Availability of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

NASA will maintain a website that provides the public with the most up-to-date project information,
including electronic copies of the EIS, as they are made available. The website may be accessed at
http://www.nasa.gov/agency/nepa/mars2020eis
 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR

THE MARS 2020 MISSION
ABSTRACT

LEAD AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546
COOPERATING AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
POINT OF CONTACT George Tahu
FOR INFORMATION: Planetary Science Division
Science Mission Directorate
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546
(202) 358-4800
DATE: November 2014

This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) has been prepared by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended, to assist in the decision-making
process for the proposed Mars 2020 mission. This Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) is a tiered document (Tier 2 EIS) under NASA’s Programmatic EIS for the Mars
Exploration Program.
The Proposed Action addressed in this FEIS is to continue preparations for and
implementation of the Mars 2020 mission. The Mars 2020 spacecraft would be
launched on an expendable launch vehicle during a launch opportunity from July
through August 2020. The Mars 2020 spacecraft would deliver a large, mobile science
laboratory (rover) with advanced instrumentation to a scientifically interesting location
on the surface of Mars early in 2021. The design of the Mars 2020 spacecraft and rover
would be based upon and similar to that used in the 2011 Mars Science Laboratory
Mission, including the use of a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator.
The purpose of the Mars 2020 mission would be to continue NASA’s in-depth
exploration of Mars. The mission described by the Mars 2020 Science Definition Team
Report provides a basis for the proposed Mars 2020 mission, recommending it consist
of a science-focused, highly mobile rover designed to explore and investigate in detail a
site on Mars that was likely once habitable. The mission concept includes new scientific
instrumentation designed to seek signs of past life in situ. This instrumentation would be
used to select a suite of samples that would be stored in a sealable cache that could be
returned to Earth by a future mission. The mission would also demonstrate new
technology for future exploration of Mars (both robotic and human missions).
This FEIS presents descriptions of the proposed Mars 2020 mission, spacecraft, and
candidate launch vehicles; an overview of the affected environment at and near the
launch site and globally; and the potential environmental consequences associated with
the Proposed Action and Alternatives, including the No Action Alternative.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Mars 2020 mission has been
prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as
amended (NEPA), (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.); Executive Order 12114, Environmental
Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions; the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-
1508); and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) NEPA policy
and procedures (14 CFR subpart 1216.3).
This FEIS for the Mars 2020 mission is a tiered document (Tier 2 EIS) under the Mars
Exploration Program (MEP). The Mars 2020 FEIS focuses on reasonable alternatives to
implement the purpose and need of the Mars 2020 mission, and the potential
environmental impacts associated with each alternative.
The purpose of this FEIS is to assist in the decision-making process concerning the
Proposed Action and Alternatives, including the No Action Alternative, for the proposed
Mars 2020 mission planned for launch in 2020. This FEIS provides information
associated with potential environmental impacts of implementing a proposed Mars 2020
mission, which would employ new scientific instrumentation in order to seek signs of
past life in situ, select and store a suite of samples in a returnable cache, and
demonstrate technology for future robotic and human exploration of Mars. NASA’s
proposed Mars 2020 mission would use the proven design and technology developed
for the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) rover Curiosity that arrived on Mars in August
2012. Under the Proposed Action, the Mars 2020 rover would be powered by a Multi-
Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG). NASA would select a
scientifically important landing site based upon data from past and current missions.

PURPOSE AND NEED FOR ACTION

The purpose of the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be to conduct comprehensive
science on the surface of Mars and demonstrate technological advancements in the
exploration of Mars. Mars 2020 mission investigations would reflect several of the high-
priority scientific investigations recommended to NASA by the planetary science
community. The overall scientific goal would be to address the questions of habitability
and the potential origin and evolution of life on Mars.
NASA further characterized these mission objectives in an Announcement of
Opportunity (AO) released on 24 September 2013 (NASA 2013c) for the competitive
acquisition of payload investigations for the Mars 2020 mission as follows:
 Characterize the processes that formed and modified the geologic record within a
field exploration area on Mars selected for evidence of an astrobiologically-
relevant ancient environment and geologic diversity.
 Perform astrobiologically-relevant investigations on the geologic materials at the
landing site.
 Assemble a returnable cache of samples for possible future return to Earth.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

 Contribute to the preparation for human exploration of Mars by making significant

progress towards filling at least one major Strategic Knowledge Gap (gaps in
knowledge or information required to reduce risk, increase effectiveness, and
improve the design of robotic and human space exploration missions).
In addition to the objectives identified as part of the AO, NASA would also retain the
objective, as identified by the Mars 2020 Mission Science Definition Team, of
demonstrating improved technical capabilities for landing and operating on the surface
of Mars for the benefit of future Mars missions.

ALTERNATIVES EVALUATED
This FEIS for the Mars 2020 mission evaluates the following alternatives in sufficient
detail to make a meaningful comparison of technical feasibility and potential
environmental impacts.
 Proposed Action (Alternative 1) [NASA’s Preferred Alternative] — NASA
proposes to continue preparations for and implement the Mars 2020 mission to
the surface of Mars. The proposed Mars 2020 spacecraft would be launched on
board an expendable launch vehicle from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Brevard County, Florida, during a 20-day
launch opportunity that runs from July through August 2020, and would be
inserted into a trajectory toward Mars. Should the mission be delayed, the
proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched during the next available launch
opportunity in August through September 2022. The rover proposed for the Mars
2020 mission would utilize a radioisotope power system to continually provide
heat and electrical power to the rover’s battery so that the rover could operate
and conduct science on the surface of Mars.
 Alternative 2 — In this Alternative, NASA would discontinue preparations for the
Proposed Action (Alternative 1) and implement an alternative configuration for
the Mars 2020 mission to Mars. The Mars 2020 rover would utilize solar power
as its source of electrical power to operate and conduct science on the surface of
Mars. The alternative Mars 2020 spacecraft would still be launched on board an
expendable launch vehicle from KSC or CCAFS, Brevard County, Florida, during
a 20-day launch opportunity that runs from July through August 2020, and would
be inserted into a trajectory toward Mars. Like Alternative 1, should the mission
be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched during the next
available launch opportunity in August through September 2022.
 Alternative 3 — In this Alternative, NASA would discontinue preparations for the
Proposed Action (Alternative 1) and implement an alternative configuration for
the Mars 2020 mission to Mars. The Mars 2020 rover would utilize solar power
as its source of electrical power to operate and conduct science on the surface of
Mars. The rover thermal environment would be augmented by the thermal output
from Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Units (LWRHUs) to help keep the rover’s
onboard systems at proper operating temperatures. The Mars 2020 spacecraft
would still be launched on board an expendable launch vehicle from KSC or

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 Executive Summary

CCAFS, Brevard County, Florida, during a 20-day launch opportunity that runs
from July through August 2020, and would be inserted into a trajectory toward
Mars. Should the mission be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be
launched during the next available launch opportunity in August through
September 2022.
 No Action Alternative — Under this alternative, NASA would discontinue
preparations for the Mars 2020 mission and, in turn, the spacecraft would not be
launched.

FUNCTIONAL AND SCIENCE CAPABILITIES AND RISKS

ALTERNATIVES 1, 2, and 3. The Mars 2020 rover designs in both the Proposed
Action (Alternative 1) and Alternatives 2 and 3 would carry the same science
instruments; therefore, each of the three alternatives would have common mission
science objectives. The main difference between these three alternatives is that the
radioisotope-powered rover, using an MMRTG, proposed for Alternative 1 would be
capable of operating for a full Martian year within a significantly broader range of
latitudes on Mars (meeting the mission objective for operation between 30 o south and
30o north) than either of the solar-powered rovers (Alternatives 2 and 3). The capability
to land the rover within a broad range of latitudes is important because doing so
maintains NASA’s flexibility to select the most scientifically interesting location on the
surface and would maximize the rover’s capability to collect the most desirable surface
samples and conduct comprehensive science experiments.
A pure solar mission (Alternative 2), with solar arrays optimized for use on Mars that
remain 40 percent dust free1 with MSL heritage avionics and mechanical systems (e.g.,
actuators) would not be feasible for an entire Martian year at any latitude. If one
assumes that the solar arrays would remain 70 percent free of dust, then a full Martian
year mission (with periods of constrained operation) most likely would be possible at a
narrow band of southern latitudes between 0-5o degrees. With current dust mitigation
technology, operation over a larger latitude range for an entire year is not possible. To
extend the range of operations, new dust mitigation technology would require
development and flight certification.

A solar mission with solar arrays optimized for use on Mars, the same assumption that
the solar arrays remain 40 percent free of dust, and the addition of LWRHUs
(Alternative 3), allow for some half-Martian year missions in northern latitudes as well as
a full Martian year mission in a latitude band between 5-20o south latitude. The
drawback of the southern latitude missions is that periods of constrained science
operations and hibernation would be necessary. In hibernation, all science operations
would be halted and only activities needed for the rover to survive would be performed.

1
Note that of the solar-powered Mars Exploration Rovers (MERs), Opportunity has remained at least
40 percent dust free for the entire mission to date, while Spirit experienced high dust accumulation
following a global dust storm; and at one point in the mission had less than 25 percent dust-free solar
arrays.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

If one assumes that the solar arrays remain 70 percent free of dust, then a full Martian
year mission could be possible between 20o south and 15o north latitudes. Even with
this improved operating range, there would be periods of constrained science operation
and hibernation.
Any of the solar-powered mission architectures would be expected to increase the
technical risk and resulting cost of mission design and development. A number of
design changes (modifications from the Curiosity heritage design) would also be
necessary to modify the rover’s power control electronics. Small increases in rover
mass on the order of less than10 kilograms (22 pounds) may also be expected relative
to the baseline MMRTG powered rover, primarily in the area of the solar array support
structure. The rover’s thermal design would have to be amended as well, since survival
heating would be provided by electrical output as opposed to any use of the MMRTG
thermal energy. The changes required to accommodate solar power for the Mars 2020
rover could potentially impact the accommodation of science instruments for the
mission.
Should the mission be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched
during the next available launch opportunity in August through September 2022. The
science potential associated with Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 with a 2022 launch would be
similar to those projected for each alternative with a 2020 launch. Under all
circumstances, an MMRTG-powered rover would provide more power and heat for
science activities.
No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, NASA would discontinue
preparations for the Mars 2020 mission and the spacecraft would not be launched.
Therefore, none of the recommended science objectives would be met.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION AND THE

ALTERNATIVES
For the proposed Mars 2020 mission, the potentially affected environment would include
the areas on or near the vicinity of the launch site and portions of the global
environment. For each of the alternatives, the potential non-radiological and radiological
environmental consequences of launch site preparation for and launch of the Mars 2020
mission are summarized below. The non-radiological consequences associated with
Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 have been addressed in prior U.S. Air Force (USAF) and NASA
environmental documents (NASA 2011, USAF 2000). The preparation of an MMRTG or
LWRHUs by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the proposed Mars 2020 mission
would be very similar to their process in preparing the nearly identical MMRTG for the
MSL mission. The environmental impacts of preparing an MMRTG by the DOE for the
Mars 2020 mission have already been evaluated in existing DOE NEPA documents
(DOE 1993, 2000, 2002, 2002b, 2008, 2013).
The evaluations presented in this FEIS are based on representative configurations of
Atlas V, Delta IV Heavy, and the Falcon Heavy class of expendable launch vehicles.
NASA considers these evaluations to adequately bound the potential environmental
consequences of the alternatives described in this FEIS.

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 Executive Summary

Environmental Impacts of a Normal Mission

Alternatives 1, 2, and 3. The environmental impacts associated with successfully
implementing either the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, or Alternative 3
would principally be with the exhaust emissions from the launch vehicle. These impacts
were addressed in the Final Environmental Assessment for Launch of NASA Routine
Payloads on Expendable Launch Vehicles (Routine Payload EA) (NASA 2011) for all
candidate launch vehicles. These effects would include short-term impacts on air quality
from the exhaust cloud at and near the launch pad, and short-term acidic deposition on
the vegetation and surface water bodies at and near the launch complex. These effects
would be transient and there would be no long-term or cumulative impacts to the
environment. Some short-term ozone degradation would occur along the flight path of
the vehicle as the vehicle passes through the stratosphere and deposits ozone-
depleting chemicals (primarily hydrogen chloride) from its solid rocket boosters. These
effects would be transient and no long-term or cumulative impacts to the ozone layer
would be expected (USAF 2000).
No Action Alternative. There would be no environmental impacts associated with the
No Action Alternative.
Non-Radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Launch Accidents
Alternatives 1, 2, and 3. Non-radiological accidents could occur during preparation for
and launch of the Mars 2020 spacecraft at the KSC or CCAFS. Non-radiological
impacts from launch accidents were addressed in the Final Environmental Assessment
for Launch of NASA Routine Payloads on Expendable Launch Vehicles (Routine
Payload EA) (NASA 2011) for all candidate launch vehicles. The two non-radiological
accidents of principal concern for the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be a liquid
propellant spill associated with fuel loading operations and a launch vehicle accident.
Propellant spills or releases would be minimized through standard remotely operated
actions that close applicable valves and safe the propellant loading system. Propellant
loading would occur only shortly before launch, further minimizing the potential for
accidents.
Range Safety at CCAFS uses models based on past launches over many years to
predict potential launch hazards to the public and to launch site personnel prior to a
launch. These models are used to calculate the risk of injury resulting from exposure to
potentially toxic exhaust gases from normal launches, and from exposure to potentially
toxic concentrations of propellant, blast overpressure, or debris due to a failed launch. A
launch could be postponed if the predicted collective risk of injury from exposure to toxic
gases, blast overpressure, or debris, exceeds acceptable established limits (USAF
2004).
A launch vehicle accident on or near the launch area during the first few seconds of
flight could result in the release of the propellants onboard the launch vehicle and the
spacecraft. The resulting emissions from the combusted propellants would chemically
resemble those from a normal launch. Debris would be expected to fall on or near the
launch pad or into the Atlantic Ocean. Modeling of postulated accident consequences
with meteorological parameters that would result in the greatest concentrations of

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emissions over land areas (as reported in previous USAF environmental documentation
(NASA 2011)) indicates that the emissions would not reach levels threatening public
health.
No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, NASA would not complete
preparations for the Mars 2020 mission. The No Action Alternative would not involve
any of the environmental impacts associated with potential launch-related accidents.
Potential Radiological Environmental Impacts of Launch Accidents
A principal concern associated with the launch of the proposed Mars 2020 mission
involves potential launch vehicle (LV) accidents that could result in the release of some
of the radioactive material onboard the spacecraft. Under Alternative 1, the Mars 2020
rover electrical power would be supplied by one MMRTG, which would use the natural
decay of its radioisotope fuel to produce electricity. The MMRTG contains 4.8 kg
(10.6 lb), or approximately 60,000 curies, of plutonium dioxide (consisting primarily of
plutonium-238). Alternative 2 would not involve radioactive material. Alternative 3
complements the power from solar arrays with up to 71 LWRHUs, each containing a
pencil eraser-sized pellet of approximately 2.7 grams, (a total of 192 grams [0.42 lb]), 33
curies (a total of 2,300 curies), of plutonium dioxide (also primarily plutonium-238).
The DOE would provide the MMRTG/LWRHUs for the Mars 2020 mission and retain
title to the MMRTG/LWRHUs and plutonium during both the preparation and launch of
the mission and in the event of a launch accident. As a cooperating agency, DOE has
prepared the Nuclear Risk Assessment for the Mars 2020 Mission Environmental
Impact Statement (SNL 2014). The nuclear risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission
considers: (1) potential accidents associated with the launch, their probabilities and
accident environments; (2) the response of the MMRTG, LWRHUs, and science
instrument sources2 to such accidents in terms of the release probabilities and
estimated amounts and form of radioactive material released; and (3) the radiological
consequences and risks associated with such releases.
Information on potential launch vehicle accident scenarios and related probabilities was
developed by NASA based on information provided by the potential launch service
providers and the spacecraft provider. DOE then assessed the response of the MMRTG
and LWRHUs to these accident environments, and estimated the amount of radioactive
material (plutonium dioxide) that could be released. Finally, DOE determined the
potential consequences of each release to the environment and to the potentially
exposed population. Accidents were assessed over all mission launch phases—from
pre-launch operations through escape from Earth orbit—and consequences were

2
The DOE performed the risk assessment prior to the selection of mission science instrumentation, and
the selection of instruments with small radioisotope sources was considered to be a possibility. The
instruments selected by NASA for the Mars 2020 mission do not contain any science instrument
radioisotope sources. However, radioisotopes may be used for calibration purposes. The very small
quantities of radioisotopes used for this purpose have been addressed in previous NASA environmental
documentation (NASA 2011) and found to have no significant impact.

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assessed for both the regional population near the launch site and the global
population.
Results of the risk assessment for this FEIS show that the most likely outcome of
implementing the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) would be a successful launch with no
release of radioactive materials. However, the risk assessment did identify potential
launch accidents that, while not expected, could result in a release of radioactive
material in the launch area for accidents occurring early in the launch, in southern Africa
for events resulting in a suborbital reentry, and in other global locations following orbital
reentry. In each of these regions, the probability of an accident resulting in a release of
radioactive material would be, at worst, 1 in 3,800 for the MMRTG and 1 in 16,000 for
the LWRHUs.
The radiological impacts for each postulated accident were calculated in terms of
(1) impacts to individuals in terms of the maximum individual dose (the largest expected
dose that any person could receive for a particular accident); (2) impacts to the
population in terms of the potential for additional latent cancer fatalities due to a
radioactive release (i.e., cancer fatalities that are in excess of those latent cancer
fatalities that the general population would normally experience from all causes over a
long-term period following the release); and (3) impacts to the environment in terms of
land area contaminated at or above specified levels. The analysis conservatively
assumes no mitigation actions, such as sheltering and exclusion of people from
contaminated land areas. Prior to launch of the Mars 2020 mission, a comprehensive
set of plans would be developed by NASA to ensure that any launch accident could be
met with a well-developed and tested response. NASA's plans would be developed in
accordance with the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and the NRF
Nuclear/ Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in coordination with DOE and other
Federal agencies, the state of Florida, Brevard County, and local governmental
organizations.
Potential environmental contamination was evaluated in terms of areas exceeding
various specific screening levels and dose-rate-related criteria. For this FEIS, land
areas would be considered to be contaminated to the point of requiring detailed
characterization for potential cleanup actions when radiological deposition exceeds a
screening level of 0.2 microcuries per square meter (μCi/m2) (SNL 2014).
Should any active decontamination be required, the costs associated with these efforts
could vary widely depending upon the characteristics of the contaminated area and its
size. Previous estimates by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), adjusted for
inflation to 2014 dollars, for general land/water radiological cleanup, range from $110
million to $611 million per square kilometer (about $284 million to $1.58 billion per
square mile) (Chanin et al. 1996).
Should the mission be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched
during the next available launch opportunity in August through September 2022. Since
this launch period is in a similar season as the 2020 launch period, the projected
radiological impacts would be similar, with only a small increase in population impacts
due to population growth. Thus, within the overall uncertainties, the radiological impacts

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associated with a 2022 launch would be the same as those for the proposed 2020
launch.
Alternative 1: As shown in Figure ES-1, the most probable outcome is a successful
launch. In the event of a launch accident, most accidents do not result in the release of
plutonium dioxide. Between one and two percent of the launch accidents do however
result in a release. These accidents may occur near the launch area, resulting in a
release within the launch area; or they may occur later in the launch and result in a
release beyond the launch area. The risk assessment shows that for the Mars 2020
mission using an MMRTG:
 There is a 97.5% chance of a successful launch.
 There is a 2.5% chance of a launch accident.
 There is a 1 in 2,600 chance of a launch accident that would release plutonium
dioxide.
o There is a 1 in 11,000 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide in the launch area.
o There is a 1 in 3,500 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide outside the launch area.
 No radiological fatalities would be expected to occur as a result of any accident.
 The average maximum dose to any member of the public from an accident with a
release in the launch area would be equal to about 3 months of exposure to
natural background radiation for a person living in the United States.

Figure ES-1. Alternative 1 - MMRTG Accident Probabilities

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 Executive Summary

The accident probabilities and mean consequences are the result of the summation of
individual accidents that have a wide range of consequences and probabilities. For
launch-related issues that could occur prior to launch, the most likely result would be a
safe hold or termination of the launch countdown with no radiological consequences.
After lift-off, most accidents would lead to activation of safety systems that would result
in automatic or commanded destruction of the launch vehicle.
For post-launch accidents near the launch area that result in a radiological release, the
predicted mean radiological dose to the maximally exposed individual would be about
0.06 rem. The probability for such an accident is about 1 in 11,000. No near-term
radiological health effects would be expected from such an exposure. Each exposure
would, however, yield an increase in the statistical likelihood of a latent cancer fatality
over the long term. For a launch area accident resulting in a release, a mean of 0.29
additional latent cancer fatalities could occur among the potentially exposed members
of the local and global populations.
The risk assessment concludes that the average land contamination above 0.2 Ci/m2
for all launch area accidents that result in a release is 7.4 km2 (2.9 square miles).
For accidents that occur prior to or shortly after the spacecraft reaches Earth orbit for
which debris could impact land, the total probability of an accident resulting in a release
during this phase is about 1 in 68,000. The maximum (mean value) dose received by an
individual close to the impact site would be about 0.043 rem. The collective dose
received by all individuals within the potentially exposed global population would result
in about 0.20 mean additional latent cancer fatalities within the exposed population.
For accidents after the spacecraft reaches Earth orbit during which debris could impact
land, the total probability of an accident resulting in a release is about 1 in 3,800. The
maximum (mean value) dose received by an individual close to the impact site would be
about 0.0005 rem. The collective dose received by all individuals within the potentially
exposed global population would result in about 0.0026 mean additional latent cancer
fatalities within the exposed population.
Considering all launch accidents assessed in this FEIS, the maximally exposed member
of the exposed population faces a much less than 1 in a million chance of incurring a
latent cancer due to a launch failure of the Mars 2020 mission.
Alternative 2: Under Alternative 2, the Mars 2020 rover would utilize solar energy as
its sole source of electrical power. Implementation of Alternative 2 would not involve
potential radiological environmental impacts.
Alternative 3: Under Alternative 3, the Mars 2020 rover would utilize solar energy as
its primary source of electrical power. Alternative 3 would not involve any MMRTG-
associated radiological risks. However, NASA may consider the use of up to 71
LWRHUs to provide additional heat to help maintain the solar-powered rover’s
functionality during extreme cold temperature conditions. The use of LWRHUs for this
alternative could also result in mission risks and related radiological consequences.
As shown in Figure ES-2, the most probable outcome is a successful launch. In the
event of a launch accident, most accidents do not result in the release of plutonium

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dioxide. Less than one percent of the launch accidents do however result in a release.
These accidents may occur near the launch area, resulting in a release within the
launch area; or they may occur later in the launch and result in a release beyond the
launch area. The risk assessment shows that for the Mars 2020 mission using
LWRHUs:
 There is a 97.5 percent chance of a successful launch.
 There is a 2.5 percent chance of a launch accident.
 There is a 1 in 15,000 chance of a launch accident that would release plutonium
dioxide.
o There is a 1 in 16,000 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide in the launch area.
o There is a 1 in 420,000 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide outside the launch area.
 No radiological fatalities would be expected to occur as a result of any accident.
 The average maximum dose to any member of the public from an accident with a
release in the launch area would be equal to about 5 days of exposure to natural
background radiation for a person living in the United States.
Most of the radiological accident impacts for Alternative 3 would be associated with
accidents that occur on or near the launch area. The LWRHUs would be expected to

Figure ES-2. Alternative 3 - LWRHU Accident Probabilities

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survive most launch accidents beyond the immediate launch area without releasing any
plutonium dioxide. For accidents near the launch area that result in a radiological
release, the predicted mean radiological dose to the maximally exposed individual
would be about 0.004 rem. The probability for such an accident is about 1 in 16,000. No
near-term radiological health effects would be expected from such an exposure. Each
exposure would, however, yield a small increase in the statistical likelihood of a latent
cancer fatality over the long term. For a launch-area accident with a release, a mean of
0.020 additional latent cancer fatalities could occur among the potentially exposed
members of the local and global populations.
The risk assessment concludes that the average land contamination above 0.2 Ci/m2
for all launch area accidents that result in a release is 0.51 km2 (0.20 square mile).
Considering all of the launch accidents assessed in this FEIS, the maximally exposed
member of the exposed population faces a much less than 1 in a million chance of
incurring a latent cancer due to a failure of the Mars 2020 mission.
No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, NASA would not complete
preparations for and implement the Mars 2020 mission. The No Action Alternative would
not involve any of the radiological risks associated with potential launch accidents.

SUMMARY COMPARISON OF THE ALTERNATIVES

Table ES-1 presents a summary comparison of the Proposed Action (Alternative 1),
Alternative 2, Alternative 3, and the No Action Alternative in terms of each alternative’s
capabilities for operating and conducting science on the surface of Mars, the anticipated
environmental impacts of normal implementation of each alternative, and the potential
environmental impacts in the event of a launch accident for each alternative.

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Table ES-1. Summary Comparison of the Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives

Proposed Action Alternative 2 Alternative 3 No Action
(Alternative 1) Alternative
Rover Power MMRTG Solar Array no LWRHUs Solar Array with LWRHUs Not applicable
Alternative
Functional Capable of operating for at Unable to operate for a full Limited operational capability Not applicable
(a)
Capability least one Mars year at landing Mars year at any latitude for a full Mars year for landing
sites between 30° north and 30° sites between 20° south and 5°
(a)
south latitudes on Mars south latitudes on Mars
Science Capability Capable of accomplishing all Capable of accomplishing up to Capable of accomplishing up to No science
science objectives at any 33% of science objectives 70% of science objectives at achieved
(b)
scientifically desirable landing during partial year operation at limited latitudes due to
(b)
site between 30° north and 30° limited latitudes constrained operations during
south latitudes northern winter
Anticipated Short-term impacts associated Short-term impacts associated Short-term impacts associated No impacts
Environmental with exhaust emissions from with exhaust emissions from with exhaust emissions from
Impacts (“Normal the launch vehicle during a the launch vehicle during a the launch vehicle during a
Launch”) normal launch normal launch normal launch
Potential Potential impacts associated Potential impacts associated Potential impacts associated No potential
Environmental with combustion of released with combustion of released with combustion of released impacts
Impacts in the propellants and falling debris propellants and falling debris propellants and falling debris
Event of a Launch Potential radiological impacts Potential radiological impacts
Accident associated with the release of associated with the release of
some of the plutonium dioxide some of the plutonium dioxide
from the MMRTG from the LWRHUs
(a) These numbers assume a dust factor of 40%. Assuming dust mitigation technology improvements on the Mars Exploration Rover solar
array performance, the rover (without LWRHUs) is estimated to survive for a full year at latitudes between 0° and 5° south and, with
LWRHUs, full year of operation (with periods of constrained operations and hibernation) between 20° south and 15° north latitudes is
possible.
(b) Improved solar array performance from dust mitigation technology would result in a corresponding increase in science capability,
expanding the range of latitudes the rover could operate for a full year.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 1
Section Page
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 ......................................................................... xvii
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................... xxv
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... xxvi
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ....................................................................... xxix
COMMON METRIC/BRITISH SYSTEM EQUIVALENTS ......................................... xxxv
1. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION .......................................................... 1-1
1.1 Background .................................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 Purpose of the Action ................................................................................... 1-4
1.3 Need for the Action ...................................................................................... 1-5
1.4 NEPA Planning and Scoping Activities ........................................................ 1-7
1.5 Results of Public Review of the Draft EIS .................................................... 1-9
1.6 Changes to the Draft EIS ........................................................................... 1-10
2. DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES ................................. 2-1
2.1 Description of the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) ....................................... 2-3
2.1.1 ......Mission Description ............................................................................. 2-3
2.1.2 ......Spacecraft Description ...................................................................... 2-10
2.1.3 ......Rover Electrical Power ..................................................................... 2-16
2.1.4 ......Operational Considerations .............................................................. 2-23
2.1.5 ......Spacecraft Processing ...................................................................... 2-24
2.1.6 ......Representative Launch Vehicle Configurations for the Mars 2020
Mission ............................................................................................. 2-24
2.1.6.1. Description of the Atlas V Launch Vehicle ............................. 2-25
2.1.6.1.1. First Stage .................................................................... 2-26
2.1.6.1.2. Centaur Second Stage ................................................. 2-26
2.1.6.1.3. Payload Fairing ............................................................. 2-26
2.1.6.1.4. Atlas V Space Launch Complex-41 .............................. 2-27
2.1.6.1.5. Launch Vehicle Processing .......................................... 2-27

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2.1.6.1.6. Launch Profile ............................................................... 2-28

2.1.6.2. Description of the Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle ................. 2-29
2.1.6.2.1. First Stage .................................................................... 2-29
2.1.6.2.2. Second Stage ............................................................... 2-29
2.1.6.2.3. Payload Fairing ............................................................. 2-30
2.1.6.2.4. Delta IV Space Launch Complex-37 (SLC-37) ............. 2-30
2.1.6.2.5. Launch Vehicle Processing .......................................... 2-30
2.1.6.2.6. Launch Profile ............................................................... 2-31
2.1.6.3. Description of the Falcon Heavy Launch Vehicle ................... 2-32
2.1.6.3.1. First Stage .................................................................... 2-32
2.1.6.3.2. Second Stage ............................................................... 2-33
2.1.6.3.3. Payload Faring.............................................................. 2-33
2.1.6.3.4. Falcon Heavy Space Launch Complexes 39A and 40 .. 2-33
2.1.6.3.5. Launch Vehicle Processing .......................................... 2-34
2.1.6.3.6. Launch Profile ............................................................... 2-34
2.1.6.4. Flight Termination System ..................................................... 2-35
2.1.6.5. Range Safety Considerations ................................................ 2-36
2.1.6.6. Electromagnetic Environment ................................................ 2-36
2.1.7 ......Radiological Emergency Response Planning ................................... 2-37
2.2 Description of Alternative 2 ........................................................................ 2-38
2.2.1 ......Mission and Spacecraft Description .................................................. 2-38
2.2.1.1. Solar Power Supply System ................................................... 2-38
2.2.2 ......Solar Power Availability .................................................................... 2-39
2.2.3 ......Operational Considerations .............................................................. 2-41
2.3 Description of Alternative 3 ........................................................................ 2-42
2.3.1 ......Mission and Spacecraft Description .................................................. 2-43
2.3.1.1. Solar Power Supply System ................................................... 2-43
2.3.1.2. Radioisotope Heater Units ..................................................... 2-43
2.3.2 ......Solar Power Availability .................................................................... 2-45
2.3.3 ......Operational Considerations .............................................................. 2-46
2.4 Description of the No Action Alternative ..................................................... 2-48

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2.5 Alternatives Considered But Not Evaluated Further ................................... 2-48

2.6 Comparison of Alternatives Including the Proposed Action ........................ 2-48
2.6.1 ......Comparison of Mission Science Capabilities .................................... 2-48
2.6.2 ......Comparison of Potential Environmental Impacts .............................. 2-50
2.6.2.1. Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch .......................... 2-50
2.6.2.2. Potential Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Launch
Accidents ............................................................................... 2-53
2.6.2.3. Potential Radiological Environmental Impacts of Launch
Accidents ............................................................................... 2-55
2.6.2.3.1. The FEIS Nuclear Risk Assessment ............................. 2-57
2.6.2.3.2. Accident Probabilities and Consequences .................... 2-58
2.6.2.3.3. Mission Risks ................................................................ 2-64
2.6.3 ......Summary Comparison of the Alternatives ........................................ 2-65
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT ........................................ 3-1
3.1 Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Kennedy Space Center Location
Description ................................................................................................... 3-1
3.1.1 ......Land Use ............................................................................................ 3-3
3.1.2 ......Air Resources ..................................................................................... 3-4
3.1.2.1. Climate ..................................................................................... 3-4
3.1.2.2. Air Quality ................................................................................ 3-5
3.1.2.3. Ozone Depleting Substances ................................................... 3-5
3.1.2.4. Risk Management Program 40 CFR 68 ................................... 3-6
3.1.3 ......Noise .................................................................................................. 3-6
3.1.4 ......Soils and Geology ............................................................................... 3-6
3.1.4.1. Soils ......................................................................................... 3-6
3.1.4.2. Geology.................................................................................... 3-6
3.1.4.3. Seismology .............................................................................. 3-7
3.1.5 ......Water Quality ...................................................................................... 3-7
3.1.5.1. Surface Water Classification .................................................... 3-7
3.1.5.2. Surface Water Quality .............................................................. 3-7
3.1.5.3. Groundwater Sources .............................................................. 3-8
3.1.5.4. Coastal Zone Management ...................................................... 3-8
3.1.6 ......Biological and Natural Resources ....................................................... 3-9

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

3.1.6.1. Vegetation, Wetland, and Wildlife Resources .......................... 3-9

3.1.6.2. Aquatic Resources ................................................................... 3-9
3.1.6.3. Threatened and Endangered Species.................................... 3-11
3.1.6.4. Sensitive Habitats .................................................................. 3-12
3.1.7 ......Socioeconomics and Children’s Environmental Health and Safety ... 3-13
3.1.7.1. Population .............................................................................. 3-13
3.1.7.2. Economy ................................................................................ 3-15
3.1.7.3. Transportation Systems ......................................................... 3-15
3.1.7.4. Public and Emergency Services ............................................ 3-15
3.1.7.5. Recreation.............................................................................. 3-16
3.1.7.6. Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and
Safety Risks ........................................................................... 3-16
3.1.8 ......Cultural and Historic Resources ....................................................... 3-16
3.1.9 ......Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Wastes ................................... 3-17
3.1.9.1. Hazardous Materials Management ........................................ 3-17
3.1.9.2. Hazardous Waste Management at CCAFS ............................ 3-17
3.1.9.3. Hazardous Waste Management at KSC ................................ 3-18
3.1.9.4. Hazardous Waste Clean up ................................................... 3-18
3.1.9.5. Pollution Prevention ............................................................... 3-19
3.1.10 ....Health and Safety ............................................................................. 3-19
3.1.10.1. Regional Safety ...................................................................... 3-20
3.1.10.2. On-Station Safety ................................................................... 3-20
3.1.11 ....Aesthetics ......................................................................................... 3-21
3.2 The Global Environment............................................................................. 3-21
3.2.1 ......Troposphere ..................................................................................... 3-21
3.2.2 ......Stratosphere ..................................................................................... 3-22
3.2.3 ......Orbital and Re-entry Debris .............................................................. 3-23
3.2.4 ......Global Population Distribution........................................................... 3-24
3.2.5 ......Earth Surface Characteristics ........................................................... 3-24
3.2.6 ......Background Radiation ...................................................................... 3-25
3.2.6.1. Natural and Manmade Sources ............................................. 3-25
3.2.6.2. Worldwide Plutonium Levels .................................................. 3-26

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4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES ................................................................ 4-1

4.1 Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) .................... 4-3
4.1.1 ......Environmental Consequences of Preparing for Launch ...................... 4-3
4.1.2 ......Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch ....................................... 4-5
4.1.2.1. Land Use.................................................................................. 4-5
4.1.2.2. Air Quality ................................................................................ 4-5
4.1.2.3. Noise ........................................................................................ 4-6
4.1.2.4. Geology and Soils .................................................................... 4-8
4.1.2.5. Water Quality ........................................................................... 4-8
4.1.2.6. Offshore Environment .............................................................. 4-9
4.1.2.7. Biological Resources................................................................ 4-9
4.1.2.8. Socioeconomics and Children’s Environmental Health and
Safety ..................................................................................... 4-11
4.1.2.9. Cultural/Historic/Archaeological Resources ........................... 4-12
4.1.2.10. Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste .......................... 4-12
4.1.2.11. Health and Safety................................................................... 4-13
4.1.2.12. Environmental Justice ............................................................ 4-14
4.1.2.13. Aesthetics .............................................................................. 4-14
4.1.2.14. Global Environment................................................................ 4-14
4.1.2.15. Orbital and Reentry Debris ..................................................... 4-16
4.1.3 ......Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents ....... 4-17
4.1.3.1. Liquid Propellant Spills ........................................................... 4-17
4.1.3.2. Launch Failures and Suborbital, Orbital and Reentry Debris . 4-18
4.1.4 ......Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents Involving
Radioactive Material ......................................................................... 4-22
4.1.4.1. Risk Assessment Methodology .............................................. 4-23
4.1.4.2. Launch Accidents and Accident Probabilities ......................... 4-26
4.1.4.3. MMRTG Response to Accident Environments ....................... 4-30
4.1.4.4. Accident Probabilities and Source Terms .............................. 4-32
4.1.4.5. Radiological Consequences................................................... 4-38
4.1.4.6. Discussion of the Results ....................................................... 4-45
4.1.4.7. Mission Risks ......................................................................... 4-49
4.1.4.8. Uncertainty ............................................................................. 4-51

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

4.1.5 ......Radiological Contingency Response Planning ................................. 4-53

4.2 Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2 ...................................................... 4-53
4.2.1 ......Environmental Consequences of Preparing for Launch .................... 4-54
4.2.2 ......Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch ..................................... 4-54
4.2.3 ......Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents ....... 4-54
4.2.4 ......Radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents.............. 4-54
4.3 Environmental Impacts of Alternative 3 ...................................................... 4-54
4.3.1 ......Environmental Consequences of Preparing for Launch .................... 4-55
4.3.2 ......Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch ..................................... 4-55
4.3.3 ......Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents ....... 4-55
4.3.4 ......Radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents
Involving Plutonium ........................................................................... 4-55
4.3.4.1. Risk Assessment Methodology .............................................. 4-56
4.3.4.2. Launch Accidents and Accident Probabilities ......................... 4-56
4.3.4.3. LWRHU Response to Accident Environments ....................... 4-57
4.3.4.4. Accident Probabilities and Source Terms .............................. 4-58
4.3.4.5. Radiological Consequences................................................... 4-62
4.3.4.6. Discussion of the Results ....................................................... 4-68
4.3.4.7. Mission Risks ......................................................................... 4-70
4.3.4.8. Uncertainty ............................................................................. 4-73
4.3.5 ......Radiological Contingency Response Planning ................................. 4-73
4.4 Environmental Impacts of the No Action Alternative .................................. 4-74
4.5 Cumulative Impacts .................................................................................... 4-74
4.6 Environmental Effects that Cannot Be Avoided.......................................... 4-76
4.7 Incomplete or Unavailable Information ....................................................... 4-76
4.8 Relationship Between Short-Term Uses of the Human Environment and the
Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity ....................... 4-78
4.8.1 ......Short-Term Uses .............................................................................. 4-78
4.8.2 ......Long-Term Productivity ..................................................................... 4-78
4.9 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources ........................... 4-79
4.9.1 ......Energy and Fuels.............................................................................. 4-79
4.9.2 ......Other Materials ................................................................................. 4-79
4.10 Environmental Compliance at CCAFS and KSC ........................................ 4-79

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4.10.1 ....Air Resources ................................................................................... 4-80

4.10.2 ....Water Resources .............................................................................. 4-80
4.10.3 ....Floodplains and Wetlands................................................................. 4-80
4.10.4 ....Hazardous Material Management ..................................................... 4-81
4.10.5 ....Hazardous Waste Management ....................................................... 4-81
4.10.6 ....Pollution Prevention .......................................................................... 4-81
4.10.7 ....Spill Prevention ................................................................................. 4-81
4.10.8 ....Biological Resources ........................................................................ 4-82
4.10.9 ....Coastal Zone Management............................................................... 4-82
4.10.10 .Cultural and Historic Resources ....................................................... 4-82
4.10.11 .Noise ................................................................................................ 4-83
4.10.12 .Worker and Public Safety and Health ............................................... 4-83
5. LIST OF PREPARERS ......................................................................................... 5-1
6. AGENCIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED ................... 6-1
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 6-1
6.2 Cooperating Agency ..................................................................................... 6-1
6.3 Scoping Process .......................................................................................... 6-1
6.4 Website ........................................................................................................ 6-2
6.5 Review of Draft EIS ...................................................................................... 6-2
6.6 Draft EIS Distribution .................................................................................... 6-2
7. INDEX ................................................................................................................... 7-1
8. REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 8-1
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS ...................................................................... A-1
APPENDIX B EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM ON THE ENVIRONMENT ........................ B-I
B-1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. B-1
B-2 RADIOLOGICAL HUMAN HEALTH IMPACTS ................................................... B-1
B-2.1 Nature of Radiation and Its Effects on Humans ........................................... B-2
B-2.2 Radiation Sources ........................................................................................ B-4
B-2.3 Exposure Pathways ..................................................................................... B-5
B-2.4 Radiation Protection Guides......................................................................... B-6
B-2.5 Radiation Exposure Limits............................................................................ B-7
B-2.6 Health Effects ............................................................................................... B-7
B-2.7 EIS Health Effect Risk Estimators .............................................................. B-10

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

B-3 EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM ON THE ENVIRONMENT ..................................... B-11

B-3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ B-11
B-3.2 Chemical And Physical Properties That Are Important For Behavior In The
Environment And The Human Body ........................................................... B-11
B-3.3 The Transport Of Plutonium Oxides Through The Environment ................ B-13
B-3.4 Transport and Deposition of Radionuclides in the Human Body ................ B-16
B-4 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX B.................................................................... B-17
APPENDIX C ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS ............................................ C-I
C-1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. C-1
C-2 DEFINITIONS AND APPROACH......................................................................... C-1
C-2.1 Minority Populations .................................................................................... C-1
C-2.2 Low-Income Populations ............................................................................. C-3
C-2.3 Disproportionately High And Adverse Human Health Effects ...................... C-3
C.2-4 Disproportionately High And Adverse Environmental Effects ...................... C-3
C-3 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. C-3
C-3-1 Spatial Resolution ....................................................................................... C-3
C-3-2 Projections of Populations ........................................................................... C-3
C-3.3 Environmental Justice Assessment ............................................................. C-3
C-4 CHARACTERIZATION OF POTENTIALLY AFFECTED POPULATIONS .......... C-4
C-5 IMPACTS ON MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS ........................ C-7
C-6 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX C...................................................................... C-8
APPENDIX D RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS ............................... D-i

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List of Figures
Figure Page
Figure ES-1. Alternative 1 - MMRTG Accident Probabilities .......................................... x
Figure ES-2. Alternative 3 - LWRHU Accident Probabilities .......................................... xii
Figure 1-1. Mars Exploration Program and Cooperative Missions 1997 - 2020 .......... 1-3
Figure 2-1. Baseline Science and Technology Capabilities for Mars 2020 Mission .... 2-2
Figure 2-2. Arrival Dates for the Proposed Mars 2020 Mission ................................... 2-5
Figure 2-3. Entry, Descent, and Landing Phase .......................................................... 2-7
Figure 2-4. Illustration of the Proposed Mars 2020 Flight System ............................. 2-10
Figure 2-5. The Mars 2020 Descent Stage and Proposed Mars 2020 Rover ............ 2-11
Figure 2-6. The Proposed Mars 2020 Rover ............................................................. 2-12
Figure 2-7. The Science Instrumentation for the Proposed Mars 2020 Rover ........... 2-13
Figure 2-8. Components of a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 2-17
Figure 2-9. A General Purpose Heat Source Module ................................................ 2-21
Figure 2-10. An Atlas V Launch Vehicle with Solid Rocket Boosters ........................ 2-25
Figure 2-11. The Spacecraft Within the Payload Fairing Envelope ........................... 2-26
Figure 2-12. Typical Atlas V Ascent Profile ............................................................... 2-28
Figure 2-13. A Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle ......................................................... 2-29
Figure 2-14. Typical Delta IV Heavy Ascent Profile ................................................... 2-31
Figure 2-15. A Falcon Heavy Launch Vehicle ........................................................... 2-32
Figure 2-16. Falcon Heavy Ascent Profile ................................................................. 2-35
Figure 2-17. A Representative Solar-Powered Alternative 2 Mars 2020 Rover ......... 2-39
Figure 2-18. Mars 2020 Solar-Powered Rover Operability (40% Dust Factor) .......... 2-40
Figure 2-19. Principal Features of a Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit
(LWRHU) .............................................................................................. 2-44
Figure 2-20. Mars 2020 Solar-Powered (with LWRHUS) Rover Operability with 40%
Dust Factor ........................................................................................... 2-46
Figure 2-21. Alternative 1 - MMRTG Accident Probabilities ...................................... 2-56
Figure 2-22. Alternative 3 - LWRHU Accident Probabilities....................................... 2-57
Figure 3-1. CCAFS and NASA/KSC Locations ........................................................... 3-2
Figure 4-1. The Radiological Risk Assessment Methodology ................................... 4-25
Figure C-1. The Area within 100 km (62 mi) of SLC-41, LC-39A and SLC-37 ........... C-2

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

List of Tables
Table Page
Table ES-1. Summary Comparison of the Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives ..................xv
Table 2-1. Baseline Operational Capabilities for the Mars 2020 Mission .................... 2-3
Table 2-2. Mars 2020 Science Measurements and Technology Capabilities ............ 2-13
Table 2-3. U.S. Space Missions Using Radioisotope Power Systems (RPSs) .......... 2-19
Table 2-4. Typical Isotopic Composition of an MMRTG ............................................ 2-22
Table 2-5. Operational Lifetime for a Solar-Powered Rover ...................................... 2-42
Table 2-6. Science Capability .................................................................................... 2-42
Table 2-7. Typical Radionuclide Composition of a LWRHU Fuel Pellet .................... 2-45
Table 2-8. Operational Lifetime for a Solar-Powered Rover with LWRHUs............... 2-47
Table 2-9. Estimated Science Capability Comparison of the Mars 2020 Mission
Alternatives ........................................................................................... 2-49
Table 2-10. Summary of Anticipated Environmental Impacts of the Mars 2020 Mission
Alternatives ........................................................................................... 2-51
Table 2-11. Summary of Estimated Mean Radiological Health Consequences ........ 2-61
Table 2-12. Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives: Land Contamination ........................... 2-63
Table 2-13. Summary Comparison of the Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives ............... 2-67
Table 3-1. State and Federal Ambient Air Quality Standards ...................................... 3-5
Table 3-2. Threatened, Endangered, and Candidate Species Occurring or Potentially
Occurring on or Around CCAFS and KSC, Florida ............................... 3-11
Table 3-3. Population of the Nine-County Region ..................................................... 3-14
Table 3-4. Minority Population of the Nine-County Region........................................ 3-14
Table 3-5. Global Population and Surface Characteristics by Latitude Band ............ 3-24
Table 3-6. Average Annual Effective Dose Equivalent of Ionizing Radiation to a
Member of the U.S. Population ............................................................. 3-26
Table 4-1. Launch Vehicle Emissions ....................................................................... 4-14
Table 4-2. Alternative 1 Accident End State Probabilities ......................................... 4-29
Table 4-3. Summary of Accident Probabilities and MMRTG Source Terms .............. 4-35
Table 4-4. Summary of Estimated MMRTG Accident Radiological Consequences .. 4-41
Table 4-5. Potential Land Decontamination Cost Factors ......................................... 4-47
Table 4-6. Summary of MMRTG Health Effect Mission Risks ................................... 4-49
Table 4-7. MMRTG Health Effect Mission Risk Contributions by Affected Region .... 4-50

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Table 4-8. MMRTG Maximum Individual Risk ........................................................... 4-51

Table 4-9. Calculated Individual Risk and Probability of Fatality by Various Causes in
the United States in 2010...................................................................... 4-52
Table 4-10. Alternative 3: Accident End-state Probabilities ....................................... 4-57
Table 4-11. Alternative 3: Summary of Accident Probabilities and LWRHU Source
Terms.................................................................................................... 4-59
Table 4-12. Summary of LWRHU Estimated Radiological Consequences................ 4-65
Table 4-13. Summary of LWRHU Health Effect Mission Risks ................................. 4-71
Table 4-14. LWRHU Health Effect Mission Risk Contributions by Affected Region .. 4-72
Table 4-15. LWRHU Maximum Individual Risk ......................................................... 4-73
Table B-1. Exposure Limits for Members of the Public................................................B-7
Table B-2. Nominal Health Risk Estimators Associated with Exposure to 1 Rem of
Ionizing Radiation ...................................................................................B-8
Table C-1. Composition of the Population in the KSC Area ....................................... C-5
Table D-1. Comment Submissions from Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals ... D-2
Table D-2. Responses to Comment Submissions Listed in Table D-1 ....................... D-3

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xxviii
 Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station
ABL atmosphere boundary
layer CDS Command Destruct
System
ac acre
CEQ Council on Environmental
ADS Automatic Destruct Quality
System
CFC chlorofluorocarbon
AEC Atomic Energy
CFR Code of Federal
Commission
Regulations
AFI Air Force Instruction
Ci curie
AFPD USAF Policy Directive
Cl2 chlorine
AIAA American Institute of
Aeronautics and Cm curium
Astronautics cm centimeter
Al2O3 aluminum oxide CMS Corrective Measures
AO Announcement of Study
Opportunity CNS Canaveral National
APXS Alpha Particle X-Ray Seashore
Spectrometer CO carbon monoxide
ASRG Advanced Stirling CO2 carbon dioxide
Radioisotope Generator COMPLEX Committee on Planetary
and Lunar Exploration
B CT Computed Tomography
CWA Clean Water Act
BEBR Bureau of Economic and
Business Research
D
BEIR Biological Effects of
Ionizing Radiation DAN Dynamic Albedo of
BLS Bureau of Labor and Neutrons
Statistics dB decibel
BMAP Basic Management Action dBA decibels (A-weighted)
Plan DHS Department of Homeland
Bq Becquerel Security
BTU British thermal unit DIL derived intervention level
DoD Department of Defense
C DOE Department of Energy
ºC degrees Celsius DOI Department of the Interior
CADS Centaur Automatic DOS U.S. Department of State
Destruct System
CBC common booster core E
EDE effective dose equivalent

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

EDL entry, descent, and gal gallon

landing GCTL ground water cleanup
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone target level
EFH essential fish habitat GIS Graphite Impact Shell
EIS Environmental Impact GMD ground-based midcourse
Statement defense
EO Executive Order GPHS General Purpose Heat
EPA Environmental Protection Source
Agency
ESA Endangered Species Act H
ETR extended test range
H2 hydrogen
EXM ExoMars Rover Mission
H2O water
ha hectare
F
HAP hazardous air pollutant
º
F degrees Fahrenheit HAPC Habitat Areas of Particular
FAA Federal Aviation Concern
Administration HCl hydrogen chloride
FDEP Florida Department of (hydrochloric acid)
Environmental Protection HEAST health effects assessment
FEIS Final Environmental summary table
Impact Statement HM/HW Hazardous Materials and
FEMA Federal Emergency Hazardous Waste
Management Agency HPS Health Physics Society
FFWCC Florida Fish and Wildlife hr hour
Conservation HTPB hydroxyl-terminated
Commission polybutadiene
FONSI finding of no significant
impact I
FMO Fishery Management
Officials IAEA International Atomic
FR Federal Register Energy Agency
FS Florida Statute ICRP International Commission
on Radiological
FSAR Final Safety Analysis
Protection
Report
in inch
FSII full-stack intact impact
INL Idaho National Laboratory
ft foot
INSRP Interagency Nuclear
FTS Flight Termination System
Safety Review Panel
FWS (U.S.) Fish and Wildlife
ISCORS Interagency Steering
Service
Committee on Radiation
Standards
G ISDS Inadvertent Separation
g gram Destruct System

xxx
 Abbreviations and Acronyms

ISRP International Space MDRPRA Marine Debris Research,

Research Park Prevention, and
ISRU In Situ Resource Reduction Act
Utilization MEDA Mars Environmental
J Dynamics Analyzer
MEI maximally exposed
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory individual
MEP Mars Exploration Program
K MEP EIS Mars Exploration Program
K degrees Kelvin Environmental Impact
kg kilogram Statement
km kilometer MER Mars Exploration Rover
km2 square kilometers MEX Mars Express
KNPR Kennedy NASA MFCO Mission Flight Control
Procedural Requirement Officer
KSC Kennedy Space Center MGS Mars Global Surveyor
MHW Multi-Hundred Watt
L mi mile
mi2 square mile
LANL Los Alamos National MINWR Merritt Island National
Laboratory Wildlife Refuge
lb pound MMH monomethyl hydrazine
lbf pound-force MMPA Marine Mammal Protection
LC Launch Complex Act
LH2 liquid hydrogen MMRTG Multi-Mission Radioisotope
LOX liquid oxygen Thermoelectric
LSTO Launch Service Task Generator
Order MOXIE Mars Oxygen ISRU
LV launch vehicle Experiment
LWRHU Light-Weight Radioisotope MPF Mars Pathfinder
Heater Unit mph miles per hour
mrem millirems
M MRO Mars Reconnaissance
Orbiter
μCi/m2 microcuries per square
meter MSL Mars Science Laboratory
g/m3 micrograms per cubic MSL FEIS Mars Science Laboratory
meter Mission Final
Environmental Impact
m micrometer Statement
m meter MST mobile service tower
MAVEN Mars Atmospheric and mt metric ton
Volatile EvolutioN
MVN Maven (Mars Atmospheric
MBTA Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Volatile Evolution)

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

N O
N2 nitrogen ODS ozone depleting substance
NAAQS National Ambient Air ODY Mars Odyssey
Quality Standards OFW Outstanding Florida
NASA National Aeronautics and Waters
Space Administration OPlan Operation Plan
NCRP National Council on OSHA Occupational Safety &
Radiation Protection and Health Administration
Measurements oz ounce
NEPA National Environmental
Policy Act P
NHL National Historic
Landmark PAFB Patrick Air Force Base
NLS NASA Launch Service PAH polychlorinated aromatic
NMFS National Marine Fisheries hydrocarbon
Service PCB polychlorinated biphenol
nmi nautical mile PEIS Programmatic
NOA Notice of Availability Environmental Impact
NOAA National Oceanic and Statement
Atmospheric PHSF Payload Hazardous
Administration Servicing Facility
NOI Notice of Intent PHX Phoenix
NOx nitrogen oxides PIXL Planetary Instrument for X-
NPD NASA Policy Directive ray Lithochemistry
NPDES National Pollutant PLF payload fairing
Discharge Elimination PM2.5 particulate matter less
System than 2.5 micrometers in
NPR NASA Procedural diameter
Requirement PM10 particulate matter less
NPS National Park Service than 10 micrometers in
diameter
NRC National Research Council
ppm parts per million
NRC Nuclear Regulatory
Commission PPPG Pollution Prevention
Program Guide
NRF National Response
Framework psf pound/square foot
NRHP National Register of Pt-30Rh platinum-30 rhodium
Historic Places Pu plutonium
NSF National Science Pu-236 Plutonium-236
Foundation Pu-238 Plutonium-238
NTO nitrogen tetroxide Pu-239 Plutonium-239
Pu-240 Plutonium-240
Pu-241 Plutonium-241

xxxii
 Abbreviations and Acronyms

Pu-242 Plutonium-242 SHERLOC Scanning Habitable

PuO2 plutonium dioxide Environments with
Raman & Luminescence
for Organics and
R
Chemicals
rad radiation absorbed dose SLC space launch complex
RCC Range Commanders SNAP Systems for Nuclear
Council Auxiliary Power
RCRA Resource Conservation SPCC Spill Prevention, Control,
and Recovery Act and Countermeasures
rem roentgen equivalent in SRB solid rocket booster
man SSB Space Studies Board
RFI RCRA facility investigation SSC state species of special
RIMFAX Radar Imager for Mars’ concern
subsurFAce eXperiment SV space vehicle
RP-1 rocket propellant-1 SVII Space Vehicle Intact
RPS Radioisotope Power Impact
System SWCTL surface water cleanup
RTG radioisotope target level
thermoelectric generator SWMU solid waste management
unit
S
s second T
S/A similarity of appearance TEDE total effective dose
SAFMC South Atlantic Fishery equivalent
Management Council TGO Trace Gas Orbiter
SAP satellite accumulation THC toxic hazard corridor
point TMDL total maximum daily load
SC spacecraft TRN Terrain Relative
SCTL soil cleanup target level Navigation
SDT Science Definition Team TRU Transuranic
SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act TSDF Transportation, Storage,
and Disposal Facility

U
UCMR Unregulated Contaminant
Monitoring Rule
UNSCEAR United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation
USAF U.S. Air Force
USBC U.S. Bureau of the Census

xxxiii
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

USCG United States Coast Guard

USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service
UV ultraviolet
UV-B ultraviolet

V
VIF Vertical Integration Facility
VOC volatile organic compound

Y
yd yard
yr year

xxxiv
 Common Metric/British System Equivalents

COMMON METRIC/BRITISH SYSTEM EQUIVALENTS

Length
1 centimeter (cm) = 0.3937 inch 1 inch = 2.54 cm
1 centimeter = 0.0328 foot (ft) 1 foot = 30.48 cm
1 meter (m) = 3.2808 feet 1 ft = 0.3048 m
1 meter = 0.0006 mile (mi) 1 mi = 1609.3440 m
1 kilometer (km) = 0.6214 mile 1 mi = 1.6093 km
1 kilometer = 0.53996 nautical mile (nmi) 1 nmi = 1.8520 km
1 mi = 0.87 nmi
1 nmi = 1.15 mi
Area
1 square centimeter (cm2) = 0.1550 square inch (in2) 1 in2 = 6.4516 cm2
1 square meter (m2) = 10.7639 square feet (ft2) 1 ft2 = 0.09290 m2
1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.3861 square mile (mi2) 1 mi2 = 2.5900 km2
1 hectare (ha) = 2.4710 acres (ac) 1 ac = 0.4047 ha
1 hectare (ha) = 10,000 square meters (m2) 1 ft2 = 0.000022957 ac
Volume
1 cubic centimeter (cm3) = 0.0610 cubic inch (in3) 1 in3 = 16.3871 cm3
1 cubic meter (m3) = 35.3147 cubic feet (ft3) 1 ft3 = 0.0283 m3
1 cubic meter (m3) = 1.308 cubic yards (yd3) 1 yd3 = 0.76455 m3
1 liter (l) = 1.0567 quarts (qt) 1 qt = 0.9463264 l
1 liter = 0.2642 gallon (gal) 1 gal = 3.7845 l
1 kiloliter (kl) = 264.2 gal 1 gal = 0.0038 kl
Weight
1 gram (g) = 0.0353 ounce (oz) 1 oz = 28.3495 g
1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds (lb) 1 lb = 0.4536 kg
1 metric ton (mt) = 1.1023 tons 1 ton = 0.9072 metric ton
Energy
1 joule = 0.0009 British thermal unit (BTU) 1 BTU = 1054.18 joule
1 joule = 0.2392 gram-calorie (g-cal) 1 g-cal = 4.1819 joule
Pressure
1 newton/square meter (N/m2) = 1 psf = 48 N/m2
0.0208 pound/square foot (psf)
Force
1 newton (N) = 0.2248 pound-force (lbf) 1 lbf = 4.4478 N
Radiation
1 becquerel (Bq) = 2.703x10-11 curies (Ci) 1 Ci = 3.70x1010 Bq
1 sievert (Sv) = 100 rem 1 rem = 0.01 Sv

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

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xxxvi
 1. Purpose and Need for the Action

1. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION

This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) has been prepared by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its cooperating agency, the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), to assist in the decision-making process as required by:
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et
seq.); Executive Order (EO) 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal
Actions; Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-
1508); and NASA policies and procedures at 14 CFR part 1216. This FEIS provides
information associated with the potential environmental impacts of preparing for and
launching a proposed Mars 2020 mission, which would employ scientific instrumentation
to seek signs of past life in situ, select and store a compelling suite of samples in a
returnable cache, and demonstrate technologies for future robotic and human
exploration of Mars. This document is a Tier 2 mission-specific FEIS under NASA’s
Mars Exploration Program Programmatic EIS (NASA 2005a). Launch of the Mars 2020
mission would take place at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Brevard
County, Florida, or Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Brevard County, Florida, during the
summer of 2020. The next launch opportunity for this mission would occur during the
summer of 2022. Chapter 2 of this FEIS describes the alternatives considered to
achieve the Mars 2020 mission.
1.1 BACKGROUND
In response to the recommendations by its advisory and analysis groups, NASA is
currently undertaking a long-term systematic program of Mars scientific exploration—the
Mars Exploration Program (MEP). To discover the possibilities for past or present life on
Mars, NASA's MEP is currently following an exploration strategy known as "Seek Signs
of Life."
This science theme marks an evolution in the Mars exploration strategy. It reflects a
long-term process of discovery on the red planet built on strategies to understand Mars'
potential as a habitat for past or present microbial life. Searching for this answer means
delving into the planet's geologic and climate history to find out how, when, and why
Mars underwent dramatic changes to become the planet we observe today.
Because water is key to life as we know it, earlier Mars missions (2001 Mars Odyssey,
Mars Exploration Rovers (MERs), Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, Mars Phoenix Lander)
were designed to make discoveries under the previous MEP science theme of "Follow
the Water." That strategy connected fundamental program goals pertaining to biological
potential, climate, and the evolution of the solid planet. Progressive discoveries related
to evidence of past and present water in the geologic record made it possible to take the
next steps toward finding evidence of life itself.
The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission and its Curiosity rover marked a transition
between the themes of "Follow the Water" and "Seek Signs of Life." In addition to
landing in a place with past evidence of water, Curiosity is seeking evidence of
organics, the chemical building blocks of life. Places with water and the chemistry
needed for life potentially provide habitable conditions.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

The scientific objectives established by the program to address the goal of answering
the question “Did life ever exist on Mars?” are to search for evidence of past or present
life, characterize the climate and volatile history of Mars, understand the surface and
subsurface geology (including the nature of the interior), and characterize the Martian
environment quantitatively in preparation for human exploration. One common thread
that links these objectives is to explore the role of water in all of its states within the
“Mars system,” from the top of the atmosphere to the interior.
The MEP is fundamentally a science-driven program focused on understanding and
characterizing Mars as a dynamic system and ultimately addressing whether life is or
was ever a part of that system. The MEP further embraces the challenges associated
with the development of a predictive capability for Martian climate and how the role of
water and other factors, such as variations in the tilt of the planet’s polar axis, may have
influenced the environmental history of Mars.
The MEP addresses the highest priority scientific investigations directly related to the
Program’s goals and objectives. These planned investigations were derived by means
of a highly inclusive process involving a large segment of the broad planetary
exploration science community. The MEP is currently implemented as a sustained
series of flight missions to Mars, each of which will provide important, focused scientific
return. NASA is taking advantage of launch opportunities available approximately every
26 months, to evolve a scientifically integrated architecture of orbiters, landers, and
rovers. Figure 1-1 provides a timeline of the MEP missions since 1997, including
proposed missions through 2020, as well as cooperative missions with the European
Space Agency. The Mars Atmospheric and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) mission has
launched and entered Mars orbit in September 2014. The MEP has launched both
orbiting and surface-focused missions with the orbiters providing both investigative and
communication capabilities.
The goals of the MEP are outlined below (NASA 2014b). The science goals described
in Section 1.2 for the proposed Mars 2020 mission support these MEP goals.
Determine if life exists or has ever existed on Mars
 Search for life where liquid water was once stable
 Look for energy sources (other than sunlight) necessary to support life
 Look for signs of life on Mars, telltale markers of current and past life
o Mineralogical clues indicating the sustained presence of water at one time
o Environments amenable (similar to sedimentary soils on Earth) to preserving
signs of life
Characterize the climate of Mars
 Characterize the current climate and climate processes of Mars
 Characterize the ancient climate of Mars

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 1. Purpose and Need for the Action

Landers - PHX: Phoenix

Rovers - MPF: Mars Pathfinder, MER: Mars Exploration Rovers, MSL: Mars Science Laboratory, EXM: ExoMars Rover, M2020: Mars 2020
Orbiting observatories and communications - MGS: Mars Global Surveyor, ODY: Mars Odyssey, MEX: Mars Express, MRO: Mars
Reconnaissance Orbiter, MVN: MAVEN, TGO: ExoMars Trace Gas Orbiter
Source: NASA 2014a

Figure 1-1. Mars Exploration Program and Cooperative Missions 1997 - 2020
Characterize the geology of Mars
 Determine the geological processes (wind, water, volcanism, tectonics, cratering,
etc.) that have resulted in formation of the Martian crust and surface.
o Identify the composition of surface materials, particularly those that may
indicate the presence of water.
 Characterize the structure, dynamics, and history of the planet’s interior.
o Determine the impact of the magnetic field Mars once had, but no longer has.
Develop an understanding of Mars in support of possible future human
exploration
 Acquire appropriate Martian environmental data such as those required to
o Characterize the radiation environment.
o Conduct in situ engineering and science demonstrations.
 Advance spacecraft technology (e.g., entry, descent, and landing technology) for
astronaut safety.
The MEP also ensures the development and demonstration of technologies required to
enable attainment of these goals. Specifically, the program enables new classes of
Mars science investigations, including remote astrobiology and new techniques for
in situ life detection. Technology developments and improvements over the course of
the program enable a progressive increase in the payload mass delivered to Mars orbit
and to the surface by program spacecraft, enhance the capability to safely and precisely
place payloads at any desired location on the surface, and enable full access to the
subsurface, surface, and atmospheric regions.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Technology improvements envisioned as part of MEP would also enhance long-lived

(one Mars year (1.88 Earth years) or longer duration, as a goal) surface science
investigations, and support the development of robotic assets to provide a nearly
continuous data return from the surface (NASA 2005a).
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE ACTION
The purpose of the proposed Mars 2020 mission is to both conduct comprehensive
science on the surface of Mars and demonstrate technological advancements
potentially useful for the future exploration of Mars. The overall scientific goal is to
address in detail questions of habitability and the potential origin and evolution of life on
Mars. In July of 2013, the Mars 2020 Science Definition Team (SDT) outlined a mission
concept for the Mars 2020 mission to explore and investigate in detail a site on Mars
that likely was once habitable. This team identified four objectives for this mission (Mars
2020 SDT 2013). NASA further characterized these mission objectives in an
Announcement of Opportunity (AO) released on 24 September 2013 (NASA 2013c) for
the competitive acquisition of payload investigations for the Mars 2020 mission. The
four objectives are to:
A. Characterize the processes that formed and modified the geologic record within a
field exploration area on Mars selected for evidence of an astrobiologically-
relevant ancient environment and geologic diversity.
B. Perform astrobiologically-relevant investigations on the geologic materials at the
landing site:
1. Determine the habitability of an ancient environment.
2. For ancient environments interpreted to have been habitable, search for
materials with high biosignature preservation potential.
3. Search for potential evidence of past life using the observations regarding
habitability and preservation as a guide.
C. Assemble a returnable cache of samples for possible future return to Earth.
1. Obtain samples that are scientifically selected, for which the field context is
documented, that contain the most promising samples identified in Objective B
and that represent the geologic diversity of the field site.
2. Ensure compliance with future needs in the areas of planetary protection and
engineering so that the cache could be returned in the future if NASA chooses to
do so.
D. Contribute to the preparation for human exploration of Mars by making significant
progress towards filling at least one major Strategic Knowledge Gap3. The

3
Gaps in knowledge or information required to reduce risk, increase effectiveness, and improve the
design of robotic and human space exploration missions.

