[Provisional Translation as of March 14, 2023 ]

DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM

December 16, 2022

Table of Contents

I Program Guidelines
II Major Programs Regarding SDF’s Capabilities
1 Stand-off Defense Capabilities
2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities
3 Unmanned Defense Capabilities
4 Cross-domain Operation Capabilities
(1) Capabilities in the Space Domain
(2) Capabilities in the Cyber Domain
(3) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain
(4) Capabilities in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains
5 Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions
(1) Enhancing Command and Control Functions
(2) Enhancing Information Gathering and Analysis Functions
(3) Responses to Integrated Information Warfare With Special Regard to the
Cognitive Dimension
6 Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection
7 Sustainability and Resiliency
(1) Procurement of Various Ammunitions
(2) Securing Fuel
(3) Improving the Operational Availability of Defense Equipment
(4) Facilities Improvement
Ⅲ Organization of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
1 Joint Operation Structure
2 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess
(2) Reorganization of the Major Units
3 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess
(2) Reorganization of the Major Units
4 Japan Air and Space Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
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(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units
5. Optimizing Organizational Capacity
IV Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance
1 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
2 Steady Implementation of Measures to Support Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan
V Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others
1 Bilateral/Multilateral Training and Exercises
2 Equipment and Technology Cooperation
3 Capacity Building Assistance
VI Elements Supporting Defense Capabilities
1 Training and Exercises
2 Reinforcing Collaboration and Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard
3 Collaboration with Local Communities
4 Reinforcing Policy Making Functions
VII Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals / Utilizing Defense
Capability and Measures for Global Security Cooperation
1 Measures to Large-Scale Disasters
2 Efforts for Maritime Security and Use of the Airspace based on Existing
International Rules
3 International Peace Cooperation Activities
Ⅷ New Measures for Early Deployment of Defense Equipment
Ⅸ Defense Production and Technological Base as Virtually Integral Part of a Defense
Capability
1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base
2 Reinforcing Defense Technological Base
(1) Stand-Off Defense Capabilities
(2) Capabilities to Respond to HGVs, etc.
(3) Capabilities to Respond to Drones and Swarm Attacks
(4) Measures for Unmanned Assets
(5) Measures for Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft
(6) Reinforcing Other Deterrence and Response Capabilities
3 Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
4 Promotion of Various Measures and Institutional Development
Ⅹ Reinforcing the Foundation for SDF Personnel, to Fulfill Abilities as Core of Defense
Capabilities

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1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base

(1) Reinforcement of Recruitment Measures
(2) Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others
(3) Effective Use of Human Resources
(4) Improvement of Living and Working Environment, etc.
(5) Human Resource Development
(6) Improving Treatment and Reemployment
2 Transformation of Medical Functions
XI Optimization Efforts
1 Equipment
2 Personnel
XII Quantities of Major Procurement
XIII Expenditures
XIV Notes
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3

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I. Program Guidelines
In accordance with the “National Defense Strategy” (approved by the
National Security Council and Cabinet on December, 16, 2022), Japan will
fundamentally reinforce its “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” through the
synergy of organically integrated capabilities in cluding space, cyber, and
electromagnetic domains, and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible
and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed
contingencies, focusing on the capabilities of our opponents and new ways
of warfare. By FY 2027 or by five years from now, Japan will strengthen its
defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary
responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and
defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others. Furthermore,
in approximately 10 years from now, Japan will make further efforts to
better attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities
to the point at which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions
against its nation much earlier and at a further distance .
Given the guiding thoughts above, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense
Forces (hereinafter referred to as “MOD/SDF”) will effectively and
efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capabilit ies based on the
following program guidelines.

1 The functions and capabilities required for the defense of Jap an are,
firstly, Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading
forces over long distances, thereby defending invasion itself. Japan
therefore will reinforce “stand-off defense capabilities” and “integrated
air and missile defense capabilities ”.
Secondly, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan
would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to
these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain
superiority across domains such as underwater, surface, and air. To this
end, Japan will reinforce “unmanned defense capabilities,” “cross-
domain operation capabilities,” and “command and control/intelligence
related functions”.
Lastly, Japan would also need to operate in a swift as well as persistent
manner so as to force the opponent to give up invasion. For this, Japan
will reinforce “mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection” and

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“sustainability and resiliency.”

Additionally, Japan will also place emphasis on the defense production
and technology base, characterized as virtually integral part of a defense
capability, as well as areas such as the human resource base that support s
our defense capability.

2 In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new,

high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement
of existing equipment, MOD/SDF will efficiently secure necessary and
sufficient quality and quantity of defense capability. In this regard,
MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its
equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development
activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness.
In addition, MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense
equipment deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from
a policy perspective of the areas that could directly affect the SDF's
current and future ways of warfare by incorporating advanced civilian
technologies.

3 In the face of Japan’s aging population with a declining birth rate, and
with no prospect of an increase in the number of recruits, MOD/SDF will
comprehensively promote various meas ures to reinforce human resource
base such as strengthening recruitment efforts, utilizing SDF Reserve
Personnel and others, promoting women’s participation, raising the
retirement age for uniformed SDF personnel, utilizing diverse and
distinguished personnel including retired uniformed SDF personnel ,
improving living and working environment, developing the human
resources, improving treatments, and supporting reemployment, etc.

4 To further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of Japan and the

United States in an integrated manner, Japan will promote cooperation,
etc. related to cross-domain operations, including space, cyber, and
electromagnetic domains. In addition, in order to reinforce the
infrastructure to support effective joint response capabilities in all phases,
Japan will reinforce efforts related to information security and
cybersecurity, as well as equipment and technology cooperation to

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promote information sharing between Japan and the United States. In

addition, measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan will
be steadily implemented.
In line with the vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), to
strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security operations,
Japan will further promote establishing policy frameworks such as
Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), Acquisition and Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA), General Security of (Milita ry) Information
Agreement (GSOMIA/GSOIA), and transfer of defense equipment and
technology agreement, while also promoting defense cooperation and
exchanges including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense
equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building, and
interchanges among military branches.

5 In fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will, while

adhering to scrap-and-build approach, optimize SDF’s organization and
authorized strength as well as equipment. We wi ll also further our
ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved
significant cost reductions. In addition, to account for Japan ’s aging
population with a declining birth rate, Japan will robustly promote
automation, labor-saving and optimization.

Ⅱ Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities

In order for Japan to buildup defense capabilities to the point at which
Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions
against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support
of its ally and others by FY 2027. Japan will place emphasis on
implementing the following major programs listed from 1 to 7 in
fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities .

1 Stand-Off Defense Capabilities

In order to reinforce capabilities to conduct diverse responses from
outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and landing forces
invading Japan, MOD/SDF will continue development and production
of the protot ype of upgraded Type -12 surface-to-ship missile
(develop surface-, ship-, and air-to-ship models), upgraded Hyper

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Velocit y Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles. MOD/SDF will

extend the ranges of its various missiles, such as by upgrading Hyper
Velocit y Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles. In order to
fundamentall y reinforce defense capabilit y as soon as possible,
MOD/SDF will procure mass-produced rounds for the above -
mentioned standoff missiles, and will also continue to steadil y
procure foreign -made stand -off missiles, such as U.S. -made
Tomahawks.
In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed research and development for
further diversifying launch platforms, and will develop and procure
vertical missile launch system (VLS) that can be equip ped on submarines
and a system that can be equipped on transport aircraft, aiming to
improve the operational capability of standoff missiles.
In order to ensure the effectiveness of stand -off defense capabilities,
MOD/SDF will enhance functions of information collection and analysis
as well as command and control by acquiring imagery intelligence, etc.
using satellite constellations and introducing unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) and target observation rounds, from the perspective of effective
collection of target information. Since the operation of these stand -off
missiles requires a series of command and control including the
collection of target information and the assignment of targets to each unit
to be conducted in a unified manner, a posture based on joint operation
will be established. In addition, a series of functions necessary for the
development and operation of stand-off missiles will be established by
building additional ammunition storage facilities for storing stand -off
missiles and other equipment, as well as facilities necessary for testing
and maintenance, including securing facilities that can be used for live -
firing.

2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

In order to enhance capabilities to detect and track threats such as
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV), MOD/SDF will procure and upgrade
ground-based warning and control radars (FPS) etc., as well as procure a
future warning and control radar. In addition, M OD/SDF will improve its
capability to respond to HGVs and other such weapons with interceptor
missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3 MSE) by upgrading the

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surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system and introducing a new

radar (LTAMDS).
In order to respond more effectively to various situations, MOD/SDF
will begin reviewing the organization and deployment of fire units and
establish a multi-layered air defense system in key areas together with
mid-range ground-to-air guided missile units, and conduct unit
operations for deployment from peacetime. MOD/SDF will also promote
the upgrade of base air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM). In addition,
research and studies will be conducted on a guided missile system which
is capable of responding to HGVs and other such weapons at the glide
phase.
In order to enhance the capability to respond to HGVs and other such
weapons, MOD/SDF will upgrade the Type 03 medium-range surface-
to-air guided missile (modified), and also procure missiles such as
interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM -3 Block IIA),
interceptors with upgraded capabilities (PAC -3MSE), and long -range
ship-to-air missiles (SM-6).
To achieve effective and efficient response through networking,
MOD/SDF will acquire a network system that enables fire control
network between destroyers and other vessels (FC network) and will
possess Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). In addition, by
modifying the information coordination central (ICC) of the surface -to-
air guided missile PATRIOT system, various guided missile systems will
be networked together.
To strengthen Japan's air defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will
procure Aegis S ystem Equipped Vessels that will primaril y conduct
BMD operations.
MOD/SDF will expeditiously develop capabilities to deal with small
unmanned aircraft, etc., by non-kinetic means through a combination of
directed energy weapons such as high-power lasers and high-power
microwaves (HPMs).
Counterstrike capabilities are SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-
off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack
against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles
and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan
to mount effective counterstrikes against the op ponent’s territory.

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Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense

and in accordance with the Three Conditions for Use of Force. O peration
of this counterstrike capability will be conducted under unified command
and control based on joint operations.

