What Is Knowledge?

Author(s): Archie J. Bahm

Source: The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Mar., 1943), pp. 266-273
Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science
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266 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
or more in height and twice as wide. from without, into the lunite. Mete-
They have been termed laccoliths by orites carry considerable amounts of
some writers,but a true laccolithwould chemciallyactiveingredients. Naturally
presuppose that the conditionsrequisite therewill be developed certain chemical
for vuleanism existed at the time of its activity accompanyingthe heat of im-
formation. Since the time when true pact. Ebullition will result. Some of
vuleanism may be reasonably assumed the gasses escape, but in some cases
to have existed,the meteoriticbombard- pockets or bubbles will form and these
mentmust have obliteratedall such fea- may becomefrozenat any stage on their
tures. They may very well have been way to escape at the surface.
formed by meteorites perforating the The rills and deep gorges which are
crust of a lava lake at an earlier stage quite numerous on the moon present
whenits crustwas not so thickand when somethingof a problem. Many of the
the lava was more fluid,with the result straight,furrow-likestructuresmay be
that a small mound was formedby ex- the result of meteoriticencountersin an
trusion, concealing any rim that may almost horizontal plane. Others are
have been produced by the meteorite's probably the results of faulting which
penetration. must of necessityhave accompaniedthe
Other mounds show funnel-likeopen- gigantic collisions represented by the
ings in theirsummitsas thougha bubble larger pits and the maria. They must
in viscid matterhad started to collapse. have been produced contemporaneously
Still othersseem to have fully collapsed. withthe productionof otherconspicuous
These are what mightbe expectedwhere lunar features. Otherwise they could
foreign materials are being intruded, not have survived.

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?
By Dr. ARCHIE J. BAHM
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY, TEXAS TECHNOLOGICAL COLLEGE

COMMON sensetells us that the table in claims they are untrue,he may be con-
our roomis coloredand solid,has size and sideredmentallyunsound. Yet, common
shape, is heavy and endures. It exists sense itselfleads us to questionthemand
where it is withoutdepending upon us eventuallyto deny many of them.
for its existence. If we left the room
and came back later, it would still be NAIVE REALISM
there and would have been there all the In orderto identifythe views moreor
time, unless, of course, somebody or less commonlyheld by unreflectivepeo-
somethinghad movedit. Our lookingat ple, epistemologistshave coinedthe termr
it does not affectit, does not change its "naive realism." The naive realist is a
nature, does not modifyit in the least. "straw man" set up to representus in
Its color,size and shape are really just as our unreflectivemoments. This straw
we see them. We could feel its weightif man is not quite like any of us, for most
we lifted it. Many of us can look at it of us have reflectedsomewhat. Thus
and all see the same thing. These state- naive realism must be, paradoxically, a
ments may seem so obvious that it is reflectivestatement of an unreflective
foolish even to mention them. If one view. It may be summarizedas follows:

