EQUAL PROTECTION

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6
Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the
status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present
opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative
power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence
of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.

To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts
and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-
Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and
one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away form the reservation.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:

The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
 "Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,

"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.

"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place
most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject
to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and

"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.

"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.

"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."

4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the
governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao
and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.

6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro
but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

 SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read
as follows:

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand
one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall
upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this
section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916;
section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to
the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is
also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category,
and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized
elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities
towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.

II. HISTORY.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title
III, in the following language.

LAW I.

The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on
February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568.
Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,

THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).

In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order
that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in
harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to
use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success,
our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and
forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these
meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and
separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and
temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of
this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without
causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves,
and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has
 been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with
in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by the laws of this title.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW VIII.

Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.

THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.

The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands,
and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can
have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.

LAW IX.

Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.

With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall
not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order
that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them
previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW XIII.

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because
these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this
law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of
one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.

LAW XV.

Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."

We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion;
if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if
the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be
less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman,
who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by
Spaniards and indios.
 LAW XXI.

Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on
January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.

We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who
deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living;
robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would
leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and
utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders
and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the
acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents,
governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the
cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-
breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)

A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:

It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral
part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to
conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the
nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the
moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance
afforded them by the same laws.

It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the
non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the
commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the, metropolis.

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important
question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the
principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to
complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and
in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.

As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the
prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing
respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I
have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves
important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After
hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of
Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of
Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held
for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding
in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and
the only form of accomplishing such a task.

For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
following:

DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of
instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its
territory.

2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided into
three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor
a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life;
and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be published in their respective dialects, and
the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the
work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the
first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means
which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or
settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing
up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year
they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the
only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than
those previously indicated.

4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the
inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute
necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for
them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to
establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.

5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations
based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties
affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the
products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same
price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as
the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of
which shall be punished with deportation.

7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall
be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally
wherever convenient.

8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all
by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.

9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains
igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their
 families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way
them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their
habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own
accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of
recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or
facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities
as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.

10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in
return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and
country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the
location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good
conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by
them be authorized in the towns already constituted.

11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the
peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April,
committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the
Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in
conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their
products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the
military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where
such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.

12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities,
shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the
scope of the authority of each.

13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of
the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.

14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the
foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and
missionaries.

15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about
due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their
respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)

B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.

1. Organic law.

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was
President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by
section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained
undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:
 In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed
by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be
subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.

Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in
view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature,
composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian
portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore
exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into
twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

2. Statute law.

Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO.
82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila;
Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special
Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization
of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an
d1917.

Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning
with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having
reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855,
1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela.
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:

No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS
FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:

SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in
excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled
 "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva
Vizcaya."

SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized,
when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.

SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and
control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom
shall be maintained.

SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced
sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to
sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the
geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.

SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in
the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, December 4, 1902.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last
named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.

These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice
with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.

C. TERMINOLOGY.

The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.

"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in
section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397, 1639, and 2551.

"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These
terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145,
2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures,
as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.

The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408,
sec. 3.)
 D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious
signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be
those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section
2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin
of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-
Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)

Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.

In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many
laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition
in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly."
The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of
the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article,
preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These
are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-
government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.

It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and
some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of
1917, etc.)

If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The
reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of
the inhabitants.

At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The
so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward
Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose
of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to
legislative, judicial, and executive authority.

The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections
2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian
tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."

As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with
article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the
point, the court makes use of the following language:
 . . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-
Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the
requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to
be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be
taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.

Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and
enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating
to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior.
Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the
Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was
circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:

Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-
Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized
are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.

It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far
in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is
so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt
the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was
not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient
advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act
and the Municipal Code.

The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person
baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will
give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may
recently have embraced Christianity.

The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of
regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the
degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above
expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized
under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say
on the subject:

As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the
term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30,
1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the
hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom.

Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The
question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the
Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular
letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):

The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The
Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess
some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he
 has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes
are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists,
etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In
other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides
whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized
manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and
living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he
was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians,
Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are
paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely
scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of
the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these
Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people
preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.

(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,

Collector of Internal Revenue.

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:

In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due
from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and
becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws
governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all
concerned:

Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not
profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three
classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .

Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of
the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other
members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the
same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the
expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign
countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A,
D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to
pay the tax for former years.

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is
subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor
even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his
mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as
members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned,
since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and
so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina
tribes.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,

Collector of Internal Revenue,
 Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.

