H e ge l’s Me tap h ys ics : Ch an gin g th e D e bate

J am es Kreines
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6): 466-480 .

ABSTRACT: There are two general approaches to Hegel’s theoretical philosophy

which are broadly popular in recent work. Debate between them is often
characterized, by both sides, as a dispute between those favoring a m ore
traditional “m etaphysical” approach and those favoring a newer “non-
m etaphysical” approach. But I argue that the m ost im portant and com pelling
points m ade by both sides are actually independent of the idea of a “non-
m etaphysical” interpretation of Hegel, which is itself sim ply unconvincing. The
m ost prom ising directions for future research, for those on both sides of recent
debates, will require recognizing that Hegel’s theoretical philosophy includes a
m etaphysics, and engaging new debates about the specific character of that
m etaphysics.

The central claim s of Hegel’s theoretical philosophy are couched in his

fam ously opaque term inology—the term inology of “the absolute,” “the idea,” etc.

And it is safe to say that recent work on Hegel’s theoretical philosophy lacks

consensus concerning these central claim s—even concerning what sorts of

philosophical issues they are m eant to address. There can be no question here of

com plete and even-handed coverage of the m any interpretive subvarieties and

debates between them all. There are, however, two general approaches broadly

popular in recent work. Debate between them is often characterized, by both

sides, as a dispute between those favoring a m ore traditional “m etaphysical”

Kreines, Changing the Debate 2

approach and those favoring a newer “non-m etaphysical” approach. But I argue

that the m ost im portant and com pelling points m ade by both sides are actually

independent of the idea of a “non-m etaphysical” interpretation of Hegel, which is

itself sim ply unconvincing. The m ost prom ising directions for future research, for

those on both sides of recent debates, will require recognizing that Hegel’s

theoretical philosophy includes a m etaphysics, and engaging new debates about

the specific character of that m etaphysics.

1. Tw o Re ce n tly Po p u lar Ap p ro ach e s

The first general approach popular in recent work is the m ore traditional of

the two; I will call it traditionalism , following Redding (20 0 2). I think this

general view is best introduced in term s of the idea that Hegel aim s to revive and

m odify a form of pre-Kantian m etaphysics—nam ely, Spinoza’s m onism .

Traditionalists see Hegel as following Spinoza in holding that everything real

m ust be “in” a single, all-encom passing substance. So Hegel’s “absolute” is akin

to what Spinoza calls “substance” or “God.” Spinoza claim s that “from God’s

suprem e power, or infinite nature … all things, have necessarily flowed” (Ethics

IP17S1). And Hegel sim ilarly holds that “the absolute” determ ines, grounds, or

organizes everything real.

Like som e of his contem poraries, however, Hegel advocates a distinctively

idealist form of m onism , in this sense: he aim s to synthesize Spinoza’s account of

substance with the em phasis on freedom in Kant and later idealists.1 But at this

point there is a divergence between interpretive subvarieties. The m ost

straightforward and vivid story is that Hegel sees substance itself as a m ind or

spirit (“Geist”) or “subject” which is som ehow freely self-creating. In Taylor’s

1For an excellent English-language version of the this version of the history of the developm ent of
post-Kantian idealism , see “Part II” of Henrich’s 1973 lectures at Harvard (20 0 3).
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 3

version, the “the universe” is supposed to be “posited by Geist” or by an all-

encom passing “cosm ic spirit” (1975, 87ff.). This idea certainly provides a natural

way to understand Hegel’s claim that “substance is essentially subject” (PhG

3:28/ 14).

But a different way of understanding Hegel’s m odification of Spinoza is

probably m ore popular in recent work, although it is also m ore difficult to

sum m arize clearly. The basic idea is that everything real is determ ined by a

fundam ental organizing principle of the whole, which interpreters often call a

basic “structure.” This is supposed to be what Hegel him self refers to as “the

idea.” It is not itself a m ind; it is an organizing principle which governs both

natural and m ental phenom ena. But this “structure” is best or m ost com pletely

realized specifically in phenom ena such as self-consciousness, subjectivity, and

freedom . Rolf Horstm ann and Frederick Beiser are two, of m any, advocates of

interpretations of this general sort.2

There is also a recently popular nontraditional approach to this m aterial. If

there is a single classic work of recent nontraditionalist interpretation, it is

Robert Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism (1989); Robert Brandom and Terry Pinkard

have long been working along broadly sim ilar lines. The basic view is best

introduced in term s of the idea that Hegel’s theoretical philosophy is a

continuation or extension of Kant’s critical project, rather than a revival or

m odification of any form of pre-critical m etaphysics. More specifically, Hegel’s

project is sim ilar to Kant's attem pt to account for the conditions of the possibility

