UNIVERSITY OF GUYANA JUSTICE BENJAMIN/ MS.

GOODINGS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

CRIMINAL LAW I - STUDYGUIDE 6

PARTICIPATION IN CRIMES

1. Modes of participation

(a) Principal: the person whose act is the most immediate cause of the actus reus, ie the

defendant who has actually committed the offence in question.

(b) Acting through an Innocent agent: Here the defendant acts through an intermediary who

is an "innocent agent". In such a case the instigator will still be regarded as the principal

offender:

R v Butt (1884) 51 LT 607

R v. Cogan and Leak [1976] 1 QB 217

R v. Bourne (1952) 36 Cr. App. R 125

(c) Accomplice or accessory: An accomplice (also known as an accessory) is the defendant

who has helped the principal in some way. An accomplice is a secondary party who aids,

abets, counsels and procures the commission of the offence.

AG Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773

R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534

R v. Rook [1993] 2 All ER 955

Blakeley and Sutton v. DPP 1991 Cr. LR 764

National Coal Board v. Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11

DPP Northern Ireland v. Maxwell [1978] 2 All ER 1140

R v. Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129

R v Kenning & others [2008] All ER (D) 317

(d) As part of a joint enterprise

A crime can be committed by more than one party, even though only one person actually

carries out the acts which constitute the commission of the offence.

AG Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773

(a) Actus reus of secondary party

Accomplice law eases the requirement of proving actus reus. The liability of secondary

parties is governed by s8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 UK:

"whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any indictable

offence ... shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

AG Reference (No. 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773

R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808

(b) Presence at the scene of the crime

Normally, a person can't be considered as an accomplice simply for being present. The

person must be constructively present. This is known as the Mere Presence rule, but there

are exceptions.

R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534

R v Bland [1988] Crim LR 41

Wilcox v Jeffrey [1951] 1 All ER 464

R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402

(c) Participation by inactivity

Tuck v Robson [1970] 1 All ER 1171.

R v Foreman & Ford [1988] Crim LR 677

R v Russell [1933] VLR 59, Supreme Court (Victoria, Australia)

(d) Mens rea of secondary parties

The mens rea required on the part of a secondary party is -

(i) that the defendant intended to do the acts which he knew to be capable of

assisting or encouraging the commission of the crime; and

(ii) knowledge that the principal will commit a crime of a certain type.
National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11

R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129

DPP for N. Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140

Blakely and Sutton v DPP [1991] Crim LR 763

Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Health Authority [1985] 3 All ER 402

3. Scope of joint enterprise

Joint enterprise is a term used in criminal law to refer to "the participation of two or more

persons in a criminal activity."

R v Stewart and Schofield [1995] 3 All ER 159

R v Petters and Parfitt [1995] Crim LR 501

R v Swindall & Osborne (1846) 175 ER 95

R v Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr App R 70

Mohan v R [1967] 2 All ER 58, PC (Trinidad & Tobago)

R v Rahman & others [2008] UKHL 45

Rv Rook [1993] Crim LR 698

Rajkumar [2013] EWCA 1512

Jogee [2013] EWCA 1344

Reardon [1999] Crim LR 392

King [2014] EWCA 871

Gnango [2014] Crim LR 457

ABCD [2010] EWCA Crim 1622

Hui Chi-Ming [1992] 1 AC 34

Willet [2010] EWCA Crim 1620

R v Buxton [2009] Crim LR 233

What is the liability of the accomplice where the principal commits some unexpected or

unforeseen offence?

(a) Accidental departure from the common design

consequences that flow from the common design being carried out.

R v Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr App R 70.

(b) Deliberate departure from the common design

A principal who deliberately departs from the common design will alone be liable for the

consequences. The accomplice ceases to be a party to his actions.

Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378

R v Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 QB 110

R v English [1997] 4 All ER 545

R v Mahmood [1994] Crim LR 368

R v Dunbar [1988] Crim LR 693

R v Smith [1963] 1 WLR 1200

R v Betty (1964) 48 Cr App R 6

R v Hyde [1990] 3 All ER 892

R v Roberts [1993] 1 All ER 583

R v Powell [1997] 4 All ER 545

R v Gilmour [2000] Crim LR 763

R v Rahman & others [2008] UKHL 45

R v Stewart and Schofield [1995] 3 All ER 159

(c) Accomplice to murder

If an accomplice who is involved in a joint unlawful enterprise realised that the principal

offender might kill or intentionally inflict serious injury in the course of the unlawful joint

enterprise, he can be convicted as an accomplice to murder. It must however be established

that the other party in the venture had the requisite intent for murder.

Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168

R v Slack [1989] 3 All ER 90

R v Hyde [1990] 3 All ER 892

Hui Chi-Ming [1991] 3 All ER 897

R v Roberts [1993] 1 All ER 583

(d) Repentance of secondary party

It may be possible for the secondary party to escape liability by withdrawal before the

principal goes on to commit the crime. What amounts to withdrawal for this purpose is

therefore crucial.

R v Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App R 212

R v Grundy [1977] Crim LR 543

R v Whitefield (1984) 79 Cr App R 36

R v Rook [1993] 2 All ER 955

4. Liability of accessory where no principal

A person can be liable as an accessory even though no principal offender has been

identified.

Hui Chi-Ming [1991] 3 All ER 897

R v. Cogan and Leak [1976] 1 QB 217

R v. Bourne (1952) 36 Cr. App. R 125

R v Stringer & Banks (1991) 94 Cr App R 13

R v Anthony [1965] 1 All ER 440

R v Humphreys & Turner [1965] 3 All ER 689

5. Acquittal of principal

If the principal offender is acquitted, a secondary party can nevertheless be convicted if it

can be proved that an offence was committed.

R v. Cogan and Leak [1976] 1 QB 217

R v. Bourne (1952) 36 Cr. App. R 125

Thornton v Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339

R v. Howe [1987] 1 AC 417

R v. Millward [1994] Crim LR 527

R v. Loukes [1996] 1 Cr App R 444

Assistance given only after the crime is not enough to make an accomplice, though it may

lead to a separate charge.

R v Coney (1882) LR 8 QBD 534

Wilcox v Jeffrey [1951] 1 All ER 464

R v Allan [1963] 2 All ER 897

R v Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344

R v Bland [1988] Crim LR 41

R v Russell [1933] VLR 59

7. Victims as accessories

A person whom the law is intended to protect cannot be convicted as an accomplice to an

offence of which he is also the "victim".

R v Ram (1893) 17 Cox CC 609

R v Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710

8. Entrapment

R v Kenning & others [2008] All ER (D) 317

9. Defences:

Mistake of fact; Abandonment and Withdrawal

10. The doctrine of respondent superior

This doctrine establishes the notion of "vicarious liability" where a master is responsible

for the illegal conduct of their servant. The relationship is what creates the liability.

R v. Millar [1970] 2 QB 54

R v. ICR Haulage [1944] KB 551

R v. Boal [1992] 1 QB 591

11. Other cases on participation in crimes

The State v Persaud (1971) 23 W.I.R 30

Persaud, Bholonauth & Doodnauth v. R (1973) 20 W.I.R. 49

R. v. Williams & Blackwood (1974) 21 W.I.R 329·

Blaize & Joseph v. R (1978) 25 WIR 542

Walters v. Lunt [1951] 2 All E.R. 645

R. v. Bickley [1909] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 73

R. v. Sang [1979] 2 All. E.R. 1222

R v. Bullock (1955) 1 W.L.R. 1

R. v. Jones [1949] 1 K.B. 194

Adams -v- The State 1994 - 54 W.I.R 220

R. v. Johnson (1966) 10 W.I.R 359

Surjupaul v The Queen (1958] LRBG 8

R. v. Bango & Bahadoor (1954) Trinidad L.R 58

R. v. Andrew & Inez Chambers (1963) 6 W.I.R. 239

R v. Andrews (1962) 1 W.L.R 1474

R v. France - 29 WIR