Jakob Ostwald 29945931

Colombia is an example of how the conflicts of the next century will be fought: not

between nation states but within a nation. Guerrillas and paramilitaries that have been

common across Colombia since the late 1960s have fought each other constantly, each with

their own bases of support. This conflict between the politically far left guerrillas and the far-

right paramilitaries in Colombia has placed all involved in a bind. These two extremes made

everyone who was caught in between them chose a side or risk making enemies of them both

by their neutrality; yet supporting either side can have disastrous consequences. Among these

groups caught in the middle was Chiquita Bananas International (“Chiquita”), a US based

banana company with large operations in Colombia. Chiquita first made payments to guerrillas

then to the paramilitaries once the paramilitaries gained control over the area. Chiquita’s

payments to the paramilitaries ended in 2004, however, they were caught making these

payments to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The issues of Chiquita making

payments to paramilitaries – in the context of Colombia – demonstrate how the Colombian

conflict forces those involved to choose a side and then face the consequences of their

decision. The consequences for Chiquita were a $25 million fine, full disclosure of their

documents, and the inevitable backlash from consumers. This is far from the full story,

however, as the consequences of not making payments to the paramilitaries may have been

worse. This paper will examine how the Colombian dilemma that Chiquita found themselves in

may be a sign of things to come around the world.

 To begin, the Colombian state has never been a strong state, neither internally nor

externally. After achieving independence from Spain, Gran Colombia (as it was called)

continually lost territory to new states.1 Warfare with other states was coupled with internal

wars, eventually leading to the secession of Panama in 1903.2 Internal war returned as the

Liberal and Conservative parties fought with each other in a period known as “La Violencia”. 3

This partisan division of the country continued under the National Front, a government that

alternated leadership between the Conservative and Liberal parties every four years. 4 It was

under this period that the guerrilla groups began to form; representing the far left end of the

political spectrum. There were many guerrilla groups that began in the 1960s, with the

National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) being

the two most prominent. The formation of these insurgent groups was a direct challenge to the

central government in a way that the pervious civil discord was not. La Violencia and the earlier

civil wars were fought over who should control the legitimate government, while these new

guerrillas sought to overturn the government completely.5 This new challenge to the authority

of both the Liberals and the Conservatives undermined the legitimacy of the government, and

this problem only intensified the longer the guerrillas were active.

The unique geography of Colombia made it easier for guerillas to develop and maintain

their control since the 1960s. Colombia borders two oceans, has three mountain ranges,

jungles, plains, hills and everything in between. This has meant that even during colonial times,

1
Stoller, “From Liberal Decay to Regeneration.” Pg. 1
2
Stoller. Pg. 1
3
Stoller, “An Elusive Legitimacy.” Pg. 171
4
Stoller, “From Liberal Decay to Regeneration.” Pg. 36
5
Gutiérrez Sanín, “Telling the Difference.” Pg. 8
the government did not have much control over many geographical areas within their own

country.6 In fact, several distinct geographical areas of development emerged, each with their

own priorities. In his history of Colombia, Marcos Palacios describes how “the four great

economic regions – Antioquia, the Caribbean coast, the east-central region, and the south-

west… had very different levels of internal political cohesion”.7 This is perhaps understating the

point, as some of the regions of Colombia would have functioned almost entirely autonomously

from the state.8 In practice this meant that fighting the guerrillas such as the FARC or the ELN

would have been akin to invading another country. Like the United States in Vietnam, the

Colombian government soon realized that this was not a conflict that could be ‘won’ in the

conventional sense, and that it would take vast amounts of time and effort to bring peace to all

the regions.9

With the Colombian government unable to quickly or effectively combat the guerrillas,

other interests began to combat the guerrillas themselves. Perhaps the most predictable of

these would be the US, who were busy fighting communism worldwide during this time. Ever

since the formation of the first Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in Colombia, the United States had

been keeping close tabs on the political instability in Colombia. The US trained Colombian

security forces to find and kill guerrilla leaders through the plan LAZO. 10 This would form the

base of the first paramilitaries in Colombia once these security forces began to distance

