LWATI: A Journal of Contemporary Research, 15(3), 169-192 2018

ISSN: 1813-222

A Comparative Study of the Character of Omolúàbí in An African

Moral System and Nietzsche’s Nobleman Theory in Western Ethics

OYEBADE Oyewole, AZENABOR Godwin and SHOTUNDE, Ayodele

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts
University of Lagos, Lagos-Nigeria
[email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected].

Abstract

This paper attempts to throw light on and show the fundamental

similarities and dissimilarities between an African and Western ethical
conceptions by examining the foundation of character ethics in the
two systems, using the concept of Omolúàbí in an African moral
system, and Nietzsche’s Nobleman in western ethics as tools of
comparative analysis. Indigenous African moral system revolves
around character and character traits much more as it aims to analyse
actions, as well as, motives of a moral agent. Omolúàbí is generally
accepted character model among the Yorùbá who are dominantly in
the West African sub-region. The virtues of Omolúàbí manifested in
(Ìwá) character are such that promote co-operation, solidarity and
interdependence of all interests towards common goal and
harmonious relationship. This concept favourably compares with
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Nobleman character model, with the emphasis
on the maximal use of instinct to achieve life ambitions. The idea of
Nietzsche, we argue, compares with Omolúàbí. Both are rationalistic
departure from supernaturalistic basis of morality but the limitation of
Nietzsche is that morality and peaceful co-existence cannot be
premised on self interest alone and the lure of nihilism. We contend
that the pursuit of selfish interest and egoism may help in the
achievement of goals but not sustainable outside of the general
interest in human society. The failure to accord a place for general
interest is precisely the limitation of Nietzsche’s character model,
which makes it an inadequate foundation of morality in line with
social order. Omolúàbí of an African ethics via Yoruba worldview,

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though not so watertight, is more humanistic and existentialist in

orientation, thereby promoting collective interest, goodwill and
peaceful coexistence. It is from this standpoint that we argue that the
humanistic basis of Omolúàbí morality is more adequate for
sustainable development in contemporary period.

Keywords: Character, African ethics, omolúàbí, morality and

nobleman

Introduction

This study demonstrates how the ethos of Omolúàbí underscores

indigenous morality among the Yorùbá nation in western part of sub-
Saharan Africa. The ethos, emerging from the socio-cultural
experience of the people is a prism through which materials of African
ethics are deduced, critically examined and appropriated. In essence,
Yorùbá ethos of Omolúàbí is a moral philosophy and a strand in
African ethics. African ethics, as a core branch of African philosophy,
may suffer over-generalisation without specific socio-cultural
paradigmatic thought system. Hence, the imperative of culture-
specific discourse like Akan ethics, Hausa morality, Igbo ethics and
Yorùbá morality among others, all under the discourse of African
ethics, and by implication African philosophy.

It must also be said that the Yorùbá are descendants of Oduduwa and
remain one of the largest ethnic groups in West Africa where they are
most concentrated. The nation has over 40 million population across
the West African sub region and about 21 per cent of the current
Nigerian population (Ajayi & Akintoye, 2006: 280). They are
predominantly in Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, Ondo, Kwara, Kogi
and Edo States. Indigenous Yorùbá communities will also be found in
neighbouring countries like Republic of Benin, Togo, Ghana and in
South American countries like Brazil, Cuba and the Caribbean.
As a traditional society with unwritten culture, surviving original
traditional values, like the concept of Omolúàbí, are best glean from
oral literature. By oral literature, we mean the rich corpora of texts
derivable from folklore, proverbs, poems, songs, tales, corpus and so

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on that are presented in spoken form for the purpose of influencing

the behaviour in a community (Awoniyi, 1975: 364). In fact, oral
literature has proven to be important mnemonic tools through which
the entire cultural values, history, beliefs and world-view are
preserved and transmitted from one generation to the other.

Pairing likes with likes, we situate Yorùbá morality with a western

paradigm to critically examine the humanistic foundation of ethics
and morality in African thought system against Nietzsche’s idea of
Nobleman in western ethics. We shall examine the utility of the two
moral paradigms towards collective well-being and social order that is
the primary goal of moral philosophy. We begin by clarifying the
notion of character and its philosophical interpretation to better
situate the discourse.

