SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 246933. March 6, 2023.]

AGNES PADRIQUE GEORFO , petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND JOE-AR JABIAN GEORFO, respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J :p

Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness which has to

be medically or clinically identified. 1 Therefore, psychiatric examination is
no longer required in Article 36 petitions. 2 In cases where a psychiatric
report is offered as an expert's opinion, the psychiatric evaluation of the
alleged incapacitated spouse is not indispensable. The psychiatric evaluation
may be based on collateral information or other sources. 3 HTcADC

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari 4 assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision 5 and Resolution, 6 which reversed and set aside
the Decision 7 and Order 8 of the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage
of Agnes Padrique Georfo (Agnes) and Joe-Ar Jabian Georfo (Joe-Ar) void on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
In late 2001, Agnes and Joe-Ar met at a restaurant in Bacolod City. A
relationship between them immediately developed. 9 Four months later,
Agnes's mother asked her to go to her brother's place in Toboso, Negros
Occidental. Joe-Ar accompanied her. Due to the limited space in her
brother's house, Agnes and Joe-Ar shared the room. 10 When Agnes's family
discovered this, they presumed that they had sex and prodded them to get
married. 11
On February 23, 2002, Agnes, then 18 years old, and Joe-Ar, then 21
years old, were married at the Latter Day Saints Church in Magsungay,
Bacolod City. Soon after, they had a son 12 and lived with Joe-Ar's family
despite Agnes's objection due to conflict with her in-laws. Agnes claimed that
Joe-Ar's father is stingy when it comes to money and berates them whenever
they tried to borrow from him. Joe-Ar and his family had no concern for her.
In one instance, Agnes suffered from diarrhea for days but they ignored her
pleas to be brought to the hospital. 13
Their marriage grew loveless, insecure, and marred by conflict and
infidelity. 14 According to Agnes, Joe-Ar had a bad temper. Every time they
had an argument, Joe-Ar would hit her. 15 Whenever she would come home
late from work, Joe-Ar would get angry and punch her on the leg and other
parts of her body. 16
When Agnes went to Cebu to escape the abuse and to work, Joe-Ar
fooled around. 17 He had relationships with several women and had two
children with one of them. 18 Agnes also alleged that Joe-Ar failed to provide
financial support for their son. 19

After living separately for eight years, Agnes filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
20

During trial, Dr. Andres Gerong (Dr. Gerong), a clinical psychologist,

was presented as a witness. 21 Dr. Gerong conducted psychological
interviews with Agnes and her sister, Cherry Mae P. Valencia (Cherry Mae).
22 He notified Joe-Ar of the psychological evaluation but he did not respond.
23

Dr. Gerong testified that Joe-Ar was "exhibiting trait patterns typical to
persons with Narcissistic Personality Disorder." 24 This prevented Joe-Ar from
carrying out his duties towards his marriage and family. Dr. Gerong
characterized Joe-Ar's family as collective narcissists. 25 Further, Joe-Ar was
found to have a dependent personality disorder because of his
overdependence on his family and church. 26 According to Dr. Gerong, Joe-
Ar's personality disorders were serious and incurable. 27
Cherry Mae also testified and corroborated Agnes' testimony. She
narrated that she once stayed with Agnes and Joe-Ar for two months and she
witnessed how Joe-Ar and his family mistreated Agnes. 28
Joe-Ar did not present his evidence. 29
In its March 3, 2016 Decision, 30 the Regional Trial Court granted
Agnes's Petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, the Court finds for the
petitioner. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 36 of the Fa mily Code of
the Philippines, the marriage between AGNES PADRIQUE GEORFO and
JOE-AR JABIAN GEORFO, entered on 23 February 2002, in Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID ab initio .
Petitioner AGNES PADRIQUE GEORFO is hereby directed to have
the entry of judgment registered with the Local Civil Registry of
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental where the marriage of the parties
was celebrated.
The Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity shall be issued
upon petitioner's compliance with Sections 22 and 23 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.
This Decision shall become final upon the expiration of fifteen
days from notice to the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made
if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Notice of Appeal is
filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor or the Solicitor
General.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner
through her counsel, the respondent and the Local Civil Registrars of
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental and Cebu City, each with a copy of
this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 31

The trial court ruled that Joe-Ar's personality disorder, as established

by the psychological report, was the cause of his incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations. 32 CAIHTE