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 1. Purpose and Need for the Action

highest priority measurements that are synergistic with Mars 2020 science
objectives and compatible with the mission concept are (in priority order):
1. Demonstration of In Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) technologies to enable
propellant and consumable oxygen production from the Martian atmosphere for
future exploration missions.
2. Characterization of atmospheric dust size and morphology to understand its
effects on the operation of surface systems and human health.
3. Collection of surface weather measurements to validate global atmospheric
models.
The SDT also identified important opportunities to demonstrate improved technical
capabilities for landing and operating on the surface of Mars to benefit future Mars
missions.
The proposed Mars 2020 mission objectives align with the priorities of the Decadal
Survey (the Space Studies Board’s (SSB’s) Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science
in the Decade 2013-2022) (NAP 2011) for solar system exploration and investigations. It
would address several of the high-priority scientific investigations recommended to
NASA by the science community. In order to fulfill these comprehensive science
objectives and maximize the potential for the mission to be most responsive to
discoveries, NASA developed capability requirements for the proposed Mars 2020
mission (these are described in Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1).
1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
The proposed Mars 2020 mission objectives align with the priorities of the National
Research Council’s (NRC’s) 2013 Planetary Science Decadal Survey for solar system
exploration and investigations, Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade
2013-2022 (NAP 2011). This report was requested by NASA and the National Science
Foundation (NSF) to review and assess the status of planetary science and to develop
a comprehensive science and mission strategy that updates and extends the NRC’s
2003 planetary decadal survey, New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated
Exploration Strategy. Drawing on extensive interactions with the broad planetary
science community, the report presents a decadal program of science and exploration
with the potential to yield revolutionary new discoveries. This report identifies
fundamental questions that a planetary exploration program should address, including
questions about past or present life in the solar system and how they relate to a NASA’s
human exploration program. The Mars 2020 mission would address several of the high-
priority scientific investigations recommended to NASA by the science community
through the decadal survey.
The MEP forms a vital part of NASA’s planetary exploration program. As stated in the
NRC document, “Mars presents an excellent opportunity to investigate the major
question of habitability and life in the solar system.” Not only can we get to and explore
Mars (as demonstrated by the success of a series of progressively larger, more
complex, and scientifically rewarding missions), Mars holds the promise of providing
answers to the questions identified for a planetary exploration program.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

The past and current environments on Mars have resulted in conditions that are unique
in the solar system (NAP 2011).
 Mars, early in its history, is thought to have had an environment in which
prebiotic compounds may have formed and that its environment may have been
conducive to the origin and continued evolution of life.
 Mars has also experienced major changes in surface conditions that have
produced a wide range of environments.
 Mars has not been subjected to significant atmospheric and geological
degradation resulting in the possibility that the early geologic record of Mars has
been preserved. This means that there is potential evidence of prebiotic and
biotic processes and how they relate to the evolution of the planet as a system.
Because of these conditions, the signs of past life on Mars may have been preserved in
such a manner that we can find them. Mars, therefore, provides the opportunity to
address questions about past and present life in the solar system such as: “Did life arise
elsewhere in the solar system, and if so, how?” “How did Mars evolve into the planet it
is today and what can be learned about Earth’s evolution?” and “How are the biological
and geological history of a planet related?” Progress on these important questions can
be made more readily at Mars than anywhere else in the solar system (NAP 2011).
The form of the proposed Mars 2020 mission—a landed rover carrying a suite of
scientific instruments—is the result of a desire to maximize the potential science return
from the mission. The rover’s mobility provides access to a significantly larger area than
possible with a landed, stationary mission. As expressed by the Space Studies Board’s
Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration (COMPLEX) (NAP 1999), mobility is
essential because evidence for past or present life on Mars will very likely not be so
abundant or widespread that it will be available in the immediate vicinity of the selected
landing site. Without the mobility necessary to conduct in situ exploration, it may not be
possible to uniquely characterize a target location. COMPLEX further emphasized the
need for very capable mobile science platforms that could carry a suite of mutually
complementary instruments, have an extensive range and long lifetime, and have one
or more manipulative devices for acquiring and caching samples. Lessons from MER
and MSL have demonstrated the advantages of mobility for conducting scientific
investigations.
The scientific instrumentation to be carried aboard the rover was selected to build upon
the results of previous missions. Discoveries from earlier missions of the MEP, including
NASA’s Spirit and Opportunity rovers, Mars Science Laboratory rover Curiosity, the
Phoenix lander, Mars Odyssey, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO), and the
European Space Agency’s Mars Express orbiter, point definitively to evidence of a past
presence of water on Mars and the presence today of subsurface water ice. Data
returned and analyzed from these ongoing missions continue to demonstrate a need for
global exploration of the planet. Future exploration efforts could use that information as
a basis for investigations intended to take the next step and “Seek Signs of Life.”
In 2002, Mars Odyssey found evidence of large amounts of subsurface water ice in the
northern arctic plains. NASA’s Phoenix Lander mission, first in the series of Mars Scout

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 1. Purpose and Need for the Action

missions within the MEP, was selected to examine this region in detail. Phoenix arrived
at Mars in May 2008 in the beginning of Northern Summer on Mars. Phoenix confirmed
deposits of underground water ice. It also found calcium carbonate, which is indicative
of the presence of liquid water at one time; and perchlorates, which some Earth
microbes can use as food, in the ice-rich soil of the Martian arctic (NASA 2010a).
NASA’s MRO mission entered orbit around Mars in March 2006 and, after a period of
adjustments to its orbit, began its primary science mission in November 2006. In
achieving its scientific objectives, MRO has searched for subsurface water and found
safe and scientifically worthy landing sites for the MSL mission and continues to be
used for reconnaissance of potential Mars 2020 landing sites.
The Mars Exploration Rovers found signs of the past presence of surface water:
minerals that on Earth are formed in the presence of water and overlapping rock layers.
The overlapping rock layers, formed as water evaporated, provide evidence that water
may have been found on the surface of Mars over long time periods. Besides finding
evidence of past surface water, the rovers identified additional chemical elements in the
Martian soil that, although not definitive proof of past life, are needed for life (NASA
2013a).
The MSL began to provide new information even before arriving at Mars. During its
journey to Mars, Curiosity instrumentation measured cosmic and solar radiation levels—
measurements that will help NASA plan and design any future manned expedition to
Mars. During the first year of its two Earth year mission, Curiosity found evidence that at
one time Mars had an environment that could support microbial life and evidence of an
ancient streambed has been found by the rover (NASA 2013b). In addition to landing in
a place with past evidence of water, Curiosity is continuing to seek evidence of
organics, the chemical building blocks of life. Places with water and the chemistry
needed for life potentially provide habitable conditions.
These previous missions have yielded new information on ancient and recent
habitability on Mars both globally and locally. To further increase our knowledge of the
solar system and of life’s evolution here on Earth, future Mars missions would be
designed to build upon the findings from these missions to search for life itself in places
identified as potential past or present habitats. Like previous MEP missions, this mission
would be driven by scientific questions that evolve from discoveries by prior missions.
The goals proposed for the Mars 2020 mission, with its overarching theme to “Seek
Signs of Life,” build upon this heritage and would improve knowledge of the habitability
of Mars from a scientifically promising location. The proposed Mars 2020 mission
objectives would also address NASA’s strategic goals of continuing to pave the way for
future human exploration.
1.4 NEPA PLANNING AND SCOPING ACTIVITIES
On April 12, 2005, NASA published a Notice of Availability of the Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars Exploration Program (PEIS MEP) (NASA
2005a, 70 FR 19102). The Record of Decision for the PEIS MEP was signed on June
22, 2005, enabling continued planning for the MEP, which represents NASA’s overall

1-7
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

plans for the robotic exploration of Mars through 2020. The PEIS MEP encompasses
the launch of at least one spacecraft to Mars during each favorable launch opportunity,
which occurs approximately every 26 months. Overall environmental compliance in
support of the MEP is addressed in the PEIS MEP, and allows planning to continue for
the Mars 2020 mission.
On September 11, 2013, NASA published in the Federal Register (78 FR 55762) a
Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and conduct
scoping for the Mars 2020 mission. Public input and comments on alternatives, potential
environmental impacts, and concerns associated with the proposed Mars 2020 mission
were requested. The scoping period ended on October 30, 2013.
NASA held scoping meetings to solicit written and oral comments on the scope of the
Mars 2020 Mission EIS. Two scoping meetings were held in the vicinity of KSC. An
open house, town hall meeting format was used for the scoping meetings. This format
provided meeting participants the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
proposed Mars 2020 mission and EIS, as well as the NEPA process during the open
house, followed by an opportunity to provide formal comments on the scope of the Mars
2020 Mission EIS.
The open house portion of the scoping meetings included displays of a variety of
posters and printed material that supported the EIS and NEPA process. Technical
experts were available to interact with the public at the various displays. In addition,
there were several “floater” experts who provided additional technical expertise where
needed. Each display was augmented with supporting written materials such as a fact
sheet.
The town hall session followed the open house portion of the scoping meeting. After
introductory remarks, presentations were made starting with videotapes by the NASA
HQ Mars 2020 Program Executive and the NASA HQ NEPA Manager; and then
followed by presentations by team members that were in attendance. In anticipation of
the government shutdown, the NASA HQ Mars 2020 Program Executive and the NASA
HQ NEPA Manager recorded their presentations at NASA TV in Washington, DC for
use during the town hall sessions. At the conclusion of the presentations, the facilitator
took leadership of the meeting, guiding individuals through the comment process.
Written comments were also received in response to the NOI. A summary of the
comments on the suggested scope of the EIS included:
 Comment: The EIS should discuss the impacts on local flora and fauna,
including Mosquito Lagoon (where [in] winter bottlenose dolphin were
found) and Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge.
Response: Chapter 4 of this EIS discusses the impacts on local flora and fauna.
The impacts of normal launches and the non-radiological impacts of launch
accidents on local flora and fauna are addressed in Sections 4.1.2.7 and
4.1.3.2, respectively. The impacts on local flora and fauna associated with
launch accidents that release radioactive material were addressed in the
DOE Nuclear Risk Assessment through land contamination and are
discussed in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.3.4.

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 1. Purpose and Need for the Action

 Comment: The EIS should discuss how the mission plans to limit the spread of
radiological and non-radiological materials to the environment in a launch
accident.
Response: As discussed in Sections 2.1.3 and 4.1.4.3 (addressing the MMRTG)
and 2.3.1.2 and 4.3.4.3 (addressing the LWRHUs), the MMRTG and
LWRHUs are designed to contain the radioactive material during normal
operations and under a wide range of launch accident conditions. In
addition, NASA and the USAF have established a range safety program
intended to limit the potential impacts associated with launch accidents
(Section 2.1.6.5). For a launch involving radioactive material, NASA would
also develop a radiological contingency plan, discussed in Sections 4.1.5
and 4.3.5, to minimize the impacts to the public and the environment
should an accident occur.
 Comment: The EIS should discuss the risk assessment and results and impacts
“to Earth’s organisms (humans, flora and fauna, natural resources).” “The
potentiality of such a scenario should be analyzed and a quantifiable
system should be created in order to ensure that the benefits outweigh the
costs of the mission, even if failed.”
Response: The impacts of launch accidents on local flora and fauna are
addressed in Section 4.1.3.2. The DOE prepared a Nuclear Risk
Assessment for the Mars 2020 mission and the results are incorporated in
this EIS. Sections 4.1.4 and 4.3.4 provide detailed assessments of the risks
and a summary is presented in Section 2.6.2. The risk assessment
discusses the probabilities of accidents, their potential impacts on humans
and flora and fauna due to land contamination, and the potential costs
associated with land cleanup. These impacts are discussed in Section
4.1.4.6. The tradeoff between the costs of the mission, accident risks, and
benefits of the mission will be made by NASA and published in the Record
of Decision.
 Comment: The EIS should discuss the nuclear wastes associated with using
radioactive power sources.
Response: Hazardous waste generation associated with this mission is
discussed in Section 3.1.9, 4.1.1, and 4.1.2.10. No significant nuclear
waste is produced during the activities addressed by this FEIS (activities at
KSC/CCAFS associated with preparation for launch and launch). Nuclear
waste associated with the production of the MMRTG and LWRHUs are
addressed in DOE NEPA documentation. Much of this information can be
found in references DOE 1993, 2000, 2002, 2002b, 2008, and 2013.
Each of these scoping comments was considered in developing the Draft EIS and FEIS.
1.5 RESULTS OF PUBLIC REVIEW OF THE DRAFT EIS
NASA published a Notice of Availability (NOA) for the Draft EIS for the proposed Mars
2020 mission in the Federal Register on June 5, 2014 (79 FR 32577). The NOA was
mailed by NASA to about 200 potentially interested Federal, state, and local agencies;
organizations; and individuals, with most also receiving a copy of the Draft EIS. In

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

addition, the Draft EIS was made available on NASA’s NEPA website
(http://www.nasa.gov/agency/nepa/mars2020eis). The U.S. EPA published its NOA for
the Draft EIS in the Federal Register on June 6, 2014 (79 FR 32729), that initiated the
45-day public review and comment period. Both print and digital advertisements
announcing the NOA and a June 26, 2014 virtual public comment meeting were run in
four Florida newspapers concurrently with the Federal Register notice and the start of
the comment period. The advertisements had links to the NASA website where the
NOA, Executive Summary, and the Draft EIS could be downloaded. Over 3,000 unique
IP addresses accessed the Mars 2020 EIS website. Over 400 unique IP addresses
accessed the Mars 2020 webpage that allowed the Draft EIS to be downloaded and
spent an average of over 5 minutes on the Draft EIS download page.
A public comment virtual meeting was held on June 26, 2014. This meeting was
advertised in the NOA and local (KSC area) digital and print news at the time of the
NOA. Additional digital advertisements were placed shortly before the meeting. In
addition, NASA announced the meeting through several of NASA’s social media sites
(Twitter, Facebook, and Google+) in the week prior to the meeting. Members of the
NASA Mars 2020 NEPA team presented information about the mission and the NEPA
process. Through a live streaming chat, members of the public were able to ask
questions about the mission and the Draft EIS and to provide comments on the Draft
EIS.
The public review and comment period closed on July 21, 2014. NASA received ten
sets of comments (by letter, email, and telephone) from two Federal agencies, one
State agency, two private organizations, and five individuals. All comments were
reviewed and considered in preparation of this Final EIS. The comments received
included “no comments” on the Draft EIS; general support for NASA and for the
mission; objection to the mission in general and, specifically, to the use of radioactive
material on the mission; and requests for additional information on specific sections of
the document. All comment submissions received by NASA during the Draft EIS public
comment period can be found in Appendix D of this Final EIS, together with NASA’s
responses to the specific comments.
1.6 CHANGES TO THE DRAFT EIS
During the time between publication of the Draft EIS and the Final EIS, NASA
completed the competitive selection of scientific instruments that would be used on the
Mars 2020 mission if Alternatives 1, 2, or 3 were selected. The Draft EIS for the Mars
2020 mission identified the potential for some of the science instruments to include
some small quantities of radioisotope sources similar to that used on the Curiosity rover.
The instruments selected through the Mars 2020 AO competition (completed after the
publication of the Draft EIS) are not anticipated to include any radioisotope source
material. Therefore, the potential radiological environmental impacts identified in the
Draft EIS associated with these radiological sources are no longer applicable to
Alternatives 1, 2, and 3, and the discussion of these impacts have been removed from
this Final EIS.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

2. DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

The purpose of the Mars 2020 mission is to continue the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration’s (NASA’s) in-depth exploration of Mars. Specifically, the mission
would consist of a science-focused, highly mobile rover designed to explore and
investigate in detail a site on Mars that was likely once habitable. The mission concept
includes new in situ scientific instrumentation designed to seek signs of past life. This
instrumentation would be used to select a suite of samples, which would be stored in a
returnable cache. The mission would also demonstrate technology for future exploration
of Mars (e.g., small secondary payloads or other technologies applicable to both robotic
and human missions).
This chapter of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Mars 2020
mission describes and compares the following alternatives:
 Proposed Action (Alternative 1, NASA’s Preferred Alternative) — NASA
proposes to continue preparations for and implement the Mars 2020 mission to
the surface of Mars. The proposed Mars 2020 spacecraft would be launched on
board an expendable launch vehicle from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Brevard County, Florida, during a 20-day
launch opportunity that runs from July through August 2020, and would be
inserted into a trajectory toward Mars. Should the mission be delayed, the
proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched during the next available launch
opportunity in August through September 2022. The rover proposed for the Mars
2020 mission would utilize a radioisotope power system to continually provide
heat and electrical power to the rover’s battery so that the rover could operate
and conduct science on the surface of Mars. A description of the Proposed
Action is presented in Section 2.1.
 Alternative 2 — In this Alternative, NASA would discontinue preparation for the
Proposed Action (Alternative 1) and implement an alternative configuration for
the Mars 2020 mission to Mars. The Mars 2020 rover would utilize solar power
as its source of electrical power to operate and conduct science on the surface of
Mars. The alternative Mars 2020 spacecraft would still be launched on board an
expendable launch vehicle from KSC or CCAFS, Brevard County, Florida, during
a 20-day launch opportunity that runs from July through August 2020, and would
be inserted into a trajectory toward Mars. Like alternative 1, should the mission
be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched during the next
available launch opportunity in August through September 2022. A description of
Alternative 2 is presented in Section 2.2.
 Alternative 3 — In this Alternative, NASA would discontinue preparations for the
Proposed Action (Alternative 1) and implement an alternative configuration for
the Mars 2020 mission to Mars. The Mars 2020 rover would utilize solar power
as its source of electrical power to operate and conduct science on the surface of
Mars. The rover thermal environment would be augmented by the thermal output
from Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Units (LWRHUs) to help keep the rover’s
onboard systems at proper operating temperatures. The Mars 2020 spacecraft
would still be launched on board an expendable launch vehicle from KSC or

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

CCAFS, Brevard County, Florida, during a 20-day launch opportunity that runs
from July through August 2020, and would be inserted into a trajectory toward
Mars. Should the mission be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be
launched during the next available launch opportunity in August through
September 2022. A description of Alternative 3 is presented in Section 2.3.
 No Action Alternative — NASA would discontinue preparations for any Mars
2020 mission and the spacecraft would not be launched. A description of the No
Action Alternative is presented in Section 2.4.
The Mars 2020 Science Definition Team (SDT) report (Mars 2020 SDT 2013)
suggested baseline4 operational capabilities for the Mars 2020 mission. These
capabilities were part of the basis for capability requirements that NASA provided both
in an Announcement of Opportunity (AO) for Mars 2020 Investigations (NASA 2013c)
and for the landing site selection process (NASA 2014b). The capability requirements
for the proposed Mars 2020 mission are summarized in Figure 2-1 and Table 2-1.
Achieving these baseline capabilities would maximize the potential for the mission to be
most responsive to real-time discoveries and fulfill its comprehensive science
objectives.

Source: Mars 2020 SDT 2013

Figure 2-1. Baseline Science and Technology Capabilities for Mars 2020 Mission

4
Baseline is defined as measurements or capabilities necessary to achieve the science objectives of the
mission and a point of departure from where implementation begins. The SDT report defined a threshold
level as a measurement or capability level below which a mission may not be worth the investment.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-1. Baseline Operational Capabilities for the Mars 2020 Mission
Launch-Related Capability
Be ready for launch during the 2020 Mars opportunity.
Be compatible with an intermediate/heavy class expendable launch vehicle.
Arrival and Landing-Site-Related Capability
Provide data communication throughout critical events at a rate sufficient to determine the state of the
spacecraft in support of fault reconstruction.
Be capable of landing on the surface of Mars within a 25 km x 20 km (16 mi x 12 mi) elliptical target
area. Improved ability to avoid terrain hazards within the targeted landing area.
Be capable of landing between 30° north and 30° south latitudes.
Be capable of landing and operating at an elevation of up to +0.5 km (about 0.3 mi) as defined by the
survey by the Mars Orbiter Laser Altimeter.
Functional Capability
Be designed to operate for at least one Mars year (687 Earth days).
Be capable of adequate mobility to ensure representative measurement of diverse sites at distances of
at least 20 km (12 mi).
Science Capability
Accommodate the NASA-selected science payload capable of definitively analyzing the mineralogy,
chemistry, texture, and structure of surface and near-surface materials; and be capable of detecting
organic material. Instrumentation suite would include the capability for context imaging, context
mineralogy, fine-scale imaging, fine-scale mineralogy, fine-scale elementary chemistry, and organic
detection.
Provide the capability for 31 to 38 samples to be acquired for caching or potential caching (includes:
rock, regolith and/or dust, blanks/standards).
Technology Capability
Demonstrate a technology enabling future human missions to Mars.

2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION (ALTERNATIVE 1)

The mission and spacecraft for the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) would be designed
and developed to meet the baseline operational capabilities. The descriptions presented
in this section are based on the information available at the time this FEIS was
prepared. Should NASA make changes in the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) that are
relevant to environmental concerns, NASA would evaluate the need for additional
environmental analysis and documentation.
2.1.1 Mission Description
The Mars 2020 spacecraft (described in Section 2.1.2) would be launched from KSC or
CCAFS onboard an Atlas V, Delta IV, or Falcon Heavy class of expendable launch
vehicles. The launch would occur within an approximate 20-day launch period opening
in July of 2020 and closing in August of 2020. Should the Mars 2020 mission not launch
during this launch period, it would launch during the next available launch opportunity—
August through September 2022. The mission cruise phase would begin when the
spacecraft separates from the launch vehicle and would end prior to atmospheric entry

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

at Mars. The cruise phase would last approximately 7 months depending on the exact
launch date, trajectory, and selected landing site.
The spacecraft’s trajectory from Earth would be designed for a direct entry into the
Martian atmosphere, without the spacecraft first entering into orbit around Mars. A final
trajectory correction maneuver would be performed prior to separation of the cruise
stage from the entry vehicle. Cruise stage separation would occur from 20 to 40 minutes
before atmospheric entry. The cruise stage would enter the Martian atmosphere and
would break apart and burn up from friction and heating.
The arrival date at Mars would range from January 2021 to March 2021. The arrival
date at Mars is constrained by many factors including the need for real-time data
transmission from the spacecraft during the critical entry, descent, and landing (EDL)
operations so that fault reconstruction could be developed should a failure occur. This
capability would be implemented most efficiently during the Mars 2020 mission via high
data rate communication. A high-rate communication link would allow real-time
transmission of all critical engineering data (e.g., spacecraft position and orientation,
and confirmation of deployment sequences).

For the Mars 2020 mission, this could only be achieved by using a pre-positioned Mars
orbiting spacecraft to relay transmissions from the Mars 2020 flight system to Earth.
Currently available orbiting spacecraft for EDL communications and surface operations
relay include the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO), which entered Mars orbit in
March 2006; Mars Odyssey, which entered orbit in October 2001; and MAVEN, which
launched in November of 2013 and arrived at Mars in September 2014 . In addition, a
planned future mission would provide an opportunity for additional Mars-orbiting
spacecraft before the Mars 2020 mission arrives at Mars. This mission—the ExoMars
Trace Gas Orbiter (a European Space Agency mission with NASA support) with a
planned arrival at Mars in 2016—would insert spacecraft with communications
capabilities able to support the Mars 2020 mission. NASA would coordinate among
these four missions to identify which would provide the optimal high data rate
communication relay spacecraft for the Mars 2020 arrival event and for subsequent
rover surface operations. The constraints on launch dates and arrival conditions during
the 20-day launch period, including mutual visibility at arrival among the orbiting
spacecraft and the Mars 2020 spacecraft, would limit arrival to specific dates between
January 2021 and March 2021.
Figure 2-2 shows the positions of Earth and Mars as they orbit the sun and the seasons
for Mars. The range of Mars 2020 proposed arrival dates would coincide with the
transition from winter to spring in the northern hemisphere of Mars.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Source: JPL 2013

Note: Earth and its orbit are in blue; Mars and its orbit in red

Figure 2-2. Arrival Dates for the Proposed Mars 2020 Mission
The exact landing site for the proposed Mars 2020 mission has not yet been selected.
The location of the landing site would be restricted to between 30 o north and 30o south
latitudes as indicated in Table 2-1. It is anticipated that the landing site would be
selected far enough in advance of the planned launch to allow sufficient time to
determine the final details of the mission design (e.g., the specific launch trajectory).
The site selection process would include a consensus recommendation by mission
scientists, utilizing very detailed, high-resolution images expected from the MRO
mission and other available science data, on the most scientifically worthy location to
land the rover. The selection process would also include NASA’s engineering
assessment of the rover’s capabilities at the proposed site. NASA would then approve
the selected site. The selected landing site would then be a factor in determination of
the optimum launch and arrival dates for the mission, given the other constraints
discussed above.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

The EDL phase of the mission (Figure 2-3) would begin when the entry vehicle reaches
an altitude of approximately 125 km (78 mi) above the surface of Mars, and would end
with a soft touchdown of the rover on the Martian surface. The spacecraft would enter
the Mars atmosphere directly from its interplanetary trajectory after a final trajectory
correction maneuver and without entering orbit. The entry vehicle would maneuver
during the early portion of atmospheric flight in order to reduce the landing site targeting
errors that could result from pressure and density variations in the atmosphere.
Following parachute deployment at an altitude of about 12 km (7.5 mi), the heat shield
would be released, the rover’s mobility system deployed, and the landing radar initiated.
The descent stage and rover would be released from the backshell about 1700
meters (m) (5,580 feet (ft)) above the surface and the terminal descent engines would
be fired to slow the descending vehicle. At just over 20 m (66 ft) above the landing site,
the rover would be lowered from the descent stage on tether/umbilical lines for a
wheels-down soft landing on the Martian surface, called the “skycrane” phase of the
landing sequence. The exact landing site is expected to be within a 25 km x 20 km (16
mi x 12 mi) elliptical area, although an improved EDL stage that would reduce the size
of the landing area to an 18 km x 14 km (11 mi x 8.7 mi) elliptical area is being
considered for the Mars 2020 mission. The tether/umbilical lines connecting the descent
stage and the rover would be released, and the descent stage with the tether/umbilical
lines attached would perform a fly-away maneuver to a hard landing a safe distance
from the rover.
After landing on Mars, primary surface operations would commence and last for
approximately one Martian year, which is 669 sols5 or 687 Earth days. Under nominal
initialization procedures, initial rover health checks would include calibration/checkout of
the high gain antenna gimbal and the rover mast azimuth/elevation mechanism,
removal of any engineering camera covers, and checkout of arm and mobility actuators.
The rover would check the status of all major subsystems. Initial landed engineering
camera and science instrument payload health checks would also occur during surface
operations phase initialization, as well as a transition to the surface flight software load
(i.e., a replacement of the onboard interplanetary cruise flight software with a flight
software load tailored for the operation of a rover on the surface of a planet). A second
phase of rover commissioning would include further checkout of mobility and arm
functionality before the rover would be ready to start nominal science operations. In
addition, first-time activities during nominal surface operations would require additional
scrutiny. For example, first-time activities on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)
Curiosity rover system included the first use of sample processing hardware and the
first use of the corer. Mars 2020 would have comparable first-time activities to
implement upon landing.

5
1 sol = 1 Martian day = 24 hours, 37 minutes = 1.026 Earth days.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Source: Mars 2020 Proposal Information Package (JPL)

Figure 2-3. Entry, Descent, and Landing Phase

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Surface operations are characterized by a long primary mission driven by an inherently

interactive geological exploration and surveying process. The rover would have limited
resources (power, mass storage, bandwidth, CPU, etc.) that require both flight- and
ground-based management. The operations would be driven by a small set of repeating
science scenarios. The general features of a typical surface operational scenario
timeline can be divided into five main types of activities. This division is intended as an
aid to understanding the Mars 2020 surface activities and scenario-dependent resource
allocations. These scenarios are built of sol templates. Five different sol templates
describe the expected building blocks of the surface mission operations plan: (1)
traverse & approach, (2) site reconnaissance (remote sensing science), (3) arm
manipulation & contact science, (4) coring/caching & contact science, and (5)
recharge/telecommunications. The sol templates are used to help define resource
usage for Mars 2020 planned activities to meet the mission and science objectives. The
operations concept for the Mars 2020 mission, including team structures, uplink and
downlink planning scenarios, daily operations timeline, and planned changes in
operations approach over the course of the mission is derived from the experience and
plans for Mars Exploration Rover (MER) and MSL flight operations.
Surface operations involve making decisions about how much time would be spent
driving, how much time would be spent conducting fieldwork, and how much time would
be spent collecting and caching samples. The amount of driving that might be required
would depend greatly on where the rover has landed and where the highest priority
science targets might be located. Fieldwork is a term used here to encompass all of the
effort expended to characterize the geology, assess habitability and preservation
potential, identify possible biosignatures, and prepare any potential cores for caching. In
particular for the Mars 2020 mission, fieldwork would include:
 acquisition and analysis of contextual imaging and mineralogy measurements,
 targeted contextual and fine-scale imaging and mineralogy observations,
 close-up elemental and organic detection measurements,
 preparation of rock surfaces by brushing and/or abrasion, and
 conduct of experiments in support of human exploration.
Fieldwork measurements would set the stage for selection of what to core, and which
cores to cache for possible return to Earth. This effort would include the engineering
interrogation of materials for their suitability to be cored. Decisions about the time spent
on each of these activities would be governed by the strategic science objectives.
Scenarios for the rover’s surface science operations are still being planned and
evaluated by Mars 2020 mission scientists and engineers. The final details of the
scenarios would depend upon factors such as the actual capabilities of the rover, when
finally assembled and tested, and the selected landing site. Surface operations would
also be adaptable to actual conditions on the surface of Mars and discoveries made
during the course of the rover’s mission. Best available information derived from the
Mars 2020 AO documentation, SDT mission objectives, and SDT desired landing sites,
are consistent with the mission operations scenarios of driving and fieldwork that have
been used to estimate resource usage in order to accomplish surface mission
objectives for the Mars 2020 mission. Resource usage models to accomplish these

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

objectives are based upon a

high-heritage flight system
implementation, as discussed
in Section 2.1.2, using
representative instrumentation
“stand-ins” and payload
elements that would
accomplish the desired
measurements as sought by
the currently underway Mars
2020 competitive procurement
process.
2.1.2 Spacecraft
Description
The Mars 2020 spacecraft flight
system is based upon the
successful MSL design and
would consist of a cruise stage,
an entry vehicle, a descent
stage, and the science rover.
The flight system, illustrated in
Figure 2-4, is currently
estimated to weigh up to 4,050
kilograms (kg) (8,930 Source: JPL 2013
pounds (lb)). Figure 2-4. Illustration of the Proposed Mars
The cruise stage, 2020 Flight System
approximately 4.4 m (14.4 ft) in
diameter, would provide the services necessary to support the trip to Mars. These
services would include communications with Earth and provision of electrical power to
the entry vehicle via a 6.8 square meter (73.2 square feet) solar array. Attitude control
and trajectory correction maneuvers would be performed via a spin-stabilized hydrazine
propellant system. Two titanium propellant tanks would contain approximately 70 kg
(154 lb) of hydrazine.
The entry vehicle, approximately 4.5 m (14.8 ft) in diameter, would contain the systems
that would safely enter the Martian atmosphere and deliver the rover to its designated
landing site. The entry vehicle would include a heat shield and backshell, a supersonic
parachute deployed by a mortar, and the stowed descent stage and rover.
The descent stage, illustrated in Figure 2-5, would provide the systems needed to
guide, decelerate, hover, and lower the rover onto its designated landing site. The
descent stage would contain five propulsion system tanks; three hydrazine tanks made
of titanium, and two helium pressure vessels made of composite material. The total
propellant load for the descent stage would be about 390 kg (860 lb) of hydrazine.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Figure 2-5. The Mars 2020 Descent Stage and Proposed Mars 2020 Rover
The preferred alternative rover, illustrated in Figure 2-6, would be made from an all-
aluminum primary structure with machined panels. The thermal subsystem would
include a heat exchange radiator system that allows use of the waste heat from the
Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) to keep the avionics
and communication systems within thermal limits throughout Mars’ daily and seasonal
temperature variations. The mobility system would connect to the rover chassis. The
rover would be designed to accommodate a payload module that would contain the
body-mounted instruments and payload element, as well as the robotic arm. The rover
would also support a remote sensing mast that would provide an elevated platform for
critical engineering and scientific assets such as navigation imaging cameras, science
imaging cameras, remote sensing instruments, and, possibly, meteorology instruments.
The payload instrumentation planned for the Mars 2020 mission were selected by
NASA through a competitive process—AO for Mars 2020 Investigations (NASA
2013c)—to meet the science objectives summarized in Chapter 1. The payload includes
the science instrumentation used for investigating the surface of Mars (objectives A and
B: to explore an astrobiologically relevant environment and to seek signs of life) and
technology capabilities (objectives C and D: to make technical progress towards sample
return and further preparation for human and robotic exploration).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Source: JPL 2013

Figure 2-6. The Proposed Mars 2020 Rover

The SDT report identified two levels of scientific measurement for the Mars 2020
mission: a threshold level and a baseline level. The baseline level includes all of the
measurements identified for the threshold level, plus additional measurement and
technology capabilities, and represents the capability to which the Mars 2020 science
instrumentation would be designed. The types of measurements needed to meet the
baseline science and technology objectives for the Mars 2020 mission are summarized
in Table 2-2, and the selected instruments on the rover are shown in Figure 2-7.
For objectives A, B, and C, six measurement types are threshold requirements to
effectively and efficiently characterize the geology of a site, assess habitability, select
samples, and document sample context.
Context Imaging. This measurement would image the terrain at a sufficient level of
detail for navigational purposes (enabling the rover to travel at the required minimum
distances per day), to characterize the geological context, to select (at a distance)
locations for further in-depth analyses by close-up instruments and sampling, and to
identify terrain that could support the assessment of past habitable environments and
the potential for preservation of signs of life.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-2. Mars 2020 Science Measurements and Technology Capabilities

Measurements and Objective A Objective B Objective C Objective D
Technology Capabilities
Context Imaging √ √ √
Fine-Scale Imaging √ √ √
Context Mineralogy √ √ √
Fine-Scale Elementary Chemistry √ √ √
Fine-Scale Mineralogy √ √ √
Subsurface Sensing †
Reduced/Organic Matter Detection √
Second Organic Matter Detection † † †
In Situ Resource Utilization †
Surface Weather Monitoring †
Entry, Descent, and Landing Data †
Entry Descent, and Landing Precision †
√ - Threshold
† - Baseline
Note: The total mass allocation for the science instruments is currently 38kg (84 lb)

Source: JPL 2014b

Figure 2-7. The Science Instrumentation for the Proposed Mars 2020 Rover
Context Mineralogy. This measurement would serve a dual role in supplying
reconnaissance information for possible drive targets and providing context for fine-
scale measurements. Context mineralogy would identify, from afar, the presence of key
mineral phases in surface targets to support the selection of specific outcrops, rocks,
and soils to investigate in detail with other rover instrumentation, especially with respect

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

to identifying potential areas that show signs of past habitable environments and the
preservation of signs of life.
Fine-scale Imaging. The objectives of this measurement would be to characterize grain
form and structure and the textural fabric of rocks and soils at a microscopic scale. Data
from this investigation would: 1) contribute to the characterization of the rover site’s
geological environment; 2) illuminate details of local geologic history, such as
crystallization of igneous rocks, deposition and conversion of sediment to rock, and
weathering and erosion; and 3) assist in the search for structural signs of life, if
preserved, in the rock record.
Fine-scale Mineralogy. The objectives of this investigation would be to detect and to
measure the spatial distribution, at sub-millimeter scale, of the signatures of key
minerals in outcrops, rocks, and soils. For Objective B, a key purpose of the
mineralogical measurement would be to detect potential biominerals and determine the
mineral composition of other potential biosignatures and associated materials.
Fine-scale Elemental Chemistry. The objective of this investigation would be to
measure the abundances of major and selected minor elements most indicative of
igneous, alteration, and sedimentary processes. The science goals of these
measurements would be to determine the fine-scale elemental chemistry of
sedimentary, igneous and alteration features, and (for Objective B) to detect potential
chemical signs of life, determine the elemental composition of potential signs of life, and
search for historical evidence of the activity of liquid water.
Organic Matter Detection. Organic matter detection would provide observations for
assessing the processes that influence preservation of information about ancient
environments. Detection of organic matter, via the identification of reduced carbon
compounds in near-surface materials, could be used to help characterize meteoritic
inputs, hydrothermal processes, atmospheric processes, and other potential processes
that might form organic matter. Lastly, in order to identify the most desirable samples for
possible return to Earth, detecting organic matter at a site would be valuable
In addition to the six threshold investigations described above, baseline investigations
would include a second method of organic detection—both to provide contextual
information on habitability and potential signs of life and to select, if possible, samples
with preserved organic chemistry—as well as subsurface sensing, in situ resource
utilization, and surface weather monitoring.
Subsurface Sensing. Techniques that sense subsurface structural continuity could
provide contextual information complementary to that obtained by the envisaged
threshold payload for surface exposures. Ground-penetrating radar is a relevant
technique that could provide information to better understand local stratigraphy.
In Situ Resource Utilization. The highest priority investigation to meet the needs for
Objective D would be the demonstration of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture, oxygen (O2)
generation, and dust characterization for atmospheric In Situ Resource Utilization
(ISRU). This payload addresses two high-priority items: demonstrating atmospheric
ISRU and measuring dust properties. It would be an architecture-enabling technology

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

for human missions to Mars, which will likely depend on ISRU for producing the
propellants needed for the return trip to Earth; ISRU can greatly reduce mass
transported to the Martian surface. ISRU would demonstrate dust filtration and non-
intrusive measurement during Mars CO2 capture and subsequent CO2 collection and
generation of O2.
Surface Weather Monitoring. The inclusion of a surface weather station on the Mars
2020 payload would provide validation data for global atmosphere models that would
enable validation of global model extrapolations of surface pressure. It would also
provide local-surface and near-surface validation data to validate regional and local
model atmospheric conditions. Parameters monitored could include pressure,
temperature, winds, humidity, and thermal and solar radiation cycles. This set of
instrumentation would address a number of climatological science questions and
objectives.
The science instruments selected to take the measurements needed to meet the
objectives identified in Table 2-2 are:
 Mastcam-Z, an advanced camera system with panoramic and stereoscopic
imaging capability with the ability to zoom. The instrument would also determine
mineralogy of the Martian surface and assist with rover operations.
 SuperCam, an instrument that would provide imaging, chemical composition
analysis, and mineralogy. The instrument would also be able to detect the
presence of organic compounds in rocks and regolith from a distance.
 Planetary Instrument for X-ray Lithochemistry (PIXL), an X-ray fluorescence
spectrometer that would also contain an imager with high resolution to determine
the fine-scale elemental composition of Martian surface materials. PIXL would
provide capabilities that permit more detailed detection and analysis of chemical
elements than ever before.
 Scanning Habitable Environments with Raman & Luminescence for Organics and
Chemicals (SHERLOC), a spectrometer that would provide fine-scale imaging
and uses an ultraviolet (UV) laser to determine fine-scale mineralogy and detect
organic compounds. SHERLOC would be the first UV Raman spectrometer to fly
to the surface of Mars and would provide complementary measurements with
other instruments in the payload.
 The Mars Oxygen ISRU Experiment (MOXIE), an exploration technology
investigation that will produce oxygen from Martian atmospheric carbon dioxide.
 Mars Environmental Dynamics Analyzer (MEDA), a set of sensors that would
provide measurements of temperature, wind speed and direction, pressure,
relative humidity, and dust size and shape.
 The Radar Imager for Mars' subsurFAce eXperiment (RIMFAX), a ground-
penetrating radar that would provide centimeter-scale resolution of the geologic
structure of the subsurface.
In addition to the competitively selected investigations, another baselined investigation
would be a flight of an enhanced EDL instrumentation payload to acquire temperature
and pressure measurements on the heat shield and other parts of the spacecraft. The
temperature and pressure measurements during atmospheric entry would be used to

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

validate analytical models for designing future EDL systems. EDL systems capable of
landing large payloads on Mars are an architecture enabling technology for human
missions.
Another possible EDL technology demonstration would include technologies to improve
EDL precision (reduce the size of the potential landing area or better ensure landing
survival). Potential technologies include: a Range Trigger, improved technology for
deployment of the parachute based on range to the landing site; Terrain Relative
Navigation (TRN), navigation by matching visual images of the landing site taken during
descent to images taken from orbit; and terminal hazard avoidance systems, a
combination of landing site hazard identification and terminal guidance technologies.
The Draft EIS for the Mars 2020 mission identified the potential for some of the science
instruments to include some small amounts of radioisotope sources. The instruments
selected through the instrument selection competition (completed after the publication of
the Draft EIS) and identified above are not anticipated to include any radioisotope
source material. However, it is still possible that the instruments could include
radioisotopes for calibration purposes. The quantity of radioisotopes used for this
purpose are very small and their use has been determined to have no significant impact
(NASA 2011).
2.1.3 Rover Electrical Power
The proposed Mars 2020 rover would use a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generator (MMRTG), provided to NASA by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), as
the source of electrical power for its engineering subsystems and science payload. This
is the same power supply used by the MSL. The MMRTG would be the only
radioisotope thermoelectric generator available for the Mars 2020 mission. NASA has
pursued the development of both the MMRTG and an Advanced Stirling Radioisotope
Generator (ASRG) (NASA 2006b). However, NASA announced in November 2013 that
it decided to end procurement of and discontinue work on the development of ASRG
flight hardware. Therefore, an ASRG would not be available for the Mars 2020 mission.
An MMRTG (Figure 2-8) converts heat from the natural radioactive decay of plutonium
(in a ceramic form called plutonium dioxide consisting mostly of plutonium-238) into
usable electrical power. RTGs have been successfully used on 27 previously-flown
United States space missions (Table 2-3), including six Apollo flights, and the Pioneer,
Viking, Voyager, Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, New Horizons, and MSL missions. The
evolutionary development of radioisotope power systems has resulted in several RTG
configurations, evolving from the Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP)-3 RTG
through the Multi-Hundred Watt (MHW)-RTG to the General Purpose Heat Source
(GPHS)-RTG used for the New Horizons mission to Pluto. The MMRTG is designed for
applications both in the vacuum of deep space and on the surface of bodies with an
atmosphere, such as Mars.
Development of the MMRTG has been documented in NASA’s Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for the Development of Advanced Radioisotope Power
Systems (NASA 2006b).

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Source: SNL 2014

Figure 2-8. Components of a Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric

Generator
The heat source assembly of the MMRTG consists of eight GPHS modules, an isolation
liner, and end components. Each GPHS module (Figure 2-9) has dimensions of
approximately 9.3 by 10.0 by 5.8 centimeters (cm) (3.7 by 3.9 by 2.3 inches (in)), a
mass of about 1.6 kg (3.5 lb), and would contain about 0.6 kg (1.3 lb) of plutonium
dioxide (SNL 2014). A GPHS module consists of a graphite aeroshell, two carbon-
bonded carbon fiber insulator sleeves, two graphite impact shells (GIS), and four iridium
clads, with each clad containing a ceramic pellet of plutonium dioxide.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-3. U.S. Space Missions Using Radioisotope Power Systems (RPSs)
Activity at
Power Source
Spacecraft Mission Type Launch Date Status Launch
(number of RPSs)
(curies)
SNAP-3B7 (1) TRANSIT 4A Navigational Jun 29, 1961 Currently in Earth orbit 1,500 – 1,600
SNAP-3B8 (1) TRANSIT 4B Navigational Nov 15, 1961 Currently in Earth orbit 1,500 – 1,600
SNAP-9A (1) TRANSIT 5BN-1 Navigational Sep 28, 1963 Currently in Earth orbit 17,000
SNAP-9A (1) TRANSIT 5BN-2 Navigational Dec 5, 1963 Currently in Earth orbit 17,000
SNAP-9A (1) TRANSIT 5BN-3 Navigational Apr 21, 1964 Mission aborted; RPS burned up on reentry as designed 17,000
SNAP-19B2 (2) NIMBUS-B-1 Meteorological May 18, 1968 Mission aborted; RPS retrieved intact 34,400
SNAP-19B2 (2) NIMBUS III Meteorological Apr 14, 1969 Currently in Earth orbit 37,000
(a)
SNAP-27 (1) APOLLO 12 Lunar Nov 14, 1969 ALSEP shut down and remains on lunar surface 44,500
SNAP-27 (1) APOLLO 13 Lunar Apr 11, 1970 Mission aborted on way to moon; ALSEP (in Lunar 44,500
Module) was successfully targeted to the southwest
Pacific Ocean in the vicinity of the Tonga Trench for safe
disposal
SNAP-27 (1) APOLLO 14 Lunar Jan 31, 1971 ALSEP shut down and remains on lunar surface 44,500
SNAP-27 (1) APOLLO 15 Lunar Jul 26, 1971 ALSEP shut down and remains on lunar surface 44,500
SNAP-19 (4) PIONEER 10 Planetary Mar 2, 1972 Successfully operated to Jupiter and beyond 80,000
SNAP-27 (1) APOLLO 16 Lunar Apr 16, 1972 ALSEP shut down and remains on lunar surface 44,500
TRANSIT-RTG (1) TRIAD-01-1X Navigational Sep 2, 1972 Currently in Earth orbit 24,000
SNAP-27 (1) APOLLO 17 Lunar Dec 7, 1972 ALSEP shut down and remains on lunar surface 44,500
SNAP-19 (4) PIONEER 11 Planetary Apr 5, 1973 Successfully operated to Jupiter, Saturn and beyond 80,000
SNAP-19 (2) VIKING 1 Planetary Aug 20, 1975 Lander shut down and remains on surface of Mars 41,000
SNAP-19 (2) VIKING 2 Planetary Sep 9, 1975 Lander shut down and remains on surface of Mars 41,000
MHW-RTG (2) LES 8 Communications Mar 14, 1976 Successfully operating in Earth orbit 159,400
MHW-RTG (2) LES 9 Communications Mar 14, 1976 Successfully operating in Earth orbit 159,400
MHW-RTG (3) VOYAGER 2 Planetary Aug 20, 1977 Successfully operated to Neptune and beyond 240,000
MHW-RTG (3) VOYAGER 1 Planetary Sep 5, 1977 Successfully operated to Saturn and beyond 240,000
(b)
GPHS-RTG (2) GALILEO Planetary Oct 18, 1989 Successfully operated in Jupiter orbit; after 8 years, 269,000
spacecraft purposefully entered Jupiter's atmosphere
GPHS-RTG (1) ULYSSES Planetary Oct 6, 1990 Successfully operated for 19 years until spacecraft 132,500
purposefully shutdown, currently in heliocentric orbit
(b)
GPHS-RTG (3) CASSINI Planetary Oct 15, 1997 Successfully operating in Saturn orbit 404,000
GPHS-RTG (1) NEW HORIZONS Planetary Jan 19, 2006 Successfully operating in flight to Pluto 121,000
MMRTG (1) MSL Planetary Nov 26, 2011 Successfully operating on the surface of Mars 58,700
(a) Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package.
(b) Includes inventory from Radioisotope Heater Units.
Note: The proposed Mars 2020 mission would use one MMRTG with approximately 60,000 curies.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Source: SNL 2014

Figure 2-9. A General Purpose Heat Source Module

An MMRTG contains about 4.8 kg (10.6 lb) of plutonium dioxide with a total radiological
activity of about 60,000 curies (Ci). Plutonium can exist in a number of different
radioactive isotopic forms. The principal plutonium isotope in the fuel, in terms of mass
and total activity, is Pu-238. Table 2-4 provides representative characteristics and the
isotopic composition of the plutonium dioxide in the MMRTG (SNL 2014). Plutonium
dioxide has a density of 9.6 grams per cubic centimeter (5.5 ounces per cubic inch),
melts at 2,400 degrees Celsius (°C) (4,352 degrees Fahrenheit (°F)), and boils at
3,870°C (6,998°F).
The DOE designed the MMRTG to provide for containment of the plutonium dioxide fuel
to the extent feasible during all mission phases, including ground handling, launch, and
unplanned events such as reentry, impact, and post-impact situations including fires.
Under normal, accident, and post-accident conditions, the safety-related design features
of the MMRTG to be used for the Mars 2020 mission are intended to:
 prevent, to the extent possible, the release of plutonium dioxide from the iridium
clad and GPHS
 minimize the release and dispersion of the plutonium dioxide fuel, especially
small, respirable particles that could be hazardous to human health

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Table 2-4. Typical Isotopic Composition of an MMRTG

(a)
Fuel Component Weight Percent Half-Life, Specific Activity, Total Activity ,
years curies/gram curies
Plutonium (Pu) 85.99
-8
Pu–236 6 x10 2.851 531.3 0.0016
Pu–238 72.33 87.7 17.12 59,440
Pu–239 11.83 24,131 0.0620 17.6
Pu–240 1.70 6,569 0.2267 18.5
Pu–241 0.09 14.1 103.0 445
Pu–242 0.04 375,800 0.00393 0.0080
Actinide Impurities 0.97 NA NA 24
Other Impurities 1.14 NA NA NA
Oxygen 11.9 NA NA NA
Total 100.00 NA NA 59,936
Source: SNL 2014

(a) Based on 4.8 kg (10.6 lb) of PuO2.

NA = Not Applicable

 minimize any land, ocean, and atmosphere contamination, particularly in

populated areas; and
 maximize the long-term immobilization of the plutonium dioxide fuel following
postulated accidents so that it does not spread further and could be more
effectively recovered.
The layered approach to the safety design features of the MMRTG and their response
to potential accidents include the following elements.
 Thermoelectric Converter/GPHS Design: The MMRTG is designed to release
the individual GPHS modules in case of inadvertent reentry into Earth’s
atmosphere after launch in order to minimize the terminal velocity of the modules
and the potential for fuel release on Earth impact. The converter housing is made
of aluminum alloy to ensure melting and breakup of the converter upon reentry,
resulting in release of the GPHS modules.
 GPHS Module, GIS, and related graphite components: The GPHS module
and its graphite components are designed to provide reentry and surface impact
protection to the iridium fueled clad in case of accidental sub-orbital or orbital
reentry. The aeroshell and GIS are composed of a rugged carbon-carbon Fine
Weave Pierced Fabric, developed originally for reentry nose cone material. The
existing GPHS module is an evolution of a design that has worked with extreme
reliability for the past three decades. To provide even greater protection, the
broad face of the module and the face between the two shells are 20 percent
thicker than the modules used in the GPHS-RTG in order to increase the
module’s strength and enhance its performance under impact and reentry
conditions (SNL 2014).

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

 Iridium Clads: The iridium that encases each plutonium dioxide pellet is a
strong, ductile metal that resists corrosion and does not react chemically with the
radioisotope fuel. In the event of an accident involving an impact, the iridium
cladding is designed to deform yet contain the fuel. Iridium is chemically
compatible with the graphite components of the GPHS module and the plutonium
dioxide fuel over the operating temperature range of the MMRTG, given iridium’s
high melting temperature (2,443°C (4,430°F)) and excellent impact response.
 Ceramic Form of Plutonium Dioxide: The nuclear fuel used in an MMRTG is
manufactured in a ceramic form. This form has material properties similar to a
coffee cup: it tends to fracture in large, non-inhalable chunks and it is highly
insoluble; this means that it does not easily mix or become easily transportable in
water, nor does it react easily with other chemicals. Plutonium dioxide has a high
melting temperature (2,400°C (4,352°F)).
The DOE has over 30 years of experience in the engineering, fabrication, safety testing,
and evaluation of GPHS modules and continues to build upon the experience gained
from previous heat source development programs and an information base that has
grown since the 1960s.
The GPHS modules were designed to prevent the release of fuel under a wide variety of
accident scenarios, including high-speed impacts, impact by projectiles, fires, and Earth
re-entry. Previous generations of heat source designs have survived two accidents: the
heat sources on the Nimbus-B spacecraft (1968) protected the fuel from release during
an early launch abort (with the fuel subsequently being re-used on a future mission);
and the Apollo 13 lunar module (1970) carried a lunar surface science experiment
package heat source that was similarly protected during its re-entry and ocean impact.
The MMRTG and enhanced GPHS module were successfully flown on the MSL mission
that launched in November 2011 and is now operating as designed on Mars. Even
though formal safety testing is ongoing, much insight has been gained by examining the
safety testing performed on the earlier GPHS-RTG and its components. The GPHS-
RTG with 18 GPHS modules has been used on the Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, and New
Horizons missions. Formal safety testing of both the MMRTG and GPHS-RTG
components has established a database that allows prediction of responses in accident
environments. These safety tests have covered responses to the following
environments:
 impact from fragments,
 other mechanical impacts,
 thermal energy,
 explosive overpressure, and
 reentry conditions (i.e., aerodynamic loads and aerodynamic heating).
2.1.4 Operational Considerations
An MMRTG supplies sufficient power for the rover to perform operations at all times and
at all possible landing sites between 30o north and 30o south latitudes. At no time would
the rover be required to operate at less than 100% capability (constrained capacity), nor

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

would it have to hibernate (cease all operations but maintain the rover temperature
within limits needed to assure rover survival).
2.1.5 Spacecraft Processing
The Mars 2020 spacecraft would be designed, fabricated, integrated and tested at
facilities of the spacecraft provider—the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)—which is
managed for NASA by the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, CA. These
facilities have been used extensively in the past for a broad variety of spacecraft, and
no new facilities would be required for the Mars 2020 spacecraft. JPL would deliver the
spacecraft to NASA’s Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida for further testing and
integration with the MMRTG and with the launch vehicle.
The spacecraft would be received at the KSC Payload Hazardous Servicing Facility
(PHSF). The spacecraft would be inspected and comprehensive tests would be
performed, including flight and mission simulations. The DOE would deliver the MMRTG
to a KSC storage facility. Once the spacecraft tests are completed, the MMRTG would
be moved to the PHSF where it would be fitted to the rover for a pre-flight systems
check. After completing these checks, the MMRTG would be returned to storage. The
spacecraft would then be fueled with a total of about 460 kg (1,014 lb) of hydrazine
(SNL 2013), the currently estimated propellant load capability for the cruise stage and
descent stage.
A systems check and other tests would then be performed, after which the spacecraft
would be enclosed within the launch vehicle payload fairing (PLF). The PLF, containing
the spacecraft, would then be transported from the PHSF to the launch complex at KSC
or CCAFS and would be attached to the vehicle’s second stage. The aft end of the PLF
would be sealed with a barrier and connected to an environmental control system to
prevent contamination during transit.
After the Mars 2020 spacecraft and its launch vehicle have been integrated at the KSC
or CCAFS, the MMRTG would be transported to the launch complex where it would be
installed on the rover through special access panels on both the launch vehicle PLF and
the entry vehicle aeroshell (Lytal 2010). MMRTG handling at the KSC and CCAFS
would be performed under stringent conditions following all requirements governing the
use of radioactive materials. Transportation of the MMRTG between KSC and CCAFS
would be in accordance with applicable U.S. Department of Transportation and other
federal, state, and local regulations (NASA 2001).
2.1.6 Representative Launch Vehicle Configurations for the Mars 2020 Mission
Early in the development process for the proposed Mars 2020 mission, NASA plans to
issue a Request for Launch Service Proposal to all NASA Launch Service (NLS)-
approved contractors. The Request for Launch Service Proposal would contain a
statement of work and request that proposals be submitted to NASA for the Mars 2020
mission. Once the proposals are received from the NLS contractors, NASA’s Launch
Service Task Order (LSTO) board would evaluate them in accordance with LSTO
procedures and previously determined technical evaluation criteria. Upon completion of
the evaluation, NASA would identify the proposed configuration of the launch vehicle

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

that would meet all the specified mission requirements and would present the best value
to the government.
The evaluations of potential environmental consequences for this FEIS, summarized in
Section 2.5 and presented in more detail in Chapter 4, were prepared before NASA
selected the launch vehicle for the proposed Mars 2020 mission. These evaluations
were based upon representative configurations of the Atlas V and Delta IV class
vehicles (the Delta IV class vehicle representing the liquid fueled Delta IV and Falcon
Heavy launch vehicles) that would have the performance capabilities necessary for the
mission. The representative launch vehicle configurations are described in the following
sections.
2.1.6.1. Description of the Atlas V Launch Vehicle
The Atlas family of launch vehicles, provided by United Launch Alliance (ULA)—a joint
venture of Lockheed Martin Corporation and The Boeing Company (a NLS-approved
contractor)—has evolved through various government and commercial programs from
the first research and development flight in 1957 through the Atlas II, III, and V
configurations. Versions of Atlas
vehicles have been built specifically
for both robotic and human space
missions. The most recent version,
the Atlas V, is currently available in
400 and 500 series configurations.
The Atlas V configurations being
considered for the proposed Mars
2020 mission are the Atlas V 541
and 551, each of which would
consist of a liquid propellant first
stage with strap-on solid rocket
boosters (SRBs), a liquid propellant
Centaur second stage, the Mars
2020 spacecraft, and the PLF. The
"541" designation denotes a 5-m
PLF, four SRBs, and a single-
engine Centaur second stage; the
“551” has five SRBs. The SRBs are
attached to the first stage and the
Centaur is mounted on top of the
first stage. The Mars 2020
spacecraft would be mounted atop
the Centaur. The PLF encloses and
protects the spacecraft. The
Atlas V, depicted in Figure 2-10, is
approximately 62.4 m (205 ft) in Source: Adapted from, ULA 2010
height (ULA 2010). Figure 2-10. An Atlas V Launch Vehicle with
Solid Rocket Boosters

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2.1.6.1.1. First Stage

The Atlas V first stage is constructed mostly of aluminum and composite material, and is
about 3.8 m (12.5 ft) in diameter and about 32.5 m (107 ft) in length. The first stage is
powered by a liquid-fueled engine and contains about 284,089 kg (626,303 lb) of
propellant. The fuel is rocket propellant-1 (RP-1), a thermally stable kerosene; and the
oxidizer is liquid oxygen (LOX). Each SRB is 1.5 m (5 ft) in diameter, 20 m (66 ft) in
length, and is fueled with about 43,000 kg (94,800 lb) of solid propellant (consisting of
ammonium perchlorate, aluminum, and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB)
binder) for a total propellant mass of about 172,000 kg (379,000 lb) for the four SRBs,
and about 215,000 kg (474,000 lb) for five SRBs (ULA 2010).
2.1.6.1.2. Centaur Second Stage
The Atlas V Centaur second stage is constructed of stainless steel and is about 3.1 m
(10 ft) in diameter and about 12.7 m (42 ft) in length. The Centaur is powered by a
single, cryogenic engine, and contains about 20,830 kg (45,922 lb) of propellant,
consisting of liquid hydrogen (LH2) as the fuel and LOX as the oxidizer (ULA 2010). The
Centaur uses less than 91 kg (200 lb) of hydrazine for reaction control (USAF 2000).
2.1.6.1.3. Payload Fairing
The PLF for the Atlas V is about 5.4 m (18 ft) in diameter and about 20.7 m (68 ft) in
length and is constructed of aluminum, carbon fiber, and composite materials. The PLF
encloses and protects the spacecraft from thermal, acoustic, electromagnetic, and
environmental conditions during ground operations and lift-off through atmospheric
ascent (ULA 2010). Figure 2-11 depicts the spacecraft within the PLF envelope.

Figure 2-11. The Spacecraft Within the Payload Fairing Envelope

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

2.1.6.1.4. Atlas V Space Launch Complex-41

Space Launch Complex (SLC)-41 is located in the northernmost section of CCAFS. The
launch complex consists of a launch pad, an umbilical mast, propellant and water
storage areas, an exhaust flume, catch basins, security services, fences, support
buildings, and facilities necessary to prepare, service, and launch Atlas V vehicles
(USAF 1998, ULA 2010).
Security at SLC-41 is ensured by a perimeter fence, guards, and restricted access.
Since all operations in the launch complex would involve or would be conducted in the
vicinity of liquid or solid propellants and explosive devices, the number of personnel
permitted in the area, safety clothing to be worn, the type of activity permitted, and
equipment allowed would be strictly regulated. The airspace over the launch complex
would be restricted at the time of launch.
2.1.6.1.5. Launch Vehicle Processing
Atlas launch vehicle preparation activities and procedures during and after launch have
been previously documented (USAF 1998, ULA 2010). All NASA launches follow
current standard operating procedures.
The Atlas V launch vehicle components for the Mars 2020 mission would be received at
CCAFS, where they would be inspected, stored, and processed at appropriate facilities.
When needed for launch, the components would be moved to the Vertical Integration
Facility (VIF) at SLC-41, where the launch vehicle would be assembled, integrated, and
tested. The PLF, containing the Mars 2020 spacecraft, would then be transported from
the PHSF at KSC to the VIF and mated to the Centaur second stage. The Atlas V
launch vehicle would then be moved via rail on a mobile launch platform (limited to a
speed of 3.2 km/h (2 mph)) to the launch pad at SLC-41 for a rehearsal of loading the
RP-1, LOX, and LH2 liquid propellants, and then unloading the LOX and LH2. The
vehicle (with RP-1) would then be moved back to the VIF, where hydrazine would be
loaded and final vehicle processing would be performed. The MMRTG would then be
installed on the spacecraft. The launch vehicle would then be moved back to the pad for
LOX and LH2 loading, final systems tests, and launch (USAF 1998, USAF 2000, ULA
2010).
Processing activities for the Mars 2020 Atlas V vehicle would be similar to those
routinely practiced for other Atlas launches from CCAFS. Effluents and solid or
hazardous wastes that may be generated by these activities are subject to federal and
state laws and regulations. NASA or its contractors would dispose of hazardous wastes.
CCAFS has the necessary environmental permits and procedures for conducting launch
vehicle processing activities (see Section 4.10).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2.1.6.1.6. Launch Profile

Launch of the Atlas V would begin with the ignition of the first stage main engine
followed approximately 3 seconds6 later by ignition of the SRBs (Figure 2-12). The SRB
casings would be jettisoned after propellant burnout. The first stage main engine would
continue to thrust and the PLF would be jettisoned. The main engine cutoff sequence
would be initiated when low propellant levels are detected by the first stage propellant
sensors (ULA 2010). The first stage would then separate from the second stage. The
SRB casings, the PLF, and the first stage would fall into the Atlantic Ocean in
predetermined drop zones and would not be recovered (USAF 2000).

Source: Adapted from ULA 2010

Figure 2-12. Typical Atlas V Ascent Profile

The Centaur second stage would be ignited shortly after separation from the first stage.
Upon achieving Earth parking orbit, the Centaur engine thrust would be cut off via a
timed command. After a brief, predetermined coast period in an Earth parking orbit, the
Centaur engine would restart and the vehicle would accelerate to Earth escape velocity.
After Centaur engine cutoff, the Mars 2020 spacecraft would separate from the Centaur
and continue on its trajectory to Mars. The Centaur would continue separately into
interplanetary space.

6
The engine undergoes an automatic "health check" during this period. Should a malfunction be
detected, the engine would be shut down and the launch would be aborted.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

2.1.6.2. Description of the Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle

The Delta launch vehicle program was initiated in the late 1950s by NASA with Douglas
Aircraft (which then became McDonnell Douglas, which became part of The Boeing
Company) and is now provided by ULA, a NLS-approved contractor. The Delta IV
launch system, evolved from the Delta II and Delta III launch systems, is the latest
generation in this nearly 50-year evolution. The Delta IV is currently available in
Medium, Medium+, and Heavy configurations.
The representative Delta IV configuration for the proposed Mars 2020 mission is the
Delta IV Heavy, which would consist of a liquid propellant first stage (called the common
booster core (CBC)), two strap-on CBCs, a liquid propellant second stage, the Mars
2020 spacecraft, and a 5-m PLF. The additional CBCs are attached to the first stage,
and the second stage is mounted atop the first stage. The Mars 2020 spacecraft would
be mounted atop the second stage. The PLF encloses and protects the spacecraft. The
Delta IV Heavy, depicted in Figure 2-13, is approximately 71.6 m (235 ft) in height (ULA
2013, ULA 2013).
2.1.6.2.1. First Stage
The Delta IV Heavy first stage
CBCs are constructed mostly of
aluminum and composite material.
Each CBC is about 5 m (16.4 ft) in
diameter and about 39.6 m (130 ft)
in length. The CBCs are each
powered by a cryogenic engine and
each contains about 202,100 kg
(445,600 lb) of propellant
consisting of LH2 as the fuel and
LOX as the oxidizer for a total first
stage propellant load of 606,300 kg
(1,336,650 lb). A cylindrical
interstage that encloses the second
stage is mounted on the central
CBC. Aerodynamic nosecones are
mounted on the two strap-on CBCs
in place of the interstage (ULA
2013, Freeman 2006).
2.1.6.2.2. Second Stage
The Delta IV second stage,
constructed of aluminum and
Source: Adapted from ULA 2013

Figure 2-13. A Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle composite material, is about 5 m

(16.4 ft) in diameter and about
13 m (42.7 ft) in length. The stage is powered by a single cryogenic engine and contains
about 27,200 kg (60,000 lb) of propellant, consisting of LH2 as the fuel and LOX as the

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

oxidizer. The stage also uses about 154 kg (340 lb) of hydrazine for reaction control
(Freeman 2006, ULA 2013).
2.1.6.2.3. Payload Fairing
The PLF for the Delta IV is about 5.1 m (16.8 ft) in diameter and about 19.1 m (62.7 ft)
in length and constructed of composite materials. The PLF encloses and protects the
spacecraft from thermal, acoustic, electromagnetic, and environmental conditions during
ground operations and lift-off through atmospheric ascent (ULA 2013). Figure 2-11
depicts the Mars 2020 spacecraft within the PLF envelope.
2.1.6.2.4. Delta IV Space Launch Complex-37 (SLC-37)
SLC-37 is located in the northeastern section of CCAFS. The launch complex consists
of a launch pad, a mobile service tower (MST), a fixed umbilical tower, propellant and
water storage areas, an exhaust flume, catch basins, security services, fences, support
buildings, and facilities necessary to prepare, service, and launch Delta IV vehicles
(USAF 1998, ULA 2013).
Security at SLC-37 is ensured by a perimeter fence, guards, and restricted access.
Since all operations in the launch complex would involve or be conducted in the vicinity
of liquid or solid propellants and explosive devices, the number of personnel permitted
in the area, safety clothing to be worn, the type of activity permitted, and equipment
allowed would be strictly regulated. The airspace over the launch complex would be
restricted at the time of launch.
2.1.6.2.5. Launch Vehicle Processing
Delta launch vehicle preparation activities and procedures during and after launch have
been previously documented (USAF 1998, ULA 2013). All NASA launches follow the
current standard operating procedures.
The Delta IV launch vehicle components for the Mars 2020 mission would be received
at CCAFS, where they would be inspected, stored, and processed at appropriate
facilities. When needed for launch, the components would be moved to the Horizontal
Integration Facility at SLC-37, where the launch vehicle would be assembled,
integrated, and tested. The Delta IV launch vehicle would then be moved via rail on the
MST to the launch pad at SLC-37. The PLF, containing the Mars 2020 spacecraft,
would then be transported from the PHSF at KSC directly to the launch pad at SLC-37
and mated to the second stage. The MMRTG would then be installed on the spacecraft.
The vehicle would then be loaded with hydrazine and the LOX and LH2 liquid
propellants, and undergo final preparations for launch (ULA 2013).
Processing activities for the Mars 2020 Delta IV vehicle would be similar to those
routinely practiced for other Delta launches from CCAFS. Effluents and solid or
hazardous wastes that may be generated by these activities are subject to federal and
state laws and regulations. NASA or its contractors would dispose of hazardous wastes.
CCAFS has the necessary environmental permits and procedures for conducting launch
vehicle processing activities (see Section 4.10).

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

2.1.6.2.6. Launch Profile

Launch of the Delta IV Heavy would begin with simultaneous ignition of the main
engines7 in the three first-stage CBCs (Figure 2-14). The two strap-on CBCs would
thrust at a higher level than the central CBC, and their propellant would be depleted
sooner. After engine cutoff, the strap-on CBCs would be jettisoned. The central CBC
engine would continue to thrust until main engine cutoff, after which the first stage would
separate from the second stage. The three depleted CBCs would fall into the Atlantic
Ocean in predetermined drop zones and would not be recovered (USAF 2000).

Source: Adapted from ULA 2013

Figure 2-14. Typical Delta IV Heavy Ascent Profile

The PLF would then be jettisoned and would also fall into the Atlantic Ocean in
predetermined drop zones and would not be recovered. The second stage would be
ignited shortly after separation from the first stage. Upon achieving Earth parking orbit,
the second stage engine thrust would be cut off via a timed command. After a brief,

7
The engines undergo an automatic "health check" 5 seconds before liftoff. Should a malfunction be
detected, the engines would be shut down and the launch would be aborted.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

predetermined coast period in an Earth parking orbit, the second stage engine would
restart and the vehicle would accelerate to Earth escape velocity. After second stage
engine cutoff, the Mars 2020 spacecraft would separate from the second stage and
continue on its trajectory to Mars. The second stage would continue separately into
interplanetary space.
2.1.6.3. Description of the Falcon Heavy Launch Vehicle
The Falcon launch vehicle program was initiated in 2002 when SpaceX was launched
as a commercial venture. The current launch vehicle is the Falcon 9. The proposed
Falcon Heavy launch vehicle is an evolutionary version of the Falcon 9, with greater
payload capability.
The representative Falcon Heavy
configuration for the proposed
Mars 2020 mission would consist
of a liquid propellant first stage
(similar to the first stage of the
Falcon 9), and two boosters (also
similar to the first stage of the
Falcon 9), a liquid propellant
second stage, the Mars 2020
spacecraft, and a 5-m PLF. The
three first stage components are
attached to each other, and the
second stage is mounted atop the
first stage. The Mars 2020
spacecraft would be mounted atop
the second stage. The PLF
encloses and protects the
spacecraft. The Falcon Heavy,
depicted in Figure 2-15, is
approximately 68.4 m (224 ft) in
height and is capable of delivering
a 13,200 kg (29,100 lb) payload to
Mars. Unlike the Atlas V and Delta
IV vehicles, the first stages of the
Falcon Heavy are designed to be
reusable and could be recovered
from the Atlantic Ocean (SpaceX
2013, SpaceX 2013b, USAF
2011).
2.1.6.3.1. First Stage
Figure 2-15. A Falcon Heavy Launch Vehicle
The Falcon Heavy first stage fuel
tanks are constructed mostly of an
aluminum and lithium alloy. Each Falcon 9 first stage is about 3.66 m (12 ft) in diameter
and about 45.7 m (150 ft) in length. The Falcon 9 first stages are each powered by nine

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

SpaceX Merlin engines (a Saturn V heritage engine) in an octagonal arrangement with

one center engine. The first stage and each booster of the Falcon Heavy contains about
261,000 kg (576,000 lb) of propellant consisting of 81,600kg (180,000 lb) of RP-1 as the
fuel, and 180,00 kg (397,000 lb) LOX8 as the oxidizer for a total first stage propellant
load of 245,000 kg (540,000 lb) of RP-1 and 539,000 kg (1,190,000 lb) of LOX. The
Falcon Heavy utilizes a propellant cross-feed system; propellant is supplied from the
two boosters to the center core so that fuel is preferentially drawn from the boosters
first. This allows the central core to continue to maintain a significant portion of its initial
fuel load and to operate well after the boosters are jettisoned. A cylindrical interstage
that encloses the second stage is mounted on the central Falcon 9 first stage.
Aerodynamic nosecones are mounted on the two Falcon 9 boosters in place of the
interstage (SpaceX 2013; NASA 2011; FAA 2014).
2.1.6.3.2. Second Stage
The Falcon Heavy second stage is constructed of aluminum and composite material
and is about 3.66 m (12 ft) in diameter and about 12.5 m (41 ft) in length. The stage is
powered by a single Merlin engine, and contains about 49,000 kg (108,000 lb) of
propellant, consisting of 15,100 kg (33,300 lb) of RP-1 as the fuel and 33,900 kg
(74,700 lb) LOX as the oxidizer (NASA 2011, FAA 2014).
2.1.6.3.3. Payload Faring
The PLF for Falcon Heavy is about 5.2 m (17.1 ft) in diameter and about 15.2 m (50 ft)
in length and is constructed of an aluminum core with carbon fiber face sheets. The PLF
encloses and protects the spacecraft from thermal, acoustic, electromagnetic, and
environmental conditions during ground operations and lift-off through atmospheric
ascent (FAA 2014). Figure 2-11 depicts the Mars 2020 spacecraft within the PLF
envelope.
2.1.6.3.4. Falcon Heavy Space Launch Complexes 39A and 40
Space X has launch privileges at both LC-39A and SLC-40. As currently configured,
neither complex is capable of supporting the launch of the Falcon Heavy, although it is
anticipated that LC-39A would be modified to support launch of the Falcon Heavy.
Modifications to either launch complex to support this vehicle would be performed as
part of the Falcon Heavy launch program and not specifically for the Mars 2020 mission.
LC-39, located on KSC, has been used as part of the Apollo program and for the Space
Shuttle program. SpaceX recently won launch privileges from LC-39A, one of two
launch pads within the launch complex. The launch complex is composed of, among
other facilities, the two launch pads, the Vehicle Assembly Building, the Orbiter
Processing Facility buildings, the Launch Control Center (which contains the firing
rooms), and various logistical and operational support buildings.