3 Unmanned Defense Capabilities

In order to accomplish missions while minimizing human loss, SDF will
expeditiously procure various types of unmanned assets, promoting
initiatives to optimize the existing equipment system and personnel
deployment. In procuring these assets, MOD/SDF will aim to secure both
safety and capability to effectively carry out our mission.
To conduct seamless intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
targeting (ISRT), SDF will procure long-endurance UAVs and ship-borne
unmanned assets that contribute to maritime surveillance, reconnaissan ce
UAVs that can continuously collect target information in the threat
envelope of an opponent, as well as a variety of unmanned assets for
ISRT. In addition, to implement rapid transport of supplies to widely
dispersed deployed units, remote bases, and na val vessels, MOD/SDF
will consider introducing transportation UAVs and take necessary
measures.
To disrupt and defeat an invasion against Japan, MOD/SDF will
procure utility/attack UAVs and miniature attack UAVs that effectively
retains various attack functions to enable itself to search and identify
personnel, vehicles, naval vessels from the air and quickly respond to
targets.
MOD/SDF will develop and procure unmanned surface vehicles
(USVs) that can be linked to naval vessels and effectively conduct
various operational maneuvers. Various types of unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) will also be developed to gain underwater superiority.
In addition, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and UAVs will be
effectively combined to improve the efficiency of secur ity and protection
systems at garrisons, bases, and critical facilities. MOD/SDF will also
enhance collaboration between manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as
strengthen its ability to operate multiple unmanned assets simultaneously.

4 Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities

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(1) Capabilities in the Space Domain

In order to improve cross-domain capabilities, including the
operation of stand-off missiles, various capabilities such as
information gathering and communications utilizing the space domain
will be further improved. Specifically, MOD/SDF will establish
satellite constellation to improve the detection and tracking of target,
with enhancing Japan-U.S. cooperation and using images from
commercial satellites as supplementary endeavors. In addition,
MOD/SDF will conduct required technological demonstrations to
improve capabilities such as detection and tracking of HGVs using
satellites, considering the possibility of cooperation with the U .S.
Furthermore, in order to cope with the increasing demand for satellite
communications, MOD/SDF will make efforts to establish multiple
layers of communication band with higher resiliency in addition to the
conventional X-band communications.
In response to the space domain, SDF will further enhance
capability to disrupt C4I and other capabilities of opponent. In
addition, in order to enhance the capability for Space Domain
Awareness (SDA), MOD/SDF will promote various efforts, including
the development of SDA satellites scheduled for launch in FY2026, as
well as further studies on the operation of multiple SDA satellites.
Furthermore, in order to enhance the resilience of Jap an's space system
including satellites, MOD/SDF will promote the use of multiple
positioning signals including Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS)
and commercial satellites, and start development and demonstration of
technology related to resilience of satellite communication.
Regarding cooperation with other countries, in addition to
promoting information sharing with the U.S. and other countries on
SDA, MOD/SDF will strengthen cooperation such as multilateral
shared use of communication waves with high resiliency.
In order to strengthen the organizational structure and human
resource base for the space domain, MOD/SDF will engage with
relevant organizations such as JAXA, as well as allied and like-minded
countries such as the U.S. to secure necessar y human resources for
space, such as by establishing a framework to effectively utilize
knowledge and experience on space gained among relevant ministries.

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(2) Capabilities in the Cyber Domain

In line with the government-wide cybersecurity policy which will
be comprehensively coordinated in a centralized manner, MOD/SDF
will enhance its cybersecurity capability, while also promot ing
initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with relevant
ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure providers, and defense
industry. MOD/SDF will establish a posture to secure command and
control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems, to assure
SDF’s ability to perform its mission, and to support the cyber defense
of the defense industry even under cyberattacks.
Therefore, considering the latest cyber threat situation, capability
of MOD/SDF in the cyber domain will be strengthened, based on an
assumption that there is no longer safe net work, transitioning from
the traditional idea that perimeter security is sufficient to maintain
the network safety. Introducing security functions based on the "Zero
Trust" concept will be considered. "Risk Management Framework
(RMF)" based on a mindset that manages risks continuously, by
analyzing, assessing and appropriately managing risks continuously
after introduction of information systems, will be introduced.
Protection posture of equipment systems and facility infrastructure
systems will be strengthened. Based on an assumption that threats
may have already intruded into our network, cyber threat hunting
capability will be improved to detect the threats early. In addition,
efforts will be made to support strengthening cybersecurity measures
for defense industry, etc.
In order to strengthen the cybersecurity posture of MOD/SDF,
MOD/SDF will reorganize the GSDF Signal School into the GSDF
System and Signal/Cyber School to expand the educational
infrastructure to train cyber personnel. Furthermore, eff orts to
develop capability to disrupt opponent ’s use of cyberspace for an
attack against Japan, will be strengthened.
In order to strengthen the capability to implement these initiatives
as an organization as a whole, the number of cyber personnel
belonging to cyber-related units such as the SDF Cyber Defense
Command will be expanded to approximately 4,000 by the end of FY

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2027, and MOD/SDF will provide training to its personnel engaged

in cyber-related tasks such as system procurement, maintenance, and
operations. In addition to the increase of cyber personnel belonging
to cyber-related units, these efforts will bring the total number of
MOD/SDF cyber personnel to approximately 20,000 by around
FY2027. Further reinforcement of cyber defense architecture is
intended in the future.

(3) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain

Along with reinforcing SDF’s communication and radar jamming
capabilities, MOD/SDF will strengthen electronic warfare capabilities
by enhancing ability to detect and identify electr omagnetic waves and
acquiring means of deception using electromagnetic waves. In addition,
MOD/SDF will expand its use of electromagnetic waves to take
countermeasures against small UAVs using lasers and other means.
Furthermore, MOD/SDF will reinforce ele ctromagnetic domain
management functions which reasonably manage and coordinate
SDF’s use of electromagnetic waves.
To this end, MOD/SDF will make the following efforts: Procurement
of network electronic warfare system (NEWS) with communication
and radar jamming capabilities, development of stand -off electronic
warfare aircraft to jam communications and other functions from
outside of their threat envelope and stand-in jammers to use various
types of electronic jamming within the threat envelope; Improvement
of signal detection and identification capabilities of naval vessels and
fixed-wing patrol aircraft by installing radio wave detection
equipment; development of anti-aircraft electronic warfare equipment
to jam radar from ground. Furthermore, MOD/SDF wil l verify the
provision of jamming capabilities to fixed-wing patrol aircraft and
take measures as necessary. In addition, MOD/SDF will start operation
of vehicle-mounted laser devices for responding to small UAVs and
take measures for early deployment of d irected energy technologies
such as high-power laser systems and high-power microwaves (HPM).
Along with adding the functions to monitor and manage the use of
electromagnetic domain in each SDF system, MOD/SDF will work
closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure SDF’s use

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of spectrum necessary for its activities.

(4) Capabilities in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains

MOD/SDF will accelerate the acquisition of equipment, etc. and
capability improvement, etc. in each of the SDF services, and
strengthen capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains that
form the basis of cross-domain operations. MOD/SDF will actively
utilize advanced technology to steadily upgrade equipment, etc. in each
of the SDF services, and enhance advanced operational capabilities to
collaborate with unmanned assets.

5 Command-and-Control and Intelligence-related Functions

(1) Enhancing Command-and-Control Functions
In order to ensure a swift and reliable command and control,
MOD/SDF will establish resilient communications, system network,
and data infrastructure, establish a real-time command and control
posture, conduct studies on command and control capabilities that
enables unified command of each SDF service, and take measures as
necessary.
To this end, MOD/SDF will develop a cloud as a common
infrastructure to reinforce information sharing function for cross -
domain operations; upgrade the SDF central command system to
strengthen the command and control function and its connection with
related ministries and agencies; procure a future command and control
system to strengthen GSDF’s autonomous operational capability;
upgrade the command and control system to further speed up the
decision-making cycle in the MSDF; upgrade Japan Aerospace Defense
Ground environment (JADGE) to strengthen the resilience of the
command and control function in the ASDF; and enhance the mobility
and flexibility of command and control function ; procure a space
operation command and control system which centrally commands and
controls the operation of space-related equipment and reinforce
resilience of the satellite use. Additionally, MOD/SDF will enhance the
Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) necessary for sharing those
information.

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(2) Enhancing Information Gathering and Analysis Functions

MOD/SDF will establish a seamless intelligence gathering and
analysis scheme by persistently collecting information on military
trends in the vicinity of Japan and fundamentally reinforcing our
capability and posture to process, analyze, and disseminate such
information, as well as establish a posture that can promptly provide
information that contributes to policy decisions and SDF unit
operations. In addition, MOD/SDF will examine the ideal state of
information sharing with U.S. forces and joint operations for
unmanned assets, and take necessary measures.
To this end, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), which
plays a central role in intelligence functions for the defense of Japan,
will strengthen the capabilities of each function, such as signal,
imagery, human, and open-source intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT,
HUMINT, and OSINT), while expanding the training base for
analysts, etc., enhancing the system for intelligence collection and
analysis, including the utilization of geospatial intelligence
(GEOINT), and augmenting its defense attaché system. The SDF will
build a satellite constellation for acquiring target detection and
tracking capabilities, which will be complemented by various
initiatives such as the strengthening of cooperation with the United
States and the use of commercial satellites, as well as the
strengthening of information gathering capabilities from space
domain using information-gathering satellites and commercial
satellites. In addition, various types of UAVs, etc. that are
indispensable for effective ISR implementation will be procured.

(3) Responses to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the

Cognitive Dimension
In the international community, emphasis is being placed on
information warfare, which is an attempt to create a favorable security
environment by influencing the public opinion and decision-making of
other countries through disinformation and strategic communications,
etc., and minimizing the impact to one's own decision -making, even
when conflict has yet to arise. MOD/SDF will establish a system and
posture that ensures the capability to cope with information warfare.

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To this end, the DIH, which plays a central role in responding to

integrated information warfare, will strengthen the system for
information collection, analysis, and communication. In addition, the
following functions will be developed: automatic collection and
analysis of open-source information using artificial intelligence (AI),
which will enable continuous collection and analysis of information
on trends in each country; automatic collection of information on
social networking sites, etc., to determine the authenticity of
information communicated by each country; and future forecasting
functions for estimating the security situation.