Our survey of various African cultures shows that there is hardly an

indigenous word for ethics or morality in African languages. Rather,
ethics is a bi-product of daily practices among the Africans. Hence, the
norm is to deploy certain indigenous words that are synonymous with
character to mean ethics or morality of the peoples. For example,
character in Igbo language means agwa. In other words, Onwe ghi ezi
agwa in Igbo thought system would mean ‘he has no morals’.
Character for the Twi part of Akan in Ghana is called suban. To say
“one has no morals or unethical” in Akan is to say Onni suban. Hausa
in the northern part of Nigeria calls character hali. Popular saying
among the people is mugun halia gareshi (he has a nasty nature or
lacks good character) (see, Momoh, 2000 & Kirk-Greene, 2000: 247).
Bear in mind that the act of narrowing ethics or morality down to
character (i.e. character-ethics) is not unique to the Africans. For
instance, borrowing from Ancient Greek language, Aristotle calls
ethics the study/science of character (i.e. he ethike, in Greek word)
(Aristotle, 1955: 23). Similarly, Islamic moral philosophy beginning
from the Medieval period adopts Akhlaq (Arabic word for character)
to mean ethics. What makes African character-ethics unique is that
discourses or statements about morality turn out to be discourses or
statements essentially about character.

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By dictionary definition, character is the intrinsic goodness of a

person, unfolding in actions that can be described as either good or
bad. It is made up of traits, that is to say, a set of stable qualities
(virtues) that are within, which influence outward actions. Moral
virtues (i.e. excellences of character) are the intrinsic qualities and the
subject matter of character, they include the general virtues like
honesty, courage, diligence, fellow-feeling, empathy, sympathy,
humility, justice, temperance and so on. Other virtues of less general
status but defined by each community in line with its aspirations
include: chastity before marriage, respect for elders, right use of
words, mastery of language and use of proverbs among others. It
follows from the foregoing that character or consistent demonstration
of virtues is the basis upon which a person is described as moral or
good fellow and to be lacking in virtues is to be immoral or bad fellow
(cf. Omoregbe, 1993: 139). Character constitutes the moral dimension
of human personality. In fact, a person’s character is his or her moral
make-up.

Specifically, from the broad spectrum of philosophy, character is the

pathway to understanding the being, as well as its nature as exhibited
in actions that define morality. In other words, character manifests
ones’ being. Thus, character underscores both the existence and
morality of man (Abimbola, 1975: 165). For instance, in Akan and
Yorùbá traditional communal thoughts, a good character is
synonymous with being a person, dubbed as oye onipa in Akan and o
s’eniyan in Yorùbá language. A bad fellow is Kii s’eniyan (a mere
caricature of person) for the Yorùbá (cf. Idowu, 1962: 155). Therefore,
to be moral is conceptually tied to existence or personhood.

In African ethics, character is defined in term of habits, words, deeds

and activities. Character is the configuration of individual personality
and action. The developmental ability of character implies the
possibility of moral reform and change. It is for this reason that people
are held responsible for their character. Character, in a Hausa
proverb, is said to be like a line drawn on a rock; nobody can erase it.
And a Yorùbá proverb remarks that Ìwá l’ewa (character is beauty);
obirin so’wa nu, oni oun o l’ori oko (a women lost out in good

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character and she is complaining that she has no luck for husband). It
is character that promotes ontological balance and harmonious
peaceful coexistence between man and man, man and the gods,
ancestors, divinities and society at large.

Concept of Omolúàbí in an African Ethics

African ethics is the critical reflection on the matter or nature of life,

conduct, behaviour and character of the African. It is the “the
conceptualization, appropriation, contextualization and analysis of
values within the African cultural experience” (Azenabor, 2010: 161).
The concept of Omolúàbí is a subset of such values and it is popular
among the Yorùbá ethnic group. It is an indigenous concept that
denotes the idea of morality, moral being or ideal character
acceptable to all and tells of the philosophical tradition of the people.
Importantly, however, ideas of Omolúàbí are till date found in the
peoples’ oral tradition, especially in forms of proverbs, myths,
folklores, and tales among other symbolic legacies. According to Ifá
literary corpus, Omolúàbí is understood as the basis of societal and
social ethics.

Omolúàbí is a well-behaved person. It is a psycho-cultural

underpinning of values and guiding principle of all human struggle and
condition. Omolúàbí is a Yorùbá ethical conceptualization of thought
and consciousness. It is central and critical to social relations and
anchored firmly on the nature of human existence. It can compare
favourably with Aristotelian Magnanimous man and the Golden mean
doctrine, Kantian Universalizability theory, Bentham’s Utilitarianism,
Hare’s Prescriptivism and Nietzsche’s Nobleman. But while these are
produced by written tradition, the Yoruba’s is based on oral and
undocumented knowledge, only made available in recent literatures.

Omolúàbí as a value system allows for preferences, choices and

freedom, but it abhors and condemns excesses (as does the Golden
mean). Omolúàbí has come to mean high regard for honour and
integrity. It has meaning in relation to others, relatives than self.

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Omolúàbí is the Yoruba’s morality which sustains the molebi and ebi,
that is, relations and community in the closely-nit social system.

