named individual to bring suit on a special
claim. a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the
government for an alleged tort. (United States vs. Guinto,
February 26, 1990)
- the consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of the State Immunity it can only be made by an
act of the legislative body (Republic of the Philippines vs.
Feliciano, March 12, 1987)
- Implied Consent to be Sued
- implied consent is conceded when:
a. the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to
a counter-claim, or
b. when it enters into a contract (Republic vs. NLRC, October
17, 1996)
- The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the
right to sue private parties in its own courts (Froilan vs Pan
Oriental Shipping Co., September 30, 1954)
- Implied consent is conceded when the State itself commences
litigation, thus opening itself to a counter-claim. (Republic vs
NLRC, October 17, 1996)
- Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim
or when it enters into contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity (DOH
vs Phil. Pharma Wealth, Feb. 20, 2013)
 - However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a
contract, the State will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. (DOH vs Phil. Pharma Wealth,
Feb. 20, 2013)
(1) The doctrine implies that a State enjoys immunity from the exercise of
jurisdiction by another State.
(2) The State may not be sued without its consent (Const. Art. XVI, Sec. 3)

BASIS: ALL STATES ARE SOVEREIGN EQUALS AND CANNOT ASSERT

JURISDICTION OVER ONE ANOTHER, CONSONANT WITH THE PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLE OF PAR IN PAREM NON HABET
IMPERIUM

RESTRICTIVE APPLICATION: Absolute sovereign immunity is NO longer

recognized. The RESTRICTIVE DOCTRINE of sovereign immunity denies
sovereign immunity with respect to state activities of COMMERCIAL
NATURE (Arigo v. Swift, GR No. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014)

The IMMUNITY OF SOVEREIGN is recognized only with regard to PUBLIC

ACTS (Holy See v. Rosario, GR No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994)

EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY:

(1) Waiver of State of Immunity:

(a) when it gives consent at the time the proceeding is instituted;
 (b) when it takes steps relating to the merits of the case before
invoking
immunity;
(c) when by treaty or contract it had previously given consent; and
(d) when by law or regulation in force at the time the complaint arose
it has indicated that it will consent to the institution of the
proceedings;
(2) if the state itself has instituted the proceedings;
(3) any counterclaim arising out of the same legal relationship;
(4) commercial transactions with private individuals or entities;
(5) death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property,
cause by an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the
State;
(6) right or interest of the State in movable or immovable property arising by
way of succession or donation;
(7) alleged infringement of patent, industrial design, trade name or business
name, trade mark, copyright, or any other form of intellectual or industrial
property;
(8) participation in a company or other collective body, whether incorporated
or unincorporated;
(9) proceeding which relates to the operation of a ship other than a warship;
and
(10) proceeding involving effects of an arbitration agreement (UN Convention
of the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property)

NOTES: When a State or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or

diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the State
where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity
(Holy See v. Rosario, GR No. 101949-December 1, 1994).

The determination of the DFA that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts (Liang v. People, GR No. 125865,
January 28, 2000).

Reason for Immunity:

- “With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at
the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against
lawsuits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.” (Republic vs Villasor,
November 28, 1973)

C. Diplomatic and consular immunities

(1) DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY - part of customary international law which grants

immunity to diplomatic representatives, in order to uphold their dignity as
representatives of their respective States and to allow them free and unhampered
exercise of their functions. Diplomatic immunity is NOT an inherent right but rather
one established by mutual consent of States.

(2) TERMS & DEFINITIONS:

(a) RIGHT OF LEGATION (RIGHT OF DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE)

 refers to the right of the State to send and receive diplomatic missions,
which enables the State to carry on friendly relations. It is NOT a natural
or inherent right, but exists only by common consent. NO legal liability
is incurred by the State for refusing to send or receive diplomatic
representatives.

(b) DIPLOMACY - a science and an art whose purpose is to accomplish

foreign policy in the most accurate way, trying to persuade the
counterpart. As a peaceful alternative to war, one of its main functions
is the MINIMIZATION of friction.
(c) VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS - a codification
of rules of international law on diplomatic intercourse, privileges, and
immunities. The Philippines signed it on October 20, 1961 and ratified
it on November 15, 1965. It has become a universal treaty with 190
State Parties as of 2014.
(d) DIPLOMATS - a class of persons including ambassadors sent by their
foreign government of a foreign state for the purpose of being general
representatives or to undertake special negotiations. The total number
of diplomats of a State constitutes its foreign service.
(e) DIPLOMATIC AGENT - is the head of the mission or a member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Art. 1(e).

