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Violence and failed leadership of the Mexican Revolution

by Saralynne Liston

Porfirio Diaz served as president of Mexico for seven terms, a lengthy stretch of a military

dictatorship softened by the illusion of fair elections, which in reality were widely considered to

be farcical. Widespread dissatisfaction with the Diaz administration and its policies – including

unequal land distribution and countless economic issues – led to the start of the Mexican

Revolution (Brenner 6). The country’s issues have always primarily been “social and economic,

not political” (Phipps 1).

Diaz, a long-term dictator, first declared himself provisional president November 28, 1876

(Rowe 281). What followed was a span of over three decades of rule which saw the destruction

of local and regional leadership, censoring of the press, a corrupt court system, and a Legislature

comprised of friends and allies who swore loyalty to Diaz (Rowe 286). The handpicked

governors were “usually the biggest landowner or an old military friend,” all of whom enjoyed,

and in most cases, abused dictatorial powers bestowed upon them by Diaz (Brenner 9), although

sham elections for state governors took place to make it appear that they held offices legitimately

(Rowe 286).

As time went on, the elitist society benefitted more and more from the Diaz administration’s

policies (Phipps 2). These elitist and oligarchical policies favored the landowners and

industrialists, and produced an orderly and systematic government with a military spirit (Brenner

6). The elitist population held in high standing with the Diaz administration were gifted large

tracts of land (Phipps 2). An 1894 land law allowed public lands to be purchased at an

inexpensive rate and without acreage limitations. Large landowners began to overtake their

weaker neighbors, oftentimes enclosing the property “held in common by the natives on the
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outskirts of villages.” The Diaz administration, and its Diaz-appointed governors, failed to

protect Mexico’s countrymen, which only intensified their “spirit of sullen discontent” and

compounded the country’s problematic agrarian issues. Any attempt by the lower class to regain

their land was a lost cause due to the country’s corrupt court system which favored the elitists

(Rowe 288-289). Diaz promised agrarian reform to the Mexican people but never followed

through (Phipps 5).

Large estates received tax breaks while small property owners bore the full burden with regard to

taxes. Foreign investors enjoyed the benefit of tax-free concessions for many years, in addition to

a variety machinery that were not subject to customs fees, all while gaining favor in the

country’s court system, and abusing the “cheap and docile labor” provided by Mexico’s

countrymen (Brenner 13-14).

In the early 1900s, the working conditions for agricultural laborers were “almost if not quite

hopeless,” earning a mere 12 to 20 cents (USD) per day, working from sunrise to sunset (Rowe

288). Miners worked for 50 to 60 cents per day, and industrial laborers earned between 40 to 60

cents on a daily basis. These wages provided evidence of a “low standard of life” for Mexico’s

countrymen. While the workers suffered greatly, all the profits went to the elitist population in

Mexico, and abroad. Wages decreased for the country’s lower class during the Diaz

administration’s extended rule, leading to frequent strikes and extreme poverty (Rowe 284).

While labor strikes were quickly squashed in the earlier days of the Diaz administration, these

demonstrations became better organized by the mid-1900s, including the Greene-Cananea

Copper Company strike in Sonora in June 1906 (Brenner 27). A year later, a strike at the textile

works in Rio Blanco turned violent as Diaz sent in troops (Brenner 149). Diaz often used federal

troops to intimidate strikers, and arrested labor leaders.

These two labor strikes, which quickly turned to bloody massacres, “cut short by slaughter,”

further solidified the resentment of state authorities that was felt throughout Mexico (Brenner

27). Bitter opposition developed in the laboring classes due to the government’s attitude toward

labor unions and strikes. Instead of appreciating and recognizing the industrial awakening and

economic success of Mexico, the Diaz administration instead glared at labor unions with disdain

and viewed strikes as mere insubordination. This growing resentment of state authorities

throughout Mexico was an important factor in countrymen turning against the Diaz

administration (Rowe 287).