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 33

questioning the reliance of the trial court on the psychological report. 34 It
argued that aside from the report, there were no other independent
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the spouses' history. Moreover, it
claimed that the report was based on the biased secondhand information
from Agnes and her sister, 35 and at most, it only showed that Joe-Ar is
immature and irresponsible by refusing to separately live from his parents,
resorting to physical violence, and abandoning his family. 36 The Office of
the Solicitor General asserted that these do not amount to psychological
incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. 37
In its June 13, 2016 Order, 38 the trial court denied the motion. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Office of the Solicitor General's motion, is
hereby denied.
Furnish copy of this Order to the parties and the Office of the
Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED. 39

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an Appeal, 40 contending that

the Decision and Order of the trial court lacked factual and legal bases. 41 It
asserted that the totality of evidence presented by Agnes did not warrant
the dissolution of their marriage, reiterating that the testimonies of Agnes
and her sister were self-serving 42 and the psychological report had no
probative value because Dr. Gerong did not personally interview and assess
Joe-Ar. Moreover, it claimed that Dr. Gerong's report was overly generic, and
that he used an obsolete version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders. 43
Agnes, however, maintained that the basis of the trial court's Decision
was clearly articulated and the evidence she presented sufficiently
established Joe-Ar's psychological incapacity. Moreover, Joe-Ar's failure to
refute the evidence against him showed his indifference towards their
marriage. 44
In its July 16, 2018 Decision, 45 the Court of Appeals granted the
Appeal. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 3
March 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cebu City, in Civil
Case No. CEB-40548 is SET ASIDE, and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 46

Using the guidelines in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 47 the

Court of Appeals ruled that Agnes failed to establish Joe-Ar's psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. 48 Foremost, the testimony of
Dr. Gerong cannot be given credence because he did not personally
examine Joe-Ar and his report is solely based on interviews with Agnes and
her sister. 49
Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that Dr. Gerong's observations
were inadequate for failing to identify the root cause of Joe-Ar's personality
disorder and its existence prior to or at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. 50 Dr. Gerong did not explain that Joe-Ar's disorder was clinically
permanent or incurable and that he cannot fulfill his marital duties due to
psychological incapacity, based on established jurisprudence. 51
Agnes moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its March 5, 2019 Resolution. 52
On May 24, 2019, Agnes filed a Petition for Review 53 before this Court.
Petitioner mainly argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the totality of evidence is insufficient to declare her marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. 54 She points out that the trial court's
Decision is supported by the findings of Dr. Gerong, who identified that
private respondent has narcissistic and dependent personality disorders.
Both disorders are characterized as grave, serious, and incurable. Moreover,
these personality disorders are deeply rooted in private respondent's family,
who were described by Dr. Gerong as collective narcissists. 55
Petitioner asserts that the non-examination of private respondent does
not invalidate the findings of the psychiatrist, 56 citing Camacho-Reyes v.
Reyes-Reyes. 57 She further stresses that private respondent was indifferent
towards the entire proceedings as he refused to be examined by Dr. Gerong,
and did not even participate in the trial. 58
aScITE

In any case, petitioner states that the psychologically incapacitated

spouse is not required to be personally examined by a physician if the
totality of the evidence is enough to support the finding, 59 as ruled in
Marcos v. Marcos . 60 Moreover, petitioner maintains that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied stringently when it will result to the
perversion of marriages and families. 61
Petitioner reiterates that private respondent's infidelity, abuse, and
disregard of his marital and familial responsibilities demonstrate his lack of
understanding of marriage. 62
In its Comment, 63 public respondent argues that the findings of Dr.
Gerong are insufficient to establish private respondent's psychological
incapacity. 64 It asserts that petitioner's assertion is qualified by Toring v.
Toring, 65 which requires sources other than the respondent's spouse. It
points out that the findings based on petitioner and her sister are unreliable
and unfair. 66 It claims that the testimonies refer to incidents which
transpired after the celebration of the marriage. Moreover, they do not have
personal knowledge to establish private respondent's private and family
history. Thus, public respondent argues that Dr. Gerong can neither
conclude that private respondent's condition existed prior to the marriage,
nor trace the incapacity's root cause. 67
Public respondent further stresses that the totality of evidence is
insufficient to establish private respondent's psychological incapacity. 68
Citing the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it submits that, at most, private
respondent was "an imperfect husband in an imperfect marriage," 69 which
does not necessarily render the marriage void. 70