6
Stoller, “From Liberal Decay to Regeneration.” Pg. 2
7
Stoller. Pg. 5
8
Stoller. Pg. 8
9
Publications, “The United States and Colombia.” Pg. 3
10
“Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics.”
themselves from the government.11 Paramilitaries were also formed as security forces for the

wealthy landholding elite, who felt that the government could not protect them. 12 The MAS

(translation: death to kidnappers) was formed by a variety of interests including businesses, the

Colombian military, US companies and, famously, the Medellin Cartel; of which Pablo Escobar

was the head.13 The paramilitary connection to illegal narcotics and narcotrafficking is a close

one, as many of the landed elites in Colombia had connections to narcotraffickers. 14

Many paramilitaries and guerrilla groups became involved with illegal narcotics

including the highly profitable cocaine trade. The western territory of Colombia was highly

contested between the guerrillas and paramilitaries, as it was the main transportation route for

these narcotics and therefore economically valuable.15 Grown in the Andes of Colombia,

Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, cocaine flowed north through illegal streams to trade. 16 The

narcotraffickers were often not politically motivated, and they would pay the local

paramilitaries or guerrillas “drug rents”.17 Through this illegal trade the guerrillas and

paramilitaries were able to increase their wealth and power.18 This meant that the

paramilitaries did not require support or owe loyalty to anyone because of their economic

independence. As cocaine became more popular and more profitable, these groups became

more influential and began to expand their reach. The lack of state control that has existed in

Colombia for centuries suddenly became a serious crisis. Paramilitary and guerrillas’ operation
11
“Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics.”
12
Rivera and Duncan, “Colombian Paramilitaries.” Pg. 2,3
13
“Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States.”
14
“Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military - Paramilitary Partnership and the United States.”
15
Livingstone, Inside Colombia. Pg. 134
16
Livingstone. Pg. 135
17
Rivera and Duncan, “Colombian Paramilitaries.”Pg. 2
18
Livingstone Pg. 135; Rivera and Duncan, “Colombian Paramilitaries.” Pg. 2
in regions beyond the government’s control, were now able to threaten to expand into more

territory because of the money they earned from drug rents. This lack of dependence on the

state allowed the paramilitaries to grow, and eventually they began to have more and more ties

to power.

The relationship between the paramilitaries and the Colombian government began to

change in favor of the paramilitaries in the late 1990s and the 2000s, especially under the

presidency of Alvaro Uribe. The relationship between the non-state paramilitaries and the

different levels of the Colombian government – specifically Uribe’s government – became

clearer in 2006 with the “parapolitics” scandal. Alvaro Uribe was the president of Colombia

from 2002-2010, and his presidency saw unprecedented gains against the guerrillas. His actions

are seen by many as critical to bringing the FARC to the negotiating table in 2012 for peace talks

and disarmament.19 The reason his achievements were unprecedented, however, is likely due

to collaboration with paramilitaries such as the AUC, although this has not been proven. 20 This

was not the beginning of the paramilitary influence on the government, however, as under the

presidencies of Gaviria and Samper Convivir organizations were legalized and promoted. 21 A

Convivr is a completely legal private security force, yet in practice they often operated as legal

fronts for otherwise illegal paramilitary activities. The creation and legalization of these groups

gave a huge boost to the legitimacy of the paramilitaries, as they could now have legal

“branches” of their groups. Although the paramilitaries themselves were still illegal, these

Convivirs are the first step towards social acceptance and integration with legal society.
19
Krakowski, “Colombian Paramilitaries Since Demobilization.” Pg. 38
20
Brodzinsky, “Colombia’s ‘parapolitics’ Scandal Casts Shadow over President.”
21
Brittain, “Government, NGOs and the Paramilitary.” Pg. 125
 The administration of President Uribe has in many ways represented this transition

towards acceptance of paramilitaries as a part of life in Colombia. Many members of his

political party were investigated for their ties to the AUC.22 Furthermore, Mario Uribe, Alvaro