In 1908, Diaz appeared to realize the end was near merely because of his advanced age. Two

years prior, he had re-established the vice presidency, and tapped Ramon Corral to the post, and

he was seen as the heir apparent to the presidency (Brenner 21). In a 1908 interview, Diaz

indicated that he would be receptive to the introduction of a government with democratic

principles, saying the country had long been ready for it (Brenner 18). He appeared indifferent to

running for a seventh term as president, noting he would welcome real opposition in the next

election.

Sensing an opening, Francisco Madero, a liberal from an upper-class family, announced his

candidacy. He was an idealist, “coming to deliver the poor and give them the land,” an issue seen

as one of the country’s most profound (Brenner 17). At first, Madero aspired to be vice

president, thinking he could position himself as heir to Diaz (Brenner 20). At 80 years old, Diaz

changed his mind and ran for reelection in what appeared to be a rigged presidential election.

Diaz had Madero jailed and won the election in June 1910.

A frustrated Mexican population was unconvinced of Diaz’s victory (Cabrera 11). Madero felt

ousting Diaz could lead to various freedoms that prior to Diaz were rarely even imagined:
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freedom of the press and speech, and free and fair elections, thus creating a population of “happy

and free people” (Phipps 3-4). Uprising had grown widespread throughout the country by 1910

as the poorer population realized they were helpless. Any real change to their benefit, they

believed, likely could not be achieved through peaceful means (Cabrera 11).

Realizing this, Madero called for a revolution to overthrow the Diaz administration. The revolt

initially failed, but small armies in northern Mexico, led by Pascual Orozco and Pancho Villa,

began raiding government stations (Brenner 29). In the south, another rebel leader, Emiliano

Zapata, led a bloody military campaign against Diaz’s rural political leaders. Diaz’s military

forces had deteriorated over time as convicts were condemned to military service, resulting in

“halfhearted” efforts against the motivated revolutionary forces. With his extensive military

background, Diaz tried to direct every action of the military while in the safety of his palace.

This practice, coupled with aging military advisers and ignorance with “modern military tactics”

made any meaningful response to the inspired revolutionary forces doomed to fail (Rowe 291).

The names Venustiano Carranza, Orozco, Villa and Zapata became synonymous with the term

“revolution.” Carranza, in northeastern Mexico, was a lawyer and rancher who had been a

senator in the Diaz congress. He hoped the revolution would break the monopolies that plagued

the country. Villa, a former cattle rustler and pack driver, covered the northwest territories

including Chihuahua and Durango (Brenner 176). In the south, Zapata, who was once kidnapped

into the Diaz army, possessed a “pure hatred for the great landed proprietors” of the country

(Brenner 179).

Revolutionary forces led by Orozco and Villa attacked and captured Ciudad Juarez in the spring

of 1911 (Rowe 293). With the Federal Army battered and defeated by northern revolutionary

forces, the Treaty of Ciudad Juarez, which required Diaz to resign, was signed May 21, 1911.
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Four days later, Diaz was out and went into exile (Rowe 281).

Madero experienced difficulties from the outset of his presidency, seeing only the political side

of the issues. He believed in constitutional government but failed to recognize the need for

economic reforms in the country. Madero compromised with Diaz holdovers and ruled under the

same laws and procedures as Diaz (Cabrera 13). The country’s poorer population expected

agrarian reform under Madero’s rule, but he instead compromised and appointed several Diaz

sympathizers to his cabinet, a grave mistake that prevented any worthwhile reform (Phipps 4-5).

He was doomed to fail because he didn’t bring about any real measurable change. Orozco and

Zapata, once Madero supporters, turned on the president due to lack of urgency in implementing

new reforms in Mexico. Zapata followers in the south demanded immediate results in terms of

land ownership. Those demands went unheeded (Brenner 182). In response to demands falling

on deaf ears, Zapata drafted the “Plan de Ayala,” effectively rebelling against Madero.