In lieu of a reply, petitioner filed a Manifestation, 71 stating that there

are no new issues raised in the Comment that she must respond to. 72
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether the marriage between
petitioner Agnes Padrique Georfo and private respondent Joe-Ar Jabian
Georfo is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Subsumed under
this issue is whether the totality of evidence presented by petitioner is
sufficient to prove that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations.
We grant the Petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code recognizes a void marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity:
Article 36. Â A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The import of Article 36 was first examined in the 1995 case ofSantos
v. Court of Appeals. 73
In Santos, Leouel Santos (Leouel) invoked Article 36 of the Family Code
to void his marriage with Julia Bedia-Santos (Julia). Leouel alleged that Julia's
failure to return home or communicate with him for more than five years
signify her psychological incapacity to fulfill her marital obligations. 74 The
lower courts denied the petition, which was affirmed by this Court. 75
Santos discussed that the Family Code Commissioners refused to
define psychological incapacity and to provide examples of what it
constitutes. This is to "allow some resiliency," giving the provision room to
accommodate varying circumstances. 76 The discussions of the Family Code
Commissioners highlight that "psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage." 77 Thus, they declined to invite a psychiatrist during
the deliberations. 78
This notwithstanding, Santos determined that psychological incapacity
refers to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]" 79 It is
reserved for "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage." 80
Santos further resolved that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 81
It explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
 marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 82
The subsequent case of Molina laid down specific guidelines in
interpreting and applying Article 36. 83 Thus:
(1) Â The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage
as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) Â The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) Â The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.DETACa

(4) Â Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Â Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
 disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) Â The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Â Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) Â The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 84
(Citations omitted)
As observed by this Court, Molina created an overly restrictive standard
in establishing psychological incapacity which resulted in the dismissal of
most psychological incapacity cases. 85 In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: 86

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to

impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases
of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly,
the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like,
to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals. 87 (Citations omitted)
In the recent case of Tan-Andal v. Andal , 88 we reviewed jurisprudence
and found the inclination to dismiss psychological incapacity cases due to
the strict interpretation in Molina. We observed:
[T]he tendency to rigidly apply the Molina guidelines continued. Apart
from Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals , Antonio v. Reyes , Ngo Te v.
Yu-Te, and Kalaw v. Fernandez , only the parties in Azcueta v.
Republic, Halili v. Santos-Halili, Camacho-Reyes v. Reye s, Aurelio v.
Aurelio, Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente , Republic v. Javier , and
Republic v. Mola Cruz were granted a decree of nullity by this Court
via a signed decision or resolution since the Family Code was signed
into law. That only a few cases were found to have satisfied the
Molina guidelines is, supposedly, in accordance with the Constitution
on the inviolability of marriage, to the extent that this Court often
reversed the factual findings of psychological incapacity by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. 89 (Citations omitted)
Tan-Andal examined the actual intent and import of Article 36 and
reassessed the interpretation developed in Molina. It modified and refined
the guidelines so that it truly reflects the meaning of psychological
incapacity.
First, Tan-Andal established that the quantum of proof required in
nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence based on the presumption of
validity of marriage. It requires more than preponderant evidence but less
than proof beyond reasonable doubt. 90
Second, Tan-Andal abandoned the guideline in Molina requiring the
root cause of the psychological incapacity to be medically or clinically
identified. 91
Tan-Andal delved into the history and intent behind Article 36 and
found that psychological incapacity is not tantamount to mental incapacity.
92 Rejecting the proposal to include the term "mentally incapacitated," the

Family Code Commissioners agreed that psychological incapacity is not a

mere vice of consent. Neither is psychological incapacity a personality
disorder. 93 It is not a mental disorder identified in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth
Edition. 94 Still, psychologists and psychiatrists are compelled "to assign a
personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse" 95 to comply with the second Molina guideline.
This Court now requires a proof of a person's "personality structure"
which makes it impossible for them to understand and comply with their
marital obligations: 96HEITAD

There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a

person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests
itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the
family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for
him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or
her essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an
expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the
spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly
incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these
behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume
the essential marital obligations. 97
This approach is consistent with the Family Code Commissioners' intent
to limit psychological incapacity to "psychic causes." 98 Moreover, it does
away with the cruel and dehumanizing exercise of labelling a person as
having a mental disorder in order to nullify a marriage. 99
Third, in light of the shift in viewing psychological incapacity as a legal
concept, the three characteristics of psychological incapacity are restated.
Juridical antecedence is established by showing that the psychological
incapacity exists at the time of the celebration, even if it only manifests
during the marriage. It may be proven by "testimonies describing the
environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may
have led to a particular behavior." 100
While it is difficult to pinpoint when the psychological incapacity
existed, it is enough that the petitioner show that the incapacity, "in all
reasonable likelihood," 101 already exists at the time the marriage was
celebrated. Since the spouses will only assume marital obligations after the
marriage, their psychological capacity to fulfill those obligations will only
manifest after the celebration of the marriage. 102
Incurability must be viewed in the legal, not medical, sense. Veering
away from the medical orientation, the third Molina guideline was amended.
Psychological incapacity is not a medical illness which can be cured: it must
be "so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality
structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the
union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage."
103