of cognition of objects: Hegel focuses on “form s of thought” which are

2 I follow here especially the version proposed by Horstm ann; see especially his discussion of a
“prim ary structure” (1991, 177-82) and the sim ilar form ulation at (1998/ 20 0 4; Part 4). And see
Beiser (1993 and 20 0 5). See also Stern (1990 , especially pp. 110 -119) and Wartenberg (1993).
Kreines, Changing the Debate 4

com parable to Kant’s “categories.”3 And Hegel, following Kant, is interested in

the source of the legitim acy or norm ative authority of these form s of thought; for

exam ple, Hegel follows what Brandom describes as a Kantian “shift in attention

from ontological questions … to deontological ones.”4

But Hegel’s project is also shaped by skepticism am ong post-Kantian

idealists about Kant’s sharp distinction between concept and intuition. Hegel

consequently places great em phasis on the challenge of accounting for

determ inate cognition or thought about objects, without assum ing that

determ inacy is provided by a given m anifold of sensible intuition.5 This task is

supposed to send Hegel in two m ain new directions. First, he defends a form of

holism according to which the “form s of thought” depend for their determ inate

identity on their places within a larger whole or network. And, second, Hegel

argues that the conditions of the possibility of determ inate cognition of objects

includes the participation by individuals in social life.6 So Taylor is right that

“Geist” is fundam ental in Hegel’s theoretical philosophy, but this term does not

refer to a “cosm ic spirit”; it refers to our own historically developing form s of

social life.7

2 . Again s t th e Id e a o f a N o n -m e tap h ys ical H e ge l

The bone of contention between these two general approaches cannot

sim ply be whether Hegel is m ore sim ilar to Kant or to Spinoza, as he will likely be

3 E.g. Pippin (1989, ch. 2) and Brandom (1999, 165).

4 Brandom (1999, 165-7) see also e.g. Pippin (1989, 7).
5 See Pippin (1989, especially p. 38; 20 0 5, 38 7) and Brandom (1999, especially p. 167).
6 E.g. Pinkard (1994, 21) and Brandom (1999, 169).
7 Insofar the best evidence for such readings is found in the Phenom enology of Spirit, recent
nontraditionalists tend see the later Science of Logic and Ency clopedia of Philosophy as
fundam entally dependent on the argument of the earlier Phenom enology . See especially Pippin
(1989, 13-14).
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 5

sim ilar to each in different respects. The question is, what specific respect is at

issue? The answer can seem to be this: one approach sees Hegel as offering an

account of what really or even absolutely exists; the other sees Hegel as

concerned rather with som ething else—with categories, concepts or conceptual

schem es. Insofar as they see the debate in this way, friend and foe alike tend to

describe nontraditionalism as a “non-m etaphysical” interpretation of Hegel.

The term “m etaphysics” can, of course, be used in m any different ways, but

the idea of a “non-m etaphysical” reading of Hegel gains m uch of its substance

from the work of Klaus Hartm ann, whose term s are adopted by m ore recent

nontraditionalists. Hartm ann explains in a 1972 essay: Hegel advocates a

“m odest … herm eneutic of categories,” or “a non-m etaphysical philosophy devoid

of existence claim s and innocent of a reductionism opting for certain existences

to the determ inant of others” (1972, 124 and 110 ). These form ulations suggest a

natural way for us to use the term “m etaphysics,” which I will adopt here:

“m etaphysics” refers to accounts of what truly exists, and to accounts of

relationships between “existences” (e.g. reduction relations, and perhaps other

form s of dependence or priority). What is so controversial in these form ulations,

however, is the suggestion about Hegel—nam ely, that he is engaged in an analysis

of categories, concepts or their justification which is designed to m aintain

“m odest” neutrality with respect to m etaphysics.

My own view is that this general idea of a “non-m etaphysical” Hegel is only

one strand, and not the m ost im portant, in recent nontraditionalist

interpretations; be that as it m ay, however, this specific idea has attracted a great

deal of criticism .8 And it is easy to see why. After all, if anything com es through

8 More recent interpreters som etim es say that they seek new interpretations which differ but
rem ain “non-m etaphysical” (Pippin 1989, 6). Brandom em ploys different but sim ilar term s: Hegel
follows a Kantian “shift in attention from ontological questions … to deontological ones” (1999,
Kreines, Changing the Debate 6

clearly in Hegel’s texts it is the great extent of his philosophical am bitions. Surely

these include the am bition to defend an account of what truly or really exists. If

that point is not already clear enough in the Phenom enology , then it is even

clearer in the Science of Logic, which is supposed to provide an “exposition” of

“what … the thing in itself is in truth” or “what is truly in itself” (WL 5:130 / 121).

