OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN TEXTS

General Editors
Gillian Clark Andrew Louth

Praise for Leontius of Byzantium

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since this is the first complete edition of the Greek in modern times. This critical
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 OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN TEXTS

The series provides reliable working texts of important early Christian writers in both
Greek and Latin. Each volume contains an introduction, text, and select critical apparatus,
with English translations en face, and brief explanatory references.

Titles in the series include:

Justin, Philosopher and Martyr

Apologies
Edited by Denis Minns and Paul Parvis
Priscillian of Avila
The Complete Works
Edited by Marco Conti
The Case Against Diodore and Theodore
Texts and their Contexts
Edited by John Behr
Jerome’s Epitaph on Paula
A Commentary on the Epitaphium Sanctae Paulae
Edited by Andrew Cain
The Life of Saint Helia
Critical Edition, Translation, Introduction, and Commentary
Edited by Virginia Burrus and Marco Conti
Nonnus of Panopolis
Paraphrasis of the Gospel of John XI
Edited by Konstantinos Spanoudakis
Damasus of Rome
The Epigraphic Poetry
Edited by Dennis Trout
Greek and Latin Narratives about the Ancient Martyrs
Edited by Éric Rebillard
Adrian’s Introduction to the Divine Scriptures
An Antiochene Handbook for Scriptural Interpretation
Edited by Peter W. Martens
Faith in Formulae
A Collection of Early Christian Creeds and Creed-related Texts
Edited by Wolfram Kinzig
Gregory of Nyssa
On the Human Image of God

JOHN BEHR
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For Metropolitan Savas of Pittsburgh

Our Best Man!

 Preface

‘Every logos’—word, argument, treatise—‘is like a living being, with a body of its
own’, so that each member is ‘composed in fitting relation to each other and to the
whole’ (Phaedr. 264c2–5). These words of Plato are certainly true of the treatise
presented here, On the Human Image of God by Gregory of Nyssa (otherwise
known as On the Making of Man). It is one of the most remarkable treatises from
the golden era of Patristic literature, presenting a sophisticated analysis of the
human being that draws upon both Scripture and the prior Christian tradition,
above all Origen, and also the tradition of philosophical and medical reflection
going back to Anaxagoras, and above all Plato’s Timaeus. Although attention is
rarely given to the treatise as a whole, it is, like its subject, a skilfully composed and
arranged complex work, with its own economy, that is, the working together of the
different parts of the text (paralleling, I argue, those of Timaeus’ speech); an
economy, moreover, which reflects, and so contributes to, the economy of God
that is the growth of human being, in the workshop of nature, towards the final
realization of God’s project from the beginning, that of making the human being,
individually and collectively, in his image and likeness.
This treatise has long been a source of fascination for me; indeed, it was the
subject of one of my first published pieces. What is presented in the introduction
to this volume is a substantial revision of my first attempt to try to make sense of
how the whole fits together. It has benefitted from other work done along the
way—on the Gospel of John, Irenaeus, and Origen—and especially by the oppor-
tunities I have had to work through this text numerous times with others, in
semester-long seminars or short summer intensives—at St Vladimir’s Seminary,
Nashotah House, Regent’s College, Trinity School for Ministry, St Andrew’s Greek
Orthodox Theological College, and St Irenaeus Institute for Orthodox Theology.
I am truly grateful to all those with whom I have had the pleasure of reading
through the text, learning from them at each stage. My especial thanks go to
Fr Andrew Louth for his guidance, Sophia Theodoratos for checking through the
critical apparatus, Brad Jersak for reading through the introduction, and Tom
Perridge for his encouragement, and all those at Oxford University Press for their
work on this volume.
 Contents

Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1. The Text, Manuscripts, and Editions 3
1. Manuscripts Used in this Edition 9
2. Title 19
3. Headings and Divisions 24
2. Philosophical and Theological Background 33
1. Anaxagoras 33
2. Plato 40
3. Philo 50
4. Origen 62
3. Gregory’s Treatise, On the Human Image of God 89
1. The Letter to Peter 91
2. The Human Image of God (1–15) 93
3. The Prevision and Provision of God (16–29) 101
4. The Life of the Human Being (30) 116
5. ‘The Fall’ and ‘Male and Female’ 120
Manuscripts, Abbreviations, Sigla, and Translation 139
Manuscripts 139
Editions and Translations 139
Indirect Witnesses 140
Abbreviations Used in Critical Apparatus 140
Sigla 141
Translation 141

Saint Gregory of Nyssa, On the Human Image of God 143

Appendix 331

Bibliography 339
Index of Ancient Sources 355
Index of Modern Authors 366
 Abbreviations

Abbreviations for classical and Patristic texts are given in the Bibliography following
the title; they are based on those found in the following:

The SBL Handbook of Style for Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical and Early Christian
Studies, ed. P. H. Alexander et al. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999).

And:

H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. H. S. Jones with

R. McKenzie. 9th edn. with revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
G. W. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

When a text is not conveniently divided according to chapter and paragraph, reference
has been given to the editor’s name, page and line number of the edition given in the
Bibliography. Scriptural references have been given according to the LXX; this prin-
cipally affects the numeration of the Psalms and the naming of 1 & 2 Samuel and 1 & 2
Kings as 1–4 Reigns.

ACA Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

ACO Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum
ACW Ancient Christian Writers
ANF Ante-Nicene Fathers
CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
CBQ MS Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CCCM Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Mediaevalis
CCSG Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca
CCSM Corpus Christianorum: Series Mediaevalis
CÉA, SA Collection des Études Augustiniennes, Série Antiquité
CLA Christianity in Late Antiquity
CMG Corpus Medicorum Graecorum
CPG Clavis Patrum Graecorum, vol. 2, ed. Maurits Geerard (Turnhout: Brepols,
1974)
CTC Christian Theology in Context
CWS Classics of Western Spirituality
D–K Herman Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Walther Kranz, 6th edn.,
3 vols (Berlin, 1951–2)
DL Diogenes Laertius
DOMP Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library
DOP Dumbarton Oaks Papers
xii 

EcRev Ecclesiastical Review

ET English translation
FC Fathers of the Church
FChr Fontes Christiani
GCS Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jarhunderte
GNO Gregorii Nysseni Opera
HTR Harvard Theological Review
IJST International Journal of Systematic Theology
JECS Journal of Early Christian Studies
JTI Suppl. Journal of Theological Interpretation Supplements
JTS Journal of Theological Studies
LCL Loeb Classical Library
M–R Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg, Basile de Césarée: La
tradition manuscrite directe des neuf homélies sur l’Hexaéméron, TU 123
(Berlin: Akademie, 1980).
MTh Modern Theology
NHC Nag Hammadi Codices
NPNF Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers
OCA Orientalia Christiana Analecta
OCT Oxford Classical Texts
OECS Oxford Early Christian Studies
OECT Oxford Early Christian Texts
OLP Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica
PPS Popular Patristic Series
PTS Patristiche Texte und Studien
RevScRel Revue des Sciences Religieuses
RSR Recherches de Science Religieuse
SA Studia Anselmiana
SBL Society of Biblical Literature
SC Sources chrétiennes
SCE Studies in Christian Ethics
SLA Studies in Late Antiquity
SPM Studia Patristica Mediolanensia
SROC Studi e Richerche sull’Oriente Cristiano
STAC Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum
StP Studia Patristica
Suppl. VC Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae
SVF Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
TS Theological Studies
TTH Translated Texts for Historians
TU Texte und Untersuchungen
UCPCP University of California Publications in Classical Philology
VC Vigiliae Christianae
WGRW Writings from the Greco-Roman World
ZAC Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum/Journal of Ancient Christianity
‘We are, clearly, transitory beings and our existence on earth is, clearly,
a process, the uninterrupted existence of a chrysalis transitioning into a
butterfly.’
Stavrogin to Shatov in appendix to Dostoevsky’s The Demons
I N T R O D UCTI ON
 Chapter 1
The Text, Manuscripts, and Editions

If, as Werner Jaeger suggested, a side effect of the French Revolution was that
the Maurist Fathers, having produced monumental editions of Basil, Gregory
of Nazianzus, and John Chrysostom, were not able to do the same for Gregory of
Nyssa,¹ it is apt that amongst all the critical editions of Patristic texts in the
various series produced during the past century, Gregory’s works are distin-
guished by the fact that he alone has an equally magnificent edition dedicated
solely to his works, overseen by Jaeger himself—the Leiden Brill Corpus,
Gregorii Nysseni Opera (GNO). The project was launched by Ulrich von
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff at the beginning of the 20th century, initially resulting
in editions of Gregory’s Contra Eunomium (ed. Jaeger, 1921) and his letters
(ed. Pasqualis, 1925).² The project was continued by Jaeger after his move to the
United States and founding the Institute for Classical Studies at Harvard
University in 1939. After decades of gathering and examining copies of more
than 1,000 manuscripts containing Gregory’s texts, volumes of GNO began to
appear from the 1950s, numbering 18 individual volumes by 2014 (the date of
the most recent volume). In a paper delivered in 1969, Hadwig Hörner recalled
how Jaeger had given her the task of editing the Apologia in Hexaemeron and
then, after Hermann Langerbeck’s death (1964), the work now customarily
known as De hominis opificio in addition, noting that ‘until then only the
collations have been made’.³ The edition of the Apologia appeared five decades
later; the De hominis opificio is the last announced work yet to appear.⁴
Fortunately, however, we do have an edition of this work published in the
mid-19th century, well in advance of any other edition from the period of this

¹ Werner Jaeger, Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and
Macarius (Leiden: Brill, 1954), 5–6.
² The earliest announcement of a new critical edition of Gregory’s corpus seems to be the notice, in
Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), 711–12, of a gathering in honour of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Moellendorff on the occasion of his 60th birthday. For more details of the history of the GNO edition,
see Hadwig Hörner, ‘Über Genese und Derzeitigen Stand der Grossen Edition der Werke Gregors von
Nyssa’, in Marguerite Harl, Écriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nysse: Actes
du Colloque de Chevetogne (22–25 Septembre 1969) (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 18–50.
³ Hörner, ‘Über Genese’, 48.
⁴ Hubert R. Drobner, Gregorii Nysseni in Hexaemeron, GNO 4.1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009). In Margarete
Altenburger annd Friedhelm Mann, Bibliographie zu Gregor von Nyssa: Editionen—Übersetzungen—
Literatur (Leiden: Brill, 1988), x, Martin Henniges is listed as the editor for the Apologia and Hadwig
Hörner for De hom. op.
4 

or any other work of Gregory, produced by the remarkable Scottish scholar,

George Hays Forbes.⁵
Gregory’s De hominis opificio was written between the death of Basil in
September 378 and Easter 379.⁶ It was very popular in antiquity as is clear from
the numerous manuscripts and translations of the treatise. The work was first
translated into Latin by Dionysius Exiguus (c.470–540) and then several centuries
later by Eriugena (completed c.862–4), who also used the work extensively in his
Periphyseon, referring to it as Gregory’s Sermo de imagine. The work was also
translated into Syriac, Arabic, Georgian, Armenian, and Slavonic.⁷ The first
printed edition of the work, entitled simply Βίβλος περὶ ἀνθρώπου, was by the
Aldus Press in 1536.⁸ In the following year, Dionysius’ Latin translation was

⁵ George Hay Forbes, Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης (ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου
Βασιλείου) τὰ εὑρισκόμενα πάντα. Sancti patris nostri Gregorii Nysseni Basilii Magni fratris quae
supersunt omnia. In unum corpus collegit, ad fidem codd. mss. recensuit, Latinis versionibus quam
accuratissimis instruxit et genuina a supposititiis discrevit, Tomus primus, Fasc. 1 and 2 (Burntisland:
Pitsligo Press, 1855, 1861). The Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου—De hominis conditione id est de imagine is
found in Fasc. 1, 102–Fasc. 2, 319; it is preceded by Forbes’ ‘Monitum’, Fasc. 1, 96–101.
⁶ For the dating of Gregory’s works, I have used the ranges given in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of
Nyssa, ed. Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, Suppl. VC 99 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 153–69,
‘Chronology of Works’, by Pierre Maraval.
⁷ For the Syriac version, see M. Parmentier, ‘Syriac Translations of Gregory of Nyssa’, Orientalia
Lovaniensia Periodica 20 (1989), 143–93, at 164. Translations of, and comments on, Vat. sir. 106, dated
c.700  (noted, but not studied by Forbes, cf. ‘Monitum’, 99), appeared in a series of articles, entitled
‘La versione siriaca del “De opificio hominis” di Gregorio di Nissa’ in SROC: T. Clementoni, on
chapters 13–14, SROC 5 (1982), 81–101, 157–71; M. R. De Deo, further on chapter 14, SROC 3
(1983), 39–56, 181–95; F. Grassi, on chapters 9–11, SROC 7 (1984), 25–50, 191–206; and
A. Bonanni, on chapter 22, SROC 10 (1987), 149–70.
For the Arabic version, see Joseph Nasrallah, ‘Dossier arabe des oeuvres de saint Basile dans la
littérature melchite’, Proche-Orient Chrétien 29 (1979), 17–43, at 27–9, on the existence of an 8th-
century Arabic translation of Basil’s Hexaemeron and Gregory’s De hom. op., which was then used for
the Georgian translation (see below).
For the Georgian version, see Tina Dolidze and Ekvtime (Tamaz) Kochlamazanashvili, ‘Old
Georgian Translations of Gregory of Nyssa’s Works’, in Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on
Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism, ed. Volker Henning Drecoll and Margitta Berghaus, Suppl. VC
106 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 577–92, at 577–8 and 581, which dates the first, anonymous, translation of De
hom. op. to the 8th–9th centuries, though preserved in the 10th-century Shatberdi collection and the
12th–13th-century manuscript Codex Jerusalem, Greek Patriarchal Library Collection 44 (now edited
by and published Ilia Abuladze: Tbilisi, 1979; in Georgian); the second translation is that by George the
Athonite (1009–65), a critical edition, edited by Ekvtime Kochlamazanashvili, is forthcoming in
Christian Archaeology 2. See Ekvtime Kochlamazanashvili and Tina Dolidze, Description of Georgian
Manuscripts Including St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Works (Tbilisi, 2009; in Georgian).
For the Armenian version, Forbes, ‘Monitum’, 99, notes an Armenian version held by the
Mekhitarists monks in Venice; see also R. P. Casey, ‘Armenia Inedita’, in Le Muséon, Revue d’études
orientales 68 (1955), 55–9, at 59, on an ms in the Tübingen collection, and M. van Esbroeck and
U. Zanetti, ‘Le manuscrit Érevan 993. Inventaire des pièces’, Revue des études Arméniennes 12 (1977),
123–67, at 139 (no. 118, regarding De hom. op. 25).
The Slavonic translation has now been critically edited by Lara Sels, Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis
opificio О Образѣ Чловѣка: The Fourteenth-Century Slavonic Translation: A Critical Edition with
Greek Parallel and Commentary, Bausteine zur Slavischen Philologie und Kulturgeschichte NF 21
(Köln: Böhlau, 2009).
⁸ Gregorii Nazanzeni Theologi orationes novem elegantissimae, Gregorii Nysseni liber de homine,
quae omnia nunc primum, emendatissima, in lucem prodeunt (Aldus, 1536); and in the final colophon:
Venetiis, in aedibus haeredum Aldi, et Andreae Asulani soceri. MDXXXVI.
  , ,   5

published (Cologne, 1537, reprinted in 1551; subsequently re-edited by Laurentius

Sifanus, Basel, 1562), with the title De creatione hominis, although in the explicit
(fol. 23v) it is referred to as De imagine.⁹ Two further Latin translations were
produced in the mid-16th century, that of the Cassinese monk Ambrosius
Ferrarius in 1553, and then, apparently without knowledge of Ferrarius’s work,
by Johannes Löwenklau (Levvenklaius).¹⁰ Löwenklau’s edition was published in
Basel in 1567, along with the Greek text from Aldus’ edition, under the title De
hominis opificio—Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου; this Latin translation and these
titles thereafter became standard.¹¹ It was this text that was included by
Claudius Morellus in the first publication of the collected known works of
Gregory in 1615.¹² An appendix to this work, containing newly discovered
works, was published in 1618, and an enlarged edition, the expanded editio
Morelliana, in 1638, which was then used as the basis for Gregory’s works in
the series Patrologia Graeca.¹³ Eriugena’s translation was only rediscovered in the
years before the Second World War, when Dom Maïeul Cappuyns noticed it in
the manuscript Bamberg B.IV.13 and published an edition of the text, comparing
it also to the translation found in Eriugena’s Periphyseon (in the three principal
recensions: Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale, 875; Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Patr.
78 [olim B.IV.13]; and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 12964–5); the
work has recently been re-edited by Giovanni Mandolino, with recourse to both
the critical edition of the Periphyseon by Édouard Jeauneau and the Greek text of
Forbes.¹⁴
Although not having yet appeared in the GNO, we are fortunate, as already
noted, to have the exceptional edition of this work of Gregory, along with the
Apologia in Hexaemeron and the Vita Moysis, edited by George Forbes and
published in 1855/61 at his own private press (Pitsligo Press, named after his
ancestor Lord Pitsligo) in Burntisland, a small town on the northern shore of the

⁹ For details of these and other editions, see Altenburger and Mann, Bibliographie, 11–12, 15, 23–4.
The editio princeps was included in PL (67.347–408), with two titles: Ad fratrem suum Petrum
Presbyterum: De imagine, id est de hominis conditione quae a fratre eorum Sancto Basilio episcopo in
Hexaemeron sunt omissa, and then De creatione hominis.
¹⁰ For more details see P. Levine, ‘Two Early Versions of St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Περὶ κατασκευῆς
ἀνθρώπου’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958), 473–92, at 475 and 484 n. 24, relating also
the scathing comments of Ferrarius and Löwenklau on Dionysius’ translation and betraying their
ignorance of the identity of Dionysius.
¹¹ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Νύσσης ἐπισκόπου θαυμαστὴ βίβλος, περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου. Opus admiran-
dum Gregorii Nysseni antistitis de hominis opificio. Interprete Iohanne Levvenklaio, annotationibus
estiam necessariis additis. Liber medicinae, philosophiae sacrarumque litterarum studiosis perutilis
(Basel: Ioannis Oporini, 1567). Ferrarius’s translation (Cod. Vat. Otto lat. 776) remains unpublished.
¹² For details, see Altenburger and Mann, Bibliographie, 50–1.
¹³ Ibid. 55, 58–60. Gregory’s treatise is found in PG 44, 123–256 (Paris, 1858).
¹⁴ M. Cappuyns, ‘Le ‘De imagine’ de Grégoire de Nysse traduit par Jean Scot Érigène’, Recherches de
théologie ancienne et médiévale 32 (Louvain, 1965), 205–62. Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae, Carmina; De
Imagine, ed. Michael W. Herren, Andrew Dunning, Giovanni Mandolino, and Chiara O. Tommasi,
CCCM 167 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020). Iohannes Scottus Eriugena, Periphyseon, ed. É. Jeauneau,
CCCM 161–5 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996–2003).
6 

Firth of Forth.¹⁵ Despite his physical handicap (paralysed from the knees down-
ward), Forbes travelled extensively, not only to Oxford and London but also to
Paris, Turin, Nancy, and Venice, to collate numerous manuscripts for his edition.
He settled on 20 manuscripts, from the 10th to 16th centuries, collating most of
them himself, but also benefitting from the kind services of others: J. G. Krabinger
collated the Munich manuscripts; J. B. Pitra also inspected manuscripts on his
behalf; and E. B. Pusey helped finance this work.¹⁶ Although it was the expanded
editio Morelliana that ultimately served as the basis for the Patrologia Graeca, it
seemed possible for a while that Abbé Migne, at the urging of Cardinal J. B. Pitra,
was willing to engage Forbes (despite being ‘a Protestant and a heretic’) to edit the
works of Gregory for his monumental series.¹⁷ Forbes consulted the 1536 Aldus
Press edition and that of Löwenklau, and also prepared his own edition, published
on the facing page, of Dionysius’ Latin translation using Sifanus’ edition and
himself collating two further manuscripts found in Oxford and the readings of
three Parisian manuscripts supplied by Pitra.
In the 19th century, the work was translated once into English (entitled On the
Making of Man; it has not been retranslated since),¹⁸ twice into Russian,¹⁹ and no
less than three times into German (under the titles: Ueber die Schöpfung des
Menschen, Abhandlung von der Erschaffung des Menschen, Über die Austattung
des Menschen).²⁰ In the mid-20th century, the first French translation appeared
in the Sources chrétiennes series, by Jean LaPlace (La création de l’homme, without
a facing Greek text as later became customary for SC), a second translation four
decades later in the series Les Pères dans la foi,²¹ then an Italian translation
(simply called L’uomo),²² and most recently a new Russian translation (Об
устроении человека).²³

¹⁵ For Forbes himself, see W. Perry, George Hay Forbes: A Romance in Scholarship (London: SPCK,
1927).
¹⁶ Cf. Forbes, ‘Monitum’, 97; Perry, George Hay Forbes, 77–8.
¹⁷ See the account, together with letters exchanged between Pitra and Migne, in Perry, George Hay
Forbes, 76–85.
¹⁸ Translation by Henry Austin Wilson in William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson, Select Writings
and Letters of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, NPNF, second series, vol. 5 (1893; reprinted Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1994); Wilson utilized some of the alternate readings noted by Forbes.
¹⁹ Cf. Cyprien Kern, Les traductions russe des textes patristiques: Guide bibliographique (Chevetogne:
Éditions de Chevetogne, 1957), 32: the complete works of Gregory first appeared in Християнское
Чтение (Moscow, 1826–47), and then in the series Творения Святых Отцов издаваемых в русском
переводе при Московской Духовной Академии vols. 37–45 (Moscow, 1861–72), vol. 37, pp. 76–222.
²⁰ The first title is from the series Sämmtliche Werke der Kirchen (Väter aus dem Urtexte in das
Teutsche übersetzt), Bd. I (Kempten 1851); second title, trans. F. Oehler, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter,
Bd. III (Leipzig, 1859), 202–315; third title, trans. H. Hayd, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, Bd.
I (Kempten, 1874), 207–317. Cf. Altenburger and Mann, Bibliographie, 85, 88–9, 93–4, respectively.
²¹ J. LaPlace and J. Daniélou, Grégoire de Nysse: La création de l’homme, SC 6 (Paris: Cerf, 1943,
reprinted 2002). J. Y. Guillaumin and A. G. Hamman, Grégoire de Nysse: La création de l’homme (Paris:
Deslcée de Brouwer, 1982).
²² B. Salmona, Gregorio di Nissa. L’uomo, Collana di testi patristici 32 (Rome: Città Nuova, 1982,
reprinted 2000).
²³ В. Лурье, Об устроении человека (St Petersburg, 2000).
  , ,   7