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 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 267
(1) Objects are independentof their person differently at differenttimes. In
being known. They can endure or con- a worldof science,the naive realist has a
tinue to exist withoutbeing experienced hard timeretaininghis naivet,.
by any one. Criticisms of naive realism may be
(2) Objects have qualities (properties,classified for convenience under four
characteristics,,attributes) which are headings.
parts of the objects. (1) It fails to account satisfactorily
(3) Objeets, includingtheirqualities, for error. If thingsare as theyseemand
are not affectedmerely by their being seem as they are, then whatever seems
known. They are neither made nor to be so is so. Such a view makes error
changedmerelyby our knowingthem. theoreticallyimpossible,for an error is
(4) Objects,seem as they are and are somethingwhichseemsto be so but isn't
as theyseem. Appearances are realities. so. Recall the common experience of
(5) Objects are known directly,i.e., seeing a stick partially submerged in
theyare in experience. There is nothing water. Upon firstsightthe stickappears
betweeinthem and our knowledge of bent or broken. If naive realismis taken
them. at its face value, then if the stick seems
(6) Objects are public, i.e., they can bent it is bent. If the stickis pulled out
be known by more than one person. of the water, it is seen to be straight.
Two or nmorepeople can see the same Does the stick bend as it goes into the
object. water? Previous experiencewith sticks
and water usually suggests"No." But
CRITICISMS OF NAIVEREALISM the stick appears to bend as it goes into
Trouble arises for the naive realist the water. What, then, can be done to
when attentionis called to the fact that determinewhetherthestickis reallybent
statements 1 and 5 are incompatible. or really straight? For the momentit
Objects are independent of experience seems both bent and straight. Since it
and yet are in experience. One's experi- can not be both, one of the two appear-
ence,knowledge,ideas, are locatedwithin ances must;be erroneous. The next step
one's head. But objects are located out- commonlytaken is to run one's hand
side of one's' head. How can objects along the stickdown into the water. To
whichare outsideof one's head be in ex- the hand the stick seems straight,even
perience which is inside of one's head? though to the eye it seems bent. The
Trouble arises for the naive realist also stickis really straight. He dismissesthe
when he faces the fact of error. When bent appearance as an erroror illusion,
errorsare called to attention,we recog- and dropsthematter. But what are illu-
nize them and are happy that we have sions? They are objects which are not
now arrived at the truth. But if asked as theyseem. If some objects are not as
whatassurancethereis thatthenew view theyseem,thenit is false that all objects
is true,we replythat it seemstrue. But are as theyseem. If someobjects are not
this is the same assurance that we had as theyseem,what makes seemingsome-
of the error before it seemed to be an times"so" and sometimes"not so," and
error. Trouble arises for the naive how oftenis seeming" so " and how often
realist in moderntimesbecause so much "not so"?
reflectionby othershas taken place. He Examples of error trouble the naive
is constantlyconfrontedwith evidence realist, buutthey trouble him little. He
that the qualities whichobjects have are goes fromconvictionto new conviction,
conditionedby various factors affecting confidentin the reliabilityof his newest
different people differently
and the same view. When pressed with the query,

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268 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
" But how can you tell that your new experiencesrepeated in the past many
convictionis more reliable than the one times may be considered more reliable
given up as erroneous'?" he often an- than a singlepresentexperience. Yet ex-
swers,"Well, I just know." Or, if you periences in the past may have been
get him in a cornerand prod him for an consistentlyerroneous.
explanation,fivekinds of replies eventu- (e) Doubts sometimeslead to experi-
ally comeout: (a) He appeals to his other mentation. Is the bent stick really
senses for corroboration. (b) He com- straight? The naive realist pulls it out
pares with past experiences. (e) He re- and puts it back in severaltimesand feels
peats the experiment.(d) He invokesthe of it several times to prove that it is
testimonyof others. (e) He appeals to reallystraight. But how can he discount
instruments. the fact that it also appears bent re-
(a) If appearancesderivedthroughone peatedly? Also, if past experiencescan
sensory channel appear contradictory, have been consistentlyin error,why not
it is natural to appeal to othersenses for presentand futureexperiences?
corroboration. If a dull ring indicates (d) When doubts about one's beliefs
that the china is cracked,one naturally become serious, it is natural to consult
feelswithhis fingerand looksto see. But others. " Does this stick look bent to
sometimes differentsenses contradict you? Feel of it and see if it isn't
each otherand sometimesdifferent senses straight." Gregariousnaive realists de-
corroboratein error. When senses con- rive much satisfactionfrom social cor-
tradict each other, which shall be ac- roboration,but theyfail to recognizetwo
cepted as reliable? The half-submerged things. First, their perceptionof other
stick looks as if bent,but feels straight. people as objects which may be con-
The distant carpenter's hammer stroke sulted is also liable to error. Most of us
is seen to stop but heard to continue. have mistakenmanikins,mirrorimages
When senses corroboratein error,one is and movie motionsfor real men. Or in
still more baffled. Who has not had the dreams we have consulted our friends
experience, in a railway terminal, of and gained their agreement. Thattest
having the train startmoving? First he is there that there are real people to
feels the rumble of the wheels over the consult? Secondly, even if we consult
tracks, and hears the movementof the real people, are they not subject to the
wheelsunder him,and looks out to check same errorsas we? Can not people be in
to see if he is at last moving. Then he is agreement and yet be in error? For
shockedto findthat not his but the next centuries people agreed that the earth
train is moving. was flat. If othersshare our error,what
(b) Comparisonof presentparadoxes can we profitby consulting them for
with past experiences involves greater proof?
possibilities of error and greater para- (e) The last resortof the naive realist
doxes. For past experiences,to be com- is an appeal to instruments. Heat is
pared, must be remembered. But mem- measured by thermometers.Weight of
ory oftenhas failed us. How can we be purchases is measured on scales. The
sure that it is not failingus again? And color of blood is revealedunder a micro-
the past experiences themselvesmight scope. But the appeal to instruments,
have been erroneous. Can the possibility like the otherappeals, is a confessionof
of erroneouLs recollection,added to the failure. For it is a confessionthat ap-
possibilityof erroneouspast experience, parently obvious objects are not self-
be used to deny evidence present at evident. And an appeal to instruments
hand? Perhaps, however,recollectionof is an appeal to reflection. To the extent