The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall NOT be

liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat
him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any
attack on his person, freedom or dignity.
 He is vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits (Minucher v. Scalzo, GR No. 142396, February 11, 2003).

(f) AGREEMENT - signifies State’s consent to the foreign State’s

appointment of a head of mission, as well as the appointment of military,
naval and air attaches.

(g) AIDE MEMOIRE - written summary of the key points made by a

diplomat in an official conversation. Literally, a document left with the
other party to the conversation, either at the time of the conversation,
or subsequently, as an aid to memory.

(h) PERSONA NON GRATA (an unwelcome person) - an offending

diplomate. The receiving State has the right to declare a diplomatic or
consular agent a persona non grata and thus request for the recall of
that agent.
(i) AGREATION - an informal inquiry (enquiry) to find out the acceptability
of a proposed envoy and an informal conformity (agrement) of the
receiving State to the appointment of the said envoy. If an appointment
is made without agregation, it amounts to a diplomatic faux pass as
there may be embarrassment.

(3) AGENTS OF DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE:

(a) Head of State - he is the embodiment of the sovereignty of the State

(b) Foreign Secretary or minister
 (c) members of diplomatic service
(d) special diplomatic agents appointed by head of the state; and
(e) envoys ceremonial

(4) DIPLOMATIC CORPS - a body consisting of all diplomatic envoys accredited

to the same local or receiving state. The doyen du corps or the head of this
body is:
(a) the Papal Nuncio, if there is one;
(b) the oldest ambassador; or
(c) in their absence, the oldest minister plenipotentiary

Appointment of Envoys/Diplomatic Corps

It is the President of the Phils. who appoints (Const. Art. VII, Sec. 16) sends
and instructs the diplomatic and consular representatives. This prerogative
is unquestionable (De Perio Santos vs. Macaraig, GR No. 94070, April 10,
1992)

(5) MEMBERS OF THE MISSION

(a) Head of the Mission

(a1) Ambassadors or nuncios accredited by the Head of State and
other heads of mission of equivalent rank;
(a2) envoys, ministers and internuncios accredited to the heads of
States;
(a3) charge d’affaires accredited to Ministers of Foreign Affairs;

(b) Staff of the Mission

 (b1) diplomatic staff (with diplomatic rank);
(b2) administrative and technical staff; and
(b3) service staff (VCDR, Art. 1)
Private Servant - in the domestic service of a member of the
mission but is not an employee of the Sending State;

(6) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

(a) DIPLOMATIC AGENTS

(a1) not obliged to give evidence as a witness [VCDR, Art. 31(2)]

(a2) inviolability of the person (VCDR, Art. 29)
(a3) inviolability of the private residence
(a4) immunity from criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state:

exceptions:

(a) a real action relating to private immovable property unless he

holds it on behalf of the Sending State for the purpose of the
mission;

(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is

acting as a private person; and
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in his private capacity;
 (a5) exemption from social security provisions with respect to services
rendered for the sending State (VCDR, Art. 33)
(a6) exemption from all dues and taxes (VCDR, Art. 34)
(a7) exemption from all personal services and military operations
(VCDR, Art. 35)
(a8) exemption from all customs, duties, taxes and related charges;
(a9) personal baggage is exempt from inspection; and
(a10) the properties, including papers and correspondence, of an
Ambassador shall be inviolable.