8
Fuel quantities are for a Falcon 9. Falcon Heavy quantities may differ slightly from these amounts.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2.1.6.3.5. Launch Vehicle Processing

All NASA launches follow the current standard operating procedures.
A Falcon Heavy has not been launched from KSC or CCAFS. The following descriptions
are based on the process used for the Falcon 9. The Falcon Heavy launch vehicle
components for the Mars 2020 mission would be received at KSC or CCAFS, where
they would be inspected, stored, and processed at appropriate facilities. When needed
for launch, the components would be moved to the Falcon 9 facility at LC-39A where
the launch vehicle would be assembled, integrated, and tested. The PLF, containing the
Mars 2020 spacecraft, would then be transported from the PHSF at KSC to the Falcon 9
facility at LC-39A and mated to the second stage. The MMRTG would then be installed
on the spacecraft. The Falcon Heavy launch vehicle would then be moved via the
vertical transporter-erector to the launch pad at LC-39A. The launch vehicle would be
transported in a horizontal position and raised to a vertical position at the launch pad.
The vehicle would then be loaded with hydrazine and the LOX and RP-1 liquid
propellants and undergo final preparations for launch (Univ 2011).
Processing activities for the Mars 2020 Falcon Heavy vehicle would be similar to those
routinely practiced for other Falcon launches from CCAFS. Effluents and solid or
hazardous wastes that may be generated by these activities are subject to federal and
state laws and regulations. NASA, or its contractors, would dispose of hazardous
wastes. KSC and CCAFS have the necessary environmental permits and procedures
for conducting launch vehicle processing activities (see Section 4.10).
2.1.6.3.6. Launch Profile
Launch of the Falcon Heavy would begin with simultaneous ignition of the main engines
in the core first stage and two first-stage boosters (Figure 2-16). The two boosters
would be jettisoned when the booster fuel tanks (which have been supplying fuel to the
core first stage and both boosters) are nearly depleted. The central core engines would
continue to thrust until main engine cutoff, after which the first stage would separate
from the second stage. The three depleted first-stage components would fall into the
Atlantic Ocean in predetermined drop zones and could be recovered (SpaceX 2013).
The second stage would be ignited shortly after separation from the first stage. The PLF
would then be jettisoned and would also fall into the Atlantic Ocean in predetermined
drop zones and would not be recovered. Upon achieving Earth parking orbit, the second
stage engine thrust would be cut off via a timed command. After a brief, predetermined
coast period in an Earth parking orbit, the second stage engine would restart and the
vehicle would accelerate to Earth escape velocity. After second-stage engine cutoff, the
Mars 2020 spacecraft would separate from the second stage and continue on its
trajectory to Mars. The second stage would continue separately into interplanetary
space.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Source: Adapted from SpaceX 2013

Figure 2-16. Falcon Heavy Ascent Profile

2.1.6.4. Flight Termination System
Range Safety requires launch vehicles to be equipped with safety systems, collectively
called the Flight Termination System (FTS), which are capable of causing destruction of
the launch vehicle in the event of a major vehicle malfunction. Range Safety further
specifies in the Range Safety User Requirements Manual (USAF 2004) that for any
launch vehicle, the FTS reliability goal shall be a minimum of 0.999 at the 95 percent
confidence level. The FTS for the Mars 2020 mission would provide the capability to
destroy the launch vehicle either (1) autonomously after detecting an inadvertent
breakup of the vehicle or unintentional separation of vehicle stages, or (2) by
commands issued via secure radio links. The primary elements of the FTS, common for
any of the candidate launch vehicles, would consist of an Automatic Destruct System
(ADS) and a Command Destruct System (CDS). The FTS for the Atlas V would also
include a Centaur Automatic Destruct System (CADS).
If inadvertent vehicle breakup or premature stage separation occurs, the ADS would
automatically initiate ordnance components that split open all first- and second-stage
propellant tanks to disperse the liquid propellants and split any strap-on solid rocket
casings to terminate solid motor thrusting. Upon receipt of valid commands from Range
Safety, the CDS would shut down the first stage or second stage main engines
(depending on the timing of the event), and initiate destruction of the vehicle in the
same manner as the ADS.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

The FTS for all candidate LVs would be armed shortly before liftoff. Each major
component of the FTS would be safed (automatically deactivated) at various times
during the vehicle's ascent when the component would no longer be needed and to
preclude its inadvertent activation. The ADS would be safed prior to separation of the
first and second stages and the CDS would be safed immediately after the second
stage when the Mars 2020 spacecraft has achieved Earth parking orbit.
For the Atlas V candidate LVs, an Inadvertent Separation Destruct System (ISDS)
would be incorporated on each of the four SRBs. In the event of an inadvertent or
premature separation of an SRB, the ISDS would initiate a linear-shaped charge to
disable the SRB after a brief time delay to assure clearance from the Atlas V. The ISDS
would be deactivated during a normal SRB separation event.
2.1.6.5. Range Safety Considerations
CCAFS has implemented range safety requirements (USAF 2004) that support
launches from KSC and CCAFS. For the Mars 2020 mission, predetermined flight safety
limits would be established for each day of the launch period. Wind criteria, impacts
from fragments that could be produced in a launch accident, dispersion and reaction
(e.g., toxic plumes, fire) of liquid and solid propellants, human reaction time, data delay
time, and other pertinent data would be considered when determining flight safety limits.
The Mission Flight Control Officer would take any necessary actions, including
destruction of the vehicle via the CDS, if the vehicle's trajectory indicates flight
malfunctions (e.g., exceeding flight safety limits) (USAF 2004).
Range Safety at CCAFS uses models to predict launch hazards to the public and
launch site personnel prior to a launch. These models calculate the risk of injury
resulting from toxic exhaust gases from normal launches, and from potentially toxic
concentrations due to a failed launch. The launch would be postponed if the predicted
collective risk of injury from exposure to toxic gases exceeds established limits (USAF
2004). Range Safety monitors launch surveillance areas to ensure that risks to people,
aircraft, and surface vessels are within acceptable limits. Controlled surveillance areas
and airspace are closed to the public as required (USAF 2004).
2.1.6.6. Electromagnetic Environment
Launch vehicles may be subject to electromagnetic conditions such as lightning,
powerful electromagnetic transmissions (e.g., radar, radio transmitters), and charging
effects (i.e., electrical charges generated by friction and the resultant electrostatic
discharges). NASA and the USAF address such conditions with respect to the design of
the launch vehicle, as well as with ordnance (e.g., explosives, explosive detonators, and
fuses), fuels, exposed surfaces of the vehicle, and critical electronic systems that must
have highly reliable operations. A large body of technical literature exists on these
subjects and has been used by NASA and the USAF in designing safeguards (see, for
example, USAF 2004). The launch vehicle, the Mars 2020 spacecraft, and the launch
support systems would be designed and tested to withstand these environments in
accordance with requirements specified in the Range Safety User Requirements
Manual (USAF 2004).

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

2.1.7 Radiological Emergency Response Planning

CCAFS, KSC, the City of Cape Canaveral, and Brevard County have a mutual aid
agreement in the event of an on- or off-station emergency. During launch activities,
CCAFS maintains communication with KSC, Brevard County Emergency Management,
the Florida Marine Patrol, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the State
coordinating agency, Florida Division of Emergency Management. Range Safety
monitors launch surveillance areas to ensure that risk to people, aircraft, and surface
vessels are within acceptable limits. Control areas and airspace are closed to the public
as required (USAF 1998).
Prior to launch of the Mars 2020 mission, a comprehensive set of plans would be
developed by NASA to ensure that any launch accident could be met with a well-
developed and tested response. NASA's plans would be developed in accordance with
the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and the NRF Nuclear/
Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in coordination with DOE and other Federal
agencies, the state of Florida, Brevard County, and local governmental organizations.
These organizations, as needed, could be involved in response to a radiological
emergency. (Scott 2012).
Radiological emergency response plans would be exercised prior to launch to verify that
response interfaces, command channels, and field response organizations would be
prepared to respond in the event of a launch accident. As described by the NRF –
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, NASA, as the coordinating agency would have full
access to the coordinated federal response..
To manage the radiological contingency response, NASA would establish a radiological
emergency response capability that would include a radiological assessment and
command center as well as field monitoring assets that would be deployed both onsite
and offsite prior to launch. The assessment and command center would be the focal
point for NASA coordination efforts. This center would also be used to coordinate the
initial federal response to a radiological contingency until the Mars 2020 spacecraft has
left Earth orbit. Pre-deployed assets to support a response to a potential launch
accident would include representation from NASA, appropriate federal agencies, the
state of Florida, and Brevard County. The center would issue appropriate direction to
KSC/CCAFS personnel and coordinate messaging and recommended actions with
State and local emergency response organizations responding to the accident, to
minimize potential exposures.
For accidents outside United States’ jurisdiction, NASA and DHS would assist the DOS
in coordinating the United States’ response via diplomatic channels and deploy federal
resources as requested. If impact occurs in the ocean following an accident, NASA
would coordinate with the DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, and the DOE to
initiate security measures and assess the feasibility of search and retrieval operations.
Efforts to recover the MMRTG or its components would be based on an assessment of
technical feasibility and in consideration of any potential health hazards presented to
recovery personnel and potential environmental impacts.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2.2 DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 2

The mission and spacecraft for Alternative 2 would be designed and developed, to the
extent practicable, to meet the operational capabilities summarized in Table 2-1. In
Alternative 2, the MMRTG power source would be replaced by a solar power array. The
rover used in this alternative would rely on the power generated by solar arrays to
generate electricity to operate the rover’s scientific instrumentation and communication
equipment and provide motive power. Power from the solar arrays would also power
electric heaters to maintain the thermal environment required to ensure the survival of
the rover’s engineering subsystems and science payload. The descriptions presented in
this section for Alternative 2 are based on the information available at the time this FEIS
was prepared, as presented in the Mars 2020 Solar Feasibility Study (JPL 2014).
Should NASA make changes in Alternative 2 that are relevant to environmental
concerns, NASA would evaluate the need for additional environmental analysis
documentation.
2.2.1 Mission and Spacecraft Description
Many of the technical aspects of the mission and spacecraft designs for Alternative 2
would be similar to those described in Section 2.1 for the Proposed Action (Alternative
1). These would include the following major features.
 The Mars 2020 spacecraft would be launched from KSC or CCAFS onboard an
expendable launch vehicle from the Atlas V, Delta IV, or Falcon Heavy class of
vehicles (see Section 2.1.5 for representative descriptions of these vehicles).
 The mission design would be as described in Section 2.1.1, including a launch
opportunity in July to August of 2020, with a backup opportunity in August to
September 2022, and an Earth-Mars trajectory leading to direct entry of the
spacecraft into the Martian atmosphere.
 The Mars 2020 flight system would consist of a high-heritage MSL cruise stage,
entry vehicle, and descent stage (as described in Section 2.1.2), and a science
rover.
 The rover’s science instrument payload would be as described in Table 2-2.
Planning for the rover science mission would be based upon an operational
timeline similar to that described in Section 2.1.1.
2.2.1.1. Solar Power Supply System
The Mars 2020 rover for Alternative 2 would use a solar array as the source of electrical
power for its engineering subsystems and science payload (JPL 2014). The size of the
array would be limited by the volume constraints of the rover in its stowed configuration
within the descent stage inside the entry vehicle, which, in turn, is limited in size by the
diameter of the launch vehicle payload fairing (see Figure 2-11). Use of a solar array
would be expected to increase the mass of power supply systems for the rover by less
than 10 kg (22 lb) compared to the use of the MMRTG (JPL 2014). The solar array
would attach to the back section of the rover and would be folded for stowage inside the
entry vehicle. The array would be deployed after the rover has landed on the surface of
Mars. A representative deployed array configuration is illustrated in Figure 2-17.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Source: Adapted from JPL 2014

Figure 2-17. A Representative Solar-Powered Alternative 2 Mars 2020 Rover

After landing, the solar array would be deployed into two separate panels and would be
in a fixed position parallel with the upper surface of the rover chassis. The deployed
array of two panels would have an active cell surface area of approximately 7.4 square
meters (80 square feet). The array would consist of Mars Optimized Solar Cell
Technology cells which provide about a 6% improvement in solar energy conversion
compared to standard NeXt Triple Junction solar cells. The NeXt Triple Junction solar
cells provide about 29% efficiency for their application in Earth orbit. The Mars
Optimized Solar Cell technology provide about 35% efficiency solar energy conversion
on the surface of Mars and are commercially available.
2.2.2 Solar Power Availability
The available electrical power produced by the solar array described in Section 2.2.1.1
would be a function of several factors (JPL 2014). The most important of these are the
landing site latitude and time of year on Mars, which affect the incidence angle of the
sunlight shining on the array and the amount of time sunlight is available per sol. Low
incidence angles at high latitudes, reduced solar intensity near Mars aphelion, and short
periods of daylight during a Martian Winter would reduce the available amount of
electrical power produced by the solar array. Other factors affecting array output would
include shadowing of the array from the masts and antennas, the amount of dust in the
Martian atmosphere, and dust deposition and accumulation on the array.
All of the energy that this solar array would generate per sol could not be used
exclusively to perform science operations. The rover would need to maintain its thermal
health and mechanical functionality so that it could communicate with Earth and drive to
specified science locations. The solar energy required to maintain the rover’s thermal
health would vary with latitude (i.e., landing site) and time of year. During the Martian
Winter there would be a higher demand for heat to maintain the rover’s components
within acceptable thermal limits, but there would be less total energy available from the
solar array for the reasons discussed above.

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 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Of the available energy per sol, approximately 100 to 600 watt-hours would be needed
to perform science operations, which would include driving to science locations, site
reconnaissance, and acquiring and analyzing samples and other scientific data (JPL
2013). The remainder of the available energy would be needed for the rover’s
engineering functions, including communications and thermal control. Figure 2-18
illustrates locations on the surface of Mars where the baseline solar array configuration
would provide sufficient power for the rover to perform science operations and maintain
its health and functionality as a function of latitude over the course of one Mars year.
40% Dust Factor
Northern Spring Summer Fall Winter
Season
Southern Fall Winter Spring Summer
o
30 N
25o N
o
20 N
o
15 N
10o N
o
5 N
o
Latitude 0
o
5 S
o
10 S
15o S
o
20 S
o
25 S
30o S

Survival Not Possible Full Operations

Hibernation Survival Latitude Band*
Constrained Operations

*Full year survival is not possible at any latitude with this mission configuration.
Notes: The expected arrival date for the Mars 2020 mission would coincide with the transition from winter to spring in the northern hemisphere
of Mars. This date appears on the far left of this figure.
Source: Adapted from JPL 2014

Figure 2-18. Mars 2020 Solar-Powered Rover Operability (40% Dust Factor)
As shown in Figure 2-18, one of the factors that affects the feasibility of using solar
power is the dust factor. This factor is a measure of the remaining electric power output
from the solar arrays when some solar energy is blocked due to the accumulation of
dust on the surface of the array panels. The dust factor is the percentage of the
effective array surface that remains clean, and is roughly equivalent to the total power
still available given the accumulation of dust—the lower the dust factor, the lower the
amount of electrical energy produced. A 40% dust factor9 means that 40% of the array
surface area is clean and the electrical output of the solar arrays is reduced

9
The 40% dust factor is based upon the dust accumulation rates on the MER solar arrays. The
accumulation of dust is limited by naturally occurring cleaning events. The 70% dust factor relies upon
more frequent cleaning events or active dust mitigation technology. Dust mitigation technology may
improve the dust factor to beyond 70%, but these technologies have not been demonstrated to function in
Martian environmental conditions.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

proportionally. Higher dust factors may be achievable only with the use of active dust
mitigation technology or with the assumption of more frequent environmental cleaning
events.
For Alternative 2, sufficient solar power for one Mars year is not available at any latitude
assuming a dust factor of 40% (the solar array remains at least 40% dust free). With
more frequent dust cleaning or mitigation resulting in a dust factor of at least 70% (the
solar array remaining at least 70% dust free), the rover could operate for one Mars year
(with periods of constrained operation) only at approximately 5° south latitude.
The solar feasibility assessment (JPL 2014), which developed these estimates of rover
operability, was performed with sufficient detail to develop estimates for a
representative solar-powered rover configuration. Should NASA select Alternative 2, the
solar-powered rover design would be finalized, but any changes would likely not change
the fundamental results presented in the solar feasibility assessment.
2.2.3 Operational Considerations
As shown in Figure 2-18, for all latitudes between 30° south and 30° north, the survival
of the rover for a full Martian year would not be expected. There are times when the
rover would have to operate at less than full capabilities (Constrained Operations),
times when the rover would have to cease scientific operations and operate in a mode
where only functions needed for rover survival—primarily maintaining an acceptable
thermal environment—are performed (Hibernation), and times the rover would not
survive. These periods of reduced science operability impact the amount of science
investigation that can be performed at the various landing sites which adversely impacts
the ability of the rover to reach all of the baseline goals for the mission.
Table 2-5 shows the estimated operational lifetime of the solar-powered Mars 2020
rover as a function of landing site latitude for the anticipated arrival dates. The MMRTG
power option, which is capable of full operations for an entire Mars year, is included for
comparison purposes. This table reflects the fact that the solar power alternative with a
40% dust factor is not capable of surviving for a full Mars year, although science
operations could be performed for parts of the year. The ability of the rover to survive
longer in the northern latitudes is a result of the mission arrival dates coinciding with
spring in the northern Martian latitudes while these arrival dates are in the fall in the
southern Martian latitudes.
A larger dust factor (70%) would extend the operational lifetime of the rover and could
allow for a full Martian year mission (with periods of constrained operation) between 5°
south latitude and 0° and would marginally extend the operational lifetime of the rover at
some latitudes, thereby increasing the amount of science that could be performed.
The science capabilities associated with partial-year operation are provided in Table
2-6. These capabilities are expressed in terms of the percentage of the samples that
could be obtained given a full year of operation with no limitations (constrained
operations or hibernation).
For comparison, Alternative 1 provides 100% capability. Given the assumptions for
initial checkout and rover movement (driving from site to site) any landing site with an

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

operational lifetime of 40% or less would not provide the opportunity to perform any
sampling activities unless the rover movement was curtailed.
Table 2-5. Operational Lifetime for a Solar-Powered Rover
a
Operational Lifetime
Option Solar MMRTG
o
30 N 50% 100%
o
25 N 50% 100%
o
20 N 50% 100%
o
15 N 55% 100%
o
10 N 60% 100%
o
5 N 60% 100%
o
Latitude 0 60% 100%
o
5 S 35% 100%
o
10 S 25% 100%
o
15 S 25% 100%
o
20 S 20% 100%
o
25 S 15% 100%
o
30 S 10% 100%
Source: Adapted from JPL 2014

(a) Lifetime expressed in terms of a full Martian year. Lifetime

assuming a 40% dust factor (solar cells remain 40% clean)

Rover operates for less than a full Martian year

Rover operates for a full Martian year

Table 2-6. Science Capability

Operational Percent of Mars Year Percent of Mars Year Percent of Sampling
Lifetime in Mars Assumed for Initial Available For Activities Available
(a) (a) (a)
Years Checkout and Driving Sampling Activities Compared to an MMRTG
(b)
Mission
50% 40% 10% 17%
60% 40% 20% 33%
70% 40% 30% 50%
100% 40% 60% 100%
(a) These values are in terms of a full Martian year (689 Earth days). For example, 40% of a Martian year is 276
Earth days.
(b) The fourth column represents the expected sampling capability, expressed as a percentage of the capabilities
associated with unconstrained operation for a full year.

2.3 DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 3

The mission and spacecraft for Alternative 3 would be designed and developed, to the
extent practicable, to meet the operational capabilities summarized in Table 2-1. The
descriptions presented in this section for Alternative 3 are based on the information
available at the time this FEIS was prepared, as presented in the Mars 2020 Solar

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Feasibility Study (JPL 2014). In Alternative 3, the MMRTG would be replaced and the
rover would be powered by solar power arrays, similar to that proposed in Alternative 2.
The rover used in this alternative would rely on the power generated by solar arrays to
generate electricity to operate the rover’s scientific instrumentation, communication
equipment, and to provide motive power. In addition to the solar arrays, the rover in this
alternative would incorporate up to 71 LWRHUs as a heat source. Power from the solar
arrays would also power electric heaters to augment the LWRHUs to help maintain the
thermal environment required to ensure the survival of the rover’s engineering
subsystems and science payload. As described in the following sections, the additional
thermal power from the LWRHUs extends the operational capabilities of the rover to
include an expanded selection of landing sites and an increased science return
capability. Should NASA make changes in Alternative 3 that are relevant to
environmental concerns, NASA would evaluate the need for additional environmental
analysis and documentation.
2.3.1 Mission and Spacecraft Description
Many of the technical aspects of the mission and spacecraft designs for Alternative 3
would be similar to those described in Section 2.1 for Proposed Action (Alternative 1).
These would include the following major features.
 The Mars 2020 spacecraft would be launched from KSC or CCAFS onboard an
expendable launch vehicle from the Atlas V, Delta IV, or Falcon Heavy class of
vehicles (see Section 2.1.5 for representative descriptions of these vehicles).
 The mission design would be as described in Section 2.1.1, including a launch
opportunity in July to August of 2020, with a backup opportunity in August to
September 2022, and an Earth-Mars trajectory leading to direct entry of the
spacecraft into the Martian atmosphere.
 The Mars 2020 flight system would consist of a high-heritage MSL cruise stage,
entry vehicle, and descent stage as described in Section 2.1.2, and a science
rover.
 The rover’s science instrument payload would be as described in Table 2-2.
Planning for the rover science mission would be based upon an operational
timeline similar to that described in Section 2.1.1.
2.3.1.1. Solar Power Supply System
The solar power system that would be used for Alternative 3 is the same system as
described in Section 2.2.1.1 for Alternative 2.
2.3.1.2. Radioisotope Heater Units
The Mars 2020 rover could use a combination of LWRHUs and electric heaters to
maintain internal temperature during periods of extreme cold. Alternative 3 considers
the use of up to 71 such LWRHUs (JPL 2014). Each LWRHU (see Figure 2-19) would
produce about 1 thermal watt of heat derived from the radioactive decay of 2.7 grams
(g) (0.095 ounce (oz)) of plutonium (mostly plutonium-238) in the form of a ceramic of
plutonium dioxide. Each LWRHU would contribute approximately 33.2 Ci for a total
plutonium inventory of up to 2,360 Ci. Table 2-7 provides the typical radionuclide

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

composition of a LWRHU’s fuel. The exterior dimensions of a LWRHU are 2.6 cm (1.03
in) in diameter by 3.2cm (1.26 in) in length. Each LWRHU has a mass of about 40g
(1.4 oz).

Source: Adapted from SNL 2014

Figure 2-19. Principal Features of a Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit

(LWRHU)

LWRHUs are designed to contain the plutonium dioxide during normal operations and
under a wide range of accident environments. The integrity and durability of LWRHUs
have been well documented by the U.S. Department of Energy (SNL 2014). The
plutonium dioxide ceramic is encapsulated in a 70% platinum and 30% rhodium alloy
clad. A fine weave pierced fabric of carbon graphite used as a heat shield provides
protection against high-temperature accident environments, and a series of concentric
pyrolitic graphite10 sleeves and end plugs thermally insulate the encapsulated
radioactive material. The LWRHU’s plutonium dioxide is principally protected from
ground or debris impact by the alloy clad. The heat shield and inner pyrolitic graphite
insulators provide additional protection.

10
Pyrolitic graphite is a man-made form of graphite, created by heating graphite and allowing it to cool
into a crystalline form. This type of graphite has enhanced thermal conduction properties compared to
ordinary graphite.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-7. Typical Radionuclide Composition of a LWRHU Fuel Pellet

Specific Activity
(Ci/g of Fuel Total Activity
Fuel Component Weight Percent Half-Life (yrs) Component)a (Ci)
Plutonium (Pu) 85.735
Pu-236 0.0000010 2.851 531.3 0.00001
Pu-238 70.810 87.7 17.12 32.7312
Pu-239 12.859 24.131 0.0620 0.02153
Pu-240 1.787 6.569 0.2267 0.01094
Pu-241 0.168 14.4 103.0 0.4672
Pu-242 0.111 375,800 0.00393 0.00001
Actinide impurities 2.413 NA NA NA
Oxygen 11.852 NA NA NA
Total 100 NA NA 33.2312

2.3.2 Solar Power Availability

The factors affecting the ability of a solar-powered rover to operate on the surface of
Mars were discussed in Section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 for Alternative 2, and are applicable to
this alternative as well. Figure 2-20 illustrates the locations on the surface of Mars
where there would be sufficient solar power (augmented by the thermal output of the
LWRHUs) for the rover to perform science operations and maintain its health and
functionality as a function of latitude over the course of one Mars year. The analysis of
this alternative assumes the same dust factors as assumed in the analysis of Alternative
2.
For Alternative 3, sufficient solar power for one Mars year of operation (although the
rover would be required to hibernate for at least part of the winter) is available between
20° south and 5° south latitudes assuming a dust factor of 40%. With improved dust
cleaning or mitigation resulting in a dust factor of 70%, the rover could operate for one
Mars year between 20° south and 15° north latitudes.
The solar feasibility assessment (JPL 2014), which developed these estimates of rover
operability, was performed with sufficient detail to develop estimates for a
representative solar-powered rover configuration. Should NASA select Alternative 3, the
solar-powered rover design would be finalized, but any changes would likely not change
the fundamental results presented in the solar feasibility assessment.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

40% Dust Factor

Northern Spring Summer Fall Winter
Season
Southern Fall Winter Spring Summer
o
30 N
o
25 N
20o N
15o N
o
10 N
o
5 N
o
Latitude 0
o
5 S
10o S
o
15 S
o
20 S
25o S
o
30 S

Survival Not Possible Full Operations

Hibernation Survival Latitude Band
Constrained Operations

Note: The expected arrival date for the Mars 2020 mission would coincide with the transition from winter to spring in the northern hemisphere
of Mars. This date appears on the far left of this figure.
Source: Adapted from JPL 2014

Figure 2-20. Mars 2020 Solar-Powered (with LWRHUS) Rover Operability with 40%
Dust Factor
2.3.3 Operational Considerations
As shown in Figure 2-20, for all latitudes between 30° south and 30° north, the ability of
the rover to fully perform for a full year is restricted. There are times when the rover
would have to operate at less than full capability (Constrained Operations), times when
the rover would have to cease scientific operations and operate in a mode where only
functions needed for rover survival—primarily maintaining an acceptable thermal
environment—are performed (Hibernation), and times the rover would not survive. Full
year survival is only possible between 20° and 5° south latitudes. The periods of
reduced science operability impact the amount of science investigation that can be
performed at the various landing sites which adversely impacts the ability of the rover to
reach all of the baseline goals for the mission.
Table 2-8 shows the estimated operational lifetime of the solar-powered Mars 2020
rover as a function of landing site latitude for the anticipated arrival dates. The MMRTG
power option, which is capable of full operations for an entire Mars year, is included for
comparison purposes. The numbers shown for a partial-year operation are indicative of
how long the rover would be expected to survive before failing due to cold weather. The
ability to survive longer in the northern latitudes is a result of the mission arrival dates
coinciding with spring in the northern Martian latitudes, while these arrival dates are in
the fall in the southern Martian latitudes.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-8. Operational Lifetime for a Solar-Powered Rover with LWRHUs

a
Operational Lifetime
b
Option Solar plus LWRHUs MMRTG

o
30 N 50% 100%
o
25 N 55% 100%
o
20 N 60% 100%
o
15 N 60% 100%
o
10 N 60% 100%
o
5 N 65% 100%
o
Latitude 0 70% 100%
o
5 S 100% 100%
o
10 S 100% 100%
o
15 S 100% 100%
o
20 S 100% 100%
o
25 S 25% 100%
o
30 S 15% 100%
Source: Adapted from JPL 2014

(a) Lifetime expressed in terms of a full Martian year

(b) Lifetime assuming a 40% dust factor (solar cells remain 40% clean)
Rover operates for less than a full Martian year
Rover operates for a full Martian year

Larger dust factors would improve the operational capabilities of the rover; however,
even with a dust factor of 70%, a full year of rover operation is possible only between
20° south and 15° north latitudes. . Even with this improved operating range, there
would be periods of constrained science operation and hibernation. The improvement in
survivability would result in an increase in the amount of science that could be
performed and an increase in the range of locations and, therefore, the number of
potential landing sites.
The science capabilities associated with a partial-year operation are provided in Table
2-6. These capabilities are expressed in terms of the percentage of the samples that
could be obtained given a full year of operation with no limitations (constrained
operations or hibernation). For comparison, Alternative 1 provides 100% capability.
Although the rover would be expected to survive for an entire year at latitudes between
20° and 5° south, it would not be able to operate at full capacity for the entire year
(Figure 2-20). The limited operational capability during the winter (constrained operation
and hibernation) limit the amount of science that can be performed to 60 to 70% of that
possible during a full year of unrestricted operations. Given the assumptions for initial
checkout and rover movement (driving from site to site) any landing site with an
operational lifetime of 40% or less would not provide the opportunity to perform any
sampling activities unless rover movement was curtailed.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

Under the No Action Alternative, NASA would discontinue preparations for the Mars
2020 mission. The next step in NASA’s Mars Exploration Program following the Mars
Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) mission in 2014 would not be conducted
as currently envisioned (excluding the NASA contributions to the European Space
Agency ExoMars missions), and NASA would need to reevaluate its programmatic
options for the 2020 launch opportunity to Mars and beyond.
Without development and implementation of a large mobile science platform, such as
the rover planned for the Mars 2020 mission, NASA’s ability to meet the highest
recommendation of the National Research Council’s Planetary Science Decadal
Survey—to acquire detailed scientific information on the habitability and biosignature
potential of Mars—would be severely limited, and the advancements in technological
and operational capabilities necessary for the future exploration of Mars may not be
achieved.
2.5 ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BUT NOT EVALUATED FURTHER
There were no alternatives considered but not evaluated further. Alternative
radioisotope power sources to the MMRTG were considered in previous environmental
impact statements (NASA 2005b, NASA 2006). These alternatives were not considered
here since no new information has been developed that would indicate that these power
sources would present a viable alternative to the MMRTG.
2.6 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION
For the purpose of the evaluations presented in this FEIS, the primary difference
between the baseline Mars 2020 mission described in the Proposed Action (Alternative
1) and the Mars 2020 mission described in Alternatives 2 and 3 is the source of
electrical power and heat that would be used for the Mars 2020 rover. For the Proposed
Action, the rover power source would be an MMRTG, described in Section 2.1.3;
whereas, for Alternative 2, the rover power source would be a solar array, described in
Section 2.2.1; and for Alternative 3, the power source would be a solar array augmented
by up to 71 LWRHUs, described in Section 2.3.1.
2.6.1 Comparison of Mission Science Capabilities
Since the Mars 2020 rover designs in the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2,
and Alternative 3 would carry the same science instruments, any of these three
alternatives could conduct the same set of experiments. The estimated science
capability for these alternatives, expressed in terms of the percentage of the full science
return that could be attained at a given latitude on Mars, is summarized in Table 2-9.
Alternative 1. The MMRTG-powered rover would be capable of achieving all of the
target operational capabilities (100% science return) as summarized in Table 2-1,
including landing at a scientifically interesting location between 30° south and 30° north
latitude, and operating and conducting science for at least one Mars year.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-9. Estimated Science Capability Comparison of the Mars 2020 Mission
Alternatives
Rover Power Landing Site Latitude Operational Capability Percentage of Science
Alternative Range Achieved at Landing Site
Latitude
MMRTG 30°S to 30°N 100% 100%
(Alternative 1)
Solar Array 0° to 30°N Unable to Operate for Full Year 20-30%
b
(Alternative 2) Maximum Operational Lifetime 60%
(40% dust
a
factor ) 30°S to 0° Unable to Operate for Full Year a few percent
Maximum Operational Lifetime 35%
Solar Array 30°S to 20°S Unable to Operate for Full Year a few percent
with LWRHUs Maximum Operational Lifetime 25%
(Alternative 3)
20°S to 5°S Constrained Operations (up to 28%) 60-70%
(40% dust
Hibernation (up to 9%)
factor)
5°S to 30°N Unable to Operate for Full Year 20-40%
Maximum Operational Lifetime 70%
Notes:
a) The MER Opportunity dust factor has always stayed above 40%, but the MER Spirit dust factor fell below
25% (more than two Mars years into the mission). The factors controlling dust accumulation are not well known,
so there is a risk that a solar-powered mission without dust mitigation technology assuming a minimum dust
factor of 40% may fail if the actual dust accumulation exceeds that seen on Opportunity and is closer to that
seen on Spirit late in its mission. Meeting a 70% dust factor (i.e., the loss of power from the solar arrays due to
accumulated dust is limited to 30%) while promising greater science return would require development of dust
removal technology.
b) For each latittude range, the Maximum Operational Lifetime represents the longest time the rover would be
expected to survive before failing due to environmental conditions. It is expressed in terms of a full Martian year.
All values are approximate. N = North Latitude; S = South Latitude.
Source JPL 2014

Alternative 2. At most latitudes on Mars, the amount of time that a solar-powered rover
could perform science operations would be limited by the ability of the solar array to
generate sufficient power for the rover to survive the extreme thermal environment. A
solar-powered rover with arrays stowable in the available volume would not be able to
survive for a full Martian year at any latitude assuming the solar arrays remain at least
40% dust free. Partial-year operation with reduced science capability is possible over a
range of latitudes from 0° to 30°north. More favorable dust factors would result in an
increase in the operational range of the rover, expanding the latitudes at which a partial
year operation would be possible, with a full year of operation possible only at latitudes
ranging from 0° to 5° south. Operations would be limited (constrained operations or
hibernation) for parts of the year.
Alternative 3. At most latitudes on Mars, the amount of time that a solar-powered
rover, with additional thermal power from LWRHUs, could perform science operations
would be limited by the ability of the solar array and LWRHUs to generate sufficient
power for the rover to survive the extreme thermal environment. A solar-powered rover
with LWRHUs (solar arrays 40% dust free) would have sufficient power to operate for a
full Martian year at latitudes on Mars between 20° south and 5° south. Partial-year

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

operation with further reduced science capability is possible over a wider range of
latitudes. This solar/RHU-powered rover could operate for nearly a full Mars year at
latitudes ranging from 20° south to 15° north, if a more favorable solar array dust factor
of 70% is assumed.
Alternative 1, 2, and 3: 2022 Launch Opportunity. Should the mission be delayed,
the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched during the next available launch
opportunity in August through September 2022. The science potential associated with
Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 with a 2022 launch would be similar to those projected for each
alternative with a 2020 launch. Under all circumstances, an MMRTG-powered rover
would provide more power for science activities.
No Action Alternative. The No Action Alternate would not accomplish any science on
the surface of Mars; this does not fulfill the purpose and need for the Mars 2020 mission
as discussed in Chapter 1 of this FEIS.
2.6.2 Comparison of Potential Environmental Impacts
This section summarizes and compares the potential environmental impacts of the
Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, Alternative 3, and the No Action
Alternative. The anticipated impacts associated with nominal or normal implementation
of Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 are considered first (Section 2.6.2.1). This is followed by a
summary of the non-radiological impacts that could occur due to a potential launch
accident with Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 (Section 2.6.2.2); and finally a summary of
potential radiological consequences and risks from a launch accident associated with
each of the Alternatives (Section 2.6.2.3). Details of these results are addressed in
Chapter 4.
As noted in Section 2.1.5, the evaluations presented in this FEIS, based on
representative configurations of the possible launch vehicles, were completed prior to
NASA’s selection of the mission launch vehicle. NASA considers these evaluations to
adequately bound the potential environmental consequences of the alternatives
described in this FEIS. Should NASA's continuing evaluations produce results that differ
substantially from the information presented in this FEIS, NASA would consider the new
information, and determine the need, if any, for additional environmental analysis and
documentation.
2.6.2.1. Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch
Table 2-10 provides a summary comparison of the anticipated environmental impacts
associated with normal implementation of Alternatives 1, 2, and 3, and the No Action
Alternative.
Alternatives 1, 2, and 3. The impacts associated with a successful launch were
addressed in the Final Environmental Assessment for Launch of NASA Routine
Payloads on Expendable Launch Vehicles (Routine Payloads EA) (NASA 2011) for all
candidate launch vehicles. These impacts were determined to have no significant
impacts, as detailed in the Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Routine
Payloads EA.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-10. Summary of Anticipated Environmental Impacts of the Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives
Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives
Impact Category
Normal Implementation of the Proposed Action and Alternatives 2 and 3 No Action Alternative
Land Use Consistent with designated land uses at KSC and CCAFS; no adverse impacts on non-launch-related land uses at No change in baseline condition.
KSC and CCAFS would be expected.

Air Quality High levels of solid propellant combustion products occur within the exhaust cloud for a launch vehicle using solid No change in baseline condition.
rocket boosters (e.g., the Atlas V).
The exhaust cloud would rise and begin to disperse near the launch complex.
Some short-term local ozone impacts. No long-term adverse air quality impacts would be expected in the region.

Noise and Sonic Boom Sound exposure levels during launch are estimated to be within OSHA and EPA regulations/guidelines for affected No change in baseline condition.
workers and the public.

Geology and Soils Some deposition of Al2O3 particulates and HCl near the launch complex for a launch vehicle using solid rocket No change in baseline condition.
boosters. No long-term adverse impacts would be expected.

Water Quality Water used for pre-launch fire protection, heat suppression, acoustic damping, and post-launch wash down is No change in baseline condition.
recovered and treated, if necessary. No long-term adverse impacts to groundwater or surface water would be
expected; short-term increase in the acidity of nearby surface waters would be expected.

Offshore Environment The offshore environments at KSC or CCAFS would be impacted by the jettisoned launch vehicle sections in pre- No change in baseline condition.
approved drop zones. Small amounts of residual propellants would be released to the surrounding water. Toxic
concentrations would not be likely because of the slow rate of the corrosion process and the large volume of ocean
water available for dilution.

Biological Resources Biota near the launch complex could be damaged or killed during launch, although no animal mortality has been No change in baseline condition.
observed that could be attributed to previous Delta and Atlas launches. Possible acidification of nearby surface
waters from solid propellant exhaust products is not expected to cause any mortality of aquatic biota. No long-term
adverse effects would be expected. No short-term or long-term impacts would be expected to threatened or
endangered species. No long-term impacts would be expected to critical habitat.

Socioeconomics No adverse impacts to socioeconomic factors such as demography, employment, transportation, and public or No change in baseline condition.
emergency services.

Environmental Justice No disproportionately high and adverse impacts would be expected. No change in baseline condition.

Cultural/Historical/ No impacts would be expected. No change in baseline condition.

Archaeological Resources

Global Environment Not anticipated to adversely affect global climate change. Temporary localized decrease in stratospheric ozone with No change in baseline condition.
rapid recovery would be anticipated along the launch vehicle’s flight path.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

The environmental impacts associated with implementing the Proposed Action

(Alternative 1), Alternative 2, or Alternative 3 would center largely on the exhaust
products emitted from the launch vehicle's strap-on solid rockets and the short-term
impacts of those emissions, should a vehicle that uses solid rockets (i.e., one of the
Atlas V configurations) be selected. High concentrations of solid rocket motor exhaust
products, principally aluminum oxide (Al2O3) particulates, carbon monoxide (CO),
hydrogen chloride (HCl), nitrogen (N2), and water (H2O), would occur in the exhaust
cloud that would form at the launch complex. CO would be quickly oxidized to carbon
dioxide (CO2); and at the high exhaust plume temperatures, N2 may react with oxygen
to form nitrogen oxides (NOX). Due to the relatively high gas temperatures, this exhaust
cloud would be buoyant and would rise quickly and begin to disperse near the launch
pad. High concentrations of HCl would not be expected, so prolonged acidification of
nearby water bodies and long-term or cumulative damage to vegetation should not
occur. First-stage liquid propellant engines that use RP-1 and LOX, such as the Atlas V
and Falcon Heavy, would primarily produce CO, CO2, and water vapor as combustion
products. First-stage liquid propellant engines that use LH2 and LOX, such as the Delta
IV, would produce water vapor. For either launch vehicle, no adverse impacts to local
air quality would be expected.
If rain were to occur shortly after launch, some short-term acidification of nearby water
bodies could occur with the accompanying potential for some mortality of aquatic biota.
Biota that happened to be in the path of the exhaust could be damaged or killed.
Threatened or endangered species would not be jeopardized nor would critical habitats
be affected at KSC or CCAFS. As the launch vehicle gains altitude, a portion of the solid
rocket motor exhaust (specifically, HCl, Al2O3, and NOX) would be deposited in the
stratosphere, resulting in a short-term reduction in ozone along the launch vehicle’s
flight path. Recovery, however, would be rapid and cumulative impacts would not be
expected.
Noise and sonic booms would be associated with the launch. However, neither launch
site workers nor the public would be adversely affected. Increased noise levels,
anticipated to be below Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
regulations for unprotected workers, would occur for only a short period during the
launch vehicle's early ascent, and would diminish rapidly as the vehicle gains altitude
and moves downrange. No impacts to cultural, historical or archaeological resources
would be expected from a normal launch. The Mars 2020 mission launch would not be
expected to disproportionately impact either minority or low-income populations.
No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, NASA would discontinue
preparations for the Mars 2020 mission, and the spacecraft would not be developed and
launched. Thus, none of the anticipated impacts associated with a normal launch would
occur.
2.6.2.2. Potential Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Launch Accidents
Alternatives 1, 2, and 3. As with the impacts associated with a successful launch,
these impacts were addressed in the Final Environmental Assessment for Launch of
NASA Routine Payloads on Expendable Launch Vehicles (Routine Payloads EA)

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

(NASA 2011) for all candidate launch vehicles. These impacts were determined to have
no significant impact and are described in the FONSI for the Routine Payloads EA.
Non-radiological accidents could occur during preparation for and launch of the Mars
2020 spacecraft at KSC or CCAFS. The two most significant non-radiological accidents
would be a liquid propellant spill associated with fuel loading operations and a launch
vehicle accident.
The potential for environmental consequences would be limited primarily to liquid
propellant spills of RP-1, LH2, LOX, and hydrazine (depending on the propellants used
in the selected launch vehicle); during fueling operations; and a launch accident at or
near the launch pad. USAF safety requirements (USAF 2004) specify detailed policies
and procedures to be followed to ensure worker and public safety during liquid
propellant fueling operations. Propellant spills or releases of RP-1, LH2, and LOX would
be minimized through remotely operated actions that close applicable valves and safe
the propellant loading system. Workers performing propellant loading (e.g., RP-1 and
hydrazine) would be equipped with protective clothing and a breathing apparatus, and
uninvolved workers would be excluded from the area during propellant loading.
Propellant loading would occur only shortly before launch, further minimizing the
potential for accidents.
A launch vehicle accident on or near the launch area during the first few seconds of
flight could result in the release of the propellants (solid and liquid) onboard the launch
vehicle and the spacecraft. A launch vehicle accident would result in the prompt
combustion of a portion of the liquid propellants, depending on the degree of mixing and
ignition sources associated with the accident, and somewhat slower burning of the solid
propellant fragments, should a vehicle that uses solid rockets be selected. The resulting
emissions would resemble those from a normal launch, consisting principally of CO,
CO2, HCl, NOX, and Al2O3 from the combusted propellants, and depending on the
propellants used in the selected launch vehicle. Falling debris would be expected to
land on or near the launch pad resulting in potential secondary ground-level explosions
and localized fires. After the launch vehicle clears land, debris from an accident would
be expected to fall over the Atlantic Ocean. Modeling of accident consequences with
meteorological parameters that would result in the greatest concentrations of emissions
over land areas indicates that the emissions would not reach levels threatening public
health. Some burning solid and liquid propellants could enter surface water bodies and
the ocean resulting in short-term, localized degradation of water quality and conditions
toxic to aquatic life. Such chemicals entering the ocean would be dispersed and
buffered, resulting in little long-term impact on water quality and resident biota.
For suborbital, orbital, and reentry debris, standard safety review processes require that
NASA missions assess the amount of launch vehicle and spacecraft debris released in
normal operations. NASA Standard 8719.14, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris. (i.e.,
Requirement 4.7-1) currently limits the risk of human casualty from reentry debris to 1 in
10,000 and requires that missions be designed to assure that in both controlled and
uncontrolled entries, domestic and foreign landmasses are avoided. The Mars 2020
mission has completed the required orbital debris assessment report for the spacecraft.
The report indicates which requirements are applicable and documents compliance with

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

applicable requirements. NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance approved the
report on January 15, 2014.
The environmental impact of objects falling into the ocean would depend on the physical
properties of the materials (e.g., size, composition, quantity, and solubility) and the
marine environment of the impact region. Based on past analyses of other space
components, it is expected that the environmental impact of reentering orbital debris
would be negligible (NASA 2005b; USAF 1998). NASA has studied the potential risks
associated with reentry and Earth impact of spacecraft propellant tanks, including those
used on prior science missions to the surface of Mars. Specifically, for the MSL
spacecraft, an analysis showed that under certain launch accident conditions, there was
a small probability the spacecraft with a full propellant load (475 kg) could reenter prior
to achieving orbit and impact land in southern Africa or Madagascar. The probability of
such an accident occurring and leading to a land impact was determined to be on the
order of 1 in 20,000. The overall risk of an individual injury resulting from the land
impact of a spacecraft and exposure to hydrazine was determined to be less than 1 in
100,000 (NASA 2010b).
In accident scenarios occurring after achievement of the park orbit, analysis for the MSL
spacecraft determined that it would be extremely unlikely that there would be any
residual hydrazine remaining inside the propellant tanks at the point of ground impact
(NASA 2010b).
No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, a launch would not occur,
therefore there would be no potential for either type of accident to occur.
2.6.2.3. Potential Radiological Environmental Impacts of Launch Accidents
This section presents a summary of DOE’s Nuclear Risk Assessment for the Mars 2020
Mission Environmental Impact Statement (SNL 2014) for the Proposed Action
(Alternative 1), Alternative 2, and Alternative 3 as described in this FEIS. More detailed
information can be found in Sections 4.1.4, 4.1.5, and 4.3.4.
Alternative 1: Figure 2-21 presents summaries of launch-related probabilities for
Alternative 1 for the proposed Mars 2020 mission. These probability summaries were
derived by combining the estimated failure probabilities from the Mars 2020
Representative Data Book (NASA 2013e), and DOE’s estimated release probabilities
(SNL 2014). As such, the estimated probabilities summarized in Figure 2-21 do not
reflect the reliability of any single launch vehicle.
The most likely outcome of implementing the proposed Mars 2020 mission, with over a
97% probability, is a successful launch to Mars. The unsuccessful launches (about a
2.5 % probability) would result from either a malfunction or a launch accident. Most
malfunctions would involve trajectory control malfunctions, which would occur late in the
ascent profile. This type of malfunction would place the spacecraft on an incorrect
trajectory escaping from Earth but leading to failure of the spacecraft to reach Mars.
Most launch accidents result in destruction of the launch vehicle but would not result in
damage to the MMRTG sufficient to cause a release of some plutonium dioxide. The
analysis estimates that for less than 0.04% of the time (a probability of 1 in 2,600), a

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

launch could result in an accident with the release of plutonium dioxide, but typically not
in a quantity large enough to result in discernible radiological consequences (see
Section 2.6.2.3.2).

Figure 2-21. Alternative 1 - MMRTG Accident Probabilities

Alternative 2: For Alternative 2, the rover would rely solely on the power from the solar
arrays to provide electric power for rover operations and heat to maintain an acceptable
thermal environment for rover equipment and instrumentation. There would be no
radioactive material incorporated into the rover.
Alternative 3: For Alternative 3, the rover would rely upon power from the solar arrays
to provide electric power for rover operations and heat to maintain an acceptable
thermal environment for rover equipment and instrumentation and incorporate up to 71
LWRHUs11 as an additional heat source.
Figure 2-22 presents summaries of launch-related probabilities for Alternative 3 of the
proposed Mars 2020 mission. These probability summaries were derived by combining
the estimated failure probabilities from the Mars 2020 Representative Data Book (NASA
2013e), and DOE’s estimated release probabilities (SNL 2014). As such, the estimated
probabilities summarized in Figure 2-22 do not reflect the reliability of any single launch
vehicle.

11
For the purposes of the risk analysis, DOE assumed the rover could include up to 80 LWRHUs.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

The differences between the three rover configurations (MMRTG powered, solar-
powered with no LWRHUs, and solar-powered with LWRHUs) do not significantly
impact the accident probability for the mission. However, the probability of an accident
with a release of plutonium dioxide is smaller, 0.006% (1 in 15,000), for the solar-
powered rover with LWRHUs configuration, than for the MMRTG powered rover. The
amount of material released is typically not large enough to result in discernible
radiological consequences. (See Section 2.6.2.3.2)

Figure 2-22. Alternative 3 - LWRHU Accident Probabilities

2.6.2.3.1. The FEIS Nuclear Risk Assessment
The nuclear risk assessment for the proposed Mars 2020 mission considers (1)
potential accidents associated with the launch and their probabilities and accident
environments; (2) the response of the MMRTG and LWRHUs to such accidents in terms
of the amount of radioactive materials released and their probabilities; and (3) the
radiological consequences and mission risks associated with such releases. The risk
assessment was based on a typical MMRTG radioactive material inventory of about
60,000 Ci of primarily plutonium-238 (an alpha-emitter with an 87.7 year half-life).
DOE’s risk assessment was developed when the candidate launch vehicles being
considered by NASA for the Mars 2020 mission were the Atlas V 541 and 551, the Delta
IV Heavy, and the Falcon Heavy. A composite approach was taken in DOE’s nuclear
risk assessment (SNL 2014) for accident probabilities, potential releases of plutonium

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dioxide in case of an accident (called source terms), radiological consequences, and

mission risks. The composite approach taken in the risk assessment and reported in
this FEIS reflects the state of knowledge at this early stage in the mission with respect
to the candidate launch vehicles.
The risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission began with the identification of the initial
launch vehicle system malfunctions or failures and the subsequent chain of accident
events that could ultimately lead to the accident environments (e.g., explosive
overpressures, fragments, fire) that could threaten the MMRTG or LWRHUs. These
launch vehicle system failures were based on launch vehicle system reliabilities and
estimated failure probabilities (NASA 2013e).
Failure of the launch vehicle has the potential to create accident environments that
could damage the MMRTG or LWRHUs and result in the release of plutonium dioxide.
Based on analyses performed for earlier missions that carried radioisotope devices
(RTGs and LWRHUs), DOE identified the specific accident environments that could
potentially threaten these devices. DOE then determined the response of the MMRTG,
MMRTG components, and LWRHUs to these accident environments and estimated the
amount of radioactive material that could be released.
For this risk assessment, the Mars 2020 mission was divided into mission phases,
which reflect principal launch events.
 Phase 0 (Pre-Launch) and Phase 1 (Early Launch): A launch-related accident
during these periods could result in ground impact in the launch area.
 Phase 2 (Late Launch): A launch accident during this period would lead to
impact of debris in the Atlantic Ocean.
 Phase 3 (Sub Orbital): A launch accident during this period prior to reaching
Earth parking orbit could lead to prompt sub-orbital reentry within minutes.
 Phase 4 (Orbital) and Phase 5 (Long-Term Reentry): A launch accident that
occurs after attaining parking orbit could result in orbital decay reentries from
minutes to years after the accident.
2.6.2.3.2. Accident Probabilities and Consequences
Section 4.1.4 provides a detailed quantitative discussion of the accident probabilities
and associated potential consequences for the proposed Mars 2020 mission.
The radiological consequences of a given accident that results in a release of
radioactive material have been calculated in terms of radiation doses, potential health
effects, and land area contaminated at or above specified levels. The radiological
consequences have been determined from atmospheric transport and dispersion
simulations incorporating both worldwide and launch-site specific meteorological and
population data.
Sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.5 (Alternative 1), and 4.3.4 (Alternative 3) describe the risk
assessment in greater detail, with the results presented for both mean and 99th
percentile values. For the purposes of this summary, the accident consequences and
associated risks are presented only in terms of the mean.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Consequences of Radiological Release on Human Health

Human health consequences are expressed in terms of maximum individual dose,
collective dose to the potentially exposed population, and the associated health effects.
The maximum individual dose is the maximum dose, typically expressed in units of rem
(Roentgen equivalent in man), delivered to a single individual assumed to be outside
during the time of radiological exposure for each accident. Collective dose (also called a
population dose) is the sum of the radiation dose received by all individuals exposed to
radiation from a given release. Health effects represent statistically estimated additional
latent cancer fatalities resulting from an exposure over a 50-year period to a release of
radioactive material, and are determined based on Interagency Steering Committee on
Radiation Standards (ISCORS) health effects estimators (DOE 2002). The estimated
radiological consequences by mission phase and for the overall mission are
summarized below.
Alternative 1: For alternative 1, an accident resulting in the release of plutonium
dioxide from the MMRTG occurs with a probability of 1 in 2,600. The mean mission
human health consequences are:
 maximum dose received by an individual would have a mean of 0.016 rem which
is equivalent to about 5% of the natural annual background dose received by
each member of the population of the United States during a year12
 a mean collective dose resulting in about 0.076 additional latent cancer fatalities
within the entire group of potentially exposed individuals.
For individual phases of the mission, the maximum dose received by an individual
ranges from 0.000016 to 0.060 rem, and the additional latent cancer fatalities range
from 0.000078 to 0.29. The largest values are both associated with accidents with
releases that occur during the Early Launch Phase (Phase 1).
Alternative 2: Implementation of Alternative 2 would not involve potential radiological
environmental impacts.
Alternative 3. For Alternative 3, an accident resulting in the release of plutonium
dioxide from the LWRHUs occurs with a probability of 1 in 15,000. The mean mission
human health consequences are:
 maximum dose received by an individual would have a mean of 0.0041 rem
which is equivalent to about 1% of the natural annual background dose received
by each member of the population of the United States during a year
 a mean collective dose resulting in about 0.020 additional latent cancer fatalities
within the entire group of potentially exposed individuals.

12
An average of about 0.3 rem per year is received by an individual in the United States from natural
sources. The dose from man-made sources, such as medical diagnosis and therapy, could be as high as
an additional 0.3 rem. See Section 3.2.6 for further information.

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For individual phases of the mission in which accidents can result in a plutonium dioxide
release, the maximum dose received by an individual ranges from 0.0013 to 0.0042 rem
and the additional latent cancer fatalities range from 0.006 to 0.020. Accidents occurring
during phases 2, 4, and 5 are not expected to release any plutonium dioxide. The
largest values are both associated with accidents with releases that occur during the
Early Launch Phase (Phase 1).
Table 2-11 provides a summary of the human health consequences for all mission
phases for each alternative.
Should the mission be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched
during the next available launch opportunity in August through September 2022. Since
this launch period is in a similar season as the 2020 launch period, the projected
radiological impacts would be similar, with only a small increase in population impacts
due to population growth. Thus, within the overall uncertainties, the radiological impacts
associated with a 2022 launch would be the same as those for the proposed 2020
launch.

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Table 2-11. Summary of Estimated Mean Radiological Health Consequences

Launch Area Accidents Accidents Beyond The Launch Area
Overall
Consequence Late Long-term Mission
Contributing Source Pre Launch Early Launch Launch Sub-Orbital Orbital reentry Accidents
Alternative 1 - Probability of
1 in
MMRTG an Accident 1 in 93,000 1 in 130,000 1 in 67,000 1 in 3,800 1 in 11,000,000 1 in 2,600
11,000
with a Release

Maximum
Individual 0.00029 0.06 0.000016 0.043 0.0005 0.0008 0.016
Dose, rem

Latent Cancer
(a) 0.0014 0.29 0.000078 0.20 0.0026 0.0038 0.076
Fatalities

Alternative 2 Probability of
an Accident N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
with a Release

Maximum
Individual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Dose, rem

Latent Cancer
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Fatalities

Alternative 3 - Probability of
1 in (b) (b) (b)
LWRHUs an Accident 1 in 3,200,000 0 1 in 430,000 0 0 1 in 15,000
16,000
with a Release

Maximum
Individual 0.0030 0.0042 - 0.0013 - - 0.0041
Dose, rem

Latent Cancer
0.015 0.020 - 0.0060 - - 0.020
Fatalities

(a) A latent cancer fatality of less than 1.0 can be interpreted as the probability of the occurrence of one or more latent cancer fatalities. For
example, a value of 0.25 would be a one in four chance that the accident would result in one or more latent cancer fatalities.
(b) The multiple protective layers of the LWRHUs would be sufficient to prevent the release of fuel under all circumstances during these
types of launch accidents. Therefore, the release probability is 0.0 and there are no associated radiological consequences as indicated
by the “-.”

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Impacts of Radiological Releases on the Environment

In addition to the potential human health consequences of launch accidents that could
result in a release of plutonium dioxide, environmental impacts could also include
contamination of natural vegetation, wetlands, agricultural land, cultural, archaeological
and historic sites, urban areas, inland water, and the ocean, as well as impacts on
wildlife.
Potential environmental contamination was evaluated in terms of areas exceeding
various screening levels and dose-rate-related criteria considered in evaluating the
need for land cleanup following radioactive contamination. In the risk assessment for
this FEIS, land areas which could be contaminated at or above a level of 0.2
microcuries per square meter (μCi/m2) have been identified. This is a screening level
used in prior NASA environmental documentation (e.g., NASA 1989, NASA 1997,
NASA 2005b, NASA 2006 (MSL EIS)) to identify areas potentially needing further
action, such as monitoring or cleanup. The results for the mean land area contaminated
at or above a level of 0.2 μCi/m2 are summarized in Table 2-12.
Table 2-12. Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives: Land Contamination
Alternative 1 Alternative 3
Alternative 2
(MMRTG) (LWRHU)
Phase Release Land Release Land Release Land
Probability Contamination Probability Contamination Probability Contamination
2 2
Pre-launch 1 in 93,000 0.035 km 1 in 3.3 0.37 km
2
(0.014 mi ) N/A N/A million 2
(0.14 mi )
2 2
Early launch 1 in 11,000 7.4 km 1 in 16,000 0.51 km
2 N/A N/A 2
(2.9 mi ) (0.20 mi )
2
Late launch 1 in 0.0020 km
2 N/A N/A 0 ----
130,000 (0.00077mi )
2 2
Sub-Orbital 1 in 68,000 5.2 km 1 in 0.15 km
2 N/A N/A 430,000 2
(2.0 mi ) (0.058 mi )
2
Orbital 1 in 3,800 0.066 km
2 N/A N/A 0 ----
(0.025 mi )
2
Long-term 1 in 0.097 km
2 N/A N/A 0 ----
Reentry 11 million (0.037 mi )
2 2
Overall 1.94 km 0.50 km
Mission 1 in 2,600 2 N/A N/A 1 in 15,000 2
(0.75 mi ) (0.19 mi )

For alternatives 1 and 3, costs associated with potential characterization and cleanup,
should decontamination be required, could vary widely ($110 million to $611 million per
km2 or about $284 million to $1.58 billion per mi2) depending upon the characteristics
and size of the contaminated area. The Price-Anderson Act of 1957, as amended (42
U.S.C. 2210), established a system of financial protection for persons who may be liable
for and for persons who may be injured in the event of a nuclear incident arising out of
activities conducted by or on behalf of the DOE. In the case of the Mars 2020 mission,
DOE retains title and responsibility for the MMRTG or LWRHUs. In the event that an
accident were to occur resulting in release of plutonium dioxide from the MMRTG or
LWRHUs, affected property owners within or outside the United States would be eligible

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for compensation for damages to or loss of property arising from the nuclear incident in
accordance with the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act.
In addition to the potential direct costs of radiological surveys, monitoring, and potential
cleanup following an accident, there are potential secondary societal costs associated
with the decontamination and mitigation activities due to launch area accidents. Those
costs may include: temporary or longer term relocation of residents; temporary or longer
term loss of employment; destruction or quarantine of agricultural products, including
citrus crops; land use restrictions; restriction or bans on commercial fishing; and public
health effects and medical care.
The areas that could be contaminated to the extent that these secondary costs would
be incurred are not necessarily the same as the area contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.
For example, the Food and Drug Administration has provided guidelines for crop
contamination intended to ensure contaminated foodstuffs would not endanger the
health and safety of the public. These guidelines, in the form of Derived Intervention
Levels (DILs) identify the level of contamination above which some action
(decontamination, destruction, quarantine, etc.) is required. For potential launch area
accidents, DOE has estimated that the crop area contaminated above the DIL would be
over 50 times smaller than the area contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.
2.6.2.3.3. Mission Risks
To place the estimates of potential health effects due to launch accidents for the
proposed Mars 2020 mission into a perspective that can be compared with other human
undertakings and events, it is useful to use the concept of risk. Risk is commonly
viewed as the possibility of harm or damage. For the Mars 2020 mission, public risk is
characterized in terms of the expectation of health effects in a statistical sense. The risk
for each mission phase and for the overall mission is estimated by multiplying the total
probability of a release by the health effects resulting from that release. Risk calculated
in this manner can also be interpreted as the probability of one or more health effects
occurring in the exposed population.
Population Risks
For Alternative 1 of the Mars 2020 mission, overall population health effects risk from
the release of plutonium dioxide is estimated to be about 1 in 34,000—that is, one
chance in 34,000 of an additional health effect. For accidents that may occur in the
launch area, not everyone within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch site would be potentially
exposed. Who would be potentially exposed is dependent upon several factors,
including the weather conditions at the time of the accident. The total probability of a
health effect within the regional population is about 1 in 61,000, or about 57% of the
total risk for the overall mission. For the global population (excluding those exposed in
the launch area region) the risk would be due to the potential for accidental release
occurring from pre-Launch through Mars trajectory insertion and was estimated to be
about 1 in 79,000, or about 43% of the total risk for the mission.
For Alternative 3 of the Mars 2020 mission, overall population health effects risk from
the release of plutonium dioxide is estimated to be about 1 in 790,000. For accidents

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that may occur in the launch area, only a portion of the total population within 100 km
(62 mi) of the launch site would be potentially exposed. The total probability of a health
effect within the regional population is about 1 in 1,200,000, or about 64% of the total
risk for the overall mission. For the global population (excluding those exposed in the
launch area region) the risk would be due to the potential for accidental release
occurring from pre-Launch through Mars trajectory insertion and was estimated to be
about 1 in 2,200,000, or about 36% of the total risk for the mission.
Individual Risks (Maximum Individual Risks)
Those individuals within the population that might receive the highest radiation
exposures, such as those very close to the launch area, would face very small risks.
The risk to the maximally exposed individual within the regional population is estimated
to be less than one in several million for alternatives 1 and 3 for the Mars 2020 mission.
Most people in the potentially exposed population would have much lower risks.
These risk estimates are small compared to other risks. Annual fatality statistics indicate
that in the year 2010 the average individual risk of accidental death in the United States
was about 1 in 2,600 per year, while the average individual risk of death due to any
disease, including cancer, was about 1 in 130 (see Section 4.1.4.7 of this FEIS for
additional details).
2.6.3 Summary Comparison of the Alternatives
Table 2-13 presents a summary comparison of the Proposed Action (Alternative 1),
Alternative 2, Alternative 3, and the No Action Alternative in terms of each alternative’s
capabilities for operating and conducting science on the surface of Mars, the anticipated
environmental impacts of normal implementation (i.e., a successful launch to Mars) of
each alternative, and the potential environmental impacts in the event of an launch
accident for each alternative.
In terms of operational capabilities, the major difference between the Proposed Action
(Alternative 1), Alternative 2, and Alternative 3 is the length of time the rover would be
expected to survive and successfully operate and conduct science experiments at a
selected landing site. The capability to operate the rover within a broad range of
latitudes is important because doing so maintains NASA’s flexibility to select the most
scientifically interesting location on the surface and fulfill the purpose and need for the
Mars 2020 mission as discussed in Chapter 1 of this FEIS. The No Action Alternative
would not fulfill the purpose and need for the Mars 2020 mission.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

Table 2-13. Summary Comparison of the Mars 2020 Mission Alternatives

Proposed Action Alternative 2 Alternative 3 No Action
(Alternative 1) Alternative
Rover Power MMRTG Solar Array no LWRHUs Solar Array with LWRHUs Not applicable
Alternative
Functional Capable of operating for at Unable to operate for a full year Limited lifetime capability for Not applicable
(a)
Capability least one Mars year at landing at any latitude operating at landing sites
sites between 30° north and 30° between 20° south and 5° south
(a)
south latitudes on Mars latitudes on Mars
Science Capability Capable of accomplishing all Capable of accomplishing up to Capable of accomplishing up to No science
(detailed science objectives at any 33% of science objectives 70% of science objectives due achieved
(b)
comparison in scientifically desirable landing during partial year operation to constrained operations
(b)
Table 2-9) site between 30° north and 30° during winter.
south latitudes
Anticipated Short-term impacts associated Short-term impacts associated Short-term impacts associated No impacts
Environmental with exhaust emissions from with exhaust emissions from with exhaust emissions from
Impacts the launch vehicle during a the launch vehicle during a the launch vehicle during a
normal launch normal launch normal launch
Potential Potential impacts associated Potential impacts associated Potential impacts associated No potential
Environmental with combustion of released with combustion of released with combustion of released impacts
Impacts in the propellants and falling debris propellants and falling debris propellants and falling debris
Event of a Launch Potential radiological impacts Potential radiological impacts
Accident (detail associated with the release of associated with the release of
comparison in some of the PuO2 from the some of the PuO2 from the
Tables 2-11 and 2- MMRTG LWRHUs
12)
(a) These numbers assume a dust factor of 40%. Assuming dust mitigation technology improvements on the MER solar array performance, the
rover (without LWRHUs) is predicted to survive for a full year at latitudes between 0° and 5° south and, with LWRHUs, is predicted to survive for a
full year at latitudes between 20° south and 15° north.
(b) Improved solar array performance from dust mitigation technology would result in a corresponding increase in science capability, expanding
the range of latitudes the rover could operate for a full year.

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 2. Description and Comparison of Alternatives

In terms of environmental impacts, normal implementation of either the Proposed Action

(Alternative 1) or Alternative 2 or 3 would primarily yield short-term impacts to air quality
from the launch vehicle’s exhaust (see Section 2.6.2.1). Should a launch accident occur
for either of these alternatives, potential environmental impacts would be primarily
associated with combustion products from released propellants and from falling debris
(see Section 2.6.2.2). For the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), a launch accident could
result in a release of some of the plutonium dioxide from the MMRTG, which could
potentially result in consequences to human health and the environment (see Section
2.6.2.3). Similarly in Alternative 3, plutonium dioxide could be released from LWRHUs
(see Section 2.6.2.3). For Alternative 2, there would be no radiological environmental
impacts associated with a launch accident. For the No Action Alternative, no
environmental impacts would occur since there would be no launch, but none of the
planned science would be achieved.

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

This chapter of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Mars 2020
mission briefly discusses the local and global areas that could be affected by
implementing the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, Alternative 3, and the
No Action Alternative as described in Chapter 2. This document is a Tier 2 mission-
specific FEIS under NASA’s Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
the Mars Exploration Program (PEIS MEP) (NASA 2005a). The PEIS MEP addressed,
in general, the regional area surrounding Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS)
and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, and the global environment that could
be affected if any of the alternatives in the PEIS were implemented. As a tiered
document, the Mars 2020 FEIS supplements that discussion. Implementing the No
Action Alternative (i.e., discontinue the Mars 2020 mission) would result in no impacts to
the existing environment. Launch of the Mars 2020 mission would take place at CCAFS
or KSC, Brevard County, Florida, during the summer of 2020 launch opportunity. The
next launch opportunity for this mission would occur during the summer of 2022.
The PEIS MEP used other National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation
such as the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (USAF 1998), Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program
(USAF 2000), and institutional documents as principal sources of information to
describe the affected environment. Where relevant, these documents are summarized
in this chapter with the exception where updated documents are noted.
Section 3.1 describes the affected environment at CCAFS and KSC and includes
consideration of the resource areas of Land Use, Air Quality, Noise, Geology and Soils,
Water Quality, Biological and Natural Resources, Socioeconomics, Historical and
Cultural Resources, Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste, Health and Safety,
Environmental Justice and Aesthetics. Section 3.2 provides a general discussion of
areas of the global environment that may be affected by the proposed action.
3.1 CAPE CANAVERAL AIR FORCE STATION AND KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
LOCATION DESCRIPTION
CCAFS is located on the east coast of Florida in Brevard County on a barrier island
called the Canaveral Peninsula. CCAFS is bounded on the west by the Banana River,
on the north by KSC, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the south by Port
Canaveral. CCAFS encompasses an area of approximately 15,800 acres (63.9 square
kilometers, 24.7 square miles).
KSC is located on the east coast of Florida in Brevard County on the north end of Merritt
Island adjacent to Cape Canaveral. KSC is bordered on the west by the Indian River
and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean and CCAFS. The northernmost end of the
Banana River lies between Merritt Island and CCAFS and is included as part of KSC
submerged lands. The southern boundary of KSC runs east west along the Merritt
Island Barge Canal, which connects the Indian River with the Banana River and Port
Canaveral at the southern tip of Cape Canaveral. The northern border lies across
Mosquito Lagoon in Volusia County. The Indian River, Banana River, and the Mosquito

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Lagoon collectively make up the Indian River Lagoon system. The land and lagoon
areas encompass approximately 139,400 acres (564.1 square kilometers, 217.8 square
miles) (NASA 2010). The CCAFS and KSC area are illustrated in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. CCAFS and NASA/KSC Locations

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

3.1.1 Land Use

NASA has devised eleven land use categories to describe the regions within which
various types of operational or support activities are conducted. These land use
categories are Launch, Launch Support, Airfield Operations, Spaceport Management,
Research and Development, Public Outreach, Seaport, Recreation, Conservation,
Agriculture, and Open Space.
Only a very small part of the total acreage of KSC has been developed or designated
for NASA operational and industrial use. Merritt Island consists of prime habitat for
unique and endangered wildlife; therefore, in 1972 NASA entered into an agreement
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to establish a wildlife preserve, known
as the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge (MINWR), within the boundaries of KSC.
Public Law 93-626 created the Canaveral National Seashore (CNS); thereby, an
agreement with the Department of the Interior (DOI) was also entered into in 1975 due
to the location of CNS within KSC boundaries (NASA 2010).
Land use is carefully planned and managed at KSC to provide required support for
missions and to maximize protection of the environment. NASA maintains operational
control of approximately 4,212 acres (17.0 square kilometers, 6.6 square miles) at KSC
and this area comprises the functional area dedicated to NASA operations. NASA's two
primary developed areas at KSC are Launch Complex (LC)-39 in the north and the
centrally located Industrial Area. Approximately 70 percent of the NASA operational
control area is developed land dedicated as facility sites, roads, lawns, and right-of way.
The remaining undeveloped areas are dedicated safety zones or are held in reserve for
planned and future expansion (NASA 2010).
Land uses at CCAFS include launch operations, launch and range support, airfield, port
operations, station support area, and open space. The launch operations land use
category is present along the Atlantic Ocean shoreline and includes active and inactive
launch sites and support facilities. The launch and range support area is west of the
launch operations area and is divided into two sections by the airfield. The airfield
includes a single runway, taxiways, and apron, and is in the central part of the station.
The port operations area is in the southern part of the station and includes facilities for
commercial and industrial activities. The major industrial area is located in the center of
the western portion of the station. This area also includes administration, recreation,
and range-support facilities. Open space is dispersed throughout the station. There are
no public beaches located on CCAFS. All land uses at CCAFS are under the
operational control of the USAF 45th SW, located at Patrick Air Force Base (PAFB)
(NASA 2011).
The proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched either on a Delta IV launch vehicle
from SLC-37 located on the northeastern section of CCAFS; an Atlas V launch vehicle
from SLC-41 located in the northernmost section of CCAFS; or a Falcon Heavy launch
vehicle from LC-39 located on the north end of Cape Canaveral at the Shuttle launch
complex.

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3.1.2 Air Resources

3.1.2.1. Climate
The climate of CCAFS and KSC is subtropical with short, mild winters and hot, humid
summers, with no recognizable spring or fall seasons. Summer weather usually begins
in April and prevails for about nine months of the year. During this period, dawns are
normally slightly cloudy or hazy, with little wind and temperatures near 70 degrees
Fahrenheit (°F). During the day, the temperature rises into the 80s and 90s °F. A typical
day is mostly sunny, with scattered white clouds. Thundershowers tend to lower the
local temperatures, followed by an ocean breeze. The dominant weather pattern (May
to October) is characterized by southeast winds, which travel clockwise around the
Bermuda High. The southeast wind brings moisture and warm air, which helps produce
almost daily thundershowers creating a wet season. Approximately 70 percent of the
average annual rainfall occurs during this period. Occasional cool days occur in
November, with winter weather starting in January and extending through February and
March. These last two months are usually windy with temperatures ranging from about
40°F at night to 75°F during the day. Weather patterns in the dry season (November to
April) are influenced by cold continental air masses. Rains occur when these masses
move over the Florida peninsula and meet warmer air. In contrast to localized, heavy
thundershowers in the wet season, rains are light and tend to be uniform in distribution
in the dry season (NASA 1979).
The main factors influencing climate at CCAFS and KSC are latitude and proximity to
the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian and Banana Rivers, which moderate temperature
fluctuations (NASA 2010). Results of the Cape Atmospheric Boundary Layer
Experiment found that wind direction, especially the sea breeze front, is controlled by
thermal differences between the Atlantic Ocean, Banana River, Indian River, and Cape
Canaveral’s land mass. Heat is gained and lost more rapidly from land than water.
During a 24-hour period, water may be warmer and again cooler than adjacent land.
Cool air replaces rising warm air creating offshore (from land to ocean) breezes in the
night and onshore (from ocean to land) breezes in the day. These sea breezes have
been recorded at altitudes of 3,281 feet (1000 m) and higher, and reach further inland
during the wet season. Seasonal wind directions are primarily influenced by continental
temperature changes. In general, the fall winds occur predominantly from the east to
northeast. Winter winds occur from the north to northwest shifting to the southeast in the
spring and then to the south in the summer months (NASA 1979).