Uribe’s cousin, senator and close political ally, was arrested for direct dealings with the AUC,

however he was released in 2012.23 Mario fled to the embassy of Costa Rica after hearing news

of the scandal that alleged that he met with the then leader of the AUC to “plan land-grabs”. 24

This, of course, was a huge blow to Alvaro Uribe politically, as many of the members of his party

were accused of varying levels of involvement with paramilitaries.25 This included Alvaro Uribe

himself, although the allegation towards him seems to be weak at best. There is also evidence

that Alvaro Uribe endorsed a meeting involving Carlos Castano, the leader of the AUC. 26 A

Chiquita Bananas executive stated that not attending the meeting would “antagonize… local

and state government officials”.27 This was in 1997 when Alvaro Uribe was the governor of the

Antioquia province where the meeting took place. The document also states that “it was well

known at the time that… the Governor of the department of Antioquia were campaigning for

the establishment of a Convivr organization”, clearly referring to Uribe.28 Uribe’s time in office

has been controversial because of his alleged links to paramilitaries, however he has always

22
Forero, “Scandal in Colombia Raises Skepticism on Capitol Hill.”
23
“Otorgan libertad condicional a Mario Uribe Escobar.”
24
Brodzinsky, “Colombia’s ‘parapolitics’ Scandal Casts Shadow over President.”
25
Brodzinsky.
26
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6278, CBI-V1-003-000023. Pg 2 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
27
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6278, CBI-V1-003-000023. Pg 2 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
28
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6278, CBI-V1-003-000023. Pg 2 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
polled extremely high in urban areas.29 It was even proposed that he run for a third term as

president.30 This was rightly ruled as unconstitutional by the supreme court, but the mere

proposal of a third term demonstrates his popularity. Uribe has in many ways tested the

willingness of the people to accept the legitimization of paramilitaries, and in this way has

become a dangerous figure. By using the paramilitaries as an aid to the government, Uribe

took huge steps down the road towards trading the security of the state for his own political

gains.

Uribe was also implicated in a US intelligence document that listed him among the most

influential narcotraffickers in Colombia, arousing further suspicion over his links to the ugly side

of Colombian society. A DIA report from 1991 that was released in 2004, provides a list of “the

more important Colombian narco-traffickers contracted by the Cartels”. 31 The validity of this

information has been denied by both the US and Colombian governments, yet it seems unlikely

that the US drug information association would falsify their information.32 The report

damningly describes how Uribe was “dedicated to collaborate with the Medellin Cartel at high

government levels”.33 It also claims, however, that Uribe “attacked all forms of the extradition

treaty”, a treaty that would allow high level narco-traffickers to be extradited to the US for their

crimes.34 This is not true because even though Uribe did initially denounce holding a vote on

29
“Popularity of Colombia’s Uribe Soars after Rescue.”
30
“Popularity of Colombia’s Uribe Soars after Rescue.”
31
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.” Pg 2, accessible
from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB131/dia910923.pdf
32
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.”
33
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.” Pg. 10,
accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB131/dia910923.pdf
34
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.” Pg. 11,
accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB131/dia910923.pdf
the extradition treaty, he claims that this was only due to the timing of the vote in relation to

the general election, not the merits of the treaty.35 Uribe did support extradition, and during

his time in office extradited many narcotraffickers to the US.36 Perhaps the most interesting

claim of this report is the claim that Uribe “has worked for the Medellin Cartel and is a close

personal friend of Pablo Escobar”.37 This claim has never been proven and has been denied by

all relevant parties, yet the fact that it was made is still intriguing. If even part of this report is

true, then the implications are astounding. This demonstrates the potential for paramilitaries

and narcotraffickers to influence government to the extent that they begin to slowly be

legitimized or at least tolerated by the government.