Furtherm ore, Hegel does address different kinds of existences and the relations

between them . He does so, for exam ple, in his discussions of “Mechanism ,”

“Teleology,” and “Life” at a crucial point at the conclusion of the Logic.9 Finally, it

is sim ply hard to believe that Hegel’s attem pt to account for som ething called

“the absolute” is any self-consciously “m odest” form of philosophy.

Granted, one m ight still try to reconstruct Hegel’s theoretical philosophy in

non-m etaphysical term s, setting aside those Hegelian aspirations which do not fit

the m old. But why? Why prefer a m etaphysically-neutral analysis of conceptual

schem es to an account of what truly or really exists? Perhaps at one tim e this

m ight have seem ed like a way to reconstruct Hegel in accordance with

contem porary philosophical orthodoxy. But anti-m etaphysical views—such as

positivism , ordinary language philosophy, and their descendents—are currently

controversial, and do not enjoy anything like the status of philosophical

orthodoxy.10 To seek to defend such views is fair enough. But it is hard to see why

we should view Hegel through the lens of this particular contem porary am bition,

especially given that doing so requires selective reconstruction of his views.

165-6). For som e persuasive criticism s see Horstm ann (1984, 47) on Hartm ann; Siep (1991) on
Pippin (1989); and Beiser (1995) on the approach of Hartm ann and his followers.
9 One indication that these sections are crucial is that they are found im m ediately before and
im m ediately after “The Idea”; these sections help to explain Hegel’s claim s about that central
term , and provide arguments for his claim s. I say m ore about Hegel on the priority of teleology
over m echanism in Kreines (20 0 4).
10See Am eriks’ (20 0 0 , 11) sim ilar point about non-m etaphysical approaches to Kant and post-
Kantians.
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 7

Sim ilarly, we should be wary of the idea that a fault-line between m etaphysical

and non-m etaphysical claim s is an intrinsic feature of Hegel’s own philosophy,

rather than an artifact created by viewing Hegel through the lens of com m itm ents

or am bitions in the contem porary debate.

Som e nontraditionalists, such as Pinkard, have responded to such concerns

by renouncing the term “non-m etaphysical” and stressing instead the idea of a

“post-Kantian” interpretation.11 But can we disentangle a m ore com pelling strand

of nontraditionalist interpretation from the unconvincing idea of a non-

m etaphysical Hegel? I think we can, and that doing so is the best way to

appreciate the m ost prom ising avenues open for further advancing and defending

nontraditional approaches.

3 . A D e bate abo u t H e ge l’s Re s p o n s e to Kan t’s Lim itatio n o f Ou r

Kn o w le d ge

What then are the other, m ore im portant and pressing, issues raised in

recent debates about Hegel’s theoretical philosophy? These can best be brought

into focus by considering Hegel’s relation ship to Kant. In short, Kant fam ously

holds that our knowledge is restricted: we can have no theoretical knowledge of

things as they are “in them selves.” All should agree that Hegel seeks to overturn

this restriction, or to establish knowledge which is not lim ited in this way—to

establish knowledge of “what is truly in itself” (WL 5:130 / 121). But there are two

surprisingly different interpretive approaches to Hegel’s am bition here.

While I will return to consider traditionalism in m ore detail below, the basic

idea is this: Traditionalists see Hegel as aspiring to surpass or to get beyond

11See the first footnote in Pinkard (1999). Also, Pinkard’s com pelling (1996) defense of Hartmann
and “non-m etaphysical” approaches, for exam ple, offers no defense of the idea that Hegel offers a
m etaphysically-neutral analysis of concepts; Pinkard instead refocuses attention on the core idea
that Hegel aim s to com plete Kant’s critical project, rather than to revive specifically pre-critical
form s of m etaphysics.
Kreines, Changing the Debate 8

Kant’s lim its. For exam ple, Kant argues that we cannot have theoretical

knowledge of the kinds of highest beings of interest to pre-critical rationalists.

Hegel asserts knowledge, beyond Kant’s lim its, that there is such a highest being:

there is an “absolute” sim ilar to Spinoza’s “God or substance.”