(b) ADMINISTRATIVE & TECHNICAL STAFF - If they, together with the

members of their families forming part of the their respective
households, are not nationals of or permanent residents in the
Receiving State, they shall be entitled to the same privileges and
immunities as that of a diplomatic agent, except that the immunity from
civil and administrative jurisdiction shall not extend to acts performed
outside the course of their duties;

(c) SERVICE STAFF - if they are NOT nationals of or permanent residents

of the Receiving State, they shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts
performed in the course of their duties as well as exemption from dues
and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their
employment [VCDR, Art. 37(3)]

(d) PRIVATE SERVANTS - if they are not nationals or permanent

residents of the Receiving State, they shall be exempt from dues and
taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment.
 They may enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted
by the receiving State. [VCDR, Art. 37 (4)]

(e) OTHER PERSONS PRIVILEGED - other members of the staff of the

mission and private servants who are nationals of or permanently
residing in the receiving State shall enjoy privileges and immunities
only to the extent admitted by the receiving State [VCDR, Art. 38]

(7) TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

(a) death
(b) extinction of State
(c) abolition of office
(d) dismissal of the Receiving State
(e) war between the Receiving and Sending States
(f) resignation
(g) removal and
(h) recall by the Sending State

● Official representatives of a state are given immunities and privileges

when they are within the territory of another state. The immunities and
privileges they enjoy are personal in the sense that they benefit the
person. But the purpose of the immunities given them is functional, that
is, to enable them to perform their functions properly. On the part of the
receiving state there lie certain obligations to protect the representative
and his property and office. The law on this subject is very important
because of the reliance states place on their representatives in dealing
with other states.
● Diplomats are concerned with the political relations of states. The
codification of the law on the subject may be found in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).
● Diplomatic relations between states are purely by mutual consent.
Before the head of mission is sent to the receiving state, an agreement
must first be obtained. The receiving state is under no obligation to give
reasons for refusing an agreement. (Art. 4, Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations)
● Diplomats and consuls are both state representatives sent to a
receiving state with different functions and matters being attended to.
Diplomat attends to the political relations of the states while consul
attends to the economic matters of the states. Both of them have the
privilege of state immunity which includes protection of property and
office while in the receiving state.
● Moreover, the “receiving State may at any time, and without having to
explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission
or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non
grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not
acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate,
either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the
mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before
arriving in the territory of the receiving State.” (Art. 9, Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
Rights And Privileges Of The Diplomatic Mission:
1. premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State
may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission (Art.
22)
2. Receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its
dignity. (Art. 22)
3. premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and
the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search,
requisition, attachment or execution. (Art. 22)
4. The sending State and the head of the mission shall be exempt from all
national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of
the mission, whether owned or leased, other than such as represent
payment for specific services rendered (Art.23)
5. The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time
and wherever they may be.( Art. 24)
6. The receiving State shall permit and protect free communication on the part
of the mission for all official purposes. In communicating with the
Government and the other missions and consulates of the sending State,
wherever situated, the mission may employ all appropriate means, including
diplomatic couriers and messages in c ode or cipher. However, the mission
may install and use a wireless transmitter only with the consent of the
receiving State. (Art. 127)
7. The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable. Official
correspondence means all correspondence relating to the mission and its
functions. (Art. 127)
9. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained. (Art. 127)
10. The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible external
marks of their character and may contain only diplomatic documents or
articles intended for official use. (Art. 127)
11. The diplomatic courier, who shall be provided with an official document
indicating his status and the number of packages constituting the diplomatic
bag, shall be protected by the receiving State in the performance of his
functions. He shall enjoy personal inviolability and shall not be liable to any
form of arrest or detention. (Art. 127)
12. The sending State or the mission may designate diplomatic couriers ad
hoc. In such cases the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article shall also
apply, except that the immunities therein mentioned shall cease to apply
when such a courier has delivered to the consignee the diplomatic bag in his
charge. (Art. 127)
13. A diplomatic bag may be entrusted to the captain of a commercial aircraft
scheduled to land at an authorized port of entry. He shall be provided with
an official document indicating the number of packages constituting the bag
but he shall not be considered to be a diplomatic courier. The mission may
send one of its members to take possession of the diplomatic bag directly
and freely from the captain of the aircraft.
14. The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable
to any form of arrest or detention. (Article 29)
15. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.
(Article 29)
16. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same
inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission. (Article 30)
 17. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of
Article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability. (Article 30)
18. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the
sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is
involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private
person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official
functions. (Article 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations)

D. Immunity of International Organizations

- The basis of their privileges and immunities is not sovereignty but necessity
for the effective exercise of their functions.
-There is no common law doctrine recognizing the immunity of international
organizations. Their immunities come from the conventional instrument
creating them a clear example of the grant of immunity is the 1946 General
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.
- International organizations, their property, and assets enjoy immunity from all
judicial proceedings concerning acts carried out in the pursuit of their object
and purpose, except in cases in which the organization expressly waives
that immunity.
 E. Act of the State Doctrine

(1) Act of State Doctrine was first stated in Underhill versus Hernandez. It
states that every sovereign is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another, done within its territory.