6 Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection

In order to secure capabilities for swift and reliable transportation
of necessary units to defeat the invasion of islands to the southwest
region, MOD/SDF will procure various transportation assets such as
transport ships (LSVs, LCUs and maneuverable boats), transport
aircraft (C-2), aerial refueling/ transport aircraft (KC -46A, etc.), and
transport/ utility helicopters (CH-47J/JA, UH-2). In addition,
MOD/SDF will secure additional private finance initiative (PFI)
vessels specialized for mass transportation of vehicles and containe rs
to supplement the maritime transportation capability.
To enhance self-sufficiency in transportation to southwestern
regions, MOD/SDF will procure transportation vehicles (container
trailers) and cargo handling equipment (large cranes and large
forklifts). In addition, MOD/SDF will conduct research and
development of a landing support system to improve the efficiency of
transportation toward islands where the size of seaports is limited. At
the same time, MOD/SDF will make efforts to reduce transport ation
needs by stockpiling supplies in the southwestern region.
In addition, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the SDF's mobile
deployment and civil protection, the government as a whole will work
on measures to develop and strengthen airports and seaports, and
others, particularly in the southwestern region, and take necessary
measures to enable SDF to use facilities such as existing airports and
seaports, as operational infrastructure. Furthermore, the government as
a whole will deepen collaboration with relevant organizations

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regarding the expansion of the use of civilian vessels and aircraft for
SDF’s maneuver and deployment, and coordinate and cooperate to
systematically implement civil protection measures employing various
transport assets of the SDF, in addition to civilian vessels and aircraft.
In doing so, the government as a whole will strengthen civil protection
training for armed attack situations as well as secure various
evacuation facilities. In addition, MOD/SDF wi ll promote various
measures such as reinforcing SDF units capable of also responding to
civil protection, and utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

(1) Procurement of Various Ammunitions
Procure required quantities of vari ous ammunitions, including
standoff missiles such as the Type 12 surface -to-ship guided missile,
interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM -3 Block IIA),
interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), long-
range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6), and Type 03 medium-range surface-
to-air guided missile (modified) promptly. In order to mass-produce
ammunitions quickly and stably, MOD/SDF will encourage the defense
industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity. Furthermore,
MOD/SDF will strengthen maintenance posture for the various
ammunitions.
In addition, in order to meet the increasing storage requirements
for ammunitions, MOD/SDF will promote the expansion of
ammunition storage facilities and the disposal of unused ammunition s.

(2) Securing fuel, etc.

MOD/SDF will secure necessary amount of fuel for SDF operations.
In addition, in order to secure fuel requirements quickly and stably,
MOD/SDF will build new fuel tanks while also renting private fuel
tanks. In addition, MOD/SDF will secure necessary quantities of food
and clothing.

(3) Improving the Operational Availability of Defense Equipment

By securing necessary budget for maintenance and material, with
lead time in consideration, while dealing with the increasingly

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sophistication and complexity of defense equipment, MOD/SDF will

eliminate the number of non-mission capable equipment caused by
material shortage and maximize the number of operationally available
equipment by FY 2027. To this end, the supply warehouse will be
renovated to improve the precision of supply and demand forecasts and
to shorten the time it takes for units to receive parts. In increasing the
number of operationally available units, MOD/SDF will promote the
outsourcing of maintenance and other operations to outside parties in
order to make effective use of limited resources. In addition,
MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of digital transformation
(DX) in the logistics support field to optimize maintenan ce and upkeep.
In addition, MOD/SDF will expand comprehensive contracts,
including Performance Based Logistics (PBL) where outcomes are
acquired through performance-based arrangements that will deliver
SDF’s requirements in maintenance.

(4) Facility Improvement

In conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition,
including standoff missiles, SDF will secure necessary ammunition
storage facilities. In securing the ammunition storage facilities, SDF
will pursue and promote efficient joint operations among the SDF
services, joint use of U.S. ammunition storage facilities, and dispersed
deployment to islands from the viewpoint of ensuring the resiliency of
the ammunition.
In order to protect major equipment and command posts, etc., and
ensure a tenacious fighting posture, MOD/SDF will establish
underground basing, reinforce facilities, take electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) measures for command posts, construct dispersal pads for
fighter aircraft, build hardened alert shelters, and establish redund ant
utility infrastructures. In addition, the base security function will be
strengthened while reducing the number of personnel.
In addition, MOD/SDF will develop facilities to enable efficient
operation of new equipment such as unmanned assets.
When renovating existing facilities, protective measures against
explosives, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons,
electromagnetic waves, and guerrilla attacks shall be provided.

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Structural reinforcement of facilities in accordance with their

functions and importance, and relocation and consolidation of
facilities to ensure stand-off distance shall also be implemented.
In order to prevent the functional decline of SDF facilities in the
event of large-scale disaster, MOD/SDF will promote countermeasures
against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that
are expected to be damaged significantly and are important for
operations. In the future, SDF will improve the resiliency of defense
facilities and infrastructure in bases and camps in order to adapt and
respond to various challenges associated with climate change, and to
fulfill SDF’s missions and roles.
MOD/SDF will smoothly execute facility improvements in a focused
manner over a five-year period, while utilizing the knowledge of
relevant ministries and agencies as well as private sector.

III Organization of Japan Self-Defense Forces

Based on the program guidelines, the structures of each SDF services
shall be developed as described in 1 through 5.

1 Joint Operation Structure

(1) A Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established in order to build
a system capable of seamlessl y conducting cross -domain operations
at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of
strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among each SDF
services. In this regard, in light of the rapidl y increasing severit y of
the securit y environment surrounding Japan, MOD/SDF will make
every effort to pursue the establishment of a Permanent Joint
Headquarters as soon as possible and, upon the new establishment of
the Permanent Joint Headquarters, SDF will examine h ow each unit,
including joint units, should be structured.
(2) For further improvement of capabilities in the cyber domain,
including constant and continuous monitoring of MOD/SDF's
network and systems as well as the capabilit y to disrupt opponent ’s
use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, SDF will possess a
cyber defense unit as a joint unit, in order to fundamentall y reinforce
cyber defense capability.

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(3) In addition, a new maritime transport unit will be established as a

joint unit to improve the mobile deployment capabilities to the
southwestern region.

2 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capabilit y to Possess
(a) Regarding the basic operational units, the 15th Brigade will be
reorganized into a division in order to strengthen the defense
architecture in the southwestern region. The other eight divisions,
five brigades, and one armored division will be operated on the
basis of rapid deployment in order to deter and respond
immediatel y to various situations effectivel y and rapidl y. In
addition, units with specialized functions such as airborne units,
amphibious rapid deployment units and air rapid deployment units
will be also operated on the basis of rapid deployment.
In this regard, based on a favorable training envir onment, one
division, two brigades, and one armored division that maintain a
high level of proficiency will be placed in Hokkaido on the premise
that they will be deployed and transported rapidl y by the integrated
transport capabilit y.
As a premise for the above measures, GSDF will thoroughly
ensure optimizing organizational capacit y, and will consider how to
structure the posture in the mid- and long-term span.
(b) In order to strengthen stand -off defense capabilities, surface -to-
ship missile units equippe d with upgraded Type 12 surface -to-ship
missiles will be retained. Furthermore, units equipped with Hyper
Velocit y Gliding Projectile, and a long -range guided missile unit
equipped with upgraded Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and
hypersonic missiles wil l be newl y established.
(c) In order to protect important bases, etc. from various airborne
threats, surface-to-air missile units equipped with upgraded Type 03
medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles (modified) will be
retained.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units.

(a) In order to strengthen cross -domain capabilities, GSDF will newl y

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establish a new anti -aircraft, and the electronic warfare unit and
reinforce the electronic warfare unit on islands. Furthermore, a new
multi-purpose unmanned aerial ve hicle unit that retains information
gathering and attack capabilities, etc., will be established. In
addition, a new unit will be established to ensure advantages in
information warfare, including in the cognitive d imension, in
coordination with cyber and electronic warfare.

(b) In order to strengthen sustainabilit y and resilienc y, the logistics

support system will be strengthened by establishing a new branch
depot in the southwestern region, and reorganizing the Ground
Material Control Command to centrall y operate each logistic depot.

(c) In order to secure the increased personnel necessary to strengthen

stand-off defense capabilities, cyber capabilities, etc., MOD/SDF
will abolish units mainl y composed of the SDF Read y Reserve
Personnel , and allocate the regular uniformed SDF personnel
belonging to the units to fulfill the personnel requirements. In
addition, MOD/SDF will manage SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as
replacement s.

3 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capabilit y to Possess
(a) To conduct persistent and multilayered information gathering
and surveillance in the waters around Japan in peace time, MSDF
will possess surface units strengthened by the introduction of
patrol vessels and other vessels so that it can persiste ntl y respond
to an increasing volume of activities, such as ensuring security of
maritime traffic, which is the foundation of stable economic
activities, and conducting overseas deployment for securit y
cooperation with other countries. And in a contingency, in order
to secure Japan's territory and the waters around Japan and to
ensure securit y of maritime traffic, MSDF will possess
strengthened and increased destroyer units and minesweeper units,
as well as strengthened patrol helicopter units to enable eff ective
and sustained execution of various operations such as anti -

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submarine warfare, anti -surface warfare, and anti -mine warfare. In

addition, MSDF will procure Aegis S ystem Equipped Vessels that
will primaril y conduct BMD operations

(b) To conduct inform ation gathering and surveillance in the waters

around Japan continuousl y in peace time, and to gain and maintain
underwater supremacy, a critical area for cross -domain operations,
during contingency, MSDF will possess strengthened submarine
units.

(c) To conduct persistent and multi -layered information gathering

and surveillance in the waters around Japan in peace time, and to
conduct various operations including reconnaissance, targeting,
and anti -submarine warfare in a contingency, MSDF will possess
strengthened fixed -wing patrol aircraft units.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units

(a) To enhance the capabilit y of responding to integrated information
warfare, including the cognitive d imension, and to develop a
posture to enable swift decision -making, MSDF will conduct
necessary research and development. In addition, MSDF will
newl y establish an Information Warfare major unit to carry out
comprehensive information warfare through consolidating units
with intelligence, cyber, communications, meteorology and
oceanography functions.

(b) To establish a multilayered surveillance posture, to secure

underwater and maritime superiorit y, and to reduce loss of human
resources, MSDF will introduce various unmanned assets, such as
UAVs, USVs including the use of ex isting manned vessels, and UUV,
as well as newl y establishing unmanned asset units.

(c) MSDF will establish a system that can sustainabl y carry out unit
operations that require a high level of speed and volume of
activities, under the joint operation syst em, through reorganizing
the structure of the major units and establishing new units as

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necessary.

(d) MSDF will improve the capabilit y of Self -Defense Fleet

Headquarters, etc. responsible for the operation of the Joint Task
Force, to improve warfare sust ainabilit y. In addition, MSDF will
initiate a review of logistics posture and take necessary measures
to ensure the sustainabilit y and robustness of MSDF.

