PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)

RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)

X. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
The State shall also promote openness to life; Provided, That parents bring forth to the world only those
children whom they can raise in a truly humane way.
Brown, Emerson, Falk, Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J 872; 936-954 (1971)
SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. – This Act declares the following as guiding principles:
Sec. 2, Sec. 3, Sec.4 (g)(h)(i)(p)(q)(s) (v), Sec 7, Sec. 8, RA 10354 (RH Law)
(a) The right to make free and informed decisions, which is central to the exercise of any right, shall not
be subjected to any form of coercion and must be fully guaranteed by the State, like the right itself;
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
(b) Respect for protection and fulfillment of reproductive health and rights which seek to promote the
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
rights and welfare of every person particularly couples, adult individuals, women and adolescents;
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
(c) Since human resource is among the principal assets of the country, effective and quality
reproductive health care services must be given primacy to ensure maternal and child health, the health
Pursuant to the declaration of State policies under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children, and sound replacement rate, in line with the
Constitution, it is the duty of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
State’s duty to promote the right to health, responsible parenthood, social justice and full human
social institution and equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
development;
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of women especially mothers in particular and of
the people in general and instill health consciousness among them. The family is the natural and
(d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient, effective
fundamental unit of society. The State shall likewise protect and advance the right of families in
and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the promotion of people’s right
particular and the people in general to a balanced and healthful environment in accord with the rhythm
to health, especially those of women, the poor, and the marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a
and harmony of nature. The State also recognizes and guarantees the promotion and equal protection
component of basic health care;
of the welfare and rights of children, the youth, and the unborn.
(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
Moreover, the State recognizes and guarantees the promotion of gender equality, gender equity,
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe,
women empowerment and dignity as a health and human rights concern and as a social responsibility.
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
The advancement and protection of women’s human rights shall be central to the efforts of the State to
research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized
address reproductive health care.
as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization:
Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of
The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and
in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
their religious convictions;
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
(f) The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
demands of responsible parenthood;
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
(b) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
convictions: Provided, That no one shall be deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
children; (2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership
among national government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design,
(c) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered programs to
enhance the quality of life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic
(d) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
trends including demographic dividends from sound population policies towards sustainable human
policies and programs
development in keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and children, born
and unborn and the promotion and protection of women’s reproductive rights and health; and (5)
The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
conduct scientific studies to determine the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, supplies which do not
reproductive health care development;
prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and relevant information and education thereon according to the priority needs of women, children and
(g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority to poor
other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those identified through the National
beneficiaries as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other government measures of
marginalization must be the primary responsibility of the national government consistent with its
identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of reproductive health care, services
obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to health and the right to life;
and supplies for free. ■ •

The State shall eradicate discriminatory practices, laws and policies that infringe on a person’s exercise
of reproductive health rights.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
(h) The State shall respect individuals’ preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in (i) Male responsibility refers to the involvement, commitment, accountability and responsibility of males
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State’s in all areas of sexual health and reproductive health, as well as the care of reproductive health
obligations under various human rights instruments; concerns specific to men.

(i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs), women’s and people’s organizations, (p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and
civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the its functions and processes. This implies that people are able to have a responsible, safe, consensual
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized; and satisfying sex life, that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when,
and how often to do so. This further implies that women and men attain equal relationships in matters
(j) While this Act recognizes that abortion is illegal and punishable by law, the government shall ensure related to sexual relations and reproduction.
that all women needing care for post-abortive complications and all other complications arising from
pregnancy, labor and delivery and related issues shall be treated and counseled in a humane, (q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
nonjudgmental and compassionate manner in accordance with law and medical ethics; supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related
problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
(k) Each family shall have the right to determine its ideal family size: Provided, however, That the State relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
shall equip each parent with the necessary information on all aspects of family life, including (1) Family planning information and services which shall include as a first priority making women of
reproductive health and responsible parenthood, in order to make that determination; reproductive age fully aware of their respective cycles to make them aware of when fertilization is highly
probable, as well as highly improbable;
(l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health; (2) Maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including breastfeeding;

(m) Gender equality and women empowerment are central elements of reproductive health and (3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
population and development;
(4) Adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and counseling;
(n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, especially the poor, and
allocations thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the unborn is protected; (5) Prevention, treatment and management of reproductive tract infections (RTIs), HIV and AIDS and
other sexually transmittable infections (STIs);
(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and integration of policies,
plans, programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people, more particularly the (6) Elimination of violence against women and children and other forms of sexual and gender-based
poor, the needy and the marginalized; and violence;

(p) That a comprehensive reproductive health program addresses the needs of people throughout their (7) Education and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health;
life cycle.
(8) Treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers and other gynecological conditions and
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as disorders;
follows:
(9) Male responsibility and involvement and men’s reproductive health;
(g) Gender equality refers to the principle of equality between women and men and equal rights to
enjoy conditions in realizing their full human potentials to contribute to, and benefit from, the results of (10) Prevention, treatment and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction;
development, with the State recognizing that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.
It entails equality in opportunities, in the allocation of resources or benefits, or in access to services in (11) Reproductive health education for the adolescents; and
furtherance of the rights to health and sustainable human development among others, without
discrimination. (12) Mental health aspect of reproductive health care.

(h) Gender equity refers to the policies, instruments, programs and actions that address the (s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
disadvantaged position of women in society by providing preferential treatment and affirmative action. It responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
entails fairness and justice in the distribution of benefits and responsibilities between women and men, other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
and often requires women-specific projects and programs to end existing inequalities. This concept information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
recognizes that while reproductive health involves women and men, it is more critical for women’s health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
health. abortifacients.

A. Cohabitation, mutual love and respect, mutual help and support

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Art. 247, RPC "2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
Article 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon "Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. reclusion perpetua.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. "Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
parents. become reclusion perpetua to death.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise "When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Art. 68, FC "When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, "The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
and render mutual help and support. aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

Art. 34 NCC "l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
ARTICLE 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or spouse of the parent of the victim;
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable
for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action "2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or
herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence penal institution;
shall suffice to support such action.
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives
Sec. 2, RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) within the third civil degree of consanguinity;

Section 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a "4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally
Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new
chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows: "5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

"Chapter Three "6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
"Rape (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and
the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military units
"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the
offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; mutilation or disability;

"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and "9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime; and
"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. "10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the It includes, but is not limited to:
penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
reclusion temporal. victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman
or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
perpetua.
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/
qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article. C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the
victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be
extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in
any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him 1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
under Article 266-A." serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

Sec. 2-6,8,21,26,35, RA 9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004) 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the 3. destroying household property;
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. 4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the (b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the
Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms physical and psychological or emotional distress.
of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. (c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or or indirectly or a combination thereof.
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in (e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a
the following acts: business or social context is not a dating relationship.

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
common child. causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is
willing temporarily to receive the victim. (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his
of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological will;
children of the victim and other children under her care.
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman
SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of or her child; and
victims of violence against women and their children.
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5
hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code;
or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the
child's movement or conduct: prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no
case be lower than arresto mayor.
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; (d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or (e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money,
or properties; (f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
decisions; child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00);
the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to
the court.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of (k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any
granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of designated family or household member consents to such relief.
safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal
provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order
(TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; Act must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without
permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects need of an application.
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has
gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence; Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.
at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment,
or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member; SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under
effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the Revised Penal Code.
the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman
respondent's removal of personal belongings; syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. against women and their children shall have the following rights:
Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same (a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the
remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the (b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal
respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court; assistance office;

(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and (c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs'
order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including
revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the (d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and
offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall
direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter; (e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a
protection order.
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income; Sec. 19, RA 9710 (Magna Carta of Woment)

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and SECTION 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. — The State
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations and shall ensure:
6
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to under the
Family Code without prejudice to personal or religious beliefs; (4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same
consent. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect; shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.

(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights; to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the
share due from them.
(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to
choose freely a profession and an occupation; When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally
obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established
(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership, in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property; child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred.

(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether CASES:
formal or customary; and
Garcia v. Santiago, supra
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The
State shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the FACTS:
husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or 1. April 8, 1910- alleged date of marriage between the plaintiff, Cipriana Garcia and the defendant,
force upon her the nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other countries concerning dual Isabelo Santiago.
citizenship that may be enjoyed equally by women and men shall likewise be considered. 2. February 3, 1925- the date when the plaintiff was compelled to leave her conjugal dwelling due to
continued family dissensions.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, that they do not discriminate against women. 3. Alejo Santiago (Defendant No. 2)
-Son of Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1)
Arts. 68 & 70, FC Compared with Art. 111, CC -allegedly seduced Prisca Aurelio
4. Prisca Aurelio
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, –daughter of Cipriana Garcia (the Plaintiff)
and render mutual help and support. -gave birth to a child that was allegedly Alejo Santiago’s child
5. Isabelo Santiago
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support -failed to see the vindication of the honor of Prisca Aurelio, the plaintiff’s daughter by requiring his son
and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, to marry her.
from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income - refused to get involved with the matter, thus seemingly countenancing the illicit relations between his
or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. son and the plaintiff’s daughter
-has allegedly conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latter’s whims &
COMPARE WITH ART 111 caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her rights. Some of these properties include lands acquired
during the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership.
Article 111. The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. These -publicly maintained illicit relationship with Geronima Yap
expenses shall be met first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from 6. February 3, 1925
the wife's paraphernal property. In case there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage -separation of the plaintiff and defendant.
settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute proportionately to the family expenses. -the separation was necessary to avoid personal violence
7. Isabelo Santiago-continually refused to provide for the plaintiff’s support
Arts. 199-200, FC 8. Cipriana Garcia (the plaintiff)-could not live in their conjugal dwelling because of the illicit relationship
between her daughter, Prisca Aurelio and Alejo Santiago, countenanced by the other defendant,
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the Isabelo Santiago.
following persons in the order herein provided: -demanded that she is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership
-claimed that her husband, Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1) has shown himself unfit to administer
(1) The spouse; the property of conjugal partnership and the court should therefore order its administration to be placed
in her hands
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
ISSUE/RATIONALE:
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
1. Whether their separation is unjustified Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The
NO. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
her to leave the house & threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Prisca’s situation is embarrassing for
her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could The above quoted provision of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
lead to further quarrels. obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to assist, and support each other. the husband
2. Whether transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when
NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidence even show that it he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband
was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage. who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving
3.Whether Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance and maintaining her in his own home.
NO. That’s too much. P50.00 would be enough.
4. Whether Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal property The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
NO. No sufficient reason found to deprive him of this right. obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
5. Whether Cipriana is entitled to an allowance of attorney’s fees natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern
NO. to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his
wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and
HELD: payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of that term, but
That the judgment appealed from is therefore modified. Separation is allowed. Isabelo is ordered to rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign.
provide Cipriana with a P50.00 monthly allowance to be paid within the first 10 days of the month. No This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as
costs allowed where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.
the pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252 (1916) public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
Facts: This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
From a judgment sustaining the defendants demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect
complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
declined to amend, the latter appealed. It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the
defendants' cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:
of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant. Note:
The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
 The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when he has no other remedy,
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to
about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. he pertinent allegations of furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and
the complaint are as follows: maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same.

"That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her MORELAND, J., concurring:
that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the I based my vote in this case upon the ground that a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal,
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his
refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed duties thereunder. In law and for all purposes within its purview, the wife still remains an inmate of the
and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was conjugal domicile; for I regard it as a principle of law universally recognized that where a person by his
unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from wrongful and illegal acts creates a condition which under ordinary circumstances would produce the
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her loss of rights or status pertaining to another, the law will, whenever necessary to protect fully the rights
parents." or status of the person affected by such acts, regard the condition by such acts created as not existing
Issue: W/N Eloisa Goitia may compel her husband to give her support, even outside of the conjugal and will recur to and act upon the original situation of the parties to determine their relative rights or the
home. status of the person adversely affected.

Ruling: Yes. Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E. 2d 221 (1985)

Ratio: "When a woman says I do, does she give up her right to say I won't?"[1] This question does not pose
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the the real question, because *152 rape[2] and aggravated sodomy are not sexual acts of an ardent
pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right husband performed upon an initially apathetic wife,[3] they are acts of violence that are accompanied
to the same." with physical and mental abuse and often leave the victim with physical and psychological damage that
is almost always long lasting. [4] Thus we find the more appropriate question: When a woman says "I
8
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
do" in Georgia does she give up her right to State protection from the violent acts of rape and death do us part." Wives were subservient to their husbands, her identity was merged into his, her
aggravated sodomy performed by her husband. The answer is no.[5] We affirm. property became his property, and she took his name for her own.

The appellant, Daniel Steven Warren, was indicted by a Fulton County Grand Jury for the rape and There have been dramatic changes in women's rights and the status of women and marriage. Today
aggravated sodomy of his wife. They were living together as husband and wife at the time. The our State Constitution provides that, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by
appellant filed a pre-trial general demurrer and motion to dismiss the indictment. After a hearing, the due process," (emphasis supplied) Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I, and "protection to person and property is the
motions were denied. The appellant sought and was issued a certificate of immediate review and filed paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete. No person shall be denied the
an *153 application for an interlocutory appeal which was granted by this court. equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis supplied.) Art. I, Sec. II, Par. II. Our State Constitution also
provides that each spouse has a right to retain his or her own property. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXVII. Our
1. The appellant asserts that there exists within the rape statute an implicit marital exclusion that makes statutory laws provide that, "[t]he rights of citizens include, without limitation, the following: (1) The right
it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife. of personal security, [and] (2) The right of personal liberty ..." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 1-2-6.
Women in Georgia "are entitled to the privilege of the elective franchise and have the right to hold any
Until the late 1970's there was no real examination of this apparently widely held belief. Within the last civil office or perform any civil function as fully and completely as do male citizens." OCGA § 1-2-7.
few years several jurisdictions have been faced with similar issues and they have decided that under Couples who contemplate marriage today may choose either spouse's surname or a combination of
certain circumstances a husband can be held criminally liable for raping his wife. See Commonwealth v. both names for their married *155 surname, OCGA § 19-3-33.1. No longer is a wife's domicile
Chretien, Mass., 417 NE2d 1203 (1981); State v. Smith, N.J. 426 A2d 38 (1981); State v. Smith, Fla. presumed to be that of her husband, OCGA § 19-2-3 and no longer is the husband head of the family
App., 401 S2d 1126 (1981); People v. De Stefano, 467 NY2d 506 (Co.Ct. 1983); State v. Rider, 449 with the wife subject to him. OCGA § 19-3-8. Marriages are revocable without fault by either party,
S2d 903 (Fla. App. 3rd Dist. 1984); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 SE2d 847 (Va. 1984); People v. OCGA § 19-5-3 (13); either party, not just the husband, can be required to pay alimony upon divorce,
Liberta, 485 NYS2d 207 (Ct.App. 1984). OCGA § 19-6-1; and both parties have a joint and several duty to provide for the maintenance,
protection, and education of their children, OCGA § 19-7-2. Couples may write antenuptial agreements
What is behind the theory and belief that a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife? There are in which they are able to decide, prior to marriage, future settlements, OCGA § 19-3-62; and our
various explanations for the rule and all of them flow from the common law attitude toward women, the legislature has recognized that there can be violence in modern family life and it has enacted special
status of women and marriage. Perhaps the most often used basis for the marital rape exemption is the laws to protect family members who live in the same household from one another's violent acts, Ga. L.
view set out by Lord Hale[6] in 1 Hale P.C. 629. It is known as Lord Hale's contractual theory. The 1981, p. 880; OCGA § 10-13-1 et seq.
statement attributed to Lord Hale used to support the theory is: "but a husband cannot be guilty of a
rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the Today, many couples write their own marriage vows in which they specifically decide the terms of their
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retreat." marriage contract. Certainly no normal woman who falls in love and wishes "`to marry, establish a home
and bring up children' . . . a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, [cits.]"
There is some thought that the foundation of his theory might well have been the subsequent marriage (emphasis supplied) Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (98 SC 673, 54 LE2d 618) (1978), would
doctrine of English law, wherein the perpetrator could, by marrying his victim, avoid rape charges. It knowingly include an irrevocable term to her revocable marriage contract that would allow her husband
was thus argued as a corollary, rape within the marital relationship would result in the same immunity. to rape her. Rape "is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the
[7] personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim. ... Short of homicide, it is the `ultimate violation of
self.'" Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (97 SC 2861, 53 LE2d 982) (1977). It is incredible to think
Another theory stemming from medieval times is that of a wife being the husband's chattel or property. that any state would sanction such behavior by adding an implied consent term to all marriage contracts
Since a married woman was part of her husband's property, nothing more than a chattel, rape was that would leave all wives with no protection under the law from the "ultimate violation of self," Coker,
nothing more than a man making use of his own property. supra at 2869, simply because they choose to enter into a relationship that is respected and protected
by the law. The implied consent theory to spousal rape is without logical meaning, and obviously
*154 A third theory is the unity in marriage or unity of person theory that held the very being or legal conflicts with our Constitutional and statutory laws and our regard for all citizens of this State.
existence of a woman was suspended during marriage, or at least was incorporated and consolidated
into that of her husband. In view of the fact that there was only one legal being, the husband, he could One would be hard pressed to argue that a husband can rape his wife because she is his chattel. Even
not be convicted of raping himself. in the darkest days of slavery when slaves were also considered chattel, rape was defined as "the
carnal knowledge of a female whether free or slave, forcibly and against her will." Georgia Code, §
These three theories have been used to support the marital rape exemption. Others have tried to fill the 4248, p. 824 (1863). Both the chattel and unity of identity rationales have been cast aside. "Nowhere in
chasm between these three theories with justifications for continuing the exemption in the face of the common-law world [or] in any modern society is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by
changes in the recognition of women, their status, and the status of marriage. Some of the justifications denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being."
include: Prevention of fabricated charges; Preventing wives from using rape charges for revenge; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52, (100 SC 906, 63 LE2d 186) (1980).
Preventing state intervention into marriage so that possible reconciliation will not be thwarted. A closer
examination of the theories and justifications indicates that they are no longer valid, if they ever had any We find that none of the theories have any validity. The justifications *156 likewise are without efficacy.
validity. There is no other crime we can think of in which all of the victims are denied protection simply because
someone might fabricate a charge; there is no evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys
Hale's implied consent theory was created[8] at a time when marriages were irrevocable and when all with revenge filled trumped-up charges, [9] and once a marital relationship is at the point where a
wives promised to "love, honor, and obey" and all husbands promised to "love, cherish, and protect until husband rapes his wife, state intervention is needed for the wife's protection.[10]

9
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
There never has been an expressly stated marital exemption included in the Georgia rape statute. Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18, 1975 and have 4 children.
Furthermore, our statute never included the word "unlawful" which has been widely recognized as On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the Accused-
signifying the incorporation of the common law spousal exclusion. Commonwealth v. Chretien, supra at Appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998.On December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant
1208. A reading of the statute indicates that there is no marital exclusion. "A person commits the boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. According to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really
offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will." OCGA § 16-6- cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. However, in 1997, he started to be
1. We need not decide whether or not a common law marital exemption became part of our old brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her clothing and, sans any foreplay, penetrate her. His
statutory rape law,[11] because the rape statute that was similar to the common law definition[12] was abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for
specifically repealed in 1968, Ga. L. 1968, p. 1338, and our new broader statute, OCGA § 16-6-1, was her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
enacted in its place which plainly on its face includes a husband. [13]
On October 16, 1998, in the spouse’s bedroom, accused-appellant got angry when KKK refused to lie
*157 2. The appellant contends that there is an implicit marital exclusion within the aggravated sodomy in bed with him because of headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her
statute that makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of an offense of aggravated sodomy reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot KKK was lying on
performed upon his wife. and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she
fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. Accused-appellant then forced KKK into sexual
Sodomy was originally defined as "the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature by intercourse with him.
man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman." Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 787.
The punishment for sodomy was "imprisonment at labor in the penitentiary for and during the natural life On October 17, 1998, KKK decided to sleep on the children’s room. The Accused-appellant attempted
of the person convicted of this destable crime." Id. Laws 1833. to carry her out of the room and transfer KKK to their bedroom. MMM and OOO, their daughters, who
saw this happen, pleaded their father to let KKK stay. Accused-appellant ordered his daughters to leave
Under the original rape and sodomy statutes, a man accused of rape could defend by alleging that the them, and proceeded to rape KKK in the children’s bedroom
victim consented. If the consent could be proven, he could not be guilty of rape, because the third
element of the offense "against her will" would be missing. One accused of sodomy could not defend by ISSUE:
alleging consent, as lack of consent was not an element of the offense, and "where a man and a Whether or not there can be marital rape.
woman voluntarily have carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature with each other,
they are both guilty of sodomy, . . ." Comer v. State, 21 Ga. App. 306 (94 S.E. 314) (1917). Thus an HELD:
allegation of consent would only go to show the other party's guilt. "One who voluntarily participates in YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies.
an unnatural act of sexual intercourse with another is also guilty of sodomy. One who does not so Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. Accused-appellant
participate is not guilty." Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 823 (12 SE2d 388) (1940). violated RA 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997). Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
In 1968 the sodomy statute was specifically repealed, Ga. L. 1968, p. 1338, and two new offenses were perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the
enacted, sodomy and aggravated sodomy, Ga. L. 1968, p. 1299. There can be no common law marital amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemption under the aggravated sodomy statute based on "implied consent," when the statute was exemplary damages, for each count of rape
enacted in 1968 and when there clearly was no marital exemption for sodomy based on "consent"
under the original sodomy statute. People v. Liberta, 64 NY 2d 152, 485 N.Y.S. 2d 207, 474 NY 2d 567 (1984)

3. The appellant contends that if we find no marital exemptions under the rape and aggravated sodomy RELEVANT PROVISIONS:
statutes it would be a new interpretation of the criminal law, and to apply the statutes to him would Section 130.35 of Penal Law: “A male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual
deprive him of his due process rights. intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion.
Note: Female here means any female person not married to
"All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct the actor.
themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden. [Cit.]" Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (96 SC 243,
*158 46 LE2d 185) (1975). Both the rape and aggravated sodomy statutes are broadly written and they Section 130.50 of Penal Law: “A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when he engages in
are unambiguous. This is a first application of these statutes to this particular set of facts, this is not an deviate sexual intercourse with another person…by forcible compulsion.”
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of criminal statutes that are narrowly drawn. See Bouie v. Columbia, Definition: Deviate sexual intercourse
378 U.S. 347 (84 SC 1697, 12 LE2d 894) (1964).  Not married
 Contact between
The appellant's reliance on Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) is misplaced.[14] That - Penis and anus
case dealt only with consensual sodomy not aggravated sodomy and the two are separate and distinct - Mouth and penis
offenses.[15] Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. - Penis and vulva