While we eagerly await a full editio maior in GNO, Forbes’ edition remains the
unparalleled basis from which to work. Regarding the 20 manuscripts used by
Forbes and his editorial judgement, Hörner was very positive: ‘All—nearly all—
the important strands of transmission were available to Forbes, whose judgment
in evaluating them was extraordinarily good.’²⁴ The manuscripts used by Forbes,
together with his sigla, are:²⁵

a ‘Nesselii ccxvii’ (i.e. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol.

gr. 222)
α ‘Burneianus 52’ (i.e. London, British Library, Burney MS 52)
b ‘Lambecii tomi iv. cod. 110’ (i.e. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek,
theol. gr. 278)
β ‘Regius 1277’ (i.e. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1277)
c ‘Lamb. t. iii. cod. 63’ (i.e. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol.
gr. 113)
d ‘Lamb. t. iii. cod. 62’ (i.e. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol.
gr. 160)
e ‘Lamb. t. iii. cod. 64’ (i.e. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol.
gr. 168)
f ‘Lamb. t. iii. cod. 65’ (i.e. Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol.
gr. 134)
g ‘Ædis Christi Oxonii’ (i.e. Oxford Christ Church Library, grec 45)
h ‘Codex in Museo Hunteriano Glasguae asservatus’ (i.e. Glasgow, University
Library, MS Hunter 447, contains only extracts)
i ‘Mon. 192’ (i.e. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 192)
k ‘Monac. 206’ (i.e. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 206,
incomplete)
l ‘Monac. 240’ (i.e. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 240)
m ‘Monac. 570’ (i.e. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 570)
n ‘Marcianus 58’ (i.e. Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San Marco, grec 58)
p ‘Regius 476’ (i.e. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 476)
q ‘Coislinianus 235’ (i.e. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin
grec 235)

²⁴ Letter to Lara Sels, dated 20 May 2003 (Sels, Gregory of Nyssa, 95, ftn. 352); Sels reused Forbes’
text for her parallel Greek–Slavonic edition of this treatise, but only noted those variants pertinent to
the Slavonic translation.
²⁵ For a, b, c, d, e, and f, Forbes refers to Daniel de Nessel, Catalogus sive Recensio specialis omnium
codicum manuscriptorum graecorum, nec non linguarum orientalium, Augustissimae Bibliothecae
Caesareae Vindobonensis (Vienna: L. Voigt & J. B. Endteri, 1690), 321 (Forbes has misidentified ‘a’
as ‘ccxvii’; Sels, Gregory of Nyssa, 95, gives ‘ccxxvii’; it should be ccxxii), and Peter Lambeck,
Commentariorum de augustissima bibliotheca caesarea Vindobonensis, Liber Tertius, editio altera
(Vienna: J. Thomae, 1776), 286 (cod. 62), 289 (cod. 63), 294 (cod. 64), and Liber Quartus, editio altera
(Vienna: J. Thomae, 1778), 126–7 (cod. 110).
8 

r ‘Musæ Britannici xvi. D 1’ (i.e. London, British Library, Royal MS 16 D I)

s ‘Baroccianus 144’ (i.e. Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 144)
t ‘Vaticanus 408’ (i.e. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 408)

In his brief introductory comments, Forbes suggested that these manuscripts

formed two basic families: first, abcikmnqrt and, second, def, with which ghpl
and s are closely connected. Further, in his assessment a/α and b/β are so close that
he only recorded α or β when the reading of a or b had not been noted (and he
occasionally notes when they disagree with each other).²⁶ Forbes also notes that
‘Regius 956’ (i.e. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 956, 14th century)
concurs very closely with n,²⁷ and he occasionally includes variant readings in his
apparatus from three other manuscripts he had read: ‘Regius 940’ (i.e. Paris,
Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 940, 14th century); ‘coislin 228’ (i.e. Paris,
Bibliothèque nationale de France, coislin grec 228, 11th century); and ‘Mon. 562’
(i.e. Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 562, 11th century).²⁸ Forbes’
apparatus is very complete and full of details, though his method of reference is
sometimes unclear and occasionally incorrect.²⁹ Moreover, when his choice of text
differs from those of previous editors, he notes the mss supporting his reading but
not those supporting the earlier editions; but, as he does note all other variants,
one can probably assume that the remaining unnamed mss align with the previous
editions. Notably, Forbes also printed the list of headings following the Letter
to Peter, prefacing the work, which had not been done in the editio Morelliana or
PG (nor in the translation of Moore and Wilson), but had been included by
Löwenklau in his edition.
We have further information about the manuscript tradition of Gregory’s trea-
tise, indirectly, from the study of the manuscript tradition of Basil’s Hexaemeron,
undertaken by Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg in preparation
for their own edition of Basil’s work.³⁰ They identified three different forms of
collections in which Basil’s work has been handed down in the manuscript tradition:
first, a small collection, including Basil’s Hexaemeron and the two homilies In
Verba: Faciamus Hominem (also called Sermones de creatione hominis)³¹ to which

²⁶ Forbes, ‘Monitum’, 98. ²⁷ Forbes, ‘Monitum’, 97.

²⁸ Paris BNF coislin grec 228, 62–74v contains chaps. 1–12.11. Munich, BSB Cod. graec. 562, contains
r v
only chap. 12, at 113 –117 , between Nemesius of Emesa’s De natura hominis and Gregory’s De Anima,
followed by a short work of John of Damascus on those who have fallen asleep in faith.
²⁹ Forbes placed a superscript letter above the Greek word in the text, with the variants noted below,
frequently followed by variants of subsequent words in the text in the lines that follow, before the next
superscript letter.
³⁰ Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg, Basile de Césarée: La tradition manuscrite
directe des neuf homélies sur l’Hexaéméron, TU 123 (Berlin: Akademie, 1980); referred to below as
M–R. Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg eds, Basilius von Caesarea: Homilien zum
Hexaemeron, GCS NF 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997).
³¹ CPG 3215 and 3216. Ed. Alexis Smits and Michel van Esbroeck, Basile de Césarée: Sur l’origine de
l’homme, SC 160 (Paris: Cerf, 1970); Hadwig Hörner, GNO Supplement (Brill, 1972), 2–40, 41–72; ET
Nonna Verna Harrison, St Basil the Great: On the Human Condition, PPS (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press,
2005), 31–48, 49–64.
  , ,   9

the apocryphal homily De Paradiso is sometimes added;³² second, what they

described as being the normal collection, in which the Hexaemeron is supplemented
by De hominis opificio and sometimes Gregory’s Apologia in Hexaemeron; and,
third, a larger collection, which brings together all the texts that are in the small and
normal collection: Hexaemeron, De hominis opificio, the two homilies In Verba:
Faciamus Hominem, and occasionally the Apologia in Hexaemeron and the De
Paradiso. Of the manuscripts they list, 68 contain Gregory’s treatise (18 in the large
collection; 50 in the normal collection), 14 of which had been used by Forbes; a full
list of these 68 manuscripts and details they supplied is given in the Appendix.³³

1. Manuscripts Used in this Edition

In the list provided on the website database ‘Pinakes|Πίνακες Textes et manuscrits

grecs’, there are 166 manuscripts of Gregory’s treatise.³⁴ For this present edition,
I have re-examined several of the manuscripts used by Forbes, especially when
his reading seemed questionable or he was in doubt or when his apparatus
was unclear. I have also collated four of the earliest manuscripts, not used by
Forbes, now digitized and available online: Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica
Vaticana, Vat. grec 2053 and Vat. grec 2066, to the latter of which also belongs
Washington, Library of Congress, Ms 60; Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 228;
and Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, grec Plut. 4.27. I have also taken note of
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1356, two fly-leaves of which, dating
from the 9th to 10th centuries, contain two passages from Gregory’s treatise. For
printed editions, I have compared the text as given in the Patrologia Graeca, the
text which, due to the scarcity of Forbes’ edition, has become the standard one in
modern times, and also the editio princeps (Aldus, 1536). Passages from the text as
they appear in Justinian’s Ep. ad Mennam, the Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione
Verbi, John of Damascus’ De Sacris Imaginibus, and the Sacra Parallela attributed
to John of Damascus, have also been noted.
I have retained Forbes’ sigla for the manuscripts, modifying α to Æ and β to ß,
to avoid confusion. The information provided below is drawn from the manu-
scripts themselves, when available online (on the websites of the various libraries in
which they are held, together with supplementary information contained therein),
‘Pinakes’, the study of A. de Mendieta and S. Rudberg (= M–R), Forbes, and the

³² CPG 3217, ed. Hörner, GNO Supplement (Brill, 1972), 75–84.

³³ The mss used by Forbes are given the following designations by M–R: β/D 5, c/F 5, d/C 3, e/H 7,
f/D 4, g/A*16, i/H 4, l/E 17, m/E 22, n/E 3, p/A 1, q/I 1, s/A*15, t/C 1. For their own edition of Basil’s
Hexaemeron, M–R used: A 1, A 2, A 3, B 1, B 2, C 1, E 1, E 2, E 3, G 1, G 2.
³⁴ https://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr (accessed 23 October 2020); the information it supplies, however,
should be treated with caution: it lists the 8th–9th-century Athens, EBE 223 as containing exclusively
works by Basil but also as including Gregory’s treatise; and it dates Moscow, Musée historique, grec 81
Vladimir to the 10th century, which as M–R observe is correct for folios 2–120, but folios 121–235, in
which we have Gregory’s work, date to the 12th century.
10 

catalogues of Nessel and Lambeck. Listed in date order, the manuscripts used for
this edition are as follows:

9th–10th centuries
Z—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1356 (images online)
The manuscript dates from the 14th century, but two fly-leaves of this volume,
containing passages from Gregory’s work, date to the late 9th to early 10th
centuries:³⁵
fol. Ar-v πρῶ]τον μὲν εἰπῶν—χαρακτῆρα: chapter 16.8–13 (16, lines 62–109).
fol. 340r-v Καίσαρος εἰκόνα—ἄν(θρωπ)οι: chapters 16.13–titulus 17 (16, lines
110–17, line 2).
fol. 341r-v τοῖς διορατικωτέροις—σπουδαζό[μενα: chapters 19.3–20.2 (19, line 25–20,
line 26).
fol. Br-v σπουδαζό]μενα Ἐπειδὴ—ἀλλ᾽ἀνα[γκαίοις: chapters 20.3–21.1 (20, line 26–21,
line 16).

W—Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 2053 (M–R G 1; images

online)
No initial title. 248r (M–R and Pinakes have 247r) Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ
ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκοπος Νύσης. 248rv Ep. to Peter. 248v Τοῦ ὁσίου πατρὸς
ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου Νύσης. σύνταξις κεφαλαίων λ, but no list of headings. 248v–283v
treatise in 30 chapters, with headings and numbers ornately marked out. Text
breaks off a few lines before the end of the treatise, at last line of 283v, with
ὑποτίθεται, λέγων ἀπεκδύσασθαι (chapter 30, line 301).

V—Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 2066 (M–R E 1; images online)
No initial title. 299r Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος
Νύσης. 299r–300r Ep. to Peter. 300r–301r list of 30 headings with numbers in
margin. 301r heading Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπίσκοπου Νύσης, then title of
first chapter. 301r–316v incomplete text, containing first 11 chapters and part
of chapter 12; text of treatise breaks off at last line of 316v, with κάτοπτρον
γινομένην κρατεῖ (chapter 12, lines 119). Chapter divisions are clearly
indicated by line of ornamentation and the chapter numbers are written in
the margin.

³⁵ Identified by Charles Astruc, ‘Deux fragments anciens (en minuscule de type “Anastase”) du De
hominis opificio de Grégoire de Nysse’, Scriptorium: revue internationale des études relatives aux
manuscrits, 39.1 (1985), 265–9, who also provides a list of variants.
  , ,   11

To this manuscript belong the two folios that constitute Washington, Library of
Congress, Ms 60 (images online with grec 2066):³⁶
fol. 1rv ἀσώμα]τον; πῶς—τῶν γεγραμμένων αἰνίττεται chapter 16.3–8 (16, lines
21–62).
fol. 2rv ἐν οἷς τόινυν—δοχεῖ τὸν μέγαν chapters 18.8–19.4 (18, line 71–19, line 29).

N—Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San Marco, grec 58 (M–R E 3)

65v title in red uncials: Τοῦ μακαρίου καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης·
εἰς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν τῶν προκειμένων τῆς ἐξαημέρου. 65v–66v: πρόλογος τῷ
ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκοπος Νύσης. 66v–67v list
of 31 headings, under the title: κεφάλαια ἐμπιλόσοφα περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κτίσεως· καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου δὲ μερικῶς· ἅπερ ἦν λείποντα τῇ ἐξαημέρῳ· ἥν
προείρηκεν ὁ μακάριος καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις Βασίλειος. 67v–116r text in 31 chapters, with
scholia.

10th century
X—Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, grec 4.27 (M–R A 3; images online)
(Dated to the first part of the 10th century) No initial title. 186v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ
Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 186v–187v Ep. to Peter. 187v–
188v list of 30 headings with numbers. 188v–240v treatise in 30 chapters with
numbers in the margins, and scholia.

P—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 476 (M–R A 1; images online)

(Dated to the first part of the 10th century) No initial title. 64v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ
Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 64v–65v Ep. to Peter. 65v–66v
list of 30 headings. 66v–116v treatise in 30 chapters, with numbers in the margins,
and scholia. 116v explicit: Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρεγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης θεώρια εἰς τὴν
κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, written around an image of the cross.

S—Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 144 (M–R A*15; images online)

(Dated to the second part of the 10th century) No initial title. 98v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ
δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 98v–100r Ep. to Peter.
100r–101r list of 30 headings. 101v–174v treatise in 30 chapters, with numbers in

³⁶ See Werner Jaeger, ‘Greek Uncial Fragments in the Library of Congress in Washington’, Traditio,
5 (1947), 79–102, with plates, and a full and fascinating study of the manuscript’s history. Jaeger
identifies the ms as having come from Constantinople and calculates that these folios would have been
fols. 325 and 332 of Vat. grec 2066.
12 

the margins. 174v explicit in black uncials: τοῦ ἐν ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου νύσης
θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

T—Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 408 (M–R C 1; images

online)
(Dated to the second part of the 10th century) No initial title. 89v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ
δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσσης. 89v–91r Ep. to Peter.
91r–92v list of 31 headings. 92v–161v treatise in 31 chapters, with numbers written
in the margins and scholia.

10th–11th centuries
O—Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 228 (M–R E 6; images online)
65r two dodecasyllables in the hand of the copyist: ὡς αὐτάδελφος καὶ ὁμότροπος
πέλων, πληροῖ τὸ λεῖπον τοῦ σοφοῦ Βασιλείου. 65r title: περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου τοῦ
μακαρίου Γρηγορίου ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου. 65r: Τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ ἀδελφῷ
δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐν κυρίῳ χαίρειν. 65r–66r Ep. to
Peter. 66r–67r list of 31 headings. 67r–118v treatise in 31 chapters, with
numbers in margin, and scholia. 118v, explicit in black uncials: Γρηγορίου
ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευήν.

Q—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin 235 (M–R I 1; images online)

No initial title. 121r Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος
νύσης εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. 121r–123r Ep. to Peter. 123r–124v list of 31 headings.
124v–208v treatise in 31 chapters, with numbers in the margins. Text breaks off a
few lines before the conclusion of chapter 31, with ἐν τῷ ἀτελεῖ καὶ ἐν (chapter 30,
line 278).

D—Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 160 (M–R C 3)

Beginning damaged; Ep. to Peter missing. 60r Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν
Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης κεφάλαια τριάκοντα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευήν, followed by list of 30 headings. 61r–113v, text of treatise missing
first seven chapters and first part of chapter 8.

11th century
J—Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 562 (113v–117r; images
online)
Chapter 12 only.
  , ,   13

12th–13th centuries
Æ—London, British Library, Burney MS 52 (Forbes α; images online)
No initial title. 88v Πρὸς Πέτρον τὸν ἴδιον ἀδελφὸν θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευὴν. 88v–89r Ep. to Peter; 89r–90r list of 31 headings (missing no. 19). 90v–
130r treatise in 31 chapters. Chapter titles, and the numbers in margins, written in
red ink.

13th century
R—London, British Library, Royal MS 16 D I (images online)
117v, two headings: Ἐπιστολὴ Γργορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης πρὸς Πέτρον τὸν ἴδιον
ἀδελφὸν εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῷ Βασιλείου then Τῷ ἀδελφῷ
αὐτοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκοπος Νύσης προοίμιον τῶν λα κεφαλαίων
τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐξαημέρῳ λεχθέντων τὰ παραλειπόμενα τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου. 117v–
118r Ep. to Peter. No list of headings, but instead another heading: τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις
πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης followed by heading for chapter 1.
118v–143r treatise in 31 chapters; headings marked by large capitals, only 11
marked by numbers in the margins.

G—Oxford Christ Church Library, grec 45 (M–R A*16)

No initial title. 115r–116v Ep. to Peter. 116v–118r list of 30 headings; 118r–194r
text in 30 chapters, with scholia. 194r explicit: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου
Νύσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and this dodecasyllable verse: + ὁ
σταυρὸς ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος καλῶν πέλει.

F—Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 134 (M–R D 4; images

online)
(Dated by ÖNB to 1200 Constantinople; by Pinakes to c.1300) No initial title. 95r
τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος νίσης. 95r–96v Ep. to
Peter. 96v–98r list of 30 headings. 98r–150v text; headings and numbers, in
margins, in red ink.

14th century
H—Glasgow, University Library, MS Hunter 447 (V.5.17)
Extracts: chapters 1, 3, 6, 7 (with lacunae), 10, 11, 12; then three excerpts
from chapter 8, under the title: Διά τι τελευταῖος κατεσκευάσθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος;
then chapters 13, 14, 15, and fragments from chapters 16, 20, 21, then chapters
24 and 30.
14 

I—Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 192 (M–R H 4; images online)

(Dated c.1370) 111v title: Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης, εἰς τὴν
ἑξαήμερον· τοῦ μακαρίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου
βασιλείου περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ ἀδελφῳ δούλῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ
γρηγόριος ἐν Κυρίω χαίρειν. 111v–112v Ep. to Peter. 112v–113v list of 31 headings.
114r–166v treatise in 31 chapters, with headings and numbers (placed before the
heading) in red ink.

M—Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 570 (M–R E 22)

108r–170v title Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης πρὸς Πέτρον
ἴδιον ἀδελφὸν εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῷ Βασιλείου· τουτέστιν
εἰς τὴν κατακσκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ep. to Peter. List of 30 headings. Treatise in 30
chapters.

ß—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1277 (Forbes β; M–R D 5; images

online)
54v–55r list of 30 headings. 55r–56r Ep. to Peter: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν
Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν· πρὸς τὸν
ἐπίσκοπον ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Πέτρον. 56r–82v treatise in 30 chapters, with chapter
numbers in the margins.

E—Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 168 (M–R: H 7)

(Pinakes 14th century; M–R 15th century) Lacking Ep. to Peter and list of
headings. 73v title: εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν. 73v–120r treatise in 30
chapters.

A—Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 222

134r Τοῦ Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης πρὸς πέτρον τὸν ἴδιον ἀδελφὸν εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ
τῆς ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῷ Βασιλείου περὶ τῶν προγεγονότων τῶν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως. 134r–187r treatise in 30 chapters.

B—Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 278

2r Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν· πρὸς τὸν ἐπίσκοπον καὶ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Πέτρον. 2r–49v
treatise in 30 chapters.
  , ,   15

15th century
C—Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 113 (M–R F 5)
(Dated 27 August 1412) 79r title: περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου· τοῦ μακαρίου Γρηγορίου
ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ
Γρηγόριος ἐν Κυρίῳ χαίρειν. 79r–80r Ep. to Peter. 80r–81r list of 31 headings. 81v–
138r treatise in 31 chapters.

L—Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 240 (M–R E 17; images

online)
(Dated by BSB and Pinakes to the 15th century; by M–R to the 14th century) 65r
title: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης κεφάλαια τριάκοντα
εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν. 65r–66r Ep. to Peter. 66r–109v text divided into
30 chapters; headings marked by large capital in the margin together with
number, in red ink.

16th century
K—Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 206
(Dated to the second half of the 16th century) 1r–34r incomplete. Forbes gives the
title as: περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου τοῦ μακαρίου Γρηγορίου ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἀγίου
—
Βασιλείου. On 17v there is the title of chapter 18 (19), with number ιθ given in
r
the margin, and on 31 title of chapter 30 (31) without an accompanying number;
the manuscript would thus have originally been in 31 chapters.

