Botnet HandoutsRevisedpdf
Botnet HandoutsRevisedpdf
Dan Boneh
Dan Boneh
Botnet Taxonomy
A taxonomy model is necessary to develop the intelligence to
identify, detect, and mitigate the risk of an attack.
Classification Scheme
● Attacking Behavior
● C&C Models
● Rally Mechanisms
● Communication Protocols
● Observable botnet activities
● Evasion Techniques
Attacking Behaviors
● Infecting new hosts
● Social engineering and distribution of malicious emails or other
electronic communications (i.e. Instant Messaging)
● Example - Email sent with botnet diguised as a harmless attachment.
● Stealing personal information
● Keylogger and Network sniffer technology used on compromised
systems to spy on users and compile personal information
● Phishing and spam proxy
● Aggregated computing power and proxy capability make allow
spammers to impact larger groups without being traced.
● Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
● Impair or eliminate availability of a network to extort or disrupt
business
Botnet Threat
● Botnets are a major threat to the Internet because:
● Consist of a large pool of compromised computers that are
organized by a master.
● a.k.a., Zombie Armies
● Carry out sophisticated attacks to disrupt, gather sensitive
data, or increase armies
● Can perform Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks,
steal data, send spam, and allows the attacker to access
the device and its connection.
● Armies are in the 1000’s to aggregate computing power
● Communication network allows bots to evolve on a
compromised host
● Process of stealing computing resources as a result of a
system being joined to a "botnet" is sometimes referred to
as "scrumping".
Botnet Architecture
Collection of bots working together for the same
bot-master constitutes a botnet.
Botmaster
Bot Bot
Bot
Recruiting Recruiting
Recruiting
Observable Behaviors
● Three categories of observable Botnet
behaviors:
● Network-based
● Host-based
● Global Correlated
Network-Based
● Network patterns can be used to detect Botnets
● IRC & HTTP are the most common forms of Botnet
communications
● Detectable by identifying abnormal traffic patterns.
● IRC communications in unwanted areas
● IRC conversations that human’s can not understand
● DNS domain names
● DNS queries to locate C&C server
● Hosts query improper domain names
● IP address associated with a domain name keeps changing
periodically
● Traffic
● Bursty at times, and idle the rest of the time
● Abnormally fast responses compared to a human
● Attacks (eg: Denial of Service) - Large amounts of invalid
TCP SYN Packets with invalid source IP addresses
Host-Based
Botnet behavior can be observed on the host
machine.
● Exhibit virus like activities
● When executed, Botnets run a sequence of
routines.
● Modifying registries
● Modifying system files
● Creating unknown network connections
● Disabling Antivirus programs
Global Correlated
● Global characteristics are tied to the
fundamentals Botnets
● Not likely to change unless Botnets are completely
redesigned and re-implemented
● Most valuable way to detect Botnets
● Behavior the same regardless if the Botnets
are communicating via IRC or HTTP
● Global DNS queries increase due to assignment of
new C&C servers
● Network Flow disruptions
Evasion Techniques
● Sophistication of Botnets allow them to evade
● AV Engines
● Signature base intrusion detection systems (IDS)
● Anomaly-based detection systems
● Techniques
● Executable packers
● Rootkits
● Protocols
Evasion Techniques
● Moving away from IRC
● Taking control of
● HTTP
● VoIP
● IPV6
● ICMP
● Skype protocols
Evasion Techniques
● Skype, the best botnet ever??
● Very popular, 9M+ users, average 4M+ connected
Peer-to-peer
● Rather than communicate with a centralized server, P2P
bots perform as both a command distribution server and
a client which receives commands.
● This avoids having any single point of failure, which is
an issue for centralized botnets.
Peer to Peer Model
● Resilient to failures, hard to discover, hard to
defend.
● Hard to launch large scale attacks because P2P
technologies are currently only capable of
supporting very small groups (< 50 peers)
Command Protocols
● The specific exploits that a bot engages in at any
given time on any specific host depend, in
general, on what commands it receives from
some human/botnet-herder.
● This is known as the command-and-control (C&C)
● The program must communicate via a covert
channel to the client on the victim's machine
(zombie computer).