(e) Destroyers and Frigates (DDG, DD, FFM), and other vessels will
be equipped with stand -off missil es, such as upgraded Type -12
surface-to-ship missile.

(f) In addition to (e) above, to gain underwater supremacy, MSDF will

develop a submarine (SS) equipped with Vertical Launching S ystem
(VLS) with the aim of acquiring stand -off missiles carrying
submarines.

(g) MSDF will decommission vessels that have been in service for a
considerable amount of years and have limitations in expandability,
etc., and increase the number of labor-saving frigate (FFM), etc., at
an earl y date. In addition, in order to enable diverse operations such
as distributed maneuver operations, MSDF will increase the number
of air defense destroyers and improve the air defense and electronic
warfare capabilities of destroyers and frigates (DDG, DD, and FFM).
Furthermore, to enhanc e mine warfare capabilities, the number of
minesweepers that control unmanned minesweeping assets will be
increased, and the number of replenishment ships will be increased
to strengthen logistical support capabilities on the sea. In addition,
in order to respond to air attacks in a contingency, etc., the
modification of destroyers ("Izumo" t ype) will be promoted to
enable the operation of fighter aircraft (F -35B).

(h) MSDF will procure fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P -1) with

enhanced capabilit y and patrol h elicopter (SH-60K (upgraded
version)), and improve the electronic warfare, anti -ship attack,
and other capabilities of fixed -wing patrol aircraft.

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4 Japan Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capabilit y to Possess
(a) ASDF will possess a warning and control unit equipped with a
grounded-based warning and control radar to conduct persistent
warning and surveillance of the airspace around Japan including
the vast airspace over the Pacific Ocean, as well as to detect and
track new airborne threats such as HGV s in addition to ballistic
missiles fl ying toward Japan. In addition, ASDF will possess
airborne warning and control unit s consisting of reinforced
airborne warning units to effectivel y monitor and control the
airspace around Japan for a longer period of time in times of
heightened tensions such as the so -called gray-zone situations.

(b) The ASDF will possess a greatl y enhanced fighter aircraft unit
in terms of both qualit y and quantit y, where fighter aircraft and
their supporting functions can work in unison to provide a
comprehensive posture for Japan's air defense and other operations.
In addition, to ensure fighter units can continue to fight
tenaciousl y in various air operations of increasing intensit y in the
airspace around J apan, etc., ASDF will possess an enhanced aerial
refueling/transportation unit and air rescue unit.

(c). ASDF will possess an enhanced air transport unit to effectivel y

conduct mobile deployment of troops, etc. and international peace
cooperation activiti es, etc.

(d) In addition to coordinating with the GSDF's surface -to-air

missile units in conducting air defense in critical areas, ASDF will
possess an enhanced fire unit to respond to increasingl y diverse
and complex airborne threats, with the capabilit y to respond in the
terminal phase, providing multi -layered protection to Japan from
ballistic missile attacks.

(e) ASDF will possess a specialized space domain unit with

enhanced SDA capabilities to ensure the stable use of space.

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(f) ASDF will possess an unmanned aircraft unit to collect

information in areas relativel y remote from Japan and to conduct
persistent surveillance in the air when the situation becomes tense.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units.

(a) In order to further refine and strengthen the qualit y and quantit y
of Japan's air capabilit y, ASDF will accelerate the pace of
replacement of fighter aircraft that are not suitable for
modernization (F-15) with fighter aircraft (F -35A and F-35B). In
addition, ASDF will continue to upgrade capabilities for
modernized fighter aircraft (F -15), such as improving its
electronic warfare capability, equipping stand -off missiles, and
increasing the number of equipped missiles. Furthermore, with
regard to fighte r aircraft (F-2), from the viewpoint of
strengthening stand -off defense capability, upgrade program will
be promoted for a total of two squadrons for them to carry
upgraded Type 12 surface -to-ship missile, etc. In addition, ASD F
will conduct necessary stud ies by FY2027, and take necessary
measures in order to further advance the quantitative
enhancement of air capabilit y. In this regard, studies on the
possibilit y of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be
conducted.

(b) Joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft with

the UK and Ital y will be promoted, while ensuring freedom of
modification and interoperabilit y with the allied countr y, so that
by the end of FY 2035, when fighter aircraft (F -2) are expected
to start retiring, fighter aircraft capable of securing and
maintaining air superiorit y in the future can be delivered. In
addition to the fighter aircraft itself, development of system s
including unmanned aerial vehicles, etc., will be undertaken with
the possibilit y of international collaboration in sight .

(c) Furthermore, for the sake of efficient training of pilots of

cutting-edge fighter aircraft such as the F -35 and next-generation

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fighter aircraft, ASDF will take necessary measures after

studying the ideal education system, including the integration of
ground training and flight training by training aircraft as one
education system.

(d) In order to continue the battle tenaciousl y, a system for rapid

development of deployment infrastructure, etc. will be
established so that m obile and dispersed operations can be
carried out at various locations. In addition, necessary studies
will be conducted on operational concepts of air capabilit y so
that air capabilit y can be flexibl y concentrated and directed to
the front of the aggressi on of Japan.

(e) In order to respond to high -intensit y air operations and from

the viewpoint of persistent combat, the aerial refueling and
transport aircraft (KC -46A, etc.) will be increased in order to
strengthen the aerial refueling function and rescue aircraft (UH-
60J) will be replaced . In addition, in order to strengthen the air
defense posture in the airspace around Japan, including the vast
airspace over the Pacific, ASDF will promote the deployment of
mobile warning and control radars, etc., on the islands on the
Pacific side, as well as increase airborne earl y warning aircraft
(E-2D). In order to implement rapid maneuvering deployment of
ground units, etc., ASDF will procure transport aircraft (C -2).

(f) In order to improve the operational capabil it y of stand -off

missiles, ASDF will introduce unmanned aerial vehicles that can
persistentl y collect target information inside the opponent's
threat envelope, and new operational intelligence units will be
established to strengthen the intelligence functi on necessary for
the execution of the unit's mission.

(g) ASDF will continue to upgrade the capabilities of surface -to-

air missile PATRIOT system and others in order to respond to
increasingl y diverse and complex airborne threats.

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(h) In order to strengthen the space operation capability,

development of SDA posture will be promoted steadil y, and a
new specialized space domain missions unit commanded by a
general will be established, and the "Air Self -Defense Force" will
be renamed to "Air and Space Self-Defense Force".

5 Optimizing Organizational Capacit y

The number of SDF personnel in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will be
reviewed as necessary to optimize organizational capacity, targeting the
level at the end of FY2022. In addition, the capacity neces sary to
strengthen the joint operation system will be transferred from each SDF,
and GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF, to meet the
increased personnel requirements of MSDF and ASDF. To this end,
approximately 2,000 GSDF personnel will be transferred to joint unit,
MSDF and ASDF, respectively.
During the period of this plan, necessary measures will be taken to
secure the necessary number of personnel without increasing the total
number of SDF personnel.

IV Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
In order to further reinforce deterrence capabilities of Japan and the
United States in an integrated manner, Japan will establish a posture to work
together with the United States on a regular basi s and promote cooperation
with the United States in cross-domain operations including space, cyber
and electromagnetic domain and measures to improve interoperability,
cooperation in the use of Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, air-defense,
anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious
operations, airborne operations, ISRT, protection of assets and facilities,
and logistic support. In addition, Japan will improve its responsive
capabilities, including the readiness and interope rability of the Alliance,
through more advanced and practical exercises and training.
In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such
attempts and occurrence of various situations, Japan will further expand and
deepen joint Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and will on a regular basis increase

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joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, and promote mutual

deployment of both units to their respective facilities for training or other
purposes. In addition, Japan will further develop coordination functions
between Japan and the United States, and will realize closer operational
coordination with like-minded countries and others with the Japan -U.S.
Alliance as its core.
In order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint responses
in all phases, Japan will reinforce measures related to information security
and cybersecurity for facilitating information sharing between Japan and
the United States, and will further enhance defense equipment and
technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting -
edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment,
improvement in mutual interchangeability, sharing and reinforcing of
various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capabilit y of
U.S. military equipment in Japan, and reinforcement of suppl y-chain.

2 Steady Implementation of Measures to Support the Stationing of U.S.

Forces in Japan
From the perspective of not only supporting the stable presence of U.S.
Forces in Japan but also strengthening deterrence and response capabilities
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will steadily secure funding for expenses
related to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, including Host Nation
Support.

V. Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others

While guided by the vision of Free and Open Indo -Pacific (FOIP), Japan
will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and
exchanges based on the recognition that creating a security environment
that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and essential initiative
that contributes to Japan’s defense itself and also relates to its basic
foundations. In particular, considering the policy on collaboration with like -
minded countries and others indicated in the National Defense Strategy, in
addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues, service-to-service
exchanges and personnel exchanges such as liaison officers, Japan will
appropriately combine, depending on characteristics of each SDF services,
and strategically implement specific in itiatives taking into account

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characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country, such as

strategic port calls and air visits, bilateral/multilateral training and
exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building ,
and International Peace Cooperation Activities, in order to improve
interoperability among SDF and armed forces of like -minded countries and
to strengthen Japan's presence.
Based on such significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in
order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and
thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of
operation procedures, development of organizational systems, review of
institutions including treatment, and establishment of infrastructu re such as
hotlines between countries including secure communications, and will
further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF
operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and
agencies as well as with other countries, nongovernmental organizations
and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan ’s
initiatives. In doing so, Japan will particularly emphasize the following.

1 Bilateral/Multilateral Training and Exercises

Taking their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges into
account, Japan will promote bilateral/multilateral training and exercises
including logistics cooperation. Through this, Japan will demonstrate the
intention and capability to create a desirable security environment and
will also seek to improve interoperability with like -minded countries and
strengthen cooperative relationships with them.

2 Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Considering that cooperation in defense equipment is an initiative that
spans more than half a century from conception to retirement, Japan will
strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation
including overseas transfers of defense equipment and international joint
development and strive to enhance our partners ’ military capabilities and
strengthen mid- and long-term relationships with those countries. In
particular, these initiatives should be combined with other efforts such
as defense cooperation and exchange, trainin g and exercises, and
capacity-building to be promoted effectively. In this regard, Japan will

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consider the transfer of equipment that has reached a considerable

number of years in service and has limited expandability to like -minded
countries through early decommissioning or early removal from service.