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 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 269
that men are reflectivethey cease to be many angles. All these make a differ-
naive. ence. Some pigments absorb all rays,
Before we let the naive realist out of others none, others some. Atmospheric
his corner,let us ask him one moreques- conditions affectvisibility, exemplified
tion: "How can you tell thatyou are not by fog,snow,dust, rain and heat waves.
dreaming?" lie naturally replies, "I Glasses,telescopes,microscopes,theirac-
can pinch myselfto see if I am awake." curacy,theiradjustment,theircolor,all
"But can you not dream of pinching affectperception. Does the real nature
yourself and convincingyourself that of things change as these intervene?
you are awake?" "Yes, but I can ask Furthermore,the distance which light
othersif I am awake, and can walk and waves travel is a factor whic'h naive
run and read." " But can you not realists neglect. If light travels at a
dream of doing these also?" He is rate of 186,000 miles per second, some
forced to admit,"Yes," but persistsin fractionof a secondis requiredfortrans-
discovering additional suggestions, in- missionfromtable to eye. So we "see"
cluding that of waking up. But people the table,not as it is whenthe lightwave
sometimes dream of waking up and reaches the eye, but as it was when the
dream of wakiingup theirfriendsto co- light wave left the table. Such fraction
operativelysettletheirdreamingdoubts. of a second seems so insignificantin the
If there is nothLing in one's waking mo- total reactioninvolvedin perceptionthat
ments about -whichone can not dream, it maybe ignoredforpractical purposes.
and if dreams seem real, then what as- When distances become great, however,
surancehas one thathe is notnow dream- the significancechanges. Astronomers
ing? If he has none, then in how far is astound naive realists with assertions
he justifiedin maintainingthe truthof thatstarswhichseemto be up therehave
his beliefsany mrore than a dreamerhas? long since ceased to be there.
How can he tell whenhe is in error? Visual perceptionis conditionedintra-
(2) It fails to take into account the organically'bythe comnplicated nature of
extra-organicand int-ra-organiccondi- eyes. Before a coloredtable can be per-
tions of knowing. Some scientists de- ceived, light waves reflectedfrom the
scribe the human body as an organism table's surfacemusttravel throughsome
and distinguishfor coiiveniencebetween mediumto the surface of the eye, pene-
extra-organica-ndintra-organicfactors, tratetheskin,travelthroughtheaqueous
i.e., factorsoutside the body and factors humor,the lens, the vitreoushumor,to
inside the body. If many factors be- the retina and its rods, which react to
tweenthe thingcausing the idea and the variations in light intensities,and its
idea itself affeetthe idea, then the idea cones,which react to variationsin wave
may be different fromwhat it would be frequencies. These cells behavelike little
if it were influencedby the thing alone. chemicalbatteriesor photoelectriccells.
Let us considera few such factors. When stimulatedby light they generate
Extra-organicconditionsof visual per- electric currents or nervous impulses
ception include light sources,pigments, which are sent throughneurones to the
atmosphericconditions,glasses. Light brain. Somehowthe brain functionsin
sources are of mianysorts,and what one such a way as to produceattentionto,and
sees may be stinmulated by a singlesource consciousness of, the object being ex-
or many sources,by lightof a single fre- perienced.
queney or of maixedfrequencies,by light How can color,whichthe naive realist
of a single intensityor of many intensi- supposedthetable to have,travelon light
ties, shining from one angle or from waves which are merelyhigh-frequency