People v. Jumawan G.R 187495 (2014) There is a marital exemption for rape and sodomy. However, a husband and wife are considered not
married if they are living apart pursuant to a decree/order for separation.
FACTS:
10
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
FACTS: 2. Elimination of marital exemption would disrupt marriages because it would discourage reconciliation
1. Mario Liberta and Denise Liberta were married in 1978. Shortly after birth of son, Mario began to Court: Violent act of rape that disrupts marriage not the part of going to court to seek protection.
beat Denise. Nothing left to reconcile after assault.
- Denise obtained Family Court order for temporary protection so that Mario would stay away from 3. Difficult to prove marital rape Court: Proving lack of consent is hard. Possibility of married women
Denise and the family home but the order allowed Mario to visit once each weekend for their son. fabricating rape complaint is almost the same as unmarried women. Besides, the criminal justice
- On March 21, 1981, Mario did not visit his son. system is designed to be capable of handling false complaints.
- Three days later, Mario asked to visit son but Denise didn’t agree. 4. Marital rape is not as serious an offense as other rape, thus can be adequately dealt with by less
2. She asked Mario instead to pick her up and their son and be brought to where Mario lived (in a severe statutes and punishments Court: Evidence suggests that marital rape is more severe than other
motel), on the condition that her friend would be there. rape
- Upon arriving at motel, the friend left and Mario attacked Denise and forced her to perform fellatio
(oral sex) and sexual intercourse with him while also forcing her to tell 2 ½ year old son to watch. 4. WoN Sec 130.35 is unconstitutional for discriminating between male and female
- Denise and son allowed to leave but went to parents’ home and hospital after to treat scratches and YES. A statute which treats males and females differently violates the equal protection unless the
bruises. classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective.
- She also went to the police station and swore out a felony complaint.
3. On July 15, 1981, defendant was charged with first degree sodomy and first degree rape. Arguments in favor of exemption for females
- Defendant moved to dismiss, claiming marital exemption. 1. Only females can become pregnant Court: No evidence that primary purpose of preventing forcible
- Trial court dismissed petition saying that the temporary order of protection DID NOT REQUIRE Mario rape is preventing pregnancy—the real purpose is to protect a woman from violent sexual intrusion into
and Denise to live apart from each other—only that he remain away from her thus marital exemption her body. No enough justification to discriminate based on gender.
applies. 2. Female rape faces probability of medical, sociological, and psychological problems unique to her
4. Appellate Division reversed and held that they live apart thus considering them “not married” for gender Court: Based on stereotypes of the sexes. Not enough reason to justify penal provision
purposes of the statute. addressed only to adult males
- Defendant convicted with first degree sodomy and rape. 3. Gender-neutral law unnecessary because men can’t be actually raped Court: Physiological
5. On this appeal, defendant claims that he can’t be convicted because the statutes (Section 130.35 impossible argument is wrong. Based on the premise that man can only engage in intercourse if
and 130.50) violate the equal protection clause and are unconstitutional. sexually aroused. Sexual intercourse, however, occurs upon any penetration, however slight.
a. Burden some but not all males (marital exemption)
b. Burden men and not women JUDGMENT: Strike marital exemption from sections 130.35 and 130.50 of the Penal Law and the
gender exemption from section 130.35 of the Penal Law
ISSUE: 1. WoN defendant was within “marital exemption” to rape and sodomy and thus could not be
prosecuted for either crime, despite order of protection. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (1984)

NO. Defendant was statutorily “not married” to Denise at the time of the rape. In 1978, definition of “not Facts:
married” was expanded to include those cases where husband and wife were living apart because of Between Oct 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey (a resident of Torrington) and others on her behalf,
court order. notified the City through the defendant police officers of the repeated threats upon her life and the life of
her child Charles Jr. made by her estranged husband Charles (Torrington resident and short order cook
2. WoN defendant has standing to question constitutionality of the statutes at Skie’s Diner where he served many members of the Torrington Police). Attempts to file complaints
against Charles were ignored or rejected by the police and the City.
YES. Standing applies to a defendant under criminal prosecution who, while conceding that it is within
the power of a State to make criminal the behavior covered by a statute, asserts that the statute he is In October 1982, Charles attacked Tracey at the home of the Bentley and St. Hilaire in the city of
prosecuted under violates equal protection because it burdens him but not others. Torrington. St. Hilaire made a formal complaint to one of the police officers and requested efforts to
keep Charles off their property. In Nov 5, Charles returned and using physical force, took Charles Jr.
3. WoN marital exemption for rape in the New York statute is unconstitutional for distinguishing The police officers refused to accept a complaint even as to trespassing.
between marital and nonmarital rape
In Nov 9, Charles screamed threats at Tracey while she was sitting in her car. One of the defendant
YES. No rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. Rape is not simply police officers just stood and watched until Charles broke the windshield of Tracey’s car. Charles was
a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates arrested and on the next day he was convicted of breach of peace. He received a suspended sentence
the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm. of 6 months and a two-year “conditional discharge” during which he was ordered to stay away from
The “implied consent” when one is married no longer holds as marriage has never been viewed as Tracey and the Bentley residence. In Dec 31, he returned to said residence and threatened Tracey.
giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand. She called the police. The police, although informed of the violation of the discharge, made no attempt
to ascertain Charles’ whereabouts/arrest him.
Arguments promoting marital exemption
1. Protects against governmental intrusion into marital privacy Court: Does not further marital privacy Between Jan 1 – May 4, 1983, repeated threats of violence were reported and his arrest requested.
because the right of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent sexual assaults May 4 and 5, Tracey reported to the police that Charles threatened to shoot the plaintiffs. One of the
defendants refused to take the complaint. May 6, Tracey filed an application for a restraining order
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
against Charles. That day, the court issued the order and the City was informed of the restraining order. sufficient to suggest a link between a violation of constitutional rights and a pattern of police
May 31, Tracey went again to the police to pursue the warrant request but no arrest took place. June misconduct." Owens v. Haas
10, Charles went again to the Bentley residence and demanded to speak to Tracey. Tracey called the
police; she then went outside to persuade him not to take or hurt Charles Jr. But Charles began to stab As to Charles Jr., his claim is dismissed because he did not suffer from a continuous failure of the
her repeatedly in the chest, neck and throat. 25 minutes after the call, a single police officer arrived; police to provide him protection. The isolated failure in the June 10 assault on him does not violate any
during his arrival, Charles was holding a bloody knife. Charles dropped the knife and kicked Tracey in constitutional right.
the head, went inside the house and returned from within, holding Charles Jr., and dropped the child on
his wounded mother, then kicked Tracey again. Soon thereafter, three of the defendants arrived but still Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
permitted Charles to wander about the crowd and to continue to threaten Tracey. Plaintiffs Tracey and Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
Charles Jr., mother and son, filed an action against the police officers of Torrington and the City of States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
Torrington for deprivation of her right to equal protection. immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used an administrative classification that manifests itself in judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
discriminatory treatment. Police protection in the city is fully provided to someone with whom the victim granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
has no domestic relationship, but lesser protection when the victim is purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
1) a woman assaulted by a spouse/boyfriend, considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
2) a child abused by a father or stepfather. Plaintiffs also alleged that although there is no law in the city
which discriminates against a victim abused by someone with whom she has a domestic relationship, Garcia v. Drilon and Jaype-Garcia, G.R. No. 179267 (2013)
there is an administrative classification. The failure to act by the police was due to the practice of
affording inadequate protection to women who have complained of having been abused by their FACTS: On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) led, for herself and in behalf of
husbands. her minor children, namely Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old a natural child of the petitioner but whom the
private respondent adopted; Jessi Anthony J. Garci, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduardo J. Garcia, 3
The City filed a motion to dismiss the claims for failure to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. years old; a veri ed petition (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
The City contends that the equal protection clause does not guarantee equal application of social City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
services; the clause only prohibits intentional discrimination that is racially motivated. (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.

Issue: Whether or not the City may be held liable for the acts of its police officers She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
Held: revolved around her husband.
YES. The motion of the City to dismiss the claims of Tracey is denied, while its motion to dismiss claims
of Charles Jr. is granted. On the other hand, petitioner, Jesus Garcia, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent
Failure of city officials and police officers to perform their duty of taking reasonable measures to protect to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
personal safety of persons whom they know may be attacked is a denial of equal protection and is
actionable. Although in this case there is no law discriminating against victims abused by their relatives, The petitioner was guilty of infidelity and physical and emotional abuse against his wife and children. In
the acts of the officers constitute an administrative classification. Equal protection clause is applicable one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force
not only to discriminatory legislative action, but also to discriminatory governmental action in that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the
administration and enforcement of law. lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had
seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat
While a municipality is not liable for the constitutional torts of its employees on a respondent superior Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times
theory, a municipality may be sued for damages [under section 19831 ] when "the action that is alleged
to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision The RTC was able to issue several Temporary Protection Orders against the complied by the latter.
officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers" or is "visited pursuant to governmental Jesus Garcia, herein, petitioner, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262, alleging that said law is
'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official violative of the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution.
decision making channels.
ISSUES: WON:
Some degree of specificity is required in the pleading of a custom or policy on the part of a municipality. 1) R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
Mere conclusory allegations devoid of factual content will not suffice. In this case, Tracey has CLAUSE.
specifically alleged a series of acts and omissions. From this pattern raises an inference of “custom” or 2) THE ISSUANCE OF RA 9262 TPO VIOLATES THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
“policy” on the part of the municipality. Furthermore, this pattern of inaction climaxed on June 10, 1983
in an incident so brutal that under the law of the Second Circuit that,"single brutal incident may be RULING:

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
1) No, R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the Constitution. Since, the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon  While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Hence, it of conspiracy under the RPC.
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
 Section 47 of RA 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC: o SEC. 47.
The equal protection clause simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the RPC and other applicable laws, shall have
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, and the enactment of the RA suppletory application.
9262 aims to address discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women, because
there have been unequal power relations between men and women which led to domination over  Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
discrimination against women by men. Hence, the equal protection of the laws clause of the constitution o Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be
through a gender-based classification and special remedies provided by law under RA 9262 should be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
sustained. supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

2) No, RA 9262 did not violate the due process clause of the constitution, most especially in the  For once conspiracy to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
issuance of Protection owner against the petitioner since, the said law states that the TPO’s purpose is conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
to prevent further acts of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances surrounding the since all the conspirators are principals.
utilization thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have immediate
and uncomplicated access to the same. Thus, Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations  It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus:
the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector o Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power. children is committed through any of the following acts:
 (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 168852 (2008) or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include,
but not be limited to, the following acts: …
FACTS:
 Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two  In addition, the protection order that may be issued to preventfurther acts of violence against the
female children were born. Six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses o SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include
Perfecto and Juanita Tan (respondents) before the RTC. any, some or all of the following reliefs:
 Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
 She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of RA 9262,
 (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC).
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
 The RTC granted the petitioner's prayer for a TPO. Respondents contend that the RTC lacked
 Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:
jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A.
o Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
No. 9262.
violence against women and their children
 It’s expressio unius est exclusion alterius vs the doctrine of necessary implication.

ISSUE: Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil. 453 (1909)

 Whether the respondent spouses, parents-in-law of petitioner may be included in the TPO in
accordance with RA 9262 or the VAWC. FACTS
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo Lauron and
RULING: Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to render
 YES. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''violence against women and their children'' as any act or a medical assistance to the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to give birth. After the
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child birth, but
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, afterbirth. The operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which defendants refused to pay.
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a
liberty. special defense, that their daughter-inlaw had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when she
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation
whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the Brief Fact Summary.
defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed Plaintiff married Defendant knowing that he was extremely frugal. Defendant provided Plaintiff with only
that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. ISSUE Can the meager amounts of money and Plaintiff was often forced to work individually to pay for needs. Plaintiff
defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation? brought a suit to recover maintenance and support money.
RULING
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi A spouse cannot maintain a suit in equity to secure support or alimony when the parties are not
contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. separated or living apart. For the courts to inquire into the living standards of a family would be contrary
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special to public policy.
laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between
the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to Facts.
which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation Plaintiff, Lydia McGuire, married Defendant, Charles McGuire, on August 11, 1919. At the time of
consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to marriage Defendant was a bachelor of 46 or 47 years of age and had a reputation of extreme frugality,
support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should of which Plaintiff was aware. Plaintiff had been previously married and had inherited a one-third interest
be in need of medical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the in 80 acres of land from her previous husband. Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant to recover
necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed suitable maintenance and support money. Plaintiff testified that defendant was a poor companion and
from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore that he would give her only small amounts of money on request. Plaintiff worked the fields and did
liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. In the face chores. For several years she had raised chickens and sold poultry and eggs to buy clothing, things she
of the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the wanted, and groceries. The house was not equipped with a bathroom, bathing facilities, or an inside
plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during toilet. Plaintiff was privileged to use all the rent money she wanted from the 80 acres of land. She used
her childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and motherin-law of the defendants this money to visit her daughters, and Defendant provided no fu
herein. Case nds for such use. Plaintiff had three abdominal operations for which Defendant paid, but Plaintiff was no
longer able to raise chickens. Defendant had land in the value of $83,960, bank deposits in the sum of
Digest on PELAYO vs. LAURON (Mutual Support) $12,786.81, and income of $8,000 or $9,000 a year. Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling in favor
Facts of Plaintiff, alleging that the decree was not supported by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law.
Oct. 13, 1906, nighttime – Arturo Pelayo, a physician based in Cebu, was called to the house of
Marcelo Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas. Their daughter-in-law was about to give Issue.
birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. Since it was a difficult birth, he had to perform Was the trial court correct in its finding that when a wife is abandoned by her husband, without means
a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. He also removed the afterbirth. He finished all of these of support, a bill in equity will lie to compel the husband to support the wife without asking for a divorce
until the following morning. He visited the patient several times the following day. Just &equitable value decree?
for the services he rendered: P500.00. Without any good reason, defendants refused to pay said
amount. Thus he filed a case praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of Held.
P500.00 + costs along with other relief that may be deemed proper. The Defendants alleged that their To maintain such an action the parties must be separated or living apart from one another, therefore the
daughter-in-law died inconsequence of the childbirth. Also, that their son & daughter-in-law lived trial court erred.
independently & her giving birth in their house was only accident al . T he y p r a ye d t h at th e y b e a The trial court found that it was well-established law that it is the duty of the husband to provide for his
bs olv e d. CF I:Defendants abso lved due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action. family with support and means of living such as fit his means, position, and station of life. Previous case
law had held that a wife may bring a suit in equity to secure support and alimony regardless of if the
ISSUE : WON the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered. action is for divorce.
In the present case the marital relationship continued for over 33 years with no complaint from the
HELD : NO.CFI judgment affirmed. Plaintiff regarding her support. The parties were not separated or living apart at any time. Public policy
RATIO : Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which requires that the standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts
spouses are bound byway of mutual support. (Arts. 142 & 143, CC) The party bound to give support to determine. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife the
should therefore be liable for all the expenses including the fees of the physician. Thus, it is the husband is legally supporting the wife.
husband’s obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants. The husband would still be liable even if his
parents were the one who called & requested for Pelayo’s assistance. The defendants are not under Discussion.
any obligation to pay the fees claimed (An obligation according to CC Art. 1089 is created by law, Without a showing of a termination of the marriage the Court found that it would be contrary to public
contracts, quasi-contracts, & by illicit acts & omissions or by those in which any kind of fault/negligence policy to force the husband to make specified payments to the wife.
occurs.). There was no contract between Pelayo & the defendants thus they can’t be compelled to pay
him B. Management of the Household

Mc.Guirev. McGuire, 157 Neb 226, 59 N.W. 2d 336 (1953) Art. 71, FC compared with Art. 115, NCC
14
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who
has not obtained consent.
Article 115. The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the
support of the family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious
objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or Article 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the
unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property. husband may object, provided:

CASES: (1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and
Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153 (1999)
(2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
Facts: Robert G. Young and Alice S. Hector got married in New Mexico on February 1982. The couple
had two daughters born in 1985 and 1988. During the early years of their marriage, the father runs a In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if
successful architectural firm with other business engagements while his wife runs her own law firm. any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper
After the birth of their children, both parents continued to work outside of the home and pursued their and in the best interest of the family. (n)
respective professional endeavors with the assistance of a live-in nanny. However, in 1988, Robert
Young’s business began to suffer which led them to eventually relocate to Miami, Florida. Once in RA 7192 (Women in Development and Nation-Building Act)
Miami, Alice Hector began to have serious discussions, which eventually escalated into arguments,
about the father’s need to find gainful employment. Instead, Robert never got a job, and from 1990- Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be cited as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act."
1993, was frequently out of the state and away from the family doing other things. When the father chan robles virtual law library
finally returned to South Florida, in the fall of 1993, the mother had accepted a partnership position with
a large Florida law firm at a salary of approximately $300,000 annually. That year she asked the father Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall
for a divorce. After this, the father spent less of his time away from the family, but remained ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provided women
unemployed. Because of this, Alice ultimately filed for a divorce on May 1995. The court granted rights and opportunities equal to that of men.chanrobles virtual law library To attain the foregoing policy:
residential custody of their minor children to the mother while the father, Robert Young contested this, (1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments
contending that he was like a super dad to the children, taking good care of them and should therefore and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned
be granted physical custody of their daughters. to support programs and activities for women; chan robles virtual law library (2) All government
departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development
Issue: programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development
Whether or not Robert Young should be granted residential custody of their children. assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and
chan robles virtual law library
Ruling: In recommending that the mother be named the primary custodial parent, the guardian ad litem (3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars,
cited three factors: issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein.
1) The guardian noted that the mother had been the more economically stable of the two parents
throughout the marriage; Sec. 3. Responsible Agency. — The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) shall
2) The mother had been a constant factor and dominant influence in the children’s lives and the father primarily be responsible for ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid, grants and
had not; and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amount to be allocated for the development activity
3) The mother’s superior ability to control her anger around the children. The court also doubted the involving women. chan robles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library
father’s claim that he was a “Super Dad” to the children when in fact, they have a nanny all these time
to take care of the children Sec. 4. Mandate. — The NEDA, with the assistance of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women, shall ensure that the different government departments, including its agencies and
C. Exercise of Profession instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect the participation of women in national development
and their integration therein:
Art. 73, FC Compared with Art. 117, NCC (1) Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside development programs or projects, provide income and
employment opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus, prevent their heavy migration from
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without rural to urban or foreign countries;
the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. (2) Include an assessment of the extent to which their programs and/or projects integrate women in the
development process and of the impact of said programs or projects on women, including their
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: implications in enhancing the self-reliance of women in improving their income; chan robles virtual law
library
(1) The objection is proper; and
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
(3) Ensure the active participation of women and women's organizations in the development programs Sec. 9. Implementing Rules. — The NEDA, in consultation with the different government agencies
and/or projects including their involvement in the planning, design, implementation, management, concerned, shall issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of
monitoring and evaluation thereof; Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6) months from its effectivity.
(4) Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data in its program/project paper, proposal or
strategy; Sec. 10. Compliance Report. — Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act and every six (6)
(5) Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so that the percentage of women who receive months thereafter, all government departments, including its agencies and instrumentalities, shall
assistance is approximately proportionate to either their traditional participation in the targeted activities submit a report to Congress on their compliance with this Act.
or their proportion of the population, whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should be stated in
the program/project paper, proposal or strategy; Sec. 11. Separability Clause. — If for any reason any section or provision of this Act is declared
(a) The obstacle in achieving the goal; chan robles virtual law library unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
(b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and chan robles virtual law library continue to be in full force and effect
(c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to overcome those obstacles, why they are not being
taken. (6) Assist women in activities that are of critical significance to their self-reliance and Sec. 12. Repealing Clause. — The provisions of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil
development. Code of the Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations,
Sec. 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. — Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under
similar circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library In all contractual situations where married men have Sec. 13. Effectivity Clause. — The rights of women and all the provisions of this Act shall take effect
the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. chanrobles virtual law library To this end: immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangement under the same conditions as men; chan robles virtual law library chan robles virtual law Secs. 12-16, 22-24, RA 9710 (Magna Carta of Women)
library
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural SECTION 12. Equal Treatment Before the Law. — The State shall take steps to review and, when
credit, loans and nonmaterial resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land necessary, amend and/or repeal existing laws that are discriminatory to women within three (3) years
resettlement programs; from the effectivity of this Act.
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and (4)
Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure visas SECTION 13. Equal Access and Elimination of Discrimination in Education, Scholarships, and
and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. In all other similar Training. — (a) The State shall ensure that gender stereotypes and images in educational materials
contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in and curricula are adequately and appropriately revised. Gender-sensitive language shall be used at all
every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. chan robles virtual law library chan times. Capacity-building on gender and development (GAD), peace and human rights, education for
robles virtual law library teachers, and all those involved in the education sector shall be pursued toward this end. Partnerships
between and among players of the education sector, including the private sector, churches, and faith
Sec. 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. — Women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, groups shall be encouraged.
civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public
purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they (b) Enrollment of women in nontraditional skills training in vocational and tertiary levels shall be
belong to the same organization. encouraged.
Sec. 7. Admission to Military Schools. — Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding,
consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for (c) Expulsion and non-readmission of women faculty due to pregnancy outside of marriage shall be
appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the outlawed. No school shall turn out or refuse admission to a female student solely on the account of her
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic having contracted pregnancy outside of marriage during her term in school.
year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except for
those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes. SECTION 14. Women in Sports. — The State shall develop, establish, and strengthen programs for the
participation of women and girl-children in competitive and noncompetitive sports as a means to
Sec. 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. — Married persons who devote full time to achieve excellence, promote physical and social well-being, eliminate gender-role stereotyping, and
managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse's consent, be entitled to provide equal access to the full benefits of development for all persons regardless of sex, gender
voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan — Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at Gobyerno), Government Service identity, and other similar factors.
Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of
the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted For this purpose, all sports-related organizations shall create guidelines that will establish and integrate
from the salary of the working spouse. The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and affirmative action as a strategy and gender equality as a framework in planning and implementing their
regulations necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this section. policies, budgets, programs, and activities relating to the participation of women and girls in sports.

The State will also provide material and nonmaterial incentives to local government units, media
organizations, and the private sector for promoting, training, and preparing women and girls for
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
participation in competitive and noncompetitive sports, especially in local and international events, SECTION 22. Right to Decent Work. — The State shall progressively realize and ensure decent
including, but not limited to, the Palarong Pambansa, Southeast Asian Games, Asian Games, and the work standards for women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable quality in conditions of
Olympics. freedom, equity, security, and human dignity.

No sports event or tournament will offer or award a different sports prize, with respect to its amount or (a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are productive and fairly remunerative as
value, to women and men winners in the same sports category: Provided, That the said tournament, family living wage, security in the workplace, and social protection for families, better prospects for
contest, race, match, event, or game is open to both sexes: Provided, further, That the sports event or personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize,
tournament is divided into male or female divisions. participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all
women and men.
The State shall also ensure the safety and well-being of all women and girls participating in sports,
especially, but not limited to, trainees, reserve members, members, coaches, and mentors of national (b) The State shall further ensure:
sports teams, whether in studying, training, or performance phases, by providing them comprehensive
health and medical insurance coverage, as well as integrated medical, nutritional, and healthcare (1) Support services and gears to protect them from occupational and health hazards taking into
services. account women’s maternal functions;

Schools, colleges, universities, or any other learning institution shall take into account its total women (2) Support services that will enable women to balance their family obligations and work responsibilities
student population in granting athletic scholarship. There shall be a pro rata representation of women in including, but not limited to, the establishment of day care centers and breast-feeding stations at the
the athletic scholarship program based on the percentage of women in the whole student population. workplace, and providing maternity leave pursuant to the Labor Code and other pertinent laws;

SECTION 15. Women in the Military. — The State shall pursue appropriate measures to eliminate (3) Membership in unions regardless of status of employment and place of employment; and
discrimination of women in the military, police, and other similar services, including revising or
abolishing policies and practices that restrict women from availing of both combat and noncombat (4) Respect for the observance of indigenous peoples’ cultural practices even in the workplace.
training that are open to men, or from taking on functions other than administrative tasks, such as
engaging in combat, security-related, or field operations. Women in the military shall be accorded the (c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas work, the State shall exert all efforts to address
same promotional privileges and opportunities as men, including pay increases, additional the causes of out-migration by developing local employment and other economic opportunities for
remunerations and benefits, and awards based on their competency and quality of performance. women and by introducing measures to curb violence and forced and involuntary displacement of local
Towards this end, the State shall ensure that the personal dignity of women shall always be respected. women. The State shall ensure the protection and promotion of the rights and welfare of migrant
women regardless of their work status, and protect them against discrimination in wages, conditions of
Women in the military, police, and other similar services shall be provided with the same right to work, and employment opportunities in host countries.
employment as men on equal conditions. Equally, they shall be accorded the same capacity as men to
act in and enter into contracts, including marriage. SECTION 23. Right to Livelihood, Credit, Capital, and Technology. — The State shall ensure that
women are provided with the following:
Further, women in the military, police, and other similar services shall be entitled to leave benefits such
as maternity leave, as provided for by existing laws. (a) Equal access to formal sources of credit and capital;

SECTION 16. Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory Portrayal of Women in Media and Film. — The (b) Equal share to the produce of farms and aquatic resources; and
State shall formulate policies and programs for the advancement of women in collaboration with
government and nongovernment media-related organizations. It shall likewise endeavor to raise the (c) Employment opportunities for returning women migrant workers taking into account their skills and
consciousness of the general public in recognizing the dignity of women and the role and contribution of qualifications. Corollarily, the State shall also promote skills and entrepreneurship development of
women in the family, community, and the society through the strategic use of mass media. returning women migrant workers.

For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of space, airtime, and resources, strengthen SECTION 24. Right to Education and Training. — The State shall ensure the following:
programming, production, and image-making that appropriately present women’s needs, issues, and
concerns in all forms of media, communication, information dissemination, and advertising. (a) Women migrant workers have the opportunity to undergo skills training, if they so desire, before
taking on a foreign job, and possible retraining upon return to the country;
The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism, information, and communication, as well as the
national media federations and associations, shall require all media organizations and corporations to (b) Gender-sensitive training and seminars; and
integrate into their human resource development components regular training on gender equality and
gender-based discrimination, create and use gender equality guidelines in all aspects of management, (c) Equal opportunities in scholarships based on merit and fitness, especially to those interested in
training, production, information, dissemination, communication, and programming; and convene a research and development aimed towards women-friendly farm technology.
gender equality committee that will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework and affirmative
action as a strategy, and monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender equality guidelines. CASE:
Bradwell v. Illinois, 21 L.E.D. 442, 16 Wall. 130 (1880)
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
responsibilities. In the nature of things it is not every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is
Mrs. Myra Bradwell, residing in the State of Illinois, made application to the judges of the Supreme qualified for every calling and position. It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations
Court of the State for a license to practice law. She accompanied her petition with all the proper founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions
documents and requirements. However, the license was refused by the Supreme Court of Illinois and callings demanding special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the State;
because the statute of Illinois on the subject of admissions to the bar allows the Supreme Court to have and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the
discretion to refuse admission to any persons or class of persons who are not intended by the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged
legislature to be admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly required by the statute. The by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and responsibilities, and that decision and
Court of Illinois was of the opinion that when the legislature gave to this court the power of granting firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex
licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege would be extended to
women. D. Use of Surname
Art. 370, 373, 377, NCC
Issue: Whether or not a female citizen, duly qualified in respect of age, character, and learning, can
claim, under the fourteenth amendment, the privilege of earning a livelihood by practicing at the bar of a Article 370. A married woman may use:
judicial court.
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
Held: No. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied the application on the ground that, by the common law, (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
which is the basis of the laws of Illinois, only men were admitted to the bar, and the legislature had not (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
made any change in this respect. It could not be supposed that the legislature had intended to adopt
any different rule. Counsel for the plaintiff in this court contends that there are certain privileges and Article 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
immunities which belong to a citizen of the United States as such; and that admission to the bar of a accordance with article 370.
State of a person who possesses the requisite learning and character is one of those which a State
may not deny. The court agrees that there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other
US, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. However, it is of the relief.
opinion that the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. This right
depends not on citizenship of the United States but on citizenship of the State. Ultimately, the court RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996)
reaffirms its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases that the right to control and regulate the granting of
license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are not transferred for its SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act will be called as the “Philippine Passport Act of 1996.”
protection to the Federal government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by
citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license. The Judgment is thus affirmed. (In SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. – The people’s constitutional right to travel is inviolable. Accordingly, the
short, they can’t overrule the legislative intent of the Illinois statute which they believe intended women government has the duty to issue passport or any travel document to any citizen of the Philippines or
to be barred from admission in the bar) individual who complies with the requirement of this Act. The right to travel may be impaired only when
national security, public safety, or public health requires. To enhance and protect the unimpaired
(But more importantly, here is Bradley’s super sexist opinion) Bradley, concurring: Justice Bradley exercise of this right, only minimum requirements for the application and issuance of passports and
believes that historically, the right of females to pursue any lawful employment for a livelihood (the other travel documents shall be prescribed. Action on such application and the issuance shall be
practice of law included) is NOT one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in expedited.
any and every profession, occupation, or employment in civil life. Both civil law and nature have always
differentiated men and women—men as woman’s protector and defender while women with natural and SEC. 3. Definitions. – As used in this Act:
proper timidity and delicacy which is unfit if for many of the occupations of civil life.
a) Department means the Department of Foreign Affairs;
Even the constitution of the family organization indicates that the domestic sphere belongs to the b) Secretary means the Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
woman. The constitution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent c) Post means a Philippine diplomatic and consular post such as an Embassy or Consulate;
career from that of her husband such that it was believed that a woman had no legal existence separate d) Passport means a document issued by the Philippine government to its citizens and requesting other
from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state. governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her all lawful
aid and protection;
Some rules of law flow from this cardinal principle. One of these is, that a married woman is incapable, e) Travel Document means a certification or identifying document containing the description and other
without her husband’s consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very personal circumstances of its bearer, issued for direct travel to and from the Philippines valid for short
incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a periods or a particular trip. It is issued only to persons whose claim to Philippine citizenship is doubtful
married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney or who fall under the category enumerated in SEC. 13 of this Act;
and counsellor. f) Supporting Documents mean any paper or document which is required to be submitted with the
passport application supporting claims to Filipino citizenship to complete the application for a passport
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and without which such application would be deemed incomplete or otherwise become subject to denial by
mother. It is not one of her fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every office and the issuing authority;
position, including those which require highly special qualifications and demanding special
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
g) Ambassadors mean those who have been appointed as chiefs of mission and have served as e) In the case of naturalized citizens, a certified copy of the naturalization certificate; or a certified
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. naturalization certificate of husband or parent duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General if citizenship is claimed through naturalization of spouse or parent;
SEC. 4. Authority to Issue, Deny, Restrict or Cancel. – Upon the application of any qualified Filipino
citizen, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or any of his authorized consular officer may issue passports in f) For an applicant who has not reached the age of majority, an affidavit of consent from a parent as
accordance with this Act. indicated in the passport application if the minor is travelling with either parent, and a clearance from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, if the minor is travelling with a legal guardian or a
Philippine consular officers in a foreign country shall be authorized by the Secretary to issue, verify, person other than a parent;
restrict, cancel or refuse a passport in the area of jurisdiction of the Post in accordance with the
provisions of this Act. g) If the applicant is an adopted person, the duly certified copy of court order of adoption, together with
the original and amended birth certificates duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil
In the interest of national security, public safety and public health, the Secretary or any of the Registrar General shall be presented: Provided, That in case the adopted person is an infant or a minor
authorized consular officers may, after due hearing and in their proper discretion, refuse to issue a or the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents, an authority from the Department of Social Welfare
passport, or restrict its use or withdraw or cancel a passport: Provided, however, That such act shall not and Development shall be required: Provided, further, That the adopting foreign parents shall also
mean a loss or doubt on the person’s citizenship: Provided, further, That the issuance of a passport submit a certificate from their embassy or consulate that they are qualified to adopt such infant or minor
may not be denied if the safety and interest of the Filipino citizen is at stake: Provided, finally, That child;
refusal or cancellation of a passport would not prevent the issuance of a Travel Document to allow for a
safe return journey by a Filipino to the Philippines. h) In case of discrepancy between the applicant’s name in the birth certificate and in any other private
documents, the former shall prevail over the latter unless by operation of law or through court order, the
SEC. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. – No passport shall be issued to an applicant applicant is permitted to use name other than what is officially recorded in the Civil Register; and
unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino
citizen who has complied with the following requirements: i) If the applicant is a government employee, the travel authority issued by the head of department,
agency or office, may be required only if said applicant is applying for an official passport.
a) A duly accomplished application form and photographs of such number, size and style as may be
prescribed by the Department; SEC. 6. Application. – The application may be filed by:

b) The birth certificate duly issued or authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: a) The applicant himself or herself; or
Provided, however, That if the birth of the applicant has not been registered yet, or if his birth certificate b) The parent or legal guardian on behalf of an applicant who is below the age of majority.
is destroyed, damaged, or not available due to other causes, he shall apply for delayed registration of
his birth with the Office of the Civil Registrar General which shall issue to said applicant a certification of In case of first time applicants, the applicant must present himself/herself in person to prove that he or
pending application for delayed registration of birth attaching thereto a copy of an accomplished she is the same person and of the age claimed in the application form. In case of renewal the
certificate of live birth. Such certification and the accomplished certificate of live birth shall be sufficient application may be filed by any licensed travel agency duly accredited by the Department of Foreign
to support an application for passport in addition to other papers which the Department may require Affairs: Provided, That the agent shall be responsible for the authenticity or bona fide of the supporting
from the applicant; documents being presented to meet the requirements for the application of passports.

c) In the absence of a birth certificate, a baptismal certificate for those who are members of a Christian SEC. 7. Types of Passports. – The Secretary or the authorized representative or consular officer may
religious organization, or similar or equivalent certificate issued by a non-Christian religious group, issue the following types of passports:
attesting to the applicant’s having been admitted to such religious group or sect at an early age and
where it is indicated that the applicant is a Filipino citizen, which should be accompanied by a joint a) Diplomatic passport for persons imbued with diplomatic status or are on diplomatic mission such as:
affidavit by two (2) persons who have personal knowledge of the applicant and of such age as to
credibly state the applicant’s date and place of birth, citizenship, and names of parents: Provided, That 1. The President and former Presidents of the Republic of the Philippines;
Filipinos who do not believe in any religion and whose parents for any reason failed to have the said 2. The Vice-President and former Vice-Presidents of the Republic of the Philippines;
applicant baptized shall be exempted from the baptismal certificate requirement: Provided, further, That 3. The Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives;
in lieu thereof, the applicant shall execute an affidavit to that effect duly corroborated by affidavit of at 4. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;
least two (2) persons of good reputation who personally know such fact: 5. The Cabinet Secretaries, and the Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Foreign Affairs;
d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been 6. Ambassadors, Foreign Service Officers of all ranks in the career diplomatic service; Attaches, and
annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, members of their families;
divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by 7. Members of the Congress when on official mission abroad or as delegates to international
the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or conferences;
declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: 8. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and delegates to international or regional
Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines; conferences when on official mission or accorded full powers by the President; and

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
9. Spouses and unmarried minor children of the above-mentioned officials when accompanying or
following to join them in an official mission abroad. 3. When the country of destination is subject to travel restriction by government policy, enforcement of
action by the United Nations or in a state of war.
The President of the Philippines and the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs may grant
diplomatic passports to officials and persons other than those enumerated herein who are on official SEC. 9. Appeal. – Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the
mission abroad. implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due
b) Official Passport to be issued to all government officials and employees on official trip abroad but course.
who are not on a diplomatic mission or delegates to international or regional conferences or have not
been accorded diplomatic status such as: SEC. 10. Validity. – Regular passports issued under this Act shall be valid for a period of five (5) years:
Provided, however, That the issuing authority may limit the period of validity to less than five (5) years;
1. Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Cabinet other than the Department of Foreign whenever in the national economic interest or political stability of the country such restriction is
Affairs, the Associate Justices and other members of the Judiciary, members of the Congress and all necessary: Provided, finally, That a new passport may be issued to replace one which validity has
other government officials and employees travelling on official business and official time; expired, the old passport being returned to the holder after cancellation.
2. Staff officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs assigned to diplomatic and
consular posts and officers and representatives of other government departments and agencies SEC. 11. Ownership of Passports. – A Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the
assigned abroad; Government, the holder being a mere possessor thereof as long as it is valid and the same may not be
3. Persons in the domestic service and household members of officials assigned to diplomatic or surrendered to any person or entity other than the government or its representative: Provided, That a
consular posts; Filipino citizen may voluntarily surrender his/her passport to a Philippine Service Post for storage and
4. Spouses and unmarried minor children of the officials mentioned above when accompanying or safekeeping for which a proper receipt shall be issued for use when reclaiming the passport at a later
following to join them. date.

c) Regular Passport issued to Filipino citizens who are not eligible or entitled to diplomatic or official SEC. 12. Names and Titles. – The passport shall contain the full name of the applicant, but shall not
passports, including government officials or employees going abroad for pleasure or other personal include his title or titles or profession or job description. If an applicant’s name is changed by order of
reasons. Government officials and employees and members of their families may, during their the court, a certified copy of the court order or decree shall be submitted together with the birth
incumbency in office, hold two passports simultaneously; (1) a regular passport for private travel; (2) a certificate or old passport on application.
diplomatic or official passport when travelling abroad on diplomatic or official business. The wife and
minor children of persons entitled to a diplomatic or official passport shall be issued regular passports, if SEC. 13. Travel Documents. – A travel document, in lieu of a passport, may be issued to:
they are not accompanying or following to join them.
a) A Filipino citizen returning to the Philippines who for one reason or another has lost his/her passport
SEC. 8. Grounds for Denial, Cancellation or Restrictions. – The application for passport may be denied, or cannot be issued a regular passport;
cancelled or restricted only on the following grounds: b) A Filipino citizen being sent back to the Philippines;
c) An alien spouse of a Filipino and their dependents who have not yet been naturalized as a Filipino
a) Denial of Passport and who are travelling to the Philippines or is a permanent resident of the Philippines;
d) Aliens permanently residing in the Philippines who are not able to obtain foreign passport and other
1. On orders of the court, after due notice and hearing, to hold the departure of an applicant because of travel documents;
a pending criminal case; e) A stateless person who is likewise a permanent resident, or a refugee granted such status or asylum
2. When so requested by the natural or legal guardian, if the applicant is a minor; in the Philippines.
3. When the applicant has been found to have violated any of the provisions of this Act;
4. Such other disqualification under existing laws. SEC. 14. Amendments. – A passport may be amended at the request of the holder for any lawful
purpose, but such amendment should be approved by the Secretary or his duly authorized diplomatic or
b) Cancellation consular officers.

1. When the holder is a fugitive from justice; Diplomatic and official passports shall be submitted for revalidation before each departure of the holder.
2. When the holder has been convicted of a criminal offense; Provided, That the passport may be
restored after service of sentence; or SEC. 15. Loss or Destruction. – The loss or destruction of a passport should be immediately reported to
3. When a passport was acquired fraudulently or tampered with. the Department or the Post. The holder of such passport shall submit to the Department or Post an
affidavit stating in detail the circumstances of such loss or destruction. The holder of such a passport
c) Restricted who is in the Philippines, should also furnish the National Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of
Immigration copies of the affidavit. For those who are abroad, copies of the affidavit will be forwarded
1. When the country of destination is in a state of political instability which could pose a danger to the by the Post to the Department’s Office of Consular Services, and in coordination with the Office of Legal
Filipino traveler; and Intelligence Services, shall transmit a copy of the affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation
2. When diplomatic ties have been fractured or severed with the Philippines; and Bureau of Immigration. The transmittal of the affidavit shall be accompanied by a request for the
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
confiscation of the said passport if found, and to investigate or detain if necessary, the person not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) nor more than Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000) and
attempting to use or has used the passport. All Posts will be informed of the lost passport, including imprisonment of not less than eighteen (18) months but not more than six (6) years, and upon
pertinent information on the passport and the circumstances of loss. conviction, be disqualified from holding appointive public office;

No new passport shall be issued until satisfactory proof is shown that the passport was actually lost and 3. Being a diplomatic or consular officer knowingly and willfully grants and issues to, amends or certifies
after the lapse of fifteen (15) days following the date of submission of the affidavit of loss as herein to the authenticity of any passport or travel document for any person not entitled thereto, or knowingly
required: Provided, however, That in the case of a passport reported lost by a Filipino travelling abroad, and willfully issues more than one passport to any person except as provided for in this Act, shall be
the Consulate may waive the fifteen (15) days requirement if the loss has been proven to the Consular punished by a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) nor more than Sixty thousand
Official’s satisfaction: Provided, further, That in case the Filipino who reported a loss of passport is pesos (₱60,000) and imprisonment of not less than eighteen (18) months nor more than six (6) years
returning to the Philippines, the holder may be issued a Travel Document: Provided, finally, That in the and upon conviction, be disqualified from holding appointive public office.
event the lost passport is found, it should be destroyed if a replacement has been issued, or mailed to
the holder who was issued a Travel Document. b) Offenses Relating to False Statements: Penalties. – Any person who willfully and knowingly:

In all cases, the head of Office of Consular Services or the head of the Consular SEC. of an Embassy 1. Makes any false statement in any application for passport with the intent to induce or secure the
or the Consul General of a consulate may, upon his discretion, waive the fifteen (15)-day waiting period. issuance of a passport under the authority of the Philippine Government, either for his own use or the
use of another, contrary to this Act or rules and regulations prescribed pursuant hereto shall be
SEC. 16. Fees. – Reasonable fees shall be collected for the processing, issuance, extension, punished by a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) nor more than Sixty thousand
amendment or replacement of a lost passport and the issuance of a Travel Document as may be pesos (₱60,000) and imprisonment of not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years: or
determined by the Department: Provided, however, That any fee shall not be increased more than once
every three (3) years. 2. Uses or attempts to use any passport which was secured in any way by reason of any false
statements, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) nor more
SEC. 17. Passport Revolving Fund. – The Department may charge a service fee of not more than Two than Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000) and imprisonment of not less than three (3) years, but not more
Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱250) for such service rendered to applicants relating to the processing and than ten (10) years; or
issuance of passports requiring special consideration, waiver or issuance beyond regular office hours.
The service fees received by the Department under this SEC. shall constitute a revolving fund to be 3. Travel and recruitment agencies whose agents, liaison officers or representatives are convicted of
called the “Passport Revolving Fund” which may be utilized by the Department for the improvement of offenses relating to false statements shall in addition to the fines and penalties abovementioned have
its passporting and consular services and other Department services except travel and transportation their license revoked with all deposits, escrow accounts or guarantee funds deposited or made as a
allowances and expenses. requirement of their business forfeited in favor of the government without prejudice to the officials of the
branch office or of the agency being charged as accessories to the offense and upon conviction barred
The setting up, use and disbursement of funds shall be subject to review, accounting and auditing rules from engaging in the travel or recruitment agency business.
and regulations of the Commission on Audit and will be subject to an annual review by Congress, but
the Secretary will submit a report on the disbursement of the fund every six (6) months to both the c) Offenses Relating to Forgery: Penalties. – Any person who:
Senate and the House Committees on Foreign Relations.
1. Falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates or alters any passport or travel document or any
SEC. 18. Waiver. – The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is solely authorized to waive any requirements set supporting document for a passport application, with the intent of using the same shall be punished by
forth in SEC. 5 of this Act. a fine of not less than Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000) nor more than One hundred fifty thousand pesos
(₱150,000) and imprisonment of not less than six (6) years nor more than fifteen (15) years; or
SEC. 19. Offenses and Penalties. – A passport being a proclamation of the citizenship of a Filipino, is a
document that is superior to all other official documents. As such, it should be accorded the highest 2. Willfully or knowingly uses or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged,
respect by its holder that to do damage to its integrity and validity is a serious crime that should be counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document or any passport validly issued which has
penalized accordingly: become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed shall be punished by a fine of not
less than Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000) nor more than One hundred and fifty thousand pesos
a) Offenses Relating to Issuances: Penalties. – Any person who: (₱150,000) and imprisonment of not less than six (6) years nor more than fifteen (15) years: Provided,
however, That officers of corporations, agencies or entities licensed in the travel and recruitment
1. Acting or claiming to act in any capacity or office under the Republic of the Philippines, without lawful industry would be held similarly as their agents, liaison officers or representatives: Provided, finally,
authority, grants, issues or verifies any passport or travel document to any or for any person That forgeries of five or more passports or travel documents, would be considered as massive forgery
whomsoever shall be punished by a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) nor more tantamount to national sabotage and shall be punished by a fine of not less than Two hundred and fifty
than Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000) and imprisonment of not less than eighteen (18) months nor more thousand pesos (₱250,000) nor more than One Million pesos (₱1,000,000) and imprisonment of not
than six (6) years; or less than seven (7) years nor more than seventeen (17) years.

2. Being a diplomatic or consular official authorized to grant, issue, amend or verify passports, d) Offenses Relating to Improper Use: Penalties. – Any person who willfully and knowingly:
knowingly and willfully grants, issues, amends or verifies any such passport to any or for any person not
owing allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, whether citizen or not, shall be punished by a fine of
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
1. Uses or attempts to use, any passport issued or designed for the use of another or any supporting Facts: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was
documents for a passport application which belongs to another; or then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following
2. Uses or attempts to use any passport or supporting documents in violation of the conditions or entries appears in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and
restrictions therein contained, or of the rules prescribed pursuant thereto; or “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
3. Furnishes, disposes, or delivers a passport to any person, for use by another or other than the marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
person for whose use it was originally issued or designed; or (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
4. Defaces or destroys a Philippine passport, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Sixty thousand replacement passport.
pesos (₱60,000) nor more than One hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱150,000) and imprisonment of not However, the petitioner’s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to change her
less than six (6) years nor more than fifteen years. surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.

e) Offenses Relating to Multiple Possession: Penalties. – No person or individual may hold more than Issue:
one valid passport, except as provided for in SEC. 7 hereof, and any individual who possesses more Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name “Remo” in her
than one unexpired passport shall, for every unexplored passport found in his possession, be punished passport.
by a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) nor more than Sixty thousand pesos
(₱60,000) and imprisonment of not less than eighteen (18) months but not more than six (6) years: Ruling:
Provided, That the maximum fine and imprisonment shall be imposed by the court if he attempts to use No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her
or actually uses an unexpired passport which is not in his name. passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in section
5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are:
In case any of the offenses prohibited in this Act constitutes a violation of the Revised Penal Code and (1) death of husband,
the penalty imposed in said Code is heavier than that provided in this Act, the latter penalty shall be (2) divorce,
imposed. (3) annulment, or
(4) nullity of marriage. since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her
SEC. 20. Suspension of Accreditation. – Any duly accredited travel or recruitment agent or agency maiden name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of
which violates the prescription on application for passport under SEC. 6 hereof shall have such her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
accreditation suspended without prejudice to civil, criminal or administrative sanctions including
revocation of its license to operate. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of the civil code
The mere submission of spurious, forged or falsified documents supporting a passport application by which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special
any duly accredited travel or recruitment agent or agency shall be prima facie evidence that the said law prevails over a general law. Wherefore, the court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of
travel or recruitment agent is the author of such forgery or falsification. the Court of Appeals

SEC. 21. Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary shall issue such rules and regulations as may be Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W. 2d 679 (1975)
necessary to implement the provisions herein within sixty (60) days from date of effectivity of this Act FACTS: Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer.
without extension or delays. She has continued to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, professionally, socially and for all
purposes. Tennessee had a state-wide compulsory Registration Law. Subsequent to her marriage, she
SEC. 22. Separability Clause. – Should any provision of this Act or the applicability thereof to any lodged with the Registrar a change of address form listing her name as Palermo. - She was advised
person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder thereof shall not be affected thereby. that she was required to register anew under the surname of her husband, or have her name purged
from the registration list. Upon her refusal to so register, her name was purged from the registration list.
SEC. 23. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof Hence this action.
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change name upon marriage
SEC. 24. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least five (5)
newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette. HELD: No. Woman upon marriage,may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname
of her husband and the choice is hers. So long as a person’s name remains constant and consistent,
Approved. and unless until changed in prescribed manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used. *According to Ma’am Beth the
legal name of any person is the one written on the birth certificate

Tolentino v. CA, 162 SCRA 66 (1988)

CASES:
FACTS: A complaint was filed by petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino against Consuelo David for the
Maria Virginia V. Remo v. DFA G.R. No. 169202 (2010) purpose of stopping and enjoining her by injunction from using the surname Tolentino. (January 13,
1972) Respondent Consuelo David filed her answer admitting she has been using and continues to use
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
the surname Tolentino. (January 18, 1972) The trial court granted the petition with the actual writ[1] surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname
being issued on January 20, 1972. The private respondent appealed the decision to the Court of during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive
Appeals raising several issues, among them, the prescription of the plaintiff's cause of action and the and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
absence of a monopolistic proprietary right of the plaintiff over the use of the surname Tolentino. (June
25, 1975) CA reversed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent
but the same was denied in a resolution dated August 29,1975. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner. court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former
husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname accordance with Muslim laws.
of her former husband from whom she was divorced.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court
HELD: NO. Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and dated July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her
consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. The wife cannot claim an maiden name and surname.
exclusive right to use the husband's surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can
she restrain others from using it. The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to DOCTRINE: The onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should
the petitioner would be an act of serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered into not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and
contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname
surname Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal
injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname and be fully Reading: Gordon, “Statutory Development: Pre-marriage Name Change,
protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for illegal purposes. There is no Resumption and Re-registration Statues”, Columbia L. Rev, Vol. 74, No. 8 (Dec. 1974)
usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so that the mere use of the surname On a separate document:
Tolentino by the Private respondent cannot be said to have injured the petitioner's rights[3]. Consuelo
never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but simply as Mrs. Consuelo David- E. Property Relations
Tolentino. She could not possibly be compelled to use the prefix "Miss" or use the name Mrs. David,
different from the surnames of her children. Arts. 74, 91-93, 98, 106, 109, 116, 125, FC

Yasin v. Shari’a District Court, supra Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:

FACTS: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to (2) By the provisions of this Code; and
resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was (3) By the local custom.
not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of
petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)
is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to
rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as
petitioner’s maiden name and surname. the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall
form part of the community property;
ISSUES: (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the
Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of community property;
name. (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)
HELD:
No. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is
husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom.
husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common
divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the
name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally
her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Held: defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: Ratio:
1. Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; redounded to the benefit of the family.
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to 2. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code: Article
only one of the spouses; and 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
1. (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless consent of the other;
the contrary is proved. 2. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited;
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the 3. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
Issue #3: W/N Honorio has civil liabilities towards Manuel for causing the alienation of his wife’s love.
CASES:
Held: No.
Carlos v. Abelardo 380 SCRA 361 (2002) Ratio: There is no proof that Honorio caused their separation.

Summary: Issue #4: W/N Manuel has civil liabilities towards Honorio for making death threats.
1. In 1989, Sps. Manuel and Theresa asked Theresa’s father Honorio Carlos for an advance of $25,000
to buy a house from seller Pura Vallejo. Held: Yes.
2. In 1994 Honorio Carlos filed a complaint for collection. Ratio: Two witnesses gave testimonies that prove that death threats were made.
3. The Court ordered the spouses to pay back the loaned amount and that the conjugal property was a. Randy Rosal, Honorio’s driver was given a written letter of threat and this was already presented as
liable since the loaned amount was used to purchase the family home. evidence.
b. He told Irineo Pajarin, also a driver, “Sabihin mo sa biyenan ko babarilin ko siya pag akita ko siya.”
Facts: The petition is granted. Honorio should be paid $25,000 or its equivalent in PH currency plus damage
1. Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, respondent and
his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of Selanova v. Mendoza, 64 SCRA 69 (1975)
US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house.
2. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to Facts: Saturino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro Mendoza with gross ignorance of the l aw for
them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a preparing and ratifying a document (November 21, 1972) extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. The conditions of the liquidation were 1.
inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. 3. On October Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against
13, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages and each of the the other and 2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity e ither one
respondents filed separate answers since by then they have already been separated. a. Maria Theresa would commit against the other In his judgment, respondent relied on Par. 4, Art 191 of the old Civil
Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. b. Manuel Code that states: the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
Abelardo denied that the $25,000 was a loan. He claims that this was his share from the profits of the during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. While the judge claimed that he asked the CFI of
construction company of Honorio which he managed. Negros (where the couple reside d) for judicial approval, the Judicial Consultant confirmed that there
was no affirmation from the same court. He still ratified the document.
Issue #1: W/N the $25,000 used to buy the Abelardo conjugal house was a loan.
Issue:
Held: Yes. WON the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial a pproval is void.

Ratio: 1. Manuel has received checks from the construction firm in the account of H.L. Carlos Held: Yes, it is void. Precedents (Quintana vs. Lerma, De Luna vs. Linatoc, De La Rosa vs. Barruga)
Construction, while the $25,000 check came from the personal account of Honorio Carlos. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:

2. Also, Theresa herself admitted that the amount was a loan. 1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the con jugal partnership of
Issue 2: W/N Manuel was solely liable to pay for the loan. gains or of the absolute community property between husband and wife.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Moreover, while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes pun ishable by the RPC, occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband
and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law , morals and public order , and as a and wife without a valid marriage.
consequence not judicially recognizable.
CASES:
Decision: Respondent severely censured.
Nazareno v. Birog, 45 OG 11 Supp 268 (1947)
Dicta:
A. Respondent Judge claimed that prohibition of the extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership Then Article 1335, Civil Code1
during the marriage made article 191 of the Civil Code nugatory. He cited Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson ARTICLE 134. Donations during the marriage by one of the spouses to the children whom the other
case to show that subsequent appr oval of the court can render the marriage dissolved. The SC argued spouse had by another marriage, or to persons of whom the other spouse is a presumptive heir at the
that the judicial sanction should be secured before the separation . time of the donation are voidable, at the instance of the donor’s heirs after his death.

B. Disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreements for the personal Case Summary This is an appeal of the judgment of the trial court ruling that petitioner has no claim
separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity. For instance, in over lands sold by his grandfather to respondents, despite the fact that his grandfather executed a deed
Panganiban vs. Borromeo, the notary was rebuked for authorizing a document that permitted both of donation of such lands in his favor before selling them to respondents
spouses to take in concubines without opposition from either spouse. In Biton vs. Momongon, a
document entitled Legal Separation was executed by a notary. The husband and wife were separated FACTS OF THE CASE
mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations in the process, and given the ● March 24, 1917 – Cirilo Braganza executed a deed of donation of the land to Bonifacio Melaño
authorization to remarry while not being witnesses against one another. The lawyer was also rebuked. Nazareno (petitioner), then six years old ○ Petitioner was a child of Mariano Melaño Nazareno with
In In re Santiago, a lawyer/ respondent prepared a document that gave a married couple the Alberta Aben, the latter being the daughter of the deceased Juan Aben with Andrea Rodriguez ○ At the
authorization to marry again while giving them assurance of renouncement of rights one would have time of the execution of the deed, Juan had already died while his widow Andrea was married to the
against the other. He was suspended from practice. donor Cirilo. Andrea and Cirilo had no offspring together.
■ In other words, Cirilo is the spouse of petitioner’s grandmother ○ The donation was executed as an
C. The judge was truly unaware of the legal prohibition in contracts for the personal separation of expression of love for the child who lived with them. However, Cirilo continued in possession and
spouses. --------------------------- enjoyment of the land

Selanova v Mendoza 64 SCRA 69 ● October 8, 1930 – Cirilo sold a portion of the land containing 71 ares and 30 centares to Francisco
Birog (respondent) for the sum of P1,100 ○ April 12, 1933 – Cirilo once again sold a second portion
Facts: Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a containing two hectares and 50 ares to Birog for P2,200
document extra judicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife. One ■ Birog did not pay the price in full, had a balance of P300
condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or ■ Paid P275 and on August 1, 1934, executed a promissory note for P25 ○ March 12, 1934 – For the
concubinage which each had fil ed against the other and that they waived their right to prosecute each third time, now selling one hectare and 70 ares to one Apoloniano Ariola (respondent) for P1,600
other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other. Respondent relied on Art ■ Ariola also executed a promissory note for P600 payable at the end of February or March, 1935
191 of the old Civil Code that states the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. The judge ratified the document ● December 24, 1934 – Cirilo died, with his brother Pedro acting on his behalf ○ Pedro collected the
without judicial appr oval from CFI Negros where the couple was residing, making it void assuming P25 from Birog, while the petitioner issued a demand letter to Ariola ● February 4, 1944 – Action for
arguendo that Art. 191 is still in effect. recovery of title and possession of land was made by petitioner against Birog and Ariola.

Issue: WON the agreement separating the conjugal property and the spouses is void. ○ Ariola was still in possession of the land he bought, while Birog and his wife donated the land they
bought to their child Adolfo
Held: It is void. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void: Any contract for personal ■ Respondent Birog died during the proceedings, continuing the action against his widow and child
separation between husband and wife; Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community property between husband ○ Trial court ruled that the sales made by Cirilo to the respondents were null and void. However,
an d wife. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, petitioner has still lost ownership over these two portions as he allowed respondents to remain
and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a possession over the lands for more than ten years.
consequence not judicially recognizable ■ Petitioner also signed the deed in favor of Ariola, and is now estopped from claiming the land back
○ Hence, this petition
F. Sales and Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa
ISSUE/S & RATIO/S
Art. 87, FC Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the lands sold by Cirilo to respondents?

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during No. The petitioner has no cause of action to make such claims of the lands, as the donation made by
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the Cirilo to him was prohibited by Article 1335 of the Civil Code. At the time of the donation, Cirilo was
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
already married to petitioner’s grandmother, making petitioner a grandchild of Cirilo where the automobile was made by the plaintiff's husband and not by his wife, to whom he had given the
prohibition still applies (9 Manresa 236). automobile. The owner of the automobile in question and had an insurable interest therein; that there
was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the valuation of the automobile, for the
The petitioner has also not acquired the lands through prescription, as there was no evidence he ever purposes of the insurance, is binding.
possessed them adversely as against Cirilo. In fact, he signed as a witness to the deed in favor of
Ariola, implying that he never claimed the lands for himself as against his grandfather. Arriola v. Arriola, G.R No. 177703 (2008)

RULING The judgement of the trial court is AFFIRMED Montemayor, Pres. J., and Concepcion, J., FACTS:
concur. In this case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
Harding v. Commercial Union, 38Phil. 464 (1918) 93570.

FACTS: John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court,
Mrs. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile with registered number 2063. On February 16, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners)
1916, she, with the consent of her husband, had the automobile insured with Smith, Bell & Company for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the
Ltd. with the payment of P150 premium with the value of the said automobile being P3, 000. On March son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of
24, 1916, the said automobile was destroyed by fire. Mrs. Harding furnished the proofs of the said loss decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
and performed all the conditions on her policy, however, the defendant has not paid the loss nor any
part thereof despite plaintiffs demands. The defendant prays that judgment be entered declaring the On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land which
said policy of insurance to be null and void. In 1913, Levy Hermanos, the Manila agents for the became final on March 15, 2004.
Studebaker automobile, sold the automobile No. 2063 to John Canson for P3,200 and that under date
of October 14, 1914, John Canson sold the said automobile to Henry Harding for the sum of P1,500; As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714
that under date of November 19, 1914, Henry Harding sold the said automobile No. 2063 to J. (subject land), respondent sought its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it.
Brannigan, of Los Baños, Province of Laguna, P.I., for the sum of P2,000; that under date of December Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land that was scheduled on May 31,
20, 1915, J. C. Graham of Los Baños, Province of Laguna, P.I., sold the said automobile No. 2063 to 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house)
Henry Harding of the city of Manila for the sum of P2,800. About January 1, 1916, the said Henry standing on the subject land. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation
Harding gave the said automobile to his wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding said that the automobile was and Motion for Contempt of Court, praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.
repaired and repainted at the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900. While the said automobile was at
the garage, Luneta Garage acting as an agent for Smith, Bell & Company Ltd. solicited Mrs. Harding The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated August 30, 2005, because petitioners were justified in
the insurance of said automobile. The proposal was filled out by the said agent and signed by Mrs. refusing to have the subject house included in the auction.
Harding. The said automobile was insured worth about P3, 000. The iron and steel portions of said
automobile which did not burn were taken into the possession of the defendant by and through its agent Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari where he sought the RTC Orders set aside and
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), and sold by it for a small sum worth P10. The defendant alleged that prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.
Mrs. Harding is not the owner of the said automobile and there was fraud on her part in the statement of
the value of the automobile. In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its Resolution14of April 30, 2007.
Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding has an insurable interest in the said automobile. ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject land?
HELD:
Mrs. Harding has insurable interest in the automobile. The contention of the defendant that the Mrs. HELD:
Harding was not the owner of the automobile is without merit. They are not in a position to challenge No, we agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by
the validity of the transfer, if it may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the the CA. However, we qualify that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and
transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate, present, remote, or otherwise, in actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription
the property in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from husband to imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
wife or from wife to husband are prohibited, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons
who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself. Furthermore, It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the existence
defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the automobile was a warranty, that the of a state of coownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the
statement was false, and that, therefore, the policy never attached to the risk. On the contrary, it shows segregation of the common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is
that the automobile had in fact cost more than the amount mentioned. The automobile was bought by under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
plaintiff's husband a few weeks before the issuance of the policy in question for the sum of P2,800, and
that between that time and the issuance of the policy some P900 was spent upon it in repairs and
repainting. It would be unfair to hold the policy void simply because the outlay represented by the
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely
different matter, since the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of (v) Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
The Family Code, particularly: aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine
and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own
“Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a CASES:
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries resides therein, Republic v. Toledano, G.R No. 94147 (1994)
the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except
as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.” (Emphasis supplied.) Doctrine:
Determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse
Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed Facts:
constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment, they began  On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is
Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses
deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
Code, viz.:
Issue: WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF
“Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and PHILIPPINE LAW.
the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall Ruling: Yes.
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.” (Emphasis supplied.)  Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the Philippines, private respondents spouses
Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its
ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of  Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3)
the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into An alien, except:
an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustains the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
judgment of coownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and consanguinity of the latter.
the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of
decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned  Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction  There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
the family home. not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United
Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by States in 1988.
public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
 Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
No costs. SO ORDERED. Petition partly granted, judgment and resolution modified 3(a) of Article 184. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185
G. Duties Toward Their Children which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Sec. 4 (v), RH Law  It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
FC, Art 220 The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. 1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
 Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along 2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
together with Article 184. 3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
 Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with compliance with the duties of citizenship;
the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be 4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
Johnston v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18284 (1963) 6. To demand from them respect and obedience;
Summary 7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
Isabel Valdes Johnston filed a petition with the CFI to adopt Ana Isabel Henriette….., with her 8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
husband’s consent. While the lower court granted the petition, it gave the adopted child the surname of
Valdes, thus Isabel filed a motion to have the child use the surname Johnston, which was denied. SC RIGHTS OF PARENTS DUTIES OF PARENTS
agreed with the lower court. CC entitles the adopted minor to use the adopter’s surname, the adopter’s 1. To keep them in their All others! So in effect, parents have more
surname. Since Isabel singly adopted the kid, without the concurrence of her husband, then her maiden company duties than rights.
name should be her adopted name. Mere consent of the husband did not have the effect of making him 2. To demand from them
the adopting father. To make it so would cause confusion in the public making them think that he also respect and obedience
adopted the child and would also cause confusion in successional rights.
FC, Art 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
Facts of the case and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
- On June 24 1960, Isabel Valdes Johnston (48 y.o., married to Raymund Johnston, Filipino, childless) and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, then under
the custody of Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage in Manila. The consent of the mother superior of FC, Art 222 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the
the orphanage and Johnston’s husband was obtained - Notices were issued and hearings were held. best interests of the child so requires
The lower court granted Jonston’s petition. Johnston then filed a motion on October 24 1960 praying
that he surname given to the adopted child be Valdes Johnston instead of Valdes only. Motion was FC, Art 223 The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising
denied by the lower court. - She argues that she is using the surname of her husbad by virtue of Article parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order
370, par. 1 of the Civil Code. Because it is the surname she used in filing for adoption, then obviously it providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
should be the surname given to her adopted child. Using Valdes will give the impression that the child counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted
was illegitimate a situation humiliating to adopter and adopted. wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds
the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant,
Issue What should be the surname of the child? Valdes the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other
measures as it may deem just and proper.
Ratio
- Article 341(4) of the Civil Code which entitles the adopted minor to use the adopter’s surname, refers FC, Art 224 The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child
to the adopter’s surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Petitioner’s real for not more than 30 days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly
surname is Valdes, not Johnston, and since she made the adoption singly without the concurrence of accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not
her husband, and not as a married woman, then her maiden name should be her adopter name. interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper
- The adoption created a personal relationship between adopter and adopted, but the consent of petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and
Raymund to her individual adoption, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, to entitle proper.
the child to use his surname.
- Since adoption gives the adoptee the same rights and duties as a legitimate child of the adopter, FC, Art 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
confusion would result if the minor children were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who didn’t unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
join the adoption. To allow the minor to use Raymund’s surname would also lead the public that the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market
Ramund adopted her as well. Later, when questions of successional rights arise, the husband’s value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
consent might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption. required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum
(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
H. Other Rights and Duties prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper
court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) led, for herself and in behalf of her
summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the minor children, namely Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old a natural child of the petitioner but whom the
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary private respondent adopted; Jessi Anthony J. Garci, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduardo J. Garcia, 3
rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental years old; a veri ed petition (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
guardianship shall apply. (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.

FC, Art 226 The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents and of financial support. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and revolved around her husband.
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family
On the other hand, petitioner, Jesus Garcia, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
PROPERTY OF THE CHILD controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent
1. child’s earning through his labor, work or industry to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
2. property acquired by the child by gratuitous title donated or inherited
3. property acquired by the child through onerous title The petitioner was guilty of infidelity and physical and emotional abuse against his wife and children. In
4. fruits of all the properties of the child whether acquired by lucrative or onerous title one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force
5. insurance proceeds accruing to the child that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the
lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had
PURPOSES WHICH THE PARENTS MAY USE THE FRUITS AND INCOME OF THE CHILD seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat
1. child’s support and education Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times
2. collective daily needs of the family as a social unit
The RTC was able to issue several Temporary Protection Orders against the complied by the latter.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF PARENT’S USUFRUCT Jesus Garcia, herein, petitioner, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262, alleging that said law is
1. emancipation of child violative of the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution.
2. death of the child
3. loss of parental authority through judicial decree ISSUES:
4. consent of the parent to the child’s living independently 5. disinheritance and incapacity to succeed WON: 1) R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
by reason of unworthiness PROTECTION CLAUSE.
2) THE ISSUANCE OF RA 9262 TPO VIOLATES THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
Administration and usufruct are two distinct things. There may be administration without usufruct or vice
versa
RULING:
FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be 1) No, R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the Constitution. Since, the
given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have guaranty
paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Hence, it
Who has authority over the child’s property? guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
1. parents unless minor or disinherited by ascendant
2. parental authority The equal protection clause simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, and the enactment of the RA
XI. Rights and Obligations of Unmarried Cohabitants 9262 aims to address discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women, because
there have been unequal power relations between men and women which led to domination over
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and Respect, Mutual Help and Support discrimination against women by men. Hence, the equal protection of the laws clause of the constitution
through a gender-based classification and
CASE: special remedies provided by law under RA 9262 should be sustained.
Case: Garcia v. Drilon and Jaype-Garcia, supra
2) No, RA 9262 did not violate the due process clause of the constitution, most especially in the
Facts: issuance

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
of Protection owner against the petitioner since, the said law states that the TPO’s purpose is to prevent
further acts of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances surrounding the utilization DECISION OF RTC: In favor of Esther Peralta.
thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have immediate and
uncomplicated access to the same. Thus, Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations were RULING: Yes. While the Saturnino’s liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under the Civil Code of
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect the 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a
safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he had foreseen them
as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power. or not, just as he must indemnify not only for dumnum emergens but also for lucrum cessans, as
required by Article 1106.
B. Exercise of Profession
Silva knew all the time that he could not marry Esther Peralta because of his undissolved marriage to
Art. 2 RA9262 an Australian woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from appellee. It is clear that Esther would not
have consented to the liaison had there been no concealment of Silva's previous marriage, or that the
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and birth of the child was a direct result of this connection. That Esther had to support the child because
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the Silva abandoned her before it was born is likewise patent upon the record, and we cannot see how said
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal appellant can be excused from liability therefor.
safety and security.
Silva's seduction and subsequent abandonment of appellee and his illegitimate child were likewise the
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and direct cause for the filling of the support case in Manila, and in order to prosecute the same, appellee
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the had to quit her employment in Davao. While the case could have been filed in Davao, we do not believe
Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms that this error in selecting a more favorable venue be allowed to neutralize appellant Silva's
of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human responsibility as the primary causative factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by appellee.
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
NO RES JUDICATA. Plainly, the issues and parties being different, the result of the child's action can
C. Use of Surname not constitute res judicata with regard to the mother's claim for damages against the father on account
Case: Silva v. Peralta, 110 Phil 57 (1960) of the amounts she was compelled to spend for the maintenance of their child.

FACTS On the contrary, the very fact that the child was not allowed to collect support from the father merely
Spouses Saturnino Silva and Elenita Ledesma Silva pray for reconsideration of the Court's decision emphasizes the account of his birth and rearing, which, in turn, was a direct consequence of appellant's
claiming that — tortious conduct.
(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther Peralta's unauthorized use of
the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva"; ACTION HAS NOT PRESCRIBED. The award for moral damages was based, not on the deceit
(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by the facts and practiced by Silva in securing Esther's assent to live maritally with him, but on his subsequent
the law. harassment of her in 1945, by filing suit against her in different provinces and otherwise applying
pressure to cause her to abandon her child's case. As this cause of action arose less than three years
The facts are that the Esther in good faith regarded herself as Saturnino's lawful wife, and that the man before the present action was filed, the defense of prescription is rendered untenable against it, for the
himself led her into this belief prior to his desertion. That later on, unknown to Esther, Silva should have limitation period had not yet expired when the suit was brought
married his co-appellant in the United States. The two appellants were living together as husband and
wife. D. Property Relations
Arts. 147-148, FC
It has also been established that Silva was previously married to an Australian woman, a matter which
was concealed to Esther. Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
Esther was forbidden from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva for the reason that it was salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
proved that she was not legally married to him, and because he is now lawfully married to Elenita their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Ledesma.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
DOCTRINES to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
Article 2202: In crimes and quasi delicts, the defendants shall be liable for all the damages which are shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
such damages have been foreseen or could have been foreseen by the defendant. efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct consequence of
Silva's deceitful maneuvers
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code,
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
of their cohabitation. relationships.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits”
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim
one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to succession.
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
paragraph of the preceding Article. without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article
40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry,
CASES: no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
Nicadao-Carino v. Yee-Carino, supra
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
FACTS: 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
between the two Susans whom he married. as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Valdes v. RTC, 260 SCRA 221 (1996)
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. are free to choose which they prefer.

Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family Code
latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was solemnized without the required contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage license. marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows: of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family
Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit. home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the
properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the
ISSUE: Civil Code shall apply."
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1)
RULING: Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian it would not be just that such donations should
the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.  Second, if there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
ISSUES: Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar. discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed
HELD: objective.
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the  Lastly, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death
be, of the Family Code. of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage
on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow.
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations  As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is surviving sister, to the other half
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s Sumbad v. CA, 308 SCRA 575 (1999)
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
Facts:
E. Sales and Donations Inter Vivos and Mortis Causa Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agata’s husband, George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law
Art.87, FC marriage with Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at,
Bontoc. George died in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at
CASES: property in favor of the private respondents who purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration
Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284 (1971) over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the property in question. In 1989,
petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds
FACTS:  In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents, alleging that they are
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. the children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata. They claim that after the death of their mother,
 Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. their father sold the Otucan property and used the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in
Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold lots included within the Sum-at property to
 Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral private respondents without their knowledge and consent. They further alleged that although the private
relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes from Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at property so the deeds of sale are null and void
thereon. and did not transfer title to private respondents. During the trial, petitioners and defense presented
 The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the several witnesses.
time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable. Issues:
 Hence this appeal. 1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of the deed of donation should be
given credence.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE BAN ON A DONATION BETWEEN THE SPOUSES DURING A MARRIAGE
APPLIES TO A COMMON-LAW RELATIONSHIP No. The court agreed with the trial and appellate court’s decision that Eillenger’s testimony is “vague
and incredible” and incapable of impugning the validity of the public document. Forgery should be
RULING: YES, it applies hence the questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and proven by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.
defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. Not only is Shirley Eillenger’s testimony difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she
 While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the anticipated the questions of petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner’s should have presented handwriting experts
marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require to support their claim that George’s signature on the deed of donation was indeed a forgery.
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
 First, if the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that 2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art. 749 of the Civil Code, which requires a public
Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property.
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and No. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However, the
wife without the benefit of nuptials. acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted
 For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater “for and in the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized, under Sec. 21 of the Revised
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths. In
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
accordance with the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, it is to be presumed Goyanko siblings discovered that Ching has already been the registered owner of the property. They
that the deputy clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in this case was duly authorized by verified the signature of their father in the deed of sale and PNP Crime Lab found it to be a forgery.
the clerk of court.  Goyanko siblings then filed for a complaint for recovery of property; praying for the nullification of the
deed of sale.
3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC  In defense, Ching claimed that she provided the purchase price for the sale and she presented the
notary public who testified that Goyanko, Sr. signed the deed of sale in his presence.
No. Art 133 provides that “every donation between spouses during the marriage shall be void. This  RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the decision and declared the sale null and void for being
prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this contrary to morals and public policy – which prohibits spouses from selling properties to each other.
prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any
family rejoicing.” This prohibition extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v. Cervantes). In fact, ISSUE:
Art 87, FC provides that “every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the WON the deed of sale is null and void
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together HELD:
as husband and wife without a valid marriage.” However, this point is being raised for the first time in YES. Petition dismissed. SC Affirmed CA.
the SC. Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic  The deed of sale violates NCC Art. 1409: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to
rules of fair play and justice. Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners were unable to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very
present evidence in support of such a claim. The evidence on record does not show whether George beginning;
was married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place. If Maria was not married to George,  NCC Art 1352: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The
evidence should have been presented to show that at the time the deed of donation was executed, cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy;
George and Maria were still maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice tait’s (one of the witnesses  And NCC Art. 1490: The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, xxx.
presented) testimone is only to the effect that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no
 It was designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to
evidence on record that George and Maria continuously maintained common-law relations until the date
protect the institution of marriage.
when the donation was made (April 2, 1974)
 Art 1490 also applies to common-law spouses, otherwise, “the condition of those who incurred guilt
would turn out to be better than those in legal union.”
4. WON the petitioners’ claim that they only learned of the sales to the private respondents in 1988
when they visited Maria because she was seriously ill is admissible  In general, transfers or conveyances (in a form of sale or donation) is prohibited between spouses.

No. Petitioners waited for twelve years before claiming their inheritance and are thus guilty of laches Doctrine: The proscription against transfers or conveyances between spouses applies even to common
which precludes them from assailing the donation made by their father in favor of Maria. Laches is the law relationships.
failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. F. Custody and Support of Children
RA 9255
5. WON Lanoy Takayeng’s testimony that Georde gave Fani-is money to purchase the Sum-at property ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER,
means that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
No. Lanoy could not state with certainty when the alleged meeting took place, the amount of money
given by George to Fani-is and when the purchase took place or if the sale was consummated in Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:
accordance with George’s instructions. Held: Petitioners have not sufficiently shown the nullity of
private respondents’ title to the lots purchased by them. Decision of CA affirmed SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Ching v. Goyanko, 506 DCRA 735 (2006)
"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
SUBJECT: donation in common law marriages mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
FACTS: record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
 Goyanko, Sr. married Epifania. Goyanko, Jr. and the rest of the respondents were born out of this handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
union. before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
 1961: Goyanko siblings allege that their parents acquired a property in Cebu City. But since their shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."
parents were Chinese citizens at that time, the property was registered in the name of their aunt,
Sulpicia.n SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules
 1993: Sulpicia executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of Goyanko, Sr. In turn, Goyanko, Sr. and regulations, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
executed a dded of sale in favor of his common-law wife, Ching.  1996: After Goyanko, Sr.’s death, the accordingly.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its publication in the became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. was pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent but
eventually backed out. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the
CASES: petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on
Silva v. CA and Gonzales, 275 SCRA 604 (1997) demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand,
the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. The petitioner
DOCTRINE: Included in parental authority is the parent’s right to the company of the children. took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first
had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been
FACTS: - Silva, a married businessman and Gonzales, an unmarried actress, had an illicit relation ship pregnant for 3 months when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 1994. During the
from which two children were born. When the relationship ended, Silva filed for custodial rights of the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child
children, on allegation that Gonzales refused to allow him the company of the children on weekends; support, retroactive from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The
Gonzales’ counter -claim: Silva engaged in ‘gambling and womanizing.’ CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son
Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly child support. The petitioner argues that the CA
RTC: awarded Silva visitorial rights but deprived him of taking the kids out without written consent from committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that the evidence on record is insufficient
the mother. Pending Gonzales’ appeal, she married a Dutch national and moved to Holland with the to prove paternity.
kids.
ISSUE:
CA: welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration (PD 603, Art. 8); a system of rotation of W/N the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the
custody (mother, weekdays, father, and weekends) might not be conducive to their upbringing, and that petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze
Art. 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides: “every child has the right to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (5)” and DECISION:
“Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, hazards and other The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA, sustaining the award of P2,000.00
conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral monthly child support, not finding any reversible error in the CA’s ruling. In this case, the respondent
development. (8 )” Best Interest of minor children: deny visitorial/temporary custodial rights to father. A established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that
home with one parent is more normal than two separate homes. Art. 176, FC: illegitimate children are she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo
under the parental authority and use the surname of their mother. corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. However,
the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
ISSUE: WON the father is entitled to visitorial rights to his children? (The right of access of an on allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial
custodial parent to his or her child/children) cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions. Since filiation is beyond question,
support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
HELD: Inherent and natural rights of parents over their children: Art. 150, FC: “family relations include illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
those between parents and children. ” Art. 209, 220 of FC: “the natural right and duty of parents and attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family
those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give
them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. ” 1987 Constitution: Gan v. Reyes, G.R No. 145527 (2012)
‘natural and primary rights’ of parents in the rearing of the youth. Nothing in these provisions limit such
rights to legitimate parent-children relationships. - Laws on support and successional rights go beyond DOCTRINE: Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget or to the plain words of a legal provision we
legitimate family members and encompass illegitimate relationships too.- Declaration of nullity of should make no further explanation.
marriages (Art. 49,FC) provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents not given custody of their
children.- The Supreme Court ruled that a few hours spent with their father could not be detrimental to FACTS:
the children. Furthermore, “allegations of the mother against the father (re: womanizing and gambling) 1. After declining the demand for support for their “love child” and denying paternity thereof, Bernadette
cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render father as unfit; allegations are a product of the mother’s Pondevida, instituted a complaint against Agustus Gan in behalf of their daughter Francheska
unfounded imagination; no immoral man would take the trouble to spend on legal action to see his Pondevida praying for support from respondent. Bernadette was quite apprehensive that she would not
illegitimate children.” RTC decision reinstated. Father’s visitorial rights restored. be able to send Francheska to school.

Gotardo v. Buling, G.R No. 165466 (2012) 2. Gan moved to dismiss the petition saying that Francheska’s birth certificate indicated an “unknown”
father thus there was no legal basis for the claim of support. His motion to dismiss was denied by the
SUMMARY Single mother seeking child support through establishing filiation with ex-fiancee. FACTS In trial court. Despite denial, Gan failed to file his answer and the trial court declared him in default. As
1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the RTC for compulsory recognition and support such, he was ordered to recognize Francheska as his illegitimate child entitled to filiation and support.
pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze, whose imputed paternity the Bernadette moved for execution of judgment which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution,
petitioner denied. Trial ensued. She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both worked. They citing as reason Francheska’s immediate need for schooling.
became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner
started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house 3. Gan appealed with CA invoking trial court’s absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement
managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle. The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and and technicalities in the issuance of writ of execution. CA dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
under Sec 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Hence this petition with SC. respondent's removal of personal belongings;

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in issuing and enforcing the writ of execution (f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

HELD: No. Petition is DENIED and the writ of execution issued by the lower court is AFFIRMED. 1. (g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support.
There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the
legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. Sec 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same
states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the
and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the
taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be
good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of (h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and
the rule mandating immediate execution. order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including
revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the
2. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall
explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner direct the appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the
provision subject of the petition. (i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;
XII. Relief from Courts
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and
Secs. 8, 21, RA 9262 (k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the
safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of
designated family or household member consents to such relief.
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and
granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of
Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal
safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and
separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The
provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order
applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.
(TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this
Act must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that
the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and
upon judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of
need of an application.
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or
permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member
Article 72
at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment,
When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to
or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;
bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court
for relief.
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal
effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany
the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)

CASES: Issues:
(A) WON the plaintiff is entitled to be declared legally separated from the defendant Vicenta F. Escaño,
Tenchavez v. Escano, supra and the latter liable for damages amounting to 1 million pesos

Summary:
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First (B) WON the defendant parents Don Mamerto Escaño and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño; her parents, Mamerto damages;
and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its ( C ) WON the plaintiff liable for and required to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage. He asked for legal separation and one counterclaim;
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff on a foreign country and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they (D) WON committed an error in dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the
had in anyway influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages. plaintiff.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife Ruling :
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and YES, plaintiff is entitled to a decree of legal separation from the defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño.
Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiffappellant, to But on the liability for damages amounting to 1 million pesos, the latter is required only to pay plaintiff-
the extent of P45,000.00; The plaintiff resorted directly to this Court appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees. Neither party to recover
costs.
Facts:
Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish NO, the defendant parents Don Mamerto Escaño and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño is NOT liable for
ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of damages
age, without the knowledge of her parents. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor
never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the YES, plaintiff is liable for and required to pay the to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate
clandestine marriage would provoke. The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorney's fee. Neither party to
advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid recover costs.
marriage, from the standpoint of the Church. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26
February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, a letter disclosing an amorous relationship YES, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, committed an
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. As error in denying the claim of the plaintiffappellant. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged. modified.

Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis:
in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to (A) Vicenta F. Escaño refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her
annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition and the case was dismissed without prejudice desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is
because of her non-appearance at the hearing. entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of
deceit, nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her
On 24 June 1950, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
purpose was to study, that she was domiciled in Cebu City. The application was approved, and mshe technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine law, and
left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
Tenchavez in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of adultery (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal. In 1951 Mamerto Furthermore, a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
Pastor. On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this country In the assessment of the moral damages
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicenta Escaño, it is proper to take into
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage
August 1958. was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on
appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant
had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code).
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
engaged in an affair with Ms. Espita, and being live-in partners, have had two children with the latter.
(B) "Sec. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or kin. - …. The parent is not liable unless he acts Atty. Nunag denied the allegations by presenting Argumentum ad Misericordia.
maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises
his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations, … even where his conduct and advice ISSUE: Should Atty. Nunag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment. There is
no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for RULING: Atty. Nunag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of evidence presented
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently and being of age, she against him, but instead, presented an argument to pity. He is, by order of the honorable court, being
was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so disbarred by virtue of The Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
doing, certainly can not be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7
— A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
( C ) Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination activities of the Integrated Bar.
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While his suit may not have been Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen. legal profession.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded FACTS: On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and
suit have wounded said defendant's feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. On the strength of the testimony of her
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of
witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with
the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable
another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely
affair.
against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
(D) YES, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, committed
RULES: Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
an error in denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant. The appealed judgment did not decree a legal
CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his
support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
wife; NO, with when It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant; YES, as to the extent of paying
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
P45,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant,
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified. There is no need for modification if the
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dominador M. Narag violated the Canon of the Code of Ethics for
Court of First Instance of Cebu did not commit an error
Lawyers.
Disposition:
HELD: Dominador M. Narag is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified, as follows:
The respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
an adulterous relationship with a married woman. The Court declared that respondent failed to maintain
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his Perez v. Tuason de Perez, 109 Phil. 654 (1960)
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorney's fee Neither party to
recover costs. Appeal from an order, dated October 27, 1958, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing its
Civil Case No. 34626 for lack of jurisdiction.
Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451 (1998)
Plaintiff Antonio Perez, in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son, Benigno
FACTS: Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Nunag, for his Perez y Tuason, initiated this civil case against Angela Tuason de Perez, the plaintiff's wife and
alleged affair with Gina Espita who happens to be a former student of the respondent back when Ms. Benigno's mother. The complaint states three causes of action.
Espita was a first-year college student. Finally, in the most recent case filed by Mrs. Nunag, the
complainant had her seven children sign the appeal for disbarment of Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag Under the first cause of action, it is averred that the defendant is squandering all of her estate on a
presented as evidence the pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita together, love letters, testimony of young man by the name of Jose Antonio Campos Boloix, because of which Benigno Perez y Tuason,
Mr. Charlie Espita, the brother of Ms. Espita and the source of the mentioned pictures and love letters, acting through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff, prays that his mother, the defendant, be declared a
and the testimony of the children of Atty. And Mrs Nunag. In the proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been prodigal and placed under guardianship; that a suitable person or institution be appointed to administer

37
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
her properties; and that during the pendency of this suit, a writ of injunction be issued to prevent the (b) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity. and acknowledgment;
continued waste and dissipation of her properties.
*******
In his second cause of action, the husband Antonio Perez, for and in his own behalf, asserts that by
virtue of the said alleged! acts of prodigality committed by the defendant wife, the conjugal partnership (d) Proceedings brought under the provisions of Articles one hundred sixteen, two hundred twenty-five,
of gain is being dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses; wherefore, he prays for a writ of injunction two hundred fifty, two and three hundred thirty-one of the Civil Code." (Italics supplied.)
to restrain her from "dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains".
While Article 116 of the Civil Code (referred to in subsection [d] above) states:
Finally, as a third cause of action, the plaintiff husband avers that, in addition to the aforementioned
acts, the defendant has repeatedly advised him, as well as other persbns, that she intends to marry "When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or
Jose Campos Boloix and to have a child by him not withstanding her present marriage to the plaintiff, material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the court for relief.
Antonio Perez; and that, if she could not have such a child, she was willing to have one by any other
person, just to put plaintiff in a ridiculous and embarrassing position. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks to The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as
recover from her the total sum of P185,000.00 by way of damages and attorney's fees. may be proper/' (Italics supplied.)

On January 2, 1958, after a preliminary hearing, wherein plaintiff was heard ex parte, the Court of First It is easy to see that the first cause of action set forth in the complaint, wherein the minor Benigno
Instance of Manila issued a preliminary injunction as prayed for in the complaint. Perez y Tuason, through his representative, asks that his mother be placed under guardianship
because of her alleged prodigality, and prays that a suitable person or institution be appointed to
On March 19, 1958, the defendant appeared through counsel and prayed for the dismissal of the case administer her properties, is exclusively cognizable by the Domestic Relations Court. The action falls
on the ground of res judicata, and that the preliminary injunction be dissolved. Said motion was denied squarely under the provisions of subsection (6), Section 38-A, R. A. 1401, above-quoted, as a "case
by the court a quo in its order of April 2, 1958. involving . . . guardianship." No error was, therefore, committed in the appealed order in holding that
this cause of action lay outside the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
On April 16, 1958, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the case, this time on the ground that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the present proceedings, which, according The same thing can be said of the third cause of action wherein Antonio Perez seeks to recover
to her, is vested under Republic Act No. 1401 with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While damages and attorney's fees because his wife's act (avowing openly her intention to marry and have a
this last motion was being considered by the Court, a compromise agreement was arrived at and child by Campos Boloix or if not, by anyone else) placed the plaintiff "in an embarrassing and
submitted for approval of the court on May 2, 1958. On May 31, 1958, before the Court could act, contemptible position" (sic) and causing him "grave anxiety, wounded feelings, extreme humiliation."
defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the compromise agreement, on the ground that (a) the The case involves acts of a spouse that "brings.....dishonor..... upon the other (spouse)" under Article
same is contrary to law and (6) it was not freely or validly entered into by her representative. Without 116 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and also lies within the jurisdiction of the Domestic Relations
resolving this particular question, the lower court asked the parties to submit further memoranda on the Court. The law (subsection (d), Sec. 38-A) expressly gives that court exclusive original jurisdiction over
sole issue of jurisdiction. After this was done, the trial court, by order of September 30, 1958, ordered proceedings under the provisions of Article 116 of the Civil Code. ,
the dismissal of the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence,
plaintiffs Perez (father and son) appealed. More controversial is the issue involved in the second cause of action of the complaint, wherein Antonio
Perez alleges that the prodigal acts of his wife result in the conjugal partnership of gains being
Appellants assign three alleged errors in the order appealed from, as follows: dissipated to the prejudice of both spouses, and prays for a writ of injunction to restrain her from
"dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains." The Court of First Instance held that this
"The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the cause of action is also one of those provided by Article 116 of4 the Civil Code, as a case where one
causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in the complaint. spouse "brings danger * * * or material injury" upon the other, and, therefore, relief should be sought in
the Court of Domestic Relations.
"The trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the
causes of action alleged by Benigno Perez y Tuason in the complaint. We are inclined to think that "material injury" as used in Article 116 does not refer to patrimonial
(economic) injury or damage, but to personal (i. e. physical or morai) injury to one of the spouses, since
The trial court erred in holding that the Doctrine of Estoppel of Jurisdiction is not applicable in this Article 116 lies in the chapter' concerning personal relations between husband and wife. Nevertheless,
country and erred further in failing to apply said doctrine to the present proceedings." the court below was correct in viewing this cause of action as primarily predicated on the grant of
guardianship due to alleged prodigality of the wife, since the allegation thereof is therein reiterated, and
We find the appeal to be untenable. the remedy of injunction sought against further (i.e. future) acts of disposition (no annulment of her past
transactions is demanded) must be necessarily based on the wife's being subject to guardianship.
Republic Act No. 1401, creating the Juvenile and Domestic, Relations Court of the City of Manila and
defining its jurisdiction, provides, among other things, that: If the wife were not in any way incapacitated, the mere fact that the alienation of her paraphernal would
deprive the conjugal partnership of the future fruits thereof would not give rise to a cause of action for
"SEC. 38-A Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have injunction, since the conjugal partnership is only entitled to the net fruits of such property, after
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act: deducting administration expenses (People's Bank vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil., 167), and it is
nowhere alleged that any such net fruits exist. More fundamental still, the wife's statutory power to
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
alienate her parapherna (Phil. Civil Code, Article 140) necessarily implies power to alienate its future in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
fruits, since the latter are mere accessory to the property itself. consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent's faithful compliance with his or her own
parental duties.
Wherefore, the second cause of action is inextricably woven into and cannot stand independently of the
demand for guardianship of the wife, the injunction being a mere incident thereof; so that like the first o BUT the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
cause of action, the second also lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Domestic Relations.
o “SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
The third alleged error charged against the Court below, that it should have held that defendant was in the Child's Development.
estoppel to question the jurisdiction of the trial court, is, on its face, without merit. Assuming for the sake (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible
of argument that defendant appellee was placed in such estoppel by merely executing the compromise for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of PD
and submitting it to the Court's approval, such estoppel could not operate against the Court. Regardless No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
of the parties, the Court, at any time, could motu proprio inquire and determine whether it had penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (emphasis supplied)
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and could dismiss the case (as it did) if it found that it
had no power to act therein. o The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference
of parents") penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants. is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and  WoN the City Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice (in affirming the City Prosecutor’s resolution)
Dizon, JJ., concur. acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause for charging Roberto

De Guzman v. Perez, G.R No. 156013 (2006) o NO. There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact financially capable of
supporting Robby's education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation indicates that
SUMMARY: The parent of an illegitimate child who fails to render support may be charged for petitioner owns P750,000 worth of paidup shares in the company. Petitioner's assertion that the GIS is
abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603. not evidence of his financial capability (since the shares are allegedly owned by his father) is of no
moment. The claim is factual and evidentiary, and therefore a defense which should be interposed
FACTS: Petitioner Roberto P. De Guzman and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became during the trial. The argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD
sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Shirley became pregnant and gave
birth to Robby in 1987. But, she and Roberto never got married. In 1991, Roberto married another Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54 (1921)
woman with whom he begot two children. Roberto sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice. Also,
when Robby fell seriously ill, Roberto gave Shirley P7,000. Other than these instances, he never Facts
provided any other support for his son. In Taiwan, she worked for two years in order to support Robby. ● Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910, and since then, with few
However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and short intervals of separation, lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920.
Robby's needs. The child's continued education thus became uncertain. Despite his luxurious lifestyle, ● Dolores went away from their common home with the intention of living separate from Mariano.
petitioner Roberto failed to provide support to Robby. On June 15, 2000, Shirley filed a criminal ● Mariano made efforts to induce Dolores to return home to no avail; hence, this action to compel
complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603. Dolores to return to their matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife.
● Dolores defended that she left their home due to the cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She
ISSUE/S: then prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal
 WoN Roberto alone may be charged for abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
of PD 603, contrary to his claim that “only if both parents are guilty” does criminal liability attach o YES. ● Lower Court Ruling: Judgment made in favor of Dolores, authorizing her to live apart from her
According to PD 603: “Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who: xxx xxx xxx (4) husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay
Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in life and financial to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case.
conditions permit. xxx xxx xxx
Ratio Decidendi
The crime has the following elements: W/N the wife has the right to have provision for separate maintenance.
(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child; No. The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil Code. The
(4) the offender's station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education to the enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance
child” of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly, it has been
determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her
o The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance
on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the expenses, including
parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family's station
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. (Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 FACTS: Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents, married in Manila to
Phil., 179.) another British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where he and his wife moved to. In his
will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal properties, among which are
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines). Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a
involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock. In
fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses Fisher. Statt filed an
be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the
of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. estate and inheritance tax on the Mines’ shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the NIRC,
hence, warranting a refund from what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed in
Ruling the CFI of Manila for the said amount. CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be deducted
Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the from the net estate of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
without sucient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from
the cross- complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered ISSUE/S: Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock.
XIII. Property Relations Between Spouses
RULING: NO. Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt
A. General Provisions any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. In the
Arts. 78-81, Family Code Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or nonresident with properties, there are imposed
upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance tax.
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although the Federal Internal
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a) Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a
Filipino citizen shall always be at a disadvantage. This is not what the legislators intended.
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for SPECIFICALLY: Section122 of the NIRC provides that “No tax shall be collected under this Title in
the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. (123a) respect of intangible personal property
(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible personal
spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or
and their residence. (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow
a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
This rule shall not apply: personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country."

(1) Where both spouses are aliens; On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law provides that intangible
personal property is exempt from tax if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a territory
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and or another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy,
executed in the country where the property is located; and succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.

(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to intangible personal
situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a) property of residents of this State, or

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-resident was
consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other State of the
shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend United States or foreign state or country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption
upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. in respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United States or
foreign state or country of residence of the decedent."

Case: Collector v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 (1961) 1. Requisites for donations
DOCTRINE: “Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt Arts. 82-83, FC
any transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.”

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in Said section provides that the contract shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced
consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. (126) by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts
mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contracts are invalid, which have not
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A
III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is
not made in conformity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But
CASES: a failure to except to evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to
Damalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 (1916) the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.

Nature of the Case: Recover of the defendant the sum of P516, together with damages estimated in the If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral
sum of P350 and interest, and costs. evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
Doctrine: If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by
evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
writing.
Serrano v. Solomon, 105 Phil 998 (1959)
Facts: Plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, he and the defendant entered into a
contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant the sum of P500 upon the Solis v. Barroso, 53 Phil. 912 (1928)
marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer; Facts: On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propternuptias of
certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in
He completed his obligation under said contract by paying to the defendant the said sum of P500, consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the
together with the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would
agreement, the said Bonifacia Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter
Laureano Sisi. the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the
same year, Juan also died. After Juan’s death, Maxima recovered possession of the donated lands.
He demanded of the defendant the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against Maxima and Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs
damages; that the damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum of Juan and demanded: (1)the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law,
of P500, was obliged to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a (2)transferring one-half of the donated property, and (3)to proceed to the partition of the donated
great sacrifice. property and its fruits.

Defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged that the facts stated in the complaint do not The lower court granted the plaintiff’s prayer, basing its judgment on article 1279 of the Civil Code. It
constitute a cause of action. ordered the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to
her the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original donation.
CFI: rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said sum of P516
together with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910. Issue: Whether or not the donation propter nuptias was valid

Issue: WON the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant in regard to the delivery Held: A donation propter nuptias, according to Art. 1328 of the Civil Code, must be governed by the
of the money by reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective rules on donations, and in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must be made in a
public instrument (Art. 633). This is the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in so far as its
Ruling: YES The appellant contends that a contract, such as the one relied upon by the plaintiff, in formal validity is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations,
order to be valid, must be reduced to writing. We have examined the record in vain to find that the in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules
defendant during the trial of the cause objected to any proof or any part thereof, presented by the on contracts (art. 622), and those which are to take effect upon the donor's death, which are governed
plaintiff, which showed or tended to show the existence of the alleged contract. That part of said section by the rules established for testamentary successions (art. 620).
335 which the appellant relies upon for relief provides:
In this case, a donation propter nuptias was not valid and did not create any right, since it was not made
"In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, in a public instrument, and hence, Art.1279 of the Civil Code is not applicable thereto. Art. 1279 refers
or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his to contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in question, for such must be governed by rules on
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be received without the writing or secondary donation. The article further provides that should the law require the execution of an instrument or any
evidence of its contents: "1.** * "2.** * "3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may
other than a mutual promise to marry." Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the
contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. other requirements for the validity of the contract exist.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
According to the lower court, the present donation as donation propter nuptias, is based upon the
marriage as a consideration and must be considered onerous, thus pursuant to Art. 622 of the Civil "ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
Code, it must be governed by the rules on contracts. This opinion is not well founded. Art. 619 of the considered deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
Civil Code provides that donations for valuable consideration are such as compensate services which
constitute debts recoverable from the donor, or which impose a charge equal to the amount of the "To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that
donation upon the donee, neither of which is true of the present donation, which was made only in are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
consideration of marriage.
" In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached,
In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
necessary to give birth to the obligation. And the marriage in a donationpropter nuptias is rather a deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at
resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved the time of his death, then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendants are hereby absolved from the complaint, order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the
without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered. donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. 4 In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then before
the court, it was in any position to rule the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its
reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.
Mateo v. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864 (1969)
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals, insofar as Civil
FACTS: Case No. 442 of the court a quo is concerned, is hereby set aside and the trial court’s order of dismissal
sustained, without prejudice to the parties’ litigating the issue of inofficiousness in a proper proceeding,
 Only issue the correctness of the appellate court’s reduction of a donation propter nuptias, for being
giving due notice to all sons interested in the estate of the late Cipriano Lagua. Without costs.
inofficious. Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan,
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo,JJ.,
Pangasinan. In 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated Lots 998
occur.
and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter’s marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The
marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took possession of the properties,
but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor’s name. The son, Alejandro, died. His widow, 2. Donation propter nuptias of present or future property.
Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter lived with her father- in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then
undertook the farming of the donated lots. It seems that at the start, Cipriano Lagua was giving to Arts. 84-85, FC
Bonifacia the owner’s share of the harvest from the land. In 1926, however, Cipria refused to deliver the Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they
said share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property.
Pangasinan, from where she obtained a judgment awarding to her possession of the two lots, plus Any excess shall be considered void.
damages. Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the
younger son, Gervasio. This sale notwithstanding, Bonifacia Mateo was continuously given the owner’s formalities of wills. (130a)
share of the harvest until 1956, when it was altogether stopped. It was only then that Bonifacia Mateo
learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-in-law, who had the sale in his favor registered only on 22 Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
September 1955. Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, assisted by her husband, Luis Alcantara, foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation
went to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. T339), seeking annulment of the deed secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total
of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession of the properties. judgment was amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.
rendered in the case - ". . . declaring the sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of the other
defendants, Gervasio Lagua and Sotera Casimero, as null and void and nonexistent; ordering the 3. Grounds for Revocation of Donation propter nuptias
Register of Deeds for the province of Pangasinan, to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 19152 Art. 86, FC
and 19153. The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
installed in possession of the land. (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the
marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
ISSUE: (2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being (3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
inofficious, and in ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
494.75-square-meter portion of the donated lots (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code
RULING: on donations in general.
The infirmity in the above course of action lies in the fact that in its Article 908 the new Civil Code
specifically provides as follows:
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
4. Void Donations (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited;
Art. 87, FC, supra (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community
property;
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the either spouse used by the family;
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or
and wife without a valid marriage. other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
B. System of Absolute Community children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
1. General Provisions- Arts. 88-90, FC other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a) spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the
debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)
in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the
waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a) Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any
other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property.
spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter.
4. Ownership and Disposition of the ACP –Arts.96-98, FC
2. What Constitutes Community Property-Arts. 91-93, FC
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a) implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
form part of the community property; However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
community property; spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a) Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n)

Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However,
proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community
property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
3. Charges Upon the ACP-Arts. 94-95, FC
5. Dissolution – Arts. 99-101 FC
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
Support; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without complying with the foregoing
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
community except that: relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not
have the right to be supported; Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital,
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate duration of each.
property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. (178a)
CASES:
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations Onas v. Javillo, 59 Phil. 733 (1934)
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such Facts:
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.  Crispulo Javillo had contracted two marriages: o 1 st: Ramona Levis (5 children) o 2 nd: Rosario Onas
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property (4 children)
relations.  18 May 1927 – Crispulo Javillo died (intestate) o 25 Jul 1927 – Petition praying that an admin. Of
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling estate be appointed: Santiago Andrada
without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
 First project of partition disapproved
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall
 Second project (Subject of Appeal)
be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
 Onas’ alleged that lower court committed the ff. errors:
6. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities – Arts 102-104, FC o Holding that properties acquired during (Onas) marriage were acquired w/ the products of the
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: properties of the (Levis) marriage
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and  SC: Well taken – only 11 parcels of land during Revis marriage, while 20 parcels of land acquired
the exclusive properties of each spouse. during Onas marriage [suggestion that fruits from Revis marriage used to acquire 20 parcels
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of preposterous]
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. o Approving the second project [based on the assumption mentioned above]
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them. Issues:
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which 1. Does the community of property continue even after a marriage had been dissolved? [NO]
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided 2. How should the estate of the deceased be partitioned and distributed? [SEPARATELY]
in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles
43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of Ruling/Ratio:
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time
of its dissolution. 1. NO.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance  Law does not contemplate extending the life of a community after the death of one of the
with Article 51. spouses (Matienzo) o When marriage dissolved, cause that brought about community ceases
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling o Community of property: for the unity of life, maintenance of that unity – purpose lost upon
and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the death of one spouse o Partnership created by law – unsafe to extend it on pretext of tacit
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen consent
the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall  Manresa o It is the life in common that creates common necessities and represents
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n) common efforts – when conjugal partnership is dissolved, acquisitions by the spouse form a
part of HIS/HER own share, which the other spouse (or his/her heirs) can claim no share.
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community 2. Properties acquired during each marriage should be partitioned separately [no spillover from the 1 st
property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If to the 2 nd]
upon the lapse of the said period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
 Levis marriage: One-half of all the conjugal property pertaining to this marriage should be divided
among the 5 children o 11 parcels of land and 5 carabaos The cases were transferred to the RTC, which ruled in favor of respondents. This decision became final
 Onas marriage: One-half of the conjugal property pertaining to this marriage must be adjudicated to and executory. The petitioner then filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA for two
the widow, Rosario o 20 parcels of land and remainder of carabao/cattle consecutive times, alleging that the sheriff had levied properties belonging to his co-petitioner (his wife
 Right to usufruct (1/9 of 2/3 of property that constitutes the presumptive legitime of the children from Joena) and subsequently, Joena filed a 3rd party claim alleging that personal properties belonging to
both marriages) her stepchildren were also subject to levy which were part of the ACP. The Appellate Court dismissed
the petitions consecutively on the ground of procedural errors.
Opinions: No separate opinions Disposition: Judgment of the lower court reversed. Case remanded for
further proceedings in conformity w/ this decision. Petitioners then elevated the case to the SC arguing that there is till a pending issue that has not been
Principles: Absolute Community of Property resolved by the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the disputed properties are part of the community property, thus, exempted from being
Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216 (1976) levied.
Facts: Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in 1907. He remarried. The second HELD: NO! It appears that Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13 Oct.
marriage with Dorotea de Ocampo lasted 46 years (1911-1957) until Nicolas’ death. The act of partition 1983. They had 3 children. After the dissolution of his first marriage, he and Joena got married on 28
was filed by Nicolas’ two children from his first marriage, and theheirs of his other deceased child (also May 1998.
from the first marriage). Lower court divided the properties in the following way: a. ½ 3 children of first In her affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren and that the levied properties – in
marriage b. ¼ Dorotea c. ¼ children of both marriage (divided in 13 parts). particular a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table – were owner by the her
stepchildren. Joena also asserted that the 2 motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as a
CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong tosecond marriage house and lot formed part of the absolute community regime.
 No proof property owned by second marriage
 Testimony of Dorotea not persuasive However, Art. 92 (3) of the FC excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
 Moises Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution: Rosa was stillalive at this time marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the
 LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-ownership by Nicolasand his children, income, if any, of that property. Neither these 2 vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the 2nd
thus fruits belong to co-ownership. marriage.
 CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND NICOLAS WHOCULTIVATED THE
LAND, HENCE THE FRUITS OF THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THESECOND MARRIAGE. Dorotea Also, it must be noted that 2 of these stepchildren were already of legal age. Also, the parental authority
elevated case to SC. According to her, Canaawan properties were not part of first marriage’s CPG as of other minor stepchildren belongs to his parents. Hence, there is an absence of any SPA authorizing
lands were homesteads. First marriage had possessory rights,but second marriage had exclusive right Joena to represent Erlando’s children.
over it as it was during the second marriage that it was registered pursuant to Act 926.

Issue: To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1st or 2nd marriage)?
C. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Held: Property belongs to the CPG of the 2nd marriage as land was only registered during second 1. General Provisions- Arts. 105-108, FC
marriage. Act 926 (Homestead Act): Rights of homesteader to land does not become absoluteuntil the Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
following requirements of law are fulfilled :a.Person filing application backed by two credible witnesses partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter
has to prove he has resided and cultivated the land for 5 years after filing applicationb.Person filing has shall be of supplementary application.
to make affidavit attesting that the land is not encumbered/alienated. Lands were only distributed by The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
cabecillas in 1905 When Dacquel, Antolin, and Pascua conveyed the land to Nicolas, they could between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
nothave fulfilled the requirements of Act 926 before conveyances to Delizo. Dacquel, less than a year, in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
Antolin, 2 years, Pascua, 3 years • The 3 did not have legal rights to transfer to Delizo. What they
transferredwere inchoate rights, not ownership rights. • PRINCIPLE: Deciding factor where homestead Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common
belongs to time of registration NOT when homestead patent is issued as registration is the onlytime all fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
requirements have been fulfilled. either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally
Abrenica v. Abrenica, GR 180572 (2012) between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)
FACTS: Petitioner was a partner of individual respondents, Attys Tungol and Tibayan, in the Law Firm
of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan. In May 6, 1998, respondents filed with the SEC 2 cases against Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. (n)
petitioner. Both were for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds. In the 1st, they
alleged that petitioner refused to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all
of land. In the 2nd, that petitioner refused to return retainer fees that he received from 2 clients of the that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their
firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997. marriage settlements.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
No, the evidence show that the properties were not acquired by Isabel by conveyance from Hilario but
2. Exclusive Property- Arts. 109-115, FC by third parties by way of exchange for a certain property she had inherited from her father‘s estate.
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: Hence, they are her separate properties according to Civil Code Art. 1396 (3) since they were acquired
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; by exchange of her separate properties. While the RTC held that they were part of her dowry, the
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; record did not prove that it was so and evidence strongly supported the presumption that it was and
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to continued to be part of her separate estate.
only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. (148a) Regarding the P700 (the balance of the price received for the lot) and the buildings constructed
thereon, SC held that they were part of the conjugal properties since the buildings were constructed out
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their of the conjugal partnership funds. Even if the land sold was the separate property of Hilario, Civil Code
exclusive properties. 1404 holds that the buildings, erected during coverture on a land belonging to one of the spouse, will be
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to considered as conjugal partnership property, that is ‗after allowing the owner of the land the value
the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the thereof’.
place the property is located. (137a, 168a, 169a)

Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her
exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with
regard to the same. (n)

Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over Rodriguez v. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665 (1907)
to the owner-spouse. (n) DOCTRINE
DCOTRINE: Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain theownership of her
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate property which she brings to the marriage relation. It is true thatarticle 1384 prescribes that she shall
shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of have the management of the property, unlessshe has delivered the same to her husband by means of a
designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper. (150a) public document, providingthat he may administer said property; but it can not be claimed, from the
mere factthat she has permitted her husband to administer her property without having hisauthority to
Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive do so evidenced by a public document, that she has thereby lost herproperty and that the same has
property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of become the property of her husband.
gains. (151a)
FACTS:
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be Matea E. Rodriguez filed a complaint to recover parcels of land alleging thatshe was the owner of the
governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. said lands which she had acquired from her deceased father,Alejo Rodriguez. Hilarion de la Cruz, her
second husband, commenced to administerthe property in question soon after their marriage. The
CASES: defendant contested that the lands were acquired by Hilarion de la Cruz, thefather of the defendants,
during his married life with his first wife, Andrea de Leon.
Lim v. Garcia, 7 Phil. 320 (1907) ISSUE:
Whether or not Matea Rodriguez lost her ownership of her property when hersecond husband, Hilarion
Facts:
de la Cruz, administer the property.
- Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903, with an estate valued at P50k. It was alleged in the inventory by the
administrator, Luis Lim, that everything but a house and lot, P10k (paraphernalia) and P700 (acquired
RULING:
as payment for the land that he sold) were the conjugal property of Hilario and his wife, Isabel Garcia.
No, the court held that the said parcels of land were acquired by Matea E.Rodriguez by inheritance
- The administrator contends that the said properties were the separate properties of Hilario because he
during the existence of her first marriage, from her deceasedfather. There is no provision in the Civil
allegedly brought them into the marriage alone. The 3 parcels of land were only conveyed to Isabel as a
Code which prohibits a husband from administeringthe property of his wife, as her representative, and
gift or for valuable consideration by Hilario during the coverture; hence, it is a void donation. The P700
certainly" it can not be concludedthat the property which he administers for his wife is his for the mere
was the price he had received for the sale of a certain lot. - -
reason that hehas administered the same for a long time. The judgment of the lower court reversed.
Issue:
WON the parcels of land were conjugal property – Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil. 167 (1934)
Held: Doctrine: Failure to comply with the requisite prescribed in article 1387 of the Civil Code, does not
render the contract, executed by the wife without permission of her husband, null and void ab initio but

46
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
merely voidable, and the right of action which may arise under such circumstances exclusively belongs mortgaged property to satisfy the judgment. On September 18, 1924, the property, which had an assessed value
to the husband or his heirs. Wherefore, even granting that such public instrument is defective, it is, of P342,685, was sold to the plaintiff for the sum of P100,000. On September 23, 1924, and for the first time, the
nevertheless, susceptible of registration. Topic: Conjugal Property of Gains Sub-Topic: Exclusive appellant personally appeared by her present attorney, and objected to the confirmation of the sale. All of such
Property – Art 109-115 FC Digester: Gera Guyo objections to the confirmation of the sale were overruled

FACTS: ISSUE: Legal force and effect of the real mortgage in question, by whom and for whom it was executed, and
1. Appeal from Court of First Instance Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled upon whom is it binding, and whether or not it is null and void as to the appellant.
“Agreement and Declaration of Trust”.
2. On October 26, 1933, Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan, and from
HELD: He would not have any authority to mortgage her property, unless the mortgage was executed for her
whom she lives separate and apart conveyed in trust her paraphernal property.
"and in her name, place or stead," and as her act and deed. The mortgage in question was not so executed. It
3. Trustee would redeem mortgage constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or
sale thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived was signed by Don Juan M. Poizat in his own name, his own proper person, and by him only, and it was
from said property while remained unsold. acknowledged by him in his personal capacity, and there is nothing in either the signature or acknowledgment
which shows or tends to show that it was executed for or on behalf of his wife or "in her name, place or stead."
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the contract is null and void since husband did not give consent. It is contended that the instrument shows upon its face that it was intended to make the wife liable for his debt,
 Whether or not the rents collected are fruits of the wife’s property which therefore belongs to Conjugal and to mortgage her property to secure its payment, and that his personal signature should legally be construed
Property of Gains. as the joint or dual signature of both the... husband and that of the wife as her agent. That is to say, construing
the recitals in the mortgage and the instrument as a whole, his lone personal signature should be construed in a
double capacity and binding equally and alike both upon the husband and the wife. No authority has been cited,
HELD: and none will ever be found to sustain such a construction.
No, acts performed by a married woman without permission of her husband are not null and void but
merely voidable.
As the husband of the wife, his signature was necessary to make the mortgage valid. In other words, to make it
In the case presented, wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint valid, it should have been signed by the husband in his own proper person and by him as attorney in fact for his
trustee to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have wife, and it should have been executed by both... husband and wife, and should have been so acknowledged.
to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. She may There is no principle of law by which a person can become liable on a real mortgage which she never executed
likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by husband or his heirs, thus
either in person or by attorney in fact. the law requires that a power of attorney to mortgage or sell real
rendering such contract merely voidable or void.
property should be executed with all of the formalities required in a deed. For the same reason that the personal
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the register of deeds for the City of signature of Poizat, standing alone, would not convey the title of his wife in her own real property, such a
Manila is hereby ordered to register the instrument in question, upon payment of the corresponding signature would not bind her as a mortgagor in real property, the title to which was in her name. Under his
legal fees, without special pronouncement as to the costs. power of attorney, Don Juan M. Poizat may have had authority to borrow money and mortgage the real property
of his wife, but the law specifies how and in what manner it must be done, and the stubborn fact remains that,
as to the transaction in question, that power was never exercised. The mortgage in question was executed by
Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat, 48 Phil, 536 (1925) him and him only, and for such reason, it is not binding upon the wife, and as to her, it is null and void.
FACTS: August 25, 1905, the appellant, with his consent, executed to and in favor of her husband, Juan M.
It follows that the whole decree against her and her paraphernal property and the sale of that property to satisfy
Poizat, a general power of attorney, which, among other things, authorized him to do "in her name, place and
the mortgage are null and void, and that any title she may have had in or to her paraphernal property remains
stead, and making use of her rights and actions. On November 2, 1912, Juan M. Poizat applied for and obtained
and is now vested in the wife as fully and as... absolutely as if the mortgage had never been executed, the decree
from the plaintiff a credit for the sum of 10,000 Pounds Sterling to be drawn on the "Banco Español del Rio de la
rendered or the property sold. As to Don Juan M. Poizat, the decree is valid and binding, and remains in full force
Plata" in London. Later, to secure the payment of the loan, he executed a mortgage upon the real property of his
and effect.
wife.