Victoriano Huerta, a general with Madero’s Federal Army, at first crushed the Orozco rebellion

in April 1912. There were other rebellions, including one led by Felix Diaz, the nephew of

Porfirio. He was broken out of prison by plotting generals against Madero, a mere 15 months

after he became president (Brenner 32). The younger Diaz led rebel forces who clashed with

federal troops in Mexico City, led by Huerta, who for many years served in the elder Diaz’s

military. This intense fighting became known as the “Ten Tragic Days,” from Feb. 9-19, 1913

(Brenner 33). On the ninth day, Felix Diaz and Huerta met with United States Ambassador

Henry Lane Wilson (serving under U.S. President William Howard Taft) and agreed to conspire

against Madero and install Huerta as president. He assumed power on the 10th day as president,

and Madero and his vice president were arrested, and shot days later (Brenner 34).

Huerta’s rule as president brought along with it further civil unrest. Seen as an inefficient ruler
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and repressive, he attempted to “reestablish exactly the same old conditions that existed” during

the Diaz administration (Cabrera 13). Huerta dissolved the Legislature and established a military

dictatorship. In Coahuila, the Legislature openly opposed Huerta’s rise to power, deeming it

unconstitutional. Other Mexican states openly favored Carranza, who was governor of Coahuila

(Brenner 37). Huerta was collectively opposed by the Constitutionalist giants at the forefront of

the revolution: Carranza, Villa, Zapata, and Alvaro Obregon. Within a year, their followers had

decimated Huerta’s federal soldiers in roughly 75% of Mexico. No agreement existed between

the different rebel forces; they only had a common enemy: Huerta (Brenner 195).

The U.S. government was no fan of the Huerta regime either. Newly elected U.S. President

Woodrow Wilson, just weeks after taking office, called for Huerta’s dismissal, in spite of

Ambassador Wilson, who was at least partially responsible for Huerta’s rise to power. President

Wilson would not recognize the Huerta government since he did not assume office by

constitutional means (Clark 23). He found Huerta to be unfit for office, and instead wanted free

elections without Huerta on the ballot and peace throughout Mexico. Without these concessions,

Mexico would not benefit from any U.S. monetary loans (Brenner 38). President Wilson

attempted to reformulate the U.S. law of recognition by introducing a “constitutionality”

requirement (Henderson 158). Further opposing the Huerta regime, President Wilson permitted

the sales of munitions from the U.S. to rebel forces in Mexico, while embargoing shipments

headed to Huerta’s army in February 1914. U.S. Marines and naval contingents, stationed off the

coast preventing a German ship from delivering munitions to Huerta’s regime, were later

temporarily detained by Mexican officials after coming ashore for water. President Wilson,

dissatisfied with Huerta’s unwillingness to make amends, sent U.S. troops to seize Veracruz on

April 21, 1914; they stayed for roughly six months (Brenner 45-46).
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By this time, rebel forces continued to topple federal garrisons, and in April 1914, Huerta

maintained power in and around Mexico City, and a “small piece of Mexico open toward the

Gulf” – the oil coast (Brenner 45). With rebel forces closing in, Huerta in July 1914 hitched a

ride on the Ypiranga, a German ship, as rebel forces marched into Mexico City. This marked the

end of the Federal Army, as its remnants were scraped and replaced by the revolutionary troops

(Brenner 47).

When Huerta was finally defeated and the Constitutionalists gained control of the capital, it was

thought that the bloodshed of the Mexican Revolution would cease, but more destruction

followed (Cabrera 14). Revolutionary generals agreed to meet in an effort to establish a new

government, but with mixed results. The group agreed that General Eulalio Gutierrez would

serve as interim president. Once united to oust Huerta, the rebel forces then turned on each other.

Carranza, from Coahuila, was a former Diaz administration senator and controlled northeast

Mexico. His adviser, Luis Cabrera, wanted the revolution to combat the monopoly plaguing the

country, hoping that in doing so, a strong middle class of Mexican countrymen who could excel

as businessmen, farmers, professionals, and industrialists could emerge (Brenner 40). Carranza

took office on August 13, 1914, as president, and Villa quickly opposed the move. Villa and

Zapata had not attended the convention of generals in Mexico City, and formed an alliance while

Obregon supported Carranza. A handful of revolutionary leaders were all vying for power, with

Carranza in Veracruz, Obregon in Mexico City, Villa in Chihuahua and Zapata’s supporters

staked out in Morelos.