Indirect Witnesses
Justinian, Ep. ad Mennam
28.4–14 (τάχα—ἐνφυσήματος) = Ep. ad Mennam (ACO 3, 199.22–31)
28.28–74 (οἱ τῷ προτέρῳ—σώμασι) = Ep. ad Mennam (ACO 3, 199.32–200.37)

Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi

4.6–9 (ἡ μὲν γὰρ—διοικουμένην) = 19, VII (Diekamp, 122.14–15)
15.7–10 (πᾶν τὸ—προσηγορίαν ἔχει) = 22, XI (Diekamp, 140.13–18)
15.16–17 (ἃ μὴ—τὴν κλῆσιν) = 22, XII (Diekamp, 140.1–2)

John of Damascus, De Sacris Imaginibus

4.11–17 (ὥσπερ—ὀνόματος) = Imag. 1.49/2.45 (Kotter, 3.153.4–11)
5.2–6 (Τὸ δὲ—τὸ ὁμοίωμα) = Imag. 1.50/2.46 (Kotter, 3.154.3–9)

John of Damascus (?), Sacra Parallela

4.6–11 (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ—φύσιν) = II¹98/K cap. A 2, 20 (Thum, 117.3–9)
16 

4.11–5.3 (ὥσπερ—θεωρεῖται) = II¹38/K cap. A 1, 38 (Thum, 67.11–68.5)

13.12–25 (ὕπνος—ἄνεσις) = II¹2122/K cap. Υ 3, 8 (Thum, 1122.3–19)
16.89–98 (ἐπεὶ δὲ—τὴν γνώμην) = II¹99/K cap. A 2, 21 (Thum, 117.12–118.5)
23.6–7 (ὁ γὰρ—τέλους) = II¹52/K cap. A 1, 52 (Thum, 86, 10)
28.4–17, 28.20–29.98 (τάχα—γίνεται, ἐπεὶ—βλαστημάτων ἐγένετο) = II¹39/K cap.
A 1, 39 (Thum, 68.8–74.21)
30.90–6 (ἐπειδὴ—πνεῦμα) = II¹1218/K cap. K 1, 19 (Thum, 687.2–11)
30.250–1 (ἀλλὰ—φύσεως) = II¹40/K cap. 1, 40 (Thum, 74.24–5)
30.253–78 (τὸ γὰρ—τέλειον) = II¹40/K cap. 1, 40 (Thum, 74.25–75.27)

As mentioned earlier, Forbes had already noted that his manuscripts fell into two
main groups. On the basis of the analysis of variant readings noted in this edition,
it appears that his second group, D E F, occurs 12 times, always in combination
with other manuscripts, never as the only three witnesses. However, D G L P S X
occur together as the sole witnesses to a variant reading 29 times, and together
with other manuscripts 79 times (with E 10 times; F 10 times; H 25 times). These
manuscripts, moreover, all divide the text into 30 chapters. Listed in date order,
they are:

X 10th century, first half

P 10th century, first half
S 10th century, second half
D 10th–11th centuries (missing last part of chapter 7 and first part of chapter 8)
G 13th century
F 13th century
E 14th century
H 14th century
L 15th century (missing list of chapters after the Letter to Peter).

The remaining manuscripts, A Æ B ß C I K M N O Q R T V W Z, also form a

distinct group. This group contains manuscripts having both 30 chapters (A B ß
M V W) and 31 chapters (Æ C I K N O Q R T). However, their variant readings
are so close that it seems impossible to differentiate them into two distinct sub-
groups. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Forbes had noticed that two pairs are
particularly close, A (with 30 chapters) and Æ (with 31), and B-ß, so that he
only recorded Æ or ß when A or B had not been noted, and the few times when
they disagree with each other. On the seven occasions noted in this edition where
A differs from Æ, it shares readings with the other group (always with D with one
  , ,   17

exception, when it agrees with G P X).³⁷ A full examination of the various

groupings of manuscripts, their transmission, and the reason behind some having
30 chapters while others have 31, must await a full examination of all 166 known
manuscripts.
For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that whereas Forbes’ group of A/Æ
B/ß C I K M N Q R T occurs together, either by themselves or with other
manuscripts, only ten times, the group Æ A B ß I K N O Q T occurs 67 times,
and with C a further 25 times, with M 32 times, with R 41 times, with V 14 times,
with W 12 times; the fragmentary Z, on the two occasions when it shares variant
readings with other manuscripts, does so with W once, and N T V W once. In date
order they appear as follows:

W 9th–10th 30 chaps N 9th–10th centuries 31 chaps + list

centuries
V 9th–10th 30 chaps + list O 10th–11th centuries 31 chaps + list
centuries
A 14th century 30 chaps Q 10th–11th centuries 31 chaps + list
ß 14th century 30 chaps + list T 10th century, second half 31 chaps + list
B 14th century 30 chaps Æ 12th–13th centuries 31 chaps + list
M 14th century 30 chaps + list R 13th century 31 chaps
I 14th century 31 chaps + list
C 15th century 31 chaps + list
K 16th century 31 chaps

Latin Translations
The Latin translations of Dionysius and Eriugena have also been collated for this
edition. For that of Dionysius, I have used the edition of Forbes, who used the
following manuscripts:

Oxford, Laud Misc. 123 (12th century, English, Gloucester), incip. f. 94v; in 31
chapters, missing list of headings.
Oxford, Ms Bodl. 238 (14th century, English), f. 185r–197r; in 31 chapters, with
list, but different set of headings.

³⁷ Chapter 23, line 40 εὑρήσοι A (sed non Æ) D G² P S; 25, line 5 νῦν om. A (sed non Æ) D L; 25, line 7
ἀνάστασιν] διάστασιν A (sed non Æ) G P X; 29, line 72 τοῦ φυτοῦ] τούτου A (sed non Æ) D E F L Nmg
P S X; 29, line 77 ψυχικὰς] τῆς ψυχῆς A (non Æ) D E F L P S X; 30, line 16 τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην συστῆναι
ζωὴν A (non Æ) D E F H L P S X: τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ζωὴν συστῆναι I. There are ten occasions when
B differs from ß, only one of which is shared with other mss (N and P) at 13, line 156. For A/Æ, the
similar case is 30, line 112 τῆς om. A (non Æ) B D E G H P X.
18 

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 2633 (12th–13th centuries), incip.

f. 98v; in 31 chapters with list of headings.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 1710 (14th century), incip. f. 1r; in 31
chapters with list of headings.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 1701 (13th century), incip. f. 42v; in
31 chapters with list of headings.

For the translation of Eriugena, we now have the critical edition of Giovanni
Mandolino with the extensive introduction by Chiara Tommasi.³⁸ For their
edition of De Imagine, the following manuscripts were used:

Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Patr. 78 (olim B.IV.13), f. 88r–114r

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, n.a. Lat. 2664, f. 122r–139v
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 18095, f. 40v–41r
Berlin, Lat. Qu. 690 (Görres 87), f. 186r–186v (fragment)
Reims, Bibliothèque Municipale, 875
Vatican City, Vat. Reg. lat. 195, f. 61v–62r

Mandolino also collated the previous edition of Cappuyns, together with Forbes’
edition of the Greek text and his edition of Dionysius’ translation, the translation
of Löwenklau (Levvenklaius) in PG, and the text as it appears in Eriugena’s
Periphyseon, as edited by Édouard Jeauneau. Comparing Eriugena’s translation
to the variant readings of the Greek manuscripts provided by Forbes, Tommasi
concludes that the manuscript to which Eriugena’s translation has greatest affinity
is Q (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin 235). For this edition, notice
has only been made of substantive differences (which are indeed significant,
especially regarding how Gregory’s text has been translated in chapter 16).
Notice has not been made, for instance, of differences of word order or matters
more properly pertaining to the transmission of the Latin manuscripts themselves;
for example, in chapter 16.14 (line 112) πρὸς ὅ τι is rendered aliquid, which
Mandolino corrected to ad quid, based on the translation of this passage given in
Eriugena’s Periphyseon and the Greek text.
This edition thus represents an intermediary stage while we await the full editio
maior from GNO. I have transcribed Forbes’ text and critical apparatus, putting
the latter into a more familiar and accessible format, and checked his readings
when his apparatus was unclear, when he was himself in doubt, or when his

³⁸ Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenae, Carmina; De Imagine, ed. Michael W. Herren, Andrew Dunning,
Giovanni Mandolino, and Chiara O. Tommasi, CCCM 167 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020).
  , ,   19

reading seemed questionable. I have further collated five of the earliest manu-
scripts, which were not available to Forbes but are now online (O V W X Z), and
also collated the Latin translations of Dionysius and Eriugena, both of which had
been done by their previous editors (Forbes and Mandolino, respectively), but
now brought together with further observations.

2. Title

Aspects of the four elements of the work—title, Letter to Peter, list of headings,
and the divisions within the treatise—have many variations from the earliest
testimonies to the work and within the manuscript traditions. The division of
works into chapters, the use of chapter titles, the development of a table of
contents, and other similar matters were unfortunately not of much interest to
previous generations of editors. These ‘paratexts’ have, however, garnered more
interest in recent decades and are important, for they have much to offer us in our
understanding of the work itself and the history of its reception.³⁹
The earliest witness to Gregory’s treatise, writing only a century and a half after
Gregory himself, is Dionysius Exiguus (c.470–540) in his letter to Eugippus
which accompanied his translation of this treatise of Gregory. In the letter he
refers to the work as De conditione hominis and mentions that it is divided
into 31 chapters (PL 67, 345c). However, the manuscripts of his translation
used by Forbes (for the work has yet to be fully edited) have the title De
imagine id est de hominis conditione as well as De conditione hominis; the
manuscripts consistently divide the work into 31 chapters, but differ as to whether

³⁹ Most of the recent work has concentrated on the Latin tradition. See J.-C. Fredouille, Marie-
Odile Goulet-Cazé, Philippe Hoffmann, and Pierre Petitmengin, Titres et articulation du texte dans
les ouvrages antiques: Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly, 13–15 décembre 1994, CÉA, SA
152 (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1997); Bianca-Jeanette Schröder, Titel und Text: Zur
Entwicklung lateinischer Gedichtüberschriften. Mit Untersuchungen zu lateinischen Buchtiteln,
Inhaltsverzeichnissen und anderen Gliederungsmitteln (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999); Andrew
M. Riggsby, ‘Guides to the Wor(l)d’, in Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh, eds., Ordering
Knowledge in the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 88–107; Laura
Jansen, The Roman Paratext: Frame, Texts, Readers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014);
Joseph A. Howley, ‘Tables of Contents’, in Dennis Duncan and Adam Smith, Book Parts (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019), 67–79; Nicholas Dames, ‘Chapter Heads’, in Duncan and Smith,
Book Parts, 153–64; and for the Greek tradition, Patrick Andrist, ‘Towards a Definition of Paratexts
and Paratextuality: The Case of Ancient Greek Manuscripts’, in Liv Ingeborg Lied and Marilena
Maniaci, eds., Bible as Notepad: Tracing Annotations and Annotation Practices in Late Antique and
Medieval Biblical Manuscripts, Manuscripta Biblica 3 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2018), 130–50; Jeremiah
Coogan, ‘Transforming Textuality: Porphyry, Eusebius, and Late Ancient Tables of Contents’, SLA
5.1 (2021), 6–27. See also the fascinating series of postings on this topic by Roger Pearse over the last
decade at www.roger-pearse.com (accessed 7 March 2020), tagged ‘chapter headings’. For a critical
study of the importance of such phenomena, see Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of
Interpretation, trans. Jane E. Lewin, Literature, Culture, Theory 20 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997 [French edn. 1987]).
20 

or not they have a list of headings following the Letter to Peter.⁴⁰ Three centuries
later, Eriugena, who also translated the work, refers to it in his Periphyseon as
Gregory’s Sermo de imagine; his translation seems to have contained 31 chapters
and lacks a list of headings.⁴¹ In the case of both Dionysius and Eriugena, however,
their rendering of Gregory’s Letter to Peter concludes with the sentence introdu-
cing a list of headings. Regarding translations, it should be noted that Vat. sir. 106,
dated to approximately 700 , has the title On the Formation [twqn’] of the
Human Being and is divided into 31 chapters, with a list of headings following the
Letter to Peter. We will return to this important manuscript later.
Our earliest reference to the work in Greek is provided by Justinian in his
Epistle to Mennas (543 ), where he refers to it as ἡ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον πραγματεία,
and quotes two passages from chapter 28, without providing a chapter number.⁴²
The 7th–8th-century text known as Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi gives
three passages from this work of Gregory, together with chapter numbers. The
first, from chapter 4, refers to the work as ἡ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωρία. For the
second and third quotations, Diekamp gives the title as ἡ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον
κατασκευή, although the 15th-century manuscript Vaticanus gr. 1102 gives it as
ἡ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι κατ᾽ εἰκόνα; these two passages are said to have come from
chapter ι& (16, which is chapter 15 in this edition), indicating that the manuscripts
used were divided into 31 chapters.⁴³ In the 8th century, John of Damascus,
despite quoting from it in his Apology for the Holy Icons, refers to it as περὶ
κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου.⁴⁴ John also provides references to the chapter number
from which he quotes, although as these are from chapters 4 to 5, it is not possible
to determine whether his text had 30 or 31 chapters. The Sacra Parallela, attrib-
uted to John of Damascus, also has a number of passages from Gregory’s work,
referring to it as ἡ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωρίας. Suidas also refers to this work of
Gregory as τεῦχος θαυμάσιον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν. As noted earlier,
the first printed edition of the work, that of the Aldus Press (1536), entitled the

⁴⁰ Oxford, Laud Misc. 123 (12th century), on 94r has the title De imagine id est de hominis conditione
and is divided into 31 chapters, with no list of chapters; Oxford Ms Bodl. 238 (14th century), on 285v
has the title De conditione hominis, and is also divided into 31 chapters, but has a list of headings
different to any other mss.
⁴¹ John Scottus Eriugena, Periphyseon (De divisione naturae), ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores
Latini Hiberniae, 7, 9, 11, 13 (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Study, 1999 [1968], 2017 [1972],
2005 [1981], 2009 [1995]): vol. 3: 735d5 (p. 292), 737a17 (p. 294); vol. 4: 758c1 (p. 40), 788a2 (p. 110),
788b2 (p. 112), 793c1 (p. 124). The only complete manuscript of Eriugena’s translation (Bamberg,
Staatsbibliothek Patr. 78) has for the title: Sermo Gregorii Episcopi Nysae de <Imagine> in ea quae
relicta sunt in Examero a beato Basilio suo fratre; the ms has a space where Mandolino has supplied
imagine. A number of the later chapters numbers are missing (e.g. 24–6, 30); however, as chapter 12
(in the division into 30 chapters) is divided into two, it seems certain that Eriugena’s translation
originally contained 31 chapters, as does Q, which Tommasi identifies as having the greatest affinity
with his translation, though Q also has a list of headings.
⁴² Ed. Eduard Schwartz, ACO 3, 199.21–200.37.
⁴³ Ed. Franz Diekamp, rev. B. Phanourgakis and E. Chrysos (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981), 122,
140–1.
⁴⁴ Ed. Kotter, 3, 153.3–11, 154.3–9.
  , ,   21

treatise Βίβλος περὶ ἄνθρωπον. This edition is divided into 30 chapters (though
they are not numbered), and it places the list of headings at the end of the
work, after the colophon, rather than after the Letter to Peter. It was only with
Löwenklau’s edition (1567) that it became customary to refer to the work as περὶ
κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου—De hominis opificio—and to present it in 30 chapters with
a list of headings following the Letter to Peter, although the list was then omitted
in both the editio Morelliana and the PG, but included by Forbes.
While we await a full study of the Greek manuscript tradition, from those
inspected for this volume and the information regarding those manuscripts
belonging to the Hexaemeron tradition given by de Mendieta and Rudberg, it is
clear that the manuscripts are themselves divided regarding the title and the
number of chapters (and that this difference cuts across the two main manuscript
groups). The earliest manuscripts which have a title for this work give it as περὶ
εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου: that is, from the 9th to 10th centuries, Vat. grec 413, which lacks
the Letter to Peter but does have a list of 31 headings between the initial title and
chapter 1;⁴⁵ and, from the 10th to 11th centuries, Bodl. Barocci grec 228, again with
31 chapters but also supplying a list of headings. From the 11th to 16th centuries,
there are four other manuscripts (one of which is incomplete) which use περὶ
εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου as the title, each with 31 chapters and two with a list of
headings.⁴⁶
The title θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου is first found in the explicit of
two 10th-century manuscripts, neither of which have an initial title to the treatise,
but each of which have 30 chapters and a list of headings: Bodl. Barocci grec 144,
and Paris, BNF, grec 476.⁴⁷ The earliest manuscript with 31 chapters which uses
the designation θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, although again only in
the explicit (for it has as the title περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου), is Bodleian Barocci grec
228 from the 10th to 11th centuries. Also from the same period, Paris, BNF,
Coislin 228 uses an abbreviated form of this designation, though as a concluding
phrase in the heading to the Letter to Peter it has: Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ
ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος νύσης εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. The first clear example of a

⁴⁵ According to de Mendieta and Rudberg, Basile de Césarée, 119, Vat. grec 413 (which is not online)
is missing the Letter to Peter, but has the list of 31 headings (374v–375v), and has the treatise under the
title περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου (375v–413r); folios 1–2 and 412–13 of this ms were replaced in the 16th
century.
⁴⁶ Athos, Lavra, grec B.77 (11th century), with no list of headings; Munich, BSB, Cod. graec. 192
(14th century) and Vienna, ÖNB, theol. gr. 113 (15th century), both with a list of headings; and the
incomplete 16th-century Munich, BSB, Cod. graec. 206, which, as chapter 18/19 is designated as 19,
would also have been in 31 chapters. It is interesting to note that this is also the title given in the
Slavonic translation (О Образѣ Чловѣка); see Sels, Gregory of Nyssa.
⁴⁷ Vat. grec 2053 (9th–10th centuries) is also divided into 30 chapters but has no initial title; after the
Letter to Peter it has the heading Τοῦ ὁσίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου Νύσης. σύνταξις κεφαλαίων λ, but
then goes straight to chapter 1, without providing a list of headings. Likewise Vat. grec 2066 (9th–10th
centuries), without an initial title, is also divided into 30 chapters and provides a list of headings
following the Letter to Peter. The remaining ms from this period, Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San
Marco, grec 58, has 31 chapters and has a different title, mentioned below.
22 

manuscript with 31 chapters, a list of headings, and the title θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν, given after the Letter to Peter and before the list of
headings, is the 12th-century Moscow, Musée historique, grec 81 Vladimir.⁴⁸
Besides the five manuscripts mentioned here, 20 other manuscripts use this title,
variously having either 30 or 31 chapters (see Appendix).
It should also be noted that other manuscripts refer to Gregory’s work in yet
other ways. Some present the work simply as a completion of the Hexaemeron of
Basil.⁴⁹ The 12th-century manuscript Paris, BN, grec 479 has the title εἰς τὸν
ἄνθρωπον θεωρία, which is closest to that used in the Aldus edition (Βίβλος περὶ
ἀνθρώπου): it, however, is divided into 31 chapters and includes a list of headings.
Several manuscripts use other words than κατασκευή: διάπλασις,⁵⁰ κτίσις,⁵¹ or
even just ἡ γένεσις.⁵² Finally, to conclude this survey, two outliers should be noted.
First, the 15th-century manuscript Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, grec 668 (Q. 14
sup.) which contains 32 chapters. Second, the 14th-century ms of English prov-
enance, Oxford, Ms Bodl. 238, which has a list of headings not found in any other
manuscript, the origin of which is totally obscure.⁵³
Regarding the title of the treatise, then, although John of Damascus refers to it
as περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου, no manuscript examined, or noted by Mendieta
and Rudberg, has these words; rather the title given in the majority of manuscripts
is θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. It is possible that the preposition εἰς
together with the word θεωρία is derived from the Letter to Peter, where Gregory
describes his task as completing what is lacking in Basil’s Hexaemeron (Ep. Pet. 2:
Εἰ γὰρ λειπούσης τῇ Ἑξαημέρῷ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωρίας . . .), and then
continues by saying that ‘our effort would be convicted of failing its promise, if,