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270 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
vibrations, penetrate skin, liquid and organic conditions we may add some
lens, then undergo chemicaltransforma- whichemphasizedifferences betweenpeo-
tion,travelthroughneuronesas electrical ple. Naive realists believe that two or
impulses,enter consciousexperienceun- more persons can see an object at the
changed? same timeand all see it as it is. Thus all
How can shape,whichthenaive realist these people can have exactly the same
supposesthetable to have,be transmitted experience. But disputes about objects
into consciousexperience? Rays travel- illustrate differences in experiences.
ing simultaneouslyreach different parts Also, scientifictests have been devised
of the curved cornea at slightlydifferent to demonstratethese differences, as for
times, travel through a mobile doubly- examplethroughcolorblindtestsand the
concaved lens, reach the curved rear anomaloscope. The anomaloscope is a
inner surface of the eyeball only after systemof prismsand lenses mountedin
being inverted. Then the rays stimulate a tube such that one can see throughan
chemicalreactionsin the rods and cones; eyepiecetwo halves of a lightedcircular
but these may react at slightlydifferent field,the colorand intensityof whichare
rates, if they are variously fatigued,or controlled by screw-adjusted slits per-
somemaynotreact at all. What happens mittingmonochromatic yellowlight (589
to thesupposed shape of the table during millimicrons)to reflectfromone half and
these chemicalreactions? Then nervous a mixtureof monochromaticgreen light
impulsesare set up travelingthroughthe (536 mm) and monochromaticred light
opticneuronesof different lengths,which (670 mm) in any proportionto reflect
twistmaze-likeon theirway to and in the from the other half. Tests show that
brain. Since we see with two eyes, we when one person has adjusted the ano-
really get two sets of patterns of rays. maloscope so that both halves of the
Impulses throughthe optic nerve split visual fieldappear equal in color and in-
in such a way thatthosecomingfromthe tensity,another person who looks will
right half of each eye terminatein the object thattheyappear different and will
leftrear lobe of thebrain and thosefrom require readjustmentto make the halves
the lefthalf of each eye in the rightlobe appear equal. Thus is demonstratedre-
of the brain. These lobes seem to be ported differencesin experience when
separatedfromeach otherby a longitudi- extra-organicconditions of stimulation
nal fissure. How can the supposed shape remainconstant. Thus obviouslydiffer-
of the table stand such distortion,trans- ent people may not see the same object
formation,duplication and separation as it is, but experiencedifferentobjects
withoutaffecting its appearance? when confrontedby the same stimulus
How can size, which the naive realist source.
supposesthetable to have,be transmitted (4) It fails to take into account the
intoconsciousexperience? The table-top "constructed character" of knowing.
is three by fivefeet. But that size can The term "constructed character"' of
not really be contained within a head knowingmay be used to name the syn-
wearing a size seven hat. Size too must thesizingprocessthatgoes on in thebrain
be transmittedthrougha tinyhole called before experiencesare produced. The
the pupil and meanderthroughtwisting various nervous impulses do not appear
brain-paths. Not size but, at best, rela- in consciousness to be consciously as-
tive size can be perceived. sembled or constructedinto an object.
(3) It fails to take into accountdiffer- Obieets annear in conseiousness as
ences in public knowing. To the previ- 1 Roy Wood Sellars, " Principles and Problems
ously mentionedextra-organicand intra- of Philosophy," p. 52.