Rebel leaders organized another convention – the Aguascalientes convention – on November 1,

1914. Obregon, Villa, and Zapata agreed that competition between Villa and Carranza made

stability an impossibility. The convention, however, failed, and Obregon sided with Carranza,
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and five bloody years of battle on Mexican soil followed (Brenner 49). The Carranza

administration still had its enemies, with Villa lurking in the north and Zapata down south. When

Obregon’s army would occupy a town, he “levied taxes” and took food and money for his

military, and in some cases, to help the lower class (Brenner 50).

Zapata and Villa suffered substantial military losses, as Obregon’s forces toppled Villa’s army in

the April 1915 Battle of Celaya. The decisive victory provided Carranza with stable military

forces and solid footing as a political leader. Midway through 1915, Villa’s forces had retreated

home to the north, and in the fall, the U.S. recognized Carranza’s government (Brenner 52).

Personal and political issues between the rebels and those in power continued, however, as

Carranza declared the revolution was finished. His counterparts, including Obregon, who was

drifting further and further away from Carranza, felt otherwise (Brenner 53). Carranza fell short

of appeasing the rebels, with some claiming his principles had moved too far from the

revolution. Advisers warned Carranza that his government would fail if he continued to enforce

past policies, and active military leaders of the revolution objected to the influence wielded by

Carranza’s civilian peers (Cumberland 289).

Villa, who blamed U.S. President Wilson due to his support of Carranza, had executed over a

dozen U.S. citizens in Santa Isabel in January 1916. Villa forces later raided Columbus, New

Mexico, on March 9, 1916, leading to the deaths of over a dozen Americans. Rather than hold

the Carranza administration responsible, the U.S. instead sent General John Pershing and 10,000

U.S. troops into Mexico where they unsuccessfully chased Villa forces in northern Mexico for

nearly a year before withdrawing in February 1917 (Brenner 57).

By 1917, Carranza’s power was waning; his administration controlled most of the Mexican

states, but he was opposed by an alliance of Obregon followers to the north, “agrarian-labor
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generals,” and Zapata’s supporters in the south. This alliance attended a convention in Queretaro,

called for by Carranza, in an effort to steady his position by amending the constitution (Brenner

54). What resulted was a revolutionary state charter with agrarian reforms as more radical

thinkers demanded more “fundamental change” in the constitution (Cumberland 289). While a

land decree in January 1915 by Carranza laid the groundwork for future agrarian reform

(Cumberland 287), the revolutionary charter declared that the country’s land and productive

resources belonged to the state but would be held as private property except when “public

interest requires otherwise.” The mineral rights would belong to Mexico and could only be

leased to private entities. Workers rights were also addressed, specifically labor laws, the eight-

hour work day, and fair pay regardless of sex or nationality. Idle lands would be returned to their

owners, and farmers who previously had their land taken away from prior administrations were

able to petition for its return (Brenner 54).

The constitution was drafted in January 1917, promulgated the next month, and Carranza was

elected in March to serve as president until December 1, 1920 (Cumberland 289). While

Carranza was honest, his administration was still corrupt and unable to appease Mexico’s

countrymen (Brenner 220). Generals in the south targeted Zapata followers who refused to fall in

line. Zapata openly opposed Carranza, and after failed negotiations, was assassinated April 10,

1919. His body was displayed in Cuautla, the capital of Morelos (Brenner 58).

The seeds for the last successful coup were planted by Carranza. Obregon, the Constitutionalist

general who defeated Villa, appeared to be the heir apparent to the presidency, but Carranza

believed the time had come for a civilian to be president, rather than someone with a military

background. His choice was Ignacio Bonillas, the country’s ambassador to the U.S. Obregon,

aligned with fellow Sonoran generals Plutarco Elias Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta, opposed
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Carranza’s choice. Government supporters sought to silence Obregon and his followers, and

Obregon realized Carranza would never leave peacefully. Realizing an attack was imminent,

Carranza loaded up a train with government officials, soldiers, and booty, and headed east to

Veracruz. They made it as far as Rinconada before rebel forces attacked. Carranza was

assassinated May 21, 1920 (Brenner 59-60).