In this case, General Hernandez in1892 revolution in Venezuela against the

legitimate govemment, commanded the anti-administration party and after
defeating the army of the administration, he entered Bolivar to assume leadership
of the government. George F.Underhill was a citizen of the United States who had
constructed a waterworks system for the city of Bolivar, under a contract with the
government, and was engaged in supplying the place with water. He also carried
on a machinery repair business. Some time after the entry of Gen. Hernandez,
Underhill applied to him for a passport to leave the city. Hernandez refused this
request as well as requests made by others on Underhill's behalf. The purpose of
Hernandez's refusal was to coerce Underhill to operate his waterworks and his
repair works for the benefit of the community and the revolutionary forces. After
Underhill was finally allowed to leave, he filed suit in the United States to recover
damages for the detention caused by reason of the denial of his permit to leave, for
his alleged confinement to his own house,and for certain alleged assaults and
affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez's army. In denying the plea of Underhill,the
U.S.court ruled with what is now known as the “act of state doctrine”.

The doctrine is similar to but different from the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
It is characterized as a rule not of international law but of judicial restraint in
domestic law whereby courts refrain from making decisions in deference to the
executive who is the principal architect of foreign relations. The act of state doctrine
does,however,have “constitutional” underpinnings. It arises out of the basic
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers.
It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement
particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations.

(2) EXTERRITORIALITY versus EXTRATERRITORIALITY

(a) exterritoriality - is commonly used to describe that status of a person

or thing physically present on a State’s territory, but wholly or partly withdrawn from
the State’s jurisdiction by a rule of International Law;

(b) extraterritoriality - the right of foreign citizens to be tried by the laws

of the country they are from, not the laws of the country where they live.

CASE DIGEST

● Pinochet case ((ON APPEAL FROM A DIVISIONAL COURT OF THE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION) ON 24 March 1999 (opinion of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson)
General Augusto Pinochet led a 1973 military coup that overthrew
democratically elected Chilean President Salvador Allende. According to a national
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at least 3,196 people were killed or forcibly
disappeared during Pinochet’s subsequent 17-year dictatorship. Thousands more
were tortured or exiled. On October 16, 1998, while seeking medical help in
London, British authorities detained Augusto Pinochet on an arrest warrant issued
by Spanish Magistrate Baltasar Garzon. Garzon who had charged Pinochet with
genocide, terrorism, and torture committed during the Chilean dictatorship was
seeking his extradition. In November 1998, a panel of British law lords ruled that
Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from prosecution as a former head of state and
could be extradited to Spain. This decision, based largely on customary
international law, was set aside, however, when one of the judges who heard the
appeal was found to have ties to Amnesty International. A larger panel of law lords
heard the appeal again in March 1999, and in a 6-1 decision, reaffirmed that
Pinochet could be extradited. The Chilean government and other extradition
opponents then urged the British government to send the former dictator back to
Chile on medical grounds. Despite the protests of legal and medical experts from
several countries, British Home Secretary Jack Straw released Pinochet on March
2,2000, ostensibly on health grounds.

Senator Pinochet’s implementation of torture as defined by the Torture

Convention cannot be a state function. The general acceptance of the
principle of individual responsibility for international criminal conduct.
“It can no longer be doubted that as a matter of general customary
international law a head of state will personally be liable to be
called to account if there is sufficient evidence that he authorized
or perpetrated such serious international crimes.”
If the implementation of the torture regime is to be treated as official
business sufficient to found an immunity for the former head of state, it must
also be official business sufficient to justify immunity for his inferiors who
actually did the torturing. Under the [Torture] Convention the international
crime of torture can only be committed by an official or someone in an official
capacity. They would all be entitled to immunity. Therefore, the whole
elaborate structure of universal jurisdiction over torture committed by
officials is rendered abortive, and one of the main objectives of the Torture
Convention to provide a system under which there is no safe haven for
torturers ill have been frustrated. In my judgment, all these factors together
demonstrate that the notion of continued immunity for ex-heads of the state
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Torture Convention.