The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript
of Circular Letter No. 327.

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion
of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The
precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay
himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the
same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:

In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question
remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same
make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these
should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.

Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning
which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or
uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who,
living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .

The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which
live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and
civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but,
without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression
which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines.

The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657
(articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning
would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.

The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or
Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census,
Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and
Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and
Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not
to religion.

In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join
in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area,
and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.

E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided
them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.

Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de
Filipinas, says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that
the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to
certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that
island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all
these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from
which we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called
the "ancients."

The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547,
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)

III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States
for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-
called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation
of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage."
The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The
Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.

Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress
passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the
Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object
sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."

A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S.,
375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then
proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the
Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.

Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who
were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have
recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established
occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were
forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority.
When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to
purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise.
 With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been,
regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not
as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the
State within whose limits they resided.

The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily
food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of
the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and
by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these
remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.

In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the
status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating
liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of
the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon
the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection,
where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have
attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering
care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule
the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488;
U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers
[1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218;
Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907],
204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286;
U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such
laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their
persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)

All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.

The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas
corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ
of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who
have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without
aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of
violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of,
and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some
place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the Government;
and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the
respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order,
he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.

The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The
second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators
for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly
tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for
the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government
almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an
extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned.
It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld."
The decision concluded as follows:

The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the
right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he
may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of
liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.

2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte,
has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws
therefore.

3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the
respondent has been directed to do.

4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and
have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do
not trespass on forbidden ground. And,

5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof,
the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.

As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the
Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of
the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse
[1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.

As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians
have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian
policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial
authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its
full responsibility.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected,
we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed
in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion,
as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of
the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary"?

The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the
Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to
the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes
provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all
matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view
of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of
Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was
necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the
Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204
U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S.,
598.)

There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule.
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised
by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged
with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select
sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says
that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as
language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,
them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their
religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be understood to
mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore
stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of
legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of
civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an
account of religious differences.

C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission,
the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
[1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the
Christian.

The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:

Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty
by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)

Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on
right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of
high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion
to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that
man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)

Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought
not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is
only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others.
(Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)

Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly
freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society
based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy.
Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury
that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the
supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of any
free government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is
equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members,
the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace
the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-
making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract,
the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free
men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627;
Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902],
114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)

One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the
natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and
equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope
of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz
[1914], 189 Al., 66.)

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of
the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a
stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a
law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
(U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due
process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.

We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution
particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said
Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has,
by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code,
prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage,
all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.)
The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary,
no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must
come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.

E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching
scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate
so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain
liberty by the exercise of the police power.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam
the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles
that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police
power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of
the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)

With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any
constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should
be effectuated.

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be
remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:

To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary
of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a
good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc.,
that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of
which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat
trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the
institution definitely justify its continuance and development.

Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the
press:
 "It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and
evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this
country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has
adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to
equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:

(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave
their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions
inhabited by the non-Christian people.

(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and
the extention of government control.

(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social
and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.

( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of
Mindanao and Sulu.

The Secretary adds:

To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian
people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may
fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being
persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to
understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect
them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of
leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and
objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with
the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)

The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians,
and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:

It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in
favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a
systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of
those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and
complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
(Sec. 3.)

May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently
working out for the ultimate good of these people?

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have
on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate
neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands.
What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for
educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this
method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation,
has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if
they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in
some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really
constitutes protection for the manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not
precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low
degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the
law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are
punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet,
unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:

Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are
engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins
thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will
ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now
fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance
they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a
rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to another
in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of
law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in
a rightful way?

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the
welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let
 along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was
adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under
the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not
far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which
has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply
because a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has
come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization?
Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of
ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor
that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To
allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a
permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge,
the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and
guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to
live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity
may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a
condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.

But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of
imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and
wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the
conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation,
the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why
can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands,
instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the
interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment
of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will
always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you
can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will
come to naught.

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not,
however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute
freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt,
this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a
prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have
little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor
to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open
for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular
case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the
individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the
very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to
be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the
Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to
some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political
theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the
government in this progressive march.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature
has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of
the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes
before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is
wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as
sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in
vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days
to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to
be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole.
The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate
branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the
courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he
is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances."
(Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the
general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but
with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.