For the Africans, to be is to exist in proverbs, myths, folk tales, music

and others expressing the people’s mythology. The following are
Omolúàbí maxims, proverbs and verses in Ifa literary corpus:

Maxims on Omolúàbí
i. Ìwá l’esin (character is the ultimate religion) (Abimbola, 1977:
155)
ii. Ìwá l’ewa (character is a person’s beauty)
iii. Ìwá l’óbá awure (character is the best mystical protections)
iv. Ìwá rere lèsó ènìyan, ehín funfun lèsó èrin (Just as white teeth
enhance a laugher, so does a good character befit a
person) (Abraham, 1970: 328)

Proverbs on Omolúàbí
i. Abo oro l’a so fun Omolúàbí; to ba de inu e, a d’odindi (A word
is sufficient for the wise)
ii. Omolúàbí kii ta’fa k’o ma wa a (Omolúàbí follows a course to
its end)
iii. Ìwà lòrìsà; báabá ti hùú ní í fi gbeni [character is like an òrìsà
(deity); if we worship well, we get its protection, and if we
behave well, we benefit] (Abraham, 1970: 328)
iv. Iponju kii mu Omolúàbí k’o di abese (Omolúàbí betrays no
character even in hardship)

Ifa literary Corpus on Omolúàbí

i. Iwa nikan l’osoro o,
Iwa nikan l’osoro;
Orikan ki’buru l’otu Ife,
Iwa nikan l’osoro o.

(Character is all that is requisite,

Character is all that is requisite;
There is no destiny to be called unhappy in Ife city,
Character is all that is requisite) (Abimbola, 1977: 156).

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ii. Iwapele l’ókun aye fi’ropeti l’owo eni.

O da ‘fa fun Orunmila
Ti o nlo fi iwa gba okun aiye l’owo okan-le-ni-‘irinwo imale.

(Gentle character is it which enables the rope of life to stay unbroken

in one’s hand.
So, declares the oracle to Orunmila
Who by means of gentle character was going to win the rope of life
from the four
hundred and one divinities) (for more information see, Abimbola,
1975: 396-399).

The foregoing examples from oral literature vividly show how

character, dimensioned as Omolúàbí and Iwà, weaves into the general
thought system of the Yorùbá. Briefly, we have seen Omolúàbí and
Iwà in connection to religion, godliness, aesthetic value,
epistemology, moral values and social justice among others.
Subsequent subsections will throw light on their inseparability.

Drawing from the ontological analysis of eniyan (man) and existence

in traditional Yorùbá thought system earlier remarked on in this study,
the following assumptions are made: (i) it is an imperfect world, ruled
by multiplicity of good and evil forces; (ii) forces influence and are
influenced in turn; (iii) man, at the centre of the muddle, is vulnerable
and (iv) there is a prevailing law of reciprocity.

It is in the light of these socio-cultural assumptions that Yorùbá hinge

morality or appropriate mode of behaviour on the doctrine of Ìwàpèlé
(cf. Abimbola, 1975: 394 & Fayemi, 2009: 169).Doctrine is used as a
set of common beliefs that serve as governing principle of life,
conducts and order among a people. Ìwàpèlé falls into this category in
the Yorùbá thought system. Obviously, the doctrine conjoins two
words, namely: Ìwà (character) and pèlé (gentle/mild).Literally and as
precise as English lexicon can offer, both add up to mean “mildness of
character” (Abraham, 1970: 328). Synonymous terms of Ìwàpèlé are
Ìwà rere (good character), Ìwà jéjé (gentle character), Ìwà tùtú

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(temperate character) and Ìwà irele (humble character). From the

above, mildness, gentility, temperance and humility all point to a
conscious state of mind that implies ontological understanding, with
the discipline to exercise caution and self-restraint in all state of
affairs. In other words, Ìwàpèlé can be defined as a phenomenological
disposition to life, based on wisdom and understanding of the
workings of reality within the socio-cultural context of the Yorùbá.

For emphasis, it may then be asked, what are the virtues of Omolúàbí
inherent in the doctrine of Ìwàpèlé? Scholars have identified a handful
(see, Idowu, 1962; Abimbola, 1975; Awoniyi, 1975; Bewaji, 2006;
Fayemi, 2009; Yoloye, 2009 & Ajadi, 2012 and so on). They include the
following, namely: (i) suuru (patience); (ii) òwò (humility/respect); (iii)
òrò-íre (good/right choice of words); (iv) otito (honesty/integrity); (v)
ogbón inú (intelligence/understanding); (vi) ìwòn-tún-wòn-sì
(moderation) and (vii) akin (courage). While the list is longer, these
are some basic qualities that standout the Omolúàbí. Indeed, these
qualities help to promote social integration and well-being of the
community. Omolúàbí is built on the foundation of honour, integrity,
duty and expectations.