REGINA v. BARTLE AND THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE: Senator

Pinochet as former head of state enjoys immunity ratione materiae in
relation to acts done by him as head of state as part of his official functions
as head of
● Issue: whether the alleged organisation of state torture by Senator
Pinochet (if proved) would constitute an act committed by Senator
Pinochet as part of his official functions as head of state. Can it be said
that the commission of a crime which is an international crime against
humanity and jus cogens is an act done in an official capacity on behalf
of the state?
● Held: Implementation of torture as defined by the Torture Convention
cannot be a state function.
● “The idea that individuals who commit international crimes are
internationally accountable for them has now become an
accepted part of international law. Problems in this area - such
as the non-existence of any standing international tribunal to
have jurisdiction over such crimes, and the lack of agreement as
to what acts are internationally criminal for this purpose– have
not affected the general acceptance of the principle of individual
responsibility for international criminal conduct.” It can no longer
be doubted that as a matter of general customary international law a
 head of state will personally be liable to be called to account if there is
sufficient evidence that he authorized or perpetrated such serious
international crimes.
● Finally, if the implementation of a torture regime is a public function
giving rise to immunity ratione materiae, this produces bizarre results.
- Immunity rationae materiae applies not only to ex-heads of state
and ex-ambassadors but to all state officials who have been
involved in carrying out the functions of the state.
- Such immunity is necessary in order to prevent state immunity
being circumvented by prosecuting or suing the official who, for
example, actually carried out the torture when a claim against
the head of state would be precluded by the doctrine of
immunity.
- If that applied to the present case, and if the implementation
of the torture regime is to be treated as official business
sufficient to found an immunity for the former head of state,
it must also be official business sufficient to justify
immunity for his inferiors who actually did the torturing.
● For these reason, as alleged, Senator Pinochet organized and
authorized torture after 08 December 1988, he was not acting in
any capacity which gives rise to immunity ratione materiae
because such actions were contrary to international law