We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This
is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of
Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment,
fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and
equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the
field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible
measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and
the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances
justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act
is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city
and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1
and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid
exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national
economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its
exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it
would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination
of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These
consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought
forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a
modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest
and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and
progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which
the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of
the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the
due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are
not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
(2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power.
Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is
the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty
and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises
the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the
measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the
exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable
arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override
legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed
legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate
scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein.
The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself,
which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer,
of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than
what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence.
As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is
enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to
unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite
variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers
perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to
members of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the
resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and
daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes
that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a
department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there
was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages;
now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the
beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural
produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent
neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community
takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and
dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost
all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired
not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber,
hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods
and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear
is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and
pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable
factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact
merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature
and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the
constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled
the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail
trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien
of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and
No.- Per cent Per cent
Retailers Pesos Pesos
Establishments Distribution Distribution
Nationality
1941:
Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74
..........
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
...........
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
............
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
..........
Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
...........
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
...........
1948: (Census)
Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
..........
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
..........
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
..........
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
..........
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
..........
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
..........
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
.........
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
..........
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87
..........

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
 Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese 7,707 9,691

..............................................

Others 24,415 8,281

...............................................

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese 7,707 24,398

.............................................

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese 7,707 24,152

..............................................

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese 7,707 33,207

.............................................

Others 24,824 22,033

...............................................

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners,
Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and
Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments
already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily
increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens
more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and
seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report,
pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers
were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly
spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target
in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution
also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically
declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on
page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or
comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of
the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of
Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other
economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the
members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic
provisions of the Constitution, he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not
desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national
stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the
national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and
hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in
somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution)
envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed
invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political
Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen,
manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express
sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth
National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second
National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and
felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone;
there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital,
unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete
unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles
to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize
or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy
and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed
completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the
aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article
offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating
it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article,
or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out
of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave
abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of
justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on
the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance
profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of
the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation
to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control
laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic
Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand;
that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in
unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws,
smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the
like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public
officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a
matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful
diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present
dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of
danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless
aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the
distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his
life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy
of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product
of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the
people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately
been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the
national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State
insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny
the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his
birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit.
His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country
and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this
country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the
ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive
and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted
in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for
a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real,
furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree
with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making
power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs.
Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal
protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely
arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest
upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell &
Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue,
because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed
by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in
enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these
Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are
in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law
clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of
Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming
houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms
part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an
equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects
a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is
contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
 enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to
preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American
commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is
projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply
because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree
of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens.
Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and
peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a
citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the
business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community,
and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a
statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to
be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that
an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the
relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke
vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance
of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly
irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear
in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted
classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the
legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended
evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City
of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies
injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens
the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914).
So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have
different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to
them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional
rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the
exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of
the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning
the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law
conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of
ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further
added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two
Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs.
McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of
foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there
was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the
distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared
invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial
antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful
the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main
reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their
right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the
court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would
deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220
(1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to
persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no
reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive
thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to
engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally
possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the
patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown
on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction
between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate
knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain
classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and
reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals
of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different
regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well
disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further
enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute
confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore
appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest
authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction
a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and
to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police
power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed
by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of
Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
 xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it
affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur.
Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate
the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court
is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter
involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the
health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation
and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and
reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged
in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner,
without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare.
But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused
by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control
of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in
times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and
circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary
capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore
engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary
to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is
not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test
of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to
carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but
actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was
enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of
the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery
of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to
our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters
of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens
of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life
and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
 The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on
the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the
police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue
now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it
abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on
this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits
to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the
preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail
trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the
radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its
people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the
danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has
been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the
occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is
accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In
the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been
denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its
aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that
the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment.
The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it
may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of
a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law,
some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the
legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be
repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law
which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or
deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens
from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI,
which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity.
It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization"
and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader
term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be
stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject
of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such
matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306,
308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of
acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily
convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in
delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves
suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an
index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was
followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or
"prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the
Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes,
under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in
the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be
claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the
persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the
United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We
find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can
be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in
domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law
(U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power
of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because
the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department
of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh
in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation
of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the
law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C.
CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.

Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal
tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for
P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of
a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside
from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that
the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under
Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the
tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because
the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.

Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under
the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by
the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same
statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.

Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred
to as a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone
is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.

Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of
Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an
export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any
form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to
impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges
or otherwise, shall be void."

Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the
latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses
will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other
alternative until Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.

The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation,
specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these
are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The
taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of
the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it
cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to
preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid
under protest. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE
VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,,
Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their
respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances,
pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being
contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew
ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents
to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the
Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City,
through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in
Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof
and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of
the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours;
(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive
parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition,
petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly
determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends
only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of
the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from
the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they
contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why
minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that
the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of children of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-
A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment,
reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command
that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that
even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they
suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and
regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night.
They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling
and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh
a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the
petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of
courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was
confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that
"[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1,
[Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it
was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the]
'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion'
as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power
to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.
]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City,
Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances
violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents
to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with
RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held
that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light
of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is
justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked
to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this
case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two
(2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of
an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's
exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the
evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and
parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on
their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The
case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the
Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not
merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must
show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged
governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue and will be
affected by the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected
in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the
right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the
Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue
affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this
Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel
Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which
they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right
to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of his
parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he
only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their
behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More particularly,
Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged
violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this
Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It
may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation
of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial
review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their
children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to
regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court
must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the
suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile,
although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they
submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to
show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not
properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to
provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49 The
void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this particular
claim. In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves
cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its
prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness
doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best
left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not
the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of
unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-
guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law
contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad
hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement
agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.
Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based
on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore,
covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential
requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be
read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor
violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state - should
be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy
is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right
includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay
late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the
rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and
the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties.
This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are
equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the
State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-
developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of
parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary"
connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the
State's deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v.
Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a) mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the
child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote these
legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to
public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the
parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental
supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors,
viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other
parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their
children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held
that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their
children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State interests
(particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and
lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during
the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions
during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours
when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence
or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at
home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but
are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who
prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities
observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify
the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They
claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of
juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the
government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have
not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that
"the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of
a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot
areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly
swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring
suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the
Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held
that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be
raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness
relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and
limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no
claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every
person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways
and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to
move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised
without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel
and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired.
If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for
any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom
of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the
First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of
juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities
within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce
the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA
9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for
children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the
parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis -
as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of
these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of
another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a
certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the
right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to travel,
minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations
demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and
overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on
the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the
streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad
range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse
influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is
within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious
scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such
use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided,
they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution,
the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined
that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less
"fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
1âwphi1

rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to
regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults
because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of
scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do
not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental
rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification
(1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has
ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them
as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez,
the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than
on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest of the State to
protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to
keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which
may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in
imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and
moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children,
and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or
wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and
national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night
time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the
tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent
avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council to support
its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the
present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement
policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping
decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest-
that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources,
including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the
United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of
such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets
late at night will make for a safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less
wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of
dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their
sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early age
may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the
point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to
reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City was
directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as
victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police
power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not
only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with
respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions
set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited
compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be
restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the
State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to
avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the
present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It
observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local
Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise
prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit
grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above
mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings if
they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional
muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and
returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases
supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as
buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after
10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their
parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities,
and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day,
New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls'
Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the
rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the
reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and
of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it
still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate
non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of
association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other
than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such
participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the
minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but
the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such
proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at
night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered
without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More
so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions
of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other
extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are
required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home
early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities
concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the
city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized
by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or returning
home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official
and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations.
The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given that the
minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew
hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the
Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their
right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these
activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits
unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this
case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not
only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction
of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not
superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents'
right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the
welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same
against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the
curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and
hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in
accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying
exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as
applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the validity of
its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8 thereof,154 does
not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her
parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or
guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile,
the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations,
to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.
 (b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the
legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten
(10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as
curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult
shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile
status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and
anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited
to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism,
gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No
penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or
to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate
intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at
risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as
counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they
prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of
curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p
]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in
tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed
against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of
the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the
same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More
importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote their
integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA
9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or
censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or
reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative
cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties -
as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the
City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law
Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice
law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered
to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or
violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual
including the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual
or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence
explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various
criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall
be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of
reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance
directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence,
invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are
allowed as they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test -
that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their
fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the
local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon
City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice