Vidal, Jaquelyn F.

2022-0864

FERDINAND “VHONG” NAVARRO vs. DENIECE MILINETTE CORNEJO

G.R. No. 263329 | February 8, 2023 | INTING, J.

DOCTRINE/APPLICABLE LAW
1. Judicial Policy of Non-Interference - filing an information in court is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor, who directs and controls the prosecution of all criminal
actions commenced by a complaint, and hence, given the executive nature of this
prosecutorial prerogative, courts cannot compel the prosecution of a person against whom
the public prosecutor has found no sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
indictment (See Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court)

2. Realistic Judicial Appraisal of the Merits of the Case during Preliminary

Investigation - preliminary investigation serves as "a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of the case" wherein a sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced
so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order
an acquittal (See also, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court)

FACTS

• The case at hand refers to the alleged incidents dated January 17, 2014 and January 22, 2014.
Deniece Milinette Cornejo and Ferdinand "Vhong" H. Navarro were friends since 2011 who were
in consistent communication, according to the complainant.

• Three (3) complaints were filed by Cornejo against Navarro before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Taguig, namely: the first dated January 29, 2014 and the second dated February
27 2014 for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to RA 9262 and the third dated
October 16, 2015 for the crimes of rape and attempted rape.

• First complaint:
Complainant:
o On January 17, Cornejo invited Navarro and a friend in her condominium in
Forbeswood, Bonifacio Global City in Taguig City, but only Navarro was able to come
and nothing happened.
o While on January 19, Cornejo narrated that following her rejection on Navarro insisting
to have carnal knowledge with her, Navarro, with use of violence, somehow managed to
force his penis on Cornejo’s vagina, until her friends arrived in the middle of the said
carnal knowledge. They reported the said incident to the police but afterwards settled
with Navarro through compensation.

Defendant:
o Navarro then filed complaints for Serious Illegal Detention, Serious Physical Injuries,
Grave Threats, Grave Coercion, Illegal Arrest, and threatening to publish and offer to
prevent such publication for a compensation against Cornejo and her friends, as well
as complaint for Perjury against Cornejo; and (c) complaint for Perjury against Cedric
Lee and Raz.
 o He alleged that on January 17, Cornejo consented to have oral sex with him. Upon being
invited again by Cornejo and upon arriving at her unit, Cornejo went outside and came
back with two men who poked a gun at him, blindfolded him, and tied his hands and
feet, while being beaten.
o While still at gunpoint, he was compelled to make a video stating that: “Ako si Vhong
Navarro, ni-rape ko ang kaibigan ko.” Cedric Lee asked him to pay P500,000, which he
agreed out of fear, but then Lee increased it to P1,000,000, then P2,000,000 at the police
station afterwards.
o Feared of being blackmailed again, Navarro did not give any police statement. However,
invectives and threats were sent to Navarro by Cedric Lee upon learning that the former
filed a complaint against them in the NBI
o Dismissal of the First Complaint:
On April 4, 2014, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Consolidated Resolution
dismissing Cornejo's First Complaint against Navarro for lack of probable cause, while
finding probable cause against Cornejo, Cedric Lee, Bernice Lee, Raz, Calma, Guerrero,
and Fernandez for serious illegal detention and grave coercion.

• Second Complaint:
o Cornejo alleged that Navarro raped her on January 17, 2014, denying Navarro’s
narration that the oral sex that transpired was consensual.
o Dismissal of the Second Complaint:
On July 1, 20 14, Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios (ACP De Dios) issued
a Resolution recommending the dismissal of the Second Complaint similarly for lack of
probable cause, stating that the sexual encounter between Cornejo and Navarro on
January 17, 2014 was consensual. Cornejo filed a motion for reconsideration on the
said resolution, but was denied.

• Third Complaint:
o Cornejo alleged that Navarro raped her on January 17, 2022; and attempted to rape her
on January 22, 2014.
o However, Navarro characterized the Third Complaint as nothing but an embellished
version of the previously dismissed complaints, and Cornejo's pertinent allegations in
the Third Complaint were not originally found in her previous sworn statements.
Navarro also averred that Cornejo accused him of consummated Rape in the First
Complaint pertaining to the January 22, 2014 incident, only to revise the accusation to
Attempted Rape in the Third Complaint
o Cornejo on the other hand maintained that the questions relating to the credibility of
her allegations is a matter of evidence that should be weighed by a judge in a full-blown
trial and that Third Complaint should be treated separately from her previous two
complaints to allow the Office of the City Prosecutor to make its independent finding of
probable cause.
o Dismissal of the Third Complaint:
Prosecutor Severino H. Gaña dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, stating
the need to scrutinize the contents of Cornejo's two previous complaints vis-a-vis her
allegations in her Third Complaint, emphasizing that all complaints pertain to the same
incidents.

• DOJ Ruling:
o DOJ dismissed Cornejo’s petition for review accentuating that unwise to ignore the
previous dismissals of Cornejo's complaints and the factual findings in support thereof,
pointing out that much time, effort, and resources had been spent therefor.
 o Cornejo’s motion for reconsideration is also denied. Hence, she then elevated the case
to the CA, through a petition for certiorari warranting that the DOJ committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, arguing that it deviated
from the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause.

• CA Ruling:
o The CA granted the petition for certiorari stating that (1) it has jurisdiction to review the
resolution issued by the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, and that Cornejo’s third complaint is sufficient to warrant all the elements of
rape and (2) the DOJ is at fault since the determination of probable cause does not
depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation or defense, or on the
admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented, and that credibility should be
adjudged during the trial proper.
o The CA then directed the OCP of Taguig City to file Informations against Navarro for (a)
Rape by Sexual Intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353; and (b) Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC

• Thus, Navarro seeks to the Supreme Court a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction seeking to enjoin both the MeTC Br. 16 and the RTC Br. 69 from proceeding with
the cases for rape and acts of lasciviousness, respectively; and the DOJ and the OCP Taguig
from further prosecuting the cases

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in finding that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
findings of Prosecutor Gafia and dismissing the Third Complaint against Navarro for lack of
probable cause. –YES.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 21, 2022 and the Resolution
dated September 20, 2022 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 166222 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the following Informations against Ferdinand "Vhong" H.
Navarro for lack of probable cause:
(a) Rape by Sexual Intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-16E-00174 pending before Branch
69, Regional Trial Court, Taguig City; and
(b) Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-
151-00815 pending before Branch 116, Metropolitan Trial Court, Taguig City.
SO ORDERED.

RATIO:
YES.
1. Judicial policy of non-interference
The Court reiterates that the determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation for
the purpose of filing an information in court is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor,
who directs and controls the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint, and
hence, given the executive nature of this prosecutorial prerogative, courts cannot compel the
prosecution of a person against whom the public prosecutor has found no sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for indictment. Armed with the power to investigate, the Court states
that prosecuting officers are in a better position to assess the strength and weakness of the
evidence on hand for purposes of filing the corresponding information in court.
However, the Court also accentuates an exception the judicial policy of non-interference stating that
while the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is a prosecutorial
prerogative, judicial intrusion is justified when the exercise of the prosecutor’s authority is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction shown as:
a. applies when it is shown that the prosecutor exercised his or her power in an "arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and
b. it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.

2. Prosecutors are duty-bound to make a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case during preliminary investigation

Citing Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated the two-fold purpose of a preliminary
investigation:

1. the paramount purpose "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial;"
2. the practical purpose "to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive
trials”
Further citing Sales v. Sandiganbayan, the Court defined preliminary investigation as
effectively "a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case" wherein a sufficient proof of
the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may
not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. Distinguishing the various complaints
filed by Cornejo, the Court relates the glaring and manifest inconsistencies in all three
complaints which are deemed readily discernible by common sense; hence, without need
of rigorous examination or an expertise of a trial court judge for such purpose.
Moreover, a certiorari would not lie against the DOJ since such is only restricted to "truly
extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void."
The DOJ's affirmance of the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause was not arrived at
in a "capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner" so as to oust the DOJ of jurisdiction.
What Cornejo raised in her petition for certiorari before the CA are not errors of jurisdiction,
but perceived errors in the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause.

How did I digest the case?

Overall, I consider cases not merely as explanation or examples of the application of law but
as stories that must be evaluated under legal circumstances. After all, these cases are real-life
stories. This principle of mine also applies when I am reading the case.
First, I am particular on the applicable law and doctrine on the case, so that while reading the
case, I can determine how the said law is applied following the facts being narrated. After all,
it gives me a sense of suspense on whether my understanding on the application of law is
correct. This is why I do not read the dispositive portion first. Sometimes, it pays to be wrong,
especially if I did not get the judgment that I thought.
Second, I tend to summarize all the facts, through bullet points, and divide the said facts per
topics, jurisdiction and ruling of the original and appellate courts. This way I could easily skim
on the status of the case, as well as interconnect them.
Third, I also summarize the ratio decidendi of the Court, after all the Court usually divides
their ratio per doctrine or applicable law. In this way, I can easily refer to the Court’s application
of the law to the facts.
Fourth and foremost, I put myself on the shoes of the digest reader. If the case is overwhelming
and bulky, the digest itself must not be, BUT it still must be complete. This is why instead of
passing on all facts, I summarize it through bullet points to put a break on the reading and to
avoid straining the eyes of the reader. Important points must also be highlighted to put a stress
on the applicable law and improves retention of the case to the reader. After all, a case digest
is just a review of the full text case, so it must be brief and handy.