The Schooner Exchange v. MacFaddon, 11 U.S. 116

Two US citizens filed a libel for the attachment of a vessel in favor of them.
They claimed that the Schooner Exchange was theirs when it was violently and
forcibly taken by certain persons, acting under the decrees and orders of Napoleon,
Emperor of the French, out of the custody of the libellants, and of their captain and
agent when she sailed from Baltimore, bound to St. Sebastians, in Spain, and was
disposed of by those persons, or some of them, in violation of the rights of the
libellants and of the law of nations on that behalf. Upon this libel the usual process
was issued wherein proclamations were issued but no appearance were made to
oppose the claim of the libellants.
Before the third proclamation was made, the Attorney of the United States for
the District of Pennsylvania appeared and filed a suggestion "That inasmuch as
there exists between the United States of America and Napoleon, Emperor of
France and King of Italy, &c., a state of peace and amity, the public vessels of his
said Imperial and Royal Majesty, conforming to the law of nations and laws of the
said United States, may freely enter the ports and harbors of the said United States
and at pleasure depart therefrom without seizure, arrest, detention or molestation.
That a certain public vessel described and known as the Balaou, or Vessel No. 5,
belonging to his said Imperial and Royal Majesty and actually employed in his
service, under the command of the Sieur Begon upon a voyage from Europe to the
Indies having encountered great stress of weather upon the high seas, was
compelled to enter the port of Philadelphia for refreshment and repairs about 22
July, 1811. That having entered the said port from necessity and not voluntarily,
having procured the requisite refreshments and repairs, and having conformed in
all things to the law of nations and the laws of the United States, was about to
depart from the said port of Philadelphia and to resume her voyage in the service
of his said Imperial and Royal Majesty when on 24 August, 1811, she was seized,
arrested, and detained in pursuant of the process of attachment issued upon the
prayer of the libellants. That the said public vessel had not at any time, been
violently and forcibly taken or captured from the libellants, their captain and agent
on the high seas, as prize of war or otherwise, but that if the said public vessel,
belonging to his said Imperial and Royal Majesty as aforesaid, ever was a vessel
navigating under the flag of the United States and possessed by the libellants,
citizens thereof, as in their libel is alleged (which nevertheless the said Attorney
does not admit), the property of the libellants in the said vessel was seized and
divested, and the same became vested in His Imperial and Royal Majesty within a
port of his empire or of a country occupied by his arms, out of the jurisdiction of the
United States and of any particular state of the United States, according to the
decrees and laws of France in such case provided. And the said attorney submitting
whether, in consideration of the premises, the court will take cognizance of the
cause, respectfully prays that the court will be pleased to order and decree that the
process of attachment heretofore issued be quashed, that the libel be dismissed
with costs, and that the said public vessel, her tackle, &c., belonging to his said
Imperial and Royal Majesty be released, &c. And the said attorney brings here into
court the original commission of the said Sieur Begon."
The libel was dismissed by the District Court but the sentence was reversed
by the Circuit Court. Thus, an appeal was filed to the US Supreme Court.
The issue is whether an American citizen can assert in an American court a
title to an armed national vessel found within the waters of the United States.
The US Supreme Court ruled on the negative by defining the jurisdiction of
courts and that of states wherein the latter cannot be subjected to the prior in
another sovereign. Further, it enumerated instances wherein territorial and
extraterritorial jurisdiction principle applies:
1st. One of these is admitted to be the exemption of the person of the
sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory.
 If he enters that territory with the knowledge and license of its sovereign, that
license, although containing no stipulation exempting his person from arrest, is
universally understood to imply such stipulation.
2d. A second case, standing on the same principles with the first, is the
immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers.
3d. A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his
territorial jurisdiction is where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass
through his dominions.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it deriving validity from an external source would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
States enjoy absolute immunity. Despite the absolute territorial jurisdiction of
states, one sovereign, being bound to not degrade the dignity of his nation by
placing himself within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter into
foreign territory in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent
sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication and
will be extended to him.
The sentence of the Circuit Court reversing the sentence of the District Court
in the case of the Exchange was Reversed, and that of the district court dismissing
the libel was affirmed.

THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE v. MACFADDON

- states enjoy absolute immunity
● “the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.”
 ● However, absolute territorial jurisdiction “would not seem to contemplate
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in
no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the
highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself
or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory, in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved
by implication, and will be extended to him.”

USA v Hon. Ruiz (G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985)

The traditional rule of State immunity is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are constantly developing and evolving. Because state activities
have multiplied, it has become necessary to distinguish them between sovereign
and governmental acts, and private, commercial and proprietary acts.
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. A state
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. But this does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case, repairs of base facilities are an integral part of the naval base
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, which is a function of
the government not utilized nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

United States v. Hon. Luis Reyes (G.R. No. 79253, March 1,1993)
A claim of immunity by an American official was rejected when shown to have
been committed outside the scope of her authority as well as contrary to law.
 Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State,
and an action against the latter is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument to perpetrate an injustice.

Holy See v Eriberto Rosario, Jr. (G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994)
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be the ultimate test of whether the activity or transaction is commercial.
One must also question: (a.) whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in
the regular course of business; and (b.) if not, whether the nature of the particular
transaction or act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity or an incident thereof. If the
answer to (b.) is yes, and especially if it is not undertaken for profit or gain, then the
act is jure imperii.
In this case, petitioner has denied having bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of a real estate business. Instead, he claimed that the acquisition
of Lot 5-A was for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature of the
Philippines. Respondent failed to dispute such claim.