3 Capacity Building
Japan will further strengthen its efforts of capacity-building to armed
forces and others of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, aiming to create
a desirable security environment for Japan, while promoting the
strengthening of relations with the countries to be assisted. In this regard,
Japan will coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and work
together with its ally and like-minded countries such as the United States
and Australia, so as to maximize results. In addition to those for
Southeast Asian countries, capacity-building for Pacific Island countries
will be expanded

Ⅵ Elements Supporting Defense Capabilities

1 Training and Exercises
To effectivel y respond to various contin gencies and enhance the
deterrence effectiveness, MOD/SDF will conduct bilateral and
multilateral training and exercises with Australia, India, and European
and Southeast Asian countries in addition to SDF’s joint training and
exercises and Japan -U.S. bilateral training and exercises, in a planned
and visible way to demonstrate Japan’s intention and capabilit y that
unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts will not
be tolerated. In doing so, MOD/SDF will seek to enhance and strengthen
training and exercises as FDO which are flexibl y implemented
according to the situation, as well as enhance the content of training
and conduct new training utilizing favorable training environments
overseas, based on the development of Reciprocal Access Agreement
(RAA) and other measures.
In addition, to maximize the capabilities of SDF units in a
contingency, MOD/SDF will expand the establishment and utilization
of training areas and other facilities in Hokkaido and other areas in
Japan, and steadil y establish and enhance the necessary training
infrastructure in Japan. In addition to expanding the joint /shared use of
U.S. military facilities and areas by SDF and the use of civili an airport

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and seaport facilities, MOD/SDF will enhance training for rapid

deployment of its units to islands such as those in the southwest ern
region, joint training , and civil protection training, etc., with relevant
organizations such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, fire fighting
services and local governments to appropriatel y respond to
infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside as well
as armed attacks in the vicinit y of remote islands .
In order to expand such training, it is necessary to obtain the
understanding and cooperation of related local governments and local
residents. Therefore, while taking all possible measures to ensure the
safet y of training, MOD/SDF will give due considerat ion to the
surrounding environment s of training infrastructures, including training
ranges in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan.

2 Reinforcing Coordination and Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

In order to appropriatel y respond to any t ypes of contingencies,
coordination and cooperation with Japan Coast Guard will be further
strengthened. To this end, MOD/SDF will deepen the information
sharing and coordination mechanism with Japan Coast Guard, a s well as
enhance various response procedures and training, including developing
procedures to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast
Guard in an armed attack situation and conducting joint training .

3 Collaboration with Local Communities

To enable S DF and U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessl y and effectivel y
conduct activities on a dail y basis, Japan will strive to gain
understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents
around their facilities.
Japan will activel y engage in public relat ions activities regarding the
policies and activities of MOD/SDF and also the role of U.S. Forces in
Japan on a regular basis, and coordinat e to accommodate the requests
and situations of the local communities, while fulfilling accountabilit y.
At the same time, Japan will continue to promote measures to improve
the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those
against noise the perspective of promoting cooperation to the defense
of Japan.

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In addition, in light of the fact that in some regions, the very

existence of SDF units contribute greatl y to the maintenance and
revitalization of local communities, and the transportation of emergency
patients by SDF support the local medical service, MOD/SDF will give
due consideration to the characteristics of the regions and the
contribution to the local econom y in order to gain understanding of the
local governments and residents upon reorganization of units as well as
placement and operation of SDF camps and bases. In addition, based on
the national government's policy on contracts concerning small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), MOD/SDF will promote various
measures that contribute to local econom ies, such as securing
opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders, while also taking
efficiency into consideration.

4 Reinforcing Policy-Making Functions

In order for SDF to full y exert its capabilities and response to the
increasingl y severe, complex, and rapid -paced strategic environment,
strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required
including such domains as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum
and MOD/SDF will fundamentall y reinforce its functions. In this regard,
MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain poli cy
advice from experts. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to
comprehensivel y advance future way of “warfare” for SDF and how to
utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies as well as appl y those
technology to defense necessary for this from a strategic perspective,
while closel y cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private
research institutions, and private companies particularly defense
industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such effort s and
support the formulation of policies, MOD/SDF will review and reinforce
its research system led by National Institute for Defense Studies and
reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.
In addition, MOD/SDF will contribute promoti ng securit y education
by dispatching lecturers to educational institutions and enhancing
public symposiums, etc., so that citizens can accuratel y recognize
knowledge and information on securit y policy. MOD/SDF will also
promote various measures to further utilize social networks, which are

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becoming increasingl y diverse, and to enhance our abilit y to

disseminate information, including in foreign languages. In addition, in
order to further strengthen the research and education functions of
MOD/SDF, centering on National Ins titute for Defense Studies,
MOD/SDF will expand networks and organizational collaboration with
domestic and foreign research and education institutions, universities,
think tanks, and other organizations.

Ⅶ Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and

Measures for International Security Cooperation
1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters
In the event of various t ypes of disasters including natural disasters
such as the Nankai Trough Earthquake, nuclear disasters, and other
special dis asters, MOD/SDF will take all possible measures to ensure
initial response promptl y by transferring and deploying units of
sufficient scale, while maintaining joint operations as the basis of its
operations.
At the same time, measures will be taken to stre ngthen the response
posture, such as the procurement of UAVs(near -field), helicopter
satellite communication systems (helicopter SATs), lifesaving systems,
and emergency power supplies.
In addition, in close coordination and cooperation with related
ministries and agencies, local governments, and the private sectors,
MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as conducting various
training and exercises, formulating plans, and securing alternative
functions and deployment infrastructure in the event of a di saster.
Furthermore, including in areas where many nuclear power plants are
located, MOD/SDF will conduct training in cooperation with related
organizations, verify coordination procedures, and take necessary
measures after examining such issues as securin g deployment
infrastructure in the vicinit y of nuclear power plants.

2 Measures for Maritime Security and Use of the Airspace based on Existing
International Rules
Recognizing that open and stable seas and the use of the airspace
based on existing interna tional rules are the foundation of peace and

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prosperit y of Japan as a maritime nation, and based on the vision of a

FOIP, MOD/SDF will promote efforts such as port calls by naval vessels
and aircraft on various occasions with other countries that share
awareness of maritime securit y and the use of airspace based on existing
rules such as through joint training and exercises, equipment and
technologies cooperation, capacit y building and information sharing. In
this way, MOD/SDF will activel y and visibl y demo nstrate our
willingness and capabilit y for the stability of the maritime order and
the use of the airspace based on existing international rules.

3 International Peace Cooperation Activities

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Securit y, Japan will
continue to promote international peace cooperation activities, while
giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of
mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations
between Japan and host countr ies. In particular, by making good use of
accumulated experiences , Japan will activel y promote activities such as
dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, capacit y
building related to UN PKO such as the UN Triangu lar Partnership
Program (TPP), and the dispatch of staff members to UN headquarters,
etc., in order to contribute to the improvement of the securit y
environment. In addition, in order to strengthen the systems concerning
international activities including rescue or transportation of Japanese
nationals overseas in the unstable international situation, the Central
Readiness Regiment and the International Operations Training Unit will
be integrated to form a new international operations force with high
readiness and high technical capabilities in the field of facilities and
unmanned aircraft operation, etc.
MOD/SDF will expand curriculum of t he Japan Peacekeeping
Training and Research Center, and given the importance of cooperation
with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non -
governmental organizations , MOD/SDF will strengthen the cooperation
with them through efforts such as providing educational opportunities
to not onl y SDF personnel but also other personnel from various
backgrounds.
Regarding the SDF's operation facilit y in Djibouti for counter-piracy

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operations, MOD/SDF will promote renewal/upgrade to ensure its long -

term and stable utilization for regional securit y cooperation, including
the protection and transportation of Japanese na tionals abroad in the
Middle East and Africa.

Ⅷ New Measures for Early Deployment of Defense Equipment

MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment
deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from a policy
perspective of the areas that could directly affect the SDF ’s current and
future operations. Those areas include stand -off defense capabilities,
maritime assets, soft kills, unmanned defense capabilities, AI, next -
generation information and communications, space domain, DX, high -
power energy and integrated information warfare. For acceleration of
defense equipment deployment, MOD/SDF will receive proposals from the
defense-related companies or incorporate advanced civilian technologies
through start-up companies, domestic research institutes and other
organizations.
To this end, MOD/SDF will establish a new framework to deploy
defense equipment within the next five years and to operate it with intensive
iterations of operational verification , evaluation, and improvement, in
addition to flexibly reviewing administrative procedures, contracting
methods and other rules of MOD/SDF that might be obstacles to this
acceleration of deployment efforts, and to realize its full -scale operation
within approximately the next 10 years.

Ⅸ Defense Production and Technological Base as Virtually Integral Part

of a Defense Capability
1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base
While Japan's defense industry is responsible for each stage of the
equipment life cycle, t he equipment and defense industry are
inseparable. In this context, the defense production and technological
bases are virtuall y integral part of a defense capability.
While the defense business requires a large investment of
management resources to meet advanced performance requirements and
maintenance measures, companies are facing diverse issues ;

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profitabilit y is lower than the level defined by the procurement system,

the industry is currentl y considered as unattractive because sales
channels are limited to SDF, and growth is not expected, and various
risks, such as suppl y chain risks and cyberattacks, are apparent.
In order to address these issues, MOD/SDF will make defen se
industry more attractive, by adopting method to evaluate each
company's qualit y management, cost management and delivery
management for defense business to calculate company ’s costs and
profits accuratel y. In addition, MOD/SDF will adopt a method of
acquiring equipment that further emphasizes the viewpoint of
maintaining and strengthening the domestic infrastructure while
developing company’s predictabilit y for projects , such as the plan-and-
proposal method. As for equipment to be procured under the Fore ign
Military Sales (FMS) procurement, efforts will be made to promote the
participation of domestic companies, as well as to streamline and
improve efficiency.
In order to cope with various risks and maintain and strengthen the
defense production bases, ap propriate fiscal measures and financial
support will be provided for companies ’ initiatives such as upgrading
manufacturing and other facilities, strengthening cybersecurit y, making
suppl y chains more resilient, and business succession.
MOD/SDF will conduct suppl y chain surveys to identify supply chain
risks and promote new entrants to the suppl y chain to strengthen the
suppl y chain and incorporate advanced commercial/basic technologies.
Furthermore, MOD/SDF will cooperate with defense authorities of
allies and like-minded countries, etc., to mutuall y complement suppl y
chains. In this way, the suppl y chain will be strengthened to contribute
to stable procurement.
Since the protection of information from intelligence activities and
cyberattacks by foreign countries, or other cause, is a prerequisite for
defense production and international equipment and technology
cooperation, MOD/SDF will reinforce industrial securit y system while
taking measure s for stead y implementation of Standards on
Cybersecurit y Meas ures for Defense Industry as well as for formulation
and application of Defense Industrial Securit y Manual. In addition,
MOD/SDF will implement sensitive technology securit y in conjunction

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with economic securit y measures such as the patent application non -

disclosure system.

