ETHICS

1. Ethics

Argument: Philosophers, though by no means the only offenders, have engaged in much
abstract and apparently meaningless jargon. They can be dazzled with words which often
appear to represent something, but which actually refer to nothing but other word clusters
equally detached from reality. Ethical as well as other statements can suffer from this disease.

Paraphrased: Philosophers are among those who are guilty of using excessive and confusing
technical language, but they are not the only ones. They often use words that seem to have
meaning, but in reality, they only refer to other sets of words that are equally disconnected from
reality. This problem affects not only ethical statements, but also statements in other areas.

Counterargument: That philosophers and others have engaged in too much verbal juggling is
rightly deplored, but does not rule out the many valid statements they have made. Emovitists
too can be deceived by words. The decisive argument against them is that the emotive theory
itself is neither a statement of identity nor verifiable by experience, and therefore falls by its own
criterion.

Paraphrased: While it is appropriate to criticize the excessive use of technical language by

philosophers and others, this does not invalidate the many valuable statements they have
made. Emotivists can also be misled by words. The decisive argument against emotivism is that
it fails to meet its own standards, as it is neither a statement of identity nor something that can
be verified through experience.

2. Conduct

Argument: Man has no moral character to begin with, but builds up one for himself by the way
he lives. Conduct has an ethical meaning and is inclusively human. Sentient acts are acts of
man while human acts are acts that’s done knowingly and willingly. Whatever one deliberately
and willfully does is voluntary, while for freedom it is thought that one must have been able to
have chosen otherwise at the moment. There can be no voluntary without knowledge. One
cannot seek what we do not know. There can be no decision of the will unless enlightened by
the intellect, whose business it is to perceive the good, to propose it to the will as something
desirably and to pass judgment on the suitability of the means to be used in its attainment.

Paraphrased: Man is born without morals; nonetheless, he develops them via the way he lives.
Conduct has a moral purpose and is universally human. Human acts are those that are
deliberately and voluntarily performed, whereas sentient acts are those of man. Whatever one
acts consciously and willingly is voluntary, whereas it is assumed that in order to be free, one
must have had the option to choose differently at the time. Without knowledge, there can be no
voluntary action, and what we cannot know what we cannot seek. The intellect must enlighten
the will before it can make a decision. Whose job it is to identify what is good, to put it forward to
the will as something desirable, and to determine whether the means to achieve it are
appropriate.

Counterargument: To admit freedom is to admit an element of randomness in the universe and

to put the highly successful scientific method in jeopardy. What we call free choice of man is
nothing but our own ignorance. We cannot predict our own or others’ future behavior because
we do not know the elements entering the situation. The decision we reach is determined by the
stronger set of motives like the pull of the vector system. There is never any possible proof that
we could have acted otherwise, since this is precisely what never did and never will take place.
It is predetermined for him by his inheritance and environment, and he is not responsible for
what he does, though society punishes him for its corrective and deterrent values as part of the
general predetermining environment.

Paraphrased: Free choice is equivalent to our own ignorance. We lack the guarantee of
knowing our own and other people's future actions in view of the fact that we do not know
the elements entering the situation. Welcoming the idea of freedom is to acknowledge the
presence of an element of randomness in the universe, which will put highly scientific
methods in jeopardy. Over and above that, there is never any proof that we could have
acted otherwise, since this is precisely what never did and never will take place. The
decision we reach is determined by the stronger set of motives like the pull of the vector
system. It is already predetermined what he will be by his inheritance and environment,
though he is not responsible for what he does, society punishes him for it's correct and
deterrent values as part of the general predetermining environment

3. Responsibility

Argument:
True and false as predicates signify nothing but only repeat the same thing emphatically. As
logic would put it: P is true = P.. The words' good and bad, right and wrong are predicated" ni
the same way, though with different emotional overtones. These adjectives refer to no definable
or ostensible* characteristics in things, but only describe our attitude to them.

Paraphrased:
There are both true and false statements. However, logical positivism is irrelevant because the
statement is neither true nor false. Logical positivism is concerned with how people act rather
than how they think.
Counterargument:
The statement "X is good" cannot be analyzed into " I approve of X" without a distorting shift
from the objective to the subjective mode of speech, a difference of meaning and not merely of
grammar. "X is good" means "X is worthy of approval" and gives reasons for "I approve of X". A
statement about X is not a statement about me, but about something else distinct from me, even
though I can have an attitude toward it. Reasons for approval or disapproval have cognitive
content and can be true or false.

Paraphrased:
The statement "X is good" cannot be analyzed into "I approve of X" without a distorting shift
from the objective to the subjective mode of speech, a difference in meaning that is not merely a
difference in grammar. "X is good" means "X is worthy of approval" and gives reasons for "I
approve of X". Even if I have an attitude toward it, a statement about X is not a statement about
me, but about something else distinct from me. Reasons for approval or rejection can be true or
false and have cognitive content.