To satisfy the requirement of incurability, there must be a showing of

an "undeniable pattern of such persisting failure to be a present, loving,
faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse [that] must be established so as
to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity
in the spouse relative to the other." 104
The requirement on the gravity of the psychological incapacity was
retained, which must be "caused by a genuinely psychic cause." 105 It must
not be mere "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts," nor "mere refusal, neglect[,] difficulty, much less ill
will." 106
In ruling that the marriage is void, this Court in Tan-Andal found that
Mario Andal (Mario) was psychologically incapacitated to enter the marriage
after his spouse, Rosanna Tan-A ndal (Rosanna), sufficiently discharged the
required burden of proof. 107 Based on the testimony of the physician-
psychiatrist Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia), Mario has a
narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder. 108 He possessed "traits
exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse,
lack of empathy, and sense of entitlement[,]" 109 which prevented him from
fulfilling his marital obligations. Moreover, he has "substance abuse disorder
with psychotic features (paranoid delusions and bizarre behavior) and
aggression against people in his environment." 110
Dr. Garcia's testimony was based on the evaluation of Rosanna,
Rosanna's sister, and daughter. 111 While Dr. Garcia was not able to examine
Mario, we ruled that the psychiatric evaluation sufficiently established
Mario's psychological incapacity. We reiterated that the personal
examination of the psychologically incapacitated spouse is not indispensable
in these establishing Article 36 cases. It is enough that the totality of
evidence establishes the psychological incapacity of one or both spouses.
112

While the testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist is no longer

required in psychological incapacity cases, Dr. Garcia was presented as an
expert in psychiatry. 113 In coming up with the interpretation, she conducted
a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination, which are
established principal techniques in psychiatric disorder diagnosis. 114 It
would have been ideal to have Mario undergo a psychological evaluation,
but in cases where the person is not available, incapable, or refuses to be
examined, "it is an accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's
psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources
aside from the person evaluated." 115
This case concerns similar circumstances. Here, the totality of evidence
established private respondent's psychological incapacity to comply with his
marital obligations.
First, petitioner has discharged the burden of proof to establish private
respondent's psychological incapacity which consisted of his personality
structure and how this personality is rooted from his childhood and
manifested during his marriage.
According to Dr. Gerong's report, private respondent's behavior is
"characterized by extreme selfishness and ego-centeredness," 116 and lack
of sensitivity and concern for others:
[R]espondent is exhibiting trait patterns typical to persons with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This type of personality disorder is
characterized by extreme selfishness and ego-centeredness. DSM-IV
specifically describes the disorder as follows: lack of empathy-unable
to feel for the other person, lack of sensitivity except for self-
appointed needs, lack of concern for others, underdeveloped
superego but overdeveloped in mental structures, erroneous or
erratic in decision-making against the backdrop of social norms where
the person belongs, interpersonally exploitative (takes advantage of
an opportunity, like money or convenience, etc.), usually arrogant,
pretentious and usually unsatisfied with almost anything.
The respondent's condition is serious. This is because the
respondent is unable to carry out the most ordinary duties in
marriage and family as prescribed by law and his culture. It is the
extreme in the continuum of personality disorder, characterized by
impairment of his functions as husband and father. The respondent's
personality is incurable. Incurability means as enduring pattern,
pervasive across time and place and enduring. It is incurable,
because the disease model is not seen here. The respondent does not
think of himself as having a disease called personality disorder. It is
not a disease but may be called a psychological malady which is
difficult to deal with. There is no medication for personality disorder.
A person with a personality disorder may express that he is anxious
and tense, then we can prescribe medication for anxiety and stress,
but not for personality disorder.
Narcissistic Personality Disorder is coded as Axis II in DSM-IV
and categorized as Cluster B Disorder, characterized as erratic,
eccentric and emotional. It has its antecedent beginning in childhood
and adolescence and carried over into the adult life and characterizes
that adult age. Indeed, this personality disorder when possessed by
one, the partner will have difficulty relating or will have difficulty
sustaining the relationship. 117
aDSIHc