The implications of Uribe’s alleged connections have effects in the United States as well,

due to the support that they have given to his administration. George W. Bush awarded Uribe

with the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2009.38 This was awarded to Uribe after many of the

previous controversies became open knowledge, which lends further legitimacy to his actions.

In this new age of instant communication and political uncertainty, the success or failure of

foreign regimes supported by the US can have significant implications within US politics.

Debates about the success or failure of new polices abroad informs the debate within the US

and the rest of the western world. For example, Venezuela has often been touted as a warning

of the dangers of socialism.39 Colombia may soon be a case study into the success or failure of

35
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.”
36
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.”
37
“U.S. Listed Colombian President Uribe Among ‘Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers’ in 1991.” Pg. 11,
accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB131/dia910923.pdf
38
“Presidential Medal of Freedom Awarded to Uribe | Security Assistance Monitor.”
39
“The Tragic Consequences of Socialism in Venezuela.”
counter insurgency and has already been described as a world leader in this regard. 40 This is

misleading, however, as the success of Colombian counter insurgency has been led by the

army, but it has also been achieved through a slow synthesis of the narcotraffickers,

paramilitaries, and the government. This potential transition away from the Westphalian idea

of the nation state means that the implications that the conflict in Colombia has on the rest of

the world is much larger than it first appears.41 If the conflicts of the next century are not to be

fought between nation states, but rather between non-state interests groups within a state,

then Colombia is a perfect example of this.42 The legitimization or at least acceptance of non-

state actors wielding huge amounts of political influence is what has been happening in

Colombia, and the success or failure of this will potentially determine the viability of this

strategy worldwide.

Into this larger policy debate, Chiquita Bananas represents an interesting side to

examine. Chiquita Bananas International’s subsidiary Banadex was making payments to the

FARC and then to the AUC for “security” for nearly twenty years. 43 This exemplifies the policy

debate around Colombia, namely: can paramilitaries/guerrillas get multinational corporations

to fund and support them, and what can be done to prevent this? Chiquita fits into this

question perfectly, as they were supporting (although no eagerly) paramilitary activity and

unlike Colombian businesses who do the same, the United States could act against them. As

the AUC was able to “convince” a multinational corporation to make payments to them, this

40
Publications, “The United States and Colombia.” Pg. 12
41
Publications. Pg. 1
42
Publications. Pg. 38
43
“The Chiquita Papers.”
began to come dangerously close to undermining the state in a new area; legal business making

payments to this illegal group. If the paramilitaries/guerrillas/narcotraffickers could get

legitimate international businesses to work with them, then it would lend huge credibility to

their operations. The United States, however, designated the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist

Organization in 2001, meaning that these payments were illegal.44 This gave the United States

not only the ability to intervene but necessitated it to do so. “The US government will bring its

full power to bear in the investigation of those who conduct business with designated terrorist

organizations, even if those acts occur outside the United States”.45 This stalwart commitment

to the investigation of Chiquita would peter out, as a settlement was reached that allowed

Chiquita to keep much of their information hidden.46 Although it seems obvious, the decision to

list the AUC as a foreign terrorist organization ensured that the AUC could never gain legitimacy

associated with a government.