4. Conscience

argument:

The grammatical form of ethical words and statements deceives us into thinking that they must
represent things or properties of things, since we use the same form of sentence to express
facts and values. It is the business of logic to cut through the illusions of common speech.Not all
grammatical sentences are logical propositions; ethical statements are but vciled imperatives.

paraphrased:

The grammatical structure of ethical phrases and statements deceives us into thinking that they
must describe objects or characteristics of things because we use the same style of sentence to
express facts and values.
Not every grammatical statement has a logical proposition; ethical declarations are only verbally
articulated imperatives. Piercing the illusions of everyday speech is the task of logic.

counter argument:
The attempt to reduce ethical judgments to wishes, exhortations, or commands is unsuccessful.
Part of the meaning, and precisely the ethical part, is lost. For example, I can command you to
do something and want the command to be obeyed, knowing all the time that I ought not to
issue such a command and you ought not to obey it. The implied knowledge is the ethical
judgment here, and it is opposed to the command. Is the ethical judgment but a hidden wish to
be disobeyed? But this is exactly what I do not wish, though I judge my conduct and yours to be
immoral.
paraphrase:
Trying to reduce ethical judgments to wishes, exhortations, or commands fails. A portion of the
meaning, specifically the ethical component, is lost. For example, I can command you to do
something and expect you to obey, despite knowing that I shouldn't issue such a command and
that you shouldn't obey it. The implied knowledge serves as the ethical judgment in this case,
and it contradicts the command. Is the ethical judgment nothing more than a covert desire to be
disobeyed? But this is precisely what I do not want, even though I believe my and your behavior
is immoral.

5. Good
Argument:
If we rebel against calling value judgments nonsignificant, we should acknowledge more than
one variety of significance. Value judgments are emotionally significant, prescriptive of action in
ourselves and others, not cognitively significant, as enlarging our knowledge of things as they
are. Only the latter kind of significance is appropriate to a science.

Paraphrased:
Suppose we disapprove of the idea of considering value judgments as unimportant. In that
case, we should realize that there are many significant things to consider, not just focus on a
one-sided ruling. Value judgements are emotionally substantial. It is prescriptive in guiding our
actions towards others and ourselves. Although it may not be cognitively significant, it still
contributes to expanding our knowledge of things as they are.

Counter Argument:
To reduce ethical judgments to mere emotional expressions of approval, like clapping or hissing,
is equally unsuccessful. There is a difference between actual approval and right approval. The
first is a statement of psychological fact: I do approve. Now I can go on to approve or
disapprove of my approval, to judge that my approval was right or wrong. This is the ethical
judgment, and it is no less capable of being true or false than the factual judgment.

Paraphrased:
Reducing ethical judgements to simple emotional demonstrations of approval, such as clapping
or hissing, is similarly ineffective. There is a distinction between actual and proper approval. The
first approval is a statement of psychological fact saying, " I do approve". Second, I can accept
or reject my approval to determine whether my approval was right or wrong. Moreover, this is
the ethical judgment, which can be true or false, just like the factual judgment.

6. Pleasure
Argument: The basic concept of ethics turns out to be unanalyzable and indefinable. At least,
ethicians do not agree on definitions or even on the possibility of a definition. If this is so, there
is no way of fixing the meaning of such a concept so that it will be the same through all stages
of an argument. A conclusion can be drawn from statements containing them cannot be
suspect. This may be satisfactory or persuasion, but cannot pretend to scientific cogency. These
may not be all the arguments emotivists can supply, but they are typical of their approach.

Paraphrased: It turns out that the fundamental idea of ethics is indefinable and incapable of
analysis. At least, there is no consensus among ethicists regarding definitions or even the
existence of a definition. If this is the case, then it is impossible to fix the meaning of such a term
so that it remains constant during the entire debate. Statements that contain them cannot lead
to the inference that they are questionable. This may be convincing or satisfying, but it cannot
claim to be scientifically logical. Although they may not be the only justifications offered by
emotivists, these are typical of their methodology.

Counterargument: All basic concepts are unanalyzable and indefinable. A verbal substitute,
such as is found in the dictionary, does not tell what the thing really is. To demand that
everything be defined is to make all knowledge impossible, including the kinds of knowledge the
logical positivists accept. Great care must be taken in arguments containing indefinables in
them. In this, ethics is no worse that

Paraphrased: All fundamental ideas are indefinable and incapable of analysis. A linguistic
substitution, like those contained in the dictionary, cannot accurately describe what something
is. Demanding that everything be specified renders all knowledge, including the sorts that logical
positivists accept, impossible. Arguments containing indefinables must be handled with extreme
caution. In this, morality is comparable to