A corollary of Omolúàbí is Ìwà. Ìwà is central to the Yoruba ethical and

moral theory. There is the saying that Ìwá l’esin (character is religion).
Character is all pervasive, it is the ornament of personhood, it is the
essence of being. Ìwà complements all things good and beautiful. A
person is evaluated for better or for worse according to his or her
character (Ìwà).

Good character is an harbinger of peace and war; the engine of

culture and civility, the hallmark of conversational prudence and
epitome of intellectual maturity. Ìwà adds value to a person becoming
an Omolúàbí. WandeAbimbola (1975: 395) opines that Omolúàbí is a
function of exhibiting and demonstrating the inherent virtue and
value of Ìwàpèlé, which is a good and gentle character. Omolúàbí
culminating in Iwapele is the basis of moral conduct in Yoruba culture.
So, Ìwàpèlé is the core defining attribute of Omoluabi. In

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conceptualizing Omoluabi, three other elements come to the fore.

They are: iteriba (respect), inurere (good mind) and Iwa (character).

Iwaibaje (bad character), eewo (taboo), abuku (calamitious action),

aidaa (wickedness) are all used in judgment, discipline and evaluation
of character and or conduct. Itiju (shame) is a sign of respect,
reverence and regard for whom it applies or relates to. Shame here is
in the positive sense, it is a moral virtue (onitiju), whose opposite is
alainitiju, i.e. an immodest and shameless person. Itiju is also in a
sense conscience – the highest level of moral development. The fear
of being put to shame or being disgraced is the basis of all moral
principles in Yoruba ethical system.

Concept of Nobleman in Nietzsche

It is not uncommon to find the word noble or “nobility of birth”
defining character or social approval in the western society. One of
the philosophers that really feature the concept is the German
existentialist, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Though he never
claimed to be an existentialist, but he is one of them in thoughts and
themes with focus on the existential conditions of man. His thoughts
culminate into works like Genealogy of Morals; Beyond Good and Evil;
The Will to Power; Thus Spake Zarathustra; Twilight of the Gods and
Esse Homo among others.

Nietzsche lived in the 19th Century, a period in European history

characterized by advances in sciences and exploration. While
innovations in medicine enhanced clinical understanding of human
anatomy, disease prevention and consequent accelerated population
growth in the west, advances in exploration led to the discovery of
new worlds in continents like Africa and Asia. Therefore, while new
form of liberalism held sway in Europe, imperialism made waves
abroad. It was also one of the notable periods of reforms and military
conflicts in Europe. There were three wars in succession and
Nietzsche was part of the Franco-Prussian War as a medical aid.
Nietzsche assessed the period that he lived as one implicitly driven by
the thought that “Europe wishes to become one” (Nietzsche, 1995:
195) and everything spurs towards “Europe, one Europe, whose soul

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pushes outward and upward through all manifold and impetuous art”
(Hubben, 1968: 97). Nietzsche observed that the implosion of “united
Europe” (Ibid: 116) was under the wrong atmosphere of Judeo
Christian morality and Greek rationalism that formed the foundation,
yet considered alien to the Germanic culture, rendering European
civilisation despicably weak and decadent for the set goal (Denise &
Peterfreund, 1992: 261).

As a rescue mission, Nietzsche waged a double demolition attack on

traditionalism; that is deconstruction and reconstruction of traditional
morality of the Greek rationalism and Christian virtues of the Judeo-
Christian religion. In the deconstruction exercise against earlier
philosophies, he was critical of modern and enlightenment ideas
traced back to Socrates on one hand. On the other hand, he vented
his aspersion on European idealism and rationalism for conjecturing a
rational universe and absolute morality through the human reason.

While considering moral values as subjective and relative, Nietzsche

launched a rebuttal against Socrates, Plato and other rationalists like
Kant and Schopenhauer for promoting the concept of ultimate Good,
absolute morality with God-like complexes, standard values and
obligatory duty to morality. The reason is that the so-called absolute
morality that accommodates free will, responsibility, guilt and
selflessness are anti-human and hindrance for man to attain higher
life. It is, therefore, along this line that Azenabor (1996: 72) wrote:
“there is no such thing as moral truth and falsity apart from a given
code, which depends on human choice and convention. There are no
absolutes values; all values are man’s creation – expressing a certain
perspective.” Nietzsche argues that rather than uplift the centrality of
instinctive will (i.e. will to power), which is natural in all human, the
rationalists deified reason, conceiving man as a rational animal with
reason becoming an end in itself, instead of facilitating and organising
the apparatus of action in the functional drive for power.
Nietzsche’s second deconstructive assault is closely related to the
former, and it is against Judeo-Christian morality, which he
condemned as slave and decadent morality. Christianity among other
religions, he notes, is the most “seductive lie” that has ever existed, a

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morality of “paltry people; a repugnant kind of degeneracy that

civilization has ever yet brought unto existence” (Nietzsche, 1992:
270-271). Nietzsche’s discontent is that, first, Christianity promotes
slave morality; second, the religion is led by Church priests who
secretly will to power. The church leaders exploits the clueless
adherents by deceiving them into denial of life, negating the fine
impulse of great accumulation of strength, the aim of which is to keep
the people suppressed in the fold (Ibid: 272).