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3.1.2.2. Air Quality

CCAFS and KSC are located in an area classified as in attainment for all the federal
and state criteria pollutants listed in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. State and Federal Ambient Air Quality Standards
Pollutant Average Time State of Florida Federal Primary Federal Secondary
Standard NAAQS NAAQS
a
Carbon Monoxide 8-hour 9 ppm 9 ppm N/A
a
1-hour 35 ppm 35 ppm N/A
Lead Quarterly 1.5 μg/m3 1.5 μg/m3 1.5 μg/m3
b
3-Month 1.5 μg/m3 0.15 μg/m3 0.15 μg/m3
Nitrogen Dioxide Annual 0.053 ppm 0.053 ppm 0.053 ppm
d
1-hour 0.10 ppm 0.10 ppm 0.10 ppm
h
Ozone 8-hour 0.075 ppm 0.075 ppm 0.075 ppm
i
1-hour N/A 0.12 ppm 0.12 ppm
e
Particulate Matter 24-hour 15 μg/m3 150 μg/m3 150 μg/m3
(PM10)
f
Particulate Matter Annual 15 μg/m3 15 μg/m3 15 μg/m3
(PM2.5) 24-hour
g
N/A 35 μg/m3 35 μg/m3
Sulfur Dioxide Annual 0.02 ppm 0.03 ppm 0.5 ppm
a
24-hour 0.10 ppm 0.14 ppm 0.14 ppm
j
1-hour N/A 0.075 ppm N/A
3-hour 0.5 ppm N/A 0.5 ppm
Source: NASA 2010, NASA 2011, KSC 2014.

a. Not to be exceeded more than once per year. b. Final rule signed October 15, 2008. c. Annual mean. d. 98th percentile averaged over 3
years. e. Annual 4th highest daily maximum 8-hour concentration averaged over 3 years. f. Not to be exceeded more than once per year on
average over 3 years. g. Annual mean averaged over 3 years. h. 99th percentile of 1-hour daily maximum concentrations averaged over 3
years. i. EPA revoked the 1-hour ozone standard in all areas, although some areas have continuing obligations under that standard (“anti-
backsliding”); the standard is attained when the expected number of days per calendar year with maximum hourly average concentrations
above 0.12 ppm is <1. j. The 3-year average of 99th percentile of daily maximum 1-hour average must not exceed 75 ppb.

3.1.2.3. Ozone Depleting Substances

The Clean Air Act amendments established a deadline of 2000 for the phase-out of the
production of the Class I Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), halons, and carbon tetrachloride; and phase-out by 2002 for methyl chloroform.
Under the Montreal Protocol, the U.S. must also phase-out its use of Class II ODS
(hydrochlorofluorocarbons) by 2030.
In 1993, Executive Order 12843 directed Federal agencies to minimize the procurement
of products containing ODS. The NASA policy requires that NASA minimize the
procurement of ODS in anticipation of the phase-out of ODS production.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

3.1.2.4. Risk Management Program 40 CFR 68

At KSC, monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) is the only listed regulated substance for
accidental release prevention under its Risk Management Program (NASA 2010).
3.1.3 Noise
Ambient noise levels at CCAFS and KSC range from quiet (40 dBA) in isolated areas to
75 dBA or more due to infrequent launch activities, aircraft movement, and other
support-related activities (NASA 1998). Noise generated at CCAFS and KSC by day-to-
day operations can be attributed to five general sources: (1) launches, (2) aircraft
movements, (3) industrial operations, (4) construction, and (5) traffic noise (NASA
2010). The closest residential areas to CCAFS are to the south, in the cities of Cape
Canaveral and Cocoa Beach. The closest residential area to LC-39 at KSC is to the
west, in the city of Titusville. Infrequent aircraft fly-over and rocket launches from
CCAFS and KSC would be expected to increase noise levels for short periods of time.
The highest recorded levels were produced by launches of the Space Shuttle, which in
the launch vicinity could exceed 160 dBA. Sonic booms produced during vehicle ascent
typically occur over the Atlantic Ocean and are directed in front of the vehicle and do not
impact land areas (USAF 1998, NASA 2011).
3.1.4 Soils and Geology
3.1.4.1. Soils
The KSC and CCAFS soil pattern is complex and not all of the same age. Soils on Cape
Canaveral, False Cape, and the barrier island section on the east side of Mosquito
Lagoon are younger than those of Merritt Island, and therefore have had less time to
weather. Well-drained soil series (e.g., Palm Beach, Canaveral) in these areas still
retain shell fragments in the upper layers, while those inland on Merritt Island (e.g.,
Paola, Pomello) do not. The presence of shell fragments influences soil nutrient levels,
particularly calcium and magnesium, and pH.
Differences in age and parent material account for some soil differences, but on
landscapes of Merritt Island with similar age, topography has a dramatic effect on soil
formation. Relatively small elevation changes cause dramatic differences in the position
of the water table that, in turn, affect leaching, accumulation of organic matter, and
formation of soil horizons. In addition, proximity to the lagoon systems influences soil
salinity.
Soils at CCAFS/KSC are highly permeable and allow water to quickly percolate into the
ground and have a high buffering capacity (NASA 1998). No prime or unique farmland
is present at CCAFS/KSC (USAF 1998).
3.1.4.2. Geology
The eastern edge of Merritt Island at its contact with the Mosquito Lagoon and the
Banana River forms a relict cape aligned with False Cape. Multiple dune ridges
represent successive stages in this growth. It is suggested that the geologic history of
the Merritt Island-Cape Canaveral barrier island was complex. The western portion of

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

Merritt Island is substantially older than the east and erosion has reduced the western
side to a nearly level plain (NASA 2010).
3.1.4.3. Seismology
Seismological investigations of the Cape Canaveral area include refraction surveys and
well logs. Investigations, conducted by the Seismological Branch of the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey, showed that the Cape Canaveral underground structure is normal and
free of voids or anomalies. The Florida Platform exhibits high seismologic stability with
very few confirmed earthquakes (NASA 2010).
3.1.5 Water Quality
3.1.5.1. Surface Water Classification
The major water bodies surrounding KSC and CCAFS include the Atlantic Ocean and
the inland estuary consisting of the Indian River, the Banana River, and the Mosquito
Lagoon. The inland estuary has been designated as an Estuary of National
Significance, and contains Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) and Aquatic Preserves.
Freshwater inputs to the estuary include direct precipitation, storm water runoff,
discharges from impoundments, and groundwater seepage (NASA 2010).
Surface drainage within CCAFS launch areas is generally westward toward the Banana
River. CCAFS/KSC launch areas do not lie within the 100-year floodplain and are not
within a wetland (USAF 2002). LC-39A is also outside the 500-year floodplain (KSC
2014). There are no National or state-designated wild or scenic rivers on or near KSC or
CCAFS (NPS 2005, FS 258.501).
3.1.5.2. Surface Water Quality
Surface water quality at CCAFS/KSC is considered to be generally good. Historically,
the best areas of water quality are adjacent to the undeveloped areas of the lagoon,
such as the north Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon, and the northernmost portion of the
Indian River. However, since 2011, the overall water quality of the waters surrounding
KSC has been markedly impacted. The likely cause for these impacts is related to the
presence of two large and persistent algal blooms in the area. The first bloom occurred
from early spring through late fall of 2011. This bloom covered a large portion of the
northern Indian River Lagoon basin, mainly the Indian River lagoon proper and Banana
River, and included the waters surrounding KSC. The second large bloom occurred
during the summer of 2012. Unlike the bloom of 2011, which began in the Banana River
Lagoon before spreading to the northern Indian River Lagoon and Mosquito Lagoon, the
2012 bloom started in the southern Mosquito Lagoon in July, then spread into the
northern Indian River Lagoon. These blooms decreased water clarity and overall quality,
which negatively impacted seagrass growth and distribution. The marked decline of
seagrass (approximately 90%) during this bloom has been documented for much of the
central Indian River and the majority of the Banana River, including the KSC long-term
monitoring sites and the St John’s River Water Management District long-term seagrass
sites (KSC 2014).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

The Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), in compliance with the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Numeric Criteria Standards for pollutants, has
set total maximum daily loadings (TMDLs) for many impaired waters in the State. The
following waters within the boundary or adjoining KSC are identified as impaired:
 Atlantic Ocean (Brevard County, Volusia County): mercury in fish tissue
 Indian River (Brevard County): mercury in fish tissue, copper, nickel, and
nutrients
 Banana River (Brevard County): mercury in fish tissue and nutrients
 Mosquito Lagoon (Brevard County, Volusia County): mercury in fish tissue.
Basin Management Action Plans (BMAPs), addressing the first five years of a 15-year
restoration period for the Banana River Lagoon and the North Indian River Lagoon,
have been developed and adopted. These BMAPs address nutrient and dissolved
oxygen impairment (KSC 2014). In addition, a statewide TMDL for mercury has been
adopted by the state of Florida and approved by the U.S. EPA (Gao 2014).

3.1.5.3. Groundwater Sources

There are three aquifer systems underlying CCAFS and KSC: the surficial aquifer
system, the intermediate aquifer system, and the Floridan aquifer system. The surficial
aquifer system, which is generally comprised of sand and marl, is under unconfined
conditions and is approximately 21 m (68.9 ft) thick. The water table in the aquifer is
generally 1 m (3.3 ft) or less below the ground surface. A confining unit composed of
clays, sands, and limestone separates the surface aquifer from the underlying Floridan
aquifer. The Floridan aquifer is the primary source of potable water in central Florida.
These two main aquifers are separated by nearly impermeable confining units and
contain three shallow aquifers referred to as the intermediate aquifer system.
Groundwater in the Floridan aquifer at CCAFS and KSC is highly mineralized. CCAFS
and KSC receive their potable water from the city of Cocoa, which utilizes water from
the Floridan aquifer (USAF 1998).
3.1.5.4. Coastal Zone Management
NASA is responsible for making consistency determinations and obtaining concurrence
from the respective state coastal zone management agency for NASA-approved or
funded actions within the coastal zone. The USAF is responsible for making the coastal
zone consistency determinations for its activities within the state. The Florida
Department of Community Affairs reviews the coastal zone consistency determination
(USAF 1998). The state of Florida’s coastal zone includes the area encompassed by all
of the state’s 67 counties and its territorial seas.
Activities at CCAFS/KSC, which are likely to require consistency determinations with the
state’s Coastal Zone Management Program, include any project subject to state or
federal dredge and fill permitting review; any point or new non-point source discharge to
surface waters; and major industrial expansion or development projects. Consistency
review is typically addressed in NEPA documentation and submitted to the Governor’s

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

Office for review via the Intergovernmental Coordination and Review Process (NASA
2010).
3.1.6 Biological and Natural Resources
Biological resources include native and introduced plants and animals within an area
potentially affected by the proposed activity. These are divided into vegetation, wildlife,
threatened or endangered species, and sensitive habitats. Sensitive habitats include,
but are not limited to, wetlands, plant communities that are unusual or of limited
distribution, and important seasonal use areas for wildlife. They also include critical
habitat as protected by the Endangered Species Act and sensitive ecological areas as
designated by state or federal rulings.
Because CCAFS and KSC are located near the coastline, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA) applies. The MMPA prohibits, with certain exceptions, the “take”
of marine mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. citizens on the high seas, and
importation of marine mammals and marine mammal products into the United States.
The term “take” means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt,
capture, or kill any marine mammal (NASA 2011).
CCAFS and KSC occupy a combined total of about 62,753 hectares (ha) (155,066 ac)
of coastal habitat on a barrier island complex that parallels Florida’s mid-Atlantic coast.
The area of interest for biological resources consists of CCAFS and KSC, the adjacent
Atlantic Ocean, and three major inland water bodies, including the Banana and Indian
Rivers and Mosquito Lagoon. The region has several terrestrial and aquatic
conservation and special designation areas (e.g., wildlife management areas and
aquatic preserves). These areas serve as wildlife habitat and occupy about 25 percent
(about 405,000 ha (1,000,000 ac)) of the total land and water area within the region.
3.1.6.1. Vegetation, Wetland, and Wildlife Resources
At CCAFS/KSC, coastal scrub and associated woodlands provide habitat for mammals,
including the white-tailed deer, armadillo, bobcat, feral hog, raccoon, long-tailed weasel,
round-tailed muskrat, and the Florida mouse (a state species of special concern).
Resident and migrating bird species include numerous common land and shore birds.
The most common types of wetlands and open water areas at CCAFS/KSC are
mangrove wetlands, salt marshes, freshwater wetlands, brackish water impoundments,
borrow pits, and drainage canal systems (USAF 2008).
Amphibians observed at CCAFS and KSC include the spade-foot and eastern narrow-
mouth toads, squirrel and southern leopard frogs, and green tree frogs. Reptiles
observed include the American alligator, the Florida box turtle, the gopher tortoise, the
Florida softshell turtle, the green anole lizard, the six-lined racerunner lizard, the
broadhead skink lizard, the southern ringneck snake, the everglades racer snake, the
eastern coachwhip snake, and the mangrove salt marsh snake (NASA 2011).
3.1.6.2. Aquatic Resources
The aquatic environment surrounding CCAFS and KSC provides diverse fish habitat,
which supports many shore bird species, and sport, commercial, and recreational

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

fishing. The Atlantic beaches at CCAFS, KSC, and the CNS are important to nesting
sea turtles. The Mosquito Lagoon is considered one of the best oyster and clam
harvesting areas on the east coast.
Marine mammals populate the coastal and lagoon waters, including the bottlenose
dolphin, the spotted dolphin, and the manatee. The seagrass beds in the northern
Indian River system provide important nursery areas, shelter, and foraging habitat for a
wide variety of fish, invertebrates, and manatees. The inland rivers and lagoons provide
habitat for marine worms, mollusks, and crustaceans. The Mosquito Lagoon is an
important shrimp nursery area.
A number of saltwater fish species can be found within the Indian and Banana River
systems, including the bay anchovy, pipefish, goby, silver perch, lined sole, spotted sea
trout, and oyster toadfish. The small freshwater habitats found on CCAFS and KSC
contain bluegill, garfish, largemouth bass, killifishes, sailfin molly, and top minnow
(USAF 1998).
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, as
amended, mandates the conservation of essential fish habitat (EFH). Ocean waters off
KSC have several areas designated as EFH that are of particular importance to sharks
and other game fish, as well as several species of lobsters, shrimp, and crabs. These
habitats include sandy shoals of capes and offshore bars, high profile rocky bottom and
barrier island ocean-side waters from the surf to the shelf break zone, and the Gulf
Stream shoreward, including areas containing Sargassum plant species. In addition, the
northern boundary of Oculina Bank, a unique strip of coral reefs not duplicated
elsewhere on Earth, is located approximately 37 km (23 mi) off of Cape Canaveral. The
entire reef is 145 km (90 mi) long. There are restrictions on many types of fishing in
most of the area; fishing for snapper and grouper species is prohibited in part of the
area (KSC 2014).
Regional Fishery Management Officials (FMOs) are responsible for designating EFH in
their management plans for all managed species within the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ), which is a managed fisheries area that extends from the shoreline to 200 miles
offshore along the coastline of U.S. waters. For the marine area surrounding CCAFS
and PAFB, the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council (SAFMC) is the managing
body. The SAFMC currently manages several types of organisms in the vicinity of Cape
Canaveral and PAFB: the South Atlantic Snapper-Grouper complex, South Atlantic
shrimps, Coastal Migratory Pelagic species, Highly Migratory species, Red Drum, Spiny
Lobster, Golden Crab, Calico Scallop, and Sargassum. The National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) defines EFH for highly migratory species under its jurisdiction. Habitat
Areas of Particular Concern (HAPCs) have also been designated within EFH areas;
these are localized areas that are vulnerable to degradation or are especially important
ecologically. HAPCs are located within the estuary systems of PAFB and CCAFS for
penaid shrimp. The Oculina Bank near Cape Canaveral also serves as a HAPC for
nursery habitat and refuge for rock shrimp (USAF 2008).
The USAF has a programmatic consultation in place with the NMFS on EFH regarding
Atlas V and Delta IV launches from CCAFS (USAF 2000). Similar consultations for

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

commercial Falcon Heavy launches would be expected to be in place before a possible

Mars 2020 launch.
3.1.6.3. Threatened and Endangered Species
The USFWS currently recognizes 112 endangered or threatened and 22 candidate
animal and plant species in the state of Florida (FWS 2014). The state of Florida
considers 118 animal species as threatened, endangered, or of special concern
(FFWCC 2014) and 55 plant species as threatened or endangered (FDACS 2014) for
the state. Table 3-2 provides a list of Threatened, Endangered, and Candidate Species
Occurring on or Around CCAFS and KSC.
CCAFS and KSC have management plans in place for conservation of threatened or
endangered species (e.g., Scrub Jay Operational Management Plan, Sea Turtle
Operational Management Plan, exterior lighting management plans to minimize impacts
from nighttime lights on sea turtle nesting beaches, designated manatee refuges, and
sanctuaries in selected inland waterways) (USAF 2001, USAF 2008). In addition to
protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the wood stork, piping plover,
roseate tern, and Florida scrub jay receive protection under the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act (MBTA) (NASA 2010).
Table 3-2. Threatened, Endangered, and Candidate Species Occurring or
Potentially Occurring on or Around CCAFS and KSC, Florida
Federal State
Common Name Scientific Name Status Status

Plants
a
Beach-star Remirea maritima – E
a
Coastal mock vervain Glandulareia maritima – E
a
Curtiss' milkweed Asclepias curtissii – E
a
Florida lantana Lantana depressa var. floridana – E
a
Hand fern Ophioglossum palmatum – E
a
Scaevola Inkberry Scaevola plumieri – T
a
Nakedwood, Simpson’s Stopper Myrcianthes fragrans – T
a
Nodding pinweed Lechea cernua – T
a
Sand dune spurge Chamaesyce cumulicola – E
a
Satin-leaf Chrysophyllum oliviforme – E
a
Sea lavender Argusia gnaphalodes – E
a
Shell mound prickly-pear cactus Opuntia stricta – T
Reptiles and Amphibians
American alligator Alligator mississippiensis T(S/A) T(S/A)
*
Atlantic (Kemp’s) Ridley sea turtle Lepidochelys kempi E E
Atlantic green turtle Chelonia mydas E E
b
Atlantic saltmarsh snake Nerodia clarkia taeniata T
Eastern indigo snake Drymarchon corais couperi T T
Florida gopher frog Lithobates capito aesopus – SSC
Florida pine snake Pituophis melanoleucus mugitus – SSC
Gopher tortoise Gopherus polyphemus C T
*
Hawksbill sea turtle Eretmochelys imbricata E E

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Federal State
Common Name Scientific Name Status Status
Leatherback sea turtle Dermochelys coriacea E E
Atlantic loggerhead sea turtle Caretta caretta T T
a
Alligator Snapping Turtle Macrochelys temminckii SSC
Birds
a
American oystercatcher Haematopus palliatus – SSC
Black skimmer Rynchops niger – SSC
Brown pelican Pelecanus occidentalis – SSC
Florida scrub jay Aphelocoma coerulescens T T
Least tern Sterna antillarum – T
Little blue heron Egretta caerulea – SSC
Piping plover Charadrius melodus T T
Reddish egret Egretta rufescens – SSC
Roseate spoonbill Ajaia ajaja – SSC
a
Roseate tern Sterna dougallii dougallii T T
Snowy egret Egretta thula – SSC
Southeastern American kestrel Falco sparverius paulus – T
Tricolored heron Egretta tricolor – SSC
White ibis Eudocimus albus – SSC
Wood stork Mycteria americana E E
a
Audubon’s Crested Caracara Poyborus plancus audubonii T
a
Snowy Plover Charadrius alexandrinus T
b
Bald Eagle Haliaeetus leucocephalus P
Mammals
Florida mouse Podomys floridanus – SSC
Northern right whale* Eubalaena glacialis E E
Southeastern beach mouse Peromyscus polionotus niveiventris T T
West Indian manatee Trichechus manatus latirostris E E
Fish
Smalltooth Sawfish* Pristis pectinata E E
Sources: NASA 2010; USAF 2007, Dankert 2014a

a. Only found at CCAFS.

b Not observed at CCAFS.
* Does not occur on CCAFS property but occurs in waters adjacent to and required to consult for
potential impacts to these species from CCAFS actions.
Key: C = candidate for Federal listing; E = endangered; SSC = State species of special concern; (S/A) = similarity of
appearance to a listed species; T = threatened; P = Protected under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.

3.1.6.4. Sensitive Habitats

Sensitive habitats on CCAFS and KSC include wetlands, critical habitats for threatened
and endangered species as defined by the ESA, and the nearby CNS and MINWR. The
MINWR contains a large number of manatees. Manatee critical habitat, located in the
Banana River system, includes the entire inland sections of the Indian and Banana
rivers, and most of the waterways between the two rivers.

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

Legally designated critical habitat for the northern right whale (Eubalaena glacialis) is
located along the CCAFS/KSC coast and extends east for 9.3 km (5.8 mi); right whales
are occasionally observed between December and March (KSC 2014).

Threatened or endangered species that inhabit the scrubby flatwoods of Merritt Island
include the Florida scrub jay and the eastern indigo snake. The southern bald eagle, a
federally protected species under the MBTA, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act,
and the Lacey Act, is also known to occur in this area (KSC 2014).
The Indian River Lagoon area (Indian River, Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon) is
home to more than 5,300 kinds of plants and animals. The lagoon has a gradation of
brackish water to salt water where it opens to the ocean. It is listed as an Estuary of
National Significance and contains more species than any other estuary in North
America (2,965 animals, 1,350 plants, 700 fish, and 310 birds). It also provides
important migratory bird habitat. The lagoon contains one of the highest densities of
nesting turtles in the western hemisphere, is a rich fishery, and is used by up to one
third of the United States’ manatee population (USAF 1998).
The Atlantic beaches are important to nesting sea turtles. Disorientation of marine
turtles related to lighting from nighttime space operations has occurred at CCAFS and
KSC in the past; however, CCAFS and KSC both have a light management plan that
addresses mitigation of impacts to nesting sea turtles during nighttime launches (USAF
2001, KSC 2014).
3.1.7 Socioeconomics and Children’s Environmental Health and Safety
The surrounding counties of CCAFS and KSC include Brevard County, Flagler County,
Indian River County, Lake County, Orange County, Osceola County, Polk Seminole
County, and Volusia County. The socioeconomic resources in this region include the
population, economy, transportation system, public and emergency services, and
recreational opportunities. Under EO 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks, dated April 21, 1997, federal agencies are encouraged
to consider potential impacts of proposed actions on the safety or environmental health
of children. Socioeconomic resources and EO 13045 are discussed below.
3.1.7.1. Population
The census population in 2010 and projected populations for 2012 and 2020 for the
nine-county region are presented in Table 3-3 (USBC 2013a). The city of Cape
Canaveral, the nearest community to CCAFS and KSC, has a population of roughly
9,912 (2010), and is located on the south side of Port Canaveral. Titusville with 43,761
(2010) residents and Merritt Island with 34,763 (2010) residents are located to the west
of CCAFS and KSC. In addition, Palm Bay and the Melbourne area, which are
communities to the south of CCAFS, have populations of between 80,000 and 100,000
(USBC 2013a).
People belonging to the following population groups reside within this region: white,
black or African American, American Indian, Alaska native, Asian, native Hawaiian and
other Pacific Islander, some other race, two or more races, and Hispanic or Latino (of
any race) (USBC 2013c).

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Table 3-3 presents the total population in 2010 and the projected total populations for
2012 and 2020 for each of the counties in the nine-county region. Table 3-4 presents
the minority population in 2010 and the projected minority population for 2020 for the
respective counties.
Table 3-3. Population of the Nine-County Region
Census Population Projected Population Projected Population 2020
Geographic Area 2010 2012
Florida 18,801,310 19,317,568 21,528,304
County
Brevard 543,376 547,307 563,317
Flagler 95,696 98,359 109,773
Indian River 138,028 140,567 151,199
Lake 297,052 303,186 329,015
Orange 1,145,956 1,202,234 1,456,375
Osceola 268,685 287,416 376,341
Polk 602,095 616,158 675,772
Seminole 422,718 430,838 464,908
Volusia 494,593 496,950 506,491
Nine-County Region 4,008,119 4,123,015 4,633,191
Source: Adapted from USBC 2013a, c
Note: Projected population values do not represent absolute limits to growth. For any county, the future population may be above or below
the projected value.

Table 3-4. Minority Population of the Nine-County Region

Projected Projected Projected Projected
Minority Percent Minority Percent Minority Percent
Geographic Population Minority Population Minority Population Minority
Area 2010 2010 2012 2012 2020 2020
Florida 4,692,148 25.0% 4,575,052 23.7% 5,098,629 23.7%
County
Brevard 92,449 17.0% 90,401 16.5% 93,046 16.5%
Flagler 16,986 17.7% 20,485 20.8% 22,862 20.8%
Indian River 21,682 15.7% 19,898 14.2% 21,403 14.2%
Lake 53,428 18.0% 49,126 16.2% 53,311 16.2%
Orange 417,161 36.4% 424,732 35.3% 514,516 35.3%
Osceola 78,044 29.0% 72,216 25.1% 94,559 25.1%
Polk 149,241 24.8% 129,743 21.1% 142,296 21.1%
Seminole 92,054 21.8% 82,176 19.1% 88,674 19.1%
Volusia 86,337 17.5% 83,324 16.8% 84,924 16.8%
Nine-County
Region 1,007,382 25.1% 972,101 23.6% 1,115,591 24.1%
Source: Adapted from USBC 2013a, c

Note: Projected population values do not represent absolute limits to growth. For any county, the future population may be above or below
the projected value.

According to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ 1997), people whose incomes
are less than the poverty threshold are defined as low-income. Data from Census 2010
(USBC 2013a) shows that 13.7 percent of the population living within the nine counties

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

reported incomes below the poverty threshold; this percentage is lower than those
reported by Florida (14.7 percent) and the United States (14.3 percent).
3.1.7.2. Economy
An estimated 1,858,000 people were employed in the nine-county region in 2012 with
an estimated unemployment rate of 8.8 percent (BEBR 2014).
The region's economic base is tourism and manufacturing, with tourism attracting more
than 20 million visitors annually. Multiple theme parks, along with KSC, are among the
most popular tourist attractions in the state. In 2010, 1.5 million out-of-state tourists
visited the KSC Visitor Complex (NASA 2010c). In addition, the cruise and cargo
industries at Port Canaveral contribute to the central Florida economy.
Industrial sectors in the region that provided significant employment in 2000 included:
education, health and social services; arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation
and food services; retail trade; and professional, scientific, management, administrative,
and waste management services (USBC 2000c).
The employment pool at CCAFS includes about 10,000 military and civilian personnel,
all associated with the USAF (USAF 2013). Military personnel are attached to the
45th Space Wing at PAFB, which is approximately 32 km (20 mi) south of CCAFS. A
majority of the employed are contractor personnel from companies associated with
missile testing and launch vehicle operations.
In FY 2012, of the $17.8 billion NASA budget, $1.3 billion in wages and purchases
within the state of Florida were made by KSC and other NASA centers. For every dollar
spent directly by NASA, about an additional dollar was added to the Florida economy,
resulting in a total economic impact of $2.15 billion for the state. In addition to the jobs
directly associated with KSC (2,100 government workers and 4,900 contractor
employees) an additional 16,500 jobs are supported. While the overall NASA impact
was significantly lower in FY 2012 from its FY 2009 peak, KSC remains the major
economic driver in Brevard County (NASA 2012). The gross state product of the overall
economic activity of Florida for 2012 is estimated to be over $777 billion (BEA 2013).
3.1.7.3. Transportation Systems
The nine-county region is supported by a network of federal, state, and county roads;
rail service; three major airports; and a seaport with cargo and cruise terminals
(USAF 2002). CCAFS has a runway for government aircraft, delivery of launch vehicle
components, and airfreight associated with the operation of CCAFS launch complexes.
3.1.7.4. Public and Emergency Services
Emergency medical services for CCAFS and KSC personnel are provided at the
Occupational Health Facility and Emergency Aid Clinic at KSC. These facilities are
staffed by medical personnel specially trained in the treatment of hazards associated
with the facilities and operations at CCAFS and KSC. A Memorandum of Understanding
for emergency treatment has been established with a network of hospitals in the region
(NASA 2010).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Fire protection at KSC/CCAFS includes a comprehensive program of fire protection

engineering, fire prevention, fire suppression and emergency response operations.
Specialized equipment and training, suited to the potential fire and emergency hazards
of operations, are provided. Three fire stations, one located in the Shuttle Landing
Facility/Vehicle Assembly Building Area, one at Pads 39A and 39B, and the other
located in the Industrial Area, provide effective coverage for all of KSC/CCAFS.
Coordination support agreements between KSC/CCAFS and local municipalities
provide for reciprocal support in the event of an emergency or disaster (NASA 2010).
Security forces maintain road access control gates and patrol the KSC/CCAFS
perimeter boundary and have coordination agreements to support local municipalities in
the event of an emergency or disaster. CCAFS and the Brevard County Office of
Emergency Management have agreements for communications and early warning in
the event of a launch accident (NASA 2010).
Range Safety at CCAFS monitors launch surveillance areas to ensure that risks to
people, aircraft, and surface vessels are within acceptable limits. Control areas and
airspace are closed to the public as required. The USAF is responsible for
disseminating a “Notice to Aviators” through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);
and air traffic in a FAA-designated area around the launch corridor is controlled. The
USAF also ensures that a “Notice to Mariners” is disseminated within a predetermined
impact debris corridor beginning 10 working days prior to a launch. The U.S. Coast
Guard transmits marine radio broadcast warnings to inform vessels of the effective
closure time for the sea impact debris corridor. Warning signs are posted in various Port
Canaveral areas for vessels leaving port (USAF 2004). In addition, PAFB maintains an
Internet website and toll-free telephone number with launch hazard area information for
mariners, and restricted airspace information for pilots.
CCAFS/KSC obtain their potable water from the city of Cocoa water system. The water
distribution systems at CCAFS and KSC are sized to accommodate the short-term high-
volume flows required for launches.
3.1.7.5. Recreation
There is an abundance of public recreational opportunities in the nine-county region
with beaches, waterways, lakes, open land, and parks. Within the confines of CCAFS,
access to recreational areas and facilities is limited to CCAFS personnel.
3.1.7.6. Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
The nearest location to the proposed launch areas with a moderate concentration of
children is the KSC Child Development Center located at least 9.6 km (6.0 miles) away.
This is a childcare center with pre-school service available for children ages six weeks
to five years old. There are no other schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, or other
places where there is a concentration of children in proximity to CCAFS/KSC.

3.1.8 Cultural and Historic Resources

Cultural resources include prehistoric and historic sites, archeological sites,
structures/buildings, districts, historic landscapes, objects, artifacts, cemeteries,

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

traditional cultural properties, sacred sites, monuments and memorials, or any other
physical evidence of human activity considered important to a culture or community for
scientific, traditional, religious, or any other reasons.
Eighty-eight archaeological sites have been identified on CCAFS and 24 have been
determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) but
have not been listed. There are numerous historic properties on CCAFS (over 100)
including seven cemeteries/grave sites. In addition, there are six CCAFS contributing
facilities listed as National Historic Landmarks (NHLs). Four are launch complexes and
two are NASA property (LC-5/6 and part of LC-19) and, therefore, are not under the
jurisdiction of CCAFS.
At CCAFS, a number of launch pads are listed on the NRHP and form a National
Historic Landmark District. No NRHP-listed or eligible prehistoric or historic
archaeological sites have been identified at either SLC-37 or SLC-41. However, the
north and south area of SLC-41 is considered a “high” zone of archeological potential
(Dankert 2014b).
In 1973, LC-39 became the first NASA site at KSC to be listed in the NRHP. The
nomination highlighted the national significance of those principal facilities associated
with the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Program. LC-39, built between November 1962
and October 1968, was evaluated as significant in the areas of architecture,
communications, engineering, industry, science, transportation, and space exploration
(NASA 2010).
As of January 2014, a total of 103 historic properties have been identified within KSC,
including 8 historic districts, 32 individually listed or eligible properties, and 69 resources
that are contributing to a historic district, but not individually eligible (Dankert 2014b).
3.1.9 Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Wastes
3.1.9.1. Hazardous Materials Management
Numerous types of hazardous materials are used to support the missions and general
maintenance operations at CCAFS and KSC. Management of hazardous materials,
excluding hazardous fuels, is the responsibility of each individual or organization. Each
organization has a supply organization and uses a “pharmacy” control approach to track
hazardous materials and to minimize hazardous waste generation, thereby minimizing
the use of hazardous materials. The PAFB supply system is the primary method of
purchasing or obtaining hazardous materials. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) requirements are accomplished by the directives listed in the respective permits
issued to KSC/CCAFS as per 45th SW Operation Plan (OPLAN) 32-3 and Kennedy
NASA Procedural Requirement (KNPR 8500.1) (NASA 2010). Liquid propellants would
be stored in tanks near the launch pad within appropriate cement containment basins
and would be managed by a Launch Service Provider.
3.1.9.2. Hazardous Waste Management at CCAFS
Typical hazardous wastes at CCAFS include various solvents, paints and primers,
sealants, photograph-developing solutions, adhesives, alcohol, oils, fuels, and various

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

process chemicals (USAF 1998). Individual contractors and organizations maintain

hazardous waste satellite accumulation points (SAPs) and 90-day hazardous waste
accumulation areas. A maximum of 208 liters (55 gal) per waste stream of hazardous
waste can be accumulated at a SAP. There is no limit to the volume of waste that can
be stored at a 90-day accumulation area, but wastes must be taken to the permitted
storage facility or disposed of offsite within 90 days. The permitted storage facility
(RCRA Part B Permit, Number HO01-255040) is operated within Buildings
44200/44205. The facility is permitted to store hazardous wastes for up to 1 year under
the current Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) permit and is
operated by the launch base support contractor. However, the permit does not allow the
waste storage site facility to store waste hydrazine, MMH, or nitrogen tetroxide (NTO)
(NASA 2011). The 45th SW OPLAN 19-14, Petroleum Products and Hazardous Waste
Management Plan, outlines specific measures for proper collection, and management
and disposal of petroleum products/waste and hazardous/non-hazardous wastes. In the
event of a spill, 45th SW OPLAN 10-2, Vol. 2, 45th SW Hazardous Material Response
Plan provides for appropriate reporting and emergency response to mitigate
environmental and human health impacts (USAF 2008).
3.1.9.3. Hazardous Waste Management at KSC
The main facility operating under the permitted KSC Transportation, Storage, and
Disposal Facility (TSDF) is the Hazardous Waste Storage Facility (K7- 0164 and K7-
0165) in the LC-39 area, which handles liquid and solid hazardous wastes. There are
four cells at this facility each of which is designated and designed for the storage of
specific hazardous wastes. Wastes permitted to be stored include the following:
flammable, organic, toxic waste; caustic, toxic, reactive wastes; acidic waste; and solid
hazardous and controlled wastes.
The quantity of hazardous and controlled waste generated at KSC depends on launch
processing, construction, and associated support activities. As part of KSC’s waste
management and pollution prevention programs, opportunities for waste prevention and
reduction are continually assessed and implemented where cost-effective (NASA 2010).
3.1.9.4. Hazardous Waste Clean up
Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) 008
LC-39A has been designated as SWMU 008. RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI)
activities were performed at LC-39A from early 1998 through mid-2000. In a portion of
the site, groundwater impacts due to volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were
observed; polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), pentachlorophenol, and 2, 4, and
6-trichlorophenol were detected above maximum contaminant levels; and groundwater
cleanup target levels (GCTLs) were established. Surface water inside and outside of the
perimeter fence contained PAHs and metals above surface water cleanup target levels
(SWCTLs); some pesticides were also detected outside the fence line. An interim
measure was conducted in 2000, which removed soils contaminated with
polychlorinated biphenols (PCBs) and PAHs (KSC 2014).
Supplemental RFI activities were performed from mid-2000 through early 2003 to
further evaluate the extent of contamination and potential ecological risks to the

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

environment. As a result, groundwater at LC-39A will not be used as a future source of

drinking water. Groundwater from the pad area discharges to surrounding surface
waters, which are classified as OFW and, therefore, must not receive discharges of
contaminants above background levels. A Corrective Measures Study (CMS) work plan
has been developed to address groundwater contamination at LC-39A. Metals are
present in the swale sediments and a CMS was recommended to evaluate means for
controlling potential off-site migration of these contaminants. There are several
contaminants in site soils that pose an unacceptable risk to future potential residents.
Restrictions are in place for any site work to prevent soils from leaving the area from
which they were excavated. An interim measure was completed in 2009 for
trichloroethylene-contaminated soils in the area west of the LOX tank. This activity
included excavation and disposal of 382 m3 (500 cubic yards) of contaminated soil. A
groundwater plume has been identified in the northwest portion of the pad and is under
investigation (KSC 2014).
Site-wide soil and groundwater sampling at various intervals was conducted between
December 2011 and October 2012 to determine current baseline conditions and further
evaluate contamination resulting from former launch activities. The investigation
confirmed the presence of VOCs in groundwater at concentrations greater than FDEP
GCTLs. Soils were found to exceed the industrial soil cleanup target levels (SCTLs) for
PAHs and PCBs. Additional soil areas have one or more chemicals of concern that
exceed residential SCTLs. These contaminants include arsenic, barium, copper, nickel,
thallium, PAHs, and PCBs (KSC 2014).
3.1.9.5. Pollution Prevention
CCAFS has a Pollution Prevention Program Guide (PPPG) and Pollution Prevention
Management Action Plan. The PPPG establishes the overall strategy, delineates
responsibilities, and specifies objectives for reducing pollution of the ground, air, surface
water, and groundwater (USAF 1998).
KSC has established a Pollution Prevention Working Group to review all aspects of the
KSC Pollution Prevention Program and to identify areas for additional pollution
prevention activities. The team consists of KSC and contractor personnel. The NASA
Acquisition Pollution Prevention Office assists KSC and other NASA centers in
identifying, validating, and implementing less hazardous materials and processes
(NASA 2011).
3.1.10 Health and Safety
The areas in and around CCAFS and KSC could be affected by payload processing,
transport, and launches. The objective of the Range Safety Program is to ensure that
the general public, launch area personnel, foreign landmasses, and launch area
resources are provided an acceptable level of safety, and that all aspects of prelaunch
and launch operations adhere to public laws. Range Safety organizations review,
approve, monitor, and impose safety holds, when necessary, on all prelaunch and
launch operations.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Hazardous materials, such as propellant, ordnance, chemicals, and booster/payload

components, are transported in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation
regulations for interstate shipment of hazardous substances (Title 49 CFR 100-199).
Hazardous materials, such as liquid rocket propellant, are transported in specially
designed containers to reduce the potential risk of an unintentional release should an
accident occur (USAF 1998).
3.1.10.1. Regional Safety
CCAFS, KSC, the City of Cape Canaveral, and Brevard County have a mutual-aid
agreement in the event of an on- or off-station emergency. During launch activities,
CCAFS maintains communication with KSC, Brevard County Emergency Management,
the Florida Marine Patrol, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the State
coordinating agency, Florida Division of Emergency Management. Range Safety
monitors launch surveillance areas to ensure that risk to people, aircraft, and surface
vessels are within acceptable limits. Control areas and airspace are closed to the public
as required (USAF 1998).
Prior to launch of a mission using MMRTGs or LWRHUs, a comprehensive set of plans
would be developed by NASA to ensure that any launch accident could be met with a
well-developed and tested response. NASA's plans would be developed in accordance
with the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and the NRF Nuclear/
Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in coordination with DOE and other Federal
agencies, the state of Florida, Brevard County, and local governmental organizations.
These organizations as well as other federal agencies, as needed, could be involved in
response to a radiological emergency (Scott 2012).
3.1.10.2. On-Station Safety
Launches are postponed if Range Safety models predict undue hazards for persons
and property due to potential dispersion of hazardous materials or propagation of blast
overpressure in the event of a launch vehicle flight termination. The 45th SW has
prepared detailed procedures to be used to control toxic gas hazards. Atmospheric
dispersion computer models are run to predict toxic hazard corridors (THCs) for both
normal and aborted launches, as well as spills or releases of toxic materials from
storage tanks, or during loading or unloading of tanks. Range Safety uses the THCs to
reduce the risk of exposure of CCAFS and KSC personnel and the general public to
toxic materials, including toxic gases.
For a NASA launch, the Launch Disaster Control Group is a joint NASA/USAF
emergency response team formed prior to each launch and situated at a fallback
location to coordinate emergency response (USAF1998).
The KSC Environmental Justice Plan (KSC 2010) was developed by the Environmental
Office in 1997 and was updated in 2010. The purpose of the Environmental Justice Plan
is to ensure KSC identifies and addresses activities which have disproportionately high
adverse human health or environmental effects on minority or low-income populations in
the surrounding Kennedy Space Center community and that the community participates
in developing policies to prevent these effects.

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

KSC is committed to ensuring that the goals of Environmental Justice Strategy are met.
Moreover, KSC will continue to communicate with and seek the input of local
communities through public meetings, material distributions, information repositories,
community events, open houses, press releases and public education campaigns. To
ensure that members of the community are well informed of potential adverse
environmental impacts from KSC activities, a mailing list with the names of local
officials, community leaders, public interest groups, interested individuals, media, and
community organizations was compiled. The mailing list is updated as changes are
reported (NASA 2010).
3.1.11 Aesthetics
NASA considers the extent to which any lighting or other visual impacts associated with
an action would create an annoyance among people in the vicinity or interfere with their
normal activities. Visual and aesthetic resources refer to natural or developed
landscapes that provide information for an individual to develop their perceptions of the
area. Areas such as coastlines, national parks, and recreation or wilderness areas are
usually considered to have high visual sensitivity. Heavily industrialized urban areas
tend to be the areas of the lowest visual sensitivity. The existing conditions at KSC are
characterized as having low visual sensitivity, because the site is currently an
industrialized area that supports rocket launches. Notable visual structures include the
lightning protection towers at LC-39B. Due to the flat topography and height of the
lightning towers (approximately 161 m (528 ft)), the lightning protection towers can be
seen several miles away. Existing light sources at KSC include nighttime security
lighting at the launch complexes and buildings. NASA has guidelines to address the
light impacts to wildlife species under the KSC Light Management Plan (NASA 2002,
KSC 2014).
3.2 THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
In accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major
Federal Actions, this section provides a general overview of the global environment.
Basic descriptions of the troposphere and stratosphere, global population distribution
and density, distribution of land surface types, and a brief discussion of background
radiation and the global atmospheric inventory of plutonium are included.
3.2.1 Troposphere
The troposphere is the atmospheric layer closest to the Earth's surface where all life
exists and virtually all weather occurs. It extends from the Earth’s surface to a height of
about 6 to 10 km (20,000 to 33,000 ft) (the lower boundary of the stratosphere). The
atmosphere above 900 m (3,000 ft) includes the free troposphere ranging from 900 m
(3,000 ft) to between 2 and 10 km (6,600 to 33,000 ft) in altitude and the stratosphere
extending from 10 km (33,000 ft) to 50 km (164,000 ft). These boundaries should be
taken as approximate annual mean values as the actual level of the boundary between
the troposphere and stratosphere (tropopause) is variable on a seasonal and day-to-day
basis (NASA 2011).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

In general, the troposphere is well mixed and aerosols are removed in a short period of
time (ranging from a few days to a few weeks) as a result of both the mixing within this
layer and scavenging by precipitation. Removal of most emissions from rocket exhaust
products from the troposphere occurs over a period of less than one week, thereby
preventing a buildup of these products on a global level (USAF 1998).
The upper (free) troposphere is characterized by vigorous mixing driven by convective
upwelling, horizontal and vertical winds, as well as transport and washout of gases that
have been introduced into this region by industrial sources. This layer does not contain
any uniquely important atmospheric constituents and it does not generally influence air
quality in the lower troposphere (i.e., atmospheric boundary layer (ABL)). The air
temperature of the ABL decreases with increasing altitude until it reaches the inversion
layer where the temperature increases with increasing altitude. The ABL is considered
the most important boundary layer with respect to the emission, transport, and
dispersion of airborne pollutants. The part of the ABL between Earth’s surface and the
bottom of the inversion layer is known as the mixing layer. Almost all of the airborne
pollutants emitted into the ambient atmosphere are transported and dispersed within the
mixing layer. Some of the emissions penetrate the inversion layer and enter the free
troposphere above the ABL.
Concentrations of gases and particles emitted into the free troposphere by transient
sources, such as launch vehicles, are quickly diluted to very low levels before they can
be deposited onto or transported near the ground by precipitation or strong down-
welling events (NASA 2011).
3.2.2 Stratosphere
The stratosphere extends from the tropopause up to an altitude of approximately 50 km
(31 mi or 164,000 ft). In general, vertical mixing is limited within the stratosphere,
providing little transport between the layers above (mesosphere) and below
(troposphere). The lack of vertical mixing and exchange between these layers provides
for extremely long residence times, on the order of months, causing the stratosphere to
act as a reservoir for certain types of atmospheric pollution (USAF 1998).
The stratospheric ozone absorbs most of the most harmful ultraviolet (UV-B) radiation
from the sun. Depletion of ozone following the introduction of man-made materials can
result in an increase in solar UV radiation on the ground, which can pose a serious
ecological and health hazard. The importance and global nature of the ozone layer
requires a careful consideration of all sources of disturbance (NASA 2011).
Solid and liquid rocket propulsion systems emit a variety of gases and particles directly
into the stratosphere (WMO 1991). A large fraction of these emissions, carbon dioxide
(CO2) for example, is chemically inert and does not affect ozone levels directly. Other
emissions, such as hydrogen chloride (HCl) and water, are not highly reactive, but have
an impact on ozone since these gases participate in chemical reactions that help
determine the concentrations of the ozone-destroying radical gases. A small fraction of
rocket engine emissions are highly reactive radicals. Particulate emissions, such as
aluminum oxide powder and carbon (soot), may mimic or enhance the role of natural
stratospheric particles by enabling or enhancing ozone-related chemical reactions.

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

Greenhouse gases absorb the radiant energy from the Sun and Earth. Some of the
greenhouse gases (e.g., CO2, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and water) are emitted
during the processes of preparing for and launching spacecraft. Other gases (e.g., NOx
and VOCs) emitted from these processes contribute indirectly by forming ozone and
other reactive species that photochemically react with greenhouse gases and control
the radiation’s penetration to the troposphere. Greenhouse gases are thought to
potentially have a negative effect on the ozone protective layer of the atmosphere.
Research on greenhouse gas production (and possible effects of certain related
pollutants, such as pollutants contributing to global warming) is ongoing by the EPA and
some states.
The Montreal Protocol is designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing
out production and consumption of substances that deplete the ozone layer.
Measurements have shown that atmospheric concentrations of ozone-depleting
substances are decreasing, indicating that emissions have been greatly reduced
(EPA 2003).
3.2.3 Orbital and Re-entry Debris
Space debris can be classified as either natural or man-made objects. The measured
amount of man-made debris equals or exceeds that of natural meteoroids at most low-
Earth orbit altitudes (i.e., below 2,000 km (1,200 mi)). Man-made debris consists of
material left in Earth orbit from the launch, deployment, deactivation, and fragmentation
of spacecraft and launch vehicle components. It exists at all inclinations and has the
greatest density at Low Earth Orbit altitudes of approximately 800 to 1,000 km (500 to
625 mi) (UN 1999). Orbital debris moves in many different orbits and directions, at
velocities ranging from 3 to over 8 km/s (1.9 to over 5 mi/s) relative to Earth (NASA-
HDBK 8719.14).
Reentry debris would include non-recoverable items from launch activities such as
jettisoned vehicle stages and solid rocket boosters. Impacts from launch activities are
typically planned to occur in broad ocean areas cleared of shipping or air traffic. Range
Safety is responsible for efforts to reduce the risk to shipping lanes and ensure vessel
activity would be outside the launch and reentry zone (KSC 2014).
There are four statutes relating to marine debris: 1) the Marine Plastic Pollution
Research and Control Act; 2) the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction
Act (MDRPRA); 3) the Shore Protection Act; and 4) the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act, which regulates the ocean disposal of hazardous waste. The most
applicable law governing reentry boosters is the MDRPRA. This Act tasks NOAA and
the U.S. Coast Guard to assess, reduce, and prevent marine debris and its adverse
impacts on the marine environment and navigation safety (KSC 2014).

Space programs managed by U.S. Government organizations are directed to follow the
U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. Commercial operations
are addressed in regulations by the Department of Transportation, the Department of
Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

3.2.4 Global Population Distribution

The distribution of the Earth’s population is an important characteristic in considering
the potential consequences of accident scenarios. For this purpose, global population
statistics and other information are distributed among equal-sized areas (cells) of the
Earth’s surface. The cells are derived by first dividing the Earth from pole to pole into
20 latitude bands of equal area. Each latitude band is then segmented into 36 equal-
sized cells, for a total of 720 cells. Each cell covers an area of 708,438 square
kilometers (273,529 square miles) (HNUS 1992).
The total population of the Earth in 2020 is projected to be approximately 7.7 billion
people (Lipinski 2014a). Table 3-5 lists the estimated global distribution of the projected
population in 2020 across each of the 20 equal-area latitude bands. The greatest
population densities occur in a relatively narrow grouping of the five northern bands
between latitudes 44° north and 11° north (bands 4 through 8). Florida lies within
latitude band 6. Due to launch azimuth angle constraints, launches from CCAFS/KSC to
other solar system objects (e.g., planets such as Mars) would partially circle the Earth
between 28° north and 28° south latitudes (bands 6 through 15) before departing for
interplanetary space.
Table 3-5. Global Population and Surface Characteristics by Latitude Band
Band Surface Fractions
Latitude Band Population
Latitude Range, Estimate for 2020, Land Rock Land Soil
Band degrees millions Water Land Fraction Fraction
a a
1 90N – 64N 5.5 0.7332 0.2668 1.0 0.0
a a
2 64N – 53N 201 0.4085 0.5915 1.0 0.0
a a
3 53N – 44N 597 0.4456 0.5544 0.251 0.749
4 44N – 36N 1020 0.5522 0.4478 0.251 0.749
5 36N – 30N 1250 0.5718 0.4282 0.153 0.847
6 30N – 23N 1490 0.6064 0.3936 0.088 0.912
7 23N – 17N 764 0.6710 0.3290 0.076 0.924
8 17N – 11N 618 0.7514 0.2486 0.058 0.924
9 11N – 5N 562 0.7592 0.2408 0.077 0.923
10 5N – 0 188 0.7854 0.2146 0.084 0.916
11 0 – 5S 217 0.7630 0.2370 0.044 0.956
12 5S – 11S 303 0.7815 0.2185 0.055 0.945
13 11S – 17S 113 0.7799 0.2201 0.085 0.915
14 17S – 23S 118 0.7574 0.2426 0.089 0.911
15 23S – 30S 136 0.7796 0.2204 0.092 0.980
16 30S – 36S 78 0.8646 0.1354 0.112 0.888
17 36S – 44S 20 0.9538 0.0462 0.296 0.704
a a
18 44S – 53S 1.0 0.9784 0.0216 0.296 0.704
a a
19 53S – 64S 0.3 0.9930 0.0070 1.0 0.0
a
20 64S – 90S -- 0.3863 0.6137 1.0 0.0a
Sources: Population estimates from Lipinski 2014a; Surface characteristics adapted from HNUS 1992

(a) Assumed values

Note: N = North Latitude, S = South Latitude

3.2.5 Earth Surface Characteristics

The worldwide distribution of surface types is also an important characteristic in
considering the potential consequences of accident scenarios. Table 3-5 also provides
a breakdown of the total land fraction for each of the 20 latitude bands (HNUS 1992).

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

The total land fraction was further subdivided by the fraction consisting of soil or rock
cover. For the most densely populated bands (bands 4 through 8), the land fraction
varies from about 25 percent in band 8 to about 45 percent in band 4, and is
predominately soil (from about 75 percent in band 4 to about 92 percent in bands 7 and
8).
3.2.6 Background Radiation
3.2.6.1. Natural and Manmade Sources
The general population is exposed to various sources of natural and human-made
radiation. These sources are divided into six broad categories: (1) cosmic radiation
(from space), (2) external terrestrial radiation or groundshine (from naturally occurring
radiation in rocks and soil), (3) internal radiation (from inhalation or ingestion),
(4) consumer products (from smoke detectors, airport x-ray machines, televisions),
(5) medical diagnosis and therapy (e.g., diagnostic x-rays, nuclear medical procedures),
and (6) other sources (e.g., nuclear power plants, transportation).
Dose is the amount of ionizing radiation energy deposited in body tissues via various
exposure pathways and is expressed in units of measurement called rem, (Roentgen
equivalent in man). An average person in the United States receives a total dose of
about 0.31 rem per year from all natural sources (see Table 3-6).
The average dose from man-made sources is also about 0.31 rem. Exposure to radon,
the largest component of natural background radiation, accounts for about 74 percent or
0.23 rem of the yearly total natural dose received. Exposure to cosmic and terrestrial
radiation collectively is about 16 percent of the yearly total natural dose. The dominant
contributor to the man-made dose is from medical uses, nuclear medicine, and medical
procedures. The dose from these two sources has increased dramatically in recent
years with the increase in the use of technologies such as computed tomography
(commonly referred to as CT scans). A single CT scan can result in a dose of anywhere
between 0.1 and 2 rem. For perspective, a simple chest x-ray results in a dose of about
0.002 rem, and about 0.065 rem is received from a diagnostic pelvic and hip x-ray. Not
everyone is subject to exposure and subsequent dose from the medical sources; the
dominant contributor to man-made background doses. There is a wide disparity in the
background dose to people who receive medical doses and those that don’t.
Due to its low elevation, Florida receives less exposure to cosmic radiation than most
parts of the country (HPS 2014). Assessments performed by the U.S. Geological
Survey and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency indicate that KSC, CCAFS, and
adjacent communities have a low potential for geologic radon (USGS 1995). In other
categories of background radiation exposure, Florida is consistent with the national
average.

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Table 3-6. Average Annual Effective Dose Equivalent of Ionizing Radiation to a

Member of the U.S. Population
a
Effective Dose Equivalent
Source rem per year percent of total
Natural
b
Radon 0.229 37
Cosmic 0.032 5
Terrestrial 0.019 5
Internal 0.031 5
Subtotal — Natural 0.310 50
Manmade
Medical procedures 0.223 36
Nuclear medicine 0.074 12
Consumer products 0.012 2
Industrial <0.6 0.1
Subtotal — Manmade 0.310 50
Total Natural and Manmade 0.620 100
Source: NRC 2011

(a) Effective dose equivalent is proportional to incremental risk in cancer.

(b) Dose equivalent to bronchi from radon decay products. The assumed weighting
factor for the effective dose equivalent relative to whole-body exposure is 0.08.

3.2.6.2. Worldwide Plutonium Levels

Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) exists in the environment as a result of atmospheric testing of
nuclear weapons and a 1964 launch accident. The following information provides a
perspective against which to compare the scope of postulated incremental releases of
plutonium from potential mission accidents.
Between 1945 and 1974, aboveground nuclear weapons tests released about
440,000 curies (Ci) of plutonium to the environment (AEC 1974). About
97 percent (approximately 430,000 Ci) of this plutonium was Pu-239 and Pu-240,
essentially identical isotopes with respect to chemical behavior and radiological
emission energies. The remainder consists primarily of Pu-238 (approximately
9,000 Ci), along with much smaller amounts of Pu-241 and Pu-242. (Some of the
Pu-238 and Pu-241 have decayed since the time of release.) About 9,000 Ci of Pu-238
was released to the atmosphere from weapons tests.
The 1964 reentry and burn-up of a Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP)-9A
radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) released 17,000 Ci of Pu-238 into the
atmosphere. This release occurred because the RTG design philosophy of the time was
to not contain the plutonium. Since 1964, essentially all of the Pu-238 released from
SNAP-9A has been deposited on the Earth's surface (AEC 1974). About 25 percent

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 3. Description of the Affected Environment

(approximately 4,000 Ci) of that 1964 release was deposited in the northern
hemisphere, with the remaining 75 percent settling in the southern hemisphere. In April
1986, approximately 369,000,000 Ci of various radioisotopes were released to the
environment from the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident (IAEA 2005a).
Approximately 400 Ci of the total Chernobyl release was Pu-238.
The total plutonium released to the ocean environment by overseas nuclear
reprocessing plants between 1952 and 1992 was more than 100,000 Ci (Gray et al.
1995), of which approximately 3,400 Ci was Pu-238 (Gray et al. 1995; IAEA 2005b;
OSPAR 2005), bringing the total amount of Pu-238 dispersed into the environment to
about 38,800 Ci.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
This chapter of the Mars 2020 mission Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
presents information on the potential environmental impacts of launching the proposed
mission. The evaluations presented in this FEIS; based on representative configurations
of Atlas V, Delta IV, and Falcon Heavy launch vehicles; were completed prior to NASA’s
selection of the launch vehicle for the Mars 2020 mission. NASA considers these
evaluations to adequately bound the potential environmental consequences of the
alternatives described in this FEIS. If new and or significant information becomes
available, NASA would evaluate the need for additional environmental analysis and
documentation.
The potential environmental impacts of launching the proposed Mars 2020 mission
would be similar in nature to those evaluated in the Mars Science Laboratory Mission
Final Environmental Impact Statement (MSL FEIS) (NASA 2006). The proposed Mars
2020 mission would be launched on a similar medium to large expendable launch
vehicle, resulting in similar normal launch and launch accident non-radiological impacts.
The Mars 2020 spacecraft for the proposed action would be essentially identical to the
MSL spacecraft and have a similar Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generator (MMRTG) as a power source. Therefore, it is expected that the radiological
impacts of accidents would also be similar to those evaluated in the MSL EIS. Mars
2020 mission-specific nuclear risk analyses have been performed by the Department of
Energy (DOE) for both the MMRTG-powered alternative and the solar power
augmented with Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Units (LWRHUs) alternative. These
analyses evaluated the impacts of launch accidents using representative configurations
of the Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles proposed for the Mars 2020 mission and the
results are reported in the Nuclear Risk Assessment for the Mars 2020 Mission
Environmental Impact Statement (SNL 2014).
The MMRTG hardware has already been manufactured and assembled by industry
under contract to DOE; those flight units are in bonded storage at the contractor facility.
Testing and fueling of the MMRTGs would be done by DOE at existing facilities. The
plutonium dioxide would be formed into pellets suitable for use in an MMRTG or
LWRHU at DOE’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico. The pellets
would be encapsulated in an iridium cladding at LANL. The encapsulated pellets would
then be shipped to Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in Idaho for final MMRTG assembly
and testing. The LWRHUs have already been manufactured; final assembly of the
LWRHUs occurred at LANL. DOE would then transport the MMRTG or LWRHUs to the
appropriate launch site. The impacts of these activities have been addressed in existing
DOE environmental documentation (DOE 1993, 2000, 2002b, 2008, 2013).
DOE’s process for preparing an MMRTG for the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be
very similar to the process they used in preparing nearly identical MMRTGs for the MSL
and Pluto New Horizons missions. The environmental impacts of preparing an MMRTG
by the DOE for the Mars 2020 mission have already been evaluated in existing DOE
NEPA documents. The plutonium that would be used for an MMRTG for the Mars 2020
mission was previously purchased from Russia and is in secure storage vaults at DOE
facilities. As stated in the terms of the purchase agreement with Russia, plutonium can

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

only be used for peaceful space exploration missions. The stockpiled plutonium would
be fabricated into fueled clads at the LANL. (The potential impacts of that process are
described in the LANL Site-Wide EIS (DOE 2008).) The fuel clads would then be
securely shipped to the INL for integration into MMRTG assemblies. The potential
impacts of that process have been described in the LANL Site-Wide EIS and other
specific DOE NEPA documents addressing portions of the MMRTG fabrication process
(DOE 2002b, 2008). The DOE found that the principal environmental impacts
associated with shipping the plutonium in various forms, fabricating the plutonium into
fueled clads and then fabricating the clads into an MMRTG and shipping to CCAFS are
the generation of solid radioactive wastes and potential external radiation exposure to
DOE facility radiation workers. Radioactive wastes would be generated at LANL and
INL. Most of the radioactive wastes would be in the form of plutonium-contaminated
solid wastes called transuranic (TRU) wastes. Production of an MMRTG for a potential
Mars 2020 mission would temporarily increase radioactive wastes generated annually
by LANL and INL and routinely shipped for ultimate deep geologic disposal at the DOE
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility in New Mexico. The generation, handling,
transportation, and disposal of these wastes have been described and impacts
evaluated in multiple DOE NEPA documents (DOE 1993, 2000, 2002b, 2008, 2013).
Since the production of an MMRTG for the proposed Mars 2020 mission would use
similar steps, processes, and facilities as that followed for recent space missions, no
new environmental impacts would be expected.
In February 2014, two safety incidents at WIPP, a salt truck fire and an over
pressurization of a TRU waste container, resulted in the suspension of normal WIPP
operations. Pending completion of investigations and implementation of corrective
measures at WIPP and other DOE sites as needed, shipments of TRU wastes from INL,
LANL, and other DOE sites to WIPP have been temporarily suspended. The containers
have been identified and corrective measures taken to ensure that future waste
containers meet the rigid WIPP waste acceptance criteria. These safety concerns are
expected to be fully addressed and mitigated prior to the need for TRU waste shipments
from INL and LANL in support of the proposed Mars 2020 MMRTG production. In
addition, adequate TRU waste interim storage capabilities exist at both INL and LANL
such that near-term operations that would support Mars 2020 operations would not be
impacted.
The discussion of the environmental impacts associated with Alternatives 1, 2, and 3
are separated into four categories of impacts:
 Environmental impacts associated with preparation for launch,
 Environmental impacts associated with a normal (successful) launch,
 Non-radiological impacts associated with launch accidents, and
 Radiological impacts associated with launch accidents.
The impacts associated with the first two categories would occur with every launch. The
impacts from the second two would be seen only if there were to be a failure of the
launch vehicle that results in an accident either with or without the release of radioactive
material. For the three alternatives, the environmental impacts associated with
preparation for a launch, a normal launch, and the non-radiological impacts of a launch

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 4. Environmental Consequences

accident would be the same for that launch system with or without radiological materials
on a rover. These impacts are discussed in Section 4.1 for the Proposed Action,
Alternative 1, Section 4.2, Environmental Impacts of Alternative 2, and Section 4.3,
Environmental Impacts of Alternative 3.
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
(ALTERNATIVE 1)
Under Alternative 1, NASA proposes to continue preparations for and to implement the
Mars 2020 mission. The proposed Mars 2020 mission would include an autonomous
rover that would perform science operations on the surface of Mars. One MMRTG
would provide the necessary electric power to operate the Mars 2020 rover and its
science instruments. The Mars 2020 spacecraft would be launched on an Atlas V, a
Delta IV Heavy, or a Falcon Heavy launch vehicle (see Section 2.1.5) from SLC-41,
SLC-37, or LC-39A, respectively, at CCAFS/KSC.
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 present the environmental impacts of preparing for launch and
the environmental impacts resulting from a normal launch event, respectively. These
impacts were addressed in the MSL EIS (NASA 2006), the Final Environmental
Assessment for Launch of NASA Routine Payloads on Expendable Launch Vehicles
(Routine Payloads EA) (NASA 2011), the PEIS MEP (NASA 2005a), Environmental
Assessment for Falcon 9 and Falcon 9 Heavy Launch Vehicle Programs from Space
Launch Complex 4 East Vandenberg Air Force Base California (USAF 2011), and the
Final Supplemental Environmental Assessment to the November 2007 Environmental
Assessment for the Operation and Launch of the Falcon 1 and Falcon 9 Space Vehicles
At Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Florida (SpaceX 2013b). The USAF has assessed
environmental impacts of Atlas V and Delta IV launches through 2020 based upon an
annual average launch rate of 10 launches and 11 launches, respectively, from CCAFS
(USAF 2000). Launch of the Mars 2020 mission would be included in and not increase
this previously approved launch rate. Launch of a Falcon Heavy was addressed in the
Routine Payloads EA (NASA 2011) and the environmental impacts are expected to be
similar to that of an Atlas V or Delta IV launch vehicle.
The potential non-radiological environmental impacts of a launch accident are
discussed in Section 4.1.3. Section 4.1.4 addresses radiological impacts, which may
result from a launch accident.
4.1.1 Environmental Consequences of Preparing for Launch
Launch processing activities for the Mars 2020 mission would be subject to federal,
state, and local environmental laws and regulations; and USAF and NASA regulations
and requirements (see Section 4.9). All CCAFS/KSC launch sites have established
plans to implement these regulations, including hazardous materials management plans
and hazardous waste disposal plans. Responsibilities and procedures for management
of hazardous materials and hazardous wastes (HM/HW) are clearly defined in those
operating plans. Processing facilities must prepare and retain a written contingency plan
and emergency procedures for responding to emergencies involving hazardous
materials. In addition, all proposed processing facilities and launch sites have active

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

pollution prevention programs to reduce the use of hazardous materials and generation
of hazardous waste.
Spacecraft and launch vehicle processing at CCAFS or KSC would involve a number of
industrial activities that include the use of hazardous materials, and would generate
hazardous wastes, other solid and liquid wastes, and air emissions. Such hazardous
materials would include but not be limited to acetone, chromate conversion coating,
denatured alcohol, epoxy, flux, inks, lacquer, paints, propellants, oils, solvents, primers,
sealants, and other process chemicals.
NASA or its contractors would acquire the required hazardous materials for the Mars
2020 mission use and would properly dispose of any generated hazardous wastes. If
the Mars 2020 spacecraft uses an MSL heritage cooling system, it would contain about
5 liters (1.3 gallons) of trichlorofluoromethane (also known as Freon-11), a Class I ODS,
as the coolant circulated in stainless steel tubing for spacecraft thermal control. Freon-
11 would be loaded into the spacecraft via a closely monitored, closed-loop system that
would minimize the possibility of a significant portion of the substance escaping to open
atmosphere.
CCAFS, KSC, NASA, and NASA Launch Service (NLS) contractors must adhere to
established programs for pollution and spill prevention. Airborne emissions from liquid
propellant loading and off-loading of spacecraft and launch vehicles are closely
monitored using vapor detectors. Systems for loading hypergolic fuels (fuels which
ignite spontaneously when mixed with an oxidizer) also use air emission controls (USAF
1998). Liquid hypergolic fuels make up the largest proportion of hazardous materials
used in processing spacecraft and these propellants are extremely hazardous and toxic.
However, they are transported and controlled by the facility propellant contractor and
are not stored at the processing facilities. Each facility that is permitted to conduct
hypergolic propellant transfers is configured to manage hypergolic propellants and
waste products in accordance with federal, state, and local regulations (NASA 2011).
Some spacecraft and launch vehicle integration personnel would be exposed to very
low doses of radiation (substantially below regulatory limits) during pre-launch testing
and integration of the MMRTG into the Mars 2020 spacecraft. Integration and launch
processing activities involving ionizing and non-ionizing radiation at KSC and CCAFS
are subject to extensive review and authorization of all activities by the local radiation
protection authority prior to initiation of any operation. Such operations are actively
monitored by launch site radiation safety personnel to ensure adherence to approved
operating and emergency procedures and to maintain operational personnel exposures
at levels that are as low as reasonably achievable (USAF 1999, NASA 2001).
The hazardous materials used to process spacecraft and launch vehicles could
potentially generate hazardous waste. Liquid and solid waste would be generated
almost exclusively from fuel and oxidizer transfer operations. Processing of launch
vehicles would increase hazardous waste production at CCAFS/KSC launch sites by
very small percentages. The spacecraft and launch vehicle contractors would be
responsible for identifying, containing, labeling, and accumulating the hazardous wastes
in accordance with all applicable Federal, state, and local regulations. All hazardous

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 4. Environmental Consequences

wastes generated from spacecraft and launch vehicle processing would be transported,
treated, stored, and disposed of by the responsible base contractor (NASA 2011).
Due to extensive HM/HW management programs and established safety programs,
processing the spacecraft and the launch vehicle for the Mars 2020 mission is not
expected to cause adverse environmental impacts.
DOE’s preparation of an MMRTG for the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be very
similar to their process in preparing the nearly identical MMRTG for the MSL mission.
The environmental impacts of preparing an MMRTG by the DOE for the Mars 2020
mission have already been evaluated in existing DOE NEPA documents (DOE 1993,
2000, 2002, 2002b, 2008, 2013).
4.1.2 Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch
Environmental impacts of a normal launch of the Mars 2020 mission on an expendable
launch vehicle would be associated with airborne exhaust emissions from propellant
combustion, hazardous materials usage, hazardous waste generation, and wastewater
generation.
4.1.2.1. Land Use
The proposed processing and launch of spacecraft would not include any new
construction or modification of facilities or roadways that would potentially impact land
resources. Processing activities would take place within closed structures, and
precautions would be taken to prevent spills and control hazardous materials in
accordance with facility operating plans. Spills of liquid propellants would be controlled
through catchment systems and holding tanks in the processing facilities and would not
impact surrounding soils or land use resources (NASA 2011).
Processing and launch of the Mars 2020 mission on either an Atlas V, Delta IV, or
Falcon Heavy would be consistent with the designated land uses of CCAFS and KSC;
and no impacts to land use resources are anticipated (USAF 2001, NASA 2002b, NASA
2005a, NASA 2006, NASA 2011).
4.1.2.2. Air Quality
Inadvertent releases of toxic air contaminants are possible as a result of improper
handling of hazardous materials during payload processing, transportation, and launch.
During payload processing and transportation, the largest releases would result from
the spillage of the entire quantity of liquid propellants. CCAFS and KSC have safety
procedures in place to ensure that these events are not likely to occur and all spills must
be managed in accordance with existing Spill Prevention, Control, and
Countermeasures (SPCC) plans. Liquid propellants would be stored in tanks near the
launch pad and within cement containment basins designed to retain 110 percent of the
storage tank volume. Propellant spills from the launch vehicle would be channeled into
sealed concrete catchment basins and disposed of according to appropriate Federal
and state regulations. Propellant loading operations would be postponed if Range
Safety models predict that a potential propellant spill would result in a toxic hazard to
the public or unprotected personnel (NASA 2011).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

ODSs may be used in fully self-contained spacecraft cooling systems. Any ODS use
would be accomplished in accordance with Federal, state, and local laws regulating
ODS use, reuse, storage, and disposal. Release of materials other than propulsion
system exhaust would be limited to inert gases. Preparation of rocket vehicles would not
result in a release of ODSs into the atmosphere (NASA 2011).
Rocket launches can cause short-term impacts on local air quality from routine launch
vehicle exhaust emissions. After ignition of the first stage and the first few seconds of
liftoff through launch vehicle ascent, the exhaust emissions would form a buoyant cloud
at the launch pad. This high-temperature cloud would rise quickly and stabilize at an
altitude of several hundred meters near the launch area. The cloud would then dissipate
through mixing with the atmosphere. The exhaust products would be distributed along
the launch vehicle's trajectory as the vehicle moves through the atmosphere. Airborne
emissions from a normal launch of the Mars 2020 mission at CCAFS/KSC would not be
expected to result in adverse impacts to the public (USAF 1998, USAF 2000, NASA
2005a, NASA 2006, NASA 2011). The nearest residential areas to SLC-37, LC-39A, or
SLC-41 are about 10 to 20 kilometers (km) (6 to 12 miles) in the cities of Merritt Island
to the southwest, Cape Canaveral and Cocoa Beach to the south, and Titusville to the
west.
First-stage liquid propellant engines that use rocket propellant-1 (RP-1) and liquid
oxygen (LOX), such as the Atlas V and Falcon Heavy, would primarily produce carbon
monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), and water vapor as combustion products. First-
stage liquid propellant engines that use liquid hydrogen (LH2) and LOX, such as the
Delta IV, would produce water vapor. Solid propellant, consisting of ammonium
perchlorate, aluminum powder, and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB) binder in
the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) of the Atlas V, would primarily produce aluminum oxide
(Al2O3) particulates, CO, hydrogen chloride (HCl), and nitrogen (N2). Under the high
temperatures of the SRB’s exhaust, the CO would be quickly oxidized to CO2, and the
N2 may react with ambient oxygen to form nitrogen oxides (NOX). Most of these
emissions would be removed from the atmosphere over a period of less than one week,
yielding no long-term accumulation of these products (USAF 1998).
No short- or long-term air quality impacts are expected as a result of the handling and
usage of liquid propellants and ODSs during a normal launch. Previous analyses have
shown that emissions from a normal launch of an Atlas V with SRBs would not create
short- or long-term adverse impacts to air quality in the region (USAF 2000, NASA
2005a, NASA 2011). The same result would be expected from the launch of a Delta IV
Heavy or Falcon Heavy rocket. Section 4.1.2.14 discusses local as well as global ozone
impacts.