● IRC is a historically favoured means of C&C
Command Protocols
● A bot master can harness the power of several
bots working together to bring about a result that
could be more damaging than what can be
accomplished by a single bot (or a worm or a
virus) working all by itself.
● E.g. message :[email protected] TOPIC
#channel DDoS www.victim.com from the bot herder
alerts all infected clients belonging to #channel to begin a
DDoS attack on the website www.victim.com.
● Response :[email protected] PRIVMSG
#channel I am DDoSing www.victim.com by a bot client
alerts the bot herder that it has begun the attack.
IRC Protocol
● IRC Botnets are the predominant version
● IRC mainly designed for one to many
conversations but can also handle one to one
● Most corporate networks due not allow any IRC
traffic so any IRC requests can determine and
external or internal bot
● Outbound IRC requests means an already infected
computer on the network
● Inbound IRC requests mean that a network computer is
being recruited
HTTP Protocol
● Due to prevalence of HTTP usage it is harder to
track a botnet that uses HTTP Protocols
● Using HTTP can allow a botnet to skirt the
firewall restrictions that hamper IRC botnets
● Detecting HTTP botnets is harder but not
impossible since the header fields and the
payload do not match usual transmissions
● Some new options emerging are IM and P2P
protocols and expect growth here in the future
Connect:
A peer uses connect messages to report their OID to other peers and
to receive a list of peers somewhat close to the peer.
Search:
A peer uses search messages to find resources and other nodes
based on OID.
Publicize:
A peer uses publicize messages to report ownership of network
resources (OIDs) so that other peers can find the resource later.
● Computers can be co-opted into a botnet
when they execute malicious software. This
can be accomplished by luring users into
making a drive-by download, exploiting web
browser vulnerabilities, or by tricking the
user into running a Trojan horse program,
which may come from an email attachment.
Common frauds
● DDoS
● Spyware
● Email spamming
● Click fraud
● Ad fraud
● Bitcoin mining
● Phishing
● Self spreading functionality
Counter measures
● Individual bot must be identified.
● Firewall, Spyware for filtering
● PKI using digital signature for message
● Install AntiBot, BotHunter S/W
● Network-based approaches tend to shutting
down C&C servers, null-routing DNS entries,
or completely shutting down IRC servers.
● Study behaviour
● Use Honeypot
Evolution of Botnets
● Motivation change in computer hacking
● Vandalism 🡪 Financial gains
● Loss of $67.2 billion (2006 figure)
Marke Wealth
t
S
SS
Buy, Sell, &
Trade
38
Sensitive Data and Market
Significance
Credit Card #s
Sensitive Data
Type
39
Storm
Node
Round 3
Bootstrapping Peer
Round 1
Round 4
Round 2
Random Mechanisms
● Theoretical architecture: Evan Cooke, et al describe the model
● Easy implementation and resilient to discovery and destruction
● Scalability limitations make it impractical for large scale attacks.
● Bots sleep and are not activated until Bot Master is ready to
attack
Rallying Mechanisms
● Hard-coded IP address
● The bot communicates using C&C ip addresses that are
hard-coded in it’s binary files.
● Easy to defend against, as ip addresses are easily detectable and
blocked, which makes the bot useless.
Rallying Mechanisms
● Dynamic DNS Domain Name
● Hard-coded C&C domains assigned by dynamical DNS providers.
● Detection harder when botmaster randomly changes the location
● Easier to resume attack with new, unblocked Domain Name
● If connection fails the bot performs DNS queries to obtain the
new C&C address for redirection.
Rallying Mechanisms
● Distributed DNS Service
● Hardest to detect & destroy. Newest mechanism. Sophisticated.
● Botnets run own DNS service out of reach of authorities
● Bots use the DNS addresses to resolve the C&C servers
● Use high port numbers to avoid detection by security devices and
gateways
Beating Evasion Techniques
● Prevention
● Find C&C servers and destroying them
● Most effective method for prevention and
cure:
● Combining traditional detection
mechanisms with those based on
anomaly network behavior
Conclusion
● By using the taxonomy and accurately
identifying what type of botnet you are
dealing with it will be easier to use the
correct evasion technique.