Nontraditionalists, by contrast, see Hegel as aspiring not to surpass but to

elim inate Kant’s lim its, or to erase those lim its from within. That is, Kant denies

the possibility of knowledge of the sorts of objects of special interest to pre-

critical m etaphysics, and Hegel agrees. But Hegel takes Kant’s denial farther:

Hegel aim s to justify the conditions of the possibility of thought about objects in a

m anner which will deny or undercut the idea that these conditions m ight block

access to a m ore fundam ental type of object or aspect of reality. So our

knowledge, though it is conditioned, is not lim ited or restricted. And the “form s

of thought” which condition our knowledge do not m erely articulate the way

objects appear to us; they are supposed to articulate the way things really or

absolutely are. For exam ple, Pippin portrays Hegel as aim ing to elim inate Kant’s

lim itation of our knowledge by arguing that “‘thought determ inations of the real’

… are what it is to be real.” Or, Hegel tries to argue that “what initially can only

be our way of taking up, discrim inating, categorizing the world” can “som ehow

pass from ‘ours’ to ‘absolute’ status.”12

Furtherm ore, just as Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” turns on the

“transcendental unity of apperception,” Hegel’s deduction of the “form s of

thought” is supposed to be grounded by appeal to som e kind of self-conscious or

12 Pippin (1989, 83) and (1993, 287) respectively. On the later form ulation, see Stern’s
(forthcoming) response. McDowell, though not focused specifically on Hegel interpretation, offers
an interesting form ulation of the general point: “it is central to Absolute Idealism to reject the
idea that the conceptual realm has an outer boundary” (1994, 44). Redding is another
nontraditionalist who advances broadly sim ilar claims in a com pelling m anner. See Redding
(20 0 2, 3.2).
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 9

apperceptive subjectivity.13 Insofar as this form of subjectivity is supposed to

ground absolute form s of thought, it will itself be the absolute. Or, perhaps Hegel
thinks that this form of subjectivity m ust be accounted for in term s of a yet m ore

basic “structure” of historically developing form s of social life (or “Geist”); if so,

then knowledge of the absolute would be achieved by, as Brandom says, “m aking

that structure explicit” (1999, 182).

Note what m akes this strand of nontraditionalism m ore com pelling than the

idea of a “non-m etaphysical” interpretation discarded above. The point here is

not that Hegel rejects m etaphysical questions about the real or absolute nature of

reality in favor of questions about our concepts, conceptual schem e, language,

and the source of their legitim acy, norm ativity, etc. The com pelling idea is rather

that Hegel pursues som e kind of consideration concepts and legitim acy which is

specifically supposed to resolve m etaphysical questions about reality, or

questions about the way things really or absolutely are. 14

4 . N o n trad itio n alis m an d th e N e e d fo r N e w Acco u n ts o f H e ge l’s

Me tap h ys ics

But what specifically are Hegel’s “thought determ inations of the real”? And,

m ore generally, what distinctive conclusions does Hegel advocate concerning the

way things really or absolutely are? The m ost prom ising ways to further develop

and defend nontraditionalism will require focusing directly on such questions

about the specific character of Hegel’s m etaphysics.

Why m ust nontraditionalists focus on such questions? To begin with, it

would be im plausible to say that Hegel seeks to justify certain “form s of thought”

13Both Pippin (1989, 18) and Brandom (1999, 168) stress Hegel’s praise of Kant’s “original
synthetic unity of apperception” at WL 6:254/ 584.
14So this strand of nontraditionalism can recognize and m ake sense of Hegel’s ambition to
em ploy som e new form of logic to resolve old questions about m etaphy sics. See e.g. EL §9An.
Kreines, Changing the Debate 10

as them selves “determ inations of the real,” but has nothing further to say about

w hich form s or determ inations—or about what reality, so-determ ined, is like.

And on this specific terrain nontraditionalists cannot lean on a com parison with

Kant. For the content of Hegel’s “determ inations of the real” is supposed to differ

from the content of Kant’s conditions of the possibility of experience. Hegel

com plains, for exam ple, about Kant’s claim “that cognition has no other form s of

thought than finite categories.”15 And Hegel does not seek a new justification for

Kant’s account of the extent of our knowledge, adding only the negative point

that it is illegitim ate to even conceive of anything beyond that extent. Nor does

Hegel sim ply borrow Kant’s account of a causally-determ ined realm of spatio-

tem poral appearances and argue that this is all there is to reality itself.

Nontraditionalists certainly do have their ways of understanding Hegel’s

departure from Kant: they em phasize, as noted above, Hegel’s holism and his

account of Geist. Both will lead nontraditionalists into debates about the specific

character of Hegel’s m etaphysics. Consider holism first. Som e form s of sem antic

holism and epistem ological holism m ay well be m etaphysically neutral. For

exam ple, the form er m ight hold, without saying anything about reality itself, that

our concepts depend for their m eanings on their places within a larger whole,

network, or conceptual schem e. But the com pelling nontraditionalist proposal is

that Hegel’s “form s of thought” are “determ inations of the real” or “what it is to

be real” (Pippin 1989, 83). So if Hegel has a holistic account of the “form s of

thought,” then this would have to include a m etaphysical dim ension; it would

have to involve som e form of the idea that, for real things them selves, “what it is