In the slave morality that religion promotes, the strong and powerful
are regarded as evil, while the sufferers are the good. The man who is
weak, ill and lazy that should be wiped out, according to Nietzsche,
turns out to the good man (see, Azenabor, 1996: 73). Christian virtues
like sympathy, selflessness, kindness, helping hands, warm heart,
patience, humility, friendliness, dread of pain and longing for bliss are
nothing but religious neurosis that have since drained life of its valour,
strength and meaning (Ibid). Nietzsche likens Christianity to a ladder
with many rungs:

It has many rungs but three of them

are of the greatest importance. The
first is the sacrifice of men to one’s
God, perhaps those men in particular
whom one most loved. The second
rung, attained in the moral period of
mankind, is the sacrifice to one’s god
of one’s strongest instincts, one’s
‘natural man’. And finally, what
remains that could be sacrificed?
Don’t we in the end have to sacrifice
everything consolatory, future
blessedness and justice? Don’t we
have to sacrifice God himself and
idolized a rock, the forces to stupidity,
of gravity, fate, nothingness – all in
order to be sufficiently cruel to
ourselves? To sacrifice God for

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nothingness – this is the paradoxical

mystery of ultimate cruelty that
remained in store for the generation
now growing up (Nietzsche, 1995: 62-
63).

Consequently, Nietzsche submits that since morality is all about

experimentation, why not experiment new ideas of transvaluation of
values such as going beyond the current fog in distinguishing between
good and evil? His plan was to take man back to nature, where life
was on autopilot of self-integration, organisation and self-
transcendence. He argues that all men naturally and instinctively “will
to power” and self-overcome (Schroeder, 2005: 132). To this innate
quest of man, there is no need for God or the thought of him because
“God is dead”. Nietzsche declares: “Not only was God dead, but also
man as god; and the task was not merely to naturalise man, but
equally to prevent his being denaturalized, turned into sand, grains of
infinite sand, which is in effect the modern intension” (cited by
Blackham, 1965: 195).

The task of nature, according to him, is to make man non-Christian

and modern man pre-Socratic. The pre-Socratic dream is not far-
fetched. Nietzsche was much impressed by the vitality of ancient
Greco Roman civilisation and by the grim realism of the contemporary
evolutionary principle of survival of the fittest. For Nietzsche, Christian
morality has lost its God just as traditional rationalism lost its reason.
Death of God or total erosion of His thought for human mind is
therefore the freedom of man and by implication, the birth of new
morality – master morality of the nobleman. The new morality simply
turns the table against slave morality of old for life affirmation, rise to
life in its exercise of the natural will to life or the will to power. In the
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche remarks:

That everywhere aristocratic, noble

(in the social sense), is the root idea,
out of which have necessarily
developed ‘good’ in the sense of ‘with

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a soul of high calibre’, ‘with a

privileged soul’ – a development
which invariably runs parallel with
that other evolution by which ‘vulgar’,
‘plebian’, ‘low’ are made to change
family into ‘bad’ (cited by Denise &
Peterfreund, 1992: 265).

The nobleman or noblemen, as the case may be, are his aristocratic
class and are moral revolutionaries. They are future new sets of
philosophers that are called free spirits, fashioned after non-Christian
virtues and pre-Socratic in outlook to life. The nobleman is beyond,
besides, above and ahead of conventional good and evil classification
of moral actions; beyond the shackled of social morality. His task is
indeed to turn the course of history and change the fortunes of
European culture. He is to save western civilisation from total eclipse,
from decadence and hypocrisy of traditional European morality of
modern rationalist philosophers and Judeo-Christian religious leaders.

Certain qualities single out the idea of Nietzsche’s nobleman. These

qualities are as follows:
 independent creator of moral values;
 impulse to power and glory;
 spartan discipline;
 courage;
 duty only to the equals; and
 egoistic nature.