2 Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

MOD/SDF will realize acceleration of defense equipment
development through various efforts concerning R&D by identifying
specific projects necessary for future warfare and organizing the entire
picture up to the acquisition. Based on the integrated equipment system,
which is systematicall y organized for future battles from the viewpoint
of joint operations, MOD/SDF will intensivel y invest in
equipment/technology fields (1)-(6) that are directl y linked to future
battles. Furthermore, by improving the efficiency of the R&D process,
including improving the capabilities of conventional equipment, and by
introducing new methods, MOD/SDF will realize shortening the time
required for R&D and lead to the acceleration of defense equipment
deployment .
At the same time, MOD/SDF will establish a mechanism to promptl y
abolish projects for research and development with low prospects for
results.
In order to secure technological superiority in the future, and realize
advanced capabilities ahead of other countries, MOD/SDF will pursue
and implement technological cooperation, including international joint
research and development and research and dev elopment that
incorporates a wide range of advanced commercial/basic technologies,
and at the same time will invest heavily in technologies that can be
directl y linked to defense applications, aiming to acquire technologies
at an earl y stage. In doing so, MOD/SDF will promote collaboration
with projects in related ministries and agencies and activel y utilize the
results of those projects.
Based on the above, the policy division, the operational division, and
the technological division will work in unison to promote measures
related to the study of future battle strategies and the utilization of
advanced technologies.
From the perspective of gathering Japan's scientific and technological
capabilities, MOD/SDF will strategically release the information on
technological fields and research and development prospects that it

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enhances predictabilit y for companies and others. In addition, in order

to fundamentall y reinforce the functions to produce defense innovation
and groundbreaking equipment, etc., a new researc h institute will be
established in A cquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA)
after FY2024 through scrap -and-build, the R&D -related organizations
of the agency, and the strengthening of the R&D system will be
implemented. In addition, from the vi ewpoint of effective
implementation of initiatives related to advanced technologies,
MOD/SDF will strongl y promote technological cooperation not onl y
with domestic research institutes but also with allies and like-minded
countries such as the United States, Australia, and the U.K.
Promote the development of equipment that anticipates equipment
transfer from the development stage and review of SDF's original
specifications. In developing equipment, MOD/SDF will consider cost
reductions in the mass production and maintenance phases. In addition,
regarding conventional technologies such as ammunition and vehicles,
measures would be taken to maintain the production and technological
infrastructure.
(1) Stand-Off Defense Capabilities
Japan will acquire capabilities to deal with vessels and landing
forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations
outside of threat zones .
a. Continue development of upgraded Type -12 surface-to-ship
missile (surface -, ship-, and air-to-ship missiles), aimi ng to
complete development of the surface- t ype by the end of FY2025 ,
the ship- t ype by the end of FY2026 , and the air-t ype by the end
of FY2028 for the air-t ype.
b. Buildup submarine-t ype stand-off defense capabilities that can
be launched from submarines that can operate in a highl y covert
manner.
c. Continue research on Hyper Velocit y Gliding Projectile
(HVGP) for island defense that fl y at high altitude and high
speed to hit ground targets, aiming to complete the project for
the earl y deployment by the end of FY2025. In addition,
upgraded HVGP for island defense will be developed to defeat
the opposing forces invading the islands , from more distant areas

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in the mainland, etc.

d. Promote research on hypersonic missiles, which are difficult to
be intercept ed by traveling at hypersonic speeds, aiming to
complete the project by FY2031, and consider the development
of derivative t ypes.
e. Research on new anti -ship guided missile for island defense
that has a longer-range, low radar cross section (RCS), and
higher mobilit y, while having multiple functions through
modularization.

(2) Capabilities to Respond to HGVs , etc.

MOD/SDF will acquire technologies to deal with Hypersonic
Glide Vehicle (HGV) threats and others that are difficult to detect
or intercept with existing equipment.
a. Develop upgraded Type -03 Medium-Range SAM (modified)
with capabilit y of responding to HGV and ballistic missiles in
addition to cruise missiles, etc.
b. Conduct research and studies on guided missile systems for
responding to HGV threats that travel at hypersonic speeds at
high altitudes with high maneuverability.

(3) Capabilities to Respond to Drones and Swarm Attacks

MOD/SDF will aim to acquire and promptly equip technologies to
economicall y and effectivel y respond to the rapidl y growing
airborne threat of drone swarms.
a. Continue research on various t ypes of high -energy lasers to
intercept drones and other airborne threats.
b. Continue research on technologies to intercept drones and other
objects by radiating them with high-power microwaves (HPM).

(4) Unmanned Assets

In order to promote unmanned and labor-saving defense
equipment, MOD/SDF will acquire technologies related to UUVs
while reviewing existing equipment systems and personnel
assignments.
a. Conduct research on technologies such as UUV-UUV control to

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enhance operational capabilities in the underwater domain.

b. Conduct research on operational support technology to control
multiple unmanned combat vehicles (UGVs) from a manned
vehicle, autonomous driving technology, etc.
c. Conduct research on technologies related to USVs in order to
further reduce personnel and achieve unmanned waterborne
vessels.

(5) Measures for Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft

a. Steadil y promote joint development of the n ext-generation
fighter aircraft with the UK and Italy, aiming to complete
development by the end of FY2035. Research and development
will also be promoted for a combat support unmanned aircraft to
be collaborating with manned aircraft such as the next -
generation fighter aircraft.
b. In conducting research and development of these technologies,
Japan-led development will be realized by ensuring freedom of
modification for timel y and appropriate upgrade in the future
and domestic production and technological base s for high
readiness, etc. on the premise that the aircraft maintains the
capabilit y to effectivel y counter numericall y superior opponents.

(6) Reinforcing Other Deterrence and Response Capabilities

a. Continue research on future railguns to improve the capabilit y
of intercepting various airborne threats .
b. Conduct research on technology of jamming device that
misleads radar and other radio wave equipment into believing
that multiple threats exist by giving false information.
c. Conduct research to reflect the technology to support
commanders ’ decision-making into equipment by anal yzing the
course of action using AI to cope with the complex and fast
changing combat situations.
d. Research and d evelop the next generation signal intelligence
aircraft , which will be the successor to the multipurpose aircraft
(EP-3), with improved target information collection capability,
etc.

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e Develop new small mines that are compact and can be controlled
remotel y in order to lay mines quickl y from naval vessels on
alert watch, etc.
f. Begin research and development of hypersonic surface -to-air
guided missiles utilizing the results of elemental research on
hypersonic missiles.

3 Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technol ogy

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is not onl y a
strategic tool of foreign and defense policy to build effective
partnerships with allied and like -minded countries and to deter
unilateral changes to the status quo by force or invasion of Japan, but
also effective in ensuring the growth of the defense industry through
the expansion of defense equipment market . From this perspective , the
government will take the lead in promoting appropriate overseas
transfer of defense equipment and technology by further cooperation
between the public and private sectors . The government will also
establish a fund and provide corporate assistance as necessary.

4 Promotion of Various Measures and Institutional Development

In order to implement the above policies, necessary budgetary
measures, etc., as well as necessary legislation and financing of projects
with a high policy nature through the use of government financial
institutions, etc., will be provided, and the status of their execution wi ll
be constantl y verified and the system will be revised as necessary.

Ⅹ Strengthening the Foundation for SDF Personnel to Fulfill Abilities as

Core of Defense Capabilities
1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base
In order to fundamentall y reinforce defense cap abilities, MOD/SDF
will reinforce the human resource base by securing necessary uniformed
SDF personnel and civilian officials and others , and by conducting
study of necessary systems, while payi ng attention to the facts that
individual SDF personnel are required to have more knowledge, skills,
and experience than ever before and that MOD/SDF needs to develop
SDF personnel who have a background to reliabl y deal with cross -

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domain operations, information warfare, a nd others. In this regard SDF

personnel who work on research and development will be secured and
their knowledge and skills will be developed. In addition, MOD/SDF
will reinforce its education, especiall y focusing on domains such as
cyber, and utilize civi lian workforce in these domains. To this end, an
environment will be created in which all SDF personnel can demonstrate
their abilities even as they face life events such as childcare, childbirth,
and nursing care, and MOD/SDF will take comprehensive measu res
focusing on the entire life cycle starting from recruitment, including
reskilling of SDF personnel.

(1) Enhancing Recruitment Efforts

In order to stabl y secure excellent human resources in the severe
recruiting environment with a declining number of people eligible
for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, MOD /SDF will promote
various recruiting measures such as digitalization of recruitment PR,
and strengthen the functions of the Provincial Cooperation Offices
and the cooperation with local gover nments and related
organizations.
In addition, from the viewpoint of improving the attractiveness of
fixed-term SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will review the system of
Candidates for SDF personnel and improve support for the re-
employment and learning at universities, etc., after the completion
of their term of service . Furthermore, in light of the declining
birthrate and higher education level, measures to expand the
recruitment of untenured officers and to broaden the recruitment
base to include college graduates, etc., should be promoted. At the
same time, MOD/SDF will secure high -qualit y human resources at
an earl y stage through the expansion of the SDF scholarship student
s ystem.
Furthermore, in order to incorporate human resources with
specialized knowledge and skills who are expected to be active in
fields such as cyber and space domains, a new SDF personnel system
will be established to enable flexible recruitment and appointment,
and necessary measures will be taken to utilize human resources
from the private sector, including retired SDF personnel.

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(2) Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.

In order for SDF Reserve Personnel and others to effectivel y
supplement regular SDF personnel in the changing operational
environment and diversifying missions of SDF, MOD /SDF will not
onl y improve their sufficiency rates but also fundamentall y review
and reinforce the system of SDF Reserve Personnel and others. To
this end, after reviewing the roles of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel
and SDF Reserve Personnel, MOD/SDF will expand the recruitment
of them from civilians with no experience in the SDF and review the
current system in light of their age limits and training periods, and
other issues.