15 WL 6:261/ 589; Also e.g. EL §62An. See also Hegel’s responses to Kant’s Antinom ies. For
exam ple: it is wrong for Kant and post-Kantians to assum e “that cognition has no other form s of
thought than finite categories” (WL 5:216/ 191 and also WL 5:270 ff.234ff.; VGP
20 :351ff./ 3:448ff). On the im portance of this Hegelian am bition to extend our knowledge beyond
Kant’s lim its, see Stern (1999, section V).
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 11

to be real” depends on their place within som e larger whole or network. That

would certainly be a substantial claim about the way things really or absolute are,

and it certainly could be argued that this claim is Hegel’s. But this raises a further

question for nontraditionalists: How would such a m etaphysically-com m itted

holism differ from the m onism traditionally attributed to Hegel? That is, how

would it differ from the m odified form s of Spinozism described in traditional

interpretations? Nontraditionalists have an opportunity to advance their case

here, but they cannot do so by retreating to non-m etaphysical discussion of

sem antics and conceptual schem es, epistem ology and webs of belief, etc. The

prom ising way forward is to focus on the im plications of their approach

concerning the specific content of Hegel’s m etaphy sics. In what specific sense are

real things them selves dependent? What is the specific nature of the w hole or

network on which things depend? Those who want a nontraditional

interpretation stressing holism need to argue that Hegel’s answers differ in

philosophically crucial respects from Spinoza’s answers, and from the answers

described in traditional interpretations of Hegel.

Som e nontraditionalists m ight wish to resist the dem and for answers to

m etaphysical questions of interest to pre-critical m etaphysicians like Spinoza,

pointing out that Hegel rejects som e pre-critical form ulations of m etaphysical

questions. For exam ple, Hegel dism isses the questions of pre-critical rational

psychology, which are supposed to illegitim ately treat Geist (m ind or spirit) “as a

thing.”16 But Hegel’s ultim ate goal here clearly is not Kantian in spirit: Hegel does

not aim to establish a lim itation of our knowledge; he aim s to overcom e such

lim itations and to establish knowledge of reality and the absolute. So he certainly

16See §389, §389Zu, §379Zu, §34Zu; VGP 19:199/ 2:181. On this point see especially DeVries
(1988) and Wolff (1991).
Kreines, Changing the Debate 12

does not hold that all m etaphysical questions in all form ulations are

unanswerable. For exam ple, if Hegel is a holist, then he m ust have answers to

questions about the nature of the whole, its parts, and their real relations. And,

m ore generally, the defense of any com pelling nontraditional approach cannot

rest without specifying which m etaphysical questions Hegel does engage, how

Hegel’s answ ers differ from traditional portrayals. Perhaps in this way Hegel’s

theoretical philosophy could be shown to be “non-m etaphysical” in a very narrow

sense: it m ight be shown to differ crucially from specifically pre-critical form s of

m etaphysics, such as Spinoza’s m onism . But, again, m aking that case would

require focusing specifically on the details of Hegel’s own m etaphysics, in order

to differentiate it.

The point applies sim ilarly to nontraditionalists’ stress on the idea that

Geist—in the sense of our own historically developing form s of social life—is

supposed to ground Hegel’s determ inate “form s of thought.” Perhaps, as

nontraditionalists som etim es suggest, this idea is sim ilar to antirealism or to

pragm atism .17 But surely not to any non-m etaphy sical form of antirealism or

pragm atism , lim ited to claim s about (e.g.) epistem ology or sem antics. For

exam ple, Hegel’s view cannot be just that the “form s of thought” inherent in our

concepts, language, standards or form s of social life determ ine what can

m eaningfully count as real for us—without involving any m etaphysical claim , any

claim about reality itself, or (as som e critics of realism put it) any claim about an

“absolute truth” or “one true theory” of the world.18 Again, nontraditionalists

17 On antirealism see Pippin (1989; 99, 262, and 267); on pragm atism see Brandom (1999).
18 Citations from Putnam (1982, 147); see also the concluding claim that m etaphysics is
“overwhelm ingly unlikely” to be revived (165). Granted, there are nearly endless varieties of
antirealism and realism debated today, and perhaps m ore than one way to understand Putnam ’s
claim s here. But I see the controversies concerning what antirealism and realism are, and what
issues are at stake there, as excellent reason to cut out the contem porary m iddleman and focus
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 13

them selves, at least in their m ore com pelling form ulations, hold that Hegel’s

“form s of thought” are supposed to be absolute, or to articulate how things

absolutely are. So if nontraditionalists propose that som e relationship between

Geist and the “form s of thought” m akes Geist so fundam ental for Hegel, then

they need an account of the m etaphysical dim ension of this relation—an account

of a real relationship between Geist (som ething real, even if not “a thing” in som e

sense) and reality generally (or “what it is to be real”). And they need to explain

how this relationship differs from traditional portrayals, such as those on which