Nature is the springboard of ideal character of nobleman, who is to

act by uncensored instinct. Traditional western morality erred by
imposing moral norms on man’s natural instinct, as if the norms are
deductible from nature. The norms are made by ‘slaves’, having
higher numerical strength to shackle naturally ambitious man and
account for the reign of traditional ‘slave morality’. The reverse is the
case for the nobleman. His, is an independent morality and master
morality; as freely created by him is not in the absolute form. True
morality of the master race, Nietzsche says, must build from the

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immediate sense of power that people can feel from within. Good or
evil actions are not ironclad logic; rather a wide pool for every free
spirit to sift from, to suit the instinctive will (see, Denise &
Peterfreund, 1992: 265). In other words, nothing is intrinsically good
or bad but thinking and self-interest make them so.

Nietzsche’s nobleman is the aristocrat, but one that is above humility

and below pride and vanity. He is opposed to these traditional views
of Christian ethics, which he replaced with ‘master morality’ of the
aristocratic class. According to Nietzsche, “Christianity is to be
condemned for denying the value of pride, pathos of distance, great
responsibility, exuberant spirits, splendid animalism, the instincts of
war and of conquest, the deification of passion, revenge, anger,
voluptuousness, adventure, knowledge,” (cited in Russell, 2005: 691-
692) many of which were missing in the general survey of nobleman.
In fact, Nietzsche’s true virtue of nobility is not a general notion,
rather of an aristocratic minority.

Unlike Aristotelian magnanimous man in the Nicomachean Ethics

(1955), Nietzsche did not advocate for eugenic principle of
procreation for his aristocratic noble class, but implicit is that, nobility
is biological. As cited by Russell, “No morality is possible without good
birth,” Nietzsche states, and “they have usually been a conquering
race or a hereditary aristocracy... the individuals of the superior race
and their descendants, are more likely to be ‘noble’, ...they will have
more strength of will, more courage, more impulse towards power,
less sympathy, less fear and less gentleness” (Russell, 2005: 694).
Nietzsche’s nobleman is akin to a war lord or warrior, schooled in
Spartan discipline of warfare and a super human with duty only to his
equals.

Nietzsche apparently has an eye for the future’s free-spirits, equipped

with Spartan training and discipline right from the youth. They are the
vanguards for the transvaluation of values; the exceptionally free
spirit, intellectually firm to receive the tutelage and not the common
herd that are the current precarious model of human condition. He
reintroduced the notion of Spartan discipline in the makeup of the

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nobleman, describing it as key to nature, as essentially the will to

power in “a brutal and savage contest to strength, characterized by
frightfulness and tragedy, bloodshed, suffering and cruelty” (Ibid:
264). It is clear that life for Nietzsche is more of a battlefront and only
the ruthless stands a chance of survival. Weaklings are persona non
grata in the brutal test of courage. Sympathy for those going down is
forbidden but cruelty, because contest for survival is the hard fact of
life.

He adds that Christian morality failed to take cognizance of

inequalities among human beings. He argues that if people are by
nature unequal in gift, strength and aspirations, why should Christian
ethics promote classless society such as is contrary to provisions of
nature? It amounts to gross injustice to accord equal lot to botched
and bungle masses on one hand, and the noble and superman on the
other; to demand equal duty from weak/lazy and the strong; or task
both the witted and imbecile with one assignment; accord special
respect to corrupt politician and business magnate; or in fact, treat a
pauper and millionaire as equals.

While Nietzsche robs the poor and weak of sympathy, ethics of the
nobleman are premised on self love and egoism. He denied that
altruism is possible, because no one can do ‘for nothing sake’. It is
contradictory and paradoxical in terms because to do ‘for nothing
sake’ is still a motive of action – ‘doing for nothing sake’. Moreover,
even the so-called philanthropists want to be seen at least as one or
acting because the holy writ deemed it imperative and the
philanthropists would want his reward in the after-life. So, where lies
the selfless deed, when according to Nietzsche, we are necessarily
self-centered? (cf. Azenabor, 1996: 73).

Comparative Critique

The precarious nature of human being in the world features in the

two moral paradigms. While Nietzsche puts the human existential
condition succinctly in observing that man has become a stranger to
himself in the scheme of modernisation and in need of redemption,

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radically looking further backwards, even farther than the theistic

existentialist and back to the pre-Socratic period, Yorùbá’s indigenous
moral approach turns to the pre-colonial morality of the Africans.
Central to both is the philosophy that delves deeply into the heart of
human condition; outcome of which is the need for radical revisit of
human value system.