(3) Effective Use of Human Resources

MOD/SDF continues to activel y recruit female SDF personnel and
appoint them according to their motivation, abilit y, and aptitude, as
well as develop an educational infrastructure that supports their
activities, and systematicall y develop women's quarters in the
military barracks and naval vessels with an eye to increasing the
number of female SDF personnel.
In addition, in order to further utilize human resources with
abundant knowledge, skills, and experience, the retirement age for
SDF personnel will be raised w hile paying attention to their military
strength, and the duties in which re -enrolled SDF personnel can be
engaged in will be greatl y expanded.
Curbing mid -career retirements is an urgent issue, therefore a
survey on SDF personnel’s attitude towards mid -career retirement
will be conducted in order to contribute to the consideration of
effective measures to curb mid -career retirement. Taking into
consideration the special nature of the missions and service
environment, MOD/SDF will constantly review and impl ement
necessary measures.

(4) Improvement of Living and Working Environment, etc.

Recognizing that there is no place for harassment which ruins the
mutual trust among SDF personnel and shakes the very foundation

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of the entire organization , MOD/SDF will establish new measures

based on the findings of the expert panel and other reviews on
harassment prevention, and ensure that all SDF personnel are full y
aware of them. In addition, MOD/SDF will develop an
organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment with
continuous review of the measures taken to ensure that they are in
line with the times.
In addition, MOD/SDF will steadil y develop housing necessary for
introducing and reorganizing units as well as ensuring readiness.
MOD/SDF will also systematicall y take measures against aging and
earthquake of barracks and housing, including modernization and
preventive maintenance. Furthermore, the living and working
environment for personnel will be improved by ensuring the
required number of livin g and working equipment, replacing aging
equipment, and ensuring the required number of dail y consumables.
In doing so, Japan will place consideration on creating a comfortable
working environment even in special environments such as naval
vessels. Through these measures , MOD/SDF will aim to improve the
morale of SDF personnel.
In addition to promoting efforts to ensure work -life balance,
including the development and dissemination of systems that
support a good balance between famil y and work, MOD/SDF will
promote measures such as the development of childcare facilities
and temporary childcare for children during emergency visits for the
office based on the needs of SDF personnel. In addition, MOD/SDF
will expand measures to support families in cooperation with local
governments and related organizations.

(5) Human Resource Development

In order to secure human resources who can contribute to more
advanced cross -domain joint operations, MOD/SDF will strengthen
the education on joint operations in the educati onal institutions such
as the Joint Staff College and staff colleges of each service . Each
SDF service, National Defense Academ y, and National Institute for
Defense Studies will strengthen their education and research
contents and architecture for cyber domain and others for securing

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and providing skilled human resources who can be come the core of
SDF units. In addition, MOD /SDF will transform the Japan Ground
Self-Defense Force High Technical School into a combined school
of each service, as well as a co educational school by accepting
female students.
In addition, in order to further promote mutual complementation
between each service of the SDF, MOD /SDF will integrate their
educational programs and promote effective and efficient education
and research b y utilizing state-of-the-art technologies.
Furthermore, the 1st and 2nd Service Schools of the Maritime
Self-Defense Force will be integrated in order to implement unified
education and improve educational effects, and the T-7/T-4
successor aircraft and re lated systems will be upgraded to optimize
the flight education and training environment for the so -called 5th
generation fighter pilot training.

(6) Improving Treatment and Reemployment

Through conducting a survey of SDF personnel's overtime work,
etc., MOD/SDF will make salaries and allowances based on the
special nature of their missions and work environment, and continue
to give due treatment to personnel engaged in harsh missions,
especiall y on naval vessels and radar sites. In addition, treatment
will be improved given the fact that missions are increasing such as
the counterstrike capability. MOD/SDF will conduct research on the
salary systems of military personnel in other countries, and consider
how SDF personnel should be paid in the future. MOD/SDF will
promote measures concerning honors and privileges for those well-
deserved for achievemen ts through many years of diligent services
for their duties as SDF personnel.
In addition, given that it is the responsibilit y of the government
to secure the livelihood of uniformed SDF personnel after retirement
under the earl y retirement system or fixed -term service system,
MOD/SDF will further improve and strengthen reemployment
support by enhancing the career guidance and job training
opportunities for SDF personnel scheduled for retirement, and by
strengthening cooperation with local governments, relevant

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organizations, and private companies, etc.

2 Transformation of Medical Functions

In order to cope with va rious situations and respond to diverse
missions in Japan and abroad, MOD/SDF will promote integrated
medical operations by unifying medical functions common to all SDF
units, build a posture that can mobilize the full strength of SDF’s
medical force, including the National Defense Medical College, and
promote fundamental reforms to improve the combat trauma care
capabilities.
In order to save the lives of personnel who are performing their duties
in a contingency without regard for danger, it is necess ary to establish
a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the front line to
the destination hospital. For this purpose, it is necessary to strengthen
the respective medical functions first aid at the front line, medical
evacuation by utilizing various assets of each service to transport
wounded personnel to the destination hospital, and the SDF hospitals.
First, for the first aid at the front line, MOD/SDF will increase the
number of frontline combat medics certified as assistant nurse and
paramedic, and further strengthen the foundation for education and
training. In addition, a new joint training course for damage control
surgery following first aid at the frontline will be established to
s ystematicall y train personnel. Furthermore, MOD/SDF plans to provide
necessary education and training regarding surgical operations on board
naval vessels for those who have completed the above course in order
to strengthen onboard medical care capability.
For aero medical evacuation, new training equipment wil l be
introduced, and an education and training environment will be
established to improve first -aid capabilities during transport of
wounded and sick. In implementing these education and training
programs, MOD/SDF will standardize, integrate and improve co mmon
knowledge and skills among each force.
MOD/SDF considers enhancing the functions and survivabilit y of the
SDF Naha Hospital is an effective measure in strengthening medical
capacit y in the southwestern region . MOD/SDF will take measures for
SDF Naha Hospital such as increasing the number of beds, adding

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medical departments, and building underground facilities. Other SDF

hospitals that can be a destination will be strengthened similarl y when
they are reconstructed.
Since most of medical functions are common to all SDF units,
MOD/SDF will promote standardiz ing medical equipment and materials
in consideration of interoperabilit y between each SDF service. In
addition, in order to enable Self -Defense Forces hospitals and other
facilities to obtain the medical information of each SDF member in a
timel y manner without distinction between the SDF services, the
medical record of each member would be digitized, and a system would
be established to enable prompt retrieval and viewing of medical record
for each member.
Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds,
gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. To prevent such deaths, it is
extremel y important to secure blood products for transfusion, and
MOD/SDF would consider establishing a system to autonomously secure
and stockpile blood products. In addition, in order to secure medical
oxygen, which is as important as blood products in war wound care,
MOD/SDF will also acquire ox ygen concentrators and other rel ative
equipment.
In addition, MOD/SDF will strengthen education and research ,
including combat trauma care capabilities improvement, at the National
Defense Medical College in light of modern medical technology
evolution. The National Defense Medical Coll ege Hospital, which is the
clinical site, is to be strengthened to accommodate the acceptance of
those wounded in war, in addition to advanced medical education for
medical and nursing officers and skill improvement for the medical
personnel of SDF. In order to accommodate the acceptance of those
wounded in war, the hospital will undergo a drastic reform of its
operation, and its functions will be strengthened by utilizing
opportunities such as the reconstruction of the hospital. As a
complement to these efforts, efforts will also be made to ensure that
medical and nursing officers receive training outside the department.

Ⅺ. Optimization Efforts
1 Equipment

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For GSDF, in order to optimize the air structure, the air units of
divisions and brigades will be abolished with some exceptions, and
helicopter functions will be concentrated in each district unit, while the
functions of anti -tank and combat helicopters (AH) and observation
helicopters (OH) will be transferred to UAVs and UAVs for
utilit y/attack and surveillance, etc. The functions of AH s and OHs will
be transferred to UAVs and UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes.
In doing so, the minimum functions necessary will be maintained by
arming existing helicopters, etc.
For MSDF, the number of fixed -wing patrol aircraft (P -1) acquisitions
will be partiall y reviewed in conjunction with the acquisition of a dwell
UAV to enhance offshore surveillance capabilities over a wide area. The
number of patrol helicopters (SH -60K (upgraded version)) acquired will
be partiall y revised due to a review of the shipboard requirements,
including the installation of fighter aircraft (F -35B) on destroyers
(Izumo class). Proceed wi th the discontinuation of the use of multi -
purpose aircraft (U -36A).
For ASDF, in order to optimize the aircraft t ypes, it will move
forward with the elimination of the use of rescue search aircraft (U -
125A) and other aircraft.
Further efforts for effectiv e and efficient acquisition of equipment
include: cost reduction through planned and stable acquisition of
equipment by expanding the application of long -term contracts,
improving the predictabilit y of companies and promoting efficient
production, procurem ent in consideration of the suppl y -demand
situation of equipment including that of other countries, and narrowing
down SDF-unique specifications that cause costs to rise. In addition,
the SDF's own unique procurement system, which takes into account the
suppl y-demand situation of equipment, including that of other countries,
and the narrowing of specifications, etc., will enhance the effectiveness
of project management throughout the equipment life cycle.

2 Personnel
In addition to transferring the capacit y necessary to strengthen the
joint operation system from each of the SDF, GSDF personnel will be
transferred to MSDF and ASDF to optimize the organizational capacit y

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of the SDF, based on the increase of required personnel by MSDF and

ASDF. To this end, approximatel y 2,000 GSDF personnel will be
transferred to joint unit, MSDF and ASDF.
In addition, the number of all SDF officers will not be increased, but
rather a review of existing units and the use of outside labor force, such
as private-sector contractors, will be promoted.

Ⅻ Quantities of Major Procurement

Targets to be achieved in five years and approximatel y in ten years
for the defense capabilities to be fundamentall y reinforced under this
program are shown in Appendix 1.
The specifi c scale of the major procurement of defense equipment
listed in II and III above is shown in Appendix 2.
In addition, the major formation quota and the specific scale of the
major procurement of defense equipment, etc. in approximatel y 10 years
are shown in Appendix 3.

XIII Expenditures
1 The expenditure aiming for the implementation of defense capabilit y
buildup described in this program for the next five years from FY2023
to FY2027 amount to approximatel y ¥43 trillion.