Geist is supposed to “posit” the universe (as in Taylor’s account). 19

In sum , nontraditionalists have prom ising avenues open to them for the

further developm ent and defense of their approach to Hegel, whether they stress

Hegel’s holism , his account of Geist, or som e com bination. But what these

avenues will require m ost of all are defenses of nontraditional accounts of Hegel’s

m etaphy sics. My own view is that especially prom ising indications of the

directions in which nontraditionalists can advance their case in this way can be

found in Brandom ’s recent interpretation of Hegel’s holism , on which Hegel’s

account of laws and properties offers a “holistic successor conception to a world

of facts—nam ely, the world as having the structure of infinity.”20

m ore directly at Hegel. See also Pippin on how Hegel’s antirealism itself am ounts to a kind of
realism involving claim s about reality “as it is in itself” (1989, 99).
19Nontraditionalists tend to worry that a m etaphysical dependence claim would result in an
unappealing form of m etaphysical idealism , suggesting their could be no reality without us; they
seek to differentiate Hegel’s views; see Pippin (1993, 65 and 20 0 1) and Brandom (20 0 1, 82). For
an interesting com bination of a traditional account of the dependence or positing relation with a
nontraditional account of Geist as our historically developing form s of social life, see Forster’s
interpretation: Hegel thinks that truth itself depends on enduring com m unal consensus, and that
we consequently have a “radical freedom , or power to determ ine what is the case quite generally”
(1998, 242).
20 Brandom 20 0 1, 69. See also Westphal on Hegel’s “ontological holism ” (1989, Ch. 10 ). And see
Redding’s suggestive rem ark about a respect in which Hegel is “at variance with the Spinozistic
form of holism on which Schelling had drawn” (1996, 10 8-9).
Kreines, Changing the Debate 14

5. Trad itio n alis m an d H igh e r Fo rm s o f In te lle ct

In what sense do traditionalists see Hegel as aspiring to surpass or to get

beyond Kant’s lim its, rather than elim inating or erasing those lim its from the

inside? Consider Kant’s view. Our understanding is m erely “discursive”: we

cannot extend our knowledge through concepts alone; we require discrete

content provided by sensible intuition.21 This lim its us to knowledge within the

bounds of sensibility or experience, or the bounds delim ited by the form s of our

sensible intuition—space and tim e. Kant will argue that this allows knowledge of

appearances but not of things as they are in them selves. Such knowledge would
require a higher kind of intellect. It would require a non-sensible intuition

providing im m ediate access to reality, or what Kant calls “intellectual intuition.”22

Kant som etim es further suggests that this sort of im m ediacy would be possible

only for a divine intellect, specifically in the sense of an intellect whose own

cognitions were “archetypes,” the very ground or source of the reality of the

objects known.23 Kant denies that we can have any knowledge of the existence of

such a divine intellect (e.g. A277-8/ B333-4). But he stresses the im portance of its

conceivability: for exam ple, “in the Critique of Pure Reason we had to have in

m ind another possible intuition if we were to hold our own to be a special kind,

nam ely one that is valid of objects m erely as appearances” (KU 5:40 6).

Traditionalists tend to see Hegel as arguing that (i) there really is such a

higher non-discursive form of intellect; (ii) there really is som e highest thing or

21Our understanding “can only think and m ust seek the intuition in the senses” (B135). To extend
m y knowledge, “I m ust have besides the concept of the subject something else (X) upon which the
understanding m ay rely” (B12), and m y source for this “som ething else” m ust be sensible
intuition.
22In the first Critique, see for exam ple A49/ B72, A252/ B30 9, A279/ B335. For a broader
sum m ary of the different senses of “intellectual intuition” in Kant, see Gram (1981).
23 See e.g. B68 and Gram (1981, 291).
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 15

aspect of reality which can be known only thereby; and (iii) we ourselves can

achieve just such knowledge of the absolute.

What does this have to do with m onism ? Kant argues that our discursive

understanding leaves us unable to have theoretical knowledge of an infinite

whole of everything; we rely for the content of our knowledge on stepwise

successive synthesis of the m anifold of sensible intuition, and an infinite

synthesis could never be com pleted.24 Here too we can conceive of an intellect not

lim ited in this way, capable of cognition grasping together im m ediately the parts,

no m atter how com plex, of a larger whole; Kant’s m ost direct and extended

discussion of this particular point is found in the third Critique discussion of

what he calls there an “intuitive understanding” (KU §§76-7). Traditionalists see