Based on Dr. Gerong's report, private respondent's personality

structure is consistent with narcissistic personality disorder, rooted in his
childhood and carried over into this adulthood and married life. His
psychological report establishes the gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence of his personality structure. As Dr. Gerong noted, private
respondent's personality makes it difficult for him to relate or sustain a
relationship with another person. Moreover, this personality structure is
serious and incurable as it manifests an enduring pattern. Lastly, the
psychological report observed that private respondent's family background
and environment nurtured and led to this type of personality. 118
Second, while a psychiatric examination is no longer required in Article
36 petitions, Dr. Gerong's testimony is offered as an expert's opinion. Dr.
Gerong is qualified to provide a psychological evaluation of private
respondent. He is a Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Psychology, a registered
Counseling Specialist and Certified Psychology Specialist. He teaches
psychology and guidance counseling and has served as an expert witness in
several psychological incapacity cases. 119 Thus, his assessment of private
respondent may be given probative value.
The Court of Appeals rejected Dr. Gerong's report and ruled that it fell
short of establishing private respondent's psychological incapacity because
it was not based on his personal examination. It concluded that the report is
biased because it was based on the interview of petitioner and her sister. 120
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that Dr. Gerong failed to identify the
root cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity and he used an
old version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 121
This line of reasoning has been dismissed in Tan-Andal. To reiterate,
the psychiatric evaluation of the alleged incapacitated spouse is no longer
required in psychological incapacity cases. The psychiatric evaluation may
be based on collateral information or other sources. 122
I n Camacho-Reyes , this Court noted that it is only reasonable that a
psychological report is based on the testimony of the petitioning spouse
since they are the one who had closely observed and interacted with their
partner. 123
The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder,
does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do
their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in
their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves
only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during
the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their
individual assessment of the present state of the parties' marriage
from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly,
petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondent's pattern of behavior which she could then
validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist. 124
(Citation omitted)
However, this Court clarified that evidence should not only come from
the petitioning spouse but also from other sources: 125
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity
outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the
allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential —
although from sources other than the respondent spouse — to show
his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of
marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential
obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability
of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or
even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
 incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of marriage, or
to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage. 126
Public respondent cites Toring in questioning the validity of Dr.
Gerong's assessment. It points out that the assessment is biased and unfair
because it is based on petitioner and her sister's testimonies. 127
Toring does not squarely apply here. In Toring, this Court found the
psychological assessment wanting because it is only culled from interviews
of the petitioning spouse and one of the spouses' son. This Court explained
that there should be sources other than the spouse. The son cannot give a
reliable testimony on his mother's psychological incapacity as he could not
have been there when his parents were married. Moreover, he could not
have known what transpired between his parents until long after his birth.
128

Here, Dr. Gerong's psychological assessment is not only based on

petitioner, but also on another source: petitioner's sister. 129 This
circumstance is more akin with Tan-Andal, where this Court gave credence to
the psychological assessment based on the interview of the petitioning
spouse, her sister, and daughter.
It is essential to have the psychological assessment derived from
sources other than the petitioning spouse because of the obvious bias in
favor of the petitioner's cause. 130 This dilemma is avoided when another
person supports the petitioner's testimony, even if the supporting testimony
comes from the petitioning spouse's friend or relative. 131 This is a realistic
reception of psychological assessments considering that the friends or
relatives of the alleged psychologically incapacitated spouse will not be
inclined to give hostile testimonies against the latter.
Thus, psychological assessments based on testimonies of petitioner
and her sister may be given credence, unless there are reasons to believe
that the testimonies are fabricated to favor the petitioner. As long as the
totality of the evidence establishes the private respondent's psychological
incapacity, the dissolution of the marriage is warranted.
Further, psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness
which has to be medically or clinically identified. Thus, the form of
psychological incapacity does not have to be culled from the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, whether an outdated or recent
version. Consequently, the psychological assessment of Dr. Gerong does not
lose credibility if it is based on an older version of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred
in disregarding Dr. Gerong's psychological report.
All told, given the totality of evidence, we find that petitioner
established with clear and convincing evidence that private respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. Thus,
their marriage is void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED. The July 16, 2018 Decision
and March 5, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
06219 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Agnes
Padrique Georfo and private respondent Joe-Ar Jabian Georfo is VOID on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
SO ORDERED. ATICcS

Lazaro-Javier, M.V. Lopez, J.Y. Lopez and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], at
40. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the
Supreme Court website.