2 The annual defense budgets for FY2023 to FY2027 under this

program amount to approximatel y ¥40,500 billion in total
(approximatel y ¥8,900 billion in FY 2027), on the assumption that the
following measures will be taken.
(1) Considering the progress of each p roject, further accelerate the
improvement of SDF facilities in an agile and flexible manner
(approximatel y ¥1,600 billion);
(2) Utilize settlement surplus in the general account further when
the surplus is larger than the expected settlement surplus in 6
(approximatel y ¥900 billion).
In light of the increasingl y severe fiscal conditions and the
significance of other budgets related to the lives of the people, in
harmony with other measures taken by the Government, further
optimization and rationalization of defense buildup will be

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thoroughl y implemented, by means of suspending the use of

equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing projects of
low cost -effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement
through cost management/reduction and long -term contracts, and
securing other revenues. If the surplus does not increase to the
above-mentioned level, MOD/SDF will secure financial resources
virtuall y through these initiatives.
In the budget formulation process of each fiscal year, MOD/SDF
will take care to respond to unforeseen circumstances such as
changes in the securit y environment . On top of that, MOD/SDF
will examine the progress, effectiveness, and feasibilit y of each
project, including the equipment procurement shown in Appendix
2, and revise proje cts flexibl y, if necessary.

3 The expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newl y

concluded to implement this program amount to approximatel y
¥43,500 billion (excluding the amount corresponding to payments for
the period outside of the program that contribute to improving project
efficiency, such as maintenance), and the future obligation for each
fiscal year is to be managed appropriatel y.

4 Since measures such as for equipment procurement and maintenance,

facilit y maintenance, R&D, and system development/upgrade will be
intensivel y implemented during the next five years from FY2023 to
FY2027 under this program , MOD/SDF will make efforts to
appropriatel y take these into account and proceed defense buildup in a
stable and sustainable manner in the subsequent program based on the
FY2027 level.

5 This program will be reviewed, if necessary, based on the medium

to long-term defense and fiscal outlook, considering various factors at
home and abroad such as the international environment at the t ime,
trends in technological standards including Information and
Communication Technology (ICT), and the situation of the economic
power and fiscal foundation supporting the reinforcement of defense
capabilities.

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6 To secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of defense

capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering this program from
FY2023 to FY2027, necessary measures will be implemented in both
expenditure and revenue areas, such as the reform in government
expenditure, using settlement surplus , creation of defense buildup
funds utilizing non-tax revenues , and tax measures.

ⅩⅣ Notes
In order to reduce the burden on Okinawa Prefecture and other local
communities, specific measures regarding the review of the U.S.
military force posture in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee
on Okinawa) related projects will be steadil y implemented.

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Appendix Table 1 Targets for Fundamentally Reinforced Defense

Capabilities and Timeline for Achievement
Fields By 5 years until FY 2027* Approx. 10 Years Later
If an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will Further efforts to ensure the
respond with primary responsibility and defense concept described on the
buildup defense capabilities to disrupt and left (buildup defense capabilities
defeat the invasion while gaining support to disrupt or to defeat invasion at
from its ally and others. an earlier and more distant
location)
Stand-Off ●Acquire practical capability to operate ●Acquire capabilities to operate
Defense Capabilities stand-off missiles more advanced stand-off missiles
●Secure required sufficient
quantities

Integrated Air and Missile ● Reinforce capability to respond to ●Reinforce wide-area air defense
Defense Capabilities Hypersonic Weapons capabilities
●Reinforce capability to respond to ●More efficient and effective
miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) UAV countermeasures
Unmanned Defense ●Expand the use of UAV to strengthen ●Reinforce capability to control
Capabilities capabilities to practically operate multiple unmanned assets
simultaneously, etc.
Cross-Domain Operation ●Reinforce Space Domain Awareness ●Further reinforce space operation
Capabilities/Civil Protection (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities, and capability
electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc. ●Further reinforce cybersecurity
● Reinforce ground, sea, and air domain capability to enable support for
capabilities that become basis of cross- entities other than SDF
domain operations ● Strengthen ground, maritime,
and air capabilities to work with
UAV
Command and ●Accelerate decision-making through the ●Reinforce information gathering
Control/Intelligence-related use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., while and analysis capabilities through
Functions strengthening the resiliency of the network the use of AI, etc., while
● Strengthen information acquisition and enhancing the system for
analysis in both strategic and tactic persistent information gathering
information, including responses in the and sharing
cognitive dimension

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 [Provisional Translation as of March 14, 2023 ]

Mobile Deployment ● Reinforce the SDF's transportation and ●Further enhancements of

Capabilities supply capabilities (deployment/civil transportation capability
protection), including enhancement of the ●Accelerate transportation and
SDF's transportation assets and use of PFI supply capabilities by improving
vessels, etc. supply centers, etc.
Sustainability and Resiliency ●Increase quantity of ammunitions and ●Maintain and ensure adequate
missiles inventory of ammunitions and
●Ensure maximum operational availability missiles
of equipment except during maintenance ●Maintain the operational
●Improve the resiliency of defense facilities availability ratio
for contingencies ●Further improve the resiliency of
●Secure required ammunition depots, etc. defense facilities
●Further secure ammunition
depots and other facilities
commensurate with ammunition
requirements
Defense Production and ●Establish strong defense production bases ●Maintain robust defense
Technological Bases through measures to strengthen the supply production base capable for
chain, etc. realizing innovative equipment
●Focused investment in equipment areas ●Acquire technologies for
directly linked to future warfare, and a securing technological superiority
significant reduction in research and in the future
development periods
Human Resource Base ●Secure the necessary number of high- ●Even amid a declining
quality human resources from a wide range population eligible for recruitment,
of sources, including the private sector, by continuously and stably secure the
strengthening recruitment capabilities and necessary human resources,
establishing a new SDF personnel system. including those with specialized
●Reinforce education and research (cyber knowledge and skills.
and other domains, joint operations, ●Further strengthen education and
medical) research
●Improvement of living and working ●Foster an organizational
environments and treatment by taking environment in which all members
necessary measures against aging barracks can demonstrate their individual
and housing and eliminating equipment abilities while maintaining high
shortages morale

※ Acce ler at e i n v e st me n t in i mp r o vi n g mo b i li t y, s ec uri n g a m m u n i tio n, a nd fo r ti fyi n g k e y d e fe n s e

fa ci li ti es to ma xi mi z e t h e us e o f e xi st i n g eq uip m en t, wh i le fo c u si n g o n fu nd a me n t al l y str e n gt he n in g
co re are as o f f u t ur e d e fe n s e cap ab il it ie s, s uc h as sta nd -o ff d e fe n se a nd u n ma n n ed a ss et d e fen se
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cap ab i li ti e s.
 [Provisional Translation as of March 14, 2023 ]

Appendix Table 2
Classification Equipment Type Procurement
Quantity
(1) Stand-off Defense Upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile Surface-type 11
capabilities (Surface-, Ship-, Air-ship) Units
Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP)
Hypersonic Missile -
Ship-to-surface cruise guided missile -
(Tomahawk) -
(2) Integrated Air and Missile Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air 14 Units
Defense Capabilities Missile (modified)
Aegis System-Equipped Vessels 2 ships
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft(E-2D) 5 aircraft
Interceptor Missiles for Ballistic Missile -
Defense (SM-3 Block IIA)
Interceptor Missiles with Upgraded -
Capabilities (PAC-3MSE)
Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles SM-6 -
(3) Unmanned Defense Various UAVs -
Capabilities USV -
UGV -
UUV -
(4) Cross-Domain Destroyer 12 ships
Capabilities Submarine 5 ships
Patrol Vessel 10 aircraft
Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) 19 aircraft
Fighter (F-35A) 40 aircraft
Fighter (F-35B) 25 aircraft
Fighter Upgrade (F-15) 54 aircraft
Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft 1 aircraft
Network Electronic Warfare System 2 types
(NEWS)
(5) Command and Control/ Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2) 3 aircraft
Intelligence-related Functions
(6) Mobile Deployment Transport Vessels 8 ships
Capabilities and Civil Transport Aircraft (C-2) 6 aircraft
Protection Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft 13 aircraft
(KC-46A, etc.)

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 [Provisional Translation as of March 14, 2023 ]

Appendix Table 3 (approximately 10 years later)

Classification Future Posture
Cyber Defense Units 1 squadron
Joint Units
Maritime Transport Units 1 group
Active-Duty Personnel 149,000 people
９ divisions
Basic Operational Units ５ brigades
１ armored division
１ airborne brigade
Airborne Units
１ amphibious rapid deployment
Amphibious Units
brigade
Air Transport Units
１ helicopter brigade
７ surface-to-ship guided missile
regiments
2 battalions
Ground Stand-off Missile Units Joint
(hyper velocity gliding projectile
Self-Defense Major Units
Intended for the defense of remote
Force Units
islands)
２long-range guided missile units
Surface-to-Air Guided Missile
８anti-aircraft artillery groups
Units
１ electronic warfare operations
Electronic Warfare Units
unit
(incl. anti-aircraft electronic
(incl.1anti-aircraft electronic
warfare units)
warfare unit)
１ multi-purpose unmanned
Unmanned Vehicle Units
aerial vehicle unit
Information Warfare Units １ unit
6 groups (21
Surface Vessels Units
divisions)
（Destroyers and Minesweeper
vessels）
Maritime 6 divisions
Major Submarine Units
Self-Defense 9 divisions
Units Patrol aircraft Units（Fixed-wing
Force (4 divisions)
Patrol aircraft Units）
Unmanned Vehicle Units
2 divisions
Information Warfare Units
1 unit

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 [Provisional Translation as of March 14, 2023 ]

Classification Future Posture

Destroyers 54
(Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) (10)
Major Aegis System Equipped Vessels 2
Equipment Patrol Vessels 12
Submarines 22
Combat Aircraft Approx. 170
Air Warning & Control Units 4 Aircraft Control & Warning
Wings
Fighter Aircraft Units 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)
Aerial Refueling/Transport Units 13 squadrons
Major Air Transport Units 2 squadrons
Air
Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile 3 squadrons
Self-Defense
Units 4 groups (24 fire squadrons)
Force
Space Domain Mission Units 1 squadron
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units 1 squadron
Operational Intelligence Units 1 squadron
Major Combat Aircraft Approx. 430
Equipment Fighters Approx. 320
Note 1 : 1 4 ou t of th e 15 d ivisions/b rig ades are operated on the b asis o f rap id
deplo yment.
Note2 ： Reg ard ing the nu mber of figh ter aircraft un its and fighters, necessary
stud ies will be conduc ted b y FY 202 7 and necessar y measu res will be taken
in o rde r to fu rthe r ad vance the quan titative enhancemen t of air capability.
In this rega rd, th e po ssibility o f u tilizing un manned aerial veh icles will be
stud ied.

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