⁴⁸ Pinakes gives this manuscript a date in the first half of the 10th century, but M–R note that while
this is so for folios 2–120, folios 121–235 (Gregory’s treatise is 189r–234r) date to the 12th century.
⁴⁹ Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San Marco, grec 58 (10th century), εἰς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν τῶν
προκειμένων τῆς ἐξαημέρου. London, British Library, Royal MS 16 D I (13th century) has two headings
on 117v: Ἐπιστολὴ Γργορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης πρὸς Πέτρον τὸν ἴδιον ἀδελφὸν εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ
ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῷ Βασιλείου. Then, immediately following the first: Τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ
Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκοπος Νύσης προοίμιον τῶν λα κεφαλαίων τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐξαημέρῳ
λεχθέντων τὰ παραλειπόμενα τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου.
⁵⁰ All from the 14th century: Moscow, Musée historique, grec 132 Vladimir, Κεφάλαια τριάκοντα εἰς
τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διάπλασιν. Paris, BN, grec 503, πρόγραμμα εἰς τὴν περὶ διαπλάσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
φιλοσοφίαν ἢ φυσιολογίαν. Paris, BN, grec 940, and grec 777 A, 14th πρόγραμμα εἰς τὴν περὶ διαπλάσεως
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φυσιολογίαν. The use of the word φυσιολογία in these two Paris manuscripts suggests a
connection or derivation from the first chapter title.
⁵¹ Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San Marco, grec 58 (10th century), which gives a list of 31
headings under the title: κεφάλαια ἐμπιλόσοφα περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κτίσεως· καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ
κόσμου δὲ μερικῶς· ἅπερ ἦν λείποντα τῇ ἐξαημέρῳ· ἥν προείρηκεν ὁ μακάριος καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις Βασίλειος.
⁵² Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale, 11.354 (12th century): Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου
ἀρχιεπισκόπου Νύσης ἡ γένεσις. See also Vienna, ÖNB, theol. gr. 222 (14th century): Τοῦ Γρηγορίου
ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης πρὸς πέτρον τὸν ἴδιον ἀδελφὸν εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῷ
Βασιλείου περὶ τῶν προγεγονότων τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως. This title is clearly derivative from
the first chapter title.
⁵³ It should also be noted that ß (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1277) is also
anomalous in that it alone has the list of headings preceding the Letter to Peter.
  , ,   23

when the human being is proposed for contemplation, anything contributing to

the topic were to be omitted’ (Ep. Pet. 3: εἰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προκειμένου τῇ θεωρίᾳ,
παρεθείη τι τῶν συντεινόντων πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν·). It is also possible that the title
περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου, or variations thereon, may in turn derive from
Gregory’s Hexaemeron, written soon after On the Human Image: towards the
end of the Hexaemeron, Gregory refers back to the present treatise, noting that
Basil ‘left aside nothing of the things requiring a contemplation, except the
formation of the human being [πλὴν τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς] which we
laboring over in a particular book before these, sent to your perfection’.⁵⁴ On the
other hand, the title found in the earliest manuscripts, Περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου, and
in the translations of Dionysius and Eriugena, does not appear to be derived from
either the Letter to Peter or Gregory’s Hex., or even from any part of the text of the
treatise itself, but is in fact, as we shall see in Chapter 3, very much the central
theme of the work itself. Moreover as the title θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου is first found in the explicit of a manuscript, in which the title heading
the treatise is Περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου, and following Dionysius (De imagine id est
de hominis conditione), I have adopted as the title of the work: Περὶ εἰκόνος
ἀνθρώπου ἤτοι θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (or in Latin De hominis
imagine, id est contemplatio de hominis conditione, abbreviated to De hom.).
One final problem remains: how best to translate the word κατασκευή?
Dionysius rendered it as conditio, while Löwenklau chose opificium, which,
while not evidenced in any manuscript, has become the standard designation.
As noted above, the term has been rendered variously in modern languages, more
often than not focusing on the idea of making or creating.⁵⁵ The term κατασκευή,
however, has a far wider range of meanings: preparation, construction, fitting-out,
state, condition, constitution, and, in the field of rhetoric, artistic treatment,
elaboration.⁵⁶ Although often read as a treatment on how the human being
came to be made and what happened after the fall, the work is, as we will see,
more concerned with the form and constitution of the human being and how and
why it is that the human being is said to be made in the image and likeness of God
when this is not really self-evident in the present. In this, Gregory’s treatise is
indeed continuous with Basil’s Hexaemeron as understood by Gregory, who
describes Basil as having ‘by his own contemplation made the sublime adornment

⁵⁴ Hex. 77: τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐπεξιέναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἑξαήμερον κοσμογένειαν πεποιημένων μάταιον
ἐνομίσαμεν, τῆς ὑψηλῆς τοῦ διδασκάλου φωνῆς μηδὲν τῶν ζητουμένων εἰς θεωρίαν παραλειπούσης πλὴν
τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς, ἣν ἡμεῖς ἐν ἰδιάζοντι βιβλίῳ πρὸ τούτων πονήσαντες ἀπεστείλαμέν σου τῇ
τελειότητι. Maraval, ‘Chronology of Works’, would place it in the early months of 379, but after the
present treatise which was composed between September 378 and Easter 379.
⁵⁵ The Russian translation by B. Lurie is a case apart: Об устроении человека, which has the sense
of order/ordering or arranging/arrangement or structure. My thanks to John Mikitish for his insights
on this. B. Salmona entitled his Italian translation simply: L’uomo.
⁵⁶ Cf. H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. H. S. Jones with R. McKenzie. 9th
edn. with revised supplement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), s.v. (hereafter, LSJ).
24 

of the universe accessible to many, making the world established by God in true
wisdom known to those who are led, by means of his understanding, to contem-
plation’ (Ep. Pet. 1). To capture both the sense of form/constitution as well as
forming or fashioning, I have chosen the word ‘formation’. As such, the title
I propose for this work is: On the Human Image of God, that is, A Contemplation
on the Formation of the Human Being.

3. Headings and Divisions

Variations regarding an introductory letter and a list of headings also occur in the
manuscript tradition of other works of Gregory.⁵⁷ In his edition of the De
Virginitate (written between 371 and 378), J. P. Cavarnos, principally on the
basis of the 12th-century manuscript Ω (Escorialensis Ω III 14), in which the
text is not divided into chapters and which lacks the introductory letter and list of
headings, hypothesized two different editions of the work from the hand
of Gregory himself: the first being simply the treatise itself and the second that
of the treatise together with the cover letter and list of headings.⁵⁸ Given the fact
that both Ω and another 12th- or 13th-century manuscript, S (Vat. grec 1907),
have an alternative opening to chapter 1, and that S, which has the epistolary
preface and list of headings, also has an apparently redundant heading after the list
and before the title of chapter 1, Cavarnos sees in this heading the original title of
the work and characterizes its opening section as being rather ‘youthfully enthu-
siastic’ and even polemical, having in view Basil of Ancyra, while the second
edition, with its more general prefatory letter, tones down this aspect.
However, as Michel Aubineau points out, the process could equally well have
been the reverse: that the Letter to Peter and its list of headings was dropped at
some point, perhaps as an adaptation for reading in a monastic context.⁵⁹ Given
the importance of such letters in antiquity, as a seal of authenticity, it is much
more likely, Aubineau argues, that it belonged to the first edition of the work.
Moreover, as the epistolary preface to Cavarnos’ ‘second edition’ refers to Basil as
living and a bishop, it cannot have come from a much later date than a postulated
earlier edition.⁶⁰ As such, Aubineau argues that it is more plausible to hold that the

⁵⁷ In his edition of De anima et resurrectione (cf. GNO 3.3, CXLI–CXLIV and 125–36), Spira
provides an appendix giving the 96 argumenta (125–36), which he attributes to the ‘bibliothekarische
Tradition’, noting also that only three mss (dating from the 11th to 14th centuries) have placed the
argumenta numbers in the margins of the text (CXLI).
⁵⁸ See J. P. Cavarnos’ introduction to his edition of De Virg. in GNO 8.1, Opera Ascetica (Leiden:
Brill, 1986), 238–40.
⁵⁹ M. Aubineau, ed. De Virg., SC 119 (Paris: Cerf, 1966), 229–35.
⁶⁰ Following Jaeger (Two Rediscovered Works), Aubineau also points to the idea that the ‘Great
Letter’ of Macarius was a reworking of Gregory’s De instituto Christiano, a position that has been
abandoned since Reinhart Staats, Gregor von Nyssa und die Messalianer: Die Frage der Priorität zweier
altkirchlicher Schriften, PTS 8 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968).
  , ,   25

introductory letter is original to the work, written in 371 at the urging of his
brother, newly made a bishop and responsible for the ascetics living in Pontus and
Cappadocia; then, as the work was recopied in this monastic milieu, various
modifications were introduced, resulting in a ‘second edition’, independent of
Gregory himself, and then at a later point (but before the Syriac translation was
made in the 6th century) summaries were formulated, often based upon elements
within the text, and written in the margins as a guide for the reader, and only later
were these utilized to divide the treatise itself up into ‘chapters’.⁶¹
Another interesting point of comparison is Gregory’s Contra Eunomium, the
first two books of which were written in 17 days in 380 and the third between 381
and 383. As Matthieu Cassin has pointed out, while each book opens with an
exordium, the editions of the work, including the ground-breaking edition of
Jaeger, do not include any general prefatory letter: the work is presented as
opening with a list of the headings of the three books, despite the fact that
‘[a]lmost all the manuscripts put the two letters just before the list of headings
or before the first book Contra Eunomium’.⁶² However, in this case it seems that,
although these two letters survive independently of the Contra Eunomium in a
single manuscript, they were only included in the manuscripts of the Contra
Eunomium, as a preface, as late as the 11th century.⁶³ Moreover, these letters,
from Gregory to Peter (Ep. 29) and Peter’s reply (Ep. 30), are highly specific:
Gregory wrote to his brother asking his advice about the wisdom of releasing his
work against Eunomius to a general readership (Ep. 29.2–6). This letter is clearly
not meant as a general preface to the work itself, although as Cassin notes, it has
many fascinating things to say about how Gregory understood his own work.
Moreover, building upon the work of J. A. Röder, Cassin argues that the headings
of the first book go back to Gregory himself and their positioning within the
treatise as chapter divisions goes back to at least the 6th century.⁶⁴ So, in this case,
we have an example of a work by Gregory that does not include a general prefatory
address or letter, but does have a list of headings, going back to Gregory himself,
prefacing the work, which are then positioned within the treatise itself as headings

⁶¹ Aubineau, ed. De Virg., 235–8.

⁶² Matthieu Cassin, ‘Text and Context: The Importance of Scholarly Reading: Gregory of Nyssa,
“Contra Eunomium” ’, in Scot Douglass and Morwenna Ludlow, Reading the Church Fathers (London:
T&T Clark, 2011), 109–31, 161–5, at 113.
⁶³ Cf. G. Pasquali, Gregorii Nysseni Epistulae, GNO 8.2, 2nd edn. (Leiden: Brill, 1998), IX, and Anna
M. Silvas, Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters. Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Suppl. VC 83
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 206–10.
⁶⁴ For the headings going back to Gregory himself see J. A. Röder, Gregor von Nyssa, Contre
Eunomium I, 1–146, eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert, Patrologia 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter
Lang, 1993), 73–4; for further analysis of the chapter divisions of Contra Eunomium see Matthieu
Cassin, L’écriture de la polémique à la fin du IV e siècle: Gregoire de Nysse, Contra Eunome III (PhD
thesis; Paris: Sorbonne, 2009), vol. 1, 135–7 and ‘Contra Eunome III: une introduction’, in Johan
Leemans and Matthieu Cassin, eds., Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III. An English Translation
with Commentary and Supporting Studies, Suppl. VC 124 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 3–33, esp. 12–18.
26 

a few centuries later. It should also be noted that there are other works of Gregory
that include an introduction addressed to a person, but they do not include lists of
headings.⁶⁵
Returning to our treatise, we have seen that two manuscripts do not contain the
Letter to Peter: the 9th–10th-century Vat. grec 413 and the 14th-century Vienna,
ÖNB theol. graec. 168, the former having a list of headings, the latter lacking also
the list. However, as the treatise presented in both is divided into chapters (the
former with 31, the latter with 30), if we (safely) assume that an initial list of
headings predates their inclusion within the text of the treatise itself as chapter
headings, we can infer that the prototype for Vienna, ÖNB theol. graec. 168 would
originally also have had a list of headings. In the case of the two other manuscripts
that do not have the list of headings, both do, nevertheless, indicate a list: Vat. grec
2053 has the words, set in an ornate box, σύνταξις κεφαλαίων λ immediately after
the Letter to Peter and before chapter 1, and BL Royal 16 D I includes the Letter to
Peter which concludes with the words announcing such a list of headings. We can
thus conclude that a list of headings following the Letter to Peter belonged to their
prototypes but was omitted by their scribes for whatever reason.
If we accept Aubineau’s point about the importance in antiquity of a cover
letter as a ‘seal of authenticity’, and that the absence of the Letter to Peter or a list
of headings in the manuscripts noted above is the result of their falling out or
failing to be copied, then we can also conclude that the Letter to Peter was intended
as the original preface to the treatise, as it indeed states. Moreover, the fact that we
have no examples of the treatise not divided into chapters, would suggest that not
only was the letter original and integral to the treatise, but so too was the list
of headings. Aubineau, on the basis of earlier studies of chapter divisions and
headings, assumed that the development of this phenomenon was later than
Gregory himself. However, that earlier authors did indeed preface their work with
an introduction (usually in the form of a letter) followed by a list of headings is
evidenced by several texts from the 1st to 2nd centuries , as we will see later.
Lists of headings are also found in manuscripts of earlier Patristic works, though not
in connection with an introductory address by the author himself; the nearest
comparable example we have might be Origen’s Preface to his On First Principles,
where he outlines the topics he will treat and which he does thereafter follow.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Cf. To Peter, a ‘man of God’, Hex. (early 379 ) and Inscr. (c.376–8 ), and to Olympias, Cant.
(post 391 ).
⁶⁶ For Irenaeus, see the introductions to the SC vols (for Haer. 1, SC 263, 30–41; for Haer. 2, SC 293,
51–80; for Haer. 3, SC 210, 47–8; for Haer. 4, SC 100, 42–3, 186–91). Many of Eusebius’s works also
include such lists: Praep. ev., Dem. ev., Marc., Eccl. theol., Mens., and Eccl. hist.; for the latter see Eduard
Schwartz, GCS 9.3 (1909), chap. 4, ‘Überschriften und Kephalaia’, pp. CXLVII–CLII. For Eusebius’s
canon tables for the Gospels, see Matthew R. Crawford, The Eusebian Canon Tables: Ordering Textual
Knowledge in Late Antiquity, OECS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) and Jeremiah Coogan,
Eusebius the Evangelist OECS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022). For chapters in Origen, see
John Behr, Origen: On First Principles, OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xxxvi–xxxviii.
  , ,   27

It is thus not impossible, and indeed quite likely, that Gregory himself appended to
his introductory letter a list of topics that he discussed in the treatise.
In all our Greek and Latin manuscripts of the treatise, including Ms Bodl. 238
which differs from every other manuscript in the headings it gives, the headings
given in the list correspond to the headings given in the treatise itself, where
almost invariably they have a number. However, in the earliest manuscript we
have, Vat. sir. 106, 41r–74v, dating to around 700 , we have a very different
pattern.⁶⁷ Here, following the Letter to Peter, we have a list of 31 headings
preceded by the word rš’ (certainly translating κεφάλαιος) and the number (41v–
42r); these correspond somewhat to those of the Greek text.⁶⁸ Following this list,
the title of the treatise is restated and chapter 1 then begins (on 42r, right column),
without any numeration or heading. What we have as chapter 2 in the Greek and
Latin manuscript traditions begins (on 43r, left column) with no break, heading,
enlarged capital or other manner of signifying a transition, but as a direct
continuation of chapter 1. Chapter 3, however, is marked by the words
‘chapter three’ (on 44r right column), but with no repetition of the heading
given in the list or any other heading. Over the course of the rest of the treatise,
only 18 other ‘chapters’ are out marked in the same way (missing are: 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
17, 24, 25, 27–31). That the manuscript has the word ‘chapter’ and ‘number’
within the body of the treatise would seem to indicate that, while accepting that
the list of headings was composed by Gregory himself, concluding his letter to his
brother, they were not used by Gregory as dividing marks within the treatise itself.
It is also likely that numbers were added to the list at the point when scribes began
to identify points in the treatise correlating to the topics listed earlier. Either the
scribe of Vat. sir. 106 was careless in transcribing each of these numbered headings
or perhaps this manuscript might even mark a stage at which the points of
correlation had not yet been fully established. Once these numbers were in the
text, it is but a small step to repeat the words given in the list at the beginning, but
now as ‘headings’ within the treatise itself.
Whatever the actual history behind this development is, one point should be
clearly borne in mind: these κεφαλαία are not ‘chapters’ in the modern sense and
the headings are not chapter titles. The earliest examples we have of such lists are
those of Scribonius Largus, Columella, Pliny the Elder, and Aulus Gellius, and
each of them introduces the list with an explanatory note, thereby indicating the

⁶⁷ The manuscript is available online at the Digital Vatican Library (https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_

Vat.sir.106, accessed 3 June 2021): 41r Title and Ep. to Peter; 41v–42r list of headings; 42v restated title;
42 –74r text; 74r explicit. Cf. S. E. Assemanus and J. S. Assemanus, Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae:
v

Codicum manuscriptorum catalogus, in tres partes distributus (Rome: 1759; reprinted Paris: Libraire
Orientale et Américaine, 1926), Partis primae, tomus tertius, 42–3.
⁶⁸ The first three headings of the list are: 1, ‘Concerning the making of the world and the correct
account of those things prior to the creation of the human being’; 2, ‘Concerning what creatures were
created following the human being’, clearly thinking of Gen. 2 rather than 1; 3, ‘Concerning the fact
that the substance and formation [twqn’] of the human being was better than all creatures’.
28 

relative novelty of the undertaking and also its purpose. Pliny concludes the letter
to Titus prefacing his Natural History by stating that ‘I have appended to this letter
what is contained in each of the books’ (quid singulis contineretur libris huic
epistulae subiunxi), so that the recipient and others ‘will not need to read right
through them either, but only look for the particular point that each of them wants
and will know where to find it. This Valerius Soranus did before me, in our
literature, in the books he entitled ἐποπτίδων.’⁶⁹ The primary purpose of these
lists, then, is indexical, enabling the locating of specific material and the sequence
of topics treated rather than being indicative of the structure of the treatment.⁷⁰ In
reverse, however, the list enables the segmentation of the text, so that it can be
viewed as a series of separate, discrete even, topics, a process which continues with
the headings being transcribed into the text itself as chapter titles: as Dames notes,
commenting on Pliny’s work, ‘a trajectory seems dimly evident, in which a table
becomes chapterized, finding its way into the text itself and thus becoming a kind
of segmentation rather than an index’.⁷¹
Gregory, however, introduces his list by stating a different purpose:

For the sake of clarity, I think it well to set out the treatise [τὸν λόγον] for you by
headings [ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων], that you may be able to know in brief the force of each
of the arguments [τῶν καθέκαστον ἐπιχειρημάτων . . . τὴν δύναμιν] of the whole
work [πάσης τῆς πραγματείας]. (Ep. Pet. 3)

The language here echoes that of Porphyry’s account of his editorial work on
Plotinus’ Enneads, when he states that for all the books except On Beauty he has
composed not only τὰ κεφάλαια, translated in Gerson’s edition as ‘key-point
summaries’ but also the ἐπιχειρήματα, ‘lines of argument’.⁷² The ‘headings’
given by Gregory are clearly not meant as a table of contents which would enable
the reader to jump to a discrete topic within a segmented or ‘chapterized’ text.
Neither do they function to indicate of the structure of the treatise as a whole; with
a few exceptions, when integrated into the body of the text they do not neatly
correspond to a division within the text, as might be indicated by a summary of
what has been discussed or the announcement of a new topic, with a reflection on
how it fits into the structure of the treatise as a whole. Rather, Gregory says, the

⁶⁹ Pliny, Nat. His. Pref. 33; ed. and trans. H. Rackham, LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967). Cf. Riggsby, ‘Guides to the Wor(l)d’, 90–1, for the other statements. See also Aude Doody, Pliny’s
Encyclopedia: The Reception of the Natural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
92–131.
⁷⁰ Cf. Howley, ‘Tables of Contents’, 68; Dames, ‘Chapter Heads’, 154–7.
⁷¹ Dames, ‘Chapter Heads’, 157, italics original.
⁷² Porphyry, Vita Plot. 26; ed. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, Oxford Classical Texts
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., Plotinus: The Enneads (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018). On Porphyry’s editorial work in arranging the text, see Jeremiah
Coogan, ‘Transforming Textuality’.
  , ,   29

purpose of these ‘headings’ is that the reader might know ‘the force of each
argument’.
As such, the items in the list provided by Gregory take on a variety of forms,
beyond the usual ‘about’ (περὶ) or ‘that’ (ὅτι) statements. Some are introduced
with ‘why’ (διὰ τί), others are designated as ‘an examination’ (ἐξέτασις), and
others again are addressed to particular interlocutors and their own claims
(πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας). Nicholas Dames draws attention to a similar phenomenon
in the Discourses of Epictetus, as edited by his disciple Arrian, and in particular the
way in which Arrian has applied Epictetus’ understanding of ‘preconceptions’ to
the headings he introduces. As Dames puts it, Arrian’s headings ‘seem in fact to be
a series of experiments on the relation between title and unity, or initial perception
and later understanding. . . . Arrian’s seemingly inapposite heads could be thought
of as provoking a constant testing or evaluation.’⁷³ Gregory, who at a key moment
in his treatise tells us that he is writing in the form of an exercise for the reader (De
hom. 15), seems to be doing the same with some of his headings. For instance, the
heading for De hom. 18 asserts ‘That our irrational passions have their starting-
point from kinship with the irrational nature’. However, as he makes clear in the
ensuing discussion, while irrational passions are indeed occasioned from such
kinship, the real problem is not the shared animality but ‘the evil husbandry of the
intellect’ (De hom. 18.4).
Two particular headings, however, deserve closer attention. Chapter 16 has the
only heading beginning with the word θεωρία—‘A contemplation of the divine
word which says, “Let us make the human being in accordance with our image
and likeness”; in which is examined what the definition of the image is, and how
the passible and mortal is liken to the blessed and impassible, and how the male
and female are in the image, these not being in the Prototype.’ The words ‘in
which it is examined . . .’ are clearly a summary of what follows, suggesting that
the previous words have more status as an actual ‘title’, marking a θεωρία.⁷⁴ And
then again, the heading for chapter 30 is also designated as a θεωρία: ‘A brief, more
medical contemplation regarding the formation of our body’.
Chapter 16 clearly constitutes a new beginning in Gregory’s treatise: he expli-
citly announces a new beginning: ‘Let us now take up again [ἐπαναλάβωμεν
πάλιν] the divine saying, “Let us make the human being in accordance with our
image and likeness”.’ It is possible that this heading might indicate a structure of
the treatise similar to that of De Vita Moysis (written mid-380s to c.392) which
(at least in one manuscript) has a twofold title (περὶ ἀρετῆς ἤτοι εἰς τὸν βίον
Μωϋσέως) and consists of two λόγοι, the second of which is described as a

⁷³ Dames, ‘Chapter Heads’, 159–60.

⁷⁴ A similar consideration might explain how chapter 12 came to be divided into two in those
manuscripts that have 31 chapters, for those manuscripts which do so, also divide the heading of
chapter 12 as well, with what now becomes chapter 13 beginning with the word θεώρημα.
30 

θεωρία.⁷⁵ Towards the end of that Preface, Gregory describes his task as being
twofold: ‘Let Moses then be proposed as our example in life, first going
through his life as we have learned it from the divine Scripture, then we
shall seek out the meaning corresponding to the history, useful as providing
suggestions for virtue, through which we will come to know the perfect life for
human beings.’⁷⁶ The pattern of narrative followed by contemplation, how-
ever, does not really adequately describe the distinction between De hom. 1–15
and 16 onwards.
An alternative model is Plato’s Timaeus. The proposed subject of Timaeus’
great speech is ‘to speak beginning from the coming-to-be of the world and end
with the nature of human beings’.⁷⁷ This is, of course, directly the theme of
Gregory’s own work. Moreover, the two chapters, 16 and 30, of Gregory’s treatise
designated as θεωρίαι correspond, as we will see more fully in the following
chapters, to the major divisions within Timaeus’ speech. The first part of
Timaeus’ speech gives an account of ‘the things crafted by Intellect’ (Tim. 47e7),
though with several detours and anticipations of points made later; the first 15
chapters of Gregory’s treatise gives a beautiful description of the cosmos and the
human being as the image of God, again with various detours. Halfway through
his speech, Timaeus proposes to ‘go back once again to the beginning and start my
inquiry from there’, to consider further dimensions, ‘necessity’ and ‘the straying
cause’, which were not directly treated, though intimated, in the first part of his
speech (Tim. 47e3–48b2); in a similar way Gregory, in De hom. 16, explicitly
returns to his own starting point, Genesis 1:27, to consider thereafter further
dimensions implicit in that scriptural verse not directly treated, though also
intimated, in De hom. 1–15, ones moreover which play upon the errant ways of
human beings. The third part of Timaeus’ speech, in which he says he will bring
together the first two parts and so put a ‘head’ on his account (Tim. 69a8–b2), is an
extensive psychophysical account of the human being; likewise Gregory’s final
lengthy chapter (De hom. 30), offers a medical account of the formation and actual
coming into being of the human being. The structural parallels with the Timaeus
seem certain. Within a year or two of writing On the Human Image, Gregory
wrote On the Soul and Resurrection, which is clearly modelled on Plato’s Phaedo; it

⁷⁵ Edited by H. Musurillo, GNO 7.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1991). Two of the manuscripts used indicate in
their titles that it was addressed to either Peter or Olympias. For the heading of the second part of the
treatise, two of the five manuscripts noted in the edition use the word θεωρία: θεωρία τῆς ἐκτεθείσης
ἱστορίας and θεωρία εἰς τὸν τοῦ Μωϋσέως βίον. Musurillo settles for simply: θεωρία. The other three
manuscripts at this point have headings describing what follows as the second λόγος on virtue.
⁷⁶ Vit. Mos. pp. 6.25–7.3. It should be noted that Musurillo’s edition does not mark out the
opening paragraphs as a ‘preface’; the critical apparatus indicates that it is preserved in various
manuscripts as addressed to Olympias or Peter; most titles noted there have a similar twofold pattern
to the one given above.
⁷⁷ Plato, Timaeus, 27a5–6; ed. J. Burnet, Oxford Classical Texts, Platonis Opera 4 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1902); trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), occasionally modified.
  , ,   31

is likely, then, that in On the Human Image of God, Gregory had his eye towards
the Timaeus.
We will turn to Gregory’s treatise itself in Chapter 3. For now, I would simply
note that although I have retained the headings for the different parts of the work,
it should be borne in mind that these are not ‘chapter titles’ for discrete topics. But
before we turn to Gregory’s On the Human Image of God, we should explore the
philosophical and theological background he inherited and built upon, for although
he presents this work to Peter as the completion of Basil’s Hexaemeron, it is, as we
will see, far more complex.
 Chapter 2
Philosophical and Theological
Background

1. Anaxagoras

Although Socrates ultimately found his account lacking, and Aristotle treated him
rather dismissively, it was Anaxagoras (sixth century ), as Socrates reports,
who was the first to argue ‘that it is intellect [νοῦς] that arranges and causes all
things’, and, according to Simplicius, he also taught that creation was ‘two-fold’.¹
There are many obscurities and contentious points of interpretation regarding
Anaxagoras’ teaching, but there are also several points of importance for under-
standing the background of Gregory’s work. Although the fragments of
Anaxagoras’ writings are primarily preserved in the writings of Simplicius in the
sixth century , extracting these fragments from that context and attempting to
make sense of them in terms of Aristotle’s presentation of Anaxagoras leads to
numerous problems and inconsistencies; indeed, Simplicius occasionally points
out that Aristotle had misunderstood or misrepresented Anaxagoras. Simplicius,
of course, was writing in a very different context than either Anaxagoras or
Aristotle, with the whole history of Neoplatonism behind him. But this doesn’t
necessarily mean that he has turned a Presocratic into a Neoplatonist; his com-
mentary on Aristotle is a fair account of the Stagirite, and we have no reason to
doubt that Simplicius is equally faithful in his representation of Anaxagoras whose
writings he knew. It is just as likely, as Tzamalikos argues, that ‘some
Neoplatonists saw in Anaxagoras the real source of a consistent solution to the
ancient problem of how exactly did the material universe come to be from
immaterial principles’.²

¹ Plato, Phaedo 96c; text and ET Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library, Plato 1 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1914). For a brief but lucid account of Anaxagoras, see David Sedley,
Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 8–30, and
for a recent massive (almost 1800-page) account arguing that Anaxagoras was the genius behind later
developments in philosophy, culminating in Origen and through him the Neoplatonists, see Panayiotis
Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, Origen, and Neoplatonism: The Legacy of Anaxagoras to Classical and Late
Antiquity, Arbeiten zur Kirchenggeschichte 128, 2 vols (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), especially, for the
topic treated here, Chapter 4, ‘A Two-Fold Creation’. The best treatment of Anaxagoras is Anna
Marmodoro, Everything in Everything: Anaxagoras’ Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017).
² Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, 58.
34 

Anaxagoras opened his book On Nature with the words: ‘All things were
together’ (ἧν ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα).³ The fullest passage preserved from
Anaxagoras’ own writings (though in fact compiled from different parts of
Simplicius’ work) describes the cosmogenic activity of intellect [νοῦς] in terms
echoed by Gregory in the opening chapter of his On the Human Image, and
deserves to be quoted in full.

The other things possess a portion of every thing, but intellect is unlimited and
master of itself, it has not been mixed with any thing, but is the only one to be
itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been mixed with some other
thing, it would participate in all things, if it had been mixed with any; for in every
thing is present a part of every thing, as I said earlier. And the things that would
be mixed with it would prevent it from having control over any thing in the same
way as it does being alone by itself. For it is at the same time both the thinnest of
all things, and the purest, and in particular it retains the full decision [γνώμην or
‘understanding’] concerning every thing and possesses the greatest power; and of
the things that have life [ψυχὴν], whether they are larger or smaller, of these
intellect is master; and intellect has been master of the whole rotation, so that
there would be rotation at the beginning [καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης
νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὤστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχὴν]. And the rotation began at first
from the small, then it rotates more broadly, and it will continue to become even
broader. And the things that mix as well as those that are detached and separate
out—all these intellect decided [ἔγνω or ‘knew’]. And as things were going to be,
and as all things were that now are not, and as all things are now, and as they will
be, intellect separated and ordered them all, as well as this rotation, which is
being performed now by the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon, the air, and the
aether, which are separating out. And the rotation itself caused the detachment
[ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὕτη ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι]. And from the rarefied the dense
separates out, from the cold the warm, from the dark the bright, and from the
moist the dry. Numerous are the parts of numerous things; yet nothing is
completely detached or separates out from one another, except intellect. But all
intellect is similar, the larger and the smaller, and nothing else is similar to
anything else, but that of which each thing contains the most, this is what each
thing is and was most manifestly.⁴

³ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 460.26); ET J. O. Urmson, On Aristotle Physics 3, ACA (London:
Bloomsbury, 2013), 79, occasionally modified.
⁴ Herman Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Walther Kranz, 6th edn., 3 vols (Berlin:
Weidmann, 1951–2), B12 (= Simplicius, In Phys., ed. Diels, 164.24–5; 156.13–157.4); text and ET,
André Laks and Glenn W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, vol. 6, LCL 529 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016), modified. I should note that while translators of Anaxagoras almost uniformly
translate νοῦς as ‘mind’, I have chosen ‘intellect’, not to project back to him later developments, but for
consistency across this volume. References to the fragments of the Presocratics will be given by the
Diels-Kranz numeration.
     35

Intellect is thus a distinct cosmogenic force, separate from everything else, and so
able to work upon all things. Unlimited, autonomous, and unmixed with anything
else, it is the active agent in the process of separating, segregating, ordering, and
thus bringing into being, that is, creating.⁵ But what are the things (χρήματα) that
were originally all together? Aristotle, perhaps led by comments that Anaxagoras
makes about nourishment which we will consider momentarily, called these
‘things’ ‘homoeomeries’, referring to ‘elements, such as bone, flesh, and marrow,
and anything else of which the part bears the same name as the whole’.⁶ However,
in the above passage Anaxagoras is clearly speaking about various sets of incor-
poreal powers (cold and hot, moist and dry, etc.).⁷ By rotating or spinning the
unified whole, intellect separates out these powers, so that, as Simplicius reports
Anaxagoras concluding, ‘the dense, <the> wet, the cold, and the dark came
together here, where earth now is, while the rare, the hot, <the bright>, and the
dry retreated to the farther parts of the aether’.⁸ Anaxagoras, as Simplicius rightly
understood, ‘posited as elements the simple qualities, which have the nature of
principles [τὰς ἁπλᾶς καὶ ἀρχοειδεῖς ποιότητας], but not the compounds . . . these
most simple things which have the character of principles are separated off and
other things of a more compound nature are in some cases compacted as
compounds [συμπήγνυσθαι ὡς σύνθετα], in others separated off, as earth’.⁹
Earth, and the other elements, are thus the resultant products of this
segregating-by-spinning activity of intellect; they are compounds compacted
from particular incorporeal powers. However, even when separated in this man-
ner, the various powers are not completely sundered or severed from each other:
never being able to be absolute heat or wetness (for heat could always, in principle,
be hotter), their opposite always remains present, so that as Anaxagoras put it
above, ‘other things [apart from intellect] possess a portion of every thing’.¹⁰
The revolving effected by intellect is one that, according to the above passage
(B12), operates even now and will continue to do so; it began small and increases

⁵ As Tzamalikos (Anaxagoras, 287–8) notes, Simplicius (In Phys., 300.27–30) quotes from
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, to the effect that Aristotle did not
mention Anaxagoras, because even though he posited intellect, he ‘does not make use of this in genesis’
(ἐν τῇ γενέσει), although, Simplicius argues, it is plain that Anaxagoras does, for he says that ‘genesis is
nothing other than separation itself ’ (τὴν γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἔκκρισιν εἶναι φησί).
⁶ Aristotle, Gen. corr. 314a18–21. For Aristotle’s misreading of Anaxagoras, see Sedley, Creationism,
26–30, and Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, 264–5, 272–3.
⁷ That these pairs of opposites (cold/warm, dark/bright, moist/dry) should be designated as ‘powers’
rather than ‘properties’ (the latter being ‘properties’ that inhere in something else) is strongly argued by
Marmodoro, Everything in Everything, 17–24, and passim.
⁸ B15 (Simplicius, In Phys. 1.4; Diels, 179.3–6; ET 79; where it follows the relevant passage from
B12). D–K marked ‘earth’ as an editorial addition; but David Sider, The Fragments of Anaxagoras, 2nd
edn. (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2005), 149, demonstrates that it is unanimously present in the
manuscript tradition, of which only one ms includes a definite article: it is ‘earth’, not ‘the earth’.
⁹ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 178.33–4, 179.6–7; ET 86).
¹⁰ Cf. B8 (Simplicius, In Phys. 1.4; Diels, 176.29 and 175.12–14): ‘The things that are in one world
order have not been separated from one another and they have not been chopped apart by an ax,
neither the hot from the cold, nor the cold from the hot.’
36 

in breadth. The separation of the unified whole into incorporeal powers is not a
primordial creation of a different world or realm, nor in fact is it Anaxagoras’ own
starting point. On Simplicius’ telling, Anaxagoras began from the observation that
bread, when taken as nourishment, becomes separated out into flesh, bones,
sinews, veins, hair, and so on.¹¹ From this, he concluded that ‘everything was
mixed in everything and genesis happens by separation [τὴν γένεσιν κατὰ ἔκκρισιν
γίνεσθαι]’.¹² This genesis, moreover, has an order and a proper time: Anaxagoras
‘saw that everything comes from everything, if not immediately, but in order
[κατὰ τάξιν]’.¹³ And from such observation, according to Simplicius, Anaxagoras
reasoned by analogy to the universe: ‘So just as in each thing there is at some time
a principle to distinguish it, so also in the universe. And just as from each,
something appears to come to be at some time, so, since everything comes to
be, the genesis of all things was separated out from the universal mixture, even if
not all together.’¹⁴ It was this that led Anaxagoras, finally, to postulate a ‘principle
and cause’ superior to bodies, which are moved externally, and he called this
intellect.¹⁵ Finally, intellect, ‘that which was distinguishing the complex and
bringing out in order the distinction from the complexity, had first to contain
itself the existent as a complex and reveal the distinction in itself ’.¹⁶ Thus, intellect
establishes the incorporeal principles that both cause and are embodied in the
material universe we inhabit.
Tracing the order of his thought in this way—from empirical observation to
postulating intellect as the primary cause—as Simplicius suggests, Anaxagoras’
hypothesis about principles becomes clear. Whereas Aristotle had presented the
superficial aspect of his thought (τὸ προφαινόμενον ἱστορεῖν τῆς Ἀναξαγόρου
δόξης), Anaxagoras was, according to Simplicius, in fact pointing to something more:

Anaxagoras, being wise, hinted at a twofold orderly arrangement: the one united
and intelligible, pre-existing, not in time (for that one is not temporal), but in
superiority of being and potentiality; the other distinct from this; and in accord-
ance with this it comes to be through the demiurgic intellect.¹⁷

¹¹ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 460.22–5; ET 79).

¹² Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 460.19–20; ET 79).
¹³ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 460.12–13; ET 79).
¹⁴ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 460.32–5; ET 80): ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἀρχὴ γίνεταί ποτε τῆς
διακρίσεως, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί. καὶ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ἑκάστου φαίνεταί τις γένεσίς ποτε γινομένη, οὕτως
ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντων ἐστὶ γένεσις, ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντων μίγματος ἡ πάντων γένεσις ἐξεκρίθη, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἅμα.
¹⁵ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 460.35–461.1; ET 80).
¹⁶ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 461.1–3; ET 80): ἔδει γὰρ τὸ τὰ συνῃρμένα διακρῖνον καὶ προάγον ἐν
τάξει τὴν διάκρισιν ἀπὸ τῆς συναιρέσεως αὐτὸ συνῃρημένην ἔχον τὴν οὐσίαν πρώτως ἀναφαίνειν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
τὴν διάρκσιν.
¹⁷ Simplicius, In Phys. 3.4 (Diels, 461.11–14; ET 80): ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας σοφὸς ὢν διττὴν ᾐνίττετο τὴν
διακόσμησιν, τὴν μὲν ἡνωμένην καὶ νοητὴν προϋπάρχουσαν οὐ χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ ἔγχρονος ἐκείνη), ἀλλ᾽
ὑπεροχῇ οὐσίας καὶ δυνάμεως, τὴν δὲ διακεκριμένην ἀπὸ ταύτη· καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ὑφίστασθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ
δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ . . .
     37

Simplicius continues by referring back to his first book, where he had given the
evidence from words of Anaxagoras himself, and in which, after quoting the
passage with which we began (B12), he makes a similar observation:

He posits a twofold world-order, one intellectual, the other perceptible, derived

from the former [διττήν τινα διακόσμησιν τὴν μὲν νοεράν, τὴν δὲ αἰσθητὴν ἀπ᾽
ἐκείνης]: that is clear both from what he has previously said and from the
following: ‘Intellect is now too where all the other things are as well [ὁ δὲ νοῦς
καὶ νῦν ἐστιν ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ πάντα], in the surrounding mass, in the things that
have separated more, and in those that are separating’ [=B14].¹⁸ Further, after
[saying] ‘in all the things that are combined there are many things of all kinds
and seeds of all things with all kinds of shapes and colours and flavours, and
human beings have been compacted [ἀνθρώπους γε συμπαγῆναι] and the other
animals which have life [ψυχὴν]’ [=B4, 2–5], he goes on ‘and human beings have
built cities and devised works [ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα], as we do, and they have a
sun and a moon and the rest, as we do, and the earth brings forth for them many
things of all kinds, the most useful of which they collect in their dwellings and
use’ [=B4, 5–10]. That he is hinting at a different world order from ours [ἑτέραν
τινὰ διακόσμησιν παρὰ τὴν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αἰνίττεται] is made clear from the phrase ‘as
we do’, which he uses more than once. That he thinks that it is not a perceptible
world, preceding this world in time, is made clear by [the words] ‘the most useful
of which they collect in their dwellings and use’. For he does not say ‘used’ but
‘use’. But he is not talking about a civilisation similar to ours located elsewhere.¹⁹

The word ‘twofold’ (διττὴν) does not occur in any preserved text of Anaxagoras; it
does, however, describe accurately the distinction between the spinning out of the
incorporeal powers and the compacted resulting products (such as earth). And, if
Simplicius is right in describing the order of Anaxagoras’ train of reflection (from
how, for instance, bread separates out into flesh and bones, to the originary
separation of incorporeal powers, such as hot and cold), this movement is not
two separate stages but two aspects of the same revolving effect of intellect. The
distinction of world orders between the intellectual and the perceptible is not a
matter of chronological priority (he emphasizes the present tense), nor are
they located in different realms. The perceptible is derived from the intellectual,
and the latter is embodied in the former; it is this world order, other than our
empirical one but embodied in it, at which Anaxagoras is ‘hinting’. More will be
said presently about Anaxagoras’ words in the above passage from Simplicius

¹⁸ Following the emendation of B14 proposed by Sider and adopted by Laks and Most.
¹⁹ Simplicius, In Phys. 1.4 (Diels, 157.5–20), adopting D–K’s emendation; Simplicius’ has ὁ δὲ νοῦς
ὅσα ἐστί . . . Trans. Pamela Huby and C. C. W. Taylor, On Aristotle Physics 1.3–4, ACA (London:
Bloomsbury, 2011), 65–6, modified.
38 

(constituting fragment B4). Regarding the first quotation given there (B14),
Tzamalikos argues that the ἵνα clause should be taken purposively rather than
locatively, so that it would read: ‘intellect exists so that others exist too’.²⁰ It is
through the activity of intellect that everything is ordered—that is, brought into
being; everything brought into being is ontologically different from intellect, yet
totally dependent upon intellect, and while intellect is ‘alone all by itself ’ (B12,
above), intellect co-exists with that which it has brought into being, and, indeed, is
embodied in it.
Although, as we have seen, Anaxagoras emphasizes the distinction of intellect
from everything else, he also affirms that intellect masters (κρατεῖ) ‘things that
have life, whether they are larger or smaller’ (B12, above), so that ‘in every thing
there is a portion of every thing except of intellect; but there are things in which
intellect too is present [ἐστιν οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἔνι]’.²¹ As Sedley comments, with
Anaxagoras ‘the reference of the word nous ranges, without clear demarcation,
over both intelligence as a power resident in each of us, whose properties we
therefore know at first hand, and the great cosmic intelligence which created the
world. The ambiguity is permissible because Anaxagoras almost certainly holds
that the great cosmic intelligence, having created the world, apportioned at least
some of itself into individual living beings, ourselves included.’²² As Gregory
would put it later, ‘intellect’ is not simply ‘given’ (ἔδωκεν) by God to human
beings, but rather ‘he gives a share’ (μετέδωκε, De hom. 9.1).
Anaxagoras seemed to Socrates and Plato to have failed in giving an account of
why the result of the activity of intellect is the best structure for the cosmos—that
is, a fully adequate teleology. Sedley, however, argues that there is in fact a
teleological orientation in the subtext of Anaxagoras’ thought: ‘when intelligence
creates worlds, it designedly constructs them so as to be hospitable to agricultural
civilizations like Anaxagoras’s own’.²³ The ‘seeds of all things’, which Anaxagoras
sees implanted in all things should, according to Sedley, be taken simply as
ordinary biological seeds, in accord with his agricultural model. Moreover, trans-
lating B4 (quoted above) as ‘and that human beings, for their part, have cities that
they have populated and farms that they have constructed [ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα],
just as where we are’, Sedley infers that this ‘mirrors accurately enough the
purposive construction of the great cosmic farm by nous’.²⁴ Moreover, as
Aristotle reports that ‘Anaxagoras asserts that it is his possession of hands that
makes the human being the most intelligent of animals’, whereas Aristotle would

²⁰ Cf. Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, 284–5; his full translation of the passage is: ‘Mind, which always is,
certainly is also now, so that all the other things also should exist, namely, in the encompassing
multitude [of the principles] and in the things that have been joined together, and in the things that
have been separated off.’
²¹ B11; Simplicius, In Phys. 1.4 (Diels, 164.23–4; ET 72).
²² Sedley, Creationism, 11. ²³ Sedley, Creationism, 22.
²⁴ Sedley, Creationism, 23; the translation is given on p. 14. Laks and Most translate ἔργα
κατεσκευασμένα similarly: ‘cultivated fields’.
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have it that it is ‘because the human is the most intelligent animal that he has
hands’, it would seem that Anaxagoras shared in the commonplace assumption
that the human being is the culmination or high point of the works of intellect
within nature.²⁵ And so, Sedley concludes, ‘it therefore seems implicit in
Anaxagoras’ text that nous constructs and, as it were, farms worlds primarily
in order to generate human beings. The teleology proves to have an anthropo-
centric bias.’²⁶
There are many themes in what we have seen that recur in Gregory’s treatise On
the Human Image (and elsewhere in his corpus): that incorporeal properties are
combined to make matter; that a process of revolving results in the genesis of
things in an ordered and temporal sequence; that creation is twofold; that intellect
is not simply given to humans, but that they have a share of it; and that humans,
the culmination of this process, have hands as befits an intellectual being.
It is possible that there is a further allusion, through the word used in the
opening sentence of Anaxagoras’ book, a leitmotif of his thought (though
obscured by Aristotle’s ‘homoeomeries’): ‘All things [χρήματα] were together.’
This word also occurs in the LXX text of Prov. 17:6 ‘The faithful one has the whole
world of money [ὅλος ὁ κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων], but the faithless not even a
farthing’, which Origen paraphrases: ‘the faithful, he says, will see the principles
of this world, which he figuratively called the things of the intellect [ὄψεται τοὺς
λόγους τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, οὕστινας χρήματα τροπικῶς τοῦ νοῦ προσηγόρευσεν]’.²⁷
This characteristically Anaxagorean word (along with other points) indicates, for
Tzamalikos, Origen’s ‘discipleship’ to Anaxagoras.²⁸ This verse from Proverbs,
through this ‘Anaxagorean’ interpretation, is thus taken as a metaphor, speaking
of the vision that the faithful one will have: the λόγοι of the world are the χρήματα
of the intellect (that is, for Origen, God), and they are held together in his Logos.
Similarly, for Origen the λόγοι are the words of Scripture, woven together as the
‘garment’ of the Word and as his body (for, according to Origen, ‘the Word always
becomes incarnate in Scripture’); they are a garment, moreover, which appears
one way to those at the foot of the mountain, but brighter than the sun to those
who climb Tabor to see the transfigured Christ in every passage.²⁹ Intriguingly,
Gregory opens his letter to Peter, introducing the work On the Human Image,
using the same word, χρήματα: ‘If it is necessary to honour with rewards of
χρήματα those who excel in virtue, “the whole world of χρήματα” ’ would not
match his brother’s virtue; but as the feast of Pascha requires a gift, Gregory offers
him a treatise (λόγος), ‘woven not without toil from our poor mind’. Moreover, the
very subject of this treatise points to the same indebtedness, for according to

²⁵ Aristotle, Parts of animals, 4.10, 687a8–10; text and ET A. L. Peck and E. S. Forster, Loeb Classical
Library, Aristotle 12 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937). Gregory too employs this
topos in De hom. 8.8.
²⁶ Sedley, Creationism, 24. ²⁷ Origen, Exp. Prov. PG 17, 197c9–11.
²⁸ Tzamalikos, Anaxagoras, 827. ²⁹ Origen, Philoc. 15.19; cf. Com. Matt. 12.38.
40 

Gregory, ‘in accordance with the image, then, the human being came to be, that is,
the universal nature, the godlike thing [ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ καθόλου φύσις, τὸ θεοείκελον
χρῆμα]’ (De hom. 22.4). It is not impossible that he is playing with these words,
and thus intimating his own indebtedness to, and standing within, the same
tradition as had, according to Tzamalikos, Origen.

2. Plato

According to Plato, Socrates was dissatisfied with Anaxagoras’ book because it did
not seem to him to provide what is most needed in an account of cosmology—that
is, how and why Intellect ‘arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is
best [βέλτιστα] for it to be’ (Phaed. 97c4). Apart from a single passage of Diogenes
of Apollonia (late fifth century ), consideration of the goodness of the intellect
and its cosmogenic activity seems not to have been treated by the Presocratics.³⁰
While the good was, of course, central to Socrates’ concerns, and although he gave
a story (μῦθος) at the end of the Phaedo which gestures towards such an account
(Phaed. 107c1–115a8), his wish, even in his last hours, to ‘be a pupil of one who
would teach me of such a cause’ (Phaed. 99c7–8) is only fulfilled, as Sedley points
out, when Plato has him listen to Timaeus, presumably a Pythagorean, so that
Plato thereby ‘legitimates his own lifetime project, portraying his later move into
physics not as a betrayal of Socrates but as the very development that Socrates
himself would above all else have welcomed’.³¹ Without a doubt, Plato’s Timaeus
was the most important text in the ancient world, and beyond, regarding the
universe, the structure of the cosmos, and the human being within it, the nature of
the soul, and providence. There are, of course, many difficult points of interpret-
ation regarding this work, some of which have been debated from the earliest
times onwards, such as the status of the ‘Craftsman’ or ‘Demiurge’ (a ‘creator god’
or a mythical figure personifying divine reason within creation working towards
good ends?) and the account of time (did the world come to be in time or time
with the creation of the world?), or, in more recent times, the setting of Timaeus in
relation to the Republic, the relation between the speeches in the Timaeus, the
parts of Timaeus’ own speech, and the way in which meaning evolves as it unfolds
in dialogue.³² I suggested in the previous chapter, and will argue more in what is to
come, that the three parts of Timaeus’ speech are paralleled by the divisions within

³⁰ Cf. Diogenes of Apollonia B3 (= Simplicius, In Phys. 1.4; Diels, 152.11–16): ‘for without intelli-
gence [ἄνευ νοήσιος], he says, it would not be possible for it to be distributed in such a way as to possess
the measures of all things, of winter and summer, of night and day, of rains and winds and fine weather;
if one wishes to think intelligently [ἐννοεῖσθαι] about them, one would find that they are arranged in the
finest way [κάλλιστα] that could be achieved’. For Diogenes, see Sedley, Creationism, 75–8.
³¹ Sedley, Creationism, 92.
³² For many of the former points, Francis MacDonald Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of
Plato (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997 [1937]) remains essential. For the latter questions, see
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Gregory’s work On the Human Image. As such, it is necessary to give a sketch of

the train of thought in each part of Timaeus’ speech, or at least key aspects of
them, in order to see how they relate and the overall picture that is given thereby.
The subject proposed for Timaeus is ‘to speak beginning from the genesis of the
world and end with the nature of human beings’ (27a5–6). Following his intro-
ductory prelude (27d5–29d3), there are three main parts to Timaeus’ speech. The
first (29d7–47e2) sets out ‘the things that have been crafted by Intellect’ (47e4: τὰ
διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα). Although intimations are already given in this first part
that he is anticipating what will come later (cf. 34b10, 44c4–5), midway through
his speech Timaeus announces he will make a new beginning, so as to give an
account of ‘Necessity’ (ἀνάγκη) and the ‘Straying Cause’ (πλανωμένη αἰτία), that
over which Intellect ‘prevailed’, ‘persuading it to direct most of the things that
come to be towards what is best’ (48a2–3); this is the subject of the second part of
his speech (47e3–69a5). The third part (69a6–92c9) is again signalled likewise: he
announces that as all the materials are now ready for construction, ‘from them we
are to weave together the remainder of our account; so let us briefly return to our
starting point and quickly proceed to the same place from which we arrived at our
present position and let us try to put a final head on our story, one that fits with
our previous discussion’ (69a7–b2). The bulk of what follows is a detailed psy-
chophysical account of the parts of the body, their functions and purposes, the
diseases of body and soul, and the need for proper care of each, ending with an
account of the differentiation into male and female (90e–92d6) and the appear-
ance of the lower animals. Timaeus concludes his speech in Critias with a prayer
‘to the god [i.e. the world] who previously of old came to be in reality and just now
comes to be in words’.³³ Timaeus’ speech is not, then, simply an account of the
formation of the cosmos and the human being within it, but a verbal representa-
tion or enactment of its order and harmony. Moreover, by showing ‘the reasons
and forethought [αἰτίας καὶ προνοίας] of the gods in causing them to be’ (44c7), it
enables others, through the right nurture of instruction, to calm the irrational
movements of their souls and so become ‘perfectly whole and healthy’ (44b8–c1).
In the prelude, Timaeus sets out the general metaphysical structure for his
account and indicates the status of the account itself. He begins by making a firm
distinction between ‘that which is grasped by intellection through a rational

Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Idea and Reality in Plato’s Timaeus’, in idem, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight
Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1980), 156–93, and Dominic J. O’Meara, Cosmology and Politics in Plato’s Later Works (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–84. In addition, I have found the following particularly helpful:
Donald J. Zeyl’s introduction to his translation of the Timaeus (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), xiii–
lxxxix (I have largely followed Zeyl’s translation, consulting others, and modifying as necessary);
T. K. Johansen, Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004); and David Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2007), 93–132.
³³ Plato, Crit. 106a3–4: τῷ δὲ πρὶν μὲν πάλαι ποτ᾽ ἔργῳ, νῦν δὲ λόγοις ἄρτι θεῷ γεγονότι.
42 

account [νοήσει μετὰ λόγου], always unchangeably being’, and ‘that which is
conceived of by opinion through unreasoning sense-perception, coming to be
and passing away but which never really is’ (28a1–3). As the heaven or the cosmos
can be seen and touched, it has a body, and thus has come to be, and necessarily
has done so because of some cause (28a7–c2). In bringing this about, Timaeus
argues, ‘the maker and father of this universe’ must have looked to the eternal for
his model, for indeed this world ‘is the most beautiful of the things that have come
to be and he is the best of causes’.³⁴ As such, what came to be must have been
crafted ‘with reference to that which is graspable by reason (λόγῳ) and wisdom’,
and it is thus ‘a likeness [εἰκόνα] of something’ (29a6–b2). These metaphysical
principles, finally, have a direct impact on how Timaeus understands his own
speech: with regard to this likeness and its model (παράδειγμα), he argues that as
‘the accounts [τοὺς λόγους] we give of things have the same character as the
subjects they set forth’, so accounts of that which is ‘stable and fixed and
transparent to understanding are themselves stable and unshifting’, whereas an
account of that which is but a ‘likeness’ (εἰκών) will itself only be a ‘likely story’
(εἰκὸς μῦθος, 29b2–c1) and also have a tendency to be ‘casual and random’, for we
too ‘greatly partake of the casual and random’ (34c2–4).
Turning to the first part of his speech, there are a number of points to note.
Most important is the affirmation that the framer of the universe, being good and
therefore without jealousy, ‘wanted everything to become as much like himself as
possible’, and that this is ‘the most preeminent reason [ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην] for the
origin of the world’s genesis’ (29e1–30a2). This being his desire, ‘the god took over
all that was visible—not at rest but in discordant and unordered motion—and
brought it from a state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order
was in every way better than disorder’ (30a2–6). Reasoning that among visible
things, those that have intellect are better than those that do not and that intellect
can only be present in those things that have souls, when the god framed the
universe he thus placed intellect within the soul and soul within the body—at least,
‘according to the likely story, this is how we must say that this world came to be by
the god’s providence [πρόνοιαν], as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and
intellect’ (30a6–c1). The result is that this world ‘resembles more closely than
anything else that Living Thing of which all other living things are parts, both
individually and by kinds. For that Living Thing comprehends within itself all
intelligible living things, just as our world is made up of us and all the other visible
creatures’ (30c5–d1).
After having established that the world must be singular and unique, as is its
model (31a1–b2), Timaeus turns to the four elements (fire, earth, water, and air)
of the cosmic body, made spherical in shape and rotating upon its axis. Within

³⁴ Plato, Tim. 28c3–29a6: ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ᾽ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων.
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that body, the god ‘set a soul in its center, which he extended throughout the
whole body and with which he then covered the body outside’ so that ‘this world
which he begat for himself is a blessed god’ (34b3–9). Catching himself, however,
Timaeus emphasizes that although he has treated the body of the world before its
soul, because of the ‘random and casual’ character of his speech, ‘priority and
seniority’ is in fact given by the god to the soul, for it is preeminent and to rule the
body (34b10–35a1). In Plato’s telling, the soul of the world is made by combining
‘the Same’—that is, that which is indivisible and always changeless—with ‘the
Different’—that is, that which comes to be in the corporeal realm and is
divisible—by means of a third, an ‘intermediary form of being derived from the
other two’, ‘conforming by force [βίᾳ] the different, which was hard to mix, into
conformity with the Same’ (35a1–9). After describing the creation of time, as ‘a
moving image of eternity’ (37c6–38b5), Plato notes that although the world, up to
the birth of time, had been made in all other respects like its model, it was still
‘unlike’ in that ‘it did not yet contain all the living things that it were to have come
to be within it’, that is, the four kinds of living things: the heavenly race of gods,
those that have wings and fly, those that live in the water, and those that have feet
and live on land (39e3–40a2). He himself made the heavenly gods—sun, moon,
stars, and planets—who regulate time, and also earth as our ‘nurturer’ and the
guardian of day and night (40a2–d5); the coming to be of other gods, he notes
briefly, has been described by their descendants (40d6–41a3).
With this accomplished, ‘the begetter of the universe’ directed all these gods
regarding their work in forming mortal beings, ‘without whom the heaven will be
incomplete [ἀτελὴς]’ (41a5–b8). He announces that he will ‘begin by sowing that
seed’ and then specifies that ‘the rest of the task is yours: weave what is mortal to
what is immortal, fashion and beget living things. Give them food, cause them to
grow, and when they perish, receive them back again’ (41c8–d3). When he
finished his speech to his children, the father of the universe, according to
Timaeus, returned to the mixing bowl, mixing together the same ingredients,
although no longer ones that are ‘invariably and constantly pure, but of a second
and third grade of purity’; after dividing the mixture into the same number of
souls as there are stars in the heavens and assigning each one to a star, he
‘mounted each soul in a carriage, as it were, and showed it the nature of the
universe’ (41d4–e1). He then ‘described to them the laws that had been ordained’,
that is, ‘that they would all be assigned one and the same initial birth [γένεσις]’, so
that all would be treated by him equally, and said that ‘he would then sow each of
the souls into that instrument of time suitable to it, where they were to acquire the
nature of being the most god-fearing of living things’, adding that ‘since human
beings have a two-fold nature’ (διπλῆς δὲ οὔσης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως), it should
be the superior kind that would from then on be called ‘man’ (ἀνήρ, 41e1–42a3).
But, importantly, before describing the work of the gods in constructing the
mortal frames for these souls, Timaeus immediately continues by spelling out how
44 

these ‘laws’ are, as it were, existentially experienced. ‘Once the souls were of
necessity implanted in bodies’, as these bodies have things coming in and going
out, ‘the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense-
perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances’, and secondly ‘love [ἔρως],
mingled with pleasure and pain’, with fear [φόβος] and spiritedness [θυμός],
together with whatever goes with having these emotions and their natural oppos-
ites (42a3–b1). ‘If they could master them, their lives would be just, whereas if they
were mastered, they would be unjust. And if a person lived a good life throughout
the due course of time, he would at the end return to his dwelling place in his
companion star.’ Failing this, ‘he would be born a second time, now as a woman’,
and if even then he could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed again,
into some wild animal (42b1–c4). There would be, moreover, ‘no rest from these
toilsome transformations until, by dragging into conformity with the revolution of
the same and uniform within him that massive accretion of fire and water and air
and earth, controlling that turbulent irrational mass by means of reason, he would
return to the form of his first and best condition’ (42c4–d2).
Only after having given these ordained laws setting out the growth that is
required of mortal embodied beings does Timaeus turn to describing how the
gods wove what is mortal to the immortal, fastening together the elements drawn
from the world with rivets rather than indissoluble bonds. And the result of their
work is what we now see: human beings who begin their existence by moving ‘in a
disorderly, random, and irrational manner’ (43b1–2), because ‘at this stage souls
do not have a ruling orbit taking the lead’ (44a4–5): ‘all these disturbances are no
doubt the reason why even today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is
bound with a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence’ (ἄνους ψυχὴ γίγνεται τὸ
πρῶτον 44a7–b1). ‘But’, Timaeus continues, ‘as the stream that brings growth and
nourishment diminishes and the soul’s orbits regain their composure, resume
their proper courses, and establish themselves more and more with the passage of
time, their revolutions are set straight, to conform to the configuration each of the
circles takes in its natural course; they then correctly identify what is the same and
what is different, and render intelligent the person who possesses them’ (44b1–7).
In this way, finally, ‘if such a person also gets proper nurture to supplement his
education, he’ll turn out perfectly whole and healthy’ (44b8–c1).
Yet, once again, Timaeus then catches himself: ‘But this doesn’t happen till
later. Our present subject, on the other hand, needs a more detailed treatment. We
must move on to treat the prior questions’ (44c4–5)—that is the construction,
form, and functioning of the various bodily parts, especially eyes and sight, and
also music, which by its rhythm assists us, for most of us ‘have lost all sense of
measure and are lacking in grace’; several pages are devoted to this (43d3–47e2),
full of extensive details that need not detain us here.
In the prelude and the first part of his speech, then, Timaeus has given us a
‘likely story’ expounding a cosmology that accounts for the world and human
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beings in terms of what is ‘best’ or ‘most beautiful’, tracing this back to the father
of the universe and the intelligible and eternal model upon which this world is
fashioned: this, or rather he, is ‘the best of causes’ and the world is indeed ‘the
most beautiful of the things that have come to be’ (29a5–6), and ‘the preeminent
reason’ for the becoming of the world is that it should be as like the god as possible
(29e2–30a2). However, as a ‘likely story’ the speech is itself rather ‘casual and
random’, with Timaeus apparently running ahead of himself and catching himself:
the formation of the body is described before that of the soul, although the priority
is in fact the other way round; the growth expected of embodied souls is detailed
before their embodiment is treated; and, most importantly, while the world is
indeed most beautiful, human beings, he points out, do not come into existence in
that way. Although as souls they are shown the nature of the universe and have
‘one and the same initial birth’, as embodied beings the first impression that
strikes them is not ‘the movement of the same within them’ but the forceful
disturbances that arise from outside by means of the senses, and so they come into
being in a rather disordered manner, with limbs flailing about rather than moving
in an orderly manner—they are at first souls lacking intelligence (44a8). But this
means that the world, while being indeed the most beautiful of things that have
come to be, is also a proving ground, as it were, where souls implanted in bodies
have the task of mastering the irrational movements stimulated by external
impressions, and for whom pleasure is mixed with pain so as to provide a stimulus
for growth in self-mastery; indeed, it is this ‘instrument of time’ into which the
souls are sown that provides the guidance for their growth, so that, conforming
their irrational movements to ‘the revolution of the Same and uniform within
him’, they will thereby return (though in what sense, as the account of creation is
not yet complete?) to the ‘first and best condition’ and ‘acquire the nature of being
the most god-fearing of living things’.³⁵ By arranging things this way, moreover,
directing the gods to give mortal beings ‘the finest, the best possible guidance they
could give’, the father and maker of the universe provides the means for their
growth, yet ‘without being responsible for any evil that these creatures might bring
upon themselves’ (42e1–4).
Having concluded this part of his speech by referring to our present condition,
in which we have ‘lost all sense of measure and are lacking in grace’ (47d7–e2),
Timaeus then announces:

³⁵ As Cornford (Plato’s Cosmology, 6) notes: ‘The Republic had dwelt on the structural analogy
between the state and the individual soul. Now Plato intends to base his conception of human life, both
for the individual and society, on the inexpugnable foundation of the order of the universe. The parallel
of macrocosm and microcosm runs through the whole discourse. True morality is not a product of
human evolution, still less the arbitrary enactment of human wills. It is an order and harmony of the
soul; and the soul itself is a counterpart, in miniature, of the soul of the world, which has an everlasting
order and harmony of its own, instituted by reason. This order was revealed to every soul before its
birth (41e); and it is revealed now in the visible architecture of the heavens.’
46 

Now in all but a brief part of the discourse I have just completed I have presented
what has been crafted by Intellect. But I need to match this account by providing
a comparable one concerning the things that have come about by Necessity
[ἀνάγκη]. For this ordered world is of mixed birth: it is the offspring of a union of
Necessity and Intellect. Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to
direct most of the things that come to be towards what is best, and the result of
this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this
universe. So, if one is to speak of how it really came to be in this way [εἴ τις οὖν ᾗ
γέγονεν κατὰ ταῦτα ὄντως ἐρεῖ], one would also have to introduce the character of
the Straying Cause [τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἶδος αἰτίας]—how it is its nature to set
things adrift. I shall have to retrace my steps, then, and, armed with a second
starting point that also applies to these same things, I must go back once again to
the beginning and start my present inquiry from there, just as I did with my
earlier one. (47e3–48b3)

Although narrated first in his ‘likely story’, the way in which Timaeus has already
included elements of the countervailing forces operative in the world and the
genesis of human beings, and also the passing mentions of ‘auxiliary’ or ‘con-
tributory’ causes (συναίτιαι 46c7, d1; συμμεταίτια 46e6), disrupting, though surely
not purposelessly, the flow of his speech, indicates that ‘what was crafted by
Intellect’ is not separate, temporally or spatially, from the world that actually is,
as he says here, ‘of mixed birth’. It is, however, only in this second part of his
speech that Timaeus sets about to examine systematically, from the same starting
point, what these are—that is, ‘Necessity’ or ‘Constraint’ and ‘the Straying Cause’.
What is meant by this ‘Necessity’ and ‘Straying Cause’ has been a matter of
considerable debate.³⁶ On one level it seems most likely, as Sedley argues, that
they consist in matter and its properties: ‘when intelligence operates in the world it
has to rely on the intrinsic properties of matter, but matter, having no inherent
tendency towards good ends, acts in a purposeless way unless it is directed, or in
Timaeus’ preferred idiom “persuaded”, by intelligence’.³⁷ But this does not simply
indicate, he further argues, the ‘intransigence of matter, its resistance to intelligent
persuasion, the cause of evil in the world’, for after all, according to the ‘likely
story’, the creator had ‘carte blanche’ in organizing the stuff from which he would
build the cosmos.³⁸ The key point is that, as Johansen puts it, this cause is
‘wandering’ in that in itself ‘it is not teleological’; yet, while its operation is not
of itself directed towards the best outcome, nevertheless when ‘persuaded’ by
Intellect it becomes a ‘contributory cause’.³⁹