2. Id. at 31.

3. Id. at 46.

4. Rollo, pp. 11-33.

5. Id. at 132-147. The July 16, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 06219 was penned
by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired member of this Court)
and concurred in by Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Louis P.
Acosta of the Special Nineteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.

6. Id. at 158-159. The March 5, 2019 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 06219 was
penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Louis
P. Acosta of the Former Special Nineteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu
City.

7. Id. at 65-71. The March 3, 2016 Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-40548 was
penned by Judge Manuel D. Patalinghug of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
22, Cebu City.

8. Id. at 88. The June 13, 2016 Order in Civil Case No. CEB-40548 was penned by
Presiding Judge Manuel D. Patalinghug of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
Cebu City.

9. Id. at 15.

10. Id. at 15 & 94.

11. Id. at 16.

12. Id. at 13.

13. Id. at 16.

14. Id. at 13.

15. Id. at 14.

16. Id. at 67.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 14 & 67.

19. Id. at 14.

20. Id. at 35-44.

21. Id. at 67.

22. Id. at 17.

23. Id. at 18.

24. Id. at 67-68.

25. Id. at 162.

26. Id. at 163.

27. Id. at 67-68.

28. Id. at 19-20.

29. Id. at 20.

30. Id. at 65-71.

31. Id. at 70.

32. Id. at 69-70.

33. Id. at 72-87.

34. Id. at 78-80.

35. Id. at 78.

36. Id. at 81.

37. Id. at 84.

38. Id. at 88.

39. Id.

40. Id. at 89-107.

41. Id. at 95-98.

42. Id. at 102.

43. Id. at 103-104.

44. Id. at 127.

45. Id. at 132-147.

46. Id. at 146.

47. 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

48. Rollo, p. 140.

49. Id. at 142.

50. Id. at 142-143.

51. Id. at 144.

52. Id. at 158-159.

53. Id. at 11-33.

54. Id. at 23.

55. Id. at 26.

56. Id. at 27.

57. 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].

58. Rollo, p. 27.

59. Id. at 28.

60. 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

61. Rollo, p. 28.

62. Id.

63. Id. at 201-212.

64. Id. at 205-206.

65. 640 Phil. 434 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].

66. Rollo, p. 205.

67. Id. at 206.

68. Id. at 207.

69. Id.

70. Id.

71. Id. at 219-222.

72. Id. at 219.

73. 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

74. Id. at 29.

75. Id. at 29 & 42.

76. Id. at 36. See also Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [Per J.
Leonen, En Banc].

77. Id. at 32.

78. Id. at 33.

79. Id. at 40.

80. Id.

81. Id. at 39.

82. Id.

83. 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

84. Id. at 676-680.

85. Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], at
24. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the
Supreme Court website.

86. 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

87. Id. at 695-696.

88. G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

89. Id. at 25-26. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded
to the Supreme Court website.

90. Id. at 27.

91. Id. at 30-31.

92. Id. at 30.

93. Id.

94. Id. at 30-31.

95. Id. at 31.

96. Id.

97. Id. at 31-32.

98. Id. at 32.

99. Id.

100. Id.

101. Cayabyab-Navarrosa v. Navarrosa , G.R. No. 216655, April 20, 2022 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division], at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy
of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
102. Id. at 6-7.

103. Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc],
at 33. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the Decision uploaded to the
Supreme Court website.

104. Id. (Citation omitted).

105. Id. at 34.

106. Id. at 33-34.

107. Id. at 40.

108. Id. at 41.

109. Id. at 40.

110. Id. at 41-42.

111. Id. at 10.

112. Id. at 46.

113. Id. at 45-46.

114. Id. at 46.

115. Id.

116. Rollo, p. 68.

117. Id. at 67-68.

118. Id.

119. Id. at 67.

120. Id. at 142.

121. Id. at 142-144.

122. Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc],
at 46. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the
Supreme Court website.

123. Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes , 642 Phil. 602, 627 (2010) [Per J. Nachura,
Second Division].

124. Id. at 627.

125. Toring v. Toring , 640 Phil. 434, 451 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].

126. Id. at 451.

127. Rollo, pp. 205-206.

128. Toring v. Toring , 640 Phil. 434, 451-452 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].

129. Rollo, p. 17.

130. So v. Valera, 606 Phil. 309, 327 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

131. Toring v. Toring , 640 Phil. 434, 451 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].