Chiquita admitted to the Department of Justice in 2003 that they were making

payments to the AUC. This was done as a good faith move Chiquita thought could potentially

allow them to continue to make the payments.47 After speaking to outside counsel that advised

emphatically that Chiquita should not make any more payments to the AUC, the board had a

meeting and decided to inform the Department of Justice that they had been making these

payments under the threat of violence, implying that if they stopped immediately then their

44
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”
45
“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist
Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
46
“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist
Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
47
“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist
Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
employees and property would be in danger.48 This seems likely as in 1997 a Chiquita executive

meet with Carlos Castano – the leader of the AUC – and Castano made it clear to him that these

payments were not optional.49 The executive described that “although redacted, likely Castano

was polite and made no explicit threats, he sent an unspoken but clear message… Autodefensas

(AUC) expected Banadex to support [the establishment of and make payments to a local]

Convivir, and if Banadex did not, Autodefensas would attack Banadex’s people and property”. 50

The second meeting between AUC and a Banadex executive – likely the same executive – the

AUC again threatened Banadex. The executive explained how he was invited to a meeting that

he “believed he could not refuse to go to”.51 He called the hotel that the meeting was to take

place at “an armed camp” and again restated that “the leader’s unspoken but clear message

was… we know who you are, and you need to make sure Banadex pays when we ask.” 52 These

unspoken threats became a critical part of Chiquita’s defense, but they were not enough to

deter the Department of Justice from prosecuting them.

After disclosing their payments to the AUC and still being prosecuted, the extent of

Chiquita’s good faith tactics was over. Chiquita continued to pay the AUC up to twenty more

times after their confession to the Department of Justice who, despite acknowledging that “the

issue of continued payments was complicated”, the Department of Justice insisted that the
48
“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist
Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
49
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6277, CBI-V1-003-000022, Pg 2 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
50
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6277, CBI-V1-003-000022, Pg 2 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
51
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6278, CBI-V1-003-000023, Pg 3 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
52
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6278, CBI-V1-003-000023, Pg 3 of a memo outlining the origins of the
payments to the AUC, accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20000900.pdf
“payments were illegal and could not continue”.53 Chiquita’s plan now changed from hoping to

have an exception made for them to claiming that these payments were extortion payments as

their defence. In order for these payments to be seen as extortion payments, they needed to

be made under threat and Chiquita needed to have never received any actual benefits from

them. For the first part of this Chiquita had good evidence for, as described previously in the

meetings. Although no explicit threats had been made, the violent nature of the AUC spoke for

itself. The second part of their defense, however, was more controversial. It is hard to say to

what extent Chiquita benefited from the AUC. The AUC’s policy of executing anyone outspoken

in favor of unions or labour organizations, would have kept wages lower than otherwise. This

point was not addressed at all in the investigation.54 Four years after the investigation had

begun, Chiquita reached a settlement for $25 million USD.55 “The Chiquita papers”, the

collective name for the thousands of pages released to the National Security Archive in 2011

following their 2010 inquiry to the Department of Justice, are the documents that potentially

reveal why Chiquita choose to settle.

The evidence found in “the Chiquita Papers” demonstrates that Chiquita did benefit

from the payments, undermining any defense they would have had claiming the payments to

simply be extortion. One document describes how Chiquita “disguised the real purpose of

providing security” and that the “money [is] for info on guerrilla movements; info not given to

53
“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist
Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
54
Rivera and Duncan, “Colombian Paramilitaries” Pg. 12; “#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads
Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
55
“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist
Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.”
the gov’t military”.56 This clearly demonstrates that there was a quid pro quo in place for these

payments to the AUC. Despite using intermediaries and a Convivir, Chiquita had benefited

from, but more importantly, gave legitimacy to the AUC. By proving the AUC with legal (in a

Colombian sense) and legitimate sources of income. Chiquita were headed down the road of

undermining the Colombian state. If the companies that operated in Colombia needed to make

payments to the illegal non-state groups, while not needing to make the same payments to the

central government, then the lines between legitimate state and illegitimate non-state

organizations become very blurry. This was exactly what was proposed during a board meeting

about security costs in 2002. Two of the four proposed options included tax evasion by simply

binging large amounts of cash into Colombia for the payments.57 One of the proposed options

even included bringing the entire $85,000 paid to the AUC into Colombia in cash, and some

con’s listed for this option included “even when it is not required to be reported, bringing that

amount of cash (aprox $7K per month) could give the wrong idea to local authorities, if

detected” and “GM locally reported salary does not match accounting records”. 58 It may never

be known how seriously this particular option was considered, but its mere proposal is

demonstrative of the attempts by Chiquita to undermine the Colombian state directly.

56
“The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6286, CBI-V1-003-000014, Pg. 1 of a notepad describing how Chiquta paid
the AUC through intermediaries and Convivirs, accessible from
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20130408/docs/20000306.pdf, “The Chiquita Papers.” CHIQUITA NSD 6284, CBI-
V1-003-000016, Pg. 3 of a notepad describing how Chiquta paid the AUC through intermediaries and Convivirs,
accessible from https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20130408/docs/20000306.pdf
57
“The Chiquita Papers.” NSD CHIQUITA 2704, CBI-V1-001-001041, Pg. 5 of a PowerPoint describing proposed
methods of hiding the funds to be given to the AUC as security payments for 2003, accessible from
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20030000.pdf
58
“The Chiquita Papers.” NSD CHIQUITA 2696, CBI-V1-001-001049, Pg. 13 of a PowerPoint describing proposed
methods of hiding the funds to be given to the AUC as security payments for 2003, accessible from
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB340/20030000.pdf
 Chiquita Bananas have since filed a lawsuit to have the release of their accounting

records to the National Security Archive revoked, showing the repercussions of the release of

many news stories about their illegal payments to the FARC and AUC. 59 Chiquita has found

themselves in turmoil since the release of “the Chiquita Papers”. This shows that in Colombia,

an international corporation believed that it had to not only deal with the Columbian

government but also deal with illegal organizations in order to operate its business. Chiquita

inadvertently gave legitimacy to the AUC whilst simultaneously taking power away from the

Colombian government. Since the release of the papers, Chiquita has been subject to several

lawsuits, including one that holds Chiquita liable for the deaths of several Americans. 60 This

shows the repercussions of lack of state control in Colombia on international business. This

story is far from complete, however, as no Chiquita employees have ever been persecuted in

either the US or Colombia.61 This highlights the complex nature of the state and non-state

actors in Colombia, as the state is not strong enough to persecute any of these actors

themselves. The influence of the US was well placed, however, forcing Chiquita to make large

payments and resulting in them abandoning their presence in Colombia. This ensures that

Chiquita cannot provide any illegal groups with legitimacy that would be gained from their co-

operation. The Colombian case study is far from over, and the full implications remain to be

seen, however the Chiquita Bananas lawsuit was undoubtedly a significant blow to the goals of

non-state actors such as the AUC, to undermine the state and build their own de facto states

within Colombia.

59
“Chiquita Sues to Block Release of Files on Colombia Terrorist Payments.”
60
“Settlement Reached in Chiquita Case Involving US Deaths.”
61
“The Chiquita 13: Profiles of Banana Officials Accused of Crimes Against Humanity | National Security Archive.”
 The Chiquita Banana International lawsuit was a significant setback to paramilitary and

non-state influences in Colombia, and the relatively gentle hand of the United States in this

highlights the delicacy of the situation. Ever since the formation of the first guerrillas and

paramilitaries in Colombia, the battle between the state for control and the non-state actors for

legitimacy has raged. With the explosion of the cocaine trade in the 1970s and 1980s the

power balance shifted towards the non-state narcotraffickers and paramilitaries. The

administration of President Uribe demonstrates the control and influence that these non-state

groups had and increased their desire for legitimacy. The Chiquita lawsuit, therefore stands as

a mark of what the paramilitaries cannot have: legitimate business dealings with international

corporations. The glass ceiling to non-state political influence is critical to determining how the

story of Colombia will be told, either it will be told as the failure of a state taken over by non-

state groups or told as the eventual success story of the conventional nation state.
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“#07-161: 03-19-07 Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments to a
Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine.” Accessed
November 20, 2019.
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