For failure to pay the loan, on November 12, 1923, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, to Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271 (2003)
foreclose the mortgage. In this action, the summons was served upon the defendant Juan M. Poizat only, who
employed the services of Antonio A. Sanz to represent the defendants. The attorneys filed a general appearance FACTS: Moises is a widower and a father of two children, Romeo and Alexander. He originally intended his two
for all of them, and later an answer in the nature of a general denial. properties, one in paco and the other in Paranque for his offspring but eventually reverted, keeping the latter for
himself while in UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984.
On February 18, 1924, when the case was called for trial, Jose Galan y Blanco in open court admitted all of the
allegations made in the complaint, and consented that judgment should be rendered as prayed for. Later, Juan Romeo and Alexander lived on the property with their own families. On August 1985, Alexander and his his
M. Poizat personally, for himself and his codefendants filed an exception to the judgment, and moved for a new family left the property.
trial, which was denied March 31, 1924. On August 22, 1924, execution was issued directing the sale of the
47
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
On February 1988, Romeo learns that the subject property was being sold to their godmother’s son, Virgilio properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased
Castro. A Php30,000 downpayment was made by their godmother to Moises. parents.

On April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. It is the position of
because “he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeo’s possession.” Romeo was able to petitioner that since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name
mortgage the property. of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificate of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E", to
"J", pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the properties covered therein were acquired during the
On December 1, 1988, Romeo and Virgilio met in MTC Manila to discuss the current status of the subject marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal
property. According to Virgilio’s lawyer, the property is now owned by Virgilio by virtue of deed of sale dated properties.
Decenber 5, 1988, for P95,000.
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner. On the other hand the Court of Appeals
Romeo filed an action for the declaration of nullity of sale and to compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal.
of conveyance. RTC rendered a decision, but the CA modified the same.
ISSUE: W/N the properties are conjugal properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital.
HELD: NO. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that: "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
RULING: It is a conjugal property. Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Article 160
time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and
applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC): Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact
that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
Art 153 (1) - “The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing
the spouses; x x x.” Records show that the property was acquired by onerous title. (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when
he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the marriage is was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Francisco v. CA, SCRA 188 (1998)
The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. DOCTRINE(S) AND APPLICABLE CONCEPT(S): NCC, Art. 160: All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into their husband or to the wife.
marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
3. CPG acquired during the marriage.
a. Presumption that property is conjugal ACTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: Petition for review on certiorari

Art. 116 ANTECEDENT FACTS:

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, ● Teresita C. Francisco, the petitioner, is the legal wife of Eusebio Francisco, one of the respondents,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is by his second marriage. ○ Other respondents, namely Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and
proved. Antonio Francisco, are Eusebio’s children by his first marriage.
● Petitioner alleged that she and her husband acquired the following during the marriage. ○ a sari-sari
CASES: store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at the Col. S. Cruz St.,
Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and; ○ a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.
Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 333 (1989) ● Petitioner further claimed that Eusebio was rendered incapable to administer the abovementioned
properties since her husband had tuberculosis, heart disease, and cancer.
FACTS: The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during ● Private respondents, according to Teresita, succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general
his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to her daughter, Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. the apartments located in Rodriguez, Rizal
Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the ● Case Trail

48
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
○ TRIAL COURT Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED
■ Action: Petitioner filed for damages and for annulment of the general power of attorney. She also
sought to be declared the administratrix of the properties in dispute. Dewara v. Alvero, GR 179010m (April 2011)
■ Decision: The properties in question belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he had the capacity to
administer them. FACTS: Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Dewara (Elenita) were married before the
■ Reason: Petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of enactment of the Family Code. Thus the Civil Code governed their marital relations. On Jan 20, 1985,
the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie causing
Ronnie to file a criminal case of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The MTCC
○ COURT OF APPEALS found Eduardo guilty and ordered him to pay damages. The writ of execution on the civil liability was
■ Decision: Affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied since Eduardo did not have separate properties of
his own. Respondent Ronnie then requested the sheriff to levy on a lot in the name of Elenita Dewara.
ISSUE(S) AND HOLDING(S): Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in
the trial court's ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was in California. Thus, Elenita filed a case for annulment
properties of Eusebio exclusively. NO of sale and for damages against respondent spouses.
RATIO: Elenita claimed that the levy on execution on her lot was illegal because the said property was her
 Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to paraphernal property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Ronnie
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". claimed that the subject lot was the conjugal property of the Spouses Dewara. They asserted that the
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo, that the property was acquired with
acquired during the marriage. the money of Eduardo noting that at the time of the acquisition, Elenita was a housewife.
o Petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be
conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. ISSUE: Is the subject lot a part of the conjugal property of the spouses Dewara?

 Land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal o Petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio RULING: Yes. There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Dewara during
that he inherited the same from his parents. o The law states that properties acquired gratuitously by a their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership
spouse prior to marriage and during the marriage are considered to be that spouse’s exclusive of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code, and they did not execute
properties. any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property applies to the lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal property may
 House, apartment, and sari-sari store at Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence – there must be strict proof of
o Petitioner as applicant of building permits for the house and apartment. Business license for the sari- the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting
sari store was issued in her name. it.
 The Court held that the said permits and license are not proofs that the improvements were acquired
during the mariage. Hence, they will not determine whether the properties are conjugal or not. Aside form the assertions of Elenita that the subject lot was donated to her, there is no other evidence
that would convince the court of the paraphernal character of the property.
 Property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal o Title was registered in the name "Eusebio Francisco,
married to Teresita Francisco" Further, the court held that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
 The Court said that such registration is not a proof that the property was acquired during the partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in
marriage. the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy the presumption. The separation-in-fact
 Acquisition of title and registration are two different acts between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership.
The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when
 Petitioner contended that respondent court erred in applying Articles 158 and 160 of NCC since they the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not
have already been repealed by the Family Code. an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
o It is true that Articles 158 and 160 of NCC was expressly repealed by Article 254 of the Family Code.
o However, the Court held that it cannot invoke the new law without impairing prior vested rights Lastly, as to the civil liability, according to the Civil Code, fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article 105 (second paragraph) of the Family Code. one of the spouses, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property, or if it be insufficient, the fines may be imposed upon the
o Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the aforementioned articles were in effect survive the partnership.
appeal.
 The Court resolved the issue of the nature of the properties based on the provisions of NCC, even if b. Properties that compose the CPG
they were repealed by the new law.
Art. 117
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
AFFIRMED.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
 Thus, Mr. Zulueta was left at Wake Island. A note from Pan Am’s airport manager stated that Mr.
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether Zulueta’s stay therein would be "for a minimum of one week," during which he would be charged $13.30
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; per day. No other plane, headed for Manila, was expected within said period of time, but Mr. Zulueta
managed to board, days later, a plane that brought him to Hawaii, whence he flew back to the
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; Philippines, via Japan.

(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse; Issue
WON award of damages and atty.’s fees was proper.
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the YES.
property where the treasure is found;
WON case should be dismissed in light of a compromise settlement between Mrs. Zulueta and Pan Am.
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting; NO.

(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind WON the damages awarded is part of the conjugal partnership.
brought to the marriage by either spouse; and YES.

(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses Ratio
therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.  Capt. Zentner, in his written report, stated that Zulueta had been off-loaded "due to drinking" and
"belligerent attitude," belying the story of the Pan Am about said alleged bomb-scare.
 If there was truly a bomb scare, Capt. Zentner would have caused every one of the passengers to be
frisked or searched. The fact that Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta were on board the plane shows
beyond doubt that Mr. Zulueta could not possibly have intended to blow it up.
 Pan Am did not only fail to comply with its obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also,
acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the
CASES: greatest possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island, in the expectation that he would
be stranded there for a "minimum of one week" and, in addition thereto, charged therefor $13.30 a day.
Zulueta v. Pan Am, 49 SCRA 1 (1973)  The Court earlier denied a motion by Mrs. Zulueta to dismiss the case, insofar as she is concerned -
she having settled all her differences with Pan Am, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50, 000
Summary The Zuluetas boarded a Pan Am plane travelling from Honolulu to Manila. During their stop- "without prejudice to the sum being deducted from the award” made in said decision.
over, Mr. Zulueta had a stand-off with the plane’s captain causing the latter to off-load Mr. Zulueta and  The Court ruled that the payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award. What is
his family. The Zulueta ladies where allowed to continue the trip but Mr. Zulueta was left in the Island. ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned.
The Court awarded damages in favor of Zulueta. Moreover, it ruled that the same is part of the  Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned. Pan Am cited:
Conjugal Partnership as having arisen from, a breach of a contract of carriage, for which fare was paid “(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in fact been
with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership. Thus, the damages would fall under separated for at least one year."
"acquired by onerous title during the marriage’  This provision however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to
the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally
Facts of the Case aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in
 Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard Pan Am’s plane from Honolulu to Manila. entering into the contract of carriage with Pan Am and paid the amount due to the latter, under the
Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said
about 30 minutes. Zulueta went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked about 400 contract, accordingly, belong.
yards away to the beach to relieve himself.  The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which her
 Upon return, Capt. Zentner told him in an intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude, "What do you husband had been subjected.
think you are?”  The sum paid to Mrs. Zulueta should be deducted from the award for the simple reason that upon
 There immediately ensued an altercation in the course of which each apparently tried to show that he liquidation of the conjugal partnership, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of
could not be cowed by the other. Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her as
including Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss Zulueta but Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed wife of Mr. Zulueta.
to continue the trip. However, according to Pan Am Zulueta was off-loaded from the plane because of a  While the law encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement, it certainly does not
bomb-scare arising from his delay in boarding the aircraft and subsequent refusal to open his bags for favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are parties in a common cause, such as the
inspection. defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is
 To add insult, Pan Am’s agent, in the presence of the other passengers and the crew referred to the to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" — which the lawseeks to protect — by creating an additional
Zuluetas as "monkeys"

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
cause for the misunderstanding that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title
rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them. during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
 Lastly, in the absence of proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common or for only one of the spouses;
benefit of the Zuluetas and that the money had come from the conjugal funds. They are deemed
conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had been Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later
made by the wife. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. This
spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the presumption is in Art. 160 CC, which provides that: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
conjugal partnership, unless there is competent proof to the contrary. to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (1983) As stated in Camia de Reyes v Resyes, "it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property."
FACTS:
Ponciano filed a complaint with CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the deed of sale of two parcels of land The disputed properties were acquired by onerous title during the marriage, and the funds used to buy
with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia, to the Mendozas on the ground that said the land and to build the improvements thereon came from the loans obtained by the spouses from
properties were conjugal properties and that Julia sold them without his knowledge or consent. RFC.

The properties in question were bought on an installment basis from Gregorio Araneta, Inc. To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal character of the property, the petitioners
(representative of J. M. Tuason & Co.). The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the have only the testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer. But her claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the
installments due to lack of money so they had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance ITRs where she made it to appear that the properties in question are conjugal assets of the partnership.
Corporation (RFC) to pay the balance of the properties in question. Also, she made a statement that the rentals paid by her coappellees were income of the conjugal
partnership.
In the deed of absolute sale executed by Araneta, the vendee named is Julia de Reyes. Her signature
appears over the caption 'vendee' and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent.' Estoppel does not apply in this case. It is mentioned that in another case which is filed against Mr.
The Transfer Certificates of Title were thus issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in the Reyes, he stated defenses that he and his wife never had any kind of fund which could be called
name of 'JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES.' The mortgage contracts executed by the conjugal partnership funds, that they acted independently from one another whenever either one
spouses in favor of the RFC were duly registered and annotated on the back of the said TCTs. engaged in any business. Estoppel can only be invoked between the person making the
misrepresentation and the person to whom it was addressed. It is essential that the latter shall have
As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later a camarin on the two lots which was relied upon the misrepresentation and had been influenced and misled thereby. The alleged
leased as a school building for 2 years. And when the school was transferred to another place, the misrepresentation was never addressed to the petitioners, much less made with the intention that they
camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza for 10 years. The contract of would act upon it.
lease was signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. In spite of the good rentals
they had been receiving for the building, the spouses failed to pay their obligations to the RFC so they The Sps. Mendoza were in bad faith On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza admitted that she learned of
had to ask for an extension of 5 years from DBP, as the successor of the RFC. the RFC mortgage when the lots were about to be purchased. The Mendozas demanded the consent of
Ponciano on the mere lease of the properties allegedly for their protection, yet on the actual sale where
On March 3, 1961, the Reyes spouses were already living separately and were not in speaking terms; there is a transfer of greater rights they have not required such consent.
while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots in question, together
with their improvements to the Mendozas without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. TCTs were There was no unjust enrichment Mr. Reyes did not receive any part of the proceeds of the sale and his
subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas. wife has been aligning herself with the Mendoza couple.

Hence, Ponciano filed a case for the annulment of the deed of sale as mentioned earlier. CFI: Villanueva v. IAC, 192 SCRA 21 (1990)
dismissed. Properties are exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia, thus she can validly dispose of
the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent purchasers. Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. After they died, their
CA: reversed. The sale is void with respect to the share of Potenciano. Thus, the petitioners filed surviving children, Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of
separate petitions for review on certiorari. extrajudicial partition.

Issue: Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Modesto was
WON properties were conjugal partnership properties? YES married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. After the death of Modesto, his two surviving
illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas. As a security
Ratio: they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. In the loan agreement executed between the parties,
a relative Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure • April 3, 1933 – Castillo, Sr. died. During his death, loan & mortgage in favor of Dr. Jacinto was still
of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. About a month later, outstanding thus, he foreclosed the mortgage & fishpond was sold to him but sale was annulled (CA
Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that finding).
the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land.
They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto • June 8, 1934 – Pasco married 4 th husband Luis San Juan
Aranas and his wife Victoria. Victoria’s will stated that her interests, rights and properties, real and • Sept. 7, 1949 – Pasco judicially consigned P12,300.00 on account of mortgage debt & its interest.
personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and • April 24, 1950 – payment completed by 2nd consignation of P752.43.
also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. Modesto’s will, on the other hand, bequeathed to his two • Petitioners allege that the fishpond is a conjugal property since it was acquired during the marriage,
illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital thus they have right to such property. They filed a complaint for partition & acctg.
property brought by him to his marriage.
• CFI Bulacan: declared fishpond as Pasco’s exclusive paraphernal prop. Complaint dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria. • CA: affirmed CFI decision. Additional findings aside from aforementioned: Pasco was a woman of
means even prior to her marriage to Castillo. Castillo, a provincial treasurer, only earned P80.00/month.
Ruling: His only property, 2 small residential lots & fishponds were encumbered & transferred to his 5 kids by 1
Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place st wife. He supported these kids in med & high school. He died w/o enough assets to pay his debts,
during his marriage, the lot would nonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by thus amounts consigned by Pasco to pay fishpond belonged to her exclusively
him “during the marriage by lucrative title”.
ISSUE: WON fishpond is conjugal or paraphernal.
Certain it is that the land itself, which Modesto had inherited from his parents, Graciano and Nicolasa, is
his exclusive and private property. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter HELD: It’s partly conjugal, partly paraphernal. CA decision revoked & set aside. Remanded to CFI for
of law. further proceedings for partition, taking into account the ff: 1) widow’s 1/6 direct share, 2) widow’s half
of community prop, 3) widow’s successional rts and 4) widow’s rt to reimbursement for advances made
c. Property Purchased by installment in paying mortgage debt

Art. 118, FC RATIO:

Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and 1. Under Spanish CC, determining ownership of properties acquired by onerous consideration during
partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the the marriage depends on source of funds used for acquisition.
marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either a. Separate if bought w/exclusive money. (Spanish CC Art. 1396)
case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the b. Conjugal if bought w/common funds whether for partnership or for one spouse only. (Spanish CC Art.
owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. 1401) Last phrase is immaterial since it’s been proven that prop was sold to both spouses.

CASES: 2. First payment: according to CA it came from Pasco’s private funds. Petitioners: w/o express proof
that debt of Gabriel came from Pasco’s private fund, they should be presumed conjugal (Art. 1407
Spanish CC). However, Art. 1416 provides that wife can’t bind conjugal partnership w/o husband’s
Castillo v. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102 (1964) consent. Her private transactions are presumed to be her own. W/o proof that Castillo authorized Pasco
Facts:
to use community funds to lend money to Gabriel, presumption that she used her private funds would
• Oct. 1931 – Marcelo Castillo, Sr., a widower married Macaria Pasco who had survived 2 previous
lie.
husbands. Petitioners are the children & grandchildren (representing their deceased parents) of
Castillo, Sr.
3. 2 nd & 3 rd payments by loans guaranteed by mortgage: since they were made to both spouses as
• Dec. 1932 – Gabriel & Purificacion Gonzales conveyed their property, a fishpond in San Roque,
joint borrowers, loan thus became obligations of conjugal partnership & loan money became part of
Paombong, Bulacan, to Castillo, Sr. & Pasco. Such property was payable in 3 payments:
conjugal property. Securing mortgage on wife’s paraphernal prop is mere accessory oblig w/c lenders
1) P1k upon execution of deed;
can waive if they wish to do so w/o affecting principal debt owed by conjugal partnership & w/c creditors
2) P2k on Jan. 25, 1933 w/o interest;
can enforce against latter if they so desire. If money borrowed by husband upon credit of wife’s prop
3) P3k w/in 1 yr thereafter w/11% interest from Feb. 1, 1933, extendible for another year, for a grand
became CP & when reinvested in construction of house, such became CP & was liable for husband’s
total of (kaching-kaching) P6k.
debt (Palanca v. Smith Bell & Co.) then all the more that a loan obtained by both spouses should be
conjugal. Court likewise ruled in Lim Queco vs. Cartagena that when wife borrows money guaranteed
• CA finding of payments: 1. P1k = P600.00 that Gabriel owed Pasco + P400.00 cash from proceeds of
w/mortgage on her paraphernal prop, money loaned & property acquired w/such will still be her
Pasco’s sale of one of her nipa lands 2. P2k = proceeds of loan from Dr. Jacinto to whom fishpond was
exclusive prop even if husband consented to such. Reason is that she is not the qualified administrator
mortgaged by both spouses. He later on assigned his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. 3. P3k = loan by
of CP. Creditor can only demand repayment from her & her properties. Palanca ruling applies, thus,
mortgage of 2 parcels of lands assessed in Pasco’s name. One she inherited from her former husband,
property is partly paraphernal by virtue of first payment & partly conjugal by virtue of 2 nd & 3 rd
Justo Pascual and the other assessed in her exclusive name
payments. It belongs to both patrimonies – 1/6 paraphernal + 5/6 CP of Castillo & Pasco.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
4. If Pasco paid mortgages with her private funds, her share is not increased. Instead, common funds Art. 120, FC compared with Art. 158, CC
can repay the amount she has advanced.
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate
Lorenzo v. Nicolas, 91 Phil. 686 (1952) property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
Facts: spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the
following rules:
Widow Magdalena Clemente and widower Manuel Lorenzo were married in 1910.
Their union was not blessed with children although Manuel had 3 children from his first marriage:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in
defendants Agapito and Marcela and deceased Policarpio (Policarpio’s children were also petitioners:
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one
Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel); while Magdalena had a son—the deceased Gerardo—from
of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
her first marriage (Gerardo’s children were the respondents Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad, Cecilia
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained
and Basilisa).
in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
Manuel died in 1929 while Magdalena died in 1934. In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall
Parcels of land 5 and 6 were purchased by Magdalena from the Bureau of Lands (BOL) before her be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
marriage to Manuel where balance was payable by installments. Payments on account of the
installment were made by her and the receipts were issued in her name by the BOL. Article 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the
While in parcel of land No. 6, the final conveyance was executed in the sole favor of Magdalena spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or
before Manuel died, the final certificate of sale of parcel of land 5 was executed in Magdalena’s favor the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership.
and name after the death of Manuel. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one
After the death of Manuel, Magdalena has conveyed in absolute sale for a valuable consideration of of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
parcel of land 6 in favor of the defendants (respondents). spouse who owns the same.
The Bulacan CFI had held that parcels of land Nos. 5 and 6 were conjugal. However, the CA reversed
this decision. Thus, in this case, the plaintiffs were assailing the decision of the CA which declared that CASE:
the parcels of land Nos. 5 and 6 as paraphernal properties of Magdalena and the appellate court’s Case: Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, 129 SCRA 675 (1984)
order that the defendant-appellants (herein respondents) pay the conjugal partnership one-half of the Facts:
whole amount paid to the bureau of lands, with legal interest thereon, from the date of the filing of the After Fernando’s father died in 1965, Fernando inherited the land. In 1978, Fernando abandoned his
complaint, after deducting from said amount the initial payments made on the said lots Nos. 5 and 6. family and was living with private respondent Corazon Daguines. During the pendency of this appeal,
they were convicted of concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27, 1981 by the then Court of
Issue: First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II, which judgment has become final.
WON parcels of land Nos. 5 and 6 are conjugal thus heirs of Manuel (petitioners) are entitled to one-
half of it. On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the subject property with the house thereon to Daguines for the sum
of P2,000.00. In the document of sale, Fernando described the house as "also inherited by me from my
deceased parents." Unable to take possession of the lot and house, Daguines initiated a complaint on
Ruling: June 19, 1980 for quieting of ti
NO. The CA held that the properties were paraphernal upon the presumption that the parcels of land
Nos. 5 and 6 continued to be exclusive properties of Magdalena Clemente until shown otherwise (the tle and damages against Mercedes. The latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute where she
status of the land from the time she acquired it and before her marriage to Lorenzo, continued until it is and her children were residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with
otherwise changed) and because she had paid the initial sums for the parcels of land before her conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale of the land together with the house and
marriage to the late Manuel. improvements to Daguines was null and void because they are conjugal properties and she had not
The fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the lifetime of the late husband Manuel given her consent to the sale
were issued in the name of Magdalena and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel No. 6 was
made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel was still alive shows that the two parcels of land Issue:
belonged to Magdalena. (1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso
But the installments paid during coverture are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they facto gave the land the character of conjugal property?
were paid out of funds exclusively to the late Magdalena and thus must be reimbursed.
(2) Whether or not the sale to Corazaon Daguines was null and void?
 DOCTRINE: Property bought on installment by either spouse before the marriage and was fully paid
only after the marriage but ownership had vested on the buyer-spouse before the marriage, is separate Ruling:
property of the buyerspouse, although the installments paid by the conjugal partnership during the No (1) In Article 158 of the civil code, both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership
marriage must be reimbursed to it upon liquidation but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning
the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be
d. Rules on improvement reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house
and lot to Corazon Daguines since his legal wife Mercedes had not given her consent to the said sale
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
No (2) NULL AND VOID. The law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited, and liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)
this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that
would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded
institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living to the benefit of the family.
as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
would turn out to be better than those in legal union.” However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines
and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse,
NOTES may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purpose is Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
very beginning. what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)

Article 1352 also provides that: "Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes,
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and
policy shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
conjugal partnership property.
In the case at bar, the sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his
family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their
support. It was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy CASES:
cherishes and protects. Hence, the Court ruled that the sale is null and void being contrary to morals
and public policy.
DBP v. Adil, 161 SCRA 307 (1988)
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses (also include couples living as husband and The issue posed in this petition for review on certiorari is the validity of a promissory note which was
wife without benefit of marriage) from selling and donating property to each other during marriage executed in consideration of a previous promissory note the enforcement of which had been barred by
subject to certain exceptions. Such prohibitions were also designed to prevent the exercise of undue prescription.
influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the
cornerstone of family law. FACTS:
 On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan
from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the
sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they
e. Charges upon the CPG bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations.
Arts. 121-123, FC
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:  As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same
Support; on or before June 15, 1961. The promissory note also stipulates that if he can secure a certificate of
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for indebtedness from the government of his back pay, he will be allowed to pay the amount of it.
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent
of the other;  Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a complaint dated
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that September 11, 1970 in the City Court of Iloilo City against the spouses for the payment of the loan.
the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal INFERIOR COURT: in favor of the petitioner.
partnership property;
 The court ordered the defendants Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte Confesor to pay the plaintiff
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property
Development Bank of the Philippines, jointly and severally, (a) the sum of P5,760.96 plus additional
of either spouse;
daily interest of P l.04 from September 17, 1970, the date Complaint was filed, until said amount is paid;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
(b) the sum of P576.00 equivalent to ten (10%) of the total claim by way of attorney's fees and
activity for self-improvement;
incidental expenses plus interest at the legal rate as of September 17,1970, until fully paid; and (c) the
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
costs of the suit.
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement; and
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Court of First Instance of Iloilo: Reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint and counter-claim WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition is reversed and set aside and another decision is
with costs against the plaintiff. hereby rendered reinstating the decision of the City Court of Iloilo City of December 27, 1976, without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance. This decision is immediately executory and no motion for
Petitioner’s argument: extension of time to file motion for reconsideration shall be granted. SO ORDERED
 the decision of respondent judge is contrary to law and runs counter to decisions of this Court when
respondent judge (a) refused to recognize the law that the right to prescription may be renounced or Luzon Surety v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969)
waived; and (b) that in signing the second promissory note respondent Patricio Confesor can bind the Facts:
conjugal partnership;
1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co. Inc., executed a surety bond in favor of PNB
 said respondent became liable in his personal capacity.
Victorias Branch to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Chavez inthe sum of PhP9,000.
2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity
ISSUE: Whether or not a promissory note executed in consideration of a previous promissory note
which had been barred by prescription constitutes as a waiver to the right of prescription of the action. agreement binding themselves solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon Surety Co. Inc. against any and all damages,
costs and and other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of having become
RULING: YES. guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest and attorney's fees related to the loan.
 The petition is impressed with merit. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount
1112 of Civil Code provides: of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s fees and other costs.
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but 4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.
not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the 5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in
renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired. solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered the third party defendants Chavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay
Luzon Surety Co. the amount to be paid to PNB.
 There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10, 1940. 6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy the claim of the petitioner. A writ of
However, when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11, 1961 whereby garnishment was soon issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar
he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, plantation.
and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent thereby 7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor of the
effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the
first promissory note. Issue:
WON the Conjugal Property of Gains could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
 This Court had ruled in a similar case that – ... when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot accommodate a third party in favour of a surety agreement.
be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be
valid and enforceable ...
Held:
No. Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
 Thus, it has been held — Where, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
promises to pay it after the same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he thereby
waives the benefit of prescription. contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of
 This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay either spouse or of the partnership;
the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the
promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. ... It is this husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
new promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgement as a legal (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to the (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate
remedy (which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover upon his children of one of the spouses;
original contract. 4 (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Art. 161 is liable only for such "debts and
 However, SC disagreed with the court a quo when it held that in signing the promissory note alone, obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite
respondent Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife, respondent Jovita Villafuerte, citing Article 166 of the showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. While Garcia by thus
New Civil Code. signing the agreement may be said to enhance his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is
o Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. As too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. Its language is clear; it does not
such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal admit of doubt. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It peremptorily calls for
partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor application.
signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal
partnership is liable for this obligation.
Ayala Investment v. CA 286 SCRA 272 (1998)

55
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on HELD:
December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. Yes.
PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment
ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the RATIO: The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code. As gleaned
appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the from the records, the following facts are undisputed: (1) therewas a check in the amount of US$25,000.00 issued
issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on by petitioner; (2) this amount was received by respondent and his wife and given to certain Pura Vallejo for the
May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not full payment of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its Manila; (3) this house and lot became the conjugal dwelling of respondent and his wife; and (4) respondent’s
order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which respondent did not sign. Respondent failed to
was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982. substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation. There was no showing that
respondent was a stockholder of H.L. Carlos Construction. His name does not appear in the Articles of
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered “for the benefit Incorporation as well as the Organizational Profile of said company either as stockholder or officer. Not being a
of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable. stockholder, he cannot be entitled to the profits or income of said corporation. Neither did respondent prove
that he was an employee or an agent so as to be entitled to salaries or commissions from the salaries or
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the commissions from the corp. Respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed
conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the
of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the
despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan
corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. together with his wife

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given to another Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, 508 SCRA 469 (2006)
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be FACTS:
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The contract  Quirino de Guzman and the Arcadio and Luisa Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of
of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six percent
signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an (46%) respectively.
exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should  November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of
not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM. this increase was subscribed by the spouses Carandang.
 March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, spouses yet again
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when subscribed to the increase. They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock
the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige  De Guzman claims that he paid for part of the said subscriptions in the amount of P293,250 for the November
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the 26, 1983 capital stock increase and P43,125 for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase or a total of P336,375.
loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself. He sent a demand letter to the spouses on March 31, 1992.
 The spouses refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed
Carlos v. Abelardo 380 SCRA 321 (2002) between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman, whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of
the former without cost, in consideration for Arcadio Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly purchased
FACTS: equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no
Petitioner Honorario L. Carlos averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, indebtedness on their part.
respondent Manuel T. Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him  De Guzman filed his complaint for the recovery of the aforementioned amount and damages. The trial court
to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, decided in favor of De Guzman and ordered the payment of the total amount plus interest and attorneys fees
Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila. Petitioner then issued a check to Pura Vallejo, seller of the and the cost of the suit.
property, Thereafter, respondent Abelardo expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount  The spouses appealed the decision to the CA but CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
to the extent of making various death threats against Petitioner Carlos. On August 24, 1994, Petitioner Carlos
made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with ISSUES:
their obligation. Thus, on October 13, 1994, Petitioner Carlos filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money  Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
and damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. In the complaint, petitioner asked  Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, considering that
for the payment of the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00. Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not included as a party-plaintiff
Petitioner Carlos. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of  Whether or not respondents were able to prove the loan sought to be collected from petitioners
evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife. CA found  Whether or not the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and solidary.
that the amount of US$25,000.00 was respondent’s share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.
56
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
HELD:  RTC: in favor of Spouses. Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the transaction, Ros could not
 On the first issue, the court did not commit any error since lack of jurisdiction over the person of the parties encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may, during their
may be waived and in this case the heirs of De Guzman did not interpose any objection and even claimed and marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract
subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, even if no valid substitution in compliance with her husband entered into without her consent.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, such act of the heirs in subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of the  CA: reversed. Assuming that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the conjugal partnership is still liable
trial court is deemed an express waiver made by them thus making the proceedings of the court valid. because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan
was used for the expansion of the family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the
 On the second issue, the answer is still No. The SC held that the joint account of the spouses from which the 4 conjugal partnership.
checks were drawn is part of their conjugal property and thus under the Civil Code and the Family Code the
husband alone may file an action to recover or protect the spouses’ conjugal property. ISSUE:
WON the debt contracted by Jose is chargeable against the conjugal partnership of gains. – YES.
 In this second issue, the spouses interchanged real party in interest and indispensable party, as Milagros de
Guzman is not an indispensable party and simply a real party in interest, and thus her not being included will not RATIO:
invalidate the proceedings.  The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The property, acquired during Ros and
Aguete’s marriage, is thus considered part of the CPG.
 On the third issue, Yes the respondents were able to prove the loan sought to be collected from petitioners
 The spouses Carandang admitted that it was indeed the de Guzmans who paid their stock subscriptions and  The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied,
their reason for not reimbursing the latter is the alleged pre-incorporation agreement, to which they offer no of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable under Art. 173 of CC. But, annulment will be
clear proof as to its existence. declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
o In this case, the document disavowed by Aguete was acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are
 The spouses claim that payment of one party of the obligation of another party will not give rise to a loan public documents. The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be
disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
 SC Held that the spouses are incorrect. This is pursuant to Articles 1236 and 1237 of the Civil Code, which
provide: Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no  Moreover, the application for loan shows that it would be used exclusively “for additional working [capital] of
interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Whoever pays for buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco.” Even in her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such
another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the
the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to
be his exclusive and private debts.
 The heirs have successfully proved their payment of the amount in favour of the spouses but the latter have
not proved the existence of the preincorporation agreement they are relying on for non-payment. f. Administrative and Disposition of the CPG
Art. 124-125
 On the last issue, the spouses are to be held liable in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and as such either of them may be sued for the full amount similar to solidary liability, although such Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
amount to be collected shall be charged to the conjugal partnership property. case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
Ros. V. PNB, April 6, 2011 decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
FACTS: conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
 Jose Ros obtained a loan from PNB Laoag Branch and as security executed a real estate mortgage involving a disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
land with all its improvements. The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. Thus PNB instituted extrajudicial absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
foreclosure proceedings. A Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB as the highest bidder. After the lapse of shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
1 year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB. perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
 Claiming that Estrella Aguete (the wife) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed by her and her husband
to annul the mortgage interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other.
that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal
 PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint and insists that it was the spouses own acts of partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the land on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment
and prescription. CASES:
Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, 120 SCRA 628 (1983)
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
encumbering or disposing property in the name of Molave Development Corp & those in their name as husband
Facts: and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was then set for
 Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several pieces of land in 1948-1950. In hearing primarily on the the issue of preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However
1960-1962, said lands were partitioned into 3 lots Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which was tenanted by
 1951 – the wife sold the lots to the petitioners without the consent of her husband Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by Payuran because allegedly the Loring property is suitable for
 April 26, 1976 – the heirs of Aldon (wife and children) filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that condo site therefore command a higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI
they had orally mortgaged the said properties to the Felipes and that an offer to redeem the properties was Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the administration of the conjugal property by Payuran subject
made but they refused to certain conditions, one of which the Loring property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile
 RTC ruled in favor of Felipe, declaring that they were the rightful owners of the lots in question Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that the
 CA reversed the decision on the ground that the sale instituted by the wife was invalid since the properties order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for certiorari at the CA
were conjugal in nature and that the sale was done without the husband’s consent which affirmed the same, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the sale of properties in question was valid without the consent of the husband? Issue:
Whether or not the court where respondent Judge (judge of CFI Rizal) sits did not acquire jurisdiction over the
Held: Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165 NCC). Subject to certain exceptions, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent Held: CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property. The amended complaint prayed among others to
(Art. 166 NCC). And the wife cannot bind the conjugal property without the husband’s consent, except in cases restrain defendant from encumbering or disposing of the property. This in effect brings the Loring property
provided by law (Art. 172 NCC) In the instant case, the wife’s sale is not covered by the phrase “except in cases under the jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is
provided by law.” THE SALE IS INVALID determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The Filing of
Void or voidable? VOIDABLE the legal separation case after the order of denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the order. The
According to Art. 1390 NCC, among the voidable contracts are “those where one of the parties is incapable of administration of property is given to Payuran but such is not absolute. It was subject to a condition. The CFI
giving consent to the contract (Par. 1). The wife had no capacity to give consent to the contract of the sale. The Pasay even recognized the jurisdiction primarily acquired by CFI Rizal. Jurisdiction once acquired continue until
capacity belonged not to the husband alone but to both spouses. This is further supported by the provision that the case is finally terminated.
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required, are annullable
at her instance during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned (Art. 173 NCC).

The voidable contract of the wife was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he
was the victim who had an interest in the contract. The wife, who was the party responsible for the defect, could Guiang v. CA,. 291 SCRA 372 (1998)
not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the
marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence
of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
did not improve the situation the wife. After the death of their father, they acquired the right to question the
defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father’s share in the lands. The FACTS:
father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have three children,
to the widow. namely: Junie (18 years old), Harriet (17), and Jodie (15). The couple bought a 421 sq. meter lot in Koronadal,
South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo through a conditional deed of sale. The consideration was payable in
The Felipes were purchasers of bad faith as revealed in a testimony that sometime in December 1970, Vicente installment. In 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda
Felipe (son of the petitioners) attempted to have the wife (Gimena) sign a ready-made document claiming the Guiang. Since then, Guiang occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon. They are thus adjoining
sale of the land to them. If sale was valid, why did they need a document of sale in their favor. Because they neighbors of the Corpuzes. Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she became a
knew the lots still did not belong to them. victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila.
After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr, 100 SCRA 619 (1980) of the time at his place of work. Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half
portion including their house to Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda Corpuz replied that she was
Facts: objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to
Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with the land. The consent of Tinitigan Luzviminda Guiang so that she would advise her father. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie Corpuz
Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of Ownership & pushed through the sale. He sold to Luzviminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer of Rights" remaining one-half
Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later amended to include “restrain defendants from portion of their lot and the house. Gilda returned home. She found her children staying with other households.
58
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS (FINALS CASE COMPILATION)
RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children together A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or
and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their proved. In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
father had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, spouses Guiang complained before the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous,
Barangay authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat signed a document for amicable settlement stating that indefinite or uncertain. Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings
Gilda Corpuz and her three children must leave voluntarily the house without any charge. Thereafter, Gilda M-3630, we assays its allegations.
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, they
stayed put in her house and lot. Spouses Guiang filed a motion for execution of the amicable settlement with the In Part Two on the "Nature of [the] Complaint," respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized the causes of
MTC. However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed a Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and action alleged in the complaint. The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the
PetitionerSpouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a Deed of allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent's causes of action were all against
Transfer of Right, which involved the conjugal property, null and void. The trial court ruled in favor of private her husband.
respondent. CA affirmed.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
ISSUE: absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to
WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed. this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses. The administration of the property of
the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J.
HELD: NO Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed was validly executed by the parties in good faith and for Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty
valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the
Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The provision in par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., three elements of a cause of action exists.
contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent husband." The accounting of conjugal
sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. The contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between
of the Family Code, which provides that "...In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.
encumbrance shall be void..."
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and
Relucio v. Lopez 373 SCRA 578 (2001) petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner.
The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned
Facts: by him with petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share alone. Failure of
Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for “Appointment as Sole Administratix of Conjugal Partnership of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach
Properties, Forfeiture, etc.” against Alberto Lopez and herein petitioner Imelda Relucio. It was alleged by herein of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however, pertains to
private respondent that Alberto Lopez is legally married to her, abandoned the latter and their legitimate Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.
children, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner Relucio and that he arrogated
unto herself full and exclusive control of administration of the conjugal property. Petitioner filed a motion to The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger. The action in Special
dismiss on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her which was denied by the Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez' own words, one by "an aggrieved wife against her
Regional Trial Court on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party. On the Court of husband. References to petitioner in the common and specific allegations of fact in the complaint are merely
Appeals, the petition for certiorari was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal. incidental, to set forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.

Issue: Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not
Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. petitioner. To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action
against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code. Hence, it can be logically inferred from the
foregoing that the action of herein private respondent does not state any cause of action against petitioner
Ruling: Imelda Relucio.
NO. Respondent's petition against her husband did not establish a cause of action against petitioner Relucio. A
cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. The Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa 374 SCRA 498 (2002)
elements of a cause of action are:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; Facts:  Thelma A. Jader-Manalo came across and advertisement placed by respondents, Spouses Norma
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa in the Classified Ads Section of Bulletin Today for the sale of their
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a ten-door apartment in Makati and in Taytay, Rizal.  Petitioner negotiated for the purchase through a real estate
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery broker. She made a visual inspection of the lots and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment
of damages. receipts, etc.  Petitioner met with the vendors who are the respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to
buy the properties from respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, Norma
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RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
Camaisa.  After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5M for the 2. Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent valid?
Tagaytay property and P2.1M for the Makati property to be paid on instalment basis.  The agreement was
handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the Held:
properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife’s conformity and consent to the sale.  The formal typewritten 1. Petitioners’ contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his
Contracts to Sell were prepared and formally signed. Petitioner delivered to Edilberto two checks for P200,000 wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents’ separation in
and P100,000 as downpayments.  Petitioner and respondents met again to clarify some provisions of the fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera’s interest over it. Under Article 178 of
contracts. They arranged a meeting again in order to incorporate the notations and formally sign the contracts.  the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the
However, in the next meeting, petitioner was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be
backing out of the agreement because they needed “spot cash” for the full amount of the consideration. Norma presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was registered
refused to sign the contracts. “in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to Elisera Chiong… .” But Elisera also presented
 Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent before RTC-Makati. Trial a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino
court dismissed the complaint because under Art 124 of the FC, the court cannot intervene to authorize the and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal
transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife. CA affirmed the dismissal. property. Moreover, the con jugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot.
Issue:
WoN the husband may validly dispose of the conjugal property without the wife’s written consent  2. The sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v.
Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or
Ruling: encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but
NO merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
 The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate “ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void as Art 124 of FC provides. or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
 The properties which are the subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be partnership without the wife’s consent… Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not
 Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even if she actively participated in obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992.
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera’s instance, during the marriage and within
by law for its validity. ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned
 Petitioner herself even admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and
 Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. execution of the deed. Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper.
However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides: “An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall restore
to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with
its interest, except in cases provided by law. In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis
Villanueva v. Chiong, 554 SCRA 197 (2008) for damages.” The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties,
insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into
Facts:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in
fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and
Flores v. Lindo, GR 169766 (March 2011)
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T19393)-2325, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga
del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, FACTS:
payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to Php 400,000.00 with monthly interest and
and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners demanded surcharge in case of late payment.
from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages, docketed as Civil Case Edna executed a deed of real mortgage and promissory note to secure the said loan. Edna issued three checks as
No. 4383. On February 12, 1992, petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with partial payments which were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This prompted petitioner to file a
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4460. Upon proper motion, the RTC consolidated these two cases. On May complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the respondents. RTC branch 33 held that
13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. On July 19, 2000, the Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed
RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to by Edna without her husband’s consent. Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days after the
vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 4460, but Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as
ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with interest from May 13, 1992. he could file a personal action against her.

Issue: Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch
1. Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? 42. Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00 and prayed for dismissal on the grounds
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RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC Branch 42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
decision of RTC Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA ruled in general that the right to be supported;
creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization
action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
Issue: solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding,
Whether or not petitioner can no longer file complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use
multiplicity of suits the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share. (178a)

Held: Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the
The Court ruled that generally, it is true that the mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.An authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the conditions as the court may impose.
debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and
the residence of the parties. In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property
consideration. relations.

Accordingly since the Deed was executed by respondent Edna without the consent and authority of her A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
husband, it is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code. Any disposition or encumbrance without the intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a)
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities
contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract. But, as noted by CA, Arts. 129-133
petitioner allowed the the decision of RTC Branch 33 to become final and executory without asking for an Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
alternative relief. Nevertheless, the petitioner is not without remedy. The principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another applies. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides: Every person who through (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the exclusive properties of each spouse.
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal
justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another. partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of
The principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
multiplicity of suits. properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
The Court directed RTC Branch 42 to proceed with the trial of collection of sum. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for
the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse
g. Dissolution of CPG from the conjugal funds, if any.
Arts. 126-128 (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or Article 51.
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a) (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
except that:
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RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into  Respondents filed a motion for allowance the ground that was cited for which was that of support which
consideration the best interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a) included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities.
 Petitioners opposed and contended that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the
hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of
property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the Pablo.
lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal  While the aforesaid case was pending respondents filed another motion for allowance to include Juanita,
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an
order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero.
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the
subsequent marriage. (n) Respondent’s Contention in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the
mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and her first three (3) children who were then of
Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of
by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under Article 188 of NCC
and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the
rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be ISSUE:
divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a) WHETHER THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE ALLOWANCE EVEN IF THEY’VE ALREADY ATTAINED
AGE OF MAJORITY
Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the
appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly HELD –
determined in this Chapter. (187a) YES

Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children RATIO
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall  The controlling provision of law in this case is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and
be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes
the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Art. 188. From the common mass of property
support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried
Cases: property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for
support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
Santero v. CFI of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728 (1987)  The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not
be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.  While the Rules of Court limit
DOCTRINE allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
 The provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83  Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
 Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right
FACTS to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83
 Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa
 Private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children Go v. Go, GR 157537 (September 2011)
begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz.
 Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was DOCTRINE:
married to their father Pablo. The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation
 Pablo Santero in turn, who died on November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero who mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by
died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in 1976.
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RESTY A. VILLEGAS, JD-1A (SANCHEZ ROMAN)
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior The CPG established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the Family Code. Hence,
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights. any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only
after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. However, the CPG must be subsisting at the time of the
FACTS: effectivity of the Family Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
• On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
• Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following
under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of its liquidation.
land (the property).
• In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share. Hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
• On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-
• On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.
demand.
• They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
• PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale
of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and
Marta was null and void.
• Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it
with his own money.
• RTC’s RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale. o However, declared the property was the conjugal property
and not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio
(namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina).
o The participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta.
o Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired
pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation?
– NO
RULING: Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership
property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the
lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the
subsequent marriage.

Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code: Article 105. In case the future
spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The
provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

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