4.1.2.3. Noise
Noise impacts may be considered substantial if (1) the proposed action substantially
increases the ambient noise level for adjoining areas, and (2) the increased ambient
noise affects the use of the adjoining areas. NASA, the FAA, and USAF carefully
consider the potential impacts from noise, (including sonic boom) on workers and the

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 4. Environmental Consequences

public as well as environmental resources including endangered species, marine

mammals, historic structures, or any other protected property (NASA 2011).
The processing of the proposed spacecraft would not produce any substantial amount
of noise outside of the processing facilities. The facilities employed for spacecraft
processing, however, may generate moderate amounts of industrial noise due to
operating machinery, generators, public address systems, and similar typical industrial
systems. All such systems are subject to occupational safety and health regulations,
and hearing protection would be utilized if and when required. The standard for noise,
such as from generators, is based on the Noise Control Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-574), as
amended. State and local standards serve as a guide if these are at least as stringent
as Federal standards (NASA 2011).
Noise impacts associated with launches occur due to sound from the launch pad from
ignition through lift-off. Increased noise levels would occur for only a short period
(typically less than two minutes) during the vehicle's early ascent, and diminish rapidly
as the vehicle gains altitude and moves downrange offshore (USAF 1998).
Non-essential workers would not be present in the launch area during the Mars 2020
liftoff, and those essential workers remaining in the area would be exposed to noise
levels anticipated to be below Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
regulations for unprotected workers (140 A-weighted decibels (dBA) maximum and 115
dBA over a 15-minute average). While some area residents may be momentarily
annoyed by noise during the Mars 2020 launch, such noise would be transient and
would not be expected to exceed the EPA maximum 24-hour average exposure level of
70 dBA13 for the general public and would therefore present no health hazard (NASA
2005a).
Sonic booms would be generated by the normal launch of the Mars 2020 mission, but
would occur offshore over the Atlantic Ocean and no adverse impact to human
populations would be expected. Ships and other vessels in the area would be warned in
advance of the launch event and would not be adversely affected (USAF 1998).
Florida scrub jays and southeastern beach mice occur in the vicinity of launch facilities
at CCAFS and KSC. A small potential exists that individuals of these species would be
directly impacted by noise from launch operations. Previous environmental analyses
concluded that impacts on these species are expected to be minimal. The behavior of
scrub jays observed after Delta, Atlas, and Titan launches has been normal, indicating
no noise-related effects (Schmalzer 1998, NASA 2011).
Sonic booms created by launches from CCAFS/KSC would occur over the open Atlantic
Ocean. Typically, marine species in the ocean’s surface waters are present in low
densities (although spring and fall migration will see periodic groups of migrating whales
that follow the coastline), and the sonic boom footprint lies over 48 km (30 mi) from

13
For comparison, a typical household vacuum cleaner generates about 70 dBA at a distance of 3 m
(10 ft); the sound level in a quiet bedroom at night is about 30 dBA (USAF 1998).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

CCAFS/KSC. Therefore, sonic booms from launches are not expected to adversely
affect the survival of any marine species (USAF 1998, NASA 2011).
4.1.2.4. Geology and Soils
For the Atlas V with SRBs, the Mars 2020 launch would result in deposition of solid
rocket exhaust products, consisting primarily of Al2O3 particulates and HCl, onto soils.
During a Delta II launch on November 4, 1995, pH in the surrounding air was monitored
to detect any changes caused by HCl vapors or deposition. Test strips were placed at
the perimeter of the launch pad and launch conditions were calm, which would yield
maximum HCl deposition. No pH changes were observed on any test strips, and there
was no evidence of acid deposition. The lack of pH changes associated with the small
ground cloud indicates that even with exposure to the concentrated cloud, acid
deposition would be minimal (USAF 1996b, NASA 2011).
Soils typically contain a substantial amount of organic matter, which results in a natural
buffering capacity that would potentially counteract the effects of any HCl they receive.
The soils of the barrier islands in this region are alkaline with high buffering capacity
(Schmalzer 1998). For example, despite additions of substantial amounts of acidic
deposition from 43 launches over a 10-year period, the affected soils at CCAFS showed
no decrease in buffering capacity. The HCl content of the exhaust plume from SRBs
would not be expected to adversely affect soils around launch sites at any of the
proposed launch sites. In addition, aluminum oxide would not affect the soils because it
would be deposited as a stable compound. Therefore, no measurable direct or indirect,
short- or long-term effects on soil chemistry would be expected as a result of launch
activities (USAF 1998, NASA 2011).
4.1.2.5. Water Quality
Impacts on water resources may be considered significant if processing or launch
activities interfere with surface water drainage, exceed the capacity of regional water
supply systems, or result in degradation of surface water or groundwater quality such
that existing water uses would be impaired.
Processing activities would take place within existing structures and precautions would
be taken to prevent and control spills of hazardous materials. Large spills of spacecraft
liquid propellant would be controlled through catchment systems in the processing
facilities. All chemicals used for processing would be managed to prevent contamination
of surface waters and groundwater.
Large quantities of water are used during launch of an Atlas V, a Delta IV, or a Falcon
Heavy for cooling, acoustic damping, post-launch wash-down, fire suppression, and
potable uses. The city of Cocoa, which pumps water from the Floridan aquifer, is
contracted to supply water to CCAFS and KSC, and has sufficient capacity to supply
sources to meet usage demands for launch of the Mars 2020 mission. Water used at
the launch complex during launch would be collected and treated, if necessary, prior to
being released to the CCAFS/KSC industrial wastewater treatment plant. At KSC, well
water is also used for some industrial purposes, including service to the LOX storage

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 4. Environmental Consequences

tanks at LC-39A (KSC 2014). No short- or long-term environmental impacts from

contaminated wastewater are expected as a result of normal launch operations.
Short-term acidification of surface water could result from contact with the launch
exhaust cloud and through HCl fallout from the exhaust cloud. Wet deposition of HCl
may also occur during simultaneous rainfall. Impacts on surface waters would be
restricted to the area immediately adjacent to the launch pad. No substantial impacts on
surface waters of nearby oceans, lagoons, or large inland water bodies should occur
due to their buffering capacity. A short-term decrease in pH could occur in small
streams and canals near the launch pad. Since there would only be a temporary
decrease in pH, aluminum oxide deposition should not contribute to increased
aluminum solubility in area surface waters (Schmalzer 1998, NASA 2011). A normal
launch would have no substantial long-term impacts on the local water quality.
Under normal flight conditions, vehicle stages that do not reach orbit have trajectories
that result in ocean impact. Stages that reach initial orbit would eventually reenter the
atmosphere as a result of orbital decay. Corrosion of stage hardware would contribute
various metal ions to the water column. Due to the slow rate of corrosion in the deep-
ocean environment and the large quantity of water available for dilution, toxic
concentrations of metals are not likely to occur.
The relatively small amounts of propellant left in the vehicle stages that impact the
ocean could release solid and liquid propellants into the water column; however this
release would be slow, with potentially toxic concentrations occurring only in the
immediate vicinity of the propellant. Insoluble fractions of RP-1 propellant would float to
the surface and spread rapidly to form a localized surface film that would evaporate.
Hydrazine fuels are soluble and would also disperse rapidly. Because of the small
amount of residual propellants present, and the large volume of water available for
dilution, no long-term adverse impacts to hydrology or surface water quality would be
expected from a normal launch of the Mars 2020 mission (USAF 1998, NASA 2005a,
NASA 2011).
4.1.2.6. Offshore Environment
Offshore environments at CCAFS/KSC would receive jettisoned launch vehicle sections
in pre-approved drop zones (see Section 4.1.2.11). Small amounts of residual
propellants associated with these launch vehicle sections would be released to the
surrounding water. Metal parts would eventually corrode, but toxic concentrations of the
metals would not be likely because of the slow rate of the corrosion process and the
large volume of ocean water available for dilution (USAF 1998, NASA 2005a). In this
regard, there would be no short- or long-term effects of jettisoned launch vehicle
sections on offshore environments.
4.1.2.7. Biological Resources
Impacts to biological resources may be considered significant if processing and launch
activities could materially impact a threatened or endangered species or critical habitat,
substantially diminish habitat for a plant or animal species, substantially diminish a
regionally or locally important plant or animal species, interfere substantially with wildlife

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

movement or reproductive behavior, and/or result in a substantial infusion of exotic plant

or animal species.
Launch vehicle processing would occur in existing facilities and payloads would be
transported on existing roadways. Adjacent habitats would not be disturbed. Exterior
lighting at all facilities used for spacecraft processing at CCAFS/KSC would comply with
established lighting policy for minimizing disorienting effects on sea turtle hatchlings.
Biological resources may be impacted due to launch activities in terms of the following
categories: (1) exhaust emissions directly at the launch pad that remain and are
deposited in the area, (2) near-field impacts from the exhaust cloud (generally within
500 m (1,640 ft)) but sometimes up to 1 km (0.62 mi) from the pad, and (3) impacts from
far-field deposition of the buoyant portion of the launch cloud (more than a few km from
the launch pad).
The near-field impacts from an exhaust cloud depend primarily on the amount of sound-
suppression water (its evaporation lowers the temperature and the altitude of the
exhaust cloud) and on the time the launch vehicle remains near the launch pad during
ascent. The observations of near-field impacts from previous launches have been well
documented based on years of launching the space shuttle and expendable launch
vehicles. For launch of the space shuttle, observations have included destruction of
sensitive plant species followed by re-growth during the same growing season and 2 to
3 days drop in pH (a measure of acidity/alkalinity) in nearby waters (down to 1 m (3.3 ft)
which have resulted in fish kills in nearby shallow surface waters. This was followed by
a return to normal pH levels. There was also a possibility of death of fauna, including
burrowing animals, in the path of the exhaust cloud. These near-field impacts from
exhaust clouds were observed at distances up to a few hundred meters from the launch
pad, well within launch site boundaries, and did not reach human populations offsite
(NASA 2007, NASA 2011).
Minor brush fires are infrequent byproducts of launches and are usually contained and
limited to vegetation within the launch complexes. HCl deposition could be created by
rain falling through the SRB exhaust cloud. Wet deposition of HCl on leaves has been
observed to persist on leaf surfaces for considerable periods; no mortality of these
plants and no changes in plant community composition or structure have been observed
in the far field related to launch effects (NASA 2007).
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) have previously reviewed NEPA documentation for the Atlas and Delta launch
vehicles at CCAFS/KSC and have specified required launch restrictions and other
impact mitigation measures. Any additional permits, permit modifications, and/or
mitigation measures based on selection of the Falcon Heavy rocket will be
obtained/addressed by CCAFS/KSC prior to implementation of the proposed action.
Unlike the experience with space shuttle launches, exhaust plumes from solid and liquid
propellants produced by expendable launch vehicles such as the Delta and Atlas launch
vehicles have not produced substantial acidification and have not resulted in recorded
fish kills to date. Without substantial acidification of surface waters, any aluminum oxide
deposited in surface waters would remain insoluble and nontoxic to the biota. No animal

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 4. Environmental Consequences

mortality has been observed at CCAFS/KSC that could be attributed to Delta and Atlas
launches (Schmalzer 1998, NASA 2011).
In summary, biological resources are not expected to be adversely affected by the Mars
2020 launch except for short-term effects on fauna and flora in the immediate vicinity of
the launch complex. Impacts to vegetation from other launch vehicles have been
observed up to about 800 meters (2,625 feet) from the launch pads. Acidic deposition
from solid propellant exhaust products and high temperatures from the exhaust cloud
could damage or kill biota within the immediate vicinity of the launch pad; however,
long-term population effects on terrestrial biota would not be expected. Jettisoned
launch vehicle sections that land in the ocean would be subject to corrosion and release
of residual propellant. However, it is not likely that these vehicle sections would have an
adverse impact on marine species (USAF 1996a, NASA 2005a, NASA 2006, NASA
2011).
During the launch, wildlife in the vicinity of the launch site would be temporarily
disturbed due to noise, generally amounting to a startle effect. Because launches are
infrequent events, no long-term impacts would be anticipated on wildlife and marine
species from noise from the Mars 2020 launch (NASA 2005a).
No adverse impacts on threatened or endangered species would be expected from a
normal launch. Observations of conditions at launch facilities provided evidence that the
extent of impacts from similar launches have been minimal to threatened/endangered
species located near the launch complex (USAF 2000). Launch of the Mars 2020
mission would not interfere with CCAFS/KSC management of Florida scrub jay habitat.
CCAFS/KSC have a light management plan that addresses mitigation of impacts to
nesting sea turtles during nighttime launches and the plan would be implemented
should the Mars 2020 launch occur at night (USAF 2001).
4.1.2.8. Socioeconomics and Children’s Environmental Health and Safety
Launch of the proposed Mars 2020 mission from CCAFS/KSC would be part of the
normal complement of launches. Thus, a single launch would result in negligible
impacts to socioeconomic factors such as demography, employment, transportation,
and public or emergency services.
The only location where children are concentrated in the vicinity of the proposed launch
areas is at the KSC Child Development Center, which is more than 9.6 km (6.0 mi) from
any of the launch sites. Children at the Center may be exposed to increased noise
levels during launches. However, noise levels are expected to be greatly diminished at
that distance from the launch pad. Estimates of sound levels that the KSC Child
Development Center would experience during a launch event with either of the potential
Mars 2020 launch vehicles would be comparable to that previously evaluated for an
Ares 1 or Ares V launch, which were estimated to result in the rise of daycare center
exterior sound levels to 80 or 90 dBA. The interior sound levels at this time may differ
from 10 to 15 dBA less than the exterior. The duration of these increased sound levels,
both interior and exterior, would be less than 30 seconds (NASA 2007c). These sound
levels would be shorter in duration and lower in frequency than experienced during the
use of gas-powered mowers maintaining the grounds at the KSC Child Development

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Center. Therefore, the proposed action would not pose disproportionately high or
adverse short- or long-term impacts to children’s environmental health or safety (KSC
2014).
4.1.2.9. Cultural/Historic/Archaeological Resources
Impacts on cultural resources could be considered substantial if the proposed action
results in disturbance or loss of values or data that qualify a site for listing in the
National Register of Historic Places (NRHP); substantial disturbance or loss of data
from newly discovered properties or features prior to their recordation, evaluation and
possible treatment; or substantial changes to the natural environment or access to it
such that the practice of traditional culture or religious activities would be lost.
The proposed action would use existing facilities for payload processing, existing
roadways for payload transportation, and existing launch facilities. No new facilities are
proposed and no new construction or modifications to existing facilities would be
required for the proposed action. There would be no effect on buildings, structures,
objects, districts, or sites such as LC-39A that are listed or eligible for listing in the
NRHP. New facilities or modifications to existing facilities required to support near-term
Falcon Heavy operations at KSC/CCAFS are expected to be in place with multiple
Falcon Heavy launches occurring prior to the proposed Mars 2020 mission. In addition,
there is a programmatic agreement between KSC, the Advisory Council on Historic
Places and the Florida State Historic Preservation Officer regarding management of
historic properties at KSC (NASA 2005a, 2010, 2011). No short- or long-term impacts
would occur to cultural, historic, or archaeological resources as a result of a normal
launch.
4.1.2.10. Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste
Hazardous materials and hazardous wastes are controlled in accordance with federal
and state regulations. CCAFS and KSC have established procedures to implement
these regulations. All hazardous material releases must be reported to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP). All hazardous waste must be properly
containerized, stored, labeled, manifested, shipped, and disposed of in full regulatory
compliance. Any hazardous materials remaining after completion of processing would
be properly stored for future use or disposal in accordance with applicable regulations.
The processing of a launch vehicle at a launch site requires the use of hazardous
materials and results in the production of hazardous wastes. Impacts due to use of large
quantities of hazardous materials and creation of large quantities of hazardous waste
could be significant; however, through the use of established hazardous material
management and pollution prevention procedures the amounts would be minimized to
the greatest extent possible. Hazardous materials and hazardous waste impacts from
launch and launch vehicle processing are therefore considered minimal (KSC 2014).
With the proper procedures and safeguards in place, it is not expected that soil, water or
groundwater impacts would be caused by operations associated with handling
hazardous materials or the production and handling of hazardous waste during a normal
launch phase. In this regard, no short- or long-term impacts are expected.

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4.1.2.11. Health and Safety

At CCAFS/KSC, procedures would be in place for the Mars 2020 mission launch
operations, and would include considerations for a normal launch, launch-related
accidents, fire protection, alarm, fire suppression, flight termination, and explosive
safety (USAF 1998, USAF 2000). Using procedures established for existing launch
systems, risks to installation personnel and the general public would be minimized to
acceptable levels during both a normal and aborted launch in accordance with the most
current USAF's Range Safety User Requirements Manual (USAF 2004).
Regardless of the launch vehicle selected, Range Safety at CCAFS/KSC would use
models to predict launch hazards to the public and to launch site personnel prior to the
launch. The most substantial potential health hazard during a normal Mars 2020 launch
would be exposure to HCl emitted from the Atlas V SRBs if the Atlas V is selected as
the launch vehicle. These models calculate the risk of injury resulting from toxic exhaust
gases from normal launches and from potentially toxic concentrations due to a failed
launch. The launch would be postponed if the predicted collective public risk of injury
from exposure to toxic exhaust gases exceeds acceptable limits (USAF 2004). This
approach takes into account the exhaust plume's concentration, direction, and dwell
time; and emergency preparedness procedures (USAF 2000).
CCAFS/KSC Range Safety would monitor launch surveillance areas to ensure that risks
to people, aircraft, and surface vessels are within acceptable limits. For the Mars 2020
mission, a launch trajectory would be created and modified to ensure safety on the
ground and at sea, and control areas and airspace would be closed to the public as
required. The underlying areas at risk from falling debris or jettisoned stages would be
cleared until all launch operations are completed. The SRB casings of the Atlas V would
land closest to shore, in pre-approved drop zones centered at distances of
approximately 230 km (143 mi) from shore. The strap-on common booster cores
(CBCs) of the Delta IV and the boosters of the Falcon Heavy would land in pre-
approved drop zones farther from shore. Finally, the payload fairing sections and the
first stage would land much farther from shore, also in pre-approved drop zones
(USAF 2000). These distances would be highly dependent on the specific Mars 2020
launch vehicle, its launch trajectory characteristics, and other factors such as wind
effects.
The USAF would disseminate a Notice to Aviators through the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA); and air traffic in a FAA-designated area around the launch
corridor would be controlled. Radar surveillance for intruding aircraft within a 50 nautical
mile (93 km, 58 miles) radius of the launch site would be conducted beginning 30
minutes prior to the scheduled launch and continue until the launch is complete. The
USAF also would ensure that a Notice to Mariners within a predetermined impact debris
corridor is disseminated 10 working days prior to launch. The U.S. Coast Guard would
transmit marine radio broadcast warnings to inform vessels of the effective closure time
of the sea impact debris corridor. Warning signs would be posted in various Port
Canaveral areas for vessels leaving port (USAF 1998). In addition, Patrick Air Force
Base would maintain a website and toll-free telephone number with launch hazard area
information for mariners and restricted airspace information for pilots.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

4.1.2.12. Environmental Justice

Launch of the proposed Mars 2020 mission would not be anticipated to result in
disproportionately high and adverse impacts to low income or minority populations.
Further details are presented in Appendix C.
4.1.2.13. Aesthetics
Because the launch sites at CCAFS/KSC considered for the proposed action are
existing sites and are located in industrialized areas, the visual sensitivity is low.
Therefore, the proposed action is not expected to have short- or long-term impacts
related to aesthetics.
4.1.2.14. Global Environment
While not regulated, rocket engine combustion is known to produce gases and particles
that reduce stratospheric ozone concentrations locally and globally (WMO 2006, NASA
2011). A large fraction of these emissions, CO2 for example, are chemically inert and do
not affect ozone levels directly. Other emissions, such as HCl and H2O, are not highly
reactive, but have an impact on ozone globally since they participate in chemical
reactions that help determine the concentrations of ozone-destroying gases known as
radicals.
Table 4-1 presents the emissions from propulsion systems of the type utilized by launch
vehicles that could most affect stratospheric ozone, grouped according to oxidizer and
fuel combination: solid propellant using ammonium perchlorate and aluminum, LOX and
liquid hydrogen, and LOX and kerosene. Table 4-1 does not account for all emissions,
only those most relevant to ozone chemistry. For example, all of the systems emit CO2,
but CO2 does not play a direct role in ozone chemistry in the stratosphere.
Table 4-1. Launch Vehicle Emissions
Propellant Launch Vehicles Emissions
LOX/H2 Delta IV H2O (NOx, HOx)
LOX/RP-1 Atlas series, Falcon series H2O (NOx, HOx), soot (carbon), H2SO4
(kerosene)
Solid Atlas series with SRBs H2O, HCl, Clx, NOx, (HOx), Al2O3
Note: Al2O3, soot, and sulfate particles less than 5 microns. Parenthesis denotes compounds that have not yet been measured but
are expected to be present.
Key: Al2O3=Alumina; Clx=Chlorine, includes: Cl, Cl2, and ClO; H2=Hydrogen; H2O=Water; HCl=Hydrogen Chloride; HOx=Hydrogen
Oxides, includes: OH=hydroxide ion, H2O; H2SO4=Hydrogen Sulfate; LOX=Liquid oxygen; NOx=Nitrogen Oxides, includes: NO, NO2,
NO3; RP-1=Rocket Propellant.

The relative emission rate (mass of emitted compound per mass of propellant
consumed) has not been accurately determined for all of the compounds listed in Table
4-1. Rocket engine combustion computer models have been used to estimate the
emission rates for some compounds (NASA 2011).
Direct measurements using high-altitude aircraft have validated the model predictions in
some cases (Ross 2000, Ch. Voigt et.al. 2013). The combustion models have not yet

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 4. Environmental Consequences

been used to estimate the rates for some important compounds, although theoretical
considerations suggest they should be present in the exhaust in small quantities.
The impact of rocket emissions is separated into an immediate local response following
each launch and a long-term global response that reflects the steady, cumulative
influence of all launches. Fast chemical reactions between reactive plume gases,
particles, and the surrounding air cause the local response. This can result in 100
percent ozone loss within the plume (Ross 2000, Murray, et.al. 2013). This phase can
last for several days until the reactive exhaust gases have been largely deactivated, and
the plume has substantially dispersed. The ozone loss in this phase, while dramatic,
does not likely contribute significantly to the global impact (Danilin 2001), at least for
SRB emissions and additional data collected by NASA indicate local ozone levels
tended to recover to ambient levels after a number of hours (NASA 2011, Murray et al.
2013).
The global response is driven by the accumulation of all gas and particulate emissions
over a long period of time after the exhaust has been mixed throughout the
stratosphere. An approximate steady state is achieved as exhaust from newer launches
replaces the exhaust from older launches, which is removed from the stratosphere by
the global atmospheric circulation, a process that takes about 3 years. The emitted
compounds add to the natural reservoirs of reactive gases and particle populations that
control ozone amounts (NASA 2011).
Of the three propellant combinations that would be utilized by the proposed launch
vehicles and listed in Table 4-1, only SRB emissions have been studied in depth. The
local and global impact of chlorine emitted by SRBs has been extensively measured
and modeled and is relatively well understood (i.e., WMO 1991, 2006). SRBs release
reactive chlorine gases directly in the stratosphere and in this case, the quantities are
small in comparison with other tropospheric sources. Stratospheric accumulation of
chlorine and alumina exhaust from current launch activities leads to small (less than 0.1
percent) global column ozone decreases and data support this conclusion (WMO 2006,
NASA 2011).
The global atmospheric models that have been successfully applied to SRB emissions
have not been applied to liquid emissions. The few findings that have been published
highlight the reactive gas and soot emissions of kerosene-fueled engines and
associated potential for ozone impacts (Newman 2001; Ross 2000). Because of the
scant data and lack of modeling tools, it is not possible to estimate the impact of liquid
propellant systems with the same degree of confidence as has been done for solid
propellant systems. Further research is required before the stratospheric impacts of
LOX/LH2 and LOX/RP-1 (kerosene) combustion emissions can be quantified (NASA
2011).
Among the proposed launch vehicles, the Atlas V 551 emits the greatest amount of
SRB exhaust into the stratosphere. It has been estimated that the ozone loss per Atlas
V 551 launch is 0.077 percent (USAF 2000). The present state of the stratosphere is
characterized by global ozone loss of about 4 percent, caused by past use of

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other controlled materials (NASA 2011). The launch of
any of the proposed launch vehicles is not expected to significantly increase ozone loss.
As a result of launch of the Delta or Falcon rockets, black carbon "soot" would be
emitted directly in the stratosphere above 20 km (12 mi). These black carbon or soot
particles can have a greater impact on climate change than rocket emissions of CO2.
Black carbon is known to be the second most important compound driving climate
change. In modeling studies, utilizing the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate
Model, researchers have shown these soot particles may accumulate into a thin cloud
at an altitude of about 40 km (25 mi), which remains relatively localized in latitude and
altitude (Ross, et al. 2010). The model suggests that if this layer reached high enough
concentrations, the Earth’s surface and atmospheric temperatures could be altered. The
globally integrated effect of these changes is, as for carbon dioxide, to increase the
amount of solar energy absorbed by the Earth’s atmosphere. Research on the potential
climate change impacts of black carbon from rockets is in a very early stage and
projections of impacts are being refined (KSC 2014).
Mitigation and/or minimization of this potential impact are being addressed in the
aerospace industry by advancing propulsion system designs and innovative fuel
mixtures that burn cleaner and reduce soot formation (KSC 2014). At present, impacts
from black carbon (soot) emitted as a result of the launch of one Atlas or Falcon series
vehicle are considered minor. Liquid propellants on the Delta IV Heavy do not generate
black carbon (soot).
Concerning long-term effects, launch of the proposed Mars 2020 mission on the Atlas
V, Delta IV, or Falcon Heavy would not be expected to make substantial contributions to
the amounts of ozone-depleting chemicals or greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Some short-term ozone depletion affects would occur within the exhaust plume of the
launch vehicle, but the depletion trail would be largely temporary and dissipate within a
few hours of the vehicle's passage. Greenhouse gases, principally CO2 (from the Atlas
V and Falcon Heavy), would be emitted during launch, but the amount would be
negligible. The Falcon Heavy is estimated to produce up to 976,000 kg (2,151,000 lb) of
CO2 per launch (USAF2011). This is on the order of one hundred-thousandths (10-5) of
a percent compared to the net greenhouse gases emitted by the United States in 2011
of approximately 5.8x1012 kg (1.3x1013 lb) measured as carbon dioxide equivalent
(EPA 2013).
In conclusion, the amount of greenhouse gases that may potentially be produced by the
launch vehicle for the 2020 mission would not result in substantial or long-term
environmental impacts to global ozone depletion or global warming.
4.1.2.15. Orbital and Reentry Debris
During the launch sequence of either the Atlas V, the Delta IV, or the Falcon Heavy for
the Mars 2020 mission (see Figures 2-12, 2-14, and 2-16 respectively), the SRB
casings of the Atlas V, the strap-on CBCs of the Delta IV, or the boosters of the Falcon
Heavy; the first stage, and the PLF would be jettisoned and fall into the Atlantic Ocean
in predetermined drop zones (see Section 4.1.2.11) well before reaching Earth’s orbit.
Shortly after separating from the first stage, the second stage engine would be ignited,

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 4. Environmental Consequences

accelerating the second stage and the attached spacecraft to low Earth orbit. After a
brief coast period, the second stage engine would be reignited, accelerating to Earth
escape velocity. After propellant depletion, the second stage would be separated from
the Mars 2020 spacecraft, and the second stage would continue separately into
interplanetary space. Therefore, a normal launch of the Mars 2020 mission would not
contribute to orbital or reentry debris.
4.1.3 Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents
The potential non-radiological environmental impacts associated with expendable
vehicle launch accidents have been discussed in previous USAF environmental
documentation (USAF 1998, USAF 2000), and are summarized here and augmented
with new information where applicable. A variety of accidents could occur during
preparations for launch and during launch. Only two types of non-radiological accidents
would have potential environmental consequences: a liquid propellant spill occurring
after the start of propellant loading operations and a launch accident. A launch accident
that leads to loss of the Mars 2020 mission is estimated to occur with a probability of
about 25 times out of 1,000 (SNL 2014). All launch accidents would have non-
radiological impacts.
The potential consequences of these accidents are presented below.
4.1.3.1. Liquid Propellant Spills
A typical Atlas V uses about 284,089 kg (626,309 lb) of RP-1 and LOX for the first
stage, and about 20,830 kg (45,922 lb) of LH2 and LOX, with less than 91 kg (201 lb) of
hydrazine for the Centaur second stage (USAF 2000, ILS 2001). A typical Delta IV
Heavy uses about 606,300 kg (1,336,663 lb) of LH2 and LOX for the first stage, about
27,200 kg (60,000 lb) of LH2 and LOX for the second stage, with about 154 kg (340 lb)
of hydrazine for the second stage (ULA 2013, Freeman 2006). The proposed Falcon
Heavy would be expected to use about 784,000 kg (1,730,000 lb) of RP-1 and LOX for
the first stage, and about 49,000 kg (108,000 lb) of LH2 and LOX for the second stage
(NASA 2011).
The Mars 2020 spacecraft would use about 460 kg (1014 lb) of hydrazine. The first
stage and second stage fueling operations for both vehicles are performed in
accordance with CCAFS/KSC propellant loading protocols. Standard procedures such
as use of closed loop systems are practiced, which would minimize worker exposure
and the potential for fuel releases.
Accidental leaks or spills of RP-1, LOX, LH2, and hydrazine could occur during
propellant loading and unloading activities. Range safety requirements specify that
plans and procedures be in place to protect the workforce and the public during fueling
operations (USAF 2004). Spill containment would be in place prior to any propellant
transfer to capture any potential release. Hydrazine transfer would involve a relatively
small amount of liquid through a relatively small transfer system, so any leakage would
be held to an absolute minimum. It is expected that, because of the limited quantities
involved, there would be no impact to the public.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Spill kits located in the work area would be used if a release were detected during RP-1
loading. Personnel would be present in the immediate area to handle any release.
Workers would be required to wear personal protective equipment while loading RP-1
and hydrazine, and all unprotected workers would be removed from the area prior to
loading. The operator would remotely close applicable valves to minimize any release
and safe the system.
If a spill or release is detected during LOX and LH2 loading at the launch pad, the
operator would remotely close the applicable valves to minimize the amount of liquid
released, and safe the system. Water deluge would be used if heat were detected in the
area of concern. Deluge water would be collected and treated, if necessary, prior to
being released to the CCAFS/KSC wastewater treatment plant.
4.1.3.2. Launch Failures and Suborbital, Orbital and Reentry Debris
Air Quality
The USAF has modeled postulated accidents at CCAFS involving combustion of typical
launch vehicle propellants (USAF 2000). Representative meteorological conditions were
used in the analyses to model movement of the exhaust cloud. Release and combustion
of both liquid and solid propellants were assumed to be involved. For the modeled
accidents, the principal constituents resulting from burning propellant were CO, Al2O3
particulates, and HCl; but also included H2, H2O, and CO2. Although Al2O3 particulates
would be deposited from the explosion cloud as it was carried downwind, little wet
deposition of HCl would be expected unless rain falls through the cloud of combustion
products. The estimated concentrations of combustion products resulting from these
postulated accidents were found to be well within applicable Federal, state, and USAF
standards. Based on these analyses, emissions resulting from an accident during the
Mars 2020 mission launch would not be expected to exceed any of the applicable
environmental standards, and would not adversely create short- or long-term impacts on
air quality in the region.
Geology and Soils
Launch accidents could result in impacts on near-field soils due to contamination from
rocket propellant. In the event of a launch accident, any spilled propellant would be
collected and disposed of by a certified disposal/remediation contractor in accordance
with the facility Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures (SPCC) plan.
Contaminated soils would be removed and treated as hazardous waste in accordance
with Federal, state, and local regulations. Short-term impacts to soils may result but
would be minimal due to soil buffering capacities. No long-term adverse impacts to
geology or soils at CCAFS/KSC would be expected from the Mars 2020 launch
(USAF 1998, NASA 2005a, NASA 2006, NASA 2011)
Water Quality
Unburned pieces of solid propellant with high concentration of ammonium perchlorate
could fall on land or into nearby bodies of water. Trace amounts of solid propellant could
disassociate into ammonium ion and perchlorate ion. At low to moderate
concentrations, the ammonium ion is a plant nutrient and could stimulate plant growth

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 4. Environmental Consequences

for short periods of time. At higher concentrations, the ammonium ion is toxic to aquatic
life and could cause short-term mortalities of aquatic animals within the immediate
vicinity of the launch vehicle impact.
Perchlorate could leach into surrounding water, but it would take about one-half year for
90 percent of the perchlorate to leach out in fresh water and about one year for 90
percent to leach out in salt water. At these rates, the perchlorate would be diluted as it
mixes with the surrounding water. Therefore, no substantial impacts to water quality and
biota in those areas would be expected as the solid propellant dissolves slowly. Pieces
of unburned solid propellant falling on land would be collected and disposed of as
hazardous waste. Similarly, large pieces falling in fresh water areas would be collected
and properly disposed of where practical, minimizing the potential for perchlorate
contamination (DOD 2003).
Launch vehicle debris from a liquid propellant fueled rocket is considered a negligible
hazard because virtually all hazardous materials are consumed in the destruct action or
dispersed in the air, and only structural debris could potentially fall into the water.
The low toxicity of this compound together with the slow release into the water does not
present a known substantial health hazard to marine life (TRW 2002).
Biological Resources
Birds, reptiles, and small mammals would be most at risk from impacts due to a launch
accident. Potential fires could result in temporary loss of habitat and mortality for
species that do not leave the area. An accident on the launch pad would frighten nearby
sensitive animal species that use the Indian and Banana Rivers (such as birds in
rookeries and neo-tropical birds). Threatened and endangered species, such as
manatees, sea turtles, and other aquatic species, would not be expected to be
adversely affected by a launch accident. Launch pad accidents resulting in full stack
intact impact could result in impacts on local water bodies due to contamination from
rocket propellant. In the event of of a launch accident, spilled propellant could enter
water bodies close to the launch pad and could cause contamination primarily from
hydrazine, monomethyl hydrazine (MMH), nitrogen tetroxide (NTO), and SRB
propellant. Powdered aluminum from the SRB propellant would rapidly oxidize to
aluminum oxide, which is non-toxic at the pH that prevails in surface waters surrounding
all proposed launch sites (NASA 2011).
In the event of a launch accident, hydrazine fuel tanks may impact water. Hydrazine
fuels are soluble and would disperse rapidly. Because of the small amount of hydrazine
present (even in the event of a full spacecraft fuel tank impacting water), short-term
impacts on the near-shore environments may result, but long-term impacts would not be
significant due to the buffering capacity of large water bodies (NASA 2008). Debris from
launch failures has the potential to adversely affect managed fish species and their
habitats in the vicinity of the launch site. Ammonium perchlorate in solid propellant
contains chemicals that, in high concentrations, have the potential to result in adverse
impacts to the marine environment. As noted above, however, perchlorate would leach
out slowly and be diluted to low concentrations in the surrounding water, posing little
impact to the marine environment (DOD 2003). The USAF has consulted with the

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

National Marine Fisheries Service on essential fish habitat regarding launches from
CCAFS (USAF 2000) of vehicles using SRBs. Launch of the Mars 2020 mission from
CCAFS would be covered under this consultation.
Residual RP-1 fuel is weakly soluble, would spread over the surface of the water, and
should evaporate within a few hours, resulting in only a short-term impact to aquatic
biota.
The environmental impact of objects falling into the ocean would depend on the physical
properties of the materials (e.g., size, composition, quantity, and solubility) and the
marine environment of the impact region. Based on past analyses of other space
components, it is expected that the environmental impact of reentering orbital debris
would be negligible (NASA 2005b; USAF 1998). There is a remote possibility that
surviving pieces of debris could impact marine life or vessels on or near the ocean
surface. Once the pieces travel a few feet below the ocean surface, their velocity would
be slowed to the point that the potential for direct impact on sea life would be low
(NASA 2008, NASA 2011).
Health and Safety
A launch vehicle accident either on or near the launch pad within a few seconds of lift-
off presents the greatest potential for impact to human health, principally to workers. For
the proposed Mars 2020 mission, the primary potential health hazard during a launch
accident would be from the HCl emitted from burning solid propellant from the SRBs.
Range Safety at CCAFS/KSC uses models to predict launch hazards to the public and
to personnel prior to every launch. These models calculate the risk of injury resulting
from toxic gases, debris, and blast overpressure from potential launch failures.
Launches are postponed if the predicted collective public risk of injury exceeds
acceptable limits, which are applied separately for the risk of injury from exposure to
toxic gases, debris, and blast overpressure (USAF 2004). This approach takes into
account the probability of a catastrophic failure, the resultant plume's toxic
concentration, direction, and dwell time, and emergency preparedness procedures
(USAF 2000).
Range Safety requirements mandate destruct systems on liquid propellant tanks and
SRBs (see Section 2.1.6.4). In the event of destruct system activation, the propellant
tanks and SRB casings would be ruptured and the entire launch vehicle would be
destroyed. A catastrophic launch failure would involve burning solid propellant and the
ignition of liquid propellant. The potential short-term effects of an accident would include
a localized fireball, falling debris from explosion of the vehicle, release of unburned
propellants and propellant combustion products, on-pad or very low altitude explosions,
death or damage to nearby biota, and brush fires near the launch pad.
A Brevard County Emergency Management Center representative would be present at
a CCAFS launch console with direct audio and video communications links to the
Center. The USAF also has a direct emergency phone line to the Florida State
Emergency Response Center.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

For suborbital, orbital, and reentry debris, standard safety review processes require that
NASA missions comply with the re-entry requirements of the NASA Standard 8719.14,
Process for Limiting Orbital Debris. This NASA Standard (i.e., Requirement 4.7.1) limits
the risk of human casualty from re-entry debris to 1 in 10,000 and requires that missions
be designed to assure that, in both controlled and uncontrolled entries, domestic and
foreign landmasses are avoided.
NASA studied the potential risks associated with reentry and Earth impact of spacecraft
propellant tanks, specifically in regard to a late launch failure to insert a spacecraft into
a typical parking orbit for later deep space trajectory injection. The study relied primarily
on existing data and analyses supplemented by a detailed assessment of the potential
impacts of a suborbital accident from the Eastern Range (CCAFS) involving
approximately 400 kg (882 lb) of hydrazine reaching land. This case was determined to
represent a wide range of potential accidents involving hydrazine propellants (NASA
2011).
The study of a postulated release of approximately 400 kg of residual hydrazine as a
result of a suborbital accident for a launch from the Eastern Range indicates there is
less than 1 chance in 10,000 (including the probability of the launch accident and
ground impact) of harming any individual based on the 1-hour interim Acute Exposure
Guideline Level-2 (AEGL-2) value of 13 ppm (17 mg/m3) established by the EPA for
hydrazine [http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/index.htm]. In fact, a larger release of
hydrazine (i.e., a factor of 2 to 3 higher) or approximately 1,200 kg under the same
circumstances would still pose less than 1 chance in 10,000 of harming any individual,
including the probability of the launch accident and ground impact (NASA 2011).
Specifically, for the MSL spacecraft, an analysis showed that under certain launch
accident conditions, there was a small probability the spacecraft with a full propellant
load (475 kg) could reenter prior to achieving orbit and impact land in southern Africa or
Madagascar. The probability of such an accident occurring and leading to a land impact
was determined to be on the order of 1 in 20,000. The overall risk of an individual injury
resulting from the land impact of a spacecraft and exposure to hydrazine was
determined to be less than 1 in 100,000 (NASA 2010b).
In accident scenarios occurring after achievement of the parking orbit, analysis for the
MSL spacecraft determined it could reenter from orbit and potentially impact land
anywhere between 36° north and south of the equator. Under these conditions, only a
small portion (i.e., less than about 5%) of the full propellant load could reach the ground
if the tanks did not burst due to reentry heating effects and release their contents into
the atmosphere. The overall probability of this type of accident occurring was
determined to be less than 1 in 200. In this type of accident, it is extremely unlikely that
there would be any residual hydrazine remaining inside the propellant tanks at the point
of ground impact (NASA 2010b).
Because of the increasing number of objects in space and their potential for reentry,
NASA adopted guidelines and assessment procedures to reduce the number of non-
operational spacecraft and spent rocket upper stages orbiting the Earth. NASA’s launch
Project Managers must employ design and operation practices that limit the generation
of orbital debris, consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness. The Mars

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2020 mission has completed the required orbital debris assessment report for the
spacecraft. The report indicates which requirements are applicable and documents
compliance with applicable requirements. NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance approved the report on January 15, 2014.
NPR 8715.6A, NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris, requires that
each program or project conduct a formal assessment for the potential to generate
orbital debris and to analyze the impacts of space structure reentry. NASA also has a
technical standard (NASA-STD 8719.14) and corresponding handbook (NASA-HBK
8719.14) to provide specific guidelines and methods to limit orbital debris generation.
To mitigate potential safety and environmental impacts from orbital debris generation
and space structure reentry, all NASA orbital missions originating from the proposed
launch facilities would comply with the processes outlined in NPR 8715.6A and NASA-
STD 8719.14, both of which establish requirements for (1) limiting the generation of
orbital debris, (2) assessing the risk of collision with existing space debris, (3) assessing
the potential of space structures to impact the surface of the Earth, and (4) assessing
and limiting the risk associated with the end of mission of a space object. These
requirements apply to both full spacecraft and jettisoned components, including launch
vehicle orbital stages.
For accidents involving suborbital debris, parts of the exploded vehicle would fall back
to Earth. Except for on-pad or near-pad accidents, most of the fragments would fall into
the Atlantic Ocean, where the metal parts would eventually corrode. Toxic
concentrations of metals would not be likely because of slow corrosion rates and the
large volume of ocean water available for dilution (USAF 1996a, NASA 2011).
4.1.4 Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents Involving Radioactive Material
NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have assessed the potential
environmental impacts of launch accidents involving release of plutonium dioxide
(PuO2). The analysis results indicate that the most likely outcome of implementing the
proposed Mars 2020 mission is a successful launch of the spacecraft toward Mars. If,
however, a launch accident were to occur, the most probable outcome is an accident
without a release of the PuO2. Specifically:
 There is a 97.5% chance of a successful launch.
 There is a 2.5% chance of a launch accident.
 There is a 1 in 2,600 chance of a launch accident that would release plutonium
dioxide.
o There is a 1 in 11,000 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide in the launch area.
o There is a 1 in 3,500 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide outside the launch area.
 No radiological fatalities would be expected to occur as a result of any accident.
 The average maximum dose to any member of the public from an accident with a
release in the launch area would be equal to about 3 months of exposure to
natural background radiation for a person living in the United States.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

The launch success probability is estimated for a composite launch vehicle to

successfully complete all pre-launch operations, first stage flight, second stage flight,
and conclude with successful insertion of the spacecraft into the proper Earth escape
trajectory toward Mars. The composite launch vehicle accident probabilities were
derived by combining the estimated accident probabilities for the Atlas V and Delta IV
launch vehicles from the Mars 2020 Representative Databook (NASA 2013e). As such,
these estimated probabilities do not reflect the reliability of any single launch vehicle.
The consequences and their probabilities are based upon these launch vehicle accident
probabilities and estimated release probabilities in DOE’s Nuclear Risk Assessment for
the Mars 2020 Mission Environmental Impact Statement (SNL 2014).
This section summarizes the results from the DOE's nuclear risk assessment (SNL
2014).
NASA, DOE, and its contractors have conducted several safety assessments of
launching and operating spacecraft using RTGs (e.g., the Galileo mission in 1989, the
Ulysses mission in 1990, the Cassini mission in 1997, the New Horizons mission in
2005, and the Mars Science Laboratory mission in 2011). In developing the nuclear risk
assessment for this FEIS, NASA and DOE have drawn from an extensive experience
base that involves:
 testing and analysis of the General Purpose Heat Source Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generator (GPHS-RTG) and its components (e.g., fueled iridium
clads and GPHS modules) (see Section 2.1.3) under simulated launch accident
environments;
 evaluating the probability of launch-related accidents based on evaluations of
system designs and launch histories, including extensive studies of the January
1997 Delta II accident at CCAFS, and of launch vehicle designs; and
 estimating the outcomes of the response of an RTG and its components to the
launch accident environments.
The information and results presented in the DOE risk assessment and summarized in
this FEIS are the result of the evolution of the risk assessments performed for previous
missions which included nuclear materials (e.g., Cassini, the Mars Exploration Rovers
(MERs), New Horizons, and Mars Science Laboratory).
4.1.4.1. Risk Assessment Methodology
The nuclear risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission considers (1) potential
accidents associated with the launch and their probabilities and resulting environments;
(2) the response of the MMRTG to such accident environments in terms of varying
amounts of radioactive material that are released and become airborne (source terms)
and the release probabilities; and (3) the radiological consequences and risks
associated with such a release. The risk assessment was based on an MMRTG typical
radioactive material inventory of approximately 60,000 curies (Ci) of plutonium -238 (an
alpha-emitter with a 87.7 year half-life) in the form of plutonium dioxide. The activity

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

includes minor contributions from other related plutonium and actinide radionuclides
(see Table 2-4).
A composite approach has been taken in reporting the results in the DOE risk
assessment for this FEIS for accident probabilities, potential releases of PuO2 in case of
an accident (with that portion of the release becoming airborne called source terms),
radiological consequences, and mission risks. In the composite approach, the results for
the representative Atlas V 551 and Delta IV Heavy launch vehicles were combined in a
probability-weighted manner. DOE’s risk assessment was developed during the time
when the candidate launch vehicles being considered by NASA for the Mars 2020
mission were the Atlas V 541 and 551, the Delta IV Heavy, and the Falcon Heavy. Data
for the Atlas V 551 was used to represent both Atlas V launch vehicles; Delta IV Heavy
data was used to represent both the Delta IV Heavy and the Falcon Heavy. The primary
difference between the Atlas V 551 and the Atlas V 541 is one additional solid rocket
booster on the Atlas V 551. Therefore, the consequences associated with launch
accidents for the Atlas V 541 would be enveloped by those for the Atlas V 551 launch
accidents. While many details regarding the Falcon Heavy design are not presently
available, both the Delta IV Heavy and Falcon Heavy are large boost capacity liquid
fueled launch vehicles. Both consist of a liquid propellant fueled first stage core with two
nearly identical boosters and a second stage powered by a single liquid fueled engine.
Differences in the launch vehicles in terms of design, accident probabilities, and
accident environments have been taken into account in developing composite results.
The basic steps in the risk assessment methodology are presented in Figure 4-1. The
nuclear risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission FEIS began with the identification of
initial launch vehicle system failures and the subsequent chain of accident events that
could ultimately lead to accident environments that could threaten the MMRTG. These
launch vehicle system failures were based on Atlas V 551 and Delta IV Heavy system
reliabilities and estimated failure probabilities developed by NASA (2013).
Some intermediate accident events (such as fragments from a propellant tank
explosion) and final accident configurations (such as the MMRTG impacting the ground
near burning solid propellant) have the potential to create accident environments that
could damage the MMRTG and result in the release of PuO2. Based on analyses
performed for earlier missions that carried radioisotope devices14, DOE identified the
specific accident events that could potentially threaten the MMRTG. Eight accident
events were identified for consideration for the Mars 2020 mission FEIS:
(1) Liquid propellant explosions;
(2) Solid propellant explosions;
(3) Liquid propellant fires;

14
RTGs and radioisotope heater units (which contain about 2.7 grams (0.1 ounce) of PuO2, and generate
1 watt of heat for passive thermal control). Radioisotope heater units are not planned for the Proposed
Action (Alternative 1).

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 4. Environmental Consequences

(4) Solid propellant fires;

(5) Fragments;
(6) Ground impacts;
(7) Debris impact; and
(8) Reentry conditions (i.e., aerodynamic loads and aerodynamic heating).

Figure 4-1. The Radiological Risk Assessment Methodology

A given accident could involve one or more of these environment characteristics. The
severity of the environments would vary from accident to accident. NASA has
conducted a number of experiments to improve understanding of accident
environments. The ongoing Solid Propellant Fire Tests and the Star 37 Motor Drop
Tests are two most recent experiments for this purpose.
DOE determined the response of the MMRTG and GPHS modules to these accident
environments and estimated the amount of radioactive material that could potentially be
released. Results of DOE’s testing and analyses program for previous configurations of
RTGs were used to determine if a release of radioactive material from the MMRTG
could potentially occur. The release fractions (the fraction of the PuO2 that would be
released to the environment) were determined by considering five accident

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

environments: explosive overpressure, fragment impact, mechanical impact, thermal

environments (liquid propellant fires and explosions and solid propellant fires), and
reentry conditions. The source term (that portion of PuO2 released from the MMRTG
that becomes airborne and can be transported downwind) for the MMRTG are based on
the results of DOE safety testing and computer modeling.
DOE’s testing program examined the response of the MMRTG and GPHS modules to
accident environments. The testing program has improved DOE’s understanding of the
response of the MMRTG and GPHS modules to reentry, impact, and solid propellant fire
conditions. DOE incorporated design modifications to address issues identified in
testing or changes in mission architecture. In particular, the GPHS modules have been
updated over time with design improvements for increased reentry survivability, impact,
and fire protection since its original design for the GPHS-RTG.
A better understanding of the response of the MMRTG to accident environments has
also allowed DOE to reduce conservatisms in the computer models used to simulate
their response to accident environments. Combined with improving computing
capabilities (both in machine capability and computer model refinements that result in
higher fidelity models), the computer models are better and more precisely able to
predict the response of the MMRTG to accident environments.
The consequences of postulated releases were estimated by determining the
consequences associated with each of the two surrogate launch vehicles (the Atlas V
551 and the Delta IV Heavy) as they would be used for the Mars 2020 mission.
Parameters considered in the consequence analysis include: 2020 population
estimates, plume configuration, launch complex location, historical meteorology during
the July to September launch period, particle size distributions derived from the
response of the MMRTG to accident environments, and key environmental factors such
as solid propellant amount and geometry. Consequence values for population dose,
maximum exposed individual dose, population health effects15, and land contamination
were estimated at both mean and 99th percentile values.
4.1.4.2. Launch Accidents and Accident Probabilities
For the purpose of this risk assessment, the MarV 2020 mission was divided into six
mission phases on the basis of mission elapsed time (the time in seconds relative to
launch) reflecting principal launch events. The key events in defining the mission
phases are: the start of the first stage main engines which occurs shortly before liftoff,
liftoff16, the time at which there is no longer a possibility that debris from an accident
would impact in the vicinity of the launch area, the time at which any debris from an

15
Additional latent cancer fatalities due to a radioactive release (i.e., the number of cancer fatalities
resulting from this release that are in addition to those cancer fatalities the general population would
normally experience from other causes).
16
The main engine undergoes an automatic health check beginning at first-stage main engine start.
Should a malfunction be detected before liftoff, the engine would be shut down and the launch would be
aborted.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

accident would be subject to suborbital reentry heating, and the time orbit is achieved.
These events occur at different mission elapsed times for the Atlas V and Delta IV
vehicles.
 Phase 0—Pre-Launch: from the installation of the MMRTG to just prior to the
start of the first stage main engine
 Phase 1—Early Launch: from the start of the first stage main engines to just prior
to the time after which there would be no potential for debris or an intact vehicle
configuration to impact land in the launch area, and water impact would occur
 Phase 2—Late Launch: from the end of Phase 1 to when the launch vehicle
reaches an altitude of about 30 km (100,000 ft), an altitude above which reentry
heating could occur
 Phase 3—Suborbital Reentry: from an altitude of about 30 km (100,000 ft) to the
first engine cutoff of the second stage and the Command Destruct System (CDS)
is disabled
 Phase 4—Orbit Reentry: from the first engine cutoff of the second stage to
separation of the spacecraft from the second stage
 Phase 5—Long-term Reentry: from spacecraft separation to no chance of
spacecraft reentry.
The methodology used to calculate the Atlas V and Delta IV probabilities utilized flight
histories of comparable United States and Russian launch vehicles flown since 1988.
This flight history consists of earlier versions of Atlas and Titan launch vehicles
manufactured by the Lockheed Martin Corporation, Delta launch vehicles manufactured
by The Boeing Company, and other launch vehicles. This is done to provide some
assurance to the estimate that all past applicable and partially applicable flight failure
experiences are considered in the reliability estimate of the launch vehicle for the Mars
2020 mission. The analytical approach for the overall mission launch reliability is
considered by NASA to be generally representative of the available launch vehicles for
this mission, including the Falcon Heavy, and is based upon the most recent best
available information at the time of the analysis. NASA continues to evaluate the
reliability of the candidate launch vehicles (NASA 2013e).
Accidents and their associated probabilities were developed in terms of initiating
failures, defined as the first system-level indication of an anomaly that could lead to a
launch abort (i.e., safe hold or termination of the launch countdown), catastrophic
accident, or mission failure. An example of an initiating failure would be a trajectory
control malfunction resulting in the launch vehicle deviating from its planned trajectory.
An initiating failure is the beginning of a sequence of intermediate events that lead to a
range of possible end states, including accident configurations involving the MMRTG
and various launch vehicle stages17 and the Mars 2020 spacecraft. For example,
activation of the Flight Termination System (FTS) following a trajectory control

17
For brevity in the following discussion, the first and second stages of the Mars 2020 launch vehicle and
the Mars 2020 spacecraft, are sometimes referred to as Stages 1 and 2, and SV (space vehicle)
respectively.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

malfunction could lead to the MMRTG impacting the ground. Associated with the
accident configuration end states are the environments that could damage the MMRTG
and result in the release of PuO2.
Pre-Launch (T < 0 seconds) initiating failures include tank failures, MMRTG cooling
system failures, and inadvertent FTS activation. Pre-Launch initiating failures generally
involve conditions that can be mitigated by existing systems or procedures, leading to
mission abort rather than accidents that threaten the MMRTG.
The Launch and Post Launch (T ≥ 0seconds) initiating failures include:
 Ground Support Equipment failure during liftoff
 Trajectory and attitude control malfunctions
 Propellant tank failures
 Catastrophic main engine failures affecting either the Stage 1 or Stage 2 engines
 SRB case failure (in the Atlas V 551)
 Structural failure
 Inadvertent FTS activation or payload fairing (PLF) separation
 Staging failure.
The post launch (Phase 1 and 2) accident end states that can result from the initiating
failures are determined to a large degree by the FTS actions (see Section 2.1.6.4) that
occur or do not occur during the accident progression following the initiating failure.
Important FTS considerations affecting the end states are:
 Automatic Destruct System (ADS). The ADS destroys the Stages 1 and 2 liquid
propellant tanks and the SRBs (on the Atlas V 551). The ADS is safed
(automatically deactivated) prior to Stage 1 / 2 separation.
 Command Destruct System (CDS): The CDS is activated by the Mission Flight
Control Officer (MFCO) and destroys the launch vehicle in the same manner as
the ADS. The MFCO would likely issue a CDS in case of a trajectory or attitude
control malfunction, where the launch vehicle deviation from the planned
trajectory violates specific range safety criteria for continuation of a safe launch.
Should the MFCO response time needed for a CDS be insufficient, ground
impact of the entire vehicle (termed full-stack intact impact, or FSII) could result.
The CDS is safed at the end of the first Stage 2 burn.
The initiating failures therefore lead to one or more of the following accident end states,
denoting conditions of first threat to the MMRTG:
 On-Pad Explosion, occurring as a result of accidents occurring during Pre-
Launch or very near the pad just prior to actual liftoff and after completion of the
Stage 1 engine health check
 Low and High Altitude FTS. “Low Altitude” denotes conditions where impacts are
likely to occur on land, while “High Altitude” denotes conditions leading to impact
on the Atlantic Ocean. The response of the spacecraft (SC) to an FTS would
depend on the launch vehicle and the accident environment conditions
 Full Stack Intact Impact (FSII), in which the entire launch vehicle stack impacts
the ground

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 4. Environmental Consequences

 Stage 2/ Space Vehicle (SV) Impact, in which Stage 2/SV impacts the ground
 SV Intact Impact (SVII), in which the intact SV impacts the ground
 Sub-orbital reentry
 Orbital reentry, referring to reentry after decay from orbit. Other types of reentry
are possible (e.g., prompt), but at a much lower probability.
 Long-term reentry, referring to Earth reentry of the spacecraft after a spacecraft
maneuver failure enroute to Mars. These type accidents may not occur for tens
to hundreds of years after launch.
The composite accident end state probabilities for the composite launch vehicle are
presented in Table 4-2.
For this FEIS, the initiating probabilities and total probabilities of an accident with a
release of PuO2 are grouped into categories that allow for a descriptive characterization
of the likelihood of each accident. The categories and their associated probability
ranges are:
 unlikely: 10-2 to 10-4 (1 in 100 to 1 in 10 thousand)
 very unlikely: 10-4 to 10-6 (1 in 10 thousand to 1 in 1 million)
 extremely unlikely: less than 10-6 (less than 1 in 1 million).

Table 4-2. Alternative 1 Accident End State Probabilities

Ground Impact Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Total
(a)
Configuration Probability
-5 -5 -4
On-Pad Explosion 3.0x10 9.8x10 - - - - 1.3x10
-5 -5
FSII - 2.2x10 - - - - 2.2x10
-5 -5
Stage 2/SV - 4.8x10 - - - - 4.8x10
-6 -7 -6
SVII 2.8x10 6.3x10 - - - - 3.4x10
-3 -3
Low Altitude FTS - 2.9x10 - - - - 2.9x10

-3 -3
High Altitude FTS - - 3.6x10 - - - 3.6x10
-2 -2
Sub-Orbital Reentry - - - 1.3x10 - - 1.3x10
-3 -3
Orbital Reentry - - - - 4.7x10 - 4.7x10
-6 -6
Long-term Reentry - - - - - 1.0x10 1.0x10
-5 -3 -3 -2 -3 -6 -2
Total 3.3 x10 3.1x10 3.6x10 1.3x10 4.7x10 1.0x10 2.5x10
Source: SNL 2014
(a) The table presents a composite of the accident end state probabilities for the Atlas V 551and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking
the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.

Some of these types of launch accidents occurred during the early development of
launch vehicles in the United States; subsequently, changes were made to both vehicle
design practices and range safety systems to prevent future occurrences. These

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

accidents, in general, require multiple failures of both launch vehicle and range safety
systems. Probability differences of a factor of a few percent would not represent
statistically significant differences and are well within uncertainty bounds. The
discussion of the probabilities by broad frequency categories is more appropriate.
The potential accident environments include blast (explosion overpressure), fragments,
thermal energy (burning liquid propellant and/or solid propellant), reentry conditions
(aerodynamic loads and heating), and surface impact. A given accident could involve
one or more sequential and/or simultaneously occurring accident environments. The
nature and severity of such environments would be a function of the type of accident
and its timing (relative to launch). There are two representative launch vehicles for the
Nuclear Risk Assessment that bound the set of LV that could be selected for the
proposed Mars 2020 mission: the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy. DOE’s nuclear
risk assessment for this FEIS uses a composite average of the two sets of accident
probabilities in performing the nuclear risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission, as
presented in Table 4-2. This approach reflects the state of knowledge at this early stage
in the mission with respect to the launch vehicle to be used on the Mars 2020 mission.
Preliminary analyses indicate that the differences between the two representative
launch vehicles are not expected to be significant, given the uncertainties in estimates
made as part of the overall nuclear risk assessment. At the same time, differences in
accident environments for the two representative launch vehicles are taken into account
in developing composite source terms for use in the analysis.
4.1.4.3. MMRTG Response to Accident Environments
The nature and severity of the accident environments and the design features of the
MMRTG and its components determine the response of the MMRTG and its
components to the accident environments. These responses are then characterized in
terms of the probability of release and the source terms.
The response of the MMRTG to accident environments is based on consideration of
 prior safety testing of the GPHS-RTG and its components (including the GPHS
module),
 modeling of the response of the MMRTG and its components (including the
GPHS module) to accident environments, and
 the types of launch vehicle accidents and their environments.
This information allows estimates to be made of the probability of release of PuO2 and
the amount of the release for the range of accident scenarios and environments that
could potentially occur during the mission. The protection provided by the GPHS
module, its graphite components, and the iridium clad encapsulating the PuO 2 reduces
the potential for release in accident environments. Potential responses of the MMRTG
and its components in accident environments are summarized below (SNL 2014).
 Explosion Overpressure and Fragments: Liquid propellant explosions and
resulting fragments are expected to damage the MMRTG, but not result in any
release of plutonium dioxide.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

 Impact: The GPHS module and its graphitic components are expected to
fracture under mechanical impact conditions. This provides some energy
absorbing protection to the fueled clad. Under most accident conditions this
results in little or no release of plutonium dioxide from the GPHS modules.
o Most impacts of an intact MMRTG or GPHS modules on steel or concrete
near the launch pad could result in little or no release of PuO2, depending on
the impact velocity.
o Suborbital or Orbital Reentry accidents lead to GPHS modules impacting rock
following reentry; a small release could occur.
o The SV is expected to stay intact until impact due to the protection of the SV
back shell and heat shield in any ground impact. The combined effect of the
SV hitting the ground and the MMRTG subsequently being hit by the SV
components above it, occasionally results in a fuel release; depending on the
impact velocity and orientation.
o Larger intact configurations, such as FSII and Stage 2/SV intact impact could
result in higher releases for certain orientations in which launch vehicle and/or
SV components impact directly onto the MMRTG.
 Thermal: The response of the PuO2 to the thermal environment is highly
dependent upon the intensity of that environment. Exposure to liquid propellant
and solid propellant fires results in very different source terms.
o Exposure of released PuO2 to a liquid propellant fireball environment would
be of short duration (nominally 20 s or less). Very minor vaporization of
exposed PuO2 particles would occur depending on the timing of the ground
impact release and the fireball development. Vaporization of PuO2 is
negligible below about 2,177oC (3,951oF) and the fireball temperature would
decrease below this temperature in less than 1 second, and continue
dropping as the fireball expands.
o For the Atlas V 551, exposure of released PuO2 fuel to the higher-
temperature (up to 2,827°C (5,121°F)), longer burning (up to 250 seconds)
solid-propellant from SRB fragments could lead to more substantial
vaporization of exposed PuO2. In addition, exposure of a bare (or breached)
iridium clad could result in clad degradation either through chemical
interactions or melting, resulting in more exposed PuO2 and additional partial
vaporization. The GPHS aeroshell graphitic components could be damaged in
accident environments, which would allow such an exposure of the iridium
clads. In addition, very minor PuO2 vapor releases from intact aeroshell
modules are possible in certain exposure conditions (e.g., underneath large
pieces of burning solid propellant). Under such conditions, temperatures
inside the module could be high enough to degrade the iridium clads and
vaporize some PuO2, which, in turn, could permeate through the somewhat
porous graphitic materials.

 Reentry: Impacts resulting from reentry of the MMRTG are dependent upon
when and from where reentry occurs.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

o Most suborbital reentries are predicted to result in intact impact of the SV due
to the presence of the SV aeroshell for Mars entry. Releases in these cases
are similar in nature to those from SV impact near the launch pad.
o Reentry from circular orbital decay or long-term reentry is predicted to cause
breakup of the SV and the MMRTG with subsequent release of the GPHS
modules. (This breakup of the MMRTG and release of the GPHS modules is
intentional and designed to limit the release of PuO2 in this type of accident.)
This will result in some heating and ablation of the surface of the GPHS
modules, but no containment failure or release in the air. When these
separated components impact land, there is a potential for release from the
GPHS module if the impact is on rock or a similar hard surface. No release is
expected from a water impact or soil impact.
Most launch accidents in Phases 0 and 1 would lead to one of several types of ground
impact configurations (e.g., FSII, Stage 2/SV, SV, SV/MMRTG, MMRTG, or free GPHS
modules). Ground impacts of the SV on steel or concrete can occasionally lead to a
release. For larger impacting configurations, such as an FSII or Stage 2/SV intact
impact, larger fuel releases are expected. Exposure to the liquid propellant fireball could
lead to some vaporization of released PuO2 depending on the relative timing of the
impact release and the fireball development. Subsequent exposure of MMRTG
components and PuO2 to burning solid propellant could result in increased releases
through partial vaporization of the PuO2.
Nearly all Phase 2 accidents lead to impact of debris in the Atlantic Ocean with no
releases. However, there are some very small releases in air from blast-generated
debris.
Phase 3 accidents could lead to sub-orbital reentry heating and ground impact of the
intact SV and MMRTG. The GPHS modules are designed to survive reentry, however,
any subsequent ground impact of the MMRTG on hard surfaces (e.g., rock) could result
in small releases of PuO2. Additionally, there is a possibility that the Mars 2020 entry
vehicle aeroshell might provide some reentry protection such that the SV or portions of
it, including the rover/MMRTG or the MMRTG, could survive reentry and result in SV
components impacting the MMRTG. This could also occasionally result in small
releases of PuO2.
Phase 4 and 5 accidents lead to orbital, and long-term reentry heating and ground
impact environments. The GPHS modules are designed to survive reentry; however,
any ground impact on rock could result in small releases of PuO2.
4.1.4.4. Accident Probabilities and Source Terms
In the nuclear risk assessment, DOE evaluated each of the identified end states and
estimated the accident environments to which the MMRTG would likely be exposed.
From that information, conditional probabilities that a release would occur and estimated
source terms were developed based on the known response of GPHS modules to
various accident environments.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

The probability of a launch accident involving any release of PuO2 is very small,
approximately 1 in 2,600. The most severe accident environments would occur during
launch area accidents that might expose the MMRTG to mechanical impacts, explosion
overpressures and fragments, and fire environments from burning liquid and solid
propellants.
A summary of the accident and source term probabilities by mission phase, along with
mean and 99th percentile source terms, is presented in Table 4-3. For the purpose of
this FEIS, "source term" is defined as the quantity of radioisotope that is released from
the fueled clads in the GPHS modules and becomes airborne. Consequences
associated with the material released in an accident are driven by the portion of the
release that can become airborne and be transported away from the impact site. Not all
of the material released from the fueled clads is expected to become airborne; the
amount that does is dependent upon the accident conditions. Several factors contribute
to a reduction in the released material to the source term. Some of the release could
become trapped in debris or slag at the MMRTG impact site. Plutonium dioxide could be
retained inside the graphite components of the GPHS module, and some could be
shielded from any fire environments by the graphite components and other debris,
including sand. In addition, the size of the plutonium dioxide particles affects the
likelihood of the plutonium dioxide becoming airborne, the larger the particles the less
likely they are to become airborne.

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Table 4-3. Summary of Accident Probabilities and MMRTG Source Terms

(c)
Source Term, Ci Source Term , Ci
Conditional
(given an accident) (given a release)
(a) Probability Total Probability of
Mission Phase Accident Probability th th
Mean 99 of Release a Release Mean 99
(b)
Percentile Percentile
-5 -5
0: Pre-Launch Very Unlikely (3.3x10 ) 0.092 0.048 0.33 Very Unlikely (1.1x10 ) 0.28 6.7

1: Early Launch
-5 -6
On-Pad Explosion Very Unlikely (9.8x10 ) 2.0 0.035 0.085 Very Unlikely (8.3x10 ) 23 40
-5 -6
FSII Very Unlikely (2.2x10 ) 15 340 0.14 Very Unlikely (3.2x10 ) 110 1,800
-5 -6
Stage 2/SV Very Unlikely (4.8x10 ) 2.8 55 0.036 Very Unlikely (1.8x10 ) 77 910

SVII Extremely Unlikely 2.7 40 0.054 Extremely Unlikely 50 580

-7 -8
(6.3x10 ) (3.4x10 )
-3 -5
Low Altitude FTS Unlikely (2.9x10 ) 1.5 16 0.025 Very Unlikely (7.5x10 ) 61 620
-3 -5
Overall Phase 1 Unlikely (3.1x10 ) 1.7 16 0.028 Very Unlikely (8.8x10 ) 59 630
-3 -5 -6
2: Late Launch Unlikely (3.6x10 ) 3.4x10 - 0.0021 Very Unlikely (7.7x10 ) 0.016 0.23
-2 -5
3: Suborbital 1.3x10 0.047 - 0.0013 Very Unlikely (1.5x10 ) 42 930
-3 -4
4: Orbital Unlikely (4.7x10 ) 0.030 0.65 0.056 Unlikely (2.6X10 ) 0.53 6.2
-6
5: Long-term Reentry Very Unlikely (1.0x10 ) 0.073 1.5 0.094 Extremely Unlikely 0.77 7.8
-8
(9.4x10 )
(d) -2 -4
Overall Mission 2.5x10 0.24 0.0095 0.016 Unlikely (3.8x10 ) 16 340
Source: SNL 2014
(a) The table presents a composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the
conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.
(b) The conditional probability of a release of PuO2 given that an accident has occurred.
(c) Total source terms given. The source term is that portion of the release, which becomes airborne would represent the amounts of PuO2 released that are no more than 100 microns (100
micrometers) in diameter. Particles larger than this do not generally become airborne and would remain in the vicinity of the accident.
(d) Overall mission values are weighted by the total probability of release for each mission phase.
Notes: Differences in multiplications and summations are due to rounding of results as reported in SNL 2014. Probability categories, i.e., unlikely, very unlikely, defined by NASA.

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As noted in Table 4-3, particles larger than 100 micrometers (μm) are expected to
remain in the vicinity of the MMRTG impact site. The 99th percentile source term is the
value predicted to be exceeded with a probability of 0.01 (1 in 100), given a release in
an accident. (This percentile is derived from a statistical analysis to model the
progression of the accident. In this analysis, DOE has used a computer code that
performs multiple trials, typically 150,000, in which the probabilities of the parameters
that affect the size of the source term are varied according to their probability
distributions. The 99th percentile is therefore the value exceeded in 1 percent of these
trials.) In this context, the 99th percentile value reflects the potential for higher
radionuclide releases at lower probabilities. The 99th percentile releases are one to
approximately 24 times the mean estimates reported in this FEIS, but at probabilities of
a factor of 100 times lower than the mean probabilities.
 Phase 0 (Pre-Launch): During the pre-launch period, and prior to ignition of the
Stage 1 liquid rocket engine, most initiating failures result in a mission abort.
Those failures that result in on-pad accidents and a release have a total
probability of 1.1x10-5 (1 in 93,000). The mean source term, given that an
accident with a release has occurred, is estimated to be 0.28 Ci.
 Phase 1 (Early Launch): During Phase 1, during which land impacts, including
near the launch complex, are possible, the accidents resulting in a release have
a total probability estimated to be 8.8x10-5 (or 1 in 11,000). The mean source
term, given that an accident with a release has occurred, is estimated to be 59
Ci.
Most initiating failures occurring in Phase 1 would lead to activation of the FTS.
The elements of the FTS are highly redundant and reliable. As a result, the
expected outcome of a Phase 1 accident is ground impact of the spacecraft or
portions thereof, including possibly the rover with attached MMRTG, the MMRTG
alone, or free GPHS modules. In this case, mechanical damage and, for an Atlas
V 551 accident, potential exposure to burning solid propellant could occur. The
probability for this impact configuration with a release is estimated to be 7.5x10-5
(or 1 in 13,000). The mean source term, given an accident with a release has
occurred, is estimated to be 61 Ci.
A much less likely outcome of a Phase 1 accident involves failure of some or all
of the FTS elements to perform properly. This could lead to ground impact of the
spacecraft (with the MMRTG inside) still attached to other launch vehicle stages
(Stages 1 and 2, or Stage 2). Since this would require multiple failures of safety
systems, such ground impact configurations leading to a release are very
unlikely, with an estimated probability of 5.0 x10-6 (1 in 200,000). However,
because the MMRTG could impact the ground within the spacecraft at higher
velocities and with additional mass above the spacecraft due to the attached
Stage(s), the potential for more severe mechanical damage is higher than with
the expected accident conditions associated with normal activation of the FTS.
For impact configurations leading to the largest estimated releases, such as the
Intact Stage 2/SV and the FSII, slightly larger estimated mean source terms
given an accident with a release, of 77 Ci and 110 Ci, respectively could occur.

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 Phase 2 (Late Launch): All accidents that could occur in Phase 2 would lead to
impact of debris in the Atlantic Ocean. Most such accidents result in no release
of PuO2. However, in some cases, small quantities of PuO2 can be released. It is
possible that blast and fragment impacts could result in some at altitude
releases. The total probability of a release is very unlikely— 7.7x10-6 (one in
130,000). The estimated mean source term, given an accident with a release
would be 0.016 Ci.
 Phase 3 (Suborbital): Accidents during Phase 3 include sub-orbital reentries.
Prior to the attainment of Earth parking orbit, these conditions could lead to
prompt sub-orbital reentry within minutes. Following spacecraft breakup during
reentry, this could result in impacts of individual GPHS modules along the vehicle
flight path over the Atlantic Ocean and southern Africa. Additional sub-orbital
land impacts are possible after crossing over Africa, depending on the launch
vehicle and its mission timeline. Should the GPHS modules impact hard surfaces
(e.g., rock), small releases are possible at ground level. There is a possibility that
the SV or portions thereof, including the rover/MMRTG or the MMRTG would
survive sub-orbital reentry. The total probability of release in Phase 3 is
estimated to be 1.5x10-5 (or 1 in 67,000). The mean source term given that a
release has occurred is estimated to be 42 Ci.
 Phase 4 (Orbital): Accidents which occur after attaining parking orbit could result
in orbital decay reentries from minutes to years after the accident, affecting Earth
surfaces between approximately 29° north latitude and 29° south latitude. Post-
reentry impact releases would be similar to those in Phase 3. The total probability
of a release is estimated to be 2.6x10-4 (or 1 in 3,800). The mean source term
given that a release has occurred is estimated to be 0.53 Ci.
 Phase 5 (Long-Term Reentry): The potential exists for an inadvertent long-term
(hundreds to thousands of years) reentry should the SC be left in an Earth
crossing orbit. Based on considerations of long-term inadvertent reentry for other
missions, the probability of such an occurrence is estimated to be less than
1x10-6. Post-reentry impact releases would be similar to those in Phase 3. The
total probability of a release is estimated to be 9.4x10-8 (or 1 in 11,000,000). The
mean source term given that a release has occurred is estimated to be 0.77 Ci.
4.1.4.5. Radiological Consequences
The radiological consequences (assuming no post-accident mitigation) of a given
accident that results in a radiological release have been calculated in terms of maximum
individual dose, collective dose, health effects, and land area contaminated at or above
specified levels. The radiological consequences have been determined from
atmospheric transport and dispersion simulations incorporating both launch-site specific
and worldwide meteorological and population data. Biological effects models, based on
methods prescribed by the Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards
(ISCORS), were applied to predict the number of health effects following a launch
accident that results in a release of PuO2. The analysis assumes that no mitigation
measures (e.g., sheltering, evacuation, and decontamination) are taken to reduce the
health impacts. Additional information on the behavior of plutonium in the environment
(environmental transport and health impact mechanisms) can be found in Appendix B.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

The maximum individual dose is the mean maximum dose delivered to a single
individual for a given accident. Collective dose is the sum of the radiation dose received
by all individuals exposed to radiation from a given release in units of “person-rem.”
Internal doses are determined using particle-size dependent dose conversion factors
based on ICRP-60 (ICRP 1979) and ICRP-66/67 (ICRP 1993, ICRP 1994). The
exposure pathways considered include direct inhalation, inhalation of re-suspended
material, ingestion (e.g., vegetables, fruit, and seafood), and external exposure. Due to
the insoluble nature of PuO2, other secondary exposure pathways (e.g., meat and milk)
would be far less important, and their contributions to dose would be negligible. The
collective dose is used to estimate the health effects impacts of launch accidents.
The health effects represent incremental cancer fatalities induced by releases,
determined using the ISCORS estimates of 6x10-4 fatalities per person-rem for the
general population (DOE 2002). The health effects estimators are based on a linear,
non-threshold model relating health effects and effective dose. This means that health
effects decrease as the dose decreases down to zero, rather than assuming a threshold
dose below which there would be no health effects. The probability of incurring a health
effect is estimated for each individual in the exposed population and then the
probabilities summed over the population; an estimate of the total health effects in the
population results.
Table 4-4 presents a summary of DOE’s risk assessment of radiological consequences
given an accident with a release for each of the mission phases. The radiological
consequences were estimated by mission phase in terms of both the mean and 99th
percentile values. The 99th percentile radiological consequence is the value predicted to
be exceeded 1 percent of the time for an accident with a release.
The radiological consequences summarized in Table 4-4 are proportional to the source
terms listed in Table 4-3. Key results for the mean estimates are summarized below; the
corresponding 99th percentile estimates can be found in Table 4-4.
Should the mission be delayed, the proposed Mars 2020 mission would be launched
during the next available launch opportunity in August through September 2022. Since
this launch period is in a similar season as the 2020 launch period, the projected
radiological impacts associated with releases from the MMRTG (Alternative 1) would be
similar to those associated with the 2020 launch, with only a small increase in
population impacts due to population growth. Thus, within the overall uncertainties, the
radiological impacts associated with a 2022 launch would be the same as those for the
proposed 2020 launch. This similarity in impacts for a 2020 and a 2022 mission launch
applies to the impacts associated with releases from LWRHUs (Alternative 3).

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Table 4-4. Summary of Estimated MMRTG Accident Radiological Consequences

(c)
Maximum Individual Dose, (b) Land Contamination
Health Effects 2
(a)
rem km
Mission Phase Total Probability of Release th th
99 99
th
Mean 99 Percentile Mean Percentile Mean Percentile
-5
0: Pre-Launch Very Unlikely (1.1x10 ) 0.00029 0.0068 0.0014 0.033 0.035 0.83

Early Launch
-6
On-Pad Explosion Very Unlikely (8.3x10 ) 0.024 0.040 0.11 0.19 2.9 4.9
-6
FSII Very Unlikely (3.2x10 ) 0.11 1.9 0.52 8.9 13 230
-6
Stage2/SV Very Unlikely (1.8x10 ) 0.079 0.93 0.38 4.5 9.7 110
-8
SVII Extremely Unlikely (3.4x10 ) 0.051 0.59 0.25 2.9 6.3 73
-5
Low Altitude FTS Very Unlikely (7.5x10 ) 0.062 0.63 0.30 3.0 7.6 77
-5
1: Overall Phase 1 Very Unlikely (8.8x10 ) 0.060 0.65 0.29 3.1 7.4 79
-6 -5 -5
2: Late Launch Very Unlikely (7.7x10 ) 1.6x10 0.0002 7.8x10 0.0011 0.0020 0.029
-5
3: Suborbital Very Unlikely (1.5x10 ) 0.043 0.95 0.20 4.6 5.2 120
-4
4: Orbital Unlikely (2.6X10 ) 0.0005 0.0063 0.0026 0.030 0.066 0.77
-8
5: Long-term Reentry Extremely Unlikely (9.4x10 ) 0.0008 0.0080 0.0038 0.038 0.097 0.98
(d) -4
Overall Mission Unlikely (3.8x10 ) 0.016 0.35 0.076 1.7 1.9 43
Source: SNL 2014
(a) The table presents a composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the
conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.
(b) Based on ISCOR health effects recommendation of 6x10-4 health effects per person-rem for the general population.
(c ) Land area contaminated above 0.2 µCi/m2; 1 km2 = 0.386 mi2.
(d) Overall mission values weighted by total probability of release for each mission phase.
Notes: Differences in multiplications and summations are due to rounding of results as reported in SNL 2014. Probability categories, i.e., unlikely, very unlikely, defined by NASA.

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 Phase 0 (Pre-Launch): The initiating failures that result in Phase 0 accident

configurations are very unlikely, having very low probabilities of occurrence. Most
problems that arise during Phase 0 can be successfully mitigated by safety
systems and procedures leading to safe hold or termination of the launch
countdown.
In the very unlikely possibility (probability of 1.1x10-5 or a 1 in 91,000 chance)
that an accident were to occur during Phase 0, however, there is a potential for
measurable releases and contamination. The probability of the MMRTG being
close to large pieces of burning solid propellant would be higher in Phase 0
accidents than in other phases. For this very unlikely accident with a release, the
mean maximum dose to an individual is estimated to be approximately 0.00029
rem (0.29 millirem), less than 0.1 percent of the dose an individual might receive
annually from natural background radiation18.
Assuming no mitigation actions, such as sheltering and exclusion of people from
contaminated land areas, the radiation doses to the potentially exposed
population are predicted to result in 0.0014 mean health effects among the
potentially exposed population.
For Phase 0 accidents with a release, the mean area contaminated above 0.2
microcuries per square meter (μCi/m2) (see Section 4.1.4.7) is estimated to be
about 0.035 square kilometers (km2) (about 0.014 square miles (mi2)). Detectable
levels below 0.2 μCi/m2 would be expected over a larger area.
 Phase 1 (Early Launch): Phase 1 consequences consist of contributions from
two types of accident scenarios. Most initiating failures occurring in Phase 1
would lead to activation of the FTS. The elements of the FTS are highly
redundant and very reliable. As a result, the expected outcome of a Phase 1
accident is that the SV and MMRTG or its components could fall free to the
ground and would be subject to mechanical damage and potential exposure to
burning solid propellant resulting in a release of material. For this very unlikely
impact configuration, with a probability estimated to be 7.5x10-5 (or 1 in 13,000),
the mean maximum individual dose is estimated to be 0.062 rem (62 millirem),
equivalent to about 20 percent of the dose an individual might receive annually
from natural background radiation.
Assuming no mitigation action, such as sheltering, the radiation dose to the
potentially exposed population is predicted to result in 0.30 mean health effects
among the potentially exposed population over the long term.
The risk assessment indicates that about 7.6 km2 (about 2.9 mi2) could be
contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.

18
An average of about 0.31 rem per year for an individual in the United States from natural sources.
Man-made sources add an additional 0.060 to 0.31 rem. The dominant man-made contribution is from
medical radiological diagnosis and therapy. See Section 3.2.6 for further information.

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A less likely outcome of a Phase 1 accident involves failure of some or all of the
FTS elements to perform properly. This could lead to ground impact of the
spacecraft (with the MMRTG inside) still attached to other launch vehicle stages
(Stages 1 and 2, or Stage 2). Since this would require multiple failures of safety
systems, such ground impact configurations leading to a release are very
unlikely, with an estimated probability of 5.0 x10-6 (1 in 200,000). However,
because the MMRTG could impact the ground within the spacecraft at high
speed, the potential for more severe mechanical damage and exposure to
burning liquid and, possibly, solid propellant, could result in higher source terms.
In the more severe impact configurations leading to the largest estimated
releases, such as the FSII, mean exposures as high as about 0.11 rem (110
millirem) to the maximum exposed individual might occur. This dose is about a
third of the dose an individual might receive annually from natural background
radiation. Assuming no mitigation action, such as sheltering, radiation doses to
the potentially exposed population are predicted to result in an estimated 0.52
mean health effects. An estimated area of nearly 13 km2 (about 5.0 mi2) might be
contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2. Detectable levels below 0.2 μCi/m2 would be
expected over a larger area.
 Phase 2 (Late Launch): The total probability of a release in Phase 2,
categorized as very unlikely, is estimated to be 7.7x10-6 (or 1 in 130,000).
Accidents in this phase result in smaller releases and impacts than in any other
phase. The mean maximum individual dose is estimated to be 1.6x10-5 rem
(0.016 millirem), a very small fraction of the dose an individual might receive
annually from natural background radiation.
Assuming no mitigation action, such as sheltering, the radiation dose to the
potentially exposed population is predicted to result in 7.8x10-5 mean health
effects among the potentially exposed population over the long term.
The risk assessment indicates that about 0.002 km2 (about 0.0008 mi2) could be
contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.
 Phase 3 (Suborbital): The total probability of a release in Phase 3, categorized
as very unlikely, is estimated to be 1.5x10-5 (or 1 in 68,000). Mean consequences
are estimated to be 0.043 rem (43 millirem) for maximum individual dose, 0.20
health effects among the potentially exposed population, and 5.2 km2 (about 2.0
mi2) could be contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.
 Phase 4 (Orbital): The total probability of a release in Phase 4, categorized as
very unlikely, is estimated to be 2.6x10-4 (or 1 in 3,800). Mean consequences are
estimated to be 0.0005 rem (0.5 millirem) for the maximum individual dose,
0.0026 health effects among the potentially exposed population, and 0.066 km2
(about 0.025 mi2) could be contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.
 Phase 5 (Long-term Reentry): The total probability of a release in Phase 5,
categorized as extremely unlikely, is estimated to be 9.4x10-8 (or 1 in
11,000,000). Mean consequences are estimated to be 0.0008 rem (0.8 millirem)

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 4. Environmental Consequences

for the maximum individual dose, 0.0038 health effects among the potentially
exposed population, and 0.097 km2 (about 0.037 mi2) could be contaminated
above 0.2 μCi/m2.
4.1.4.6. Discussion of the Results
Maximum Individual Doses
The maximum individual dose is the maximum dose delivered to a single individual for
each accident. During Phase 1, the predicted mean radiation dose to the maximally
exposed individual ranges from about 0.024 rem (24 millirem) for the on-pad explosion
launch area accident up to about 0.11 rem (110 millirem) for a very unlikely FSII in
combination with burning solid propellant. No near-term radiological effects would be
expected from any of these exposures. The dose to the maximally exposed individual
for the FSII is the largest single maximally exposed individual dose for any phase. Each
exposure would increase the statistical likelihood of a health effect. It should be noted
that the prediction of doses to the maximally exposed individual is subject to large
variations and uncertainties in the locations of individuals, meteorological conditions,
periods of exposure, and dispersion modeling.
Population Exposures
Impacts to downwind populations that might be exposed to releases following an
accident are estimated by first calculating the collective dose to that population. This is
simply the sum of the radiation dose received by all individuals exposed to radiation
from a given release. These collective doses are assumed to result in the potential for
health effects among the potentially exposed population following an accident. The
health effects induced by releases are calculated using the methods described above in
Section 4.1.4.5. The consequences discussed below have been estimated considering
impacts to both the local population and the global population. Because of a variety of
factors, principally involving meteorological conditions at the time of launch and the
amount and particle size distribution of any PuO2 released, not all persons in the
affected regions would be exposed to a release.
Prior to launch, most problems that could potentially lead to an accident would be
mitigated by safety systems and procedures that would lead to safe hold or termination
of the launch countdown. After launch, most significant problems would lead to
activation of the FTS, which would result in the destruction of all of the vehicle stages.
This would lead to the spacecraft or portions thereof, including possibly the rover with
attached MMRTG, the MMRTG alone, or free GPHS modules, falling to the ground,
where it could be subject to ground impact mechanical damage and potential exposure
to burning solid propellant. The probability for this scenario with a release is 7.5x10-5 (or
1 in 13,000). Assuming no mitigation actions, such as sheltering and exclusion of
people from contaminated land areas, the radiation dose to the potentially exposed
population is predicted to result in less than one additional health effect over the long
term. The mean estimate for this release scenario is 0.30 health effects.
Even for the very and extremely unlikely launch area accidents, mean releases are not
significantly higher than for the most probable accident and release. Assuming no

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

mitigation actions (e.g., sheltering), estimated mean health effects range from a low of
less than 0.11 to a high of 0.52. As with the maximum individual dose, the largest
population dose is associated with a phase 1 release. In the event of a launch area
accident, it is unlikely that any given racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group of the
population would bear a disproportionate share of the consequences.
Impacts of Radiological Releases on the Environment
The environmental impacts of the postulated accidents include the potential for PuO 2 to
be released to the environment, resulting in land and surface water contamination. The
health and environmental impacts associated with plutonium-238 in the environment
were addressed extensively in the EISs for previous NASA missions that used RTGs,
including the Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, New Horizons and Mars Science Laboratory
missions (NASA 1989, NASA 1990, NASA 1995, NASA 1997, NASA 2005, NASA
2006). Each of these documents identified the potential for launch area accidents
contaminating land areas. These EISs referenced evaluations of the potential impacts of
PuO2 releases on natural vegetation, wetlands, agricultural land, urban areas, inland
water, the ocean, and other global areas. Based on these previous analyses, the
potential impacts of plutonium releases from the launch area accidents on the
environment are discussed in Appendix B.
The affected environment, described in Section 3 of this FEIS, includes the regional
area near CCAFS and the global area. Launch area accidents (Phases 0 and 1) would
initially release material into the regional area, defined in this FEIS to be within 100 km
(62 mi) of the launch pad. Since some of the accidents result in the release of very fine
particles (less than a micron in diameter), a portion of such releases could be
transported beyond 100 km (62 mi) and become well mixed in the troposphere, and
thus affecting the global environment. Releases during Phase 3 could involve reentering
GPHS modules that could impact the ground in southern Africa. Releases during
Phase 4 could affect the environment anywhere between 29° north and 29° south
latitude. Releases during phase 5 could nominally affect the environment anywhere on
Earth, but only when the spacecraft impacts land.
Potential environmental contamination was evaluated in terms of areas exceeding
various screening levels (0.1 and 0.2 μCi/m2), and dose-rate related criteria (15, 25, and
100 millirem per year) considered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and DOE in evaluating the need for land cleanup
following radioactive contamination.
The risk assessment for this FEIS uses the 0.2 μCi/m2 screening level (a screening
level used in prior NASA environmental documentation (e.g., NASA 1989, NASA 1997,
NASA 2002b, NASA 2005)) as an indicator of the extent of land area contaminated due
to a release of PuO2 from a potential launch accident. The results are summarized in
Table 4-4. The area of land contaminated above the EPA lifetime-risk criterion,
associated with an average annual dose rate criterion of 15 mrem/yr, could be higher or
lower than the land area contaminated above the 0.2 μCi/m 2 level in the first year
following the release, depending on the particle size distribution of the release and the
potential for resuspension. The resuspension contribution to dose assumes that no
mitigation measures are taken.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

DOE's risk assessment indicates that for the most likely type of launch area accidents
with a release, (that is the intentional destruction of all the vehicle stages) would result
in about 7.6 km2 (about 2.9 mi2) being contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2. The risk
assessment also indicates that in at least one very unlikely ground impact configuration,
FSII with a total estimated probability of 3.2 x10-6 (one in 310,000), a mean area of 13
km2 (about 5.0 mi2) could be contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2. Detectable levels below
0.2 μCi/m2 would be expected over an even larger area.
Land areas contaminated at levels above 0.2 μCi/m2 would potentially need further
action, such as monitoring or cleanup. Costs associated with cleanup efforts, as well as
continued monitoring activities, could vary widely depending upon the characteristics of
the contaminated area. These costs do not include costs of government oversight,
management or administration nor litigation costs. Indirect costs could double the cost
per unit area. Potential cost estimating factors for decontamination (cleanup) of various
land types are summarized in Table 4-5. These cost factors address a wide variety of
possible actions, including land acquisition, waste disposal, site restoration, and final
surveys of remediated sites.
Table 4-5. Potential Land Decontamination Cost Factors
Cost Factor in 2014 Dollars
2 2
Land Type Cost per km Cost per mi
Farmlands $112 million $291 million

Rangeland $110 million $284 million

Forests $200 million $518 million

a
Mixed-Use Urban Areas $611 million $1.58 billion

a. Mixed use urban area applicable to a U.S. city of approximately 100,000 population. Costs
are not applicable to downtown business districts, heavy industrial areas, or high-rise apartment
buildings.

Source: Adapted from Chanin et al. 1996

In addition to the potential direct costs of radiological surveys, monitoring, and potential
cleanup following an accident, there are potential secondary societal costs associated
with the decontamination and mitigation activities with the very unlikely, potentially
higher consequence launch area accidents. Those costs could include, but may not be
limited to:
 temporary or longer term relocation of residents;
 temporary or longer term loss of employment;
 destruction or quarantine of agricultural products, including citrus crops;
 land use restrictions (which could affect real estate values, tourism and
recreational activities);
 restriction or bans on commercial fishing; and
 public health effects and medical care.
As indicated in Table 4-5, costs for farmland decontamination have been identified. In
addition to the costs of decontamination, there is the potential that the contamination of
crops would require additional mitigation measures. These actions could be required to

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prevent contaminated foodstuffs from being consumed by the public. In the case of
plutonium dioxide contamination, the preventive measures could include the collection
and disposal of contaminated crops. The Food and Drug Administration has established
Derived Intervention Levels (DILs) (FDA 1998) designed to limit the dose to an
individual from consuming contaminated foodstuff. These DILs identify recommended
levels of contamination above which individuals consuming the contaminated foodstuff
would receive an unacceptable dose. The DIL varies depending upon the receptor (the
individual consuming the foodstuff) primarily based upon the age of the individual. In the
case of plutonium-238, the limiting DIL (that is, the lowest allowable concentration) of
2.5 Bq/kg 19 (FDA 1998) is the DIL for infants.
As a part of the Nuclear Risk Assessment, DOE performed an analysis to determine the
extent of cropland that could be contaminated to levels in excess of this DIL. The
analysis used the same accident and meteorological data used in the NRA to address
the release and dispersal of plutonium dioxide in the event of an accident, i.e., the same
accident conditions, release quantities, and weather data. In addition, the analysis
considered the following items:
 The acreage of land used as farmland (and the fraction of land used for each
crop type (leafy vegetables, fruit, pasture, etc.),
 The types of crops grown in Florida and in the KSC area,
 The quantities of each crop type grown, and
 The fraction of plutonium dioxide deposited on cropland that would be deposited
on or absorbed by each crop type.
The results of this analysis indicated that for all phases and for all accidents, the area
contaminated above the DIL is consistently more than 50 times lower than (less than 2
percent) the area contaminated at or above the 0.2 μCi/m2 level that are shown in Table
4-4. For example, in assessing the Phase 1 accident with Low Altitude FTS, DOE
calculated that the DIL value of 2.5 Bq/kg would be exceeded in an area of 0.13 km 2
(0.05 mi2 or about 32 acres). This is the mean value for the cropland area where some
mitigation measures could be required to limit the public health impact from the
consumption of food contaminated by a release from this accident. The 99 th percentile
area would be 1.35 km2 (0.52 mi2 or 330 acres). These values are less than 2% of the
calculated land contamination area using the 0.2 µCi/m2 criteria (See Table 4-4) (SNL
2014).
The Price-Anderson Act of 1957, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2210), established a system
of financial protection for persons who may be liable for and persons who may be
injured in the event of a nuclear incident arising out of activities conducted by or on
behalf of the DOE. The Price-Anderson Act is incorporated into the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.). A "nuclear incident" is defined under the

19
A Becquerel (Bq) is the activity of a quantity of radioactive material in which one nucleus decays per
2
second. One curie is equal to 37,000 million Bq. The land contamination criteria of 0.2 microcuries/m is
2
equivalent to 7.4 Bq/m .

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 4. Environmental Consequences

Atomic Energy Act as “any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence,

within the United States causing, within or outside the United States, bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property,
arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, other hazardous
properties of source, special nuclear or byproduct material…" (42 U.S.C. 2014 (q)). In
the case of the Mars 2020 mission, DOE retains title to and responsibility for the
MMRTG. In the event that an accident were to occur resulting in release of PuO 2 from
the MMRTG, affected property owners would be eligible for compensation for damages
to or loss of property arising from the nuclear incident in accordance with the provisions
of the Price-Anderson Act.
4.1.4.7. Mission Risks
A summary of the mission risks is presented in Table 4-6. For the purpose of this FEIS,
risk is defined as the expectation of health effects in a statistical sense (i.e., the product
of total probability times the mean health effects resulting from a release, and then
summed over all conditions leading to a release). The risk of health effects in the
potentially exposed populations is determined for each mission phase and the overall
mission.
Table 4-6. Summary of MMRTG Health Effect Mission Risks
Conditional Mean Health
Accident Probability Total Probability Effects (given Mission
(a)
Mission Phase Probability of a Release of a Release a release) Risks
-5 -8
0: Pre-Launch 3.3x10 0.33 Very Unlikely 0.0014 1.5x10
-5
(1.1x10 )
-3 -5
1: Early Launch 3.1x10 0.028 Very Unlikely 0.29 2.5x10
-5
(8.8x10 )
-3 -5 -10
2: Late Launch 3.6x10 0.0021 Very Unlikely 7.8x10 6.0x10
-6
(7.7x10 )
-2 -6
3: Suborbital 1.3x10 0.0013 Very Unlikely 0.20 3.0x10
-5
(1.5x10 )
-3 -4 -7
4: Orbital 4.7x10 0.056 Unlikely (2.6X10 ) 0.0026 6.8x10
-6 -10
5: Long-term Reentry 1.0x10 0.094 Extremely Unlikely 0.0038 3.6x10
-8
(9.4x10 )
-2 -4 -5
Overall Mission 2.5x10 0.016 Unlikely (3.8x10 ) 0.076 2.9x10

Source: SNL 2014

(a) The table presents a composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted
value of the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5. Accident probabilities are the
average of individual values for the two vehicles. Based on the current state of knowledge, the specific accident probabilities for the
accident conditions for each vehicle are expected to be similar.
Differences in multiplications and summations are due to rounding of results as reported in SNL 2014.
Probability categories (i.e., unlikely, very unlikely) as defined by NASA.

Since the health effects resulting from a release equals the sum of the probability of a
health effect for each individual in the exposed population, risk can also be interpreted
as the total probability of one health effect given the mission. The overall radiological

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

risk for the Mars 2020 mission is estimated to be 2.6x10-5. Thus, the total probability of
one health effect for the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) is about 1 in 39,000.
The risk contribution from Phase 1 accidents, 2.5x10-5 (or a probability of about 1 in
40,000 that a health effect will occur), represents 87 percent of the radiological risk for
the Mars 2020 mission. The primary contributors to the Phase 1 risk in order of
significance are (1) Low Altitude FTS, (2) FSII, and (3) On-Pad Explosion. Phase 3
contributes 10 percent of the overall mission risk, due primarily to releases from GPHS
modules impacting hard surfaces (e.g., rock) following suborbital reentry and possibly
other impact configurations up to and including the spacecraft.
The contributions to risk within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch site and in the global area
are summarized in Table 4-7. The launch area risk is about 57 percent of the overall
mission risk, while the risk to global areas is 43 percent. The launch area risks are due
entirely from accidents during Phases 0 and 1, with Phase 1 being the primary
contributor. The global risks are due to accidents in all mission phases, with Phase 1
being the primary contributor due to the atmospheric transport of small particles beyond
100 km from the launch site.
Table 4-7. MMRTG Health Effect Mission Risk Contributions by Affected Region
Mission Risks
(a) (b) (c)
Mission Phase Launch Area Global Total
-9 -9 -8
0: Pre-Launch 8.9x10 5.9x10 1.5x10
-5 -6 -5
1: Early Launch 1.7x10 8.9x10 2.5x10
-10 -10
2: Late Launch — 6.0x10 6.0x10
-6 -6
3: Suborbital — 3.0x10 3.0x10
-7 -7
4: Orbital — 6.8x10 6.8x10
-10 -10
5: Long-term Reentry — 3.6x10 3.6x10
-5 -5 -5
Overall Mission 1.7x10 1.3x10 2.9x10
Source: SNL 2014

(a) The table presents a composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined
by taking the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of
having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.
(b) Phases 0 and 1: within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch site.
(c) Phase 3: southern Africa; Phase 4: land impacts between 29° north and 29° south latitude.
Note: Differences in summations may be due to rounding

Individual Risks (Maximum Exposed Individual)

Individual risk can be interpreted as the probability of a particular individual in the
exposed population incurring a fatal cancer. For an accident near the launch site, not
everyone within the regional area would be expected to receive a dose as a result of the
accident. Due to meteorological conditions prevailing at the time of launch, only a
portion of the total regional population is estimated to receive some measurable
radiological exposure should an accident occur.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

Even those individuals within the exposed population, such as those very close to the
launch area that might receive the highest exposures, would face very small risks. The
risk to the maximally exposed individual within the launch-area and global populations
(Table 4-8) is estimated to be less than 1 in 300 million for the Mars 2020 mission. Most
people in the potentially exposed population would have much lower risks.
Table 4-8. MMRTG Maximum Individual Risk
(a)
Mission Phase Release Probability Maximum Individual Maximum Individual
(b), (c)
Dose, (rem) Risk
-5 -12
0: Pre-Launch Very Unlikely (1.1x10 ) 0.00029 1.9x10
-5 -9
1: Early Launch Very Unlikely (8.8x10 ) 0.060 3.2x10
-6 -5 -14
2: Late Launch Very Unlikely (7.7x10 ) 1.6x10 7.6x10
-5 -10
3: Suborbital Very Unlikely (1.5x10 ) 0.043 3.8 x10
-4 -11
4: Orbital Unlikely (2.6X10 ) 0.0005 8.5 x10
-8 -14
5: Long-term Reentry Extremely Unlikely (9.4x10 ) 0.0008 4.5 x10

Source: SNL 2014

(a) A composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted value of
the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.
(b) Determined as the product of total probability of release, maximum individual dose (mean value) and a health effects
estimator of 6x10-4 latent cancer fatalities per rem.
(c) The individuals associated with the maximum individual risk in Phase 0 and 1 are assumed to be the same individual, so the
two risks are additive. The individuals associated with the maximum individual risk in Phases 3, 4, and 5 would not be the
same individual due to different global regions potentially affected.
Probability categories (i.e., unlikely, very unlikely) as defined by NASA.

The individual risk estimates are small compared to other risks. For example, Table 4-9
presents information on annual individual fatality risks to residents of the United States
due to various types of hazards. This data indicates that in 2010 the average individual
risk of accidental death in the United States was about 1 in 2,600 per year, while the
average individual risk of death due to any disease, including cancer, was about 1 in
140.
4.1.4.8. Uncertainty
An uncertainty analysis to estimate uncertainties in probabilities, source terms,
radiological consequences, and mission risks has not been performed as part of this
report. Based on experience with uncertainty analyses in the risk assessment of
previous missions (e.g., for the Cassini, Mars Exploration Rover, New Horizons, and
Mars Science Laboratory missions), the uncertainty in the estimated mission risk for the
Mars 2020 mission can be approximated. The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
analysis for those missions indicate that the uncertainty is dominated by the uncertainty
associated with the launch vehicle accident probabilities. The 5 th and 95th percentile
accident probabilities are about a factor of 25 lower and higher, respectively, than the
accident median probabilities.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Table 4-9. Calculated Individual Risk and Probability of Fatality by Various

Causes in the United States in 2010
Accident Type Number of Approximate Individual Probability
Fatalities Risk Per Year
Extremely Unlikely
-8
Lightning 29 9.39 x 10 1 in 11 million
-7
Tornadoes 45 1.46 x 10 1 in 6.9 million
-7
Flood 103 3.33 x 10 1 in 3 million
-7
Extreme Heat or Cold 172 5.57 x 10 1 in 1.8 million

Very Unlikely
-6
Legal Intervention 412 1.33 x 10 1 in 750,000
-6
All Weather 490 1.59 x 10 1 in 630,000
-6
Accidental Discharge of Firearms 606 1.96 x 10 1 in 510,000
-6
Water, Air and Space Transport 1,600 5.18 x 10 1 in 190,000
Accidents (includes unspecified
transport accidents)
-6
Accidental Exposure to Smoke, Fires 2,782 9.01 x 10 1 in 110,000
and Flames
-5
Accidental Drowning and Submersion 3,782 1.22 x 10 1 in 82,000
-5
All Fatal Injuries at Work 4,690 1.52 x 10 1 in 66,000
-5
Assault (Homicide) 16,259 5.27 x 10 1 in 19,000
-5
Alcohol-induced deaths 25,692 8.32 x 10 1 in 12,000
-5
Falls 26,009 8.42 x 10 1 in 12,000
-4
Accidental Poisoning and Exposure to 33,041 1.07 x 10 1 in 9,300
Noxious Substances
-4
Motor Vehicle 35,332 1.14 x 10 1 in 8,700
-4
Suicide 38,364 1.24 x 10 1 in 8,000
-4
Drug-induced deaths 40,393 1.31 x 10 1 in 7,600
-4
All Accidents 120,859 3.91 x 10 1 in 2,600

Unlikely
-3
All Diseases 2,254,585 7.30 x 10 1 in 140
-3
All Causes 2,468,435 7.99 x 10 1 in 125
Sources: USBC 2013b, BLS 2013, NOAA 2013, HHS 2013.
Note: The census population of the United States for the year 2010 was 308,745,538.

The Mars 2020 mission risk estimate of 2.9x10-5 (or a probability of about 1 in 34,000
that a health effect would occur) can be treated as the median of the uncertainty

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 4. Environmental Consequences

probability distribution (i.e., it is equally probable that the mission risk could be higher or
lower than this value). The mission risks at the 5th and 95th percent confidence levels
are then estimated to be 1.2x10-6 (or a probability of about 1 in 860,000 that a health
effect will occur) and 7.3x10-4 (or a probability of about 1 in 1,400 that a health effect will
occur), respectively.
4.1.5 Radiological Contingency Response Planning
Prior to launch of the Mars 2020 mission, a comprehensive set of plans would be
developed by NASA to ensure that any launch accident could be met with a well-
developed and tested response. NASA's plans would be developed in accordance with
the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and the NRF Nuclear/
Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in coordination with DOE and other Federal
agencies, the state of Florida, Brevard County, and local governmental organizations.
These organizations, as needed, could be involved in response to a radiological
emergency. (Scott 2012).
.Radiological emergency response plans would be exercised prior to launch to verify
that response interfaces, command channels, and field response organizations would
be prepared to respond in the event of a launch accident. As described by the NRF –
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, NASA, as the coordinating agency would have full
access to the coordinated federal response
To manage the radiological contingency response, NASA would establish a radiological
emergency response capability that would include a radiological assessment and
command center, as well as field monitoring assets deployed both onsite and offsite
prior to launch. The assessment and command center would be the focal point for
NASA and DHS coordination efforts. This center would also be used to coordinate the
initial Federal response to a radiological contingency until the Mars 2020 spacecraft has
left Earth orbit. Pre-deployed assets to support a response to a potential launch
accident would include representation from NASA, appropriate federal agencies), the
state of Florida, and Brevard County. The center would issue appropriate direction to
KSC/CCAFS personnel and coordinate messaging and recommended actions with
State and local emergency response organizations responding to the accident, to
minimize potential exposures.
For accidents outside United States jurisdiction, NASA and DHS would assist the DOS
in coordinating the United States’ response via diplomatic channels and in deploying
Federal resources as requested. If impact of the Mars 2020 spacecraft occurs in the
ocean following an accident, NASA would coordinate with the DHS, the U.S. Coast
Guard, the U.S. Navy, and DOE to initiate security measures and assess the feasibility
of search and retrieval operations. Efforts to recover the MMRTG or its components
would be based on an assessment of technical feasibility and consideration of any
potential health hazards presented to recovery personnel and potential environmental
impacts.
4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE 2
With Alternative 2, NASA would discontinue preparations for the Proposed Action
(Alternative 1) and implement an alternative Mars 2020 mission. The alternative Mars

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

2020 mission would include an autonomous rover that would perform science
operations on the surface of Mars. Instead of an MMRTG, a solar array would provide
the necessary electric power to operate the Mars 2020 rover and its science
instruments.
The non-radiological impacts for this alternative would be identical to those described
for Alternative 1 and are addressed in Sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Environmental Consequences of Preparing for Launch
With Alternative 2, the potential environmental consequences of preparing for launch
would be the same as those described in Section 4.1.1 for the Proposed Action, with the
exception that some spacecraft and launch vehicle integration personnel would not be
exposed to radiation from the MMRTG during pre-launch testing and integration, since a
radioisotope power system, the MMRTG, would not be used as the source of electrical
power for the Alternative 2 Mars 2020 rover.
4.2.2 Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch
With Alternative 2, the primary environmental impacts of a normal launch of the Mars
2020 mission would be the same as those described in Section 4.1.2 for the Proposed
Action (Alternative 1).
4.2.3 Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents
With Alternative 2, the environmental non-radiological impacts of potential accidents
would be the same as those described in Section 4.1.3 for the Proposed Action
(Alternative 1).
4.2.4 Radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents
Implementation of Alternative 2 would not involve any potential radiological
environmental impacts from launch accidents.
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE 3
In Alternative 3, NASA would discontinue preparations for the Proposed Action
(Alternative 1) and implement an alternative Mars 2020 mission. The alternative Mars
2020 mission would include an autonomous rover that would perform science
operations on the surface of Mars. A solar array would provide the necessary electric
power to operate the Mars 2020 rover and its science instruments. In addition, the
power from the solar array would be augmented by up to 71 LWRHUs. These LWRHUs
would be used to provide thermal power to maintain the internal temperature of the
rover within the required limits to ensure equipment and instrumentation survivability.
The non-radiological impacts for this alternative would be identical to those identified for
the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) and are addressed in Sections 4.3.1 through 4.3.3.
Environmental impacts of potential accidents involving the release of PuO2 from the
LWRHUs for the rover powered by a solar array augmented with LWRHUs are
addressed in Section 4.3.4.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

4.3.1 Environmental Consequences of Preparing for Launch

With Alternative 3, the potential environmental consequences of preparing for launch
would be the same as those described in Section 4.1.1 for the Proposed Action, with the
exception that some spacecraft and launch vehicle integration personnel would not be
exposed to radiation from the MMRTG during pre-launch testing and integration, since a
radioisotope power system, the MMRTG, would not be used as the source of electrical
power for the Alternative 3 Mars 2020 rover.
4.3.2 Environmental Impacts of a Normal Launch
With Alternative 3, the primary environmental impacts of a normal launch of the Mars
2020 mission would be the same as those described in Section 4.1.2 for the Proposed
Action (Alternative 1).
4.3.3 Non-radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents
With Alternative 3, the environmental non-radiological impacts of potential accidents
would be the same as those described in Section 4.1.3 for the Proposed Action.
4.3.4 Radiological Environmental Impacts of Potential Accidents Involving
Plutonium
NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have assessed the potential
environmental impacts of launch accidents involving release of PuO2. The likelihood
that a malfunction or system failure would lead to a launch accident is essentially the
same for this alternative (a solar-powered rover with LWRHUs) as for Alternative 1 (an
MMRTG powered rover). The analysis results indicate that the most likely outcome of
implementing this alternative version of the Mars 2020 mission is a successful launch of
the spacecraft toward Mars. If, however, a launch accident were to occur, the most
probable outcome is an accident without a release of the PuO2. Specifically:
 There is a 97.5% chance of a successful launch.
 There is a 2.5% chance of a launch accident.
 There is a 1 in 15,000 chance of a launch accident that would release plutonium
dioxide.
o There is a 1 in 16,000 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide in the launch area.
o There is a 1 in 420,000 chance of a launch accident that would result in a
release of plutonium dioxide outside the launch area.
 No radiological fatalities would be expected to occur as a result of any accident.
 The average maximum dose to any member of the public from an accident with a
release in the launch area would be equal to about 5 days of exposure to natural
background radiation for a person living in the United States.

This section summarizes the results from the DOE's nuclear risk assessment (SNL
2014) for the solar-powered rover with LWRHUs.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

4.3.4.1. Risk Assessment Methodology

The nuclear risk assessment for this alternative for the Mars 2020 mission was
performed using the same methodology as that used for Alternative 1. The discussion of
the methodology is contained in Section 4.1.4.1. The DOE risk analysis was performed
assuming that 80 LWRHUs could be used on the Mars 2020 rover. This is slightly more
than the 71 LWRHUs that NASA anticipates could be used on the rover. The DOE
analysis conservatively assumed more LWRHUs to address the possibility that design
requirements could change requiring more thermal power to maintain the proper
environment for rover equipment and instrumentation.
Safety testing and response analyses of the LWRHU to accident environments indicate
that the protection provided by graphitic components and the platinum-30 rhodium (Pt-
30Rh) clad encapsulating the PuO2 fuel, makes releases unlikely due to purely
mechanical damage, including overpressures and fragments. The primary release
mechanism is from impact by very heavy LV fragments. Another release mode is from
exposure to high-temperature burning solid-propellant fuel, which could lead to clad
melting and partial vaporization of the PuO2. Should the aeroshell and/or cladding be
damaged or stripped, a greater amount of fuel could be vaporized. If the aeroshell
remains intact, any vaporized fuel release would be limited to that which permeates
through the graphitic components of the aeroshell, which would be a very small fraction
(about 1/1000) of that vaporized fuel associated with a bare clad.
4.3.4.2. Launch Accidents and Accident Probabilities
Launch accidents and their associated probabilities were identified and developed using
the methodology described in Section 4.1.4.2. As in the analysis for Alternative 1, the
analysis considered two representative launch vehicles (the Atlas V 551 and the Delta
IV Heavy) in developing the composite analysis results. The same six mission phases
were identified for the analysis.
 Phase 0 - Pre-Launch,
 Phase 1 - Early Launch,
 Phase 2 - Late Launch,
 Phase 3 - Suborbital Reentry,
 Phase 4 - Orbit Reentry, and
 Phase 5 – Long-term Reentry.
The composite accident end-state probabilities for the launch vehicle are presented in
Table 4-10. The only difference between these accident probabilities and those
developed for Alternative 1 (Table 4-2) is in Phase 0. Because there is no MMRTG in
this alternative, the accidents associated with the failure of the pre-launch cooling
system for the MMRTG during Phase 0 are not applicable to this alternative. Therefore,
the Phase 0 accident probability for the Mars 2020 mission using solar power
augmented with LWRHUs is smaller (3.3x10-6 instead of 3.3x10-5) than for the Mars
2020 MMRTG alternative.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

Table 4-10. Alternative 3: Accident End-state Probabilities

Ground Impact Phase 0 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Total
Configuration Probability
-7 -5 -4
On-Pad Explosion 4.8x10 9.8x10 - - - - 1.2x10
-5 -5
FSII - 2.2x10 - - - - 2.2x10
-5 -5
Stage 2/SV - 4.8x10 - - - - 4.8x10
-6 -7 -6
SVII 2.8x10 6.3x10 - - - - 3.4x10
-3 -3
Low Altitude FTS - 2.9x10 - - - - 2.9x10

-3 -3
High Altitude FTS - - 3.6x10 - - - 3.6x10
-2 -2
Sub-Orbital Reentry - - - 1.3x10 - - 1.3x10
-3 -3
Orbital Reentry - - - - 4.7x10 - 4.7x10
-6 -6
Long Term - - - - - 1.0x10 1.0x10
-6 -3 -3 -2 -3 -6 -2
Total 3.3 x10 3.1x10 3.6x10 1.3x10 4.7x10 1.0x10 2.5x10
Source: SNL 2014

Note: This is a composite of the accident end state probabilities for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the
probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.

For this FEIS, the probabilities of an accident with a release of PuO2 are grouped into
categories that allow for a descriptive characterization of the likelihood of each accident.
The categories and their associated probability ranges are:
 unlikely: 10-2 to 10-4 (1 in 100 to 1 in 10 thousand);
 very unlikely: 10-4 to 10-6 (1 in 10 thousand to 1 in 1 million); and
 extremely unlikely: less than 10-6 (less than 1 in 1 million).

The potential accident environments associated with accidents include blast (explosion
overpressure), fragments, thermal energy (burning liquid propellant and/or solid
propellant), reentry conditions (aerodynamic loads and heating), and surface impact. A
given accident could involve one or more sequential and/or simultaneously occurring
accident environments. The nature and severity of such environments would be a
function of the type of accident and its timing (relative to launch) of occurrence.
4.3.4.3. LWRHU Response to Accident Environments
Most launch accidents in Phases 0, 1, and 3 would lead to intact impact of various
SV/launch vehicle configurations. The resulting impact could lead to mechanical
damage of the LWRHU aeroshell, depending on the orientation at impact, and
subsequent exposure to burning solid propellant. This, in turn, could potentially lead to
PuO2 releases from the fire. In addition, impact by large pieces of LV or SV debris could
lead to some mechanical release of PuO2.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Phase 2 results in water impact and no release. For Phases 4 and 5 of the mission,
accidents could lead to reentry heating and ground impact environments. The LWRHU
is designed to survive the reentry environments and subsequent surface impacts. No
clad melt, eutectic formation with graphitics, or release is expected from impact
following orbital or suborbital reentry.
4.3.4.4. Accident Probabilities and Source Terms
In the nuclear risk assessment, DOE evaluated each of the identified end states and
estimated the accident environments to which the LWRHUs would likely be exposed.
From that information, conditional probabilities that a release would occur and estimated
source terms were developed based on the known response of LWRHUs to various
accident conditions.
As discussed earlier, the probability of a launch accident involving any release of PuO 2
is very small, approximately 1 in 15,000. The most severe accident environments would
occur during launch area accidents that might expose the LWRHUs to mechanical
impacts, explosion overpressures and fragments, and fire environments from burning
liquid and solid propellants.
A summary of the accident and source term probabilities by mission phase, along with
mean and 99th percentile source terms, is presented in Table 4-11. For the purpose of
this FEIS, "source term" is defined as that portion of the release that becomes airborne
and could be transported downwind.
The 99th percentile source term is the value predicted to be exceeded with a probability
of 0.01 (1 in 100), given a release in an accident. In this context, the 99th percentile
value reflects the potential for higher radionuclide releases at lower probabilities. The
99th percentile releases are up to 36 times the mean estimates reported in this FEIS, but
at probabilities of a factor of 100 lower than the mean probabilities. Essential features of
the results are summarized below.
 Phase 0 (Pre-Launch): During the pre-launch period, prior to ignition of the
Stage 1 liquid rocket engine, most initiating failures result in a mission abort.
Those failures that result in on-pad accidents could result in a release at a total
probability of 3.1x10-7 (1 in 3,200,000). The mean source term, given that an
accident with a release has occurred, is estimated to be 3.0 Ci.
 Phase 1 (Early Launch): During Phase 1, during which land impacts, including
near the launch complex, are likely, the accidents resulting in a release have a
total probability estimate of 6.2x10-5 (or 1 in 16,000). The mean source term,
given an accident with a release has occurred, is estimated to be 4.1 Ci.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

Table 4-11. Alternative 3: Summary of Accident Probabilities and LWRHU Source Terms
(c)
Source Term, Ci Conditional Source Term , Ci
(a) (given an accident) Probability Total Probability of (given a release)
Mission Phase Accident Probability
99
th of Release a Release 99
th
(b)
Mean Percentile Mean Percentile
0: Pre-Launch Very Unlikely (3.3x10-6) 0.28 5.0 0.093 Extremely Unlikely (3.1x10-7) 3.0 21

1: Early Launch

On-Pad Explosion Very Unlikely (9.8x10-5) 0.16 2.7 0.12 Very Unlikely (1.2x10-5) 1.3 3.2

FSII Very Unlikely (2.2x10-5) 8.1 270 0.13 Very Unlikely (3.0x10-6) 60 380

Stage 2/SV Very Unlikely (4.8x10-5) 0.020 0.84 0.017 Extremely Unlikely (8.0x10-7) 1.2 5.1

SVII Extremely Unlikely (6.3x10-7) 0.062 2.0 0.047 Extremely Unlikely (2.9x10-8) 1.3 4.3

Low Altitude FTS Unlikely (2.9x10-3) 0.020 0.67 0.016 Very Unlikely (4.6x10-5) 1.3 6.1

Overall Phase 1 Unlikely (3.1x10-3) 0.082 0.89 0.020 Very Unlikely (6.2x10-5) 4.1 76

2: Late Launch 3.6x10-3 - - – – - -

3: Suborbital 1.3x10-2 0.00022 - 0.00018 Very Unlikely (2.4x10-6) 1.2 4.6

4: Orbital Unlikely (4.7x10-3) - - - - - -

5: Long-term Reentry Very Unlikely (1.0x10-6) - - - - - -

(d) -2 -5
Overall Mission 2.5x10 0.011 - 0.0026 Very Unlikely (6.5x10 ) 4.0 73
Source: SNL 2014

(a) A composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating
the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.
(b) The conditional probability of a release of PuO2 given that an accident has occurred.
(c ) Total source terms given. The source term is that portion of the release which becomes airborne would represent the amounts of PuO2 released that are no
more than 100 microns (100 micrometers) in diameter. Particles larger than this do not generally become airborne and would remain in the vicinity of the
accident.
(d) Overall mission values are weighted by the total probability of release for each mission phase.
Notes: Differences in multiplications and summations are due to rounding of results as reported in SNL 2014.
Probability categories (i.e., unlikely, very unlikely) as defined by NASA.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

Most initiating failures occurring in Phase 1 would lead to activation of the FTS.
The elements of the FTS are highly redundant and reliable. As a result, the
expected outcome of a Phase 1 accident is ground impact of the spacecraft or
portions thereof, including possibly the rover with LWRHUs. In this case,
mechanical damage and, for an Atlas V 551 accident, potential exposure to
burning solid propellant could occur. The probability for this impact configuration
with a release is estimated to be 4.6x10-5 (or 1 in 22,000), with an estimated
mean source term, given an accident with a release has occurred, is estimated to
be 1.3 Ci).
A much less likely outcome of a Phase 1 accident involves failure of some or all
of the FTS elements to perform properly. This could lead to ground impact of the
spacecraft (with the LWRHUs inside) still attached to other launch vehicle stages
(Stages 1 and 2, or Stage 2). Since this would require multiple failures of safety
systems, such ground impact configurations leading to a release are very
unlikely. However, because the LWRHUs could impact the ground within the
spacecraft at higher velocities and with additional mass above the spacecraft due
to the attached Stage(s), the potential for more severe mechanical damage is
higher than with the expected accident conditions associated with normal
activation of the FTS.
In the impact configurations leading to the largest estimated releases, such as
the FSII, slightly larger estimated mean source terms, given an accident with a
release, of 60 Ci. Both of these events would fall in the very unlikely range.
 Phase 2 (Late Launch): All accidents that could occur in Phase 2 lead to impact
of debris in the Atlantic Ocean with no release of PuO2.
 Phase 3 (Suborbital): Accidents during Phase 3 include suborbital reentries.
Prior to the attainment of Earth park orbit these conditions could lead to prompt
suborbital reentry within minutes. This could result in impacts of the intact SV
entry vehicle and LWRHUs along the vehicle flight path over the Atlantic Ocean
and Africa. Additional suborbital land impacts are possible after crossing over
Africa, depending on the launch vehicle selected and its nominal mission
timeline. Should the SV impact land, releases are possible. The total probability
of release in Phase 3 is estimated to be 2.4x10-6 (or 1 in 420,000). The mean
source term, given an accident with a release, is estimated to be 1.2 Ci.
 Phase 4 (Orbital): Accidents which occur after attaining parking orbit could result
in orbital decay reentries from minutes to years after the accident, affecting Earth
surfaces between approximately 29° north latitude and 29° south latitude. As
previously stated, the LWRHU is designed to survive reentry environments and
surface impacts. No releases are expected from accidents in this phase.
 Phase 5 (Long-term Reentry): The potential exists for an inadvertent long-term
(hundreds to thousands of years) reentry should the SV be left in an Earth
crossing orbit. Based on considerations of long-term inadvertent reentry for other
missions, the probability of such an occurrence is estimated to be less than
1x10-6. As previously stated, the LWRHU is designed to survive reentry

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environments and surface impacts. No releases are expected from accidents in

this phase.
The specific probability values presented in this FEIS are estimates and will likely differ
from those that might ultimately be developed in the more detailed FSAR that would be
prepared by DOE if this Alternative is selected. Some probabilities would likely increase
while others may decrease. However, NASA expects the overall probability of an
accidental release of radioactive material would not vary substantially from the values
presented in this FEIS.
4.3.4.5. Radiological Consequences
The radiological consequences of a given accident that results in a radiological release
have been calculated in terms of maximum individual dose, collective dose, health
effects, and land area contaminated at or above specified levels. The radiological
consequences have been determined from atmospheric transport and dispersion
simulations incorporating both launch-site specific and worldwide meteorological and
population data. Biological effects models, based on methods prescribed by the
ISCORS, were applied to predict the number of health effects following a launch
accident that results in a release of PuO2. The analysis assumes that no mitigation
measures (e.g., sheltering, evacuation, and decontamination) are taken to reduce the
health impacts. Additional information on the behavior of plutonium in the environment
(environmental transport and health impact mechanisms) can be found in Appendix B.
The maximum individual dose is the mean maximum dose delivered to a single
individual for a given accident, considering the probability distribution over all release
conditions. Collective dose is the sum of the radiation dose received by all individuals
exposed to radiation from a given release in units of “person-rem.” Internal doses are
determined using particle-size dependent dose conversion factors based on ICRP-60
(ICRP 1979) and ICRP-66/67 (ICRP 1993, ICRP 1994). The exposure pathways
considered include direct inhalation, inhalation of re-suspended material, ingestion (e.g.,
vegetables, fruit, and seafood), and external exposure. Due to the insoluble nature of
PuO2, other secondary exposure pathways (e.g., meat and milk) would be far less
important, and their contributions to dose would be negligible.
The health effects represent incremental cancer fatalities induced by releases, as
determined by using the ISCORS estimates of 6x10-4 fatalities per person-rem for the
general population (DOE 2002). The health effects estimators are based on a linear,
non-threshold model relating health effects and effective dose. This means that health
effects decrease as the dose decreases down to zero, rather than assuming a threshold
dose below which there would be no health effects. When the probability of incurring a
health effect is estimated for each individual in the exposed population and then the
probabilities summed over the population, an estimate of the total health effects in the
population results.
Table 4-12 presents a summary of DOE’s risk assessment of radiological
consequences for each of the mission phases. The radiological consequences were
estimated by mission phase in terms of both the mean and 99th percentile values. The
99th percentile radiological consequence is the value predicted to be exceeded 1

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 4. Environmental Consequences

percent of the time for an accident with a release. In this context, the 99th percentile
value reflects the potential for higher radiological consequences to the exposed
population at lower probabilities. The 99th percentile consequences are one to less than
42 times the mean estimates reported in this FEIS, but at probabilities of a factor of 100
lower than the mean probabilities.
The radiological consequences summarized in Table 4-12 are proportional to the source
terms listed in Table 4-11, except that the scaling factors vary with the type and nature
of the release. Key factors include the particle size distribution of the release, release
height, and energy of the release. The higher dose numbers are associated with very
small particles that might be released if the PuO2 were exposed to solid propellant fires.
The radiological dose per curie released is about ten times higher with the PuO2
exposed to solid propellant fires. Key results for the mean estimates are summarized
below; the corresponding 99th percentile estimates can be found in Table 4-12.
 Phase 0 (Pre-Launch): The initiating failures that result in Phase 0 accident
configurations are extremely unlikely, having very low probabilities of occurrence.
The overall mean probability of a release is 3.1x10-7 (or 1 in 3,200,000) during
Phase 0. Most problems that arise during Phase 0 can be successfully mitigated
by safety systems and procedures leading to safe hold or termination of the
launch countdown.
 If an accident were to occur during Phase 0, however, there is a potential for
measurable releases and contamination. The probability of the LWRHUs being
close to large pieces of burning solid propellant would be higher in Phase 0
accidents than in other phases. The mean maximum dose to an individual is
estimated to be approximately 0.003 rem (3 millirem), about one percent of the
dose an individual might receive annually from natural background radiation20.
 Assuming no mitigation actions, such as sheltering and exclusion of people from
contaminated land areas, the radiation doses to the potentially exposed
population are predicted to result in 0.015 mean health effects among the
potentially exposed population.
 For Phase 0 accidents with a release, the mean area contaminated above 0.2
microcuries per square meter (μCi/m2) (see Section 4.1.4.7) is estimated to be
about 0.37 km2 (about 0.14 mi2). Detectable levels below 0.2 μCi/m2 would be
expected over a larger area.

20
An average of about 0.31 rem per year for an individual in the United States from natural sources.
Man-made sources add an additional 0.060 to 0.31 rem. The dominant man-made contribution is from
medical radiological diagnosis and therapy. See Section 3.2.6 for further information.

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Table 4-12. Summary of LWRHU Estimated Radiological Consequences

(b) (c) 2
Maximum Individual Dose, rem Health Effects Land Contamination km
(a) Total Probability of
Mission Phase 99
th
99
th
Release th (f)4.0
Mean 99 Percentile Mean Percentile Mean Percentile
-7
0: Pre-Launch Extremely Unlikely (3.1x10 ) 0.0030 0.022 0.015 0.10 0.37 2.6

Early Launch
-5
On-Pad Explosion Very Unlikely (1.2x10 ) 0.0013 0.0032 0.0063 0.016 0.16 0.39
-6
FSII Very Unlikely (3.0x10 ) 0.062 0.38 0.30 1.8 7.5 47
-7
Stage2/SV Extremely Unlikely (8.0x10 ) 0.0013 0.0052 0.0060 0.025 0.15 0.64
-8
SVII Extremely Unlikely (2.9x10 ) 0.0014 0.0044 0.0066 0.021 0.17 0.54
-5
Low Altitude FTS Very Unlikely (4.6x10 ) 0.0013 0.0062 0.0061 0.030 0.16 0.76
-5
1: Overall Phase 1 Very Unlikely (6.2x10 ) 0.0042 0.078 0.020 0.37 0.51 9.5

2: Late Launch — — — — — — —
-6
3: Suborbital Very Unlikely (2.4x10 ) 0.0013 0.0047 0.0060 0.022 0.15 0.57

4: Orbital — — — — — — —

5: Long-term Reentry — — — — — — —
(d) -5
Overall Mission Very Unlikely (6.5x10 ) 0.0041 0.075 0.020 0.36 0.50 9.1
Source: SNL 2014

(a) A composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of
having a given launch vehicle as 0.5.
(b) Based on ISCOR health effects recommendation of 6x10-4 health effects per person-rem for the general population.
(c ) Land area contaminated above 0.2 µCi/m2; 1 km2 = 0.386 mi2.
(d) Overall mission values weighted by total probability of release for each mission phase.
Notes: Differences in multiplications and summations are due to rounding of results as reported in SNL 2014. Probability categories (i.e., unlikely, very unlikely) as defined by NASA.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

 Phase 1 (Early Launch): The Phase 1 consequences consist of contributions

from two types of accident scenarios. Most initiating failures occurring in Phase 1
would lead to activation of the FTS. The elements of the FTS are highly
redundant and very reliable. As a result, the expected outcome of a Phase 1
accident is that the SV and LWRHUs or its components could fall free to the
ground and would be subject to mechanical damage and potential exposure to
burning solid propellant. The probability for this very unlikely impact configuration
with a release is 4.6x10-5 (or 1 in 22,000). The mean maximum individual dose is
estimated to be 0.0013 rem (1.3 millirem), less than one percent of the dose an
individual might receive annually from natural background radiation.
Assuming no mitigation action, such as sheltering, the radiation dose to the
potentially exposed population is predicted to result in 0.0062 mean health
effects among the potentially exposed population over the long term.
The risk assessment indicates that about 0.16 km2 (about 0.062 mi2) could be
contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.
A less likely outcome of a Phase 1 accident involves failure of some or all of the
FTS elements to perform properly. This could lead to ground impact of the
spacecraft (with the LWRHUs inside) still attached to other launch vehicle stages
(Stages 1 and 2, or Stage 2). Since this would require multiple failures of safety
systems, such ground impact configurations leading to a release are very
unlikely. However, because the LWRHUs could impact the ground within the
spacecraft at high speed, the potential for more severe mechanical damage and
exposure to burning liquid and, possibly, solid propellant, could result in higher
source terms.
The more severe impact configurations, such as the FSII, would result in larger
estimated mean releases. In the highest consequence case, identified in Table 4-
12, mean exposures as high as about 0.062 rem (62 millirem) to the maximum
exposed individual might occur with a total probability of 3.0x10-6 or 1 in 330,000.
Assuming no mitigation action, such as sheltering, radiation doses to the
potentially exposed population are predicted to result in an estimated 0.30 mean
health effects. An estimated area of 7.5 km2 (about 2.9 mi2) might be
contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2. Detectable levels below 0.2 μCi/m2 would be
expected over a larger area.
 Phase 2 (Late Launch): No radiological consequences would be expected from
an accident that could occur during Phase 2 since any accident during this
mission phase would lead to impact of debris in the Atlantic Ocean with no
release of PuO2 from the LWRHUs.
 Phase 3 (Suborbital): The total probability of a release in Phase 3, categorized
as very unlikely, is estimated to be 2.4x10-6 (or 1 in 420,000). Mean
consequences are estimated to be 0.0013 rem (1.3 millirem) for maximum
individual dose, and a collective dose that results in 0.0060 health effects among
the potentially exposed population. An estimated area of 0.15 km2 (about
0.058 mi2) might be contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2.

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 Phase 4 (Orbital): There are no radioactive releases during this phase and,
therefore, no radiological consequences.
 Phase 5 (Long-term Reentry): There are no radioactive releases during this
phase and, therefore, no radiological consequences.
4.3.4.6. Discussion of the Results
Maximum Individual Doses
The maximum individual dose is the maximum dose delivered to a single individual for
each accident. During Phase 1, the predicted mean radiation dose to the maximally
exposed individual ranges from about 0.0013 rem (1.3 millirem) for the on-pad
explosion launch area accident up to about 0.062 rem (62 millirem) for a very unlikely
FSII in combination with burning solid propellant. This maximum individual dose is the
largest for any phase. No short-term radiological effects would be expected from any of
these exposures. Each exposure would increase the statistical likelihood of a health
effect. It should be noted that the prediction of doses to the maximally exposed
individual is subject to large variations and uncertainties in the locations of individuals,
meteorological conditions, periods of exposure, and dispersion modeling.
Population Exposures
Impacts to downwind populations that might be exposed to releases following an
accident are estimated by first calculating the collective dose to that population. This is
simply the sum of the radiation dose received by all individuals exposed to radiation
from a given release. These collective doses are assumed to result in the potential for
health effects among the potentially exposed population following an accident. The
health effects induced by releases are calculated using the methods described above in
Section 4.1.4.5. The consequences discussed below have been estimated considering
impacts to both the local population and the global population. Because of a variety of
factors, principally involving meteorological conditions at the time of launch and the
amount and particle size distribution of any PuO2 released, not all persons in the
affected regions would be exposed to a release.
Prior to launch, most problems that could potentially lead to an accident would be
mitigated by safety systems and procedures that would lead to safe hold or termination
of the launch countdown. After launch, most significant problems would lead to
activation of the FTS, which would result in the destruction of all of the vehicle stages.
This would lead to the spacecraft or portions thereof, including possibly the rover with
LWRHUs, falling to the ground, where it could be subject to ground impact mechanical
damage and potential exposure to burning solid propellant. The probability for this
scenario with a release is 4.6x10-5 (or 1 in 22,000). Assuming no mitigation actions,
such as sheltering and exclusion of people from contaminated land areas, the radiation
dose to the potentially exposed population is predicted to result in less than one
additional health effect over the long term. The mean estimate for this release scenario
is 0.0062 health effects.
Even for the very and extremely unlikely launch area accidents, mean releases are not
significantly higher than for the most probable accident and release. Assuming no

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 4. Environmental Consequences

mitigation actions, such as sheltering, estimated health effects range from a low of less
than 0.0063 to a high of 0.30. As with the maximum individual dose, the largest
population dose is associated with a Phase 1 FSII release.
In the event of a launch area accident, it is not likely that any given racial, ethnic, or
socioeconomic group of the population would bear a disproportionate share of the
consequences.
Impacts of Radiological Releases on the Environment
The environmental impacts of the postulated accidents include the potential for PuO2 to
be released to the environment, resulting in land and surface water contamination. The
affected environment, described in Section 3 of this FEIS, includes the regional area
near CCAFS and the global area. Launch area accidents (Phases 0 and 1) would
initially release material into the regional area, as defined in this FEIS, to be within 100
km (62 mi) of the launch pad. Since some of the accidents result in the release of very
fine particles (less than a micron in diameter), a portion of such releases could be
transported beyond 100 km (62 mi) and become well mixed in the troposphere, and
thus affect the global environment. Releases during Phase 3 could involve reentering
LWRHUs that could impact the ground in southern Africa. Releases during Phase 4
could affect the environment anywhere between 29° north and 29° south latitude.
The risk assessment for this FEIS uses the 0.2 μCi/m2 screening level (a screening
level used in prior NASA environmental documentation (e.g., NASA 1989, NASA 1997,
NASA 2002b, NASA 2005)) as an indicator of the extent of land area contaminated due
to a release of PuO2 from a potential launch accident. The results are summarized in
Table 4-12.
DOE's risk assessment indicates that for the most likely type of launch area accidents
with a release, the intentional destruction of all the vehicle stages would result in about
0.16 km2 (about 0.062 mi2) being contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2. The risk assessment
also indicates that in at least one very unlikely ground impact configuration—FSII with a
total probability of release of 3.0x10-6 (or 1 in 330,000)—a mean area of 7.5 km2 (about
2.9 mi2) could be contaminated above 0.2 μCi/m2. Detectable levels below 0.2 μCi/m2
would be expected over an even larger area.
Land areas contaminated at levels above 0.2 μCi/m2 would potentially need further
action, such as monitoring or cleanup. Costs associated with these efforts, as well as
continued monitoring activities, could vary widely depending upon the characteristics of
the contaminated area. Potential cost estimating factors for decontamination of various
land types are summarized in Table 4-5. These cost factors address a wide variety of
possible actions, including land acquisition, waste disposal, site restoration, and final
surveys of remediated sites.
As indicated in Table 4-5 costs for farmland decontamination have been identified. In
addition to the costs of decontamination, there is the potential that the contamination of
crops would require additional mitigation measures. Actions could be required to
prevent contaminated foodstuffs from being consumed by the public. As discussed in
Section 4.1.4.6, DOE performed an assessment of the areas that might be

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contaminated to the point that the FDA suggested DIL might be exceeded and
mitigation measures may be required.
The results of this analysis indicated that for all phases and for all accidents, the area
contaminated above the DIL is consistently more than 50 times lower than (less than 2
percent) the area contaminated at or above the 0.2 μCi/m2 level that are shown in Table
4-12. For example, in assessing the Phase 1 accident with Low Altitude FTS, DOE
calculated that the DIL value of 2.5 Bq/kg would be exceeded in an area of 0.0028 km2
(0.0011 mi2 or about 0.69 acres). This is the mean value for the cropland area where
some mitigation measures could be required to limit the public health impact from the
consumption of food contaminated by a release from this accident. The 99th percentile
area would be 0.013 km2 (0.0050 mi2 or 3.2 acres). These values are less than 2% of
the calculated land contamination area using the 0.2 µCi/m2 criteria (Table 4-12) (SNL
2014).
The Price-Anderson Act of 1957, as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2210), establishes a system of financial protection for persons who may be
liable for and persons who may be injured in the event of a nuclear incident arising out
of activities conducted by or on behalf of the DOE. A "nuclear incident" is defined under
the Atomic Energy Act as “any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear
occurrence, within the United States causing, within or outside the United States, bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of
property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, other
hazardous properties of source, special nuclear or byproduct material…" (42 U.S.C.
2014 (q)). In the case of the Mars 2020 mission, DOE retains title to and responsibility
for the LWRHUs. In the event that an accident were to occur resulting in release of
PuO2 from the LWRHUs, affected property owners would be eligible compensation for
damages to or loss of property arising from the nuclear incident in accordance with the
provisions of the Price-Anderson Act.
In addition to the potential direct costs of radiological surveys, monitoring, and potential
cleanup following an accident, there are potential secondary societal costs associated
with the decontamination and mitigation activities with the very unlikely, potentially
higher consequence launch area accidents. Those costs could include, but may not be
limited to:
 temporary or longer term relocation of residents;
 temporary or longer term loss of employment;
 destruction or quarantine of agricultural products, including citrus crops;
 land use restrictions (which could affect real estate values, tourism, and
recreational activities);
 restriction or bans on commercial fishing; and
 public health effects and medical care.
4.3.4.7. Mission Risks
A summary of the mission risks is presented in Table 4-13. For the purpose of this
FEIS, risk is defined as the expectation of health effects in a statistical sense (i.e., the
product of total probability times the mean health effects resulting from a release, and

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 4. Environmental Consequences

then summed over all conditions leading to a release). The risk of health effects in the
potentially exposed populations is determined for each mission phase and the overall
mission.
Table 4-13. Summary of LWRHU Health Effect Mission Risks
Conditional Mean Health
Accident Probability Total Probability Effects (given Mission
(a)
Mission Phase Probability of a Release of a Release a release) Risks
-6 -9
0: Pre-Launch 3.3x10 0.093 Extremely Unlikely 0.015 4.4x10
-7
(3.1x10 )
-3 -6
1: Early Launch 3.1x10 0.020 Very Unlikely 0.020 1.3x10
-5
(6.2x10 )
-2
2: Late Launch 3.6x10 – – — —
-2 -8
3: Suborbital 1.3x10 0.00018 Very Unlikely 0.0060 1.4x10
-6
(2.4x10 )
-3
4: Orbital 4.7x10 - - - -
-6
5: Long-term Reentry 1.0x10 - - - -
-2 -6
Overall Mission 2.5x10 0.0026 Very Unlikely 0.020 1.3x10
-5
(6.5x10 )
Source: SNL 2014
(a) A composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-weighted value of the two
sets of results, treating the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5. Accident probabilities are the average of
individual values for the two vehicles. Based on the current state of knowledge, the specific accident probabilities for the accident
conditions for each vehicle are expected to be similar.
Differences in multiplications and summations are due to rounding of results as reported in SNL 2014.
Probability categories (i.e., unlikely, very unlikely) as defined by NASA.

Since the health effects resulting from a release equals the sum of the probability of a
health effect for each individual in the exposed population, risk can also be interpreted
as the total probability of one health effect given the mission. The overall radiological
risk for the solar powered rover with LWRHUs Mars 2020 mission is estimated to be
1.3x10-6. Thus, the total probability of one health effect for Alternative 3 (with LWRHUs)
is about 1 in 790,000.
The risk contribution from Phase 1 accidents, 1.3x10-6 (or a probability of about 1 in
800,000 that a health effect will occur), represents nearly all of the radiological risk for
the Mars 2020 mission. The primary contributors to the Phase 1 risk in order of
significance are (1) FSII, (2) Low Altitude FTS, and (3) On-Pad Explosion.
The contributions to risk within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch site and in the global area
are summarized in Table 4-14. The launch area risk is about 64 percent of the overall
mission risk, while the risk to global areas is 36 percent. The launch area risks are due
entirely from accidents during Phases 0 and 1, with Phase 1 being the primary
contributor. The global risks are due to accidents in all mission phases, with Phase 1
being the primary contributor due to the atmospheric transport of small particles beyond
100 km from the launch site.

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Table 4-14. LWRHU Health Effect Mission Risk Contributions by Affected Region
Mission Risks
(a) (b) (c)
Mission Phase Launch Area Global Total
-9 -9 -9
0: Pre-Launch 2.7x10 1.8x10 4.4x10
-7 -7 -6
1: Early Launch 8.1x10 4.4x10 1.3x10

2: Late Launch — — —
-8 -8
3: Suborbital — 1.4x10 1.4x10

4: Orbital — — -

5: Long-term Reentry — — -
-7 -7 -6
Overall Mission 8.2x10 4.6x10 1.3x10
Source: SNL 2014

(a) A composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by
taking the probability-weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the
conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle as 0.5
(b) Phases 0 and 1: within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch site.
(c ) Phase 3: southern Africa; Phase 4: land impacts between 29° north and 29° south
latitude.
Note: Differences in summations may be due to rounding

Individual Risks
Individual risk can be interpreted as the probability of an individual in the exposed
population incurring a fatal cancer. For an accident near the launch site, not everyone
within the regional area would be expected to receive a dose as a result of the accident.
Due to meteorological conditions prevailing at the time of launch, only a portion of the
total regional population is estimated to receive some measurable radiological exposure
should an accident occur.
Even those individuals within the exposed population, such as those very close to the
launch area that might receive the highest exposures, would face very small risks. The
risk to the maximally exposed individual within the launch area and global populations
(Table 4-15) is estimated to be much less than 1 in 10,000,000 for Alternative 3 (with
LWRHUs) of the Mars 2020 mission. Most people in the potentially exposed population
would have much lower risks.
The individual risk estimates are small compared to other risks. For example, Table 4-9
presents information on annual individual fatality risks to residents of the United States
due to various types of hazards. This data indicates that in 2010 the average individual
risk of accidental death in the United States was about 1 in 2,600 per year, while the
average individual risk of death due to any disease, including cancer, was about 1 in
140.

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 4. Environmental Consequences

Table 4-15. LWRHU Maximum Individual Risk

(a)
Mission Phase Release Probability Maximum Individual Maximum Individual Risk
(b), (c)
Dose, (rem)
-7 -13
0: Pre-Launch Extremely Unlikely (3.1x10 ) 0.0030 5.6x10
-5 -10
1: Early Launch Very Unlikely (6.2x10 ) 0.0042 1.6x10

2: Late Launch – — —
-6 -12
3: Suborbital Very Unlikely (2.4x10 ) 0.0013 1.8x10

4: Orbital - — —

5: Long-term Reentry - — —

Source: SNL 2014

(a) A composite of the results for the Atlas V 551 and the Delta IV Heavy, determined by taking the probability-
weighted value of the two sets of results, treating the conditional probability of having a given launch vehicle
as 0.5.
(b) Determined as the product of total probability of release, maximum individual dose (mean value) and a health
-4
effects estimator of 6x10 latent cancer fatalities per rem.
(c ) The individuals associated with the maximum individual risk in Phase 0 and 1 are assumed to be the same
individual, so the two risks are additive. The individuals associated with the maximum individual risk in Phases
3, 4, and 5 would not be the same individual due to different global regions potentially affected.
Note: Probability categories, i.e., unlikely, very unlikely, defined by NASA.

4.3.4.8. Uncertainty
An uncertainty analysis to estimate uncertainties in probabilities, source terms,
radiological consequences, and mission risks has not been performed as part of this
report. Based on experience with uncertainty analyses in the preliminary risk
assessment of previous missions (e.g., for the Cassini, Mars Exploration Rover, New
Horizons, and Mars Science Laboratory missions), the uncertainty in the estimated
mission risk for the Mars 2020 mission can be approximated. The FSAR analysis for
those missions indicate that the uncertainty is dominated by the uncertainty associated
with the launch vehicle accident probabilities. The 5th and 95th percentile accident
probabilities are about a factor of 25 lower and higher, respectively, than the accident
median probabilities. The mission risk estimate for Alternative 3 (with LWRHUs) of
1.3x10-6 (or a probability of about 1 in 790,000 that a health effect will occur) can be
treated as the median of the uncertainty probability distribution (i.e., it is equally
probable that the mission risk could be higher or lower than this value). The mission
risks at the 5th and 95th percent confidence levels are then estimated to be 5.1x10-8 (or a
probability of about 1 in 19,000,000 that a health effect will occur) and 3.2x10-5 (or a
probability of about 1 in 32,000 that a health effect will occur), respectively.
4.3.5 Radiological Contingency Response Planning
Radiological contingency response planning for any configuration of the Mars 2020
mission that contains plutonium (either an MMRTG or LWRHUs) would be similar, and
has been described in Section 4.1.6.

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4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

Under the No Action Alternative, preparations for the proposed Mars 2020 mission
would be discontinued and the mission would not be implemented. Environmental
impacts associated with preparation of the proposed Mars 2020 spacecraft and the
processing of the launch vehicle would not occur. There would be no local or global
launch-related environmental impacts.
As a result of the No Action Alternative, NASA could decide to utilize the 2020 launch
opportunity to Mars for a different mission, which could address some of the objectives
of the proposed Mars 2020 mission or could have completely different objectives. In
either case, such a mission would be outside the scope of this FEIS and new
environmental documentation would be prepared.
4.5 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS
NEPA analyses conducted under the NEPA and its implementing regulations (CEQ,
1992), must include the evaluation of direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental
impacts associated with a proposed action (40 CFR 1508.7). A cumulative impact is the
“...impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions...”
(32 CFR 651).
The potential cumulative impacts associated with use of the launch vehicles and
facilities addressed within this FEIS have been assessed using currently available
information. Implementing either the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, or
Alternative 3 (i.e., launch of the Mars 2020 mission) would not increase the number of
either Atlas V or Delta IV launches beyond the scope of previously approved programs
for CCAFS (USAF 1998, USAF 2000).
Various components of the spacecraft and launch vehicle for the proposed Mars 2020
mission would be manufactured at different sites in the United States, with final
integration of the components occurring at KSC and CCAFS. Each of these sites would
be required to follow applicable Federal, state, and local regulations governing these
areas such as air pollution, noise ordinances, wastewater disposal, pollution prevention,
disposal of hazardous waste, and worker safety and health (see Section 4.9).
Spacecraft and launch vehicle manufacturing are specialized activities with only a very
limited number of units manufactured each year. While such activities could generate air
pollutants, noise, and hazardous waste, any quantities would be small compared to
major industrial activities and subject to the appropriate Federal, state, and local
environmental laws and regulations pertinent to the individual manufacturing facilities.
The MMRTG hardware has already been manufactured and assembled by industry
under contract to DOE; those flight units are in bonded storage at the contractor facility.
Testing and fueling of the MMRTGs would be done by DOE at existing facilities. The
plutonium needed to fuel the MMRTG is currently in storage at a DOE facility.
Production efforts would meet all current DOE safety and environmental requirements.
The programmatic environmental impacts associated with MMRTG production were

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addressed by the DOE for the Mars 2020 mission in existing DOE NEPA documents
(DOE 1993, 2000, 2002, 2002b, 2008, 2013).
The use of the facilities at KSC and CCAFS for processing the Mars 2020 spacecraft,
launch vehicle components, and for launch of the mission would be consistent with
existing land uses at each site. No new processing facilities for the Mars 2020 mission
are expected at either KSC or CCAFS, and any impacts from the use of existing
facilities are expected to be within the scope of previously approved programs (e.g.,
USAF 1998, USAF 2000, NASA 2002, NASA 2011). Implementing the Mars 2020
mission would not likely add new jobs to the workforce at either site.
Launching the Mars 2020 spacecraft would principally contribute to exhaust emission
impacts on and near SLC-37, LC-39A, or SLC-41 at CCAFS/KSC, depending on the
launch vehicle. The USAF has monitored numerous launches from CCAFS (USAF
1998). Launch could result in scorched vegetation and partially or completely defoliated
trees near the launch complex from flame and acidic deposition. Deposition could also
impact nearby bodies of water, resulting in temporary elevation of acidity levels. While
these impacts may persist with continued use of either launch complex, they are
probably not irreversible. At KSC, NASA found that in affected areas near the Space
Shuttle launch pads, vegetation reestablished itself after the launches stopped
(Schmalzer, et al. 1998).
On a short-term basis, the Mars 2020 launch would contribute negligible amounts of
ozone-depleting chemical compounds to the stratosphere. The USAF has estimated
that the total contribution from large expendable launch vehicles with SRBs to the
average annual depletion of ozone would be small (approximately 0.014 percent per
year). By comparison, a 3 percent to 7 percent annual decrease in ozone at mid-
latitudes occurs as a result of the current accumulation of all ozone-depleting
substances in the stratosphere (USAF 2000). Moreover, the ozone depletion trail from a
launch vehicle has been estimated to be largely temporary, and would be self-healing
within a few hours of the vehicle's passage (AIAA 1991). Furthermore, because
launches at CCAFS are always separated by at least a few days, combined impacts in
the sense of holes in the ozone layer combining or reinforcing one another would not
occur (USAF 2000).
Rocket launches result in the emission of greenhouse gases (CO2, trace emissions of
NOX emitted by the SRBs). The exhaust cloud would also contain CO, most of which,
under the high temperatures of the SRB's exhaust, would quickly react with oxygen in
the atmosphere to form CO2. The principal source of carbon emissions that could be
associated with spacecraft launches would be from NASA’s energy use in support of the
launches. The following annual greenhouse gas emissions were reported for 2011 in
the U.S.: 5,612.9 million metric tons (mt) (6.187 billion tons) of CO2 equivalent, 12.8
million mt (14.2 million tons) of NOX, and 65.1 million mt (71.8 million tons) of CO (EPA
2013, EPA 2014).
Concerning cumulative ozone depletion impacts, while present day ozone loss caused
by rocket emissions may be small, future ozone changes may not be; potential
increases in rocket launch rates due to space tourism or by geoengineering measures
in space should be considered. In addition, rocket-induced ozone loss might become

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more significant in the future when the anthropogenic stratospheric halogen loading
decreases due to implementation of the Montreal Protocol (Murray et. al. 2013).
Since the Mars 2020 mission would not increase the previously analyzed launch rates,
launch of the mission would not be anticipated to contribute further to the accumulation
of greenhouse gases from expendable launch vehicles and there would not be any
substantial increase in cumulative impacts for payload processing and launch.
Therefore, the long-term, cumulative effects to the local and regional environment by
the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, or Alternative 3 would not be
substantial (NASA 2011).
Other activities on or near CCAFS that are not connected with the Mars 2020 mission
that could occur during this timeframe include the proposed development and
construction of the KSC Exploration Park (formerly the International Space Research
Park (ISRP)) located on 160 hectares (400 acres) of KSC and the proposed
development and construction of a commercial space launch facility, the Shiloh Launch
Complex (FAA 2013). NASA intends to expand the launch capability of the Shuttle
Launch Complex (LC-39A and 39B) to include the ability to launch several vehicles
including the Space Launch System and commercial launch vehicles. These and other
potential construction activities at and in the vicinity of CCAFS could potentially
contribute to increases in noise, particulates and dust, solid waste disposal, and the
potential for involving wetlands and endangered species. An EIS for the ISRP has been
prepared (NASA 2004). It is anticipated that, should NASA approve this project, phased
construction would occur over the next 20 to 25 years. NASA has prepared an EA for
the expansion of LC-39A and B (KSC 2014). FAA is preparing an EIS for the Shiloh
Launch Complex.
No cumulative impacts would occur under the No Action Alternative.
4.6 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED
At lift-off and during ascent, the main engine and SRBs of the Atlas V would produce
Al2O3, CO, HCl, and relatively smaller amounts of CO2, NOX, hydrogen, nitrogen,
chlorine, and water. The main engines of the Delta IV would produce primarily water
vapor and water. The exhaust cloud would be concentrated near the launch pad during
the first moments of launch. Thereafter, the exhaust cloud would be transported
downwind and upward, eventually dissipating to background concentrations.
Biota in the immediate vicinity of the Atlas V launch pad at SLC-41, the Delta IV launch
pad at SLC-37, or the Falcon Heavy launch pad at LC-39A could be damaged or killed
by the intense heat and HCl deposition (at SLC-41) from the exhaust cloud. No long-
term adverse effects to biota would be anticipated. Al2O3 particulates from the Atlas V
SRBs would also be deposited on soils and nearby surface waters at the launch site as
the exhaust cloud travels downwind.
4.7 INCOMPLETE OR UNAVAILABLE INFORMATION
This FEIS has been developed before final preparations could be completed for the
proposed Mars 2020 mission. The final mission and spacecraft designs would be
subject to refinement and modification as the detailed mission planning and spacecraft

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design processes proceed. The results of this development process are not anticipated
to substantively affect the environmental evaluations presented in this FEIS. However,
should substantial change occur in the environmental impact analyses, NASA would
evaluate the need for additional environmental analysis and documentation.
The launch vehicle to be used on the Mars 2020 mission has not been selected.
Candidate vehicles include two versions of the Atlas V (the 541 and 551), the Delta IV
Heavy, and the Falcon Heavy. The Falcon Heavy is under development and has not yet
been flown. Some of the information presented in this FEIS regarding this launch
vehicle is based upon the design and operation of the Falcon 9. In particular, launch
vehicle preparation for the Falcon Heavy is based on preparation activities for the
Falcon 9. The description of the launch complex assumed to be used for Falcon Heavy
launches (LC-39A) is the description of the complex as it is now and does not include
any modifications necessary to support Falcon Heavy launches.
The risk assessment for the Mars 2020 mission prepared by DOE evaluates postulated
launch accidents that could potentially result in a release of PuO2 from the MMRTG.
DOE’s risk assessment has made use of the techniques developed in risk analyses for
previous NASA missions.
DOE’s risk analysis makes use of the results of extensive testing for the response of
plutonium dioxide to the environments associated with accident conditions. In addition,
DOE has developed sophisticated computer models to predict the detailed sequences
of events that might result in the release of plutonium dioxide to the environment under
these accident conditions. These techniques represent state-of-the-art plutonium
accident modeling. Several technical issues that could impact the results presented in
this FEIS would undergo continuing evaluation as a part of a more detailed safety
analysis should NASA proceed with the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) or the LWRHU-
based Alternative 3. Issues that continue to be evaluated include:
 the solid propellant fire environment and its potential effect on the release of
PuO2 from the MMRTG; and
 the mechanical response of the MMRTG or LWRHUs for the mission-specific
configuration of the Mars 2020 mission.
Recent solid fire propellant tests indicate that DOE’s analysis is conservative, but the
results of any future test programs could impact the modeling of the fire environment
and its effects on the MMRTG. Therefore, this issue continues to be evaluated. The
Mars 2020 mission, while using an MSL heritage design, would be expected to have
some differences in the spacecraft and rover configurations. These differences could
alter the conditional probabilities of MMRTG damage and PuO2 release. As indicated
below, a safety analysis (which would include another risk assessment) that
incorporates more detailed configuration information will be performed for this mission.
Under Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum 25, a separate
nuclear launch safety review of the Mars 2020 mission would be conducted by NASA,
DOE, DoD and EPA should NASA proceed with the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) or
Alternative 3. As part of this process, DOE would prepare an FSAR that would include a
complete, detailed risk analysis. In preparing the FSAR, DOE would follow procedures

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and use techniques similar to those used in the risk analyses performed for earlier
NASA missions using radioisotope devices. An Interagency Nuclear Safety Review
Panel (INSRP) would be formed for the Mars 2020 mission, and would review this
safety analysis. Should the FSAR present risk estimates that differ significantly from
those presented in this FEIS, NASA would consider the new information, and determine
the need for additional environmental analysis and documentation.
A detailed uncertainty analysis has not been performed as part of the risk assessment
prepared for this FEIS. Based on uncertainty analyses performed for previous mission
risk assessments (e.g., for the Cassini, Mars Exploration Rover, New Horizons, and
Mars Science Laboratory missions), parameter and model uncertainties associated with
estimating radiological consequences could result in risk estimates that vary from one to
two orders of magnitude at the 5 percent and 95 percent confidence levels. The Mars
2020 FSAR would include the results of a formal uncertainty analysis based on the
Mars 2020 risk analysis.
4.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES OF THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM
PRODUCTIVITY
4.8.1 Short-Term Uses
Under the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, or Alternative 3, the Mars 2020
mission would be launched from CCAFS or KSC. The short-term affected environment
would include the launch complex and surrounding areas. At CCAFS and KSC, short-
term uses include commercial, NASA and USAF operations, urban communities, a fish
and wildlife refuge, citrus groves, residential communities, and recreational areas. The
proposed Mars 2020 mission would be conducted in accordance with past and ongoing
NASA and USAF procedures for operations at CCAFS and KSC. Should an accident
occur under the Proposed Action causing a radiological release, short-term uses of
contaminated areas would be curtailed, pending mitigation.
4.8.2 Long-Term Productivity
No change to land use at CCAFS or KSC and the surrounding region is anticipated due
to the Proposed Action (Alternative 1), Alternative 2, or Alternative 3. The region would
continue to support human habitation and activities; wildlife habitats; citrus groves;
grazing and agricultural land; and cultural, historic, and archaeological areas. No long-
term effects on these uses are anticipated because of any of these 3 alternatives.
However, should an accident occur under the Proposed Action causing a radiological
release, the long-term productivity of contaminated land areas could be impacted,
pending mitigation.
The successful completion of the proposed Mars 2020 mission would benefit science
and the United States space program, which is important to the economic stability of the
area. In addition to the localized economic benefits from proactive small and small
disadvantaged business plans, implementing this mission has broader socioeconomic
benefits. These include technology spin-offs, such as low-power digital receivers, to
industry and other space missions, maintaining the unique capability of the United

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States to conduct complex planetary missions by a large number of scientists and

engineers, and supporting the continued scientific development of graduate students in
a number of universities and colleges. Furthermore, comprehensive formal and informal
education programs would be conducted as education and public outreach efforts, and
proactive small business plans would be available to provide opportunities for small
businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, and woman-owned small businesses;
and historically black colleges and universities. Data and images acquired by the Mars
2020 mission would be made available to the general public, schools, and other
institutions via a broad variety of media, including the Internet. In short, the mission
would maintain and foster the nation’s human engineering and science expertize.
4.9 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
An irretrievable resource commitment results when a spent resource cannot be
replaced within a reasonable period of time. For the Proposed Action (Alternative 1),
Alternative 2, and Alternative 3, quantities of various resources, including energy, fuels,
and other materials, would be irreversibly and irretrievably committed. The use of these
resources would be associated with the fabrication, launch, and operation of all
elements of the proposed Mars 2020 mission.
4.9.1 Energy and Fuels
Fabrication of the Mars 2020 spacecraft and its launch vehicle would use electrical and
fossil-fuel energy. This use constitutes an irretrievable commitment of resources but
would not impose any significant energy impacts. The launch and operation of the
spacecraft would consume solid and liquid propellant and related fluids. The solid
propellant ingredients for the Atlas V SRBs would be ammonium perchlorate, aluminum
powder, and HTPB binder. The liquid propellants would include RP-1 (for the Atlas V),
hydrazine, LH2, and LOX. Typical quantities that would be used are summarized in
Section 2.1.5.
4.9.2 Other Materials
The total quantities of other materials used in the proposed Mars 2020 mission that
would be irreversibly and irretrievable committed are relatively minor. Typically, these
materials include steel, aluminum, titanium, iron, molybdenum, plastic, glass, graphite,
nickel, chromium, lead, zinc, and copper. Small quantities of plutonium for the MMRTG
of the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) and an even smaller quantity for the LWRHUs of
Alternative 3 would be used. Less common materials may include small quantities of
silver, mercury, gold, rhodium, gallium, germanium, hafnium, niobium, platinum, iridium,
tantalum, and beryllium.
4.10 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AT CCAFS AND KSC
This section presents an overview of environmental laws, regulations, reviews and
consultation requirements applicable to operations at CCAFS and KSC, and includes
permits, licenses, and approvals. The information presented is summarized from the
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
Program (USAF 1998), the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (USAF 2000), NASA's Final

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Environmental Assessment for Launch of NASA Routine Payloads on Expendable

Launch Vehicles, (NASA 2011), and the KSC Environmental Resources Document
(NASA 2010).
The referenced NEPA documents present the relevant discussions, analyses, potential
environmental impacts, and applicable mitigation plans within each topic of concern.
Launch services for the Mars 2020 mission would be provided by a commercial NLS
contractor that would be required to adhere to facility permits and regulatory
requirements. USAF requirements are cited for some of the environmental resource
areas noted below as examples of the documentation the NLS contractor would need to
implement. Launch of the Mars 2020 mission from CCAFS or KSC would follow all
applicable environmental and health and safety regulatory requirements. No
modifications to existing permits are anticipated for the Delta or Atlas launch vehicles. If
the Falcon Heavy is selected as the launch vehicle, applicable permits will be obtained
and/or existing permits will be modified accordingly.
4.10.1 Air Resources
Air permits are required for activities considered as stationary sources, such as launch
support activities (e.g., vehicle preparation, assembly, propellant loading), having the
potential to release threshold amounts of air pollutants but are not required for
emissions from mobile sources such as launch vehicles during liftoff and ascent.
Existing equipment and services would be used for preparation and launch of the
selected launch vehicle.
CCAFS and KSC are classified as major sources because emissions are above major
source thresholds. In this regard, CCAFS and KSC have both been issued Title V
permits by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) and currently
operate under their respective Title V permits. The NLS contractors are required to
comply with all applicable Clean Air Act requirements for their launch service
operations.
4.10.2 Water Resources
The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1977, as amended (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.), provides
regulatory guidelines for water quality.
Wastewater at CCAFS and KSC is discharged in accordance with its respective
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit conditions. Water
used during launch would be discharged under the CCAFS/KSC NPDES permit issued
by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection or generated wastewater would
be tested and properly disposed of by a certified contractor.
4.10.3 Floodplains and Wetlands
Executive Order (EO) 11988, Floodplain Management, and EO 11990, Protection of
Wetlands, would be followed. Most wetlands are considered waters of the U.S. and are
under the jurisdiction of the CWA. A number of Federal agencies regulate and
administer programs that can potentially affect wetlands and their likelihood for
utilization including but not limited to the Army Corps of Engineers, Florida Department

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 4. Environmental Consequences

of Environmental Protection, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior,
and the Environmental Protection Agency.
No added impacts to floodplains and wetlands beyond those normally associated with
typical launches would be anticipated. The proposed Mars 2020 launch would not be
anticipated to add substantial impacts beyond those normally associated with a launch
vehicle.
4.10.4 Hazardous Material Management
Hazardous materials are regulated under Federal laws such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (42
U.S.C. 9601 et seq.); the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1986, as amended
(15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.); and the Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1970, as
amended (49 U.S.C. 1803 et seq.). In addition, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 32-7086,
Hazardous Material Management, provides guidance for managing hazardous materials
at all Air Force installations, including CCAFS.
As required by contract, all hazardous material would be procured and managed by the
NSL contractor in accordance with all applicable Federal, state, and local requirements.
4.10.5 Hazardous Waste Management
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6901 et
seq.), corresponding state law, and associated Federal and state regulations establish
regulatory requirements for managing hazardous wastes. For example, Air Force
Instruction AFI 32-7042, Solid and Hazardous Waste Compliance, and the 45th Space
Wing Operations Plan 19-14, Petroleum Products and Hazardous Waste Management
Plan, provide guidance on managing hazardous waste. Hazardous wastes must be
collected, labeled appropriately, and stored in hazardous waste collection areas prior to
disposal.
Hazardous wastes would be managed by the NLS contractor in accordance with all
applicable Federal, state, and local requirements.
4.10.6 Pollution Prevention
The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, as amended (42 U.S.C. 13101 et seq.), provides
the regulatory framework for reducing pollution. For example, Department of Defense
Directive 4210.15, Hazardous Material Pollution Prevention; USAF Policy Directive
AFPD 32-70, Environmental Quality; and AFI 32-7080, Pollution Prevention Program,
provide pollution prevention guidelines. NASA participates in a partnership with the
military services called the Joint Group on Pollution Prevention to reduce or eliminate
hazardous material or processes.
Pollution prevention guidelines are provided, for example, by the 45th Space Wing
Pollution Prevention Program Guide and Pollution Prevention Management Action Plan.
4.10.7 Spill Prevention
Oil pollution prevention regulations in 40 CFR 112 require preparation and
implementation of spill prevention, control, and countermeasures (SPCC) plans for all

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non-transportation-related facilities that store oil in excess of specific quantities [an

aggregate aboveground container capacity greater than 1,320 gals (only containers
greater than or equal to 55 gals are counted), or completely buried storage capacity
greater than 42,000 gals] and that have discharged or could reasonably be expected to
discharge oil into navigable waters of the U.S. or its adjoining shorelines. Since both
CCAFS and KSC store more than 1,320 gals of oil above ground and, because a spill
could reach a navigable U.S. waterway, the facilities are subject to the SPCC
regulations (NASA 2010).
The NSL contractor would be responsible for prevention of spills or releases of
hazardous material, and, in most cases, be responsible for cleanup of any released
hazardous material in accordance with all applicable Federal, state, and local
requirements. When a spill of a Federally-listed oil or petroleum occurs, the substance
would be collected and removed for disposal by a certified contractor.
4.10.8 Biological Resources
Federal mandates for the conservation of biological resources include, but are not
limited to, the Endangered Species Act of (ESA) 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1531 et
seq.); the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1361 et
seq.); and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, as amended (16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.).
Both CCAFS and KSC have ESA-listed (endangered or threatened) species. USAF and
KSC consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service are in place or in process. Established standard practices (e.g.,
complying with the light management plan for nesting sea turtles and hatchlings) would
be observed to minimize impacts to these resources.
Any consultation agreements would be modified, if necessary and as applicable, to
address the Falcon Heavy launch vehicle if this vehicle is selected for launch of the
Mars 2020 rover.
4.10.9 Coastal Zone Management
The regulatory framework for coastal zone management is provided by the Federal
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.), which
establishes a national policy to preserve, protect, develop, restore, and enhance the
resources of the nation's coastal zone. CCAFS and KSC would follow the state of
Florida's coastal zone management requirements. No added impacts beyond those
normally associated with launches would be anticipated.
4.10.10 Cultural and Historic Resources
Directives of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended
(16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.), would be followed. The State Historic Preservation Officer and
the Federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation would be consulted if the USAF
or KSC believe that the Mars 2020 mission might adversely affect cultural or historic
resources, although no such adverse effects are anticipated at this time.

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4.10.11 Noise
Regulations and guidelines prescribed by the Noise Control Act of 1972, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 4901 et seq.); the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health would be followed at both CCAFS
and KSC.
4.10.12 Worker and Public Safety and Health
OSHA regulations would be followed to ensure worker and public safety and health from
excessive noise, exposure to hazardous materials and hazardous wastes, and ingestion
of toxic fumes from operations such as fueling. The 45th Space Wing at CCAFS has the
responsibility to follow Range Safety guidelines as outlined in the Range Safety User
Requirements Manual (USAF 2004). MMRTG handling at the launch site would be
performed following applicable regulations as outlined in KHB 1860.1, KSC Ionizing
Radiation Protection Program (NASA 2001) and in accordance with the DOE safety
rules and regulations as summarized in a Mars 2020-specific Documented Safety
Analysis that would be prepared by the DOE prior to activities in support of a Mars 2020
launch.

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 5. List of Preparers

5. LIST OF PREPARERS
This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Mars 2020 mission was
prepared by the Science Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). As a cooperating agency, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
has contributed expertise in the preparation of this FEIS. The organizations and
individuals listed below contributed to the overall effort in the preparation of this
document.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
George Tahu Program Executive, Mars 2020 Mission
M.S., Systems Engineering Science Mission Directorate
Years of Experience: 24
Tina Norwood NASA NEPA Coordinator
M.S., Ecology Environmental Management Division
Years of Experience: 29
Ken Kumor NASA NEPA Analyst
JD
Years of Experience: 34
Thomas Hayes NASA Office of General Counsel
JD
Years of Experience: 20

California Institute of Technology - Jet Propulsion Laboratory

(Contractor to NASA)
Reed Wilcox Manager, Project Support Office
M.S., City and Regional Planning
Years of Experience: 28
J. Mark Phillips Manager, Mars Exploration Program
B.S., Biology Launch Approval
Years of Experience: 33
Jonathan Stabb Launch Approval Engineer
M.A., Mathematics
Years of Experience: 25
Victoria Ryan Group Supervisor, Launch Approval
MS, Environmental Engineering Engineering
Years of Experience: 13
Paul VanDamme Deputy Manager, Launch Approval
M.S., Public Policy Engineering
Years of Experience: 22
Douglas Bernard Project System Engineering Manager
PhD, Aeronautics and Astronautics
Years of Experience: 31
Michael Wilson Mission System Manager
MS, Aerospace
Years of Experience: 31

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

California Institute of Technology - Jet Propulsion Laboratory

(Contractor to NASA)
Deborah Bass Deputy Project Scientist
PhD Planetary Geology
Years of Experience: 21
Douglas Isbell Risk Communication Coordinator
MS, Journalism
Years of Experience: 24

U.S. Department of Energy

Ryan Bechtel Program Manager, Space Nuclear Power
M.S., Nuclear Engineering, Civil Systems Safety
Engineering
Years of Experience: 5

Sandia National Laboratories (Contractor to DOE)

Ronald Lipinski Manager, Radioisotope Power Systems
PhD, Nuclear Engineering Launch Safety
Years of Experience: 37
Daniel Clayton Source Team Leader
PhD, Chemical Engineering
Years of Experience: 11
John Bignell Blast and Impact Team Leader
PhD, Civil Engineering
Years of Experience: 8
Tim Bartell Fire and Thermal Team Leader
PhD, Engineering Physics
Years of Experience: 30
Don Potter Reentry Team Leader
MS, Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering
Years of Experience: 33
Nate Bixler Consequence Analysis Team Leader
PhD, Chemical Engineering
Years of Experience: 31

Cornell Technical Services, LLC (Contractor to NASA)

Michael Cadena CTS Task Manager
B.S., Economics
Years of Experience: 23
Jayme Melofchik Meeting Facilitator, Senior Environmental
B.S., Biology Scientist
Years of Experience: 26

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 5. List of Preparers

Leidos (Contractor to Cornell Technical Services)

Douglas Outlaw EIS Project Manager, Radiological Risks
PhD, Nuclear Physics and Impacts
Years of Experience: 37
Daniel Gallagher Chapters 1 and 2 Manager, Risk Analyst
M.E., Nuclear Engineering Reliability and Risk Engineer
Years of Experience: 34
Suzanne Crede Environmental Analyst
B.S., Chemistry Education
Years of Experience: 22
Scott Heiser Deputy Project Manager
M.S., Engineering Management
Years of Experience: 22
Sydel Cavanaugh Public Meetings Coordinator
B.A., Interdisciplinary Studies-Personnel and
Sociology
Years of Experience: 17

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 6. Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals Consulted

6. AGENCIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

6.1 INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) states, “There shall be an early and
open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying
the significant issues related to the proposed action.” As such, NASA has engaged
stakeholders and the general public in the preparation of this FEIS. Stakeholders
include Federal, state, and local governments; business interests; landowners;
residents; and environmental organizations.
This chapter of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission
summarizes the public and agency outreach program NASA has undertaken in support
of its Mars Exploration Program and the Mars 2020 mission.
In preparing the FEIS, NASA has actively solicited input from a broad range of
interested parties. In addition to publication in the Federal Register of a Notice Of Intent
(NOI) (78 FR 55672) for the EIS, NASA mailed on September 23, 2013 an introductory
letter directly to agencies, organizations, and individuals who may have interest in
environmental impacts and alternatives associated with the Mars 2020 mission.
6.2 COOPERATING AGENCY
As defined in Title 40 CFR 1508.5, and further clarified in subsequent Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance memoranda, a cooperating agency can be any
Federal, state, tribal, or local government that has jurisdiction by law or special
expertise regarding any environmental impact involved in a proposal or a reasonable
alternative.
NASA is the Federal agency that funds the launch of the Mars 2020 mission and is
therefore the lead agency for preparation of this FEIS. The DOE is participating as a
cooperating agency because they possess both regulatory authority and specialized
expertise regarding the environmental context of the use of plutonium.
6.3 SCOPING PROCESS
On April 12, 2005, NASA published a Notice of Availability of the Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars Exploration Program (PEIS MEP) (NASA
2005a, 70 FR 19102). The Record of Decision for the PEIS MEP was signed on June
22, 2005, enabling continued planning for the MEP, which represents NASA’s overall
plans for the robotic exploration of Mars through 2020. The PEIS MEP encompasses
the launch of at least one spacecraft to Mars during each favorable launch opportunity,
which occurs approximately every 26 months. Overall environmental compliance in
support of the MEP is addressed in the PEIS MEP, and allows planning to continue for
the Mars 2020 mission.
On September 11, 2013, NASA published a NOI in the Federal Register (78 FR 55762)
to prepare an EIS and conduct scoping for the Mars 2020 mission. Public input and
comments on alternatives, potential environmental impacts, and concerns associated
with the proposed Mars 2020 mission were requested.

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NASA held scoping meetings on October 9 and 10, 2013, to solicit written and oral
comments on the scope of the Mars 2020 Mission Draft EIS. Two scoping meetings
were held in the vicinity of Kennedy Space Center (KSC). An open house, town hall
meeting format was used for the scoping meetings. This format enabled meeting
participants to familiarize themselves with the proposed Mars 2020 mission and Draft
EIS, as well as the NEPA process during the open house, followed by an opportunity to
provide formal comments on the scope of the Mars 2020 Mission EIS.
The open house portion of the scoping meetings included displays of a variety of
posters and printed material that supported the EIS and NEPA process. Technical
experts were available to interact with the public at the various displays. In addition,
there were several “floater” experts that provided additional technical expertise where
needed. Each display was augmented with supporting written materials such as a fact
sheet.
The town hall session followed the open house. After introductory remarks,
presentations were made including videotaped presentations by the NASA HQ Mars
2020 Program Executive and the NASA HQ NEPA Manager, and followed by
presentations by other team members that were in attendance. In anticipation of the
government shutdown, the NASA HQ Mars 2020 Program Executive and the NASA HQ
NEPA Manager recorded their presentations at NASA TV in Washington, DC. At the
conclusion of the presentations, the facilitator took direction of the meeting, guiding
individuals through the comment process. During the formal scoping comment portion,
one member of the public asked questions on the science portion of the mission but did
not provide comments on the scope of the EIS. Written scoping comments were
received by one individual representing a college class (Turner 2013). The scoping
period ended on October 30, 2013.
6.4 WEBSITE
Throughout the duration of the Mars 2020 Mission NEPA process, NASA will maintain a
website that provides the public with the most up-to-date project information, including
electronic copies of the EIS, as they are made available. The website may be accessed
at http://www.nasa.gov/agency/nepa/mars2020eis
6.5 REVIEW OF DRAFT EIS
The public was notified of the opportunity to review and comment on this Draft Mars
2020 Mission EIS by announcements in the Federal Register (79FR 32577 and 79FR
32729, June 5th and 6th 2014, respectively) and local digital and print news media. This
Mars 2020 Mission Draft EIS was also available for downloading from the website
identified above.
6.6 DRAFT EIS DISTRIBUTION
The Draft Mars 2020 Mission EIS was made available for review and comment by
Federal, state, and local agencies and the public. The public review and comment
period extended 45 days from the publication of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) Federal Register notice of availability (NOA) (79FR32729) published
on June 6, 2014. Comments were considered during the preparation of the Final EIS.

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 6. Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals Consulted

As announced in the NOA, the Draft EIS was available for review and download at the
NASA web site: http://www.nasa.gov/agency/nepa/index.html#.UzQr1lEVF8M
NASA mailed copies of the Draft EIS directly to the agencies, organizations, and
individuals who had requested a printed copy or CD of the document. In addition, NASA
sent copies of the NOA via mail or email to the stakeholders listed below:
Federal Agencies
Council on Environmental Quality
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA Headquarters
NASA Ames Research Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Johnson Space Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Kennedy Space Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Langley Research Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Stennis Space Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Glenn Research Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Shared Services Center FOIA Customer Service Center
NASA Public Liaison Office
National Science Foundation
Office of Management and Budget
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Department of the Air Force
Patrick Air Force Base
U.S. Department of the Army
U.S. Department of Commerce
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries)
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Food and Drug Administration
National Cancer Institute
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 4
Transportation Security Administration
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Department of the Interior
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
Fish and Wildlife Service
National Park Service
Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

U.S. Department of State

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Office of Safety, Energy and Environment
Research and Innovative Technology Administration
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
USEPA, Region 4
U.S. House of Representatives
Corrine Brown (Florida 5th District)
Judy Chu (California 27th District)
Ron DeSantis (Florida 6th District)
Alan Grayson (Florida 9th District
John Mica (Florida 7th District)
Patrick Murphy (Florida 18th District)
Bill Posey (Florida 8th District)
Tom Rooney (Florida 17th District)
Adam Schiff (California 28th District)
Daniel Webster (Florida 1st District)
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
U.S. Senate
Senator Barbara Boxer (California)
Senator Diane Feinstein (California)
Senator Bill Nelson (Florida)
Senator Marco Rubio (Florida)
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
State Agencies
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
Florida State Clearinghouse
State of Florida
Office of Governor
Office of Lt. Governor
State of Florida Senate
John Trasher (6th District)
Dorothy L. Hukill (8th District)
David Simmons (10th District)
Alan Hays (11th District)
Geraldine F. Thompson (12 District)
Andy Gardiner (13th District)
Darren Soto (14th District)
Kelli Stargel (15th District)
Thad Altman (16th District)
Denise Grimsley (21st District)

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 6. Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals Consulted

Joe Negron (32nd District)

State of Florida House of Representatives
Travis Hutson (24th District)
Charles David Hood, Jr. (25th District)
Dwayne L. Taylor (26th District)
David Santiago (27th District)
Jason T. Brodeur (28th District)
Michael Philip Clelland (29th District)
Karen Castor Dentel (30th District)
Bryan Nelson (31st District)
Mike La Rosa (42nd District)
Ricardo Rangel (43rd District)
Randolph Bracy (45th District)
Bruce Antone (46th District)
Linda Stewart (47th District)
Victor Manuel Torres, Jr. (48th District)
Joe Saunders (49th District)
Tom Goodson (50th District)
Steve Crisafulli (51st District)
Ritch Workman (52nd District)
John Tobia (53rd District)
Debbie Mayfield (54th District)

County Agencies
Brevard County
Board of Commissioners
Natural Resources Management Office
Office of Emergency Management
Planning and Zoning Office
Lake County Board of Commissioners
Orange County Board of Commissioners
Osceola County Board of Commissioners
Seminole County Board of Commissioners
Volusia County
County Chair
County Manager
Local Agencies
Port Canaveral Commissioners, Chairman, District 1
Mayor Rocky Randels, City of Cape Canaveral
Mayor Henry U. Parrish III, City of Cocoa
Mayor Dave Netterstrom, City of Cocoa Beach
Mayor Jim Swan, City of Kissimmee
Mayor Kathy Meehan, City of Melbourne
Mayor Adam Barringer, City of New Smyrna Beach
Mayor Buddy Dyer, City of Orlando

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Scott Morgan, City Manager, City of West Melbourne

Mayor Rebecca Borders, City of St. Cloud
Mayor James H. Tully, Jr., City of Titusville
Organizations
Aerospace Industries Association
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Astronomical Society
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Audubon of Florida
Space Coast Audubon Society
Pelican Island Audubon Society
Economic Development Commission of Florida's Space Coast
Environmental Defense Fund
Environmental Defense Institute, Inc.
Federation of American Scientists
Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice
Florida Solar Energy Center
Friends of the Earth
Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space
Global Security.org
Greenpeace International
Innovative Health Applications, LLC
International Committee Against Mars Sample Return
Mars Society
National Audubon Society
National Congress of American Indians
National Hispanic Environmental Council
National Space Society
National Tribal Environmental Council
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation
National Wildlife Federation
Natural Resources Defense Council
The Nature Conservancy
Partnership for a Sustainable Future, Inc.
Physicians for Social Responsibility
The Planetary Society
Sierra Club National Headquarters
Snake River Alliance
Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice
The Space Foundation
Union of Concerned Scientists
Public Libraries
NASA Headquarters Library
Central Brevard Library and Reference Center

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 6. Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals Consulted

Individuals
Sebnem Aynur
Walter Blair
Peter Carson
Sandip Chatterjee
Lois Clark
Kevin Clendaniel
James Dean – Florida Today
Premilla Dixit
Margaret Dutton
Dr. Murray Felsher
Rosemary Galli
Nancy Goodspeed
Daniel Gruenbaum
Jane Hanna
Russell D. Hoffman
Karl Johanson
Leah R. Karpen
Helene Knox, PhD.
Deborah Kreis
Chris Kridler
Sarah Lasenby
Dr. John F. Martin
Natacsha Mayers
Ross McCluney
Gary Moore – Webster University
Shirley Morrison
Robert Osband
Richard Paczynski, MD
L. Peterson
Andrew Pesce
John Plotnicky
Mary Ann Powell
Wilfred Phillips
Ralph E. Renno, III
Lilly Ryterski
Gregory Sakala
Dr. Judith Schmidt
Alan H. Scoville
William Sell
Jean Stewart
Bryan Thomas
Eric Turner
Matt Van Kleunen
Caroll Webber
Linda West

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Claire Whitehill
Faith Molly Wilcox
Tim Yep
William Young
Sylvia Z. Zisman

6-8
 7. Index

7. INDEX
A
Abbreviations, xxix
Accident
cleanup costs, ix, 2-63, 4-47
configurations, 4-24, 4-27, 4-41, 4-63
consequences
non-radiological, vii, 2-53, 4-17, 4-54, 4-55
radiological, viii - xiii, 2-55, 4-22, 4-54, 4-55
environments, viii, 2-23, 2-44, 2-57, 4-23 - 4-26, 4-30
probabilities, x - xiii, 2-56, 2-57, 2-61, 2-63, 4-23, 4-24, 4-26, 4-32, 4-56, 4-59
Acronyms, xxix
Affected Environment, 3-1
Agencies and Individuals Consulted, 5-1
Air quality, vii, 2-51, 2-53, 3-5, 4-5, 4-18
Alternatives
Alternative 1 (see Proposed Action)
Alternative 2, iv, 2-1, 2-38, 4-53
Alternative 3, iv, 2-1, 2-42, 4-54
considered but not evaluated further, 2-48
comparison of, xiii, 2-48 – 2-69
No Action, v, 2-48, 4-74
Proposed Action, i, iv, 2-1, 2-3, 4-3
Aluminum oxide (Al2O3), 2-53, 3-22, 4-6, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-19
Ambient noise, 3-6, 4-6
Ammonium perchlorate, 2-26, 4-6,4-14, 4-18, 4-79
Aquatic preserves, 3-7, 3-9
Aquatic resources, 3-9, 3-10
Archaeological resources, 2-51, 3-17, 4-12
Atlas V, vi, 2-3, 2-25, 2-57, 3-3, 3-10, 4-1
Atomic Energy Act, 4-48, 4-70
Automatic Destruct System (ADS), 2-35, 4-28
B
Background radiation, x, xii, 3-25
Biological resources, 2-51, 3-9, 4-9, 4-19, 4-82
C
Cancer fatalities (see Latent cancer fatalities)
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), iv, vii, 1-1, 2-1, 2-27, 2-30, 2-34, 3-1, 4-3,
4-79
Carbon dioxide (CO2), 2-15, 2-53, 3-22, 4-6, 4-14
Carbon monoxide (CO), 2-53, 3-5, 4-6

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Centaur (see Second stage)

Centaur Automatic Destruct System (CADS), 2-35
Clean Air Act, 3-5, 4-80
Clean Water Act, 4-80
Climate
global, 2-51, 4-16
Mars, 1-1, 1-2
regional, 3-4
Collective dose, xi, 2-59, 4-39, 4-45, 4-62, 4-68
Command Destruct System (CDS), 2-35 – 2-36, 4-27 – 4-28
Consultations with agencies and individuals, 5-1
Contaminated (radiation), ix, 2-58, 2-63, 4-41, 4-43 – 4.48, 4-65 – 4-70
Contaminated (other), 3-19, 4-8, 4-18
Contributors, 6-1
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), iii, 1-1, 3-14, 4-74, 6-1
Critical habitat, 2-51, 3-9, 3-12, 4-9
Cultural resources, 3-16, 4-12
Cumulative impacts, vii, 2-53, 4-74 – 4-76
D
Debris
launch accident, vii, xi, xv, 2-54, 2-67, 4-16, 4-18 - 4-22
normal launch, 3-16, 3-23, 4-13, 4-16
orbital and reentry, xi,2-54, 3-23, 4-18 - 4-22
Delta IV, vi, 2-3, 2-29 – 2-32, 2-57, 3-3, 3-10, 4-1
Dose
average background, xi, xii, 3-25, B-1
collective, ix, 2-59, 4-39, 4-45, 4-64 – 4-68
maximum individual, ix - xiii, 2-61, 4-38 – 4-45, 4-62 - 4-69
E
Economic impacts, 2-51, 3-15, 4-11
Emergency response planning, 2-37, 3-16, 4-20, 4-53
Emergency services, 2-51, 3-13, 3-15, 4-11
Endangered species, 2-51, 2-53, 3-9, 3-11 – 3-13, 4-7, 4-9, 4-19, 4-76, 4-82
Environmental Compliance, 4-79
Environmental impacts
normal launch, vii, xv, 2-50, 4-5, 4-54, 4-55
non-radiological accidents, vii, 2-54, 4-17, 4-54, 4-55
preparing for launch, 2-54, 4-3, 4-54, 4-55
radiological accidents, viii, xii, 2-54, 4-22, 4-54, 4-55
Environmental justice, 3-20, 4-14, C-1
Essential fish habitat, 3-10, 4-20
Exhaust emissions (see Launch emissions)

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 7. Index

F
Falcon (Heavy), vi, 2-3, 2-32 -2-35, 3-3, 3-10, 4-1
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), 4-51, 4-62, 4-73, 4-77, 4-78
First stage, 2-26, 2-29, 2-32, 4-16
Flight Termination System (FTS), 2-35, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, 4-35, 4-37, 4–41, 4-43, 4-57,
4-59, 4-61, 4-68
Floodplain, 3-7, 4-80
Florida scrub jay, 3-12, 3-13, 4-7
Freon-11, 4-4
G
General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), 2-17 – 2-23, 4-23, 4-25, 4-26, 4-30 – 4-33,
4-37, 4-38
Global environment, 2-51, 3-21, 4-14
Global climate change, 2-51, 4-16
Glossary, A-1
Greenhouse gases, 3-23, 4-16, 4-75
Groundwater, 2-51, 3-8, 3-18, 3-19, 4-8, 4-12
H
Health effects, xi, xiii, 2-59 – 2-61, 2-64, 4-26, 4-38 - 4-45, 4-49, 4-62 -4-69, B-7
Historic resources, 3-16, 4-82
Hydrazine, 2-10, 2-24, 2–26, 2-27, 2-30, 2-34, 2-54, 3-6, 4-9, 4-17, 4-79
Hydrogen chloride (HCl), vii, 2-51, 2–53, 3-22, 4-6 – 4-10, 4-13 – 4-14, 4-18, 4-76
Hydrology, 4-9
hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene binder (HTPB), 2-25, 4-6, 4-79
I
Incomplete or unavailable information, 4-76
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP), 4-78
K
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), iv, vii, 2-1, 2-24, 2-30, 2-33, 2-51, 3-1, 4-2, 4-74, 4-78,
4-79
L
Land use, 2-51, 3-3, 4-5, 4-47, 4-70, 4-78
Latent cancer fatalities, (see also Health effects) x–xiii, 2-59 – 2-63, 4-26, 4-51, 4-73
Launch Complex (LC)-39A, 2-33
Launch vehicle (exhaust) emissions, 3-22, 4-5, 4-14, 4-75
Launch phases (see Mission phases)
Launch profile, 2-27, 2-30, 2-34
Launch vehicle processing, 2-26, 2-30, 2-33, 4-4, 4-10, 4-12
Launch vehicles
Atlas V, vi, 2-4, 2-25, 2-35, 2-53, 2-57, 3-3, 3-10, 4-1

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Delta IV, vi, 2-4, 2-29, 2-53, 2-57, 3-3, 3-10, 4-1
Falcon (Heavy), vi, 2-4,2-32, 2-57, 3-3, 3-10, 4-1
Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU),
Description, 2-43
Response to accidents, 2-44, 4-57, 4-58
General, iv, vi, viii, xi, xv, 2-1, 4-1
Lightning, 3-11, 3-13, 3-21, 4-10
Liquid propellant, vii, 2-25, 2-27, 2-29, 2-35, 2-54, 3-17, 4-5, 4-8, 4-15, 4-17, 4-20, 4-24
Liquid hydrogen (LH2), 2-26, 2-29, 2-53, 4-6, 4-15, 4-17
Liquid oxygen (LOX), 2-26, 2-29, 2-53, 3-19, 4-6, 4-15, 4-17
M
Manatee, 3-10 - 3-13, 4-19
Maximally exposed individual, xi - xiii, 2-65, 4-45,4-51, 4-70,4-72
Maximum individual dose, ix, 2-59, 2-61, 4-35, 4-41 – 4-46, 4-51, 4-62 – 4-68
Mission Flight Control Officer (MFCO), 4-28
Mission
description, i, 2-3
objectives, iii, 1-4, 1-5
phases, 2-21, 2-58, 4-26
risk (radiological), v, viii, x, xi - xiii, 2-64, 4-22 – 4-26, 4-49 – 4-51, 4-70 – 4-73
Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG),
general, iii, v – vi, viii, 2-11
description, viii, 2-16 – 2-21
response to accidents, viii, 2-21 – 2-22, 4-30 – 4-33
N
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), 3-5
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), i, iii, 1-1, 1-7, 3-1, 4-1
Nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 3-5
Nitrogen oxides (NOX), 2-53, 3-5, 4-6, 4-14, 4-75
No Action Alternative, v, 2-2, 2-48, 4-74
Noise, 2-51, 2-53, 3-6, 4-6, 4-7, 4-11, 4-74, 4-83
Notice of Availability, 1-7, 1-9, 6-1
Notice of Intent, 1-8, 6-1
O
Offshore environment, 2-51, 3-10, 4-9
Outstanding Florida Waters, 3-7
Ozone (O3), vii, 2-51, 2-53, 3-5, 3-22, 3-23, 4-13 – 4-16, 4-75
P
Particulates, 2-51, 3-5, 4-6,4-8, 4-15, 4-17, 4-76
Payload fairing (PLF), 2-26, 2-30, 2-33
Perchlorate contamination, 4-18, 4-19

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 7. Index

Plutonium
environmental effects, B-1
worldwide levels, 3-26
Plutonium (Pu)-238, viii, 2-16, 2-21, 2-43, 2-45, 2-57, 4-23, 4-46
Plutonium dioxide (PuO2), viii, x -xiii, 2-16, 2-21 - 2-23, 2-43, 2-44, 2-57, 4-1, 4-22,
4-31, 4-48, 4-73, 4-79
Population
global, 3-24
regional, 3-13, C-4 – C-6
risk, 2-64
Price-Anderson Act, 2-64, 4-48, 4-70
Proposed Action
description, i, iv, 2-1, 2-3, 2-48, 4-3
need, iii, 1-5
purpose, iii, 1-4
Purpose and Need for Action, 1-1
R
Range Safety, vii,1-9, 2-35, 3-16, 3-19, 3-23, 4-5, 4-13
References, 8-1
Risk
assessment, viii, 1-9, 2-55, 2-57, 4-1, 4-22 – 4-26, 4-56
individual, 2-51, 2-65, 4-50 – 4-52, 4-72
general, v, ix – xiii, 2-36, 2-56 – 2-57, 4-33, 4-20, 5-50 -4-51, 4-71 – 4-73, B-10
mission, 2-66, 4-49 – 4-53, 4-70 – 4-73
population, 2-64
Rocket Propellant (RP-1), 2-26, 2-27, 2-33, 2-34, 2-53, 4-6, 4-9, 4-14, 4-17, 4-79
S
Safety
public, 4-83
Range (see Range Safety)
worker, 4-74, 4-83
Science instruments, 2-11 – 2-15
Science objectives, xv, 1-5, 2-2, 2-67
Second stage, 2-25, 2-26, 2-29, 2-33, 4-17
Socioeconomics, 2-51, 3-13, 4-11, 4-46, 4-78
Solid propellant, 2-26, 2-36, 2-51, 2-54, 4-6, 4-14, 4-18, 4-19, 4-20, 4-24, 4-31, 4-43, 4-
58
Solar power, iv, 2-1, 2-38 – 2-41, 2-43, 2-45
Solid rocket booster (SRB), 2-25, 2-26, 2-28, 2-36, 4-6, 4-8, 4-10, 4-13, 4-14, 4-15,
4-16, 4-19, 4-20, 4-75
Sonic booms, 2-51, 2-53, 3-6, 4-6
Source term, 2-58, 4-23 – 4-26, 4-32 - 4-38, 4-58 - 4-62

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Spacecraft description, 2-10

Spacecraft processing, 2-24
Space Launch Complex (SLC)-37, 2-30
Space Launch Complex (SLC)-41, 2-27
Stage 1 (see First stage)
Stage 2 (see Second stage)
Stratospheric ozone, 2-51, 3-22, 4-14
Surface water, vii, 2-51, 2-54, 3-7, 3-18, 4-8, 4-19, 4-46, 4-69, 4-76
Surface water, Mars, 1-6, 1-7
T
Threatened and endangered species, 3-11, 3-12, 4-19
Toxic gases, (see also Launch emissions) vii, 2-36, 3-20, 4-20
Trichlorfluoromethane, 4-4
Turtles, 3-9 - 3-13, 4-10, 4-19, 4-82
U
Uncertainty, 4-51, 4-73
Upper atmospheric impacts
stratosphere, vii, 2-53, 4-14 – 4-16, 4-75
troposphere, 4-46, 4-69
W
Water
groundwater, 2-51, 3-7 – 3-8, 3-18 – 3-19, 4-8, 4-12
Mars, 1-6, 1-7
quality, 2-51, 2-54, 3-7, 4-8, 4-19, 4-80
surface, vii, 2-51, 2-54, 3-7, 3-18, 4-8, 4-19, 4-46, 4-69, 4-76
Wetlands, 3-9, 3-12, 4-46, 4-76, 4-80

7-6
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 Appendix A

A.

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
99th percentile—An expression of an outcome that would not occur in more than
1 percent of all statistical samples (that is, 1 percent of the outcomes would be
greater than the 99th percentile level); the 99th percentile is derived from the
distribution of outcomes on which the mean value is based.
accident environment—Conditions resulting from an accident, such as blast
overpressure, fragments, and fire.
affected environment—A description of the existing environment that could be affected
by the Proposed Action or its alternatives.
Alpha particle—Alpha particles are the heaviest type of ionizing radiation, consisting of
two protons and two neutrons. They can travel only a few centimeters in air.
Alpha particles lose their energy almost as soon as they collide with anything.
They can be stopped easily by a sheet of paper or by the skin’s surface.
ambient air—The surrounding atmosphere, usually the outside air, as it exists around
people, plants, and structures. (It is not the air in the immediate proximity of an
emission source.)
astrobiology—The science that studies the question of whether life exists on other
planets and encompasses the study of the origin, evolution, distribution, and
future of life in the universe.
Atlas—A family of launch vehicles originally developed by the Lockheed Martin Space
Systems Company and currently manufactured by the United Launch Alliance, a
joint venture between Lockheed Martin and The Boeing Company.
attainment—An area is designated as being in attainment by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency if it meets the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for a given criteria pollutant. Non-attainment areas are areas in which
any one of the NAAQS have been exceeded, maintenance areas are areas
previously designated non-attainment and subsequently re-designated as
attainment, and unclassifiable areas are areas that cannot be classified on the
basis of available information as meeting or not meeting the NAAQS for any one
criteria pollutant.
background radiation—Ionizing radiation present in the environment from cosmic
rays, natural sources in the Earth, and artificial sources; background radiation
varies considerably with location.
Bequerel (Bq) - One Bq is defined as the activity of a quantity of radioactive material in
which one nucleus decays per second

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

biosignature—Any substance that provides evidence of past or present life. A

biosignature may be an element, molecule, or any observable occurrence that
provides signs of life.
chromatography—A method of determining the chemical composition of a substance
by passing a gas or liquid over a solid or gel and using the different adsorption
characteristics between the substance and solid to separate the chemicals in the
substance being examined.
conditional probability—Within the context of this Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), the probability that a release of radioactive material could occur given an
initiating accident (that is, the accident has occurred).
confidence level—In statistics, the degree of desired trust or assurance in a given
result. A confidence level is always associated with some assertion and
measures the probability that a given assertion is true.
constrained operations—A mode of operation during which performance of science
activities would require high power demand, beyond the capability of the rover
batteries to support the activity. Such activities would need to be spread over
multiple Martian days to allow the rover battery to recharge, reducing the number
of science operations that could be performed.
criteria pollutants—The Clean Air Act requires the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to set air quality standards for common and widespread pollutants
after preparing criteria documents summarizing scientific knowledge on their
health effects. Currently, there are standards in effect for six criteria pollutants:
sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter equal to or less than 10
microns in diameter (PM10) and particulate matter equal to or less than 2.5
microns in diameter (PM2.5), nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and lead.
cultural resources—The prehistoric and historic districts, sites, buildings, objects, or
any other physical activity considered important to a culture, subculture, or a
community for scientific, traditional, religious, or any other reason.
cumulative impact—The impact on the environment which results from the incremental
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or
person undertakes other such actions. Cumulative impacts can result from
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of
time.
curie (Ci)—A measure of the radioactivity level of a substance (that is, the number of
unstable nuclei that are undergoing transformation in the process of radioactivity
decay); one curie equals the disintegration of 3.7x1010 (37 billion) nuclei per
second and is equal to the radioactivity of one gram of radium-226.
decibel (dB)—A logarithmic measurement unit that describes a particular sound
pressure level compared to a standard reference value. The threshold of human
hearing is approximately 0 dB, and the threshold of discomfort or pain is around

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 Appendix A

120 dB. A-weighted decibels (dBA) refer to measured decibels whose

frequencies have been adjusted to correspond to the highest sensitivity of human
hearing, which is typically in the frequency range of 1,000 to 4,000 hertz.
Delta—A family of space launch vehicles originally developed by The Boeing Company
and currently manufactured by United Launch Alliance, a joint venture between
Lockheed Martin and The Boeing Company.
derived intervention level (DIL)—Guidance levels for radionuclide activity
concentration in food established by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to
determine whether food in interstate commerce or offered for import presents a
safety concern.
dose—The amount of energy deposited in the body by ionizing radiation per unit body
mass.
essential fish habitat—The United States Congress defined essential fish habitat for
federally managed fish species as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish
for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to maturity” (16 U.S.C. 1802(10)). The
conservation of essential fish habitat is an important component of building and
maintaining sustainable fisheries.
exposure to radiation—The incidence of radiation from either external or internal
sources on living or inanimate material by accident or intent.
Falcon—A family of space launch vehicles manufactured by SpaceX.
first stage—The launch vehicle stage that provides thrust at lift-off.
full stack intact impact (FSII)—For the purpose of this Environmental Impact
Statement, a postulated accident in which the entire launch vehicle (that is, all
stages, other vehicle elements, and the payload) impacts the ground in an intact
configuration due to a failure at or very shortly after lift-off.
General Conformity Rule—The General Conformity Rule is applicable to non-
attainment or maintenance areas (see attainment) as designated by the EPA,
and ensures that federal actions conform to each State Implementation Plan for
air quality. These plans, approved by the EPA, are each State's individual plan to
achieve the NAAQS as required by the Clean Air Act. The EPA is required to
promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan if a state defaults on its
implementation plan. A conformity requirement determination for the action is
made from influencing factors, including, but not limited to, non-attainment or
maintenance status of the area, types of emissions and emission levels resulting
from the action, and local impacts on air quality.
General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS)— The building block of the internal heat
source for a radioisotope thermoelectric generator. Each GPHS houses four
pellets of plutonium dioxide (consisting mostly of plutonium-238) in a ceramic
form, contained within several layers of rugged materials for protection from
impacts, fire, and other potential accident conditions. The heat radiated from the
GPHS is converted into electrical power.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

geology—The study or science of the Earth (or any solid celestial body), its history, and
its life as recorded in the rocks.
health effects—Within the context of this EIS, health effects are defined as the number
of additional latent cancer fatalities due to a radioactive release (that is, the
number of cancer fatalities resulting from this release that are in excess of those
cancer fatalities which the general population would normally experience from
other causes).
hibernation—A mode of operation to facilitate survival of the rover during winter that
requires orientation of the solar panels such that the batteries supply sufficient
power to keep the rover and its instruments warm but electric power would not be
adequate to perform most science activities.
hydrazine—A toxic, colorless liquid fuel that is hypergolic (able to burn spontaneously
on contact) when mixed with an oxidizer such as nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) or
placed in contact with a catalyst. Vapors may form explosive mixtures with air.
initiating probability—The probability that an identified accident and associated
adverse conditions (accident environments) will occur.
ionosphere—An upper atmospheric region where ionization of atmospheric gases
occurs.
isotope—Any of two or more species of atoms of a chemical element with the same
atomic number and nearly identical chemical behavior, but with different atomic
mass (due to different number of neutrons) or mass number and different nuclear
properties.
latent cancer fatalities—Estimation of latent cancer fatalities. This estimation assumes
that exposures to the radioactive material released to the environment occur over
a 50-year period, and that the internal dose resulting from such exposure are 50-
year committed doses; meaning that, following inhalation or ingestion of the
radioactive material, the resulting internal doses are based on tracking the
material in the body for a 50-year period. The time period over which latent
cancer fatalities occur is undefined, and could occur well after 50 years following
the release.
launch azimuth—The initial angle, measured clockwise from North, which a launch
vehicle takes as it begins to ascend.
Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU)— A radioactive heat source that
provides heat for temperature-sensitive spacecraft components. Each LWRHU
provides about one watt of heat derived from the radioactive decay of about 2.7
grams (0.1 ounce) of plutonium dioxide, having approximately 33.2 curies of
activity.
mass spectrometry—An analytical technique for the identification of the chemical
composition of a substance. Using an electrical or magnetic field the mass
spectrometer creates gaseous ions from the substance being examined and
sorts and identifies the ions.

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 Appendix A

maximally exposed individual (MEI)—A hypothetical person that would receive the
maximum predicted dose following an accident with a release of radioactive
material.
mean—The outcome (source term, dose, health effects, or land contamination as used
in this EIS) that would be anticipated if an accident which released radioactive
material were to occur; the mean is a statistical expression of probability-
weighted values (source terms or radiological consequences).
Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG)—An evolutionary
power source derived from the GPHS-RTG that converts the heat from the
radioactive decay of plutonium (in a ceramic form of plutonium dioxide consisting
mostly of plutonium-238, a non-weapons grade isotope) contained in eight GPHS
modules into usable electrical energy.
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)—Section 109 of the Clean Air Act
requires the EPA to set nationwide standards—the NAAQS—for widespread air
pollutants. Currently, six pollutants are regulated by primary and secondary
NAAQS (see criteria pollutants).
nominal—In the context of this EIS, default, typical, or planned conditions or
operations; functioning normally or acceptably.
oxides of nitrogen (NOx)—Gases formed primarily by fuel combustion, which
contribute to the formation of acid rain. Hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen
combine in the presence of sunlight to form ozone, a major constituent of smog.
parking orbit—A temporary low-altitude Earth orbit in which a spacecraft with its
second or third launch vehicle stage waits until it is in the proper position to
continue toward its next or final destination.
payload—The element(s) that a launch vehicle or spacecraft carries over and above
what is necessary for the operation of the vehicle. For a launch vehicle, the
spacecraft being launched is the payload; for a scientific spacecraft, the suite of
science instruments is the payload.
payload fairing (PLF)—The protective shell on a launch vehicle that encapsulates the
spacecraft through atmospheric ascent.
plutonium—The chemical element of atomic number 94, a dense silvery radioactive
transuranic metal of the actinide series. Plutonium occurs in trace amounts in
nature but is predominantly man-made.
plutonium dioxide—A chemical compound with the formula PuO2. In ceramic form it is
used to fuel the MMRTG and in LWRHUs. The fuel has a high melting
temperature (2400oC (4350oF)), is nearly insoluble in water, and tends to fracture
into largely non-respirable pieces upon impact.
plutonium-238—A non-weapons grade radioactive isotope of plutonium that decays
with a half-life of 87.7 years through the emission of an alpha particle. It is the

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

energy generated during this alpha decay that powers the MMRTG and provides
the heat from an LWRHU.
Prebiotic—Occurring or existing before the development of life
pyrolitic graphite— A man-made form of graphite, created by heating graphite and
allowing it to cool into a crystalline form. This type of graphite has enhanced
thermal conduction properties compared to ordinary graphite.
radiation—The emitted particles (alpha, beta, neutrons) or photons (x-rays, gamma
rays) from the nuclei of unstable (radioactive) atoms as a result of radioactive
decay. Some elements are naturally radioactive; others are induced to become
radioactive by bombardment in a nuclear reactor or other particle accelerator.
The characteristics of naturally occurring radiation are indistinguishable from
those of induced radiation.
radiation dose—The amount of energy from ionizing radiation deposited within tissues
of the body; a dose is a time-integrated measure of potential damage to tissues
from exposure to radiation and, as such, can have health-based consequences.
radioactive half-life—The time required for one half of the atoms in a radioactive
isotope to decay.
radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG)—A power system used by NASA and
built by DOE that generates electricity using the heat from the natural decay of
plutonium dioxide. Excess heat from the RTG is often used to keep spacecraft
electronics and mechanical systems at proper operating temperatures in the cold
of space.
rem—The unit dose representing the amount of ionizing radiation needed to produce
the same biological effects as one roentgen of high-penetration x-rays (about
200,000 electron volts). The biological effects of 1 rem are presumed to be
independent of the type of radiation. There are 1,000 millirem in each rem.
risk—Within the context of this EIS, risk is defined as the expectation of health effects
in a statistical sense (that is, the mathematical product of total probability times
the mean health effects resulting from a release of plutonium dioxide, and then
summed over all conditions leading to a release).
second stage—The launch vehicle stage that continues to provide thrust during ascent
after the vehicle's first stage has depleted its propellant and been jettisoned.
sol—One Martian day. A Martian day is 24 hours, 37 minutes or 1.026 Earth days long.
solar longitude (of Mars)—The apparent longitude of the sun seen on a celestial
sphere whose equator is defined by the plane of Mars’ orbit about the sun. The
transition from winter to spring in the northern hemisphere on Mars defines zero
degrees solar longitude.
source term—Typically the quantities of materials released during an accident to air or
water pathways and the characteristics of the releases (for example, particle size
distribution); used for determining accident consequences. The DOE Nuclear

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 Appendix A

Risk Assessment identifies the quantities of material released that can become
airborne as the source term.
spectrometer—A device used to identify the chemical composition of a substance.
The mass spectrometer uses an electrical or magnetic field to create gaseous
ions from the substance being examined and sorts and identifies the ions.
Strategic Knowledge Gap—Gaps in NASA’s knowledge or information required to
reduce risk, increase effectiveness, and improve the design of robotic and human
space exploration missions.
stratosphere—An upper portion of the atmosphere above the troposphere reaching a
maximum height of 50 kilometers (31 miles) above the Earth’s surface. The
temperature is relatively constant in the lower stratosphere and gradually
increases with altitude. The stratosphere is the Earth’s main ozone producing
region.
take—To pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect (50 CFR 10.12).
tropopause—The boundary between the troposphere and stratosphere, usually
characterized by an abrupt change of lapse rate; the change is in the direction of
increased atmospheric stability from regions below to regions above the
tropopause; its height varies from 15 kilometers (9 miles) in the tropics to about
10 kilometers (6 miles) in polar regions.
troposphere—The portion of the atmosphere next to the Earth’s surface in which the
temperature rapidly decreases with altitude, clouds form, and convection is
active. The troposphere begins at ground level and extends to an altitude of 10 to
12 kilometers (6 to 8 miles) above the Earth’s surface.
unavoidable adverse effects—Effects that cannot be avoided due to constraints in
alternatives. These effects must be disclosed, discussed and mitigated, if
practicable.

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 Appendix B

B.

APPENDIX B
EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM ON THE ENVIRONMENT

Table of Contents
B-1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. B-1
B-2 RADIOLOGICAL HUMAN HEALTH IMPACTS ................................................... B-1
B-2.1 Nature of Radiation and Its Effects on Humans ........................................... B-2
B-2.2 Radiation Sources ........................................................................................ B-4
B-2.3 Exposure Pathways ..................................................................................... B-5
B-2.4 Radiation Protection Guides......................................................................... B-6
B-2.5 Radiation Exposure Limits............................................................................ B-7
B-2.6 Health Effects ............................................................................................... B-7
B-2.7 EIS Health Effect Risk Estimators .............................................................. B-10
B-3 EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM ON THE ENVIRONMENT ..................................... B-11
B-3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ B-11
B-3.2 Chemical And Physical Properties That Are Important For Behavior In The
Environment And The Human Body ........................................................... B-11
B-3.3 The Transport Of Plutonium Oxides Through The Environment ................ B-13
B-3.4 Transport and Deposition of Radionuclides in the Human Body ................ B-16
B-4 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX B.................................................................... B-17

List of Tables
Table B-1. Exposure Limits for Members of the Public................................................B-7
Table B-2. Nominal Health Risk Estimators Associated with Exposure to 1 Rem of
Ionizing Radiation ...................................................................................B-8

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 Appendix B

APPENDIX B
EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM ON THE ENVIRONMENT
B-1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix addresses the potential impacts from a radioactive source containing
plutonium (Pu)-238 released to the environment, which could occur in any of the low-
probability accidents described in Chapter 4 of this Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). In Alternative 1, the Proposed Action, the Mars 2020 rover would carry one Multi-
Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) containing approximately 4.8
kilograms (10.6 pounds) of plutonium dioxide (PuO2) (consisting mostly of Pu-238), with
a total activity of about 60,000 curies. Additionally, in Alternative 3, the Mars 2020 rover
would include light weight radioisotope heater units (LWRHUs) to keep avionics and
communication systems within thermal limits. The rover could include up to 71
LWRHUs, each containing approximately 2.7 grams (0.095 oz) of PuO2 (consisting
mostly of Pu-238), with a total activity of about 33.2 curies. Should 71 LWRHUs be used
the total activity would be about 2,400 curies. The health and environmental risks
associated with Pu-238 have been previously addressed in the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's (NASA’s) EISs for the Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, Mars
Exploration Rovers, New Horizons, and Mars Science Laboratory missions (NASA
1989, NASA 1990, NASA 1995, NASA 1997, NASA 2002b, NASA 2005 and NASA
2006).
Because radiation exposure and its consequences are of interest to the general public,
Section B.2 provides information about the nature of radiation and explains basic
concepts used to evaluate radiation health effects. Section B.3 discusses the behavior
of plutonium in the environment, including how it interacts with the human body.
B-2 RADIOLOGICAL HUMAN HEALTH IMPACTS
This appendix presents numerical information using scientific, or exponential, notation.
For example, the number 100,000 can also be expressed as 1 × 105. The number 0.001
can be expressed as 1 × 10-3. The following chart defines the equivalent numerical
notations that may be used in this appendix.
Fractions and Multiples of Units

Multiple Decimal Equivalent Prefix Symbol

6
1 × 10 1,000,000 mega- M
3
1 × 10 1,000 kilo- k
2
1 × 10 100 hecto- h
1 × 10 10 deka- da
-1
1 × 10 0.1 deci- d
-2
1 × 10 0.01 centi- c
-3
1 × 10 0.001 milli- m
-6
1 × 10 0.000001 micro- μ

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

B-2.1 NATURE OF RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON HUMANS

What Is Radiation?
Radiation is energy transferred in the form of particles or waves. Globally, humans are
exposed constantly to radiation from the solar system and from Earth’s rocks and soil.
This radiation contributes to the natural background radiation that always surrounds us.
Manmade sources of radiation also exist, including medical applications (tests and
therapy), dental x-rays, and household smoke detectors.
All matter in the universe is composed of atoms. Radiation comes from the activity of
tiny particles within an atom. An atom consists of a positively charged nucleus (central
part of an atom) with a number of negatively charged electron particles in various orbits
around the nucleus. There are two types of particles in the nucleus: neutrons that are
electrically neutral, and protons that are positively charged. Atoms are categorized as
different stable elements based on the number of protons in the nucleus. There are
more than 100 natural and manmade elements. An element has equal numbers of
electrons and protons. When atoms of an element differ in their number of neutrons,
they are called isotopes. All elements have three or more isotopes, some or all of which
could be unstable.
Unstable isotopes undergo spontaneous change, known as radioactive disintegration or
radioactive decay. The process of continuously undergoing spontaneous disintegration
is called radioactivity. The radioactivity of a material decreases with time. The time it
takes a material to lose half of its original radioactivity is its half-life. An isotope’s half-life
is a measure of its decay rate. For example, an isotope with a half-life of eight days will
lose one-half of its radioactivity in that amount of time. In eight more days, one-half of
the remaining radioactivity will be lost, and so on. Each radioactive element has a
characteristic half-life. The half-lives of various radioactive elements may vary from
millionths of a second to billions of years.
As unstable isotopes change into more stable forms, they emit particles and/or energy.
An emitted particle may be an alpha particle (a helium nucleus), a beta particle (an
electron), or a neutron, with various levels of kinetic energy. Sometimes these particles
are emitted in conjunction with gamma rays. The particles and gamma rays are referred
to as “ionizing radiation.” Ionizing radiation refers to the fact that the radiation can
ionize, or electrically charge, an atom by stripping off one or more of its electrons.
Gamma rays, even though they do not carry an electric charge, can ionize atoms as
they pass through an element by ejecting electrons. Ionizing radiation can cause a
change in the chemical composition of many things, including living tissue (organs),
which can affect the way they function.
When a radioactive isotope of an element emits a particle, it changes to an entirely
different element or isotope, one that may or may not be radioactive. Eventually, a
stable element is formed. This transformation, which may take several steps, is known
as a decay chain. For example, the isotope plutonium-238, has a half-life of 87.7 years.
It emits an alpha particle and becomes the isotope uranium-234, a radioactive isotope
with a half-life of 246,000 years. The decay products will build up and eventually die
away as time progresses.

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 Appendix B

Characteristics of various forms of ionizing radiation are briefly described in the

following text and in the table below.
Radiation
Typical Travel Distance in Air Barrier
Type

 Few centimeters Sheet of paper or skin’s surface

 Few meters Thin sheet of aluminum foil or glass
 Very large Thick wall of concrete, lead, or steel
n Very large Water, paraffin, graphite

Alpha () – Alpha particles are the heaviest type of ionizing radiation, consisting of two
protons and two neutrons. They can travel only a few centimeters in air. Alpha particles
lose their energy almost as soon as they collide with anything. They can be stopped
easily by a sheet of paper or by the skin’s surface.
Beta (β) – Beta particles, consisting of an electron, are 7,330 times lighter than alpha
particles and can travel a longer distance in the air. A high-energy beta particle can
travel a few meters in the air. Beta particles can pass through a sheet of paper, but can
be stopped by a thin sheet of aluminum foil or glass.
Gamma () – Gamma rays (and x-rays), unlike alpha or beta particles, are waves of
pure energy. Gamma rays travel at the speed of light. Gamma radiation is very
penetrating and requires a large mass, such as a thick wall of concrete, lead, or steel, to
be stopped.
Neutrons (n) – Neutrons produce ionizing radiation indirectly by collision with hydrogen
nuclei (protons) and when gamma rays and alpha particles are emitted following
neutron capture in matter. A neutron has about one-quarter the weight of an alpha
particle. It will travel in the air until it is absorbed in another nucleus. The most prolific
source of neutrons is a nuclear reactor.
Radiation Measuring Units
During the early days of radiological experimentation, there was no precise unit for
radiation measure. Therefore, a variety of units were used to measure radiation. These
units determined the amount, type, and intensity of radiation. Just as heat can be
measured in terms of its intensity or effects using units of calories or degrees, amounts
of radiation or its effects can be measured in units of curies, radiation absorbed dose
(rad), or dose equivalent (roentgen equivalent in man, or rem). The following text
summarizes these units.
Curie – The curie, named after scientists Marie and Pierre Curie, describes the intensity
of a sample of radioactive material. The decay rate of 1 gram of radium was the original
basis of this unit of measure. Because the measured decay rate kept changing slightly
as measurement techniques became more accurate, the curie was subsequently
defined as exactly 3.7 × 1010 disintegrations (decays) per second.

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Radiation Units and Conversions to International System of Units

10
1 curie = 3.7 × 10 disintegrations per second
10
= 3.7 × 10 becquerels

1 becquerel = 1 disintegration per second

1 rad = 0.01 gray

1 rem = 0.01 sievert

1 gray = 1 joule per kilogram

Rad – The rad is the unit of measurement for the physical absorption of radiation. The
total energy absorbed per unit quantity of tissue is referred to as “absorbed dose” (or
simply “dose”). As sunlight heats pavement by giving up an amount of energy to it,
radiation similarly gives up energy to objects in its path. One rad is equal to the amount
of radiation that leads to the deposition of 0.01 joule of energy per kilogram of absorbing
material.
Rem – The rem is a measurement of the dose equivalent from radiation based on its
biological effects. The rem is used in measuring effects of radiation on the body.
One rem of one type of radiation is presumed to have the same biological effects as
one rem of any other kind of radiation. This allows comparison of the biological effects
of radionuclides that emit different types of radiation. One-thousandth of a rem is called
a millirem.
Person-rem – The term used for reporting the collective dose, the sum of individual
doses received in a given time period by a specified population from exposure to a
specified radiation source.
The corresponding units of radiation measure in the International System of Units are:
becquerel (a measure of source intensity), gray (a measure of absorbed dose), and
sievert (a measure of dose equivalent).
An individual may be exposed to ionizing radiation externally (from a radioactive source
outside the body) or internally (from ingesting or inhaling radioactive material). The
external dose is different from the internal dose because an external dose is delivered
only during the actual time of exposure to the external radiation source, while an internal
dose continues to be delivered as long as the radioactive source is in the body. The
dose from internal exposure is calculated over 50 years following the initial exposure.
Both radioactive decay and elimination of the radionuclide by ordinary metabolic
processes decrease the dose rate with the passage of time.
B-2.2 RADIATION SOURCES
The average American receives a total of approximately 620 millirem per year from all
radiation sources—both natural and manmade—of which approximately 310 millirem
per year are from natural sources. Radiation sources can be divided into six different
categories: (1) cosmic radiation, (2) terrestrial radiation, (3) internal radiation, (4)

B-4
 Appendix B

consumer products, (5) medical diagnosis and therapy, and (6) other sources
(NCRP 1987, NRC 2011). These categories are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Cosmic Radiation – Cosmic radiation is ionizing radiation resulting from energetic
charged particles from space continuously hitting Earth’s atmosphere where they create
secondary particles and photons (primarily gamma rays and x-rays). These particles,
and the secondary particles and photons they create, compose cosmic radiation.
Because the atmosphere provides some shielding against cosmic radiation, the
intensity of this radiation increases with the altitude above sea level. The average dose
to people in the United States from this source is approximately 32 millirem per year.
External Terrestrial Radiation – External terrestrial radiation is radiation emitted from
radioactive materials in Earth’s rocks and soils. The average individual dose from
external terrestrial radiation is approximately 19 millirem per year.
Internal Radiation – Internal radiation results from the human body metabolizing natural
radioactive material that has entered the body by inhalation or ingestion. Natural
radionuclides in the body include isotopes of uranium, thorium, radium, radon,
polonium, bismuth, potassium, rubidium, and carbon. The major contributors to the
annual dose equivalent for internal radioactivity are the short-lived decay products of
radon, which contribute approximately 229 millirem per year. The average individual
dose from other internal radionuclides is approximately 31 millirem per year.
Consumer Products – Consumer products also contain sources of ionizing radiation. In
some products, such as smoke detectors and airport x-ray machines, the radiation
source is essential to the product’s operation. In other products, such as televisions and
tobacco, radiation occurs as the products function. The average dose from consumer
products is approximately 12 millirem per year.
Medical Diagnosis and Therapy – Radiation is an important diagnostic medical tool and
cancer treatment. Nuclear medical procedures result in an average exposure of about
297 millirem per year—a significant increase over the 14 millirem per year exposure
estimated in the recent past. This increase is due primarily to the expanded use of
computed tomography and the use of nuclear medication in therapy. Individual
exposures vary widely since not all individuals undergo the same medical procedures.
Other Sources – There are a few additional sources of radiation that contribute minor
doses to individuals in the United States. The average dose from nuclear fuel cycle
facilities (e.g., uranium mines, mills, and fuel processing plants) and nuclear power
plants has been estimated to be less than 1 millirem per year. Radioactive fallout from
atmospheric atomic bomb tests, emissions from certain mineral extraction facilities, and
transportation of radioactive materials contribute less than 1 millirem per year to the
average dose to an individual. Air travel contributes approximately 1 millirem per year to
the average dose.
B-2.3 EXPOSURE PATHWAYS
As stated earlier, an individual may be exposed to ionizing radiation both externally and
internally. The different ways that could result in radiation exposure to an individual are

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

called exposure pathways. Each type of exposure is discussed separately in the

following paragraphs.
External Exposure – External radiation exposure can result from several different
pathways, including exposure to a cloud of radioactive particles passing over the
receptor (an exposed individual), standing on ground contaminated with radioactivity,
and swimming or boating in contaminated water. If the receptor leaves the source of
radiation exposure, the dose rate will be reduced, if not eliminated. Dose from external
radiation is based on time spent exposed to a radiation source. The appropriate dose
measure is called the effective dose equivalent (EDE).
Internal Exposure – Internal exposure results from a radiation source entering the
human body through either inhalation of contaminated air or ingestion of contaminated
food or water. In contrast to external exposure, once a radiation source enters the body,
it remains there for a period of time that varies, depending on decay and biological half-
life.1 The absorbed dose to each organ of the body is calculated for a period of 50 years
following intake. The calculated absorbed dose is called the committed dose equivalent.
Various organs have different susceptibilities to damage from radiation. The committed
EDE takes these different susceptibilities into account and provides a broad indicator of
the health risk to an individual from radiation. The committed EDE is a weighted sum of
the committed dose equivalent in each major organ or tissue. The concept of the
committed EDE applies only to internal pathways.
B-2.4 RADIATION PROTECTION GUIDES
Several organizations have issued radiation protection guides. Responsibilities of the
main radiation safety organizations, particularly those that affect policies in the United
States, are summarized in the following text.
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) – ICRP has responsibility
for providing guidance in matters of radiation safety. ICRP’s operating policy is to
prepare recommendations to address basic principles of radiation protection, leaving
the various national protection committees to introduce detailed technical regulations,
recommendations, or codes of practice best suited to the needs of their countries.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements – In the United States, this
council has responsibility for adapting and providing detailed technical guidelines for
implementing ICRP recommendations. The Council consists of expert radiation
protection specialists and scientists.
National Research Council and National Academy of Sciences – The National Research
Council, which provides science and policy research supporting the National Academy
of Sciences, associates the broad science and technology community with the
Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the Federal Government.
The Council’s Nuclear Radiation Studies Board prepares reports to advise the Federal

1
Biological half-life is the time for one-half of a radioactive source that has entered the body to be
removed from the body by natural processes.

B-6
 Appendix B

Government on issues related to radiation protection and radioactive materials. The

Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR), which has issued a
number of studies on radiation exposure health conveyances, operates under the
Nuclear Radiation Studies Board.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) – EPA has published a series of
documents, Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies, used as a regulatory
benchmark by a number of Federal agencies to limit public and occupational workforce
exposures to the greatest extent possible.
The Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards (ISCORS) – ISCORS
technical reports serve as guidance for Federal agencies to assist them in preparing
and reporting analysis results and implementing radiation protection standards in a
consistent and uniform manner. ISCORS issued a technical report entitled A Method for
Estimating Radiation Risk from TEDE (DOE 2002). This report provides dose-to-risk
conversion factors using total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to estimate dose. It is
recommended for use by DOE personnel and contractors when computing potential
radiation risk from calculated radiation dose for comparison purposes. Alternatively, for
radiation risk assessments required in risk management decisions, DOE recommends
that the radionuclide-specific risk coefficients in EPA’s Federal Guidance Report No. 13,
Cancer Risk Coefficients for Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides (EPA 1999)
should be used.
B-2.5 RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS
Exposure limits for members of the public and radiation workers are generally
consistent with ICRP recommendations. EPA also considers National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements and ICRP recommendations, and sets specific
annual exposure limits (usually less than those recommended by ICRP) in Radiation
Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies documents. Each regulatory organization then
establishes its own set of radiation standards. Examples of exposure limits set by DOE,
EPA, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for members of the public
are shown in Table B-1.
Table B-1. Exposure Limits for Members of the Public
Guidance Criteria (Organization) Public Exposure Limits at the Site Boundary

40 CFR Part 61 (EPA) 0.01 rem per year (all air pathways)

40 CFR Part 141 (EPA) 0.004 rem per year (drinking water pathways)

DOE Order 5400.5 (DOE) 0.01 rem per year (all air pathways)
0.004 rem per year (drinking water pathway)
0.1 rem per year (all pathway)

10 CFR 20.1301 (NRC) 0.1 rem per year (all pathways)

B-2.6 HEALTH EFFECTS

To provide background information for discussions of radiation exposure impacts, this
section explains basic concepts used to evaluate radiation effects.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Radiation can cause a variety of damaging health effects in humans. The most
significant effects are induced cancer fatalities. These effects are referred to as “latent
cancer fatalities” because the cancer may take many years to develop. In the
discussions that follow, all fatal cancers are considered latent; therefore, the terms
“latent cancer fatalities” and “fatal cancers” are used interchangeably in this appendix.
The National Research Council’s Committee on the BEIR has prepared a series of
reports to advise the Federal Government on radiation exposure health consequences.
Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR V (NRC 1990),
provides current estimates for excess mortality from leukemia and other cancers
expected to result from exposure to ionizing radiation.
Models and risk coefficients in BEIR V were derived through analyses of relevant
epidemiologic data that included the Japanese atomic bomb survivors, ankylosing
spondylitis (spinal arthritis) patients, Canadian and Massachusetts fluoroscopy (breast
cancer) patients, New York postpartum mastitis (breast cancer) patients, Israeli tinea
capitis (thyroid cancer) patients, and Rochester, New York, thymus (thyroid cancer)
patients. Models for leukemia, respiratory cancer, digestive cancer, and other cancers
used only the atomic bomb survivor data, although the ankylosis spondylitis patient
analysis results were considered. Atomic bomb survivor analyses were based on
revised dosimetry, with an assumed relative biological effectiveness of 20 for neutrons,
and were restricted to doses less than 400 rad. Estimates of fatal cancer (other than
leukemia) risks were obtained by totaling estimates for breast, respiratory, digestive,
and other cancers.
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, based on radiation
risk estimates provided in BEIR V and ICRP Publication 60 recommendations
(ICRP 1991), estimated the total detriment resulting from low-dose or low-dose-rate
exposure to ionizing radiation to be 0.0007 per rem for the general population (NCRP
1993). The total detriment includes fatal and nonfatal cancers, as well as severe
hereditary (genetic) effects. The major contribution to the total detriment is from fatal
cancer, estimated to be 0.0005 per rem for the general population. The risk estimator
breakdowns for the general population are shown in Table B-2. (Risk estimators are
lifetime probabilities that an individual would develop a fatal cancer per rem of radiation
received.) Nonfatal cancers and genetic effects are less probable radiation exposure
consequences.
Table B-2. Nominal Health Risk Estimators Associated with Exposure to 1 Rem of
Ionizing Radiation
Nonfatal Genetic
a b b
Exposed Individual Fatal Cancer Cancer Disorders Total

Public 0.0005 0.0001 0.00013 0.00073

Source: NCRP 1993.

(a) For fatal cancer, the health effect coefficient is the same as the probability coefficient. When applied to an
individual, the unit is the lifetime probability of a cancer fatality per rem of radiation dose. When applied to a
population of individuals, the unit is the excess number of fatal cancers per person-rem of radiation dose.
(b) In determining a means of assessing radiation exposure health effects, the ICRP has developed a weighting
method for nonfatal cancers and genetic effects.

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 Appendix B

The EPA, in coordination with other Federal agencies involved in radiation protection,
issued the September 1999 Federal Guidance Report No. 13, Cancer Risk Coefficients
for Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides (EPA 1999). This document is a
compilation of risk factors for doses from external gamma radiation and internal intake
of radionuclides. Federal Guidance Report No. 13 is the basis of radionuclide risk
coefficients used in the EPA Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables (EPA 2001)
and in computer dose codes, such as the DOE Argonne Residual Radiation code.
However, DOE and other agencies regularly conduct dose assessments with models
and codes that calculate radiation dose from exposure or intake using dose conversion
factors and do not compute risk directly. In these cases, where it is necessary or
desirable to estimate risk for comparative purposes (e.g., comparing risk associated
with alternative actions), it is common practice to simply multiply the calculated TEDE
by a risk-to-dose factor. ISCORS recommends that agencies use a conversion factor of
6 × 10-4 fatal cancers per TEDE (rem) for mortality and 8 × 10-4 cancers per rem for
morbidity when making qualitative or semi-quantitative estimates of radiation exposure
risk to members of the general public2 (DOE 2002). The TEDE-to-risk factor provided in
Estimating Radiation Risk from Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE), ISCORS
Technical Report No. 1, is based upon a static population with characteristics consistent
with the U.S. population.
The ISCORS report notes that the recommended risk coefficients used with TEDE dose
estimates generally produce conservative radiation risk estimates (i.e., they
overestimate risk).3 For the ingestion pathway of 11 radionuclides compared, risks
would be overestimated compared with Federal Guidance Report No. 13 values for
about 8 radionuclides, and significantly overestimated (by up to a factor of 6) for 4 of the
8. The DOE Office of Environmental Policy and Guidance also compared the risks
obtained using the risk conversion factor with the risks in Federal Guidance Report No.
13 for the inhalation pathway, and found a bias toward overestimation of risk, although it
was not as severe as for ingestion. For 16 radionuclides/chemical states evaluated, 7
were significantly overestimated (by more than a factor of 2), 5 were significantly
underestimated, and the remainder agreed within about a factor of 2. Generally, these
differences are within the uncertainty of transport and uptake portions of dose or risk
modeling and, therefore, the approach recommended is fully acceptable for comparative
assessments. That notwithstanding, it is strongly recommended that, wherever possible,
the more rigorous approach with Federal Guidance Report No. 13 cancer risk
coefficients be used (DOE 2002).
The values in Table B-2 are “nominal” cancer and genetic disorder probability
coefficients. They are based on an idealized population receiving a uniform whole-body
dose. Recent EPA studies, based on age-dependent dose coefficients for members of

2
Such estimates should not be stated with more than 1 significant digit.
3
This statement presumes that using the radionuclide-specific risk factors in Federal Guidance Report
No. 13 would be a more accurate measure of potential risk than multiplying the TEDE by a single average
risk factor.

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the public, indicate that the product of the effective dose and the probability coefficient
could over- or underestimate radiological risk (EPA 1999). In support of risk results
provided in Federal Guidance Report No. 13, EPA performed an uncertainty analysis on
uniform whole-body exposure effects. The analysis resulted in an estimated nominal
risk coefficient increase from 0.051 fatal cancers per gray (0.00051 fatal cancers per
rad) to 0.0575 fatal cancers per gray (0.000575 fatal cancers per rad) (EPA 1999a).
This result indicates a nominal risk coefficient increase of about 20 percent over that
provided in Risk Estimates for Radiation Protection (NCRP 1993) for the public.
Based on review of recent EPA reports, ISCORS recommended that a risk factor of
0.0006 fatal cancers per rem be used for estimating risks when using calculated dose
(DOE 2002).
Numerical fatal cancer estimates presented in this EIS were obtained using a linear no-
threshold extrapolation from the nominal risk estimated for lifetime total cancer mortality.
Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or lower
numerical fatal cancer estimates. Studies of human populations exposed to low doses
are inadequate to demonstrate the actual risk level. There is scientific uncertainty about
cancer risk in the low-dose region below the range of epidemiologic observation, and
the possibility of no risk cannot be excluded (CIRRPC 1992). The National Research
Council in its report on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) states that the
available scientific information is consistent with a linear dose model for low exposure
levels and that, in their judgment, it is unlikely that a threshold exists (NRC 2006).
Therefore, the risk factor of 0.0006 fatal cancers per rem was used as the conversion
factor for all radiological exposures due to accidents, including those in the low-dose
region.
B-2.7 EIS HEALTH EFFECT RISK ESTIMATORS
Health impacts of radiation exposure, whether from external or internal sources,
generally are identified as somatic (i.e., affecting the exposed individual) or genetic
(i.e., affecting descendants of the exposed individual). Radiation is more likely to
produce somatic than genetic effects. The somatic risks of most importance are induced
cancers. Except for leukemia, which can have an induction period (time between
exposure to the carcinogen and cancer diagnosis) of as little as 2 to 7 years, most
cancers have an induction period of more than 20 years.
For uniform irradiation of the body, cancer incidence varies among organs and tissues;
the thyroid and skin demonstrate a greater sensitivity than other organs. Such cancers,
however, also produce relatively low mortality rates because they are relatively
amenable to medical treatment. Because fatal cancer is the most serious effect of
environmental and occupational radiation exposures, estimates of cancer fatalities,
rather than cancer incidence, are presented in this appendix. The numbers of fatal
cancers can be used to compare risks among the various alternatives.
Based on the preceding discussion, the number of fatal cancers to workers and the
general public for postulated accidents in which individual doses are less than 20 rem is
calculated using a health risk estimator of 0.0006 per person-rem. The risk estimator

B-10
 Appendix B

associated with total cancer incidence among the public is 0.0008 per person-rem (DOE
2002).
The fatal cancer estimators are used to calculate the statistical expectation of the
effects of exposing a population to radiation. For example, if 100,000 people were each
exposed to a one-time radiation dose of 100 millirem (0.1 rem), the collective dose
would be 10,000 person-rem. The exposed population would then be expected to
experience six additional cancer fatalities from the radiation (10,000 person-rem ×
0.0006 lifetime probability of cancer fatalities per person-rem = 6 cancer fatalities).
Calculations of the number of excess fatal cancers associated with radiation exposure
do not always yield whole numbers. These calculations may yield numbers less than
one, especially in environmental impact applications. For example, if a population of
100,000 were exposed to a total dose of only 0.001 rem per person, the collective dose
would be 100 person-rem (100,000 persons × 0.001 rem = 100 person-rem). The
corresponding estimated number of cancer fatalities would be 0.06 (100 person-rem ×
0.0006 cancer fatalities per person-rem = 0.06 cancer fatalities). The 0.06 means that
there is 1 chance in 16.6 that the exposed population would experience 1 fatal cancer.
In other words, 0.06 cancer fatalities are the expected number of deaths that would
result if the same exposure situation were applied to many different groups of 100,000
people. In most groups, no person would incur a fatal cancer from the 0.001 rem dose
each member received. In a small fraction of the groups, one cancer fatality would
result; in exceptionally few groups, two or more cancer fatalities would occur. The
average expected number of deaths over all the groups would be 0.06 cancer fatalities
(just as the average of 0, 0, 0, and 1 is ¼, or 0.25). The most likely outcome is no
cancer fatalities.
The same concept is applied to estimate radiation exposure effects on an individual
member of the public. Consider the effects of an individual’s exposure to a 300-millirem
(0.30-rem) annual dose from all natural radiation sources. The probability that the
individual would develop a fatal cancer from continuous exposure to this radiation over
an average life of 72 years (presumed) is 0.013 (one person × 0.30 rem per year ×
72 years × 0.0006 cancer fatalities per person-rem = 0.013). This corresponds to 1
chance in 77.
B-3 EFFECTS OF PLUTONIUM ON THE ENVIRONMENT
B-3.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to describe qualitatively the factors that influence the
movement of PuO2 through the environment and into the human body in the event that
there is an accidental release of PuO2 from the spacecraft's MMRTG or LWRHUs.
B-3.2 CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES THAT ARE IMPORTANT FOR
BEHAVIOR IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE HUMAN BODY
In this section, the following important characteristics are discussed:
 Chemical form;
 Particle size distribution;

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

 Solubility;
 Half-life; and
 Decay modes.
Chemical Form
In the MMRTG for the Mars 2020 mission, the Pu-238 is present as plutonium dioxide in
ceramic form. The predominant risk pathways are those in which this material is
released as the result of ground impact and fire. It is therefore assumed that the
plutonium remains oxidized. This is important because the chemical form influences the
solubility, which, in turn, strongly influences such factors as bioaccumulation and uptake
in the human body.
Particle Size Distribution
It is also important to understand the physical form of the material, in particular the
particle size distribution, which influences: whether the material will fall to the ground in
the immediate vicinity of the accident or will be transported over long distances; the
initial deposition and subsequent resuspension of particles in both air and water;
solubility in water and in biological fluids; and whether or not the material can be inhaled
and where it will be deposited and retained within the human respiratory system.
Generally speaking, larger particles have less potential for suspension and
resuspension; as the particle size decreases, particles are more easily kept in
suspension.
The initial particle size distribution is a function of the conditions of the accident. For
example, the launch area source terms could initially be in the form of vapor as a result
of exposure to fire. The vapors would contain not only the radionuclides but also various
structural materials. The radionuclides would tend to condense with and agglomerate
with these other materials, which would then predominantly determine the
characteristics of the aerosol. The potential for uptake of inhaled particles is critically
dependent on the size of the particles (respirable particles are generally considered to
be 10 microns (10 micrometers) or less, although larger sizes can be deposited in the
upper respiratory tract).
Solubility
A number of factors affect the solubility of PuO2 in water. Physical parameters most
important to the solubility of PuO2 are the reactive surface area and oxidation state of
plutonium and the water chemistry, including pH, reduction/oxidation potential, and
temperature. The mass to surface area ratios of particles affect the reactivity and
solubility, with solubility being inversely related to particle size. In general, PuO2 is
insoluble.
Because PuO2 is so insoluble, movement through the environment depends on physical
processes. PuO2 may be carried into the soil by a number of routes, including the
percolation of rainfall and subsequent leaching of particles into the soil, animal
burrowing activity, and plowing or other disturbance of the soil by humans. Migration of

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 Appendix B

the PuO2 into the soil column is of concern, primarily because of the potential for PuO2
to reach groundwater aquifers used as drinking water suppliers. Once deposited on soil,
however, PuO2 appears to be extremely stable. Soil profile studies have shown that
generally more than 95 percent of the PuO2 from nuclear weapons fallout remained in
the top 5 centimeters (2 inches) of surface soil (in undisturbed areas) for 10 to 20 years
following deposition (DOE 1987).
Half-Life
The half-life of Pu-238 is 87.7 years. This half-life is particularly important for chronic
exposure pathways (inhalation and ingestion). Over a human lifetime (nominally
70 years), the amount of Pu-238 in the body is reduced by less than a factor of 2 due to
radioactive decay.
Decay Modes
Pu-238 is an alpha particle emitter with decay energies of about 5 million electron volts.
Its radioactive decay products are also alpha-emitters with about the same decay
energy. These alpha particles are what predominantly determine the effects on the
human body. Pu-238 can also undergo extremely unlikely spontaneous fission, but with
significantly smaller effects.
B-3.3 THE TRANSPORT OF PLUTONIUM OXIDES THROUGH THE ENVIRONMENT
This Section discusses the various ways in which plutonium can be transported through
the environment to the point at which it is taken into or irradiates the human body. The
modeling for the Mars 2020 mission encompasses both short-term (during plume
passage) and long-term (chronic exposure) pathways.
Plutonium is one of the most widely studied elements in terms of chemistry and
environmental behavior. Although its chemistry and oxidation states are quite diverse,
the element’s environmental mobility is very limited (INSRP 1989). The pathways and
the generalized behavior of plutonium in the environment are described in the literature
(e.g., Aarkrog 1977, Pinder and Doswell 1985, Pinder et al. 1987, Yang and Nelson
1984). The extent and magnitude of potential environmental impacts caused by PuO 2
releases depend on the mobility and availability of PuO2 and are directly controlled by a
number of physical and chemical parameters, including particle size, potential for
suspension, deposition and resuspension, solubility, and oxidation state of any
dissolved plutonium.
During Plume Passage
The predominant pathway during the passage of the airborne plume is inhalation. The
important parameters in this calculation are the rate of dilution of the plume as it travels
downwind, the deposition mechanisms that deplete the plume and leave radioactive
material on the ground, and the rate of inhalation. All of these parameters and
mechanisms are independent of the fact that the radionuclide in question is Pu-238. For
example, the small particle sizes arising from agglomeration onto aluminum oxide
particles (see Section B.3.2) mean that gravitational settling is not important. It is
therefore appropriate to use a standard Gaussian model for the atmospheric dispersion.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Similarly, the small particle size means that, once it is transported to a human receptor,
it is inhaled. Work done for previous EISs shows that inhalation of the particles in the
passing plume and of resuspended particles are the two most important contributors to
the radiation dose accumulated by human receptors.
The other pathway that is potentially important during plume passage is cloud shine—
the irradiation of the human body by neutrons and gamma rays emitted by the passing
plume of radioactive material. However, because Pu-238 emits predominantly alpha
particles, this irradiation pathway is not a significant contributor to doses resulting from
potential accidents associated with the Mars 2020 Mission.
Chronic Exposure Pathways
This section considers contributions due to resuspension, ingestion of vegetables,
external exposure, seafood ingestion, and contamination of drinking water.
Resuspension
For launch area accidents, the resuspension model used in the analysis starts with an
initial resuspension factor that decreases exponentially to a constant long-term
resuspension factor (Momeni et al. 1979; Strenge and Bander 1981). For materials
deposited after traveling more than 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the source of a
release, or released high in the atmosphere, the resuspension factor is at all times
typically similar to the long-term resuspension factor (Bennett 1976, UNSCEAR 1982).
The work done in previous EISs shows that resuspension is the most significant of the
chronic exposure pathways and is comparable to or larger in its effects on humans than
is the direct inhalation pathway.
Vegetable Ingestion
Parameters used for estimating the uptake from harvesting and consumption of
agricultural products has been measured (Baes et al. 1984, Rupp 1980, Yang and
Nelson 1984). These and similar agricultural and food consumption parameters and
plutonium ingestion parameters (ICRP 1979) are used as the basis for estimating
human doses via ingestion. For example, an analysis of Pu-238 contamination of
orange trees shows that a total of only 1 percent of the plutonium actually aerially
deposited on the plants would be transported on fruit from field to market during the 12
months following harvesting (Pinder et al. 1987). Most of this plutonium would adhere to
the fruit’s peel and would be removed prior to ingestion; uptake to the orange itself
would be extremely small or nonexistent.
Four mechanisms of vegetable ingestion were taken into account, as described below.
1. Initial deposition immediately following the accident: The amount initially
deposited per curie released depends on non-PuO2 specific factors such as particle
size distribution and characteristics of the vegetation. The predicted amount of
radioactive material ingested by humans then depends on assumptions about
physical mechanisms and vegetable distribution, such as: the removal half-life for
leaf-deposited material, a leaf interception factor, and a vegetable density.
Additionally, harvesting (whether continuous or delayed) and consumption

B-14
 Appendix B

assumptions would affect the predicted amount of radioactive material ingested by

humans.
2. Continuous redeposition on the vegetables due to resuspension over the first
50 years following the accident: The amount ingested by individuals is controlled
by the resuspension mechanism (see above), the assumed dry deposition velocity,
and assumptions about harvesting and distribution.
3. Root uptake: This mechanism is, in principle, highly radionuclide and vegetable-
specific and depends on such factors as solubility, radionuclide chemistry, and
vegetable chemistry. In general, PuO2 is insoluble and is poorly transported in
terrestrial environments. Most forms of plutonium, including PuO2, are removed from
biological pathways by processes such as fixation in soil. Only small amounts of
material would be concentrated by biological accumulation into grazing animals and
vegetables.
4. Rain splashup: This mechanism depends in part on the characteristics of the soil
and the rainfall.
For Pu-238, radiation doses arising via these pathways are a small fraction of those
arising from the inhalation pathways.
External Radiation
External radiation from material deposited on the ground and resuspended material is
calculated using standard methods for cloudshine and groundshine. Because Pu-238 is
predominantly an alpha emitter, this exposure pathway is relatively unimportant.
Seafood and Fish Pathway
Radiation doses can result from the bioaccumulation of plutonium deposited on the
surfaces of inland waters or oceans. The predicted radiation doses arising from this
pathway depend on a number of assumptions and physical and chemical processes,
including how the deposited radionuclides are diluted in the water, how the
radionuclides are partitioned between water and sediment, and how radionuclides are
accumulated in different types of fish, crustaceans and mollusks.
In marine and aquatic systems, larger particles would quickly settle to the bottom
sediments; smaller silt-size particles may remain in suspension within the water column
for extended periods of time. Smaller particles may not even break the water surface
(due to surface tension), forming a thin layer on the water surface that is subsequently
transported to the shoreline by wind and wave action. Resuspension of smaller particles
from the bottom could occur due to physical disturbance of the sediments by wave
action and recreational uses of the water bodies (e.g., swimming, boating, and fishing),
as well as by the feeding activity of various marine and aquatic species. Particles of
PuO2, as a component of the bottom sediments, may also be transported toward and
along the shoreline by wave action and currents in near-shore environments (NASA
1990).
Studies have indicated that bioaccumulation in marine organisms can vary widely
depending on the type and population densities of seafood species impacted (e.g.,

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

freshwater fish, saltwater fish, mollusks), the amount and particle size distribution of
radioactive material released, and the deposition area.
PuO2 entering into a water/sediment system would be preferentially taken out of
solution and bound in saturated sediments in amounts on the order of 100,000 times
greater than the amounts that would remain in the associated water column
(NASA 1990).
Clays, organics, and other anionic constituents tend to bind most of the PuO 2 particles
in the sediment column. The binding of PuO2 usually occurs in the first few centimeters
of sediment, greatly reducing the concentration of this constituent with depth.
Overall, the seafood pathway is insignificant for PuO2. This is due to a combination of
considerable dilution in the water, overwhelming partition into sediment, and small
bioaccumulation factors.
Contamination of Drinking Water
It is possible that surface water runoff containing PuO2 could directly contaminate
drinking water supplies that originate from surface water bodies, because this type of
contamination is primarily due to suspended PuO2 particles and not from dissolved
PuO2. Filtering the surface water before chemical treatment would reduce the
concentration of total plutonium to very low levels (NASA 1990).
B-3.4 TRANSPORT AND DEPOSITION OF RADIONUCLIDES IN THE HUMAN
BODY
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has developed
accepted models for the distribution of inhaled and ingested radionuclides in the body.
The ultimate fate of these radionuclides depends on such factors as particle size
distribution, solubility, and chemistry. The ICRP models require knowledge of numerous
parameters, most of which are obtained empirically (e.g., there is no theoretical model
for determining what fraction of ingested plutonium enters the bloodstream). The
required parameters are obtained from animal experiments and, if available, from
human studies concerning the effects of nuclear weapons and of nuclear fallout. Of the
transuranium elements, plutonium is by far the most widely studied.
PuO2 that enters the human body by inhalation or ingestion has many possible fates, all
of which have been studied in detail (ICRP 1979; ICRP 1986). The inhalation route is
found to be approximately 1,000 times as effective as ingestion in transporting
plutonium to the blood, due to the short time of residency, the chemical properties of
plutonium, and the physiological environment of the gastro-intestinal tract (ICRP 1979).
Ingested PuO2 would quickly pass through the digestive system and be excreted with
only a small quantity being absorbed via the mucosa into the bloodstream. The
fractional absorption of PuO2 is estimated to average about 1 part in 100,000 ingested
(ICRP 1979; ICRP 1986) – that is, in ICRP terminology, the f1 factor for ingestion is 10-5.
The fractional absorption is based on the average individual. Note that PuO2 in the
environment could become more soluble with time due to the use of fertilizers in
gardening, chlorination in drinking water, and conversion to soluble forms in seawater.

B-16
 Appendix B

Dietary and physiological factors, such as fasting, dietary calcium deficiency, disease or
intake of medications, may also change the fractional absorption (ICRP 1986).
Inhaled PuO2 would be transported to one or more portions of the respiratory system
depending on the particle size. Generally, most particles larger than 5 to 10 microns
would be intercepted in the nasopharyngeal region and either expelled or swallowed to
pass through the digestive tract; what is not absorbed would then be excreted. Particles
smaller than about 5 microns would be transported to and remain in the trachea,
bronchi, or deep lung regions. Particles reaching the deep lung would be cleared from
the body much more slowly than those not entering the lung. For example, approximate
micrometer-size PuO2 particles would typically be cleared from the pulmonary area of
the lung at the rate of 40 percent in the first day, and the remaining 60 percent cleared
in 500 days (ICRP 1979). Particles captured in the mucous lining of the upper
respiratory tract would be moved more rapidly to the pharynx, where they would be
swallowed. Once swallowed, they would behave as if ingested.
Plutonium dioxide remaining in the lung would continuously irradiate lung tissue, and a
small fraction would be transported over time directly to the blood or to lymph nodes
and then to the blood. The estimated fraction of plutonium transferred directly from
pulmonary lung tissues to the blood would be about 1 percent of the amount retained in
the lungs, depending on the size distribution of ultra-fine particles. Smaller particles are
likely to form over time from larger particles due to the natural fragmentation processes
associated with radioactive decay and may also be transferred to the blood. Over a
period of years, approximately 15 percent of the PuO2 initially deposited in the lungs
would be transferred to the lymph nodes. Of that, up to 90 percent would likely be
retained in the lymph node with a 1,000 day half-life before being transferred to the
blood (ICRP 1986). Overall, the PuO2 f1 factor for inhalation is the same as that for
ingestion, i.e., 10-5.
Once PuO2 has entered the blood via ingestion or inhalation, it would circulate and be
deposited primarily in the liver and skeletal system. It is currently accepted that
plutonium transported by the blood is distributed to the following organs: 45 percent in
the liver, 45 percent in the skeletal system, 0.035 percent in the testes, and 0.011
percent in the ovaries, with a non-measurable amount crossing the placenta and
available for uptake by the fetus. The remaining 10 percent of the activity in the blood is
excreted through the kidneys and colon or deposited in other tissues (ICRP 1979,
ICRP 1986).
The estimated residence times in the liver, skeletal system, and gonads are quite long.
Current estimates for 50 percent removal times for plutonium are 20 years for the liver,
50 years for the skeleton, and permanent retention for the gonads.
B-4 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX B
Aarkrog 1977. Environmental Behavior of Plutonium Accidentally Released at Thule,
Greenland. Health Physics Society Journal 32: 271-284. April 1977.
Baes et al. 1984. Baes, C., R. Sharp, A. Sjoreen, and R. Shor. A Review and Analysis
of Parameters for Assessing Transport of Environmentally Released

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Radionuclides Through Agriculture. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL-5786.

September 1984.
Bennett 1976. Transuranic Element Pathways to Man. Transuranium Nuclides in the
Environment. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. 1976.
CIRRPC 1992. Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination
1992. Use of BEIR V and UNSCEAR 1988 in Radiation Risk Assessment,
Lifetime Total Cancer Mortality Risk Estimates at Low Doses and Low Dose
Rates for Low-LET Radiation, ORAU 92/F-64. Science Panel Report No. 9,
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President,
Washington, DC, December.
DOE 1987. U.S. Department of Energy. Environmental Research on Actinide Elements.
Document Number DOE 86008713. Washington, DC August 1987.
DOE 2002. U.S. Department of Energy. Estimating Radiation Risk from Total Effective
Dose Equivalent (TEDE), ISCORS. Technical Report No. 1, Office of
Environmental Policy and Guidance, DOE/EH-412/0015/0802, Rev. 1,
Washington, DC, January 2002.
DOE Order 5400.5 U.S. Department of Energy. Radiation Protection of the Public and
the Environment, Washington, D.C. 1993.
EPA 1999. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Cancer Risk Coefficients for
Environmental Exposure to Radionuclides. Federal Guidance Report No. 13,
EPA 402-R-99-001, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, DC,
September 1999.
EPA 2001. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Health Effects Assessment
Summary Tables (HEAST) - Radionuclide Table: Radionuclide Carcinogenicity –
Slope Factors, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. April 16, 2001.
ICRP 1979. International Commission on Radiological Protection. Limits for Intakes of
Radionuclides by Workers. ICRP Publication 30, Part I, pp. 105-107. 1979.
ICRP 1986. International Commission on Radiological Protection. The Metabolism of
Plutonium and Related Elements. ICRP Publication 48. 1986.
ICRP 1991. International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1990
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
Annals of the ICRP, ICRP Publication 60, Vol. 21, No. 1-3, Pergamon Press,
New York, New York, November, 1991.
INSRP 1989. Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel. Safety Evaluation Report for
the Galileo Mission, Volumes 1 and 2. INSRP 89-01. May 1989.
NASA 1989. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Galileo Mission (Tier 2). Solar System Exploration
Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, DC May 1989.

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 Appendix B

NASA 1990. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Environmental

Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2). Solar System Exploration
Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, DC June 1990.
NASA 1995. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission. Solar System Exploration Division,
Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC June 1995.
NASA 1997. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement for the Cassini Mission. Mission and Payload
Development Division, Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, DC June 1997.
NASA 2002b. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Mars Exploration Rover-2003 Project. Mars Exploration
Program Office, Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC
December 2002.
NASA 2005. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the New Horizons Mission. Science Mission Directorate,
NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC. July 2005.
NASA 2006. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Mars Science Laboratory Mission. Science Mission
Directorate, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.November 2006.
NCRP 1987. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Ionizing
Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States. NCRP Report No. 93,
Bethesda, Maryland, September 1, 1987.
NCRP 1993. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Risk
Estimates for Radiation Protection, NCRP Report No. 115, Bethesda, Maryland,
December 31, 1993.
NRC 1990. National Research Council. Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation, BEIR V, Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing
Radiation, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
NRC 2006. National Research Council of the National Academies. Health Risks From
Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, BEIR VII Phase 2. Committee to
Assess Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation.
Washington DC, 2006.
NRC 2011, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Biological Effect of Radiation. Fact Sheet,
Washington DC, 2011.
Pinder and Doswell 1985. Pinder, J., and A. Doswell. Retention of 238Pu-Bearing
Particles by Corn Plants. Health Physics Society Journal, 49:771-776. 1985.
Available at: http://journals.lww.com/health-

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physics/Abstract/1985/11000/Retention_of_238Pu_bearing_Particles_by_Corn.9.
aspx
Pinder et al. 1987. Pinder, J., D. Adriano, T. Ciravolo, A. Doswell, and D. Yehling. The
Interception and Retention of 238Pu Deposition by Orange Trees. Health
Physics, 52:707-715. May 8, 1987. Available at: http://journals.lww.com/health-
physics/Abstract/1987/06000/The_Interception_and_Retention_of_238Pu_Depos
ition.2.aspx
Rupp 1980. Age Dependent Values of Dietary Intake for Assessing Human Exposures
to Environmental Pollutants. Health Physics Society Journal. 39:151-163. August
1980.
Strenge and Bander 1981. Strenge, D.L. and T.J. Bander. MILDOS A Computer
Program for Calculating Environmental Radiation Doses from Uranium Recovery
Operations. NUREG/CR-2011/PNL-3767. April 1981.
UNSCEAR 1982. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation. Ionizing Radiation: Sources and Biological Effects. New York. 1982.
Yang and Nelson 1984, Yang, Y. and Nelson, C., An Estimation of the Daily Average
Food Intake by Age and Sex for use in Assessing the Radionuclide Intake of
Individuals in the General Population. Prepared for the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Report 520/1-84-021. 1984.

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 Appendix C

C.

APPENDIX C
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
C-1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. C-1
C-2 DEFINITIONS AND APPROACH......................................................................... C-1
C-2.1 Minority Populations .................................................................................... C-1
C-2.2 Low-Income Populations ............................................................................. C-3
C-2.3 Disproportionately High And Adverse Human Health Effects ...................... C-3
C.2-4 Disproportionately High And Adverse Environmental Effects ...................... C-3
C-3 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. C-3
C-3-1 Spatial Resolution ....................................................................................... C-3
C-3-2 Projections of Populations ........................................................................... C-3
C-3.3 Environmental Justice Assessment ............................................................. C-3
C-4 CHARACTERIZATION OF POTENTIALLY AFFECTED POPULATIONS .......... C-4
C-5 IMPACTS ON MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS ........................ C-7
C-6 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX C...................................................................... C-8

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure C-1. The Area within 100 km (62 mi) of SLC-41, LC-39a and SLC-37 ............ C-2
List of Table
Table C-1. Composition of the Population in the KSC Area ....................................... C-5

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C-ii
 Appendix C

APPENDIX C
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS
C-1 INTRODUCTION
Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations, directs Federal agencies to identify and
address, as appropriate, the disproportionately high and adverse health or
environmental effects of their programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has oversight responsibility for
documentation prepared in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.). In December 1997, the CEQ
released its guidance on Environmental Justice (CEQ 1997). The CEQ’s guidance was
adopted as the basis for the information provided in this Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed Mars 2020 mission. The launch opportunity for the
proposed Mars 2020 mission occurs during July – August 2020 and the next opportunity
occurs 26 months later.
This appendix provides data necessary to assess the potential for disproportionately
high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority and low-income
populations that may be associated with implementation of the Mars 2020 mission. The
areas examined in this appendix include the counties for which any part of the county is
within 100 kilometers (km) (62 miles (mi)) of either Space Launch Complex 41 (SLC-41)
located in the northernmost section of Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS),
Brevard County, Florida, Space Launch Complex 37 (SLC-37), located on the
northeastern section of CCAFS Brevard County Florida; or Launch Complex 39A (LC-
39A) located on KSC, Brevard County, Florida north and east of SLC-41 and SLC-37.
The counties that lie within 100 km (62 mi) of LC-39A and SLC-40 include Brevard,
Indian River, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, Volusia, and small portions of Flagler, Lake,
and Polk (Figure C-1). The counties that lie within 100 km (62 mi) of SLC-37 include
those listed above with the exclusion of Flagler.
C-2 DEFINITIONS AND APPROACH
C-2.1 MINORITY POPULATIONS
During the Census of 2010, the U.S. Bureau of the Census (USBC) collected population
data in compliance with guidance adopted by the Office of Management and Budget (62
FR 58782). The following definitions of minority individuals and population are used in
this analysis of environmental justice:
Minority Individuals: Persons who are members of any of the following population
groups: Hispanic or Latino of any race, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black
or African-American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, or Multiracial (and at
least one race, which is a minority race under CEQ guidance of 1997).

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Figure C-1. The Area within 100 km (62 mi) of SLC-41, LC-39A and SLC-37
Minority Population: The total number of minority individuals residing within a
potentially affected area.
Persons self-designated as Hispanic or Latino are included in the Hispanic or Latino
population regardless of race. For example, Asians self-designated as Hispanic or
Latino are included in both the Hispanic or Latino population and in the Asian
population. Data used to characterize minority populations in the years 2010 and 2012
was extracted from the American Fact Finder portion of the U.S. Census Bureau 2010
census website (USBC 2013c) containing Census 2010 demographic data. Data used
for the projection of population groups in Florida for the year 2020 was projected from
the USBC's 2010 and 2012 (projected) census data for the nine surrounding counties.

C-2
 Appendix C

C-2.2 LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS

Poverty thresholds are used to identify "low-income" individuals and populations
(CEQ 1997). The following definitions of low-income individuals and population are used
in this analysis:
Low-Income Individuals: Persons whose self-reported income is less than the poverty
threshold for a given year.
Low-Income Population: The total number of low-income individuals residing within a
potentially affected area.
Data used to characterize low-income populations in the year 2010 was extracted from
the American Fact Finder portion of the U.S. Census Bureau 2010 census website
(USBC 2013c) containing Census 2010 demographic data.
C-2.3 DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH AND ADVERSE HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS
Disproportionately high and adverse health effects are those that are significant
(40 CFR1508.27) or above generally accepted norms, and for which the risk of adverse
impacts to minority populations or low-income populations appreciably exceeds the risk
to the general population.
C.2-4 DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH AND ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Disproportionately high and adverse environmental effects are those that are significant
(40 CFR 1508.27), and that would adversely impact minority populations or low-income
populations appreciably more than the general population.
C-3 METHODOLOGY
C-3-1 SPATIAL RESOLUTION
For the purposes of enumeration and analysis, the USBC has defined a variety of aerial
units (USBC 2001; USBC 1992). Aerial units of concern in this document include (in
order of increasing spatial resolution) states, counties, census tracts, block groups, and
blocks. The block is the smallest of these entities and offers the finest spatial resolution.
This term refers to a relatively small geographical area bounded on all sides by visible
features such as streets and streams, or by invisible boundaries such as city limits and
property lines. In the analysis below, the county level data was used in the analysis of
minority impacts.
C-3-2 PROJECTIONS OF POPULATIONS
The U.S. Census estimates for population groups living in the nine counties of interest
closest to KSC for the years 2010 and 2012 are shown in Table C-1. Estimates for the
2020 populations living in the nine counties were obtained as linear projections of
resident populations for the years 2010 and 2012.
C-3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT
The purpose of this analysis is to (1) identify minority populations and low-income
populations residing within the identified area that would be potentially affected by

C-3
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

implementation of the Proposed Action (Alternative 1) or Alternatives 2 and 3, and

determine if implementation of the Proposed Action or Alternatives would result in
disproportionately high and adverse effects on these populations. In the event that
radiological or other human health risks resulting from the implementation of the
Proposed Action or Alternatives are found to be significant, then the health risks to
minority populations and low-income populations will be evaluated to determine if they
are disproportionately high.
C-4 CHARACTERIZATION OF POTENTIALLY AFFECTED POPULATIONS
The land area within the nine counties surrounding KSC includes approximately
2.2 million hectares (5.4 million acres) of central Florida’s eastern coast. Approximately
4.0 million persons lived within the nine counties in the year 2010 (Table C-1). Between
2010 and 2012, the minority population within this area declined slightly and in 2012,
minority persons comprised approximately 24 percent of the total population. By the
year 2020, the total population is projected to increase to nearly 4.6 million persons, and
minorities are projected to comprise approximately 24 percent of the total population.
In 2010, approximately 40 percent of the total and minority populations lived in Orange
County.
Hispanic or Latino and Black or African-American populations were the largest minority
groups living within the nine counties surrounding KSC in 2010. Blacks or African-
Americans are the largest resident minority group in Brevard and Flagler counties;
Hispanic or Latino the largest in the remaining seven counties. Hispanics or Latinos
comprise the largest group of minority residents in the total area.
Data from Census 2010 (USBC 2013c) shows that 13.7 percent of the population living
within the nine counties reported incomes below the poverty threshold; lower
percentages than reported by Florida (14.7 percent) and the United States (14.3
percent).

C-4
 Appendix C
Table C-1. Composition of the Population in the KSC Area
Region
Population
2010 2012 2020a
Total 4,008,199 4,123,015 4,633,191
White alone 3,000,817 3,150,914 3,517,600
Black or African American alone 563,524 597,053 682,502.3
American Indian and Alaska Native alone 16,119 10,080 11,225
Asian alone 117,240 123,613 142,107
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone 3,221 3,584 3,741
Some other race alone 194,124 134,859 158,873
Two or more races 113,154 102,912 117,142
Hispanic or Latino 768,264 840,134 979,685
Percent Minority 25.1% 23.6% 24.1%
Percent Low Income 13.7% — —
(a) Projected based on increase in total population by county between 2010 and 2012

Brevard County Flagler County Indian River County

Population
2010 2012 2020a 2010 2012 2020a 2010 2012 2020a
Total 543,376 547,307 563,317 95,696 98,359 109,773 138,028 140,567 151,199
White alone 450,927 456,906 470,272 78,710 77,874 86,911 116,346 120,669 129,796
Black or African American alone 54,799 55,223 56,838 10,884 11,999 13,391 12,397 12,825 13,795
American Indian and Alaska Native
2,118 1,146 1,180 267 0 0 408 0 0
alone
Asian alone 11,349 12,279 12,638 2,046 2,174 2,426 1,666 1,807 1,944
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific
514 2,519 2,593 59 64 71 51 0 0
Islander alone
Some other race alone 9,299 5,658 5,824 1,544 4,058 4,529 4,909 3,080 3,313
Two or more races 14,370 13,576 13,973 2,186 2,190 2,444 2,251 2,186 2,351
Hispanic or Latino 43,943 47,891 49,292 8,251 8,705 9,715 15,465 15,970 17,178
Percent Minority 17.0% 16.5% 16.5% 17.7% 20.8% 20.8% 15.7% 14.2% 14.2%
Percent Low Income 13.7% — — 13.30% - - 13.40% - -

C-5
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Lake County Orange County Osceola County

Population
2010 2012 2020a 2010 2012 2020a 2010 2012 2020a

Total 297,052 303,186 329,015 1,145,956 1,202,234 1,456,375 268,685 287,416 376,341
White alone 243,624 254,060 275,704 728,795 777,502 941,859 190,641 215,200 281,781
Black or African American alone 29,103 30,197 32,770 238,241 256,542 310,773 30,369 34,793 45,558
American Indian and Alaska
1,472 993 1,078 4,532 1,874 2,270 1,452 978 1,281
Native alone
Asian alone 5,173 4,525 4,910 56,581 57,438 69,580 7,406 8,402 11,002
Native Hawaiian and Other
215 267 290 1,266 100 121 294 0 0
Pacific Islander alone
Some other race alone 10,778 5,945 6,451 77,216 72,607 87,955 27,623 18,795 24,610
Two or more races 6,687 7,199 7,812 39,325 36,171 43,817 10,900 9,248 12,109
Hispanic or Latino 36,009 39,299 42,647 308,244 339,202 410,906 122,146 137,250 179,714
Percent Minority 18.0% 16.2% 16.2% 36.4% 35.3% 35.3% 29.0% 25.1% 25.1%
Percent Low Income 11.40% - - 14.90% - - 13.90% - -

Polk County Seminole County Volusia County

Population
2010 2012 2020a 2010 2012 2020a 2010 2012 2020a
Total 602,095 616,158 675,772 422,718 430,838 464,908 494,593 496,950 506,491
White alone 452,854 486,415 533,476 330,664 348,662 376,234 408,256 413,626 421,567
Black or African American alone 88,833 93,201 102,218 47,107 48,809 52,669 51,791 53,464 54,490
American Indian and Alaska
2,706 1,878 2,060 1,386 1,422 1,534 1,778 1,789 1,823
Native alone
Asian alone 9,760 10,458 11,470 15,692 18,345 19,796 7,567 8,185 8,342
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific
360 213 234 258 58 63 204 363 370
Islander alone
Some other race alone 32,847 8,954 9,820 15,421 5,099 5,502 14,487 10,663 10,868
Two or more races 14,735 15,039 16,494 12,190 8,443 9,111 10,510 8,860 9,030
Hispanic or Latino 106,532 114,459 125,533 72,457 78,568 84,781 55,217 58,790 59,919
Percent Minority 24.8% 21.1% 21.1% 21.8% 19.1% 19.1% 17.5% 16.8% 16.8%
Percent Low Income 16.40% - - 10.00% - - 15.00% - -

C-6
 Appendix C

C-5 IMPACTS ON MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS

As discussed in Chapter 4 of this EIS, accidents during launch of the proposed Mars
2020 mission could result in human exposure to radioactive and other hazardous
materials. Plutonium-238 is the primary radioactive material of concern. Potential
radiological releases could affect populations residing both within and beyond 100 km
(62 mi) of the launch complex. As shown in Tables 4-6 and 4-13 of Chapter 4, if either
Alternative 1 or 3 is implemented, and if an accidental release of radioactive material
were to occur during any mission phase, on average no latent cancer fatalities would be
expected to occur. Implementation of Alternative 2 does not involve the use of
radioactive material.
Mission risks (consequences that would occur in the event of a radioactive release
multiplied by the probability of a release) are also small. As shown in Table 4-6, should
Alternative 1 be selected, the likelihood of an accident resulting in a release of
radioactive material from the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
(MMRTG) during the pre-launch and early launch phases combined is 9.9x10-5
(approximately 1 in 10,000). The corresponding risk to the local population (persons
residing within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch facilities) of a latent cancer fatality resulting
from an accident in pre-launch or early launch is 1.7x10-5 (approximately 1 in 59,000)
(Table 4-7). The risk to the global population (persons residing more than 100 km (62
mi) from the launch site) of a latent cancer fatality resulting from an accident during the
Mars 2020 mission is 1.3x10-5 (approximately 1 in 77,000).
As shown in Table 4-13, should Alternative 3 be selected, the likelihood of an accident
resulting in a release of radioactive material from the Light Weight Radioisotope Heater
Units (LWRHUs) during the pre-launch and early launch phases combined is 6.2x10-5
(approximately 1 in 16,000). The corresponding risk to the local population (persons
residing within 100 km (62 mi) of the launch facilities) of a latent cancer fatality resulting
from an accident in pre-launch or early launch is 8.2x10-7 (approximately 1 in 1,200,000)
(Table 4-14). The risk to the global population (persons residing more than 100 km (62
mi) from the launch site) of a latent cancer fatality resulting from an accident during the
Mars 2020 mission is 4.6x10-7 (approximately 1 in 2,200,000).
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, non-radiological accidents also pose no significant risks
to the public. Toxic effects that could result from a liquid propellant spill during fueling
operations would not extend beyond the immediate vicinity of the launch pad. Members
of the public are excluded from the area at risk during fueling operations. A fuel
explosion on the launch pad or during the first few seconds of flight could (if the Atlas V
is selected as the launch vehicle) temporarily increase carbon monoxide (CO),
hydrochloric acid (HCl), and aluminum oxide levels near the CCAFS boundary. One-
hour average concentrations of hazardous emissions from such an explosion are less
than the emergency response guidelines recommended by the American Industrial
Hygiene Association and the National Research Council for the Department of Defense
(USAF 1998).
Thus, implementation of the Proposed Action or the Alternatives would pose no
significant radiological or non-radiological risks to the public, including minority and low-
income groups within the potentially affected population.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

C-6 REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX C

CEQ 1997. Council on Environmental Quality. Environmental Justice: Guidance under
the National Environmental Policy Act. Executive Office of the President.
Washington, DC. December 10, 1997. Available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.
pdf
USAF 1998. U.S. Air Force. Final Environmental Impact Statement – Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle Program. HQ USAF/ILEVP, 1260 Air Force
Pentagon, Washington, DC. April 1998. Available at
handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA413417
USBC 2013c. U.S. Census Bureau. 2010 Census, American Fact Finder. November
2013. Available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml

C-8
 Appendix D

D.

APPENDIX D
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS

LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
D-1. Comment Submissions From Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals .......... D-2
D-2. Responses to Comment Submissions Listed in Table D-1 ............................... D-3

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This page intentionally left blank.

D-ii
 Appendix D

APPENDIX D
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS
NASA published a Notice of Availability (NOA) of the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (Draft EIS) for the Mars 2020 Mission in the Federal Register on June 5,
2014 (79 FR 32577). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency published its NOA for
the Draft EIS in the Federal Register on June 6, 2014 (79 FR 32729). The Draft EIS was
mailed by NASA to about 200 potentially interested federal, state, and local agencies;
organizations; and individuals. In addition, the Draft EIS was publicly available in
electronic format on NASA’s NEPA web site. Publication of the EPA’s Draft EIS
notification (79 FR 32729) initiated the 45-day public review and comment period.
Concurrently with the Federal Register notice and the start of the comment period, print
and digital advertisements were placed in four Florida newspapers. The advertisements
had links to the NASA website where the NOA, Executive Summary, and portions or all
of the Draft EIS could be downloaded. Over 3,000 unique individuals visited the Mars
2020 EIS website. Over 400 unique individuals visited the Mars 2020 webpage that
allowed the Draft EIS to be downloaded and spent an average of over 5 minutes on the
DEIS download page.
In addition to soliciting comments for submittal by letter and e-mail, on June 26, 2014,
NASA held a virtual meeting during which the public was invited to provide comments
on the Mars 2020 DEIS. This meeting was advertised in the NOA, in local (KSC area)
digital and print news at the time of the NOA and additional digital advertisements were
placed shortly before the meeting. In addition, NASA announced the meeting through
several of NASA’s social media sites (Twitter, Facebook, and Google+) during the week
before the meeting.
The web meeting was held on June 26, 2014 from 1 to 3 PM EDT via the Adobe
Connect web meeting software. Members of the NASA Mars 2020 NEPA team
presented information about the mission and the NEPA process. Through a live
streaming chat, members of the public were able to ask questions about the mission
and the Draft EIS and to provide comments on the Draft EIS. Although general
questions on the Mars 2020 program were asked and answered, no comments
regarding the scope of the Draft EIS, the alternatives considered, or the environmental
impacts analyses were received during this meeting. The web meeting was available for
streaming video replay through the end of the comment period.
The public review and comment period closed on July 21, 2014. Ten comment
submissions (letters, emails, and by telephone) were received from two federal
agencies, one state agency, two private organizations, and five individuals.
This appendix provides specific responses to the comment submissions received from
the agencies, organizations, and individuals. Table D-1 lists the ten comment
submissions received from the federal and state agencies, two private organizations,
and five individuals. Copies of each of these submissions are presented in Table D-2.
The relevant comments in each submission are marked and numbered for identification.
The comments received included “no comment,” requests for clarification of specific
sections of text, and objections to the use of nuclear material for space missions.
NASA’s response to each identified comment is also presented in Table D-2.

D-1
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Table D-1. Comment Submissions from Agencies, Organizations, and Individuals

Submission Agency, Organization, or Individual

1 State of Florida; Department of Environmental Protection

2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
3 U.S. Department of the Interior
4 Sky watch group India; India
5 Wesleyan Methodist Church, Brazil chapter
6 Anonymous
7 Dave Dooling; Alamogordo, New Mexico
8 Carol Propper; Palm Coast, Florida
9 Roger L. Thompson; (no address provided)
a
10 Mr. Patrick Reed; Nicco, Florida
a. Message received by telephone with additional information provided during a
follow-up phone call.

D-2
 Appendix D

Table D-2. Responses to Comment Submissions Listed in Table D-1

Comment Response

1-1 Response: Thank you for your comments.

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Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Comment Response

2-1 Response: Thank you for your comments. As with past

missions utilizing radioisotope thermoelectric generators
(RTGs), NASA will include a discussion of emergency response
planning in the ROD as a part of the mitigation measures
discussion. As indicated in Sections 2.1.7 and 4.1.5
Radiological Emergency Response Planning, Prior to launch of
the Mars 2020 mission, a comprehensive set of plans would be
developed by NASA to ensure that any launch accident could
be met with a well-developed and tested response. NASA's
plans would be developed in accordance with the National
Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and the NRF
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in
coordination with DOE and other Federal agencies, the state of
Florida, Brevard County, and local governmental organizations.
Radiological emergency response plans would be exercised
prior to launch to verify that response interfaces, command
channels, and field response organizations would be prepared
to respond in the unlikely event of a launch accident. The
agencies involved in the development of the plan, as needed,
could be involved in response to a radiological emergency.

D-4
 Appendix D

Comment Response

On August 13th, 2014, NASA and the EPA Region 4 office held
a conference call to clarify the EPA comment. In this call
• EPA voiced clarification of their comment as wanting
the Mars 2020 FEIS and ROD to state that EPA would be
invited to the Radiological Contingency Response.
• NASA stated that if NASA decides to go forward with
the Proposed Action, then the ROD would discuss how NASA
plans for Radiological Contingency Planning (RCP) by
complying with the National Response Plan (NRP) when
launching missions that utilize Radioisotope Power Systems.
EPA recognized that NASA is the lead agency for RCP but that
EPA would be part of it per the NRP.
• EPA stated their comment would be satisfied if the
potential future ROD stated that NASA would develop
radiological contingency plans in accordance with the NRP.

D-5
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Comment Response

3-1 Response: Thank you.

D-6
 Appendix D

Comment Response

4-1 Response: Thank you for your comments.

The DOE performed a risk analysis to assess the probability of
an accident that would release plutonium dioxide, the potential
consequences of such accidents, and the overall risk to the
public and the environment of any such release. The results of
this analysis are presented in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.3.4.
Prior to launch of the Mars 2020 mission, a comprehensive set
of plans would be developed by NASA to ensure that any
launch accident could be met with a well-developed and tested
response. NASA's plans would be developed in accordance
with the National Response Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and
the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in
coordination with DOE and other Federal agencies, the state of
Florida, Brevard County, and local governmental organizations.
Radiological emergency response plans would be exercised
prior to launch to verify that response interfaces, command
channels, and field response organizations would be prepared
to respond in the unlikely event of a launch accident.
5-1 Response: Thank you for your interest in the Mars 2020
mission. NASA provides the opportunity for the public to follow
and interact with the program for all of its Mars missions. The
Participate portion of the Mars Exploration Program website at
http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov/participate/ identifies several social
media through which the public can interact with the Mars
Exploration Program.

D-7
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Comment Response

6-1 Response: Thank you for your comments.

7-1 Response: Thank you for your comments.

D-8
 Appendix D

Comment Response

8-1 Response: As noted in sections 2.1.6.1.6, 2.1.6.2.6,

2.1.6.3.6, and 4.1.2.15. no matter which launch vehicle is
selected a successful Mars 2020 mission would not contribute
to orbital debris. All components of the first stage of the launch
vehicle would return to Earth shortly after launch. After placing
the Mars 2020 spacecraft on a trajectory to Mars, the launch
vehicle second stage would continue into interplanetary space
and the Mars 2020 spacecraft would travel to Mars.
8-2 Response: The U.S. Congress and the Administration
develop national budget priorities among the various Federal
agencies based on many considerations related to national
interests and security. The final budget reflects compromises
and tradeoffs when all factors and programs are considered
from the broadest perspective.
8-3 Response: NASA and DOE have estimated that a launch
accident leading to release of plutonium dioxide from the
proposed Mars 2020 mission’s MMRTG would be unlikely; if
such an accident were to occur, the analysis estimated that
potential effects to human health and the environment would be
small; see Section 4.1.4 of this EIS for more information. This
analysis indicates that, due to the safety features of the
MMRTG, an impact in the ocean should not result in the release
of plutonium. (Samples from the area near where the Apollo 13
RTG entered the Pacific Ocean, and these measurements have
shown no indication that the plutonium from that RTG has been
released to the atmosphere or ocean (ANS 1999). Also, the
Nimbus-B spacecraft launch was aborted and the RTG heat
source fell into the ocean. It was later recovered intact and the
fuel was recycled for use on another mission.
8-4 Response: With the publication of the Draft EIS, NASA has
solicited public input on the proposed action to implement the
Mars 2020 mission. As indicated in the response to comment 8-
2, ultimate responsibility for developing and funding national
budget priorities is the responsibility of the U.S. Congress and
the Administration.

D-9
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Comment Response

8-5 Response: Actions not related to the Mars 2020 mission

are beyond the scope of the EIS. However, in addition to its
efforts in planetary exploration, NASA also contributes to a wide
variety of Earth science and climate change research.
9-1 Response: Thank you for your comments.

D-10
 Appendix D

Comment Response

10-1 Response: NASA decided that holding a Virtual Meeting

during the public comment period provided the best opportunity
to reach the largest number of people. The meeting was
advertised in both print and digital ads and through NASA social
media, which has some of the largest audiences in the Federal
government. The concern that not all citizens would be able to
attend such a meeting was considered in making this decision
(and will be a consideration for the public comment meetings for
any future NEPA activities); this concern was moderated by the
ability to replay the Virtual Meeting online at any time during the
25 days after the meeting before the comment period closed.
In addition to providing the public with the opportunity to
participate in the public meeting, NASA also solicited comments
through more traditional means, including the U.S. mail, email,
and telephone.
10-2 Response: NASA and DOE have estimated that a launch
accident leading to release of plutonium dioxide from the
proposed Mars 2020 mission’s MMRTG would be unlikely, but
that if such an accident were to occur, the potential effects to
human health and the environment would be small; see Section
4.1.4 of this EIS for more information.
DOE conducted a study on the ability for the MMRTG and its
subcomponents to achieve criticality (Lipinski 2008). It is
physically impossible for the MMRTG, LWRHUs, or their
subcomponents to achieve a self-sustaining critical nuclear
fission (i.e., go critical) similar to a reactor.

D-11
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Mars 2020 Mission

Comment Response

10-3 Response: Prior to launch of the Mars 2020 mission, a

comprehensive set of plans would be developed by NASA to
ensure that any launch accident could be met with a well-
developed and tested response. NASA's plans would be
developed in accordance with the National Response
Framework (NRF) (DHS 2013) and the NRF Nuclear/
Radiological Incident Annex (DHS 2008) in coordination with
DOE and other Federal agencies, the state of Florida, Brevard
County, and local governmental organizations. These
organizations, as needed, could be involved in response to a
radiological emergency.
In the event of an accident resulting in a radiological release in
the launch area, NASA would provide prompt information on the
estimated release and its recommendation to the state of
Florida, Brevard County, and local governments who, in turn,
would determine an appropriate course of action, including
notifications to the public.
10-4 Response: The flight path of a Mars 2020 launch would
be similar to past launches from Cape Canaveral and generally
in an eastward direction — not directly down the coast.
10-5 Response: The health effects from human exposure to
plutonium are discussed in detail in Appendix B. The health
effect used to measure the impact of any plutonium dioxide
released in an accident is latent cancer fatalities; that is the
number of cancer fatalities resulting from the release that would
be in excess of those cancer fatalities which the general
population would normally experience from other causes.
Health effects could result from the ingestion or inhalation of
plutonium. External exposures (exposure to plutonium in the air
or on the ground) do not significantly contribute to health
effects. Plutonium is an alpha particle emitter and these
particles travel only a few inches in air and are easily stopped
by the surface of the skin.

D-12
 Appendix D

Comment Response

10-6 Response: For the Mars 2020 mission the EIS considers
two alternatives with solar power options. One alternative
(Alternative 2) would make use of a solar powered rover and
the second (Alternative 3) would use solar power augmented
with the thermal output of LWRHUs. The descriptions of these
alternatives in Chapter 2 discuss the ability of a solar powered
rover (both with and without LWRHUs) to meet the science
objectives of the Mars 2020 mission.
10-7 Response: The current cost estimate for the Mars 2020
mission WKURXJKODXQFKis $1.9 billion.
10-8 Response: The U.S. Congress and the Administration
develop national budget priorities among the various Federal
agencies and programs based on many considerations related
to national interests and security. The final budget reflects
compromises and tradeoffs made when all factors and
programs are considered from the broadest perspective.

D-13