Hegel as asserting, in response, that there is an absolute or highest being to be

found in an infinite and unified whole of everything, and that we can gain

knowledge of this absolute by achieving som ething sim ilar to Kant’s “intuitive

understanding.”25

This general approach raises com plex issues concerning the developm ent of

Hegel’s philosophy and his relationships to his contem poraries. To m ake a long

story very short, the clearest supporting evidence is found in Hegel’s earliest

publications, from 180 1 and 180 2. Here Hegel certainly does seem to claim that

we can have “intellectual intuition,” specifically of a highest being akin to

Spinoza’s substance—or that “God’s knowledge is accessible to finite

consciousness” (Longuenesse 20 0 0 , 263). Hegel portrays him self as thereby

defending the philosophy of his friend and collaborator Schelling. But Hegel and

Schelling fall out shortly thereafter. And in later publications, beginning with the

24 E.g. A424/ B454, A428/ B456, A432/ B460 ; A486/ B514.

25For accounts on which Hegel seeks to establish the reality of a m odified form of the “intuitive
understanding,” see Baum (1990 , 173); Düsing (1986, 125) and Longuenesse (20 0 0 , 234).
Kreines, Changing the Debate 16

180 7 Phenom enology of Spirit, Hegel consistently em phasizes extrem ely sharp

criticism of appeals to “intellectual intuition” by his contem poraries.26

If the m ature Hegel explicitly now rejects appeals to “intellectual intuition,”

then should we still see him as aspiring to knowledge of a highest being accessible

only to a higher form of intellect, beyond Kant’s discursive understanding?

Traditionalists answer in the affirm ative. They portray the changes in Hegel’s

writings as a reflection of his developm ent of a new way of m eeting m ore or less

continuous philosophical goals, goals form ed during Hegel’s collaboration with

Schelling, and perhaps owing m uch to the influence of Germ an rom anticism .

More specifically, the changes involve a new term inology for stating, and a new

way of justifying, the basic claim that there is a higher form of intellect and an all-

encom passing substance or absolute knowable only thereby.27

But consider Hegel’s specific philosophical com plaint about his

contem poraries: it is “as prevalent as it is pretentious,” Hegel says, to claim that

there is som e highest being knowable only by “intellectual intuition,” or only by

grasping reality im m ediately ; but such claim s always beg the question, because

they cannot be known in a m anner m ediated by philosophical argum ent.28 So the

m ature Hegel com es to think, as Harris puts it, that “‘intuition’ m ust be resolved

into a truly speculative m ethod of discursive reasoning” (1993, 44). If so, then

26PhG 3:23/ 10 . Hegel does not nam e Schelling here, and there is room for dispute about whether
Schelling’s account of “intellectual intuition” is his target. But Hegel will later apply the basic
com plaint here to Schelling specifically (VGP 20 :421 ff.). For m ore on Hegel’s developm ent and
his developing relationship to Schelling, see Baum (1986), especially his basic gloss at (32-3) and
on the “disappearance of intuition” (225 ff.). On this disappearance of intuition, see also Harris
(1993, 44) and Beiser (1993, 18).
27 Beiser (20 0 5) stresses an approach to Hegel via Schelling (59 f.) and Germ an rom anticism (34
f.), though he also em phasizes Hegel’s later rejection of intuition (14 and 169 f.). See also the
recent accounts of the continuity of Hegel’s basic goals in Longuenesse (20 0 0 ) and Franks (20 0 5,
6.4).
28 Citations from PhG 15/ 4. For the clearest presentations of the criticism here, see especially
Hegel’s criticism s of Schelling at VGP 20 :434-5/ 3:525 and the extended discussion of Hegel’s
contem poraries at EL §61 ff. On this criticism see especially Westphal (20 0 0 ).
Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 17

traditionalists seem to m e to be in an awkward position: Hegel now specifically

seeks to lim it him self to claim s which can be justified by entirely discursive

m eans; so how could he seek to conclude that there is a highest being which is

specifically supposed to be such as could be known to exist only by transcending

the lim its of the discursive understanding? Traditionalists need to show that a

m ore com plex view of the m atter resolves this apparent tension. Or they need to

shift toward a portrayal on which Hegel argues that the absolute can be known

discursively; but the latter approach would be a huge step toward the central

claim of recent nontraditionalists: Hegel does not seek to surpass Kant’s lim its,

or the lim its of the discursive understanding, but rather to elim inate the idea that

som e m ost fundam ental thing or aspect of reality m ight exceed these lim its.29