³⁶ Cf. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 162–77; Johansen, Plato’s Natural Philosophy, 92–116; Sedley,
Creationism, 113–27.
³⁷ Sedley, Creationism, 114–15. ³⁸ Sedley, Creationism, 115.
³⁹ Johansen, Plato’s Natural Philosophy, 93.
     47

Besides the question of matter and its own properties, there is also a further
dimension of necessity at play in the growth of the human being, already alluded
to by Timaeus in 41d4–42d2. Whether the ‘necessity’ by which souls are
implanted into bodies (42a4) or the ‘necessity’ by which they come first to
experience violent impressions from without (42a5) is related to the ‘Necessity’
in 47e3–48b3 or not,⁴⁰ the point that embodied souls are to undergo a process of
growth under ‘the finest, the best possible guidance’ (42e2–3) is a given, a
‘foreordained law’ laid down by the maker of the universe, even before their
embodiment, or at least before the narration of the construction of their bodies
(41e2–3). While the maker of the universe can use force (βίᾳ, 35a9) in construct-
ing souls, their growth cannot be forced but requires guidance and especially time:
‘sown into the instrument of time’ (41e5), souls are able to conform their
movements with the revolution of the Same within each, and so return ‘to their
original condition of excellence’ (42d2).
It is in this part of the speech that Timaeus introduces the third factor in his
account: in the first part he had distinguished two kinds (δύο εἴδη), the intelligible
changeless model and the visible imitation of that model that comes to be, but now
he needs to distinguish ‘a third, one of a different sort’ (τρίτον ἄλλο γένος), and this
is ‘a receptacle of all genesis, its wetnurse, as it were’ (πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως
ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὴν οἷον τιθήνην, 48e2–49a6). Plato’s account of this receptacle is
perhaps the most obscure part of the Timaeus, it being debated whether he is
speaking of ‘space’ or ‘stuff ’. Zeyl suggests that the way to resolve these two
interpretations is to think rather of ‘room’, in the sense of ‘room to move about
in’: while it is necessarily the case that movement requires room in which to move,
this is, for Plato, both the stuff and the room in which the stuff moves, as when a
liquid in a container is agitated, forming currents, ‘parts’ of the liquid will travel
through other ‘parts’ of it, travelling through the room, so that ‘the parts through
which the currents travel is the room. But any part of the room may become a
traveller as well.’⁴¹ If the connection between movement and time has been explored
in the first part of Timaeus’ speech, it is the connection between movement and
space that is explored here further, opening out into a detailed examination of the
mathematical and geometrical properties constituting the elements in the realm of
becoming. However, while time is of great importance to Gregory in On the Human
Image, space does not seem to be an important factor for him, at least in that work,
and so this aspect of the Timaeus can be left aside here.
The third part of Timaeus’ speech (69a6–92c9), as already noted, brings the
speech together by returning to the starting point, but now ‘weaving together’ the
materials developed in the first two parts, so as to put a ‘head’ upon his story
(69b1). The bulk of what follows is a detailed psychophysical account of the

⁴⁰ Cf. Sedley’s comment about the very common word ἀνάγκη in Creationism, 114 ftn. 48.
⁴¹ Zeyl, Timaeus, lxiii.
48 

human being, analysing the functions and purposes of the various bodily parts
and how they contribute to human well-being, together with an examination of
the diseases of body and soul, and the need for the care of each. Accepting that ‘the
Timaeus is not easy reading’, Cornford adds that ‘the physiological and medical
chapters towards the end would be repellent to many’.⁴² However, the purpose of
this extensive psychophysical investigation is indicated towards the end of the
speech, when Timaeus reflects that it should suffice for ‘the subject of the living
thing as a whole and its bodily parts, and how a man should both lead and be led
by himself in order to have the best prospects for living a rational life’ (89d2–4).
Moreover, we are to make sure that the motions of the ‘three distinct types of soul
that reside within us’ are kept in due proportion (89e3–90a2). It is ‘the most
sovereign part of our soul [that is] god’s gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit’,
which resides in our heads, raising us up from the earth, ‘as plants grown not from
the earth but from heaven. For it is from heaven, the place from which our souls
were originally born, that the divine part suspends our head, that is, our root, and
so keeps our whole body erect’ (90a2–b1). Rather than becoming absorbed in the
appetites or ambitions, and so become thoroughly mortal, we should devote
ourselves to the love of learning and true wisdom, thereby nourishing that part
of our soul, and ‘redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown off course
around the time of our birth’ by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the
universe, bringing our understanding into conformity with what it contemplates
(90b1–d5). And so, Timaeus, concludes, ‘when this conformity is complete, we
shall have achieved our goal: that most excellent life offered to humankind by the
gods, both now and forevermore’ (90d5–7).
Although it seems that Timaeus has completed his assignment of tracing the
formation of the universe and culminating in the coming to be of humankind, he
recalls that there are other things whose coming to be is necessary for this world to
be fully like its model (cf. 39e3–40a2)—that is, the appearance of women and the
other animals. ‘According to the likely account’, as Timaeus tells it and as we have
already seen, ‘males who lived lives of cowardice or injustice were reborn in the
second generation as women’ (90e6–91a1). This explains why, according to
Timaeus, it is only at this time that ‘the gods fashioned the desire for sexual
union’ by constructing the reproductive organs, which in turn ‘produced the love
of procreation’, and which are ‘unruly and self-willed’, refusing to be subject to
reason, but seeking to overpower everything else, until ‘finally the woman’s desire
and the man’s love bring them together, and, like plucking the fruit from the tree,
they sow the seed into the ploughed field of her womb, living things too small to be
visible and still without form’ (91a1–d5).⁴³ Birds in turn, are reincarnations of

⁴² Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 20.

⁴³ As Zeyl, Timaeus, lxxxviii, observes: ‘Sexual desire, then, is not a desire of the male or female
proper—not even of the appetitive part of his or her soul—but of the reproductive organs.’
     49

simpler souls who have studied the heavens through visible observation rather
than mathematical calculation; land animals are those who followed the lower
parts of the soul rather than reason; and aquatic animals are derived from those
who were ‘the most stupid and ignorant of all’ (91d6–92c3). Although in this
‘likely story’ women are derived from the moral failings of males, and the groups
of animals from human intellectual failure, it nevertheless remains the case that
for the world to be a perfect likeness of its intellectual model, it must contain all
these beings. Only now has Timaeus’ speech come to an end: ‘This world of ours
has received and teems with living things, mortal and immortal. A visible living
thing containing visible ones, a perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living
Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection are unexcelled. Our one
heaven, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be’ (92c4–9). Although it had
‘previously of old come to be in reality’, it is indeed in Timaeus’ speech that it ‘just
now comes to be in words’ (Crit. 106a3–4), and so his task, ‘to speak beginning
from the genesis of the cosmos and end with the nature of human beings’
(27a5–6), is discharged.
While there are many particular points of similarity between the Timaeus and
Gregory’s treatise, which are noted in the following translation, most striking is
the parallel threefold division of each work, together with the numerous fore-
shadowings, backtracking, and apparent detours, and switching between different
modes of speech. Gregory’s treatise begins with an ideal description of creation
and the human being as the image of God (De hom. 1–15), with a lengthy
excursion into the apparent relapse from rational control exhibited in tears,
laughter, yawning and dreaming, which provides an occasion for a brief (and
deeply embedded in a lengthy discussion about the slackening of rational control
in such bodily phenomena) treatment of the genesis of evil (De hom. 12–13). But
then, noting that the image he has just described is not in fact what we see when
looking at actual human beings, he returns again to his starting point, the
scriptural verses of Gen. 1:26–7, discerning this time a distinction between the
image and the prototype inscribed in these verses (De hom. 16.1–9). Thus begins a
lengthy and complex analysis of the waywardness of human beings, God’s provi-
dence, the division into male and female, the arising of the passions, and the time
needed to reach the fullness (both intensively and extensively) of the human being
that will happen together with the end of time at the universal reconstitution and
the transformation of humanity from the corruptible and earthy to the impassible
and eternal. The economy of creation is thus for Gregory, as it is for Plato, a
pedagogy, God ‘persuading’ human beings by providing them with the occasion,
the time, and the means for growth in understanding and virtue. The third part of
Gregory’s treatise, the final lengthy chapter (De hom. 30), as with the third part of
Timaeus’ speech, draws extensively upon medical knowledge, describing the
various organs and their functions, showing how they contribute to the growth
of the human being. This chapter is as hard a read as Cornford found the final
50 

chapters of the Timaeus, replete with extensive and detailed discussions of medical
and physiological matters, and it only overtly returns in the last paragraphs (if one
gets that far!) to important threads pulling the whole treatise together. His
purpose, Gregory says as he nears the end, acknowledging that he has ‘wandered
far from the matters of hand’, was to show that ‘the seminal cause of our
constitution is neither soul without a body nor a body without a soul, but that,
from animated and living bodies a being, living and animated from the first, is
generated, human nature receiving it to be cherished, like a nursling, with her own
powers’, so that each part grows appropriately and together, and the soul, which
initially appears somewhat obscurely, ‘by this artistic and scientific process of
formation’, gradually ‘increases in radiance concurrently with the perfecting of the
organism’ (De hom. 30.28–9). In a similar manner to the way in which a statue is
fashioned, he argues, so too ‘the all-contriving nature, taking from the kindred
matter within herself the part that comes from the human being, crafts the statue’,
and, as with the carver and his stone, ‘in the carving of the organism the form of
the soul, by the analogy, is displayed in the substratum, incompletely in that which
is incomplete, and perfectly in that which is perfect; but it would have been perfect
from the beginning had nature not been maimed by evil’ (De hom. 30.30). What
Gregory understands by evil maiming nature must wait for the examination of his
treatise itself, but the analogy with the statue emerging from the stone—in this
case, a living embodied soul requiring growth in both body and soul to reach
completeness—indicates that we are within the realm of necessity and pedagogy,
and, above all, time and the possibilities for transformation that time opens up.

3. Philo

With Philo of Alexandria (c.20 –50 ) we see for the first time the cosmo-
logical reflections of the Greek philosophers applied to the opening chapters of
Genesis. His work, On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, is of
particular interest for understanding the background of Gregory’s treatise, as,
unlike the later hexaemeral tradition it inspired, Philo deals with both creation
accounts (and, indeed, Gen. 3), holding them in tension, yet also providing a
unitary account.⁴⁴ As Moses is primarily the lawgiver, the work is not simply a
treatise on cosmology and the place of the human being within the cosmos, but is

⁴⁴ Greek text ed. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, Philo vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library, Philo 1
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929); ET David T. Runia, Philo, On the Creation of the
Cosmos according to Moses: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Philo of Alexandria
Commentary Series 1 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001); I have used Runia’s translation,
modifying it occasionally. On the title, see Runia, Creation, 96–8. For the relation between Philo and
the Timaeus, see David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, Philosophia Antiqua 44
(Leiden: Brill, 1986); and for a survey of his influence in later Christian writers, see idem, Philo in Early
     51

framed rather in terms of the law. So it begins with Philo pointing out that, unlike
all the others who either ‘simply drew up unadorned regulations’ or ‘enclosed their
thoughts with a mass of verbiage and so deceived the masses by concealing the
truth with mythical fictions’ (Opif. 1), Moses did not simply state what was to be
done, ‘nor did he, since it was necessary to form in advance the minds
[προτυπῶσαι τὰς διανοίας] of those who were to make use of the laws, invent
myths or express the approval of those composed by others’ (Opif. 2). Moses’
account of creation (κοσμοποιίαν) is thus a pedagogy, showing how ‘the cosmos is
in harmony with the law and the law with the cosmos’, so that ‘the man [ἀνδρὸς]
who observes the law is at once [εὐθὺς] a citizen of the cosmos [κοσμοπολίτου],
directing his actions towards the purpose of nature [πρὸς τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως],
in accordance with which the entire cosmos also is administered’ (Opif. 3). And
the work concludes, in turn, by drawing out five lessons that Moses teaches by
means of his account of the creation of the cosmos (Opif. 170–2).
Before turning to the opening verses of Genesis, Philo begins, much like
Timaeus, by laying out a fundamental distinction. Moses, according to Philo,
taught that it is ‘absolutely necessary that among existing things there is an
activating cause on the one hand, and a passive object on the other [ἐν τοῖς οὖσι
τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητόν]’: ‘the activating cause is the
absolutely pure and unadulterated Intellect [νοῦς] of the universe superior to
excellence and superior to knowledge and even superior to the good and the
beautiful itself ’ (Opif. 8), while the passive element ‘when set in motion and
shaped and ensouled by the Intellect [ψυχωθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ] changes into the
most perfect piece of work, this cosmos’ (Opif. 9). To deny this and say that the
world is ungenerated, according to Philo, would eliminate the most important aid
towards piety, which is the idea of providence, for ‘reason demands that the Father
and Maker of all exercise care for that which has come into being’, just as a father
does for his children or a craftsman for his work (Opif. 10). Moreover, as the
ungenerated ‘was of a totally different order’ than the visible and ‘the entire sense-
perceptible realm is in a process of genesis and change [ἐν γενέσει καὶ μεταβολαῖς]
and never remains in the same state, [Moses] assigned eternity to the invisible and
intelligible, as being akin and related to it’, but to the sense-perceptible ‘he ascribed
the appropriate name “genesis” [γένεσιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα ἐπφήμισεν]’ (Opif. 12)—the
name, of course, of the book under discussion.
Turning to the opening verses of Genesis, Philo emphasizes that although the
fashioning of the cosmos is described as taking place over six days, this was not
because the maker needed a length of time, ‘for God surely did everything
simultaneously [ἅμα], not only in giving commands but also in his thinking’,

Christian Literature: A Survey, Compendia rerum judaicarum ad Novum Testamentum, Section III,
Jewish Traditions in Early Christian Literature 3 (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum; Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1993).
52 

whereas things that come into existence require ‘order’ (Opif. 13). Noting a
distinction in the text between the beginning, designated by the cardinal number
‘one’ (μία), and the ordinal numbers used for the following days (Opif. 15; Gen.
1:5), Philo emphasizes that ‘day one’ stands alone, distinct from the following
sequence of days. Day one contains innumerable things, preeminent among which
is ‘the intelligible cosmos [νοητὸν κόσμον]’ (Opif. 15). Using similar reasoning to
Timaeus, he continues:

For God, because he is God, understood in advance [προλαβὼν] that a beautiful

copy [μίμημα καλὸν] would not come into existence apart from a beautiful
paradigm, and that none of the objects of sense-perception would be without
fault, unless it was modelled on the archetypal and intelligible idea. Therefore
when he had decided to construct this visible cosmos, he first marked out the
intelligible [προεξετύπου τὸν νοητόν], so that he could use it as an incorporeal and
most god-like paradigm and so produce the corporeal, a younger likeness of the
older [πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα], which would contain as many sense-
perceptible kinds as there were intelligible ones in that other. (Opif. 16)

It is noteworthy that the intention of God is to create the visible, and thus bodily,
cosmos, and it is in order to do this that he first marks out the intelligible pattern.
This intelligible paradigm, Philo continues, should not be thought to exist ‘in
some place’ (Opif. 17). It exists, rather, in the way that a plan of a city, ordered to
be founded by a king, first exists in the head of the architect, who then constructs
the city out of stones and timber, all the while ‘looking at the model and ensuring
that the corporeal objects correspond to each of the incorporeal ideas’ (Opif.
17–18). In the same way, when God ‘decided to found the great cosmic city, he
first conceived of its outlines’, from which ‘he composed the intelligible cosmos,
which served him as a model when he completed the sense-perceptible cosmos as
well’ (Opif. 19). And as the archetype for the city was engraved in the soul of the
architect, so also ‘the cosmos composed of the ideas would have no other place
than the divine Logos who gives these [ideas] their ordered disposition’ (Opif. 20);
the location of the intelligible cosmos is not in space, nor, as we will see, in time,
but rather ‘in’ or even ‘as’ the Logos. The analogy with an architect is modified a
few lines later when Philo states that if one wanted to speak more simply, ‘one
would say that the intelligible cosmos is nothing other than the Logos of God as he
is actually making the cosmos’.⁴⁵ While the analogy implies a distinction between
the king and the architect, Philo drops that implication thereafter: God alone is the
creator—apart from when the plural of Gen. 1:26 and other considerations, as we
will see, demand others (although the Logos is not in fact introduced as a

⁴⁵ Opif. 24: οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἢ θεοῦ λόγου ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος. For the
translation of ἤδη as ‘actually’, see Runia, Creation, 148.
     53

collaborator in the creation of the human being). The Logos is the ‘place’ of all the
powers of God, especially that ‘cosmos-producing power which has as its source
that which is truly good’ (Opif. 20–1), containing in or as itself the intelligible
cosmos as the blueprint for the work being effected. Philo concludes this reflection
by drawing an analogy from the part to the whole: as the human being is made in
the image of God, so too must be the whole, so that ‘this entire sense-perceptible
cosmos . . . is a representation of the divine image’, and as such, ‘it is plain that the
archetypal seal, which we affirm to be the intelligible cosmos, would itself be the
model and archetypal idea of the ideas, the Logos of God’ (Opif. 25). As Runia
observes, Philo seems to be deliberately rejecting any attempt to introduce sub-
ordinate deities: ‘the intelligible world and the Logos—as object and subject of
thought, respectively—may be identified because they are both intrinsically tied to
God’s creative activity’.⁴⁶
Turning to the reason why the universe was constructed, Philo again follows
Plato, ‘one of the ancients’, to affirm that as ‘the Father and Maker was good’, ‘he
did not begrudge a share of his own excellent nature to an existence [οὐσίᾳ] which
did not possess any beauty of its own but was able to become all things’ (Opif. 21).
However, although the distinction between the active cause and passive object is
bridged through God’s creative activity, that which has come into being is
nevertheless too weak to be able to receive ‘the unstinting riches of his beneficence’
in their own infinite measure. God thus conferred his blessings ‘in proportion to
the capacities of those who receive them, . . . dispensing with fine tuning to each
thing its allotted portion’ (Opif. 23), a proportional measuring out presumably
effected through the Logos.
Only now does Philo turn to the full phrase of Gen. 1:1: ‘In the beginning God
made heaven and earth.’ Regarding the term ‘beginning’, Philo is emphatic that
this should not be taken in a temporal sense: ‘for there was no time before the
cosmos, but rather it either came into existence together with the cosmos or after
it’, and thus time is ‘the extension [διάστημα] of the movement of the cosmos’
(Opif. 26). While all things were made ‘simultaneously’ (ἅμα), what comes into
‘beautiful existence’, however, possesses ‘order’ (τάξιν), ‘for there is no beauty in
disorder’ (Opif. 28). At this stage of the Genesis account and Philo’s exposition, we
are still in the realm of the intelligible cosmos, for the earth is ‘invisible and
unformed’ (Gen. 1:2: ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος), and the heaven is likewise,
according to Philo, ‘bodiless’ (Opif. 29). In this ‘one day’, God also made ‘a form
[ἰδέαν] of air and of void’, which is the ‘darkness’ and the ‘abyss’, respectively, and
also ‘the incorporeal being of water and of spirit, and as seventh and last of all
light’, the latter being the ‘intelligible model’ of the sun and the stars which would
be placed in the heavens (Opif. 29). The ‘invisible and intelligible light’, moreover,

⁴⁶ Cf. Runia, Creation, 154.