In the interim, de la Huerta served as provisional president following Carranza’s death and held

office until Obregon was elected to the presidency (Brenner 76). De la Huerta helped negotiate

Villa’s retirement in July 1920 as he retreated with his last 200 soldiers to a quiet ranch in

Canutillo, Chihuahua (Hansis 214). De la Huerta would later serve in Obregon’s cabinet as head

of the treasury (Brenner 69).

While armed regional conflicts were rampant throughout the previous decade, Obregon’s

presidency ushered in a new era for Mexico. Obregon distributed power in government in a way

that has been emulated ever since by each successive presidential administration. He believed

that active military personnel should not participate in government, instead choosing to rely on

and trust the judgement of educated civilians (Brenner 62-63). Obregon combatted broken

railroads, repeatedly decimated during the heavier rebellion years; he promised improved

infrastructure throughout the country (Brenner 229). When the U.S. recognized the Obregon

government on August 31, 1923, but refused to provide a loan, the Obregon administration set up

a government-controlled national bank to help fund the government.

Improving upon his predecessors’ failures, Obregon’s army twice defended itself against two

attempted coups. A group of generals, unceremoniously relieved of duties in 1920, united

roughly two years later in the failed Murguia Revolt against Obregon’s loyal Federal Army. The

more profound attempted coup – the de la Huerta Revolt – was another violent debate over
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presidential succession (Hansis 209).

Obregon favored Calles, his old Sonoran general comrade. His only serious threat was de la

Huerta, but Calles went on to win the presidential election with Obregon’s backing (Brenner 76).

De la Huerta was joined by upset military officers and political dissidents on a scale larger than

the Murguia Revolt, but the larger insurrection still failed. These two failed coups likely deterred

future rebellions, which became more and more minor as time wore on (Hansis 209).

Revolutionary leaders from 1910-1920 recognized that peace would never be fully achieved in

the country if past mistakes were not remedied. Up to September 1, 1921, well over 400,000

acres of land had been “transferred to the villages and communities by way of restitution.” An

additional 1,462,293 acres were granted by the government as well. New provisions in the

constitution, including labor organization and land ownership rights, would lead to

improvements in Mexico and prevent monopolies from plaguing the country (Phipps 13-14). The

Mexican Revolution, as Phipps writes, was the beginning of a long, and unfortunately destructive

process, to right past wrongs against the country’s citizens. After years of political and

philosophical theories that fell short of appeasing the masses, Mexico could have a fresh start

(Phipps 18).
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Annotated Bibliography
Brenner, Anita. “The Wind That Swept Mexico.” Austin, Texas. University of Texas Press,
Austin. Copyright 1943, renewed 1971, ninth paperback printing 2011. Kindle.

Author Anita Brenner was born in 1905 in Mexico and was raised and educated in the United
States before returning to her homeland in the 1920s following the Mexican Revolution. She
spent the next two decades immersed in the Mexican arts and anthropology. Brenner’s fourth
book, published in 1943, was “The Wind That Swept Mexico.” According to the publisher, at the
time of its release, it was “widely recognized as one of the most powerful and discerning
pictorial histories ever published” as it features historical photographs assembled by George R.
Leighton (publisher’s foreword). Its importance on both sides of the border cannot be overstated
as to that point, it was the first widely available work other than scholarly journal studies to be
published (in either English or Spanish) covering the Mexican Revolution.

––––

Cabrera, Luis. “The Mexican Revolution: Its Causes, Purposes and Results.” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 69, January 1917, pp. 1-17. JSTOR,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3804613. Accessed 17 April 2023.