Quite similar of the two approaches is the refusal to ground ethics and
morality on supernaturalistic basis. The Yorùbá tradition of thought
reckons with Olodumare (God) as the centre of existence and saddled
with ontological justice as the final arbiter (Idowu, 1962: 38-47 &
Oluwole, 1984: 21). It is not far-fetch to see the morality of Omolúàbí
in this light. The Yorùbá’s epistemic outlook on reality recognizes,
without contradiction, the Supreme Being is a necessary part of
cosmic reality and intellectually agreeable like the Kantian sense.
However, and as we have noted earlier, the apex of our moral
pyramid-like outlook is not the supernatural Being, rather the
humanistic essence (see, Oluwole, 1984: 21). In as much as man
recourses to his gods in worship, prayer and supplication, he does so
in complement of human effort, especially when such had proven
inadequate. The goal of Yorùbá’s Omolúàbí is to live peacefully with
the community and other intelligent forces in nature in one indivisible
whole. He recognizes that his duty is not for duty-sake, rather for
human upliftment in the community. Even, to this similar humanistic
course, the gods are also adjudged to be committed, as the ground of
their being in the ontological structure. Omolúàbí is, therefore, to
promote humanistic course, whose reward is the fulfillment of
existential harmony and life of bliss in the otherworld.

Sequel to the foregoing exposition and analysis, both moralities are

existentialist in outlook, bothering on human condition. According to
William Barrett, Nietzsche’s works are immense observation on the
condition of human nature, which in the view of Nietzsche is one that
can never be understood as an animal species within the zoological
order of nature, because he has broken free from confines of nature
and has thereby posed the question of his own meaning cum that of
nature and what destiny has in stock for him (Barrett, 1962: 170-180).

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Scholars on Yorùbá concept of Omolúàbí ask the question on the ideal

character model that is adequate in meeting the socio-cultural goal of
harmonious living. While Nietzsche submits that there is no
intellectual, scientific objectivity or religious ultimate true story to
account for human condition (as there is no more ‘the human nature’
but from subjective individuals in varying existential conditions), he
advances a monistic view of human plight for his nobleman. Without
denying inequality in human capabilities and potential, Nietzsche opts
for the strongest and the denial of human facticity like natural
weakness.

Meanwhile, a pluralistic conception of human nature and attendant

morality of the Yorùbá socio-cultural experience accommodates the
dynamism inherent in human nature and the dangers of condensing
profiles or reality in one monistic account, constitution or perception.
This explains a popular saying among the Yorùbá that: eda o l’aropin,
that is, human being is indeed an endless possibilities or cannot be a
write off. These statements strengthen the fact that no condition is
permanent. In essence, human being is capable of love as well hate,
cruelty and sympathy, strength and weakness and in all these; there is
no finitude or permanence in his acts. Hence, he cannot be adjudged
as entirely bad and meant for the iron-hand as Nietzsche suggests, as
he is equally capable of good virtues as well. In the communitarian
outlook, therefore, even though his death is personal, he is not alone
in the fate as it is the case with his facticity.

Nietzsche’s approval of the strongest character is personal and

psychological. It was first aimed at giving himself a mental succor
against the reality of poor health and vitality. In line with this position,
Barrett (1962:180) observes that Nietzsche’s thought was out of tune
with reality having been produced by a mind that has not only lost
touch in communicating with real world, but also owned by one of the
loneliest man that has ever lived. And having tied his personality to his
works, criticisms of Nietzsche have not distinguished between the two
either. Therefore, Barrett described his “fantasies, delusions and
grandiose inflation of ego as only sickly and lonely, emotionally
starved ghostly figure, fleeting from place to place in search of

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healing, but one that is also more often than not homeless; a dwarf
reality that is of the imagined giant about whom he boasts”
(1962:182).

Sickly nature, human weakness and limitations are grim facts of life
that cannot be wished away. Nietzsche wishes for a generation of
noblemen that he is by nature not endowed to be among and
anticipates a society that he would never have survived in either. In
one of his blanketed judgment, Nietzsche condemned women as
weaklings and a set-back to the ambition of the strong; yet, as Russell
(2005: 696) remarks, a handful of such women would have snuffled
life out of him in a physical contest. With more discretion, the
morality of Omolúàbí promotes compassion and like the golden rule
principle, doing unto others as one would want others to do to him, in
similar circumstance. Though there is role differentiation in the
community and among gender, men and women are intrinsically
equal, just as the mighty and the lowly. No amount of industry can
make the Omolúàbí character model to lord it over others in the same
community. He realizes that he is, just because others are. Omolúàbí
exercises his freedom within the context permissible to others, which
is a constraint to absolute freedom that Nietzsche celebrates.

Based on the foregoing exposition and analysis of the two traditions,

what do we make of their humanistic outlook? As concepts with
characteristic features in existentialism, both are aimed at human
benefits and well-being is the focal point. While Omolúàbí of the
Yorùbá, in line with African humanism theoretically sets out to benefit
all cadre of men in the community or humanity at large, nobleman of
Nietzsche is addressed to edify the individual and very few strong
men. In fact, it purported the world for the strongest, who are laws
unto themselves in a manner that is more nihilistic than humanistic.
Both terms require some elucidation.