Traditionalists often see Hegel as always assum ing the possibility of the very

sort of m etaphysics which Kant criticizes.30 So they could say that Hegel’s

discursive reasoning begins from this assum ption, proceeding to the conclusions

that a highest being of interest in such m etaphysics m ust really exist, and that we

m ust have the capacities required to know this absolute. But to dispute Kant’s

views by first assum ing the contrary of the conclusion for which Kant actually

argues would be to beg the question, and m anifestly so. How could that be m eant

as an alternative to the question-begging, the lack of philosophical argum ent,

which Hegel him self com plains about in his contem poraries? This worry has

nothing to do with whether Hegel’s argum ents m eet the standards of

contem porary philosophy; the challenge is m aking sense of how Hegel’s

29See especially Pippin on Hegel’s developm ent an d relation to Schelling (1989, ch. 4). Also
Redding: “the very opposition that Kant has between finite hum an thought and infinite godly
thought is suspect” (20 0 2, section 3.2; also 1996, 23-4).
30 See e.g. Düsing: “the possibility of scientific m etaphysics, which Kant examines critically, is
accepted without question” (1983, 421) and also (Düsing 1976, 119). And Guyer (1993, 171-2 and
20 4-5). And Siep (20 0 0 , 18-21).
Kreines, Changing the Debate 18

argum ents are supposed to m eet the standards Hegel him self em ploys in

criticizing his contem poraries. Here nontraditionalists have enjoyed an

advantage: Pippin in particular provides a rival account of Hegel’s developm ent

and his relation to Schelling (1989, ch. 4)—one which dovetails with a

philosophical account focused on explaining how Hegel’s argum ents seek to

engage Kant without m anifestly begging the question (1989, 7).

In m y view, the m ost fruitful avenues for future developm ent of

traditionalist approaches will be those which respond in kind, linking a m ore

traditional understanding of Hegel’s views and their developm ent with new

philosophical accounts of how Hegel’s argum ents function. One especially

prom ising recent approach can be found in Longuenesse’s (20 0 0 ) account of how

Hegel draws on resources genuinely present in Kant’s three Critiques in order to

try to justify his claim s. Another can be found in Paul Franks’ (20 0 5) new

account of how Schelling’s argum ents function, and of how Hegel follows

Schelling (371 ff.). And yet another can be found in Horstm ann’s (20 0 6) account

of Hegel’s Phenom enology as a m odified form of transcendental argum ent for

m etaphysical m onism .

5. Co n clu s io n

In sum , interpreters of all persuasions should look beyond debates about the

idea of a “non-m etaphysical” interpretation of Hegel, focusing instead on

debating about the answers to questions concerning the specific character of

Hegel’s m etaphysics. For exam ple, are traditionalists right to see Hegel’s

“absolute” as akin to the highest beings of interest to pre-critical rationalists like

Spinoza, or akin to those objects which (Kant argues) could be known only by a

higher form of non-discursive intellect? Or can nontraditionalists m ake a

stronger case that this specific kind of m etaphysics differs in philosophically

Philosophy Com pass 1:5 (20 0 6) 19

crucial respects from Hegel’s contrasting and distinctive m etaphysical account of

reality and the absolute?

And there is one final advantage to be gained by this shift in focus. The old

debate tends to be a zero-sum gam e, where any advantage for a “non-

m etaphysical” account is a disadvantage for “m etaphysical” interpretations, and

vice-versa. Once we focus instead on debating the specific character of Hegel’s

m etaphysics, we open up the possibility of hybrid accounts. For it m ay be

possible to follow traditional accounts of Hegel’s m etaphysics in som e respects

while also following nontraditional accounts of Hegel’s m etaphysics in other

respects. If so, then the very best future interpretations m ight turn out to be those

which can recognize and integrate the advantages of both traditional and

nontraditional approaches to Hegel’s theoretical philosophy. 31

31 I would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of an anonymous reader for this journal.
Kreines, Changing the Debate 20

Prim ary Te xts / Abbre viatio n s

H EGEL: I cite the Ency clopedia by § num ber, with ‘An’ indicating Anm erkung
and ‘Zu’ indicating the Zusatz. All other references to Hegel’s writings are given
by volum e and page num ber of W erke in zw anzig Bände. Edited by E.
Moldenhauer und K. Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkam p, 1970 -1. I use the following
abbreviations and translations:
PhG: Phenom enology of Spirit. Translations from A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977.
WL: Hegel’s Science of Logic. Translations from A.V. Miller. London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1969.
EL: Ency clopaedia Logic.
VGP: Lectures on the History of Philosophy .
K AN T: Aside from references to the Critique of Pure Reason, all references to
Kant’s writings are given by volum e and page num ber of the Akadem ie edition of
Kant’s Gesam m elte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 190 2-). I use these
abbreviations and translations:
A/ B: Critique of Pure Reason. Translations from Paul Guyer and Allen Wood.
Cam bridge, 1998.
KU: Critique of the Pow er of Judgm ent. Translations from Guyer and Mathews.
Cam bridge, 20 0 0 .

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