Republic of Indonesia v Vinzon (G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003)

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement with
respondent, James Vinzon of Vinzon Trade and Services, to maintain specified
equipment (aircons, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, water motor
pumps) at the Embassy Main and Annex buildings and that the Wisma Duta.
Chief of Administration, Minister Counselor Azhari Kasim allegedly found
Vinzon’s work unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the agreed standards.
Thus, the Embassy terminated the agreement.
 Respondent alleges that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Vinzon
filed a complaint in the RTC Makati. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss based on
sovereign immunity from suit as well as diplomatic immunity under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, regarding the suit against Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner has expressly waived its immunity
from suit based on a provision in the Maintenance Agreement which states that any
legal action arising from the agreement will be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines. In addition, the
Ambassador and Minister Counsellor may be sued in their personal capacity for
tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss, which the CA affirmed.
Petitioner questions the ruling of the CA that the former had waived its
immunity from suit based on the agreement.
The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner:
a.) The rules of IL are neither unyielding not impervious to change. The
increasing need of sovereign states to enter into purely commercial activities
brought about a new concept of immunity. The restrictive theory holds that immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts but not with regard to
private acts.
b.) The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial
activity, as in this case, the particular act or transaction must be then tested by its
nature. If it is in pursuit of a sovereign activity or an incident thereof, then it is an
act jure imperii.
c.) The existence alone of a provision in the contract stating that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines
and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of state
immunity from suit. It is merely meant to apply where: (a.) the sovereign party elects
to sue in the local courts; or (b.) otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent
act. The applicability of Philippine laws include the principle recognizing sovereign
immunity.
d.) Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and
unequivocal, given explicitly or by necessary implication. There is not such waiver
in this case.
e.) The establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign function. It
encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment
of the embassy and the living quarter of its agents and officials.
f.) Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent may be sued in his private capacity for (c.) an action relating to
any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions. But the acts of the Ambassador and
the Minister Counsellor in terminating the agreement was committed in relation to
their official functions. Thus, they enjoy immunity from suit.

● DOTC v Sps. Abecina (G.R. No. 206484. June 29, 2016)

Legal Doctrine:
The case relies on the principle of "State Immunity from Suit," which holds that the
state may not be sued without its consent, except when the state has waived its
immunity, either expressly or by implication.

The doctrine distinguishes between acts jure imperii (sovereign or governmental

acts) and acts jure gestionis (private, commercial, or proprietary acts). Acts jure
imperii are generally immune from suit, while acts jure gestionis may constitute a
waiver of immunity.

Cting Ministerio v CFI, Amigable v. Cuenca, Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO, and Vigilar v.
Aquino that the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen

Facts of the Case:

The case involves a dispute between the Department of Transportation and

Communications (DOTC) and the Abecina spouses over properties in Camarines
Norte. The DOTC, in the performance of its governmental function, awarded Digitel
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., a contract to manage a Regional
Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP). Inadvertently, the municipality
of Jose Panganiban donated land to the DOTC for the project, which included
portions of the Abecina spouses' properties. After the Abecina spouses discovered
this encroachment, they sent a final demand to DOTC and Digitel to vacate the
premises and pay damages, but their demands were not met. The Abecina spouses
filed an accion publiciana complaint against the DOTC and Digitel. The DOTC
initially claimed immunity from suit but later admitted the Abecina spouses'
ownership of the properties during pre-trial.
A compromise agreement was reached between the Abecina spouses and Digitel,
but the DOTC remained in dispute. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the
DOTC to vacate the properties and pay damages, citing that government immunity
could not be used to perpetuate an injustice against citizens. The DOTC appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing immunity and contesting the damages. The
CA affirmed the RTC's decision, with the exception of exemplary damages. The
DOTC appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the DOTC can claim state immunity from suit?

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the DOTC, in this case, cannot claim state immunity
from suit because the encroachment on the respondents' property resulted from a
mistake and the DOTC's initial refusal to initiate expropriation proceedings. While
the DOTC's actions were taken in pursuit of its governmental function, it did not
follow the regular procedure upon discovering the encroachment. Therefore, the
DOTC's entry into and taking possession of the respondents' property amounted to
an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit. The Court also
determined that there was no genuine necessity for the DOTC to take the property,
as the respondents were willing to lease it. Additionally, the Court found that the
DOTC was not a builder in bad faith, so the forfeiture of improvements made by the
DOTC in favor of the respondents was unwarranted. The CA's decision was
affirmed, with the deletion of the forfeiture of improvements.
 ● ICMC v Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990)

Legal Doctrine:
The principle of diplomatic immunity, as articulated in Article III, Sections 4 and 5
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, and
Article 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1620 is the main idea in this case. This doctrine
asserts that international organizations, like ICMC and IRRI, enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process, except where they have expressly waived their
immunity. The purpose of this immunity is to protect international organizations from
interference by the host country and to ensure their unimpeded performance of
functions.