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 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 271
wholes. They enter experiencealready should have to be consciousalready and
made. Some unconsciousor subconscious to include the beginningof the flash of
process determinesour consciousexperi- consciousnesswithinconsciousness.Thus
ences for us, even thoughwe can never theillusionof continuityof consciousness
become aware of it. The mysteryof is a basic illusion withoutwhich experi-
consciousnessmay nleverbe explained ence could not be. The naive realist can
satisfactorily,but it is obvious to those not believe this.
who reflect that something happens Anotherbasic constructionis the con-
withinus to make us see thingsthe way structionof "objects." Objects seem to
we do. This somethingmust be taken be "out there," even thoughtheyare not
into account in explainingthe nature of reallyout thereas experienced. One may
knowledge. trythe experimentof lookingat his own
Perhaps the most startling construe- hand, whichhe usually considersa part
tion is that of consciousnessitself. Con- of himself. His hand seems to be out
sciousnessseemns to be continuous,at least there. Try again to look at the tip of his
fromwakiingin the mnorning until going nose. It too seemsout there. Try again,
to sleep at night. But psychologistsnow- with eyes closed, to imagine his own
adays are inclined to think that con- brain. If he can imagineit, the image of
sciousnessis not a continuumbut a series it too seems to be out there,not as if in
of pulsations,each lasting some fraction theroombeforehim,but still as an object
of a second. The relative durations of out therein experience.
periods of impulses to the durations of Taking leave of naive realism,we may
periods between impulses vary from summarizethe typesof criticismn offered.
person to person and fromtime to time. It fails to accountsatisfactorily forerror.
Measurementof the lengthof these pul- It fails to take account of the extra-or-
satingperiodsof consciousnessis difficult ganic and intra-organicconditions of
and mnustbe done by indirect means. knowing. It fails to take into account
Pulsations of consciousness sometimes differencesin public knowing. It fails
correspondto eye-jerks,which pass un- to take into account the co:nstructed
noticed by most readers. One sees the characterof knowing. If thesecriticisms
line of print1ed words he is reading as a are warranted,then naive realism is un-
continuous line, but if he observes an- tenable. The naive realist is baffledby
otherreader's eyes he will note that eyes them. But the natural urge to believe
do not move continuouslybut stop,flick, that thingsare as theyseem is so strong
stop and flick. If consciousness is a that in practice he is little troubled by
series of impulses,why do we seem to be them.
consciouscontinuously? In order to be
SCIENTIFIC REALISM
consciousof the period betweenmoments
of consciousnesswe would have to be If naive realism is untenable, then
conscious when we are not conscious. whatview shall one hold? Skippingover
This is impossible. We can experience many steps which one would normally
neitherthe period.between,nor the end- take in the gradual process of reflection
ing, nor the beginningof a flashof con- and many steps which have been taken
sciousness. In order to experience the historicallyin the developmentof reflee-
end of a flash,we should have to be con- tive thought,'we may summarizea view
scious long enough to include the end called "scientific realism." Like the
withinconsciousness,which again is im- naive realist,the scientificrealist is also
possible. In order to experiencethe be- a strawman set up to representthe point
ginning of a flash of consciousness,we of view which"the" scientistwould hold

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272 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
if all the assumptionsand conclusionsof scientists, there are certain criticisms
the differentsciences were synthesized whichshouldbe considered.
into a single view of the nature of know- (1) Scientistsalso depend upon senses
ing. Comparing scientificrealism with for information. Like naive realists,
naive realism (see p. 1), we may sum- scientificrealists also get their experi-
marize comparable essentials as follows. ences only through sensory channels.
Basic throughoutis a distinctionbetween The scientiststill seems to see the half-
what we shall call real "things" and ap- submergedstickas bentor broken. Each
parent or experienced"objects." of his typesof perceptionis equally liable
(1) " Objects" are dependent upon to error. Thus scientificconclusions,in
theirbeing known; they can not endure so far as their reliabilitydepends upon
without being experienced. " Things" the reliabilityof perception,are subject
are independentof their being known; to the same criticismsas naive realism.
they can endure without being experi- Price's way of putting this criticism
enced. is worthrepeating.
(2) "Objects" have qualities (proper- Every man entertains a great number of be-
ties,characteristics,attributes)whichare liefs concerningmaterial things, e.g., that there
parts of the "objects" (but not parts of is a square-topped table in this room, that the
"things"). " Things" have qualities earth is a spheroid, that water is composed of
hydrogenand oxygen. It is plain that all these
(properties, characteristics,attributes) beliefs are based upon sight and on touch (from
whichare parts of the" things" (but not which organic sensation can not be separated):
parts of "objects"). based on them in the sense that if we had not
(3) "Objects" (includingtheirquali- had certain particular experiences of seeing and
ties) are affectedby, are dependentfor touching,it would be neitherpossible nor reason-
able to entertain these beliefs. Beliefs about
their existenceupon, are determinedin imperceptibles such as molecules or electrons
their nature by, their being known. or x-raysare no exception to this. Only they are
"Things" (includingtheirqualities) are based not directlyon sight and touch, but indi-
not affectedmerelyby theirbeingknown. rectly. Their direct basis consists of certain
seem to be real other beliefs concerning scientific instruments,
(4) "Objects" photographic plates, and the like. Thus, over
"things" but are not real "things." and above any intrinsic uncertainty that they
"Things" are not as they seem to be. themselves may have, whatever uncertainty at-
Appearances are not realities and reali- taches to these more basic beliefs is communi-
ties are not appearances. cated to them. It follows that in any attempt
either to analyze or to justify our beliefs con-
(5) " Objects" are known directly; cerning material things, the primary task is
they are in experience. "Things" are to consider beliefs concerning perceptible or
knownindirectly;theyare not in experi- " macroscopic" objects such as chairs and
ence; theyare knownonly through"ob- tables, cats and rocks. It follows, too, that no
jects" which " represent" them, and theory concerning I microscopicI objects can
possibly be used to throw doubt upon our be-
which are caused by them and by other liefs concerningchairs or cats or rocks, so long
extra-organic and intra-organiccondi- as these are based directlyupon sight and touch.
tionswhichhappen to operateconjointly Empirical science can never be more trustworthy
with them. than perception,upon which it is based; and it
can hardly fail to be less so, since among its
(6) "Objects" are private, i.e., can non-perceptualpremises there can hardly fail to
not be knownby more than one person. be some which are neitherself-evidentnor dem-
"Things" are public, i.e., may be the onstrable. Thus the not uncommonview that the
cause of "objects" in more than one world which we perceive is an illusion and only
person. the "scientific" world of protons and electrons
is real, is based upon a gross fallacy, and would
destroy the very premises upon which science
CRITICISMSOF SCmENTUIcREmLISM itseqlf 1PnPnds.2
Satisfactoryas this view may seem to 2 H. H. Price, " Perception," p. 1.