Humanism is an outlook or system of thought that attaches prime

importance to human, rather than divine or supernatural forces.
Foremost humanist, Jim Herrick (2006:1) notes that: “the emphasis is
on the human, the here-and-now, the human. Humanists are atheists

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or agnostics and do not expect an afterlife. It is essential to humanism

that it brings values and meaning to life. It is an approach that is
neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but realistic.” Essence and source
of morality are human and societal needs. The highest level of
morality is developed personally as the individual moves towards an
idea of personal and social goodness. This morality adequately
combines contentment, happiness with social responsibility and
harmony. Human recognizes that the idea of perfect society is at best
utopian. But with every individual (in their importance) contributing
to the commonwealth, rendering human solution to human problems,
a more realistic rather than optimistic or pessimistic outlook to life is
brought about.

Meanwhile, nihilism is the doctrine of ‘nothing’ or that nothing of a

general class exists, or is knowable and valuable. Nietzsche defines a
nihilist as “one who judges of the world as it exists that it should not
be, whereas he says of the world as it ought to be that it does not
exist” (see, Hubben, 1968: 121). It is probably more accurate to call a
man a nihilist who considers life as meaningless, without moral law,
devoid of values to common men, and without the prospect of a
hereafter (Ibid).

Ethical nihilism is the denial of the vitality of all distinctions of moral

values, though a troubled road least travelled by moral philosophers
because of its denial of possibility of all ethical philosophy (Dagobert,
1971: 210). However, a “less pure ethical nihilism sometimes appears
as an intermediate stage in a philosophy which wishes to deny the
validity of all previous systems of values as a preliminary of
substituting a new one in their places” (Ibid). In between the extremes
of pure nihilism and less pure ethical nihilism, Nietzsche’s nobleman
has either been lauded as a call to personal responsibility or
lambasted as a recipe for inhumane society as anchored on
meaninglessness. There is no doubt that Nietzsche’s deconstructive
agenda of traditional values and Christian morality sets the stage for
nihilism. However, Nietzsche did not leave the moral foundation
fallow without new moral codes. And “it is because Nietzsche filled

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this vacuum and did not leave the world in nothingness, that absolved
him from the accusation of nihilism” (Azenabor, 1996: 75).

We have earlier noted that most implicit in both concepts is the

question of individual morality; asking the question on how best the
individual should nourish himself in order to grow into a higher
individual or moral stature. With the nobleman, it ends with the
individual or herd of noblemen, but with Omolúàbí model, it ends
with the society. As Barrett (1962: 192) observes, “so far as Nietzsche
attempts to make the goal of his higher individual the goal of
mankind, a fatal ambiguity appears within his ideal itself.” Nietzsche
laments the condition (slave-morality) of modern man but rather than
theorize a transvaluation of mankind through master morality into
humane entities, he succeeded in setting the stage for man’s
inhumanity to man. Conversely, the Omolúàbí model fairs differently,
as it sets the agenda for a more humane world.

Indeed, the humanism of Omolúàbí emphasizes the uniqueness of

African person, his or her dignity and cultural paradigm. The unique
domestication or application of humanism to African experience is
what Oluwole calls “African Humanism” (see, Azenabor, 2010: 110-
133). Essentially, “African humanism as an African thought system
stresses relationships among people in society that is interdependent,
rather than sole descriptions of individual events in human experience
or individualism” (Ibid: 125). And in consonance with the overriding
theory of African Ontology (see, Azenabor, 2010: 79-86), the notion of
Omolúàbí is moved by the spirit of interdependence, which
empathises and as well emphasizes co-existence rather than conquest
in nature and the world. In as much as there is solidarity with the
human course in African cultural experience, it would not be out of
place to say that Omolúàbí is also very compassionate and
sympathetic to human limitations in the community. In the scheme of
things, therefore, the attitude is that of selfish interest or aggression
to outplay others, rather of solidarity and cooperation with general
interest.

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Conclusion

It is clear from the foregoing that an African and a western moral

paradigm possess humanistic foundation of morality rather than
supernaturalistic basis. Although religion, God and the gods are part
of the ontological architecture of an African tradition of thought,
African morality or ethics is grounded on human rationality, the
Omolúàbí; aligning self-interest with that of the whole. Nietzsche
argues that since religion has historically failed and God is dead, man
is left to himself to decide morality in accordance to his instinct and
promote self-interest. Whereas an African humanistic moral paradigm
of Omolúàbí engenders collective interest to achieve social order and
sustainable development, a western humanistic ethical model of
Nietzsche’s nobleman emphasizes nihilism, egoism and more conflicts
in human society. Therefore, it is on this basis that an African ethics
via Yoruba moral concept of Omolúàbí is more adequate for
sustainable development in contemporary period than Nietzsche’s
nobleman model, given the former’s interpersonal and co-existent
nature.
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