Facts of the Case:

The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) invoked their diplomatic immunity granted by the
Philippine Government. ICMC, accredited by the Philippine Government, operated
a refugee processing center. TUPAS filed a petition for a certification election
among ICMC's rank and file members, which ICMC opposed, citing its diplomatic
immunity. The Department of Foreign Affairs granted ICMC the status of a
specialized agency with diplomatic privileges and immunities. In the IRRI case, IRRI
was established as an autonomous, tax-free, non-profit organization, and it was
granted diplomatic immunity by virtue of Pres. Decree No. 1620. The Organized
Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) filed a petition for a
certification election, which IRRI opposed based on its immunity. Ultimately, the
issue in both cases revolved around whether the diplomatic immunity granted to
ICMC and IRRI extended to exemption from the application of Philippine labor laws.
Issue:
Whether or not the diplomatic privileges and immunities granted to ICMC and IRRI
extend to exemption from the application of Philippine labor laws?

Held:
The Court held that ICMC's diplomatic immunity from local jurisdiction did not
deprive labor of its basic rights. It was emphasized that ICMC employees still had
recourse in case of disputes, and the government retained the power to withdraw
ICMC's privileges and immunities in the event of abuse. The Court concluded that
certification elections could be seen as part of the "legal process," which
international organizations are immune from. In the IRRI case, the Court held that
IRRI's immunity did not deprive its employees of the right to self-organization, and
they had the option to resolve disputes through other means. The Secretary of
Labor's decision to dismiss the petition for certification election was not a grave
abuse of discretion. The Court clarified that diplomatic immunity of international
organizations does not exempt them from all aspects of Philippine labor laws, but
it protects them from undue interference in their internal operations and functions.

WHO v Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972)

The petitioner in this case, Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, was assigned by the WHO
to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services on
December 6, 1971. Pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951,
between the Philippine Government and the World Health Organization, he is said
to be entitled to diplomatic immunity. When petitioner Verstuyft’s personal effects
contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage
on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and
taxes. These crates were directly stored at the warehouse of Eternit Corporation
located in Mandaluyong, Rizal, pending his relocation into permanent quarters.

Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge, Hon. Benjamin H. Aquino,

issued on March 3, 1972, upon application on the same date of respondents
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers search warrant for alleged
violation of RA No. 4712 directing the search and seizure of the dutiable items in
said crates.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same

date respondent Judge advising that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from
search in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search
warrant order pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC upon protest of Dr.
Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific with station in Manila,
on March 6, 1972.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an extended comment stating the
official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government that petitioner
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity. It accordingly joined petitioner
Verstuyft’s prayer for the quashal of the search warrant. The respondent judge
nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant. Hence, the petition
in this case.

Petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to all privileges and immunities, exemptions,

and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law
under section 24 of the Host Agreement.
 Diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea for diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General, or other officer acting under his direction.

Kirkpatrick v ETC, 493 U.S. 400 (1990)

- The Republic of Nigerian wanted to build an Aeromedical center at Kaduna
Air force base.
- Harry Carpenter and Kirkpatrick and chief executive officer arranged for a
Nigerian Citizen to bribe the government officials to award the construction and
equipment contract to Kirkpatrick carpenter provided the bribe money to the
intermediary who then dispersed the bribes.
- Kirkpatrick won the contract. The payment of bribes and the officials
acceptance of those bribes violated Nigerian law.
- Environmental Tectonics, an unsuccessful bidder, found that Kirkpatrick had
bribed Nigerian officials to win the contract. It brought the matter to the Nigerian Air
Force and the US embassy in Lagos.Carpenter and Kirkpatrick were charged in
federal court with violating the foreign corrupt practices act and both pleaded guilty.
- Environmental Tectonics brought a civil action against Kirkpatrick to seek
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss the complaint based on the Act of State Doctrine.
SC ruled that the act of state doctrine is inapplicable where the validity of a foreign
government act is not in question, as in this case.
In denying Underhill’s plea, the US court applied the ―act of state doctrine:
a.) Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one county will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another, done within its own territory.
b.) Redress of grievances due to such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.