Chapter 3 Costs of Proection in China
Chapter 3 Costs of Proection in China
Summary of Results
This chapter reports the static benefits of trade liberalization and the
accompanying adjustment costs for 25 highly protected goods in China.
We do not attempt to measure the dynamic benefits—higher domestic
productivity, more variety of goods and services, and more competition.
However, these additional dynamic benefits are at least as large as the
static gains calculated here and possibly much larger. Appendix E gives
illustrative calculations for just one dynamic benefit—more competitive
markets.
We examine 25 highly protected goods that are imported in large quanti-
ties and highly protected to estimate the costs of protection in China. We
then make rough estimates of the total of tariff and nontariff barriers
for these 25 goods by calculating the difference between the CIF (cost,
insurance, and freight) price of imported goods and the wholesale landed
price of imported goods in the protected domestic market. We obtain an
estimate of the tariff equivalent of the nontariff barrier by subtracting the
estimated tariff rate from the total calculated barrier (see appendix B for
the details of this calculation).
We estimate that, for 1994, China’s consumer surplus loss from trade
protection for these 25 goods totaled $35 billion, which suggests that
liberalizing trade for these 25 products would create a significant con-
sumer surplus gain. That gain would be about 6.2 percent of GNP using
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Japan. In 1989, tariff and nontariff barriers averaged 178 percent for high-
ly protected industries—food and beverages, textiles, metal products,
chemical products, and mechanical products. Of this amount, tariffs aver-
aged only 5 percent, while nontariff barriers averaged a tariff equivalent
of 173 percent. The standard deviation of protection within these indus-
tries was 4.9 for tariff and 81.7 for nontariff barriers. The Japanese import
ratio for the highly protected products was 12 percent (the sum of imports
and domestically produced products being $442 billion).
United States. In 1990, the estimated protection in the United States for
21 highly protected products was 35 percent, with tariffs accounting for
16 percentage points and nontariff barriers accounting for 19 percentage
points of this protection. The standard deviation of protection within
these industries was 23 percent. The US import ratio was about 21 percent
(the sum of imports and domestic goods being $260 billion).
1. To measure Chinese GNP in dollars, we use a nominal exchange rate of 8.6 yuan/
dollar throughout this book. In China, the difference between market exchange rates and
purchasing-power exchange rates is significant. According to World Bank estimates (World
Bank 1996), at purchasing-power exchange rates, China’s 1994 GNP was about $3,012 billion.
At market exchange rates, China’s 1994 GNP was $552 billion. Using a purchasing-power
calculation, the consumer surplus gain from liberalizing these 25 sectors is about 1.2 percent
of GNP.
Selection of Goods
We used three criteria to select goods for this study: import volume
(greater than $10 million in 1994), tariff rates (greater than 7 percent in
Fossil-fuel products
Gasoline 6,408 1,305 1,728 2,155 24.7 6.0 18.7 25.2
Diesel fuel 6,379 235 289 391 35.2 9.0 26.2 5.8
Chemicals
Ammonium phosphate 33 763 862 1,486 72.4 0.0 72.4 97.8
Plastics
(chemically produced) 3,179 5,536 6,477 8,867 36.9 25.0 11.9 73.6
2. By contrast, Sazanami, Urata, and Kawai (1995) estimate the degree of protection in Japan
by comparing the exfactory price of domestic products and the CIF price of imported prod-
ucts.
3. The premium is part of t Ⳮ n, because the CIF price is calculated on the basis of 5.8
yuan/dollar to compare landed and CIF prices.
4. Before 1994, 80 percent of the foreign exchange earnings of domestic firms was retained
in the form of exchange quotas and divided among the trading company, the producer,
and the local government. These retained exchange quotas could be used to import goods
in accordance with China’s foreign exchange regulations, or they could be sold in the
supplementary exchange market at a market exchange rate.
5. The adjustment excludes processing trade when calculating ‘‘adjusted total imports,’’
because materials imported, processed, and then reexported do not involve an expenditure
of foreign currency.
The data described in the preceding sections were used in the partial
equilibrium model (described in appendix A) to solve the basic equations
(equations A.6 to A.9). The solutions to the basic equations were used to
estimate the equilibrium prices and quantities that would characterize
the domestic and imported goods markets after liberalization. The results
of this exercise are summarized in table 3.4.
Table 3.4 shows that, if these 25 goods were liberalized, the average
domestic price index would fall to 0.90 (from 1.00). The value of domestic
production of these goods would decline from a preliberalization level
of $114.2 billion to $78.2 billion, a 31.5 percent fall (this figure differs from
the figure in table 3.4 due to rounding). The decline in value comprises
a decline in quantity of about two-thirds and an average price decline of
about one-third. The drop in output would occur because cheaper
imported goods would replace more expensive domestic goods. Obvi-
ously, there is no unanimity of opinion within China that such changes
are desirable. However, trade liberalization promotes efficient resource
utilization by compelling workers and capital to move to sectors where
China has a comparative advantage.
As for imported goods after liberalization, the landed price index for
imports would drop to 0.68 from 1.00, and the CIF value of imports would
increase by approximately $30 billion. The landed value of imports would
increase to a lesser extent because higher import volumes would be offset
6. After liberalization, the CIF value and the landed value of imports are assumed to be
the same.
7. Because the value of domestic production falls by much more than the quantity, we are
implicitly assuming that the drop in the price of domestic output is absorbed by lower rents
and returns to capital or by lower wages, but not by still greater cuts in the number of
workers. If firms responded to falling prices by using labor more efficiently, the supply
curve would shift downward and domestic output would fall by less. This kind of dynamic
response is certainly possible, but it is not captured in the static methodology used in
this book.