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 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 273
(2) Scientificconceptsare humancon- tingthat"objects" are private,scientific
structs. While scientific realism at- realiststhemselvesfall intotheegocentric
temptsto take into account the fact that predicament. Only private "objects"
knowing involves some mysterioussub- are experiencible. How then is it possi-
conscious synthesis,neverthelessit can ble to knoweitherthat thereis an unex-
not preventits own conceptsfrombeing periencedreal world or what it is like?
thus mysteriouslysynthesized or con- When scientificrealists claim that they
structed. E-veryscientificidea is a hu- knowthat thereare -public"things" and
man idea, is aii idea limitedby the pecu- that theyare electrons,atoms,niolecules,
liar limitationsinherentin the mind or etc.,they claim to know the existenceof
minds of those who entertainit. Some and, within limits,the nature of unex-
scientistswho are especially self-critical perienciblethings. How can knowledge
cease to be scientificrealists. This criti- which is locked up, so to speak, within
cal attitude is exemplifiedby P. W. momentsof conscious experience tran-
Bridgman's "The Logic of Modern Sci- scend those mnoments and reach out, so
ence." The laws of physics,like all sci- to speak, into the unreachablereal world
entific laws, are merely " operational to knowit? Knowledge of realityseems
ideas" which serve to explain in what to presuppose experience of the unex-
way, thoughnot why,eventsoccur in ex- periencible. To be real is to be inde-
perience. In howfar -regular pendent of experience, so inherent in
occurrences
representreal events outside of experi- scientificrealism is the necessityof ex-
ence is not the businessof scienceto say. periencingwhat, by the very nature of
Such a view seemsto scientificrealistsas experience,can not be experienced.
a thin pale shadow of science, not one (5) Scientistsstill fail to explain why
"objects" appear as if they were
which gives -usz the knlowledgeof reality
"things." The mysteryof why appear-
that scientistsbelieve they are looking
ances seemreal remainsa mysteryto the
for. Yet, if scientistIsbelieve they can
end. The scientificrealistis besetwitha
penetratereality,can they explain how beliefin therealityof theobjects he talks
theycan do it with ideas which are sub- about. Even though he is constantly
consciouslyconstructedand which have critical,can he ever conceivea real atom
their momentaryexistences locked up withoutconceivingit as real? Why, if
withinflashesof pulsatingconsciousness? one's conceptionscontinueto be within
(3) Scientistsstill have no bettertests him, does he conceive objects as if they
than dreamers. This charge at first were really " out there" ?
shocks scientists as absurd. But, for No attempthas been made in this arti-
everytestthata scientistproposesforhis cle to give any finalanswer to the ques-
being awake or for the reliabilityof his tion,"What is knowledge?" Two types
conclusions,one may ask, "Is it impos- of answershave been presentedand criti-
sible for him tzodream that this is so ? cized. It is hoped that the reader has
Surely he must answer " No " and been aroused sufficiently to investigate
therebyadmit the impossibilityof prov- othertypes of answerssuch as rational-
ing his position any better than a ism, idealism, scepticism, agnosticism,
dreamermight. critical realism, neo-realism, pragma-
(4) Scientific realists unwittingly tism,positivismor the author's proposed
claim impossibletranscendence. Admit- "tentative realism."

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