54 

‘has come into being as an image of the divine Logos which communicated its
genesis’ (Opif. 31), so that when the light appeared, ‘its rival darkness proceeded to
withdraw’, and God built a wall between them to keep them separate, thus
establishing morning and evening, which are thus also intelligible realities (Opif.
33–4). All this is contained in ‘day one’, which ‘was named in this way because of
the aloneness of the intelligible cosmos which has the nature of the unit’ (Opif. 35).
With the intelligible cosmos thus ‘completed and established in the divine
Logos’, ‘the sense-perceptible cosmos was ripe for birth, with respect to the
model of the incorporeal’.⁴⁷ That what follows is ‘sense-perceptible’ is implied
by the first thing made after ‘day one’, that is, the ‘firmament’, called ‘heaven’ by
the Creator (Opif. 36; Gen. 1:6–8): the word στερέωμα is related to στερέος,
meaning ‘firm’, ‘solid’, with three dimensions. With the earth created on the
third day (Opif. 38–44), Philo then catches himself, in a similar manner to the
way in which Timaeus does when noting that he has spoken about the body before
the soul, to affirm that their priority is in fact the other way round. Philo argues
that although it is only once the earth is finished that God sets about adorning the
heavens, this is ‘not because he placed it after the earth in rank . . . but rather in
order to give a very clear demonstration of the might of his sovereignty’ (Opif. 45).
However, Philo’s explanation of this demonstration involves him anticipating
further the course of his exposition. The creator, he continues, ‘understood in
advance what the humans who had not yet come into existence would be like in
their thinking’, that is, that ‘they would focus their aim on what is likely and
convincing and contains much that is reasonable, but not on the unadulterated
truth, and they would put their trust in appearances rather than on God, thereby
showing admiration for sophistry rather than wisdom’ (Opif. 45). Anticipating
that by looking at the revolutions of the sun and the moon, and deducing that they
cause the seasons, humans would conclude that they were also the ‘first causes’ for
created beings, God said (to whom is not specified): ‘Let them turn back in their
minds to the first genesis of the universe’, for such reflection, he continues, should
lead them to God and his providence (Opif. 46–7). In other words, the rationality,
as it were, of the cosmos and the order of its production is already that of
providing a suitable pedagogy and correction to human beings.
Philo blurs somewhat the distinction between the fifth and the sixth day, so as
to set apart the creation of the human being.⁴⁸ After describing the creation of the
animals that inhabit the waters, the air, and the land, God, then, ‘to crown all
proceeded to “make the human being” ’ (Opif. 65). However, before turning
directly to this, Philo makes an observation about Moses’ account of these days
that would be picked up by Gregory: Moses ‘employed a truly excellent sequence

⁴⁷ Opif. 36: Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀσώματος κόσμος ἤδη πέρας εἶχεν ἱδρυθεὶς ἐν τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ, ὁ δ᾽ αἰσθητὸς πρὸς
παράδιεγμα τούτου ἐτελειογονεῖτο.
⁴⁸ Cf. Runia, Creation, 211, 222.
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of succession in describing the birth of the animal realm’, beginning with ‘the most
sluggish and least delineated type of soul’, that which is found in fishes, and
ending with ‘the most developed and in every respect best type [which] has been
assigned to the kind of the human beings’ (Opif. 65). For all living beings, he
points out, ‘seed is the starting-point of genesis’, but it is only when deposited in
the womb that it obtains movement and natural growth, the latter being superior
to seed ‘since movement is superior to quiescence in created things [ἐν γενητοῖς]’
(Opif. 67). Philo compares ‘nature’ to a craftsman, or, better, ‘an irreproachable
art’ (ἀνεπίληπτος τέχνη) which ‘moulds living beings’ (ζῳοπλαστεῖ), distributing
the moist substance to the limbs and organs of the body and ‘the life-giving
substance’ or ‘air’ to the faculties of the soul (τὴν δὲ πνευματικὴν εἰς τὰς τῆς
ψυχῆς δυνάμεις), that is, ‘nourishment and sense-perception’ (Opif. 67): beginning
with seed, nature thus ‘ended with what is most precious, the structure of an
animal and a human being’ (Opif. 68: τὴν ζῴου καὶ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν). This
ordering is also exemplified in the coming into existence of the universe: when the
creator decided to form living beings, he did so in an ordered sequence, beginning
with ‘insignificant’ animals and ending with ‘the best, human beings’ (Opif. 68).
Returning to the question of how God made the human being, Philo focuses on
three aspects of the description given in Gen. 1:26–7: the dimension of image and
likeness; the plurality of the verb; and the specification that the result of this work,
the human being, is also male and female. Regarding the first point, Philo
comments:

After all these other creatures, as has been stated, he says that the ‘human being’
has come into existence ‘in accordance with God’s image and in accordance with
his likeness’. This is most excellently said, for nothing earthborn bears a closer
resemblance to God than the human being [ἐμφερέστερον γὰρ οὐδὲν γηγενὲς
ἀνθρώπου θεῷ]. But no one should infer this likeness from the characteristics of
the body, for God does not have a human shape and the human body is not God-
like. The term ‘image’ has been used here with regard to the director of the soul,
the intellect. (Opif. 69)

It is noteworthy that although Philo has not yet turned to Genesis 2 and the
moulding of the human being from the earth described there, and although his
point here is that it is possession of intellect that marks the human being as ‘in
accordance with the image and likeness’, the human being that he speaks about is
‘earthborn’—that is, embodied in a material body. This is particularly striking
given that later on (Opif. 134), as we will see, Philo distinguishes Gen. 1:26–7 and
2:7 in terms of the ‘vast difference’ between the human being made ‘after the
image’ and the human being ‘moulded from the earth’.
What exactly this ‘intellect’ is, by virtue of which the human being is said to be
‘after the image and likeness’, is described by Philo in the paragraphs that follow:
56 

‘On that single intellect of the universe, as on an archetype, the intellect in each
individual human being was modelled. In a sense it is a god of the person who
carries it and bears it around as a divine image.’ As such, the human intellect has
the same position in the human being that God has in the cosmos: it is invisible,
yet it sees all; its own nature is unclear, yet it comprehends the nature of other
things (Opif. 69). In line with the ordering of creation in terms of human
pedagogy, seen above, Philo continues here by setting before the intellect the
path of growing in knowledge: by the arts and sciences, the intellect comes to
know all aspects of the earthly creation, and then it is led to the revolutions of the
heavens and their ‘perfect music’, and then, attaining to the intelligible realm,
where it becomes ‘possessed by sober drunkenness’, and stimulated by ‘a higher
form of desire, . . . it thinks it is heading to the Great King himself ’, yet finds itself
overwhelmed by brightness and suffering from vertigo (Opif. 70–1).
Regarding the question why the human was not created by God alone, Philo
offers an answer ‘through a likely conjecture’ (δ᾽ εἰκότι στοχασμῷ, Opif. 72).
Noting that plants and animals without reason do not share in goodness or evil,
he concludes that ‘intellect and reason [νοῦς καὶ λόγος] may be regarded as the
home where goodness and evil naturally reside’ (Opif. 73). As such, he surmises,
creatures with a ‘mixed nature’, capable of both these opposite characteristics,
must have been created with the assistance ‘of other collaborators’ in order that
their good decisions can be attributed to God, while the opposite cases can be
attributed to ‘the others who are subordinate to him’ (Opif. 75). Although Philo
introduced the Logos when he touched upon Gen. 1:26–7 in Opif. 25 (discussed
above), it is striking that Philo does not do the same, as one might have expected
to him to do, when discussing here the plurality of Gen. 1:26.
Finally, regarding the creation of the human being as male and female, Philo
simply observes that ‘even though individual members had not yet taken shape’
(μήπω τῶν ἐν μέρει μορφὴν λαβόντων), ‘after he had called the genus “human
being”, he separated its species and stated that it was created “male and female” ’
(Opif. 76). This is, he says, ‘because the most proximate of the species are present
in the genus and become apparent as if in a mirror to observers with sharp vision’.
As with the first point regarding this scriptural verse, where the term ‘image’ refers
to the intellect, distinguishing human beings from other ‘earthborn’ creatures as
the one most resembling God (even though Gen. 2:7 has not yet been discussed),
so here, in reverse, while the focus is on the genus ‘human being’ prior to
particular individuals, nevertheless the species, male and female, found in the
particular individuals, are already accounted for in the intelligible realm. Given the
scriptural verse before him, he could not reasonably have concluded, as Timaeus
did, that women are reincarnated males with moral failings; nor could he, as we
will see Gregory do, take the analysis a step further, on the ground that in Christ,
the archetype, there is ‘neither male and female’ (Gal. 3:28).
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Following his analysis of Gen. 1:26–7, Philo gives four reasons why the human
being was created last, several of which are picked up by Gregory. The first of these
is that ‘the Director of the universe, like an organizer of games and a holder of a
banquet, when he was about to invite the human being to a lavish feast and a
spectacle’, made all the necessary preparations first, ‘so that, when the human
being entered the cosmos, he would immediately encounter both a festive meal
and a most sacred theatre’ (Opif. 77–8). The second is that the human being would
find all the means needed for living, without toil or trouble, as shown in ‘the
example of the original ancestor of their race’, but which will become a present
reality ‘when unreasoning pleasures fail to gain the upper hand by constructing
gluttony and lust as battle stations in the soul’. The ‘present time’, however, is one
in which ‘all these vices flourish and human beings have unconditionally surren-
dered themselves to the passions’, the punishment for which is that ‘the necessities
of life are difficult to obtain’; what lies before us is thus the acquisition of self-
control, in the hope that God ‘will cause the good things of life to be supplied to
the race spontaneously and ready for consumption’ (Opif. 79–81).
The third reason given by Philo is that ‘God, having reasoned that the begin-
ning and end of creation should be harmonized together in a necessary and loving
relationship, proceeded to make heaven as its beginning [ἀρχὴν] and the human
being as its end [τέλος], the former as the most perfect of immortal beings in the
sense-perceptible realm, the latter as the best of earthborn and mortal creatures’
(Opif. 82); it is again already the earthborn mortal being that he has in mind as the
end of creation. In this way, the human being is ‘a miniature heaven who carries
around in himself numerous star-like beings as divine images’. The fourth and
final reason, the only one said to be ‘necessary’, is that the human being had to
appear last so as to instil astonishment in all other creatures, rendering them
tame and demonstrating his kingly rule, despite his lack of armour or weapons
(Opif. 83–8).
Following the text of the LXX, which has God completing his works on the sixth
day, rather than the seventh (Gen. 2:2), Philo concludes his exposition of the
first creation account by describing the seventh day, which alone is called ‘holy’
(Gen. 2:3), as a universal festival, ‘the birthday of the cosmos’ (Opif. 89). Although
Philo concedes that ‘I do not know whether anyone can give sufficient praise to
the nature of the seven; it is superior to every form of speech’ (Opif. 90), he
continues to sing the praises of the hebdomad for many pages, drawing in all sorts
of numerological reflections.
Reaching Gen. 2:4–5 (LXX), Philo notes a particularity in the text: ‘this is the
book of the genesis of heaven and earth when it came to be on the day that God
made heaven and earth and all the green of the field before it came to be upon the
earth and all the grass of the field before it sprang up’. As this verse speaks of God
having ‘made heaven and earth’ as an action already accomplished, Philo takes it
as a ‘summarizing statement’ uttered by Moses reflecting upon his account of the
58 

creation of the cosmos.⁴⁹ The ‘book of the genesis of heaven and earth’ mentioned
in Gen. 2:4 thus refers to the preceding verses.⁵⁰ But, although Philo had previ-
ously described the creation that begins on the second day as ‘sense-perceptible’
(Opif. 36), if Scripture at this point says that God has ‘made’ (past tense) all the
‘green’ and ‘grass’ of field ‘before it came to be upon the earth’, the vegetation
mentioned earlier (Gen. 1:11–12) must, Philo now concludes, refer to ‘the incor-
poreal and intelligible ideas, which are in fact the seals of the completed products
perceived by the senses’. Moreover, although Moses in his brevity did not say
more, this is a principle which holds for all things: ‘It should be understood that
for each of the other things which the senses judge, anterior forms and measures
also pre-existed [τὰ πρεσβύτερα εἴδη καὶ μέτρα . . . προϋπῆρχε], by means of which
the things that come into being are given form and measured’, so that ‘the nature
of the whole of reality’ is such that nothing among sense-perceptible things is
brought to completion without an incorporeal paradigm (Opif. 130).
This observation enables Philo, as he continues his exposition, to contrast the
creation account thus far, as intelligible and incorporeal, with what follows.
The account in Genesis 2 clearly centres upon the creation of human beings
from the earth. The only item to be mentioned before the human being is the
spring of water rising up to water the earth (Gen. 2:6), which Philo explains, using
the procreative imagery we have already seen him use, by the idea that ‘moist
substance has to be part of the earth which gives birth to all things’, so that ‘the
earth too is a mother’ (Opif. 132–3). Only now do we get to the formation of
actual, material human beings:

After this, he says that God ‘moulded the human being taking clay from the earth
and he inbreathed onto his face the breath of life.’ By means of this text too he
shows in the clearest fashion that there is a vast difference between the human
being ‘who has been moulded’ and the one who previously came into being ‘in
accordance with the image of God’. For the one ‘moulded’ is sense-perceptible,
already participating in quality, consisting of body and soul, either man or
woman, by nature mortal; the one ‘in accordance with the image’ is a kind of
idea or genus or seal, intelligible, incorporeal, neither male nor female, by nature
immortal.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Opif. 129: Ἐπιλογιζόμενος δὲ τὴν κοσμοποιίαν κεφαλαιώδει τύπῳ φησιν . . .

⁵⁰ Opif. 129. On the difference between the LXX and the Hebrew text, and the way in which Philo
treats this verse in comparison to modern scholarship, see Runia, Creation, 309.
⁵¹ Opif. 134: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φυσιν ὅτι “ἔπλασεν ὁ θεός τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ
ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς”. ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τούτου παρίστησιν ὅτι διαφορὰ
παμμεγέθης ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον· ὁ
μὲν γὰρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἤδη μετέχων ποιότηος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς, ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή,
φύσει θνητός· ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφαγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὔτ᾽ ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ,
ἄφθαρτος φύσει.
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The contrast between the human being of Gen. 1:26–7 and 2:7 is clear, but what is
the meaning of the designation of the difference between them as ‘previously’? As
we have already noted, when describing the human being who has come into
being ‘after the image’, Philo was already speaking about the ‘earthborn’: it was the
possession of intellect that distinguished the human being from all other earth-
born creatures, giving the human a ‘closer resemblance to God’ than any other
(Opif. 69), making them ‘the best of earthborn and mortal creatures’ (Opif. 82).
The ‘species’ male and female are also present in the intellectual realm, although at
that point there were no concrete individual humans. The two accounts, though
distinct, are thus also interwoven with each other.⁵² That they cannot be separated
too sharply is further underscored by Philo’s emphasis that God does everything
‘simultaneously’ (ἅμα), even though things come to be in sequence and order, and
that God’s primary intention is in fact to make the visible, bodily cosmos, with the
intelligible cosmos being the ‘prior’ design for this, or, better, the intelligible
cosmos ‘is nothing other than the Logos of God actually making the cosmos’
(Opif. 24). The ‘previously’ is thus not temporal: time measures the sequence of
days measuring the emergence of things within creation, not the relationship
between the intellectual world (in itself in day one) and the material world. It also
takes time to narrate the unfolding of God’s simultaneous action; that Genesis 1
necessarily comes before Genesis 2 does not mitigate the fact that, as Runia puts it,
Philo takes ‘the creation account as a unified whole’.⁵³ There nevertheless does
remain a fundamental priority of elements within this unified account, in that it is
the possession of intellect—incorporeal, neither male nor female, immortal—that
renders the earthborn, moulded human ‘in accordance with the image and
likeness’ of God. Finally, it must also be recalled that Philo reads Moses’ account
as a pedagogy, ‘preparing minds’ so that human beings can be ‘citizens of the
cosmos’.⁵⁴
Rather than a ‘double creation’ as such, Philo’s interest is thus, as becomes clear
in what immediately follows, on ‘the composite structure [τὴν κατασκευὴν
σύνθετον] of the sense-perceptible and individual human being, composed of
earthly substance and divine spirit’ (Opif. 135). In this composite, the body
came to be ‘when the Craftsman took clay and moulded a human shape out of

⁵² For full discussion of the scholarly positions regarding the relation between ‘the one in accordance
with the image’ in Gen. 1 and ‘the one moulded from the earth’ in Gen. 2, see Runia, Creation, 321–3.
I would concur with Runia that ‘the human being after the image’ of Gen. 1:27 should not be taken as
the ‘idea of the human being’, in a technical sense, and that the intellect spoken of in Opif. 69–71 should
not be too readily equated with the divine part inbreathed into the composite human being of Gen. 2:7,
but rather, in Runia’s words (Creation, 323), that ‘the former is an idealization, i.e. the “true human
being” such as he should and can be when the cares of the body and earthly life have entirely fallen away
. . . an idealization of human nature in terms of the intellect’.
⁵³ Runia, Creation, 309.
⁵⁴ Runia, Creation, 224: ‘Philo is answering a specific question raised by the biblical text. For this
reason, perhaps, he is not concerned to give a full anthropology. His doctrine is that humankind is
above all characterized by its intellectual powers is significant enough.’
60 

it’, while, on the other hand, ‘the soul obtained its origin from nothing which has
come into existence at all’, but comes from the Father and Director of all things,
when he breathed into its face the divine spirit, ‘which has emigrated here from
that blessed and flourishing nature for the assistance of our kind’. As such, while
the composite human being is mortal in its visible part, ‘it would be immortalized
[ἀθανατίζεται] with regard to its invisible part’ (Opif. 135). The human being thus
‘is the borderline [εἶναι μεθόριον] between mortal and immortal nature, sharing in
both to the extent necessary, he has come into existence as a creature which is
mortal and at the same time immortal, mortal in respect of the body, immortal in
respect of the mind’ (Opif. 135).
The first human born of earth, Philo further asserts, excelled those who
followed in both body and soul. Philo gives three reasons why this was the case
for the body: first, that the earth was new and so ‘unmixed and undefiled and pure
as well as receptive and easy to work with’ (Opif. 136); second, because God took
‘from pure matter the purest and utmost refined part’ (Opif. 137); and third, as the
creator excelled in knowledge, the proportions were carefully fashioned to be
harmonious (Opif. 137). Regarding the excellence of the soul, Philo introduces
again the Logos of God:

For it is fitting that for his construction God used no other model belonging to
the realm of becoming, but only, as I said, his own Logos. For this reason, he says
that the human being has come into existence as its likeness and representation
[ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμημα] by being inbreathed into the face, which is the location
of the senses. . . . The representation of a splendid model must be splendid itself.
The Logos of God is even superior to the beauty which is beauty as it occurs in
nature. It is not adorned with beauty, but, if the truth be told, it is itself beauty’s
preeminent adornment. (Opif. 139)

It is again striking that Philo did not introduce the Logos in his examination of
Gen. 1:26–7 in Opif. 69, when his claim that the image relates to the human
possession of intellect and the plurality of the verb might have invited him to do
so, but does so here, in consideration of how the moulded human of Gen. 2:7, by
being ‘inbreathed’, is the likeness and imitation of the Logos. Concluding his
discussion of Gen. 2:7, Philo puts the matter thus: ‘every human being, as far as his
mind is concerned, is akin to the divine Logos and has come into being as a casting
or fragment or effulgence of the blessed nature, but in the structure of his body he
is related to the entire cosmos’ (Opif. 146).
Regarding the formation of the woman, this turns out to be, for Philo, a mixed
blessing. Although, as we have seen, the ‘species’ male and female are present in
the intelligible realm, Philo begins his treatment of the appearance of the woman
in Genesis 2 with the statement: ‘But, since nothing is stable in the world of genesis
and mortal beings necessarily [ἀναγκαίως] undergo reversals and changes, the first
     61

human being had to enjoy some ill fortune [ἐχρῆν . . . ἀπολαῦσαί τινος
κακοπραγίας]’, and this is woman, who is ‘for him the starting-point of a blame-
worthy life’ (Opif. 151). He continues: ‘As long as he was single, he resembled God
and the cosmos in his solitariness, receiving the delineations of both natures in his
soul, not all of them, but as many as a mortal constitution could contain.’ When
the woman was moulded, seeing in her ‘a sisterly form and a kindred figure’, he
rejoiced at the sight and greeted her; she, in turn, seeing that he resembled herself
more than any other living creature, was also glad and responded modestly (Opif.
151–2). Echoing Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium, Philo continues:
‘Love [ἔρως] ensues bringing together the two separate halves of a single living
being as it were, and joins them together into unity, thereby establishing in both a
desire [πόθον] for union with the other in order to produce a being similar to
themselves.’ But as this is also the desire which begets bodily pleasure, which is the
starting point of wickedness, they thereby ‘exchange the life of immortality and
well-being for the life of mortality and misfortune’ (Opif. 152).
Finally, Philo notes that as ‘the garden of delights’ was planted by God while the
man was still solitary, these delights bear no resemblance to pleasures we experi-
ence; the garden instead ‘hints at the ruling part of the soul’, while the tree of life
hints at the most important of virtues, reverence for God (Opif. 153–4). But when
the first couple had their attention caught by that which was ‘highly attractive to
behold’, offered by the serpent, they passed by the tree of immortal life, ‘through
which they could have enjoyed the fruits of an age-long life of well-being’, and
chose instead ‘that ephemeral and mortal existence, not a life but a time span full
of misfortune’, suffering the punishments that the outraged Father determined fit
(Opif. 156).
Philo has, thus, given us a multi-layered account of creation and the human
being, which also seems to shift as he works his way through the scriptural text:
‘day one’ is distinct from the sequence of days that follow, for it contains ‘the
intelligible cosmos’, while the others describe the successive appearances of sense-
perceptible creation; but then, from Gen. 2:4–5 onwards, the first account
becomes the creation of the intelligible paradigm, while the second account is of
that which is moulded from the earth. In both cases, however, the accounts are
thoroughly interwoven: it is as the best of earthborn creatures that the human
being mentioned in Gen. 1:26–7 is, by virtue of the intellect, ‘in accordance with
the image’, and the species of that human being, male and female, is already
accounted for in the intelligible realm, even though, when particular earthborn
individuals, men and women, are created (or, at least, when their creation is
narrated), it is made clear that being male and female is on a different level than
their common possession of intellect, and the appearance of the woman, for Philo,
disrupts the solitary (godlike) existence of the man. Holding these interweavings
together is the fact that, for Philo, God’s act is ‘simultaneous’, encompassing his
thinking and doing, while those things which come into being have their own
62 

proper sequence and order, just as they must also be narrated sequentially. That all
things are held together in God’s ‘simultaneous’ act, yet unfold in time, is perhaps
best captured in the statement which Philo himself designates as stating his
position in the simplest, ‘most naked’, words: ‘the intelligible cosmos is nothing
other than the Logos of God as he is actually making the cosmos’ (Opif. 24).
There are numerous particular themes in this work which are picked up by
Gregory (and noted in the footnotes to the translation): the sequential appearance
of increasing levels of life narrated by Moses, with ‘nature’ being ‘an irreproach-
able art moulding living beings’ (Opif. 65–8); that though our intellect sees all and
comprehends the nature of other things, it remains unseen and not understood by
itself (Opif. 69); that the intellect and reason are the seat of goodness and evil
(Opif. 73); that although the human being is created in Gen. 1:27, the individual
does not come into existence until Gen. 2:7 (Opif. 176); and that the cosmos has
been prepared as a feast for the human being, and that the human being is to be an
unarmed king before whom animals become tame (Opif. 77–83). More generally,
the importance of this text of Philo for understanding Gregory’s treatise lies in the
way in which we see, for the first time, an attempt to combine the two creation
accounts in Genesis into a unified account, but one that accounts for ‘the com-
posite structure’ (τὴν κατασκευὴν σύνθετον) of the human being, the ‘borderline’
between the mortal and the immortal (Opif. 135), and, of course, how they
respectively deal with the question of male and female. Finally, if Moses’ own
account, in and as Philo’s telling of this, is meant to aid in the forming of the
human being, by observing the law, to be a citizen of the cosmos, Gregory’s
account pushes further towards something more, an economy that provides a
pedagogy leading from Adam to Christ.

4. Origen

While Origen’s influence on Gregory is indisputable, Origen’s understanding of

creation is anything