Published in 1917, this work provides a more in-depth look at the Mexican Revolution at the
time it was happening, particularly countering journalistic coverage in the United States, which
was typically articulated in a negative light. Cabrera was a vocal critic of Porfirio Diaz and his
regime, particularly in its later years. Under Venustiano Carranza, Cabrera wrote this work as
minister of finance in Mexico, and chairman of the Mexican Section of the American and
Mexican Joint Commission. Cabrera seeks to shed his role as diplomat while writing this paper,
instead explaining the issues which have agitated his countrymen during the revolution, such as
lack of education of the indigenous population, agrarian problems due to geography and ethnical
conditions, and multiple industrial and political problems.

––––

Clark, Mary Edmond. “Exemplary Service: The U.S. Army in Vera Cruz, 1914.” Army History,
no. 18, spring 1991, pp. 23-26. Published by U.S. Army Center of Military History. JSTOR,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26302838. Accessed 17 April 2023.

This work provides an examination of the United States’ occupation of Veracruz in 1914,
illustrating how the new U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, opposed Victoriano Huerta when he
unconstitutionally took office in Mexico. This paper also covers Wilson’s support for Venustiano
Carranza, and the measures the U.S. military presence took to demonstrate Wilson’s concern for
the Mexican people and their right to enjoy a constitutional form of government.

––––

Cumberland, Charles E. “‘Dr. Atl’ and Venustiano Carranza.” The Americas, vol. 13, no. 3,
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January 1957, pp. 287-296. JSTOR, https://jstor.org/stable/978949. 18 April 2023.

Published in 1957, Cumberland’s work takes a look at the Mexican Revolution, more
specifically the time of Venustiano Carranza, decades after the fact. The paper explores
Carranza’s efforts to address agrarian reform and redraft the country’s constitution and shows
that certain failures within his administration led to its ouster.

––––

Hansis, Randall. “The Political Strategy of Military Reform: Alvaro Obregon and Revolutionary
Mexico, 1920-1924.” The Americas, vol. 36, no. 2, October 1979, pp. 199-233. JSTOR,
https://jstor.org/stable/980747. Accessed 18 April 2023.

Published over 50 years after the fact, Hansis examines the reforms Obregon employed in his
military, which in turn was able to successfully defend Obregon during his presidency. Prior to
that point, revolutionary factions that had revolted against federal armies had largely succeeded
in their efforts. This paper shows that while past successful military campaigns by revolutionary
forces would inspire rebels to continue to work to overthrow a current administration, the quick
dismissal of rebel forces during Obregon’s administration deterred any small pockets of rebel
forces that still existed.

––––

Henderson, Peter V. N. “Woodrow Wilson, Victoriano Huerta, and the Recognition Issue in
Mexico.” The Americas, vol. 41, no. 2, October 1984, pp. 151-176. JSTOR,
https://jstor.org/stable/1007454. Accessed 21 April 2023.

This work takes a sharp look at the evolution of the law of recognition, specifically as U.S.
President Woodrow Wilson did not recognize the government of Victoriano Huerta, a dictator
who the American president deemed unfit to lead the Mexican people. The paper shows that
Wilson’s creative use of the recognition laws, including the introduction of a constitutionality
requirement, and selling arms to constitutionalist forces while embargoing Huerta’s shipments,
led to his government’s downfall.

––––

Phipps, Helen. “The Agrarian Phase of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920.” Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 1, March 1924, pp. 1-18. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2142681.
Accessed 24 April 2023.

This work explores the widespread abuse of Mexico’s poorer population as they routinely had
their land taken away from them by more influential persons. The author points out that while
more than one Mexican president promised agrarian reform, they would typically fail to live up
to their promises after assuming office, until reform began to take place toward the end of the
revolution.
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––––

Rowe, L.S. “The Mexican Revolution: Its Causes and Consequences.” Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, June 1912, pp. 281-297. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2141244.
Accessed 17 April 2023.

Published in 1912, Rowe provides a real-time perspective of the end of Porfirio Diaz’s
dictatorship, the emergence of Francisco Madero, and the wide range of issues Madero inherited.
Rowe’s work describes the changes the country experienced under Diaz, as well as some of the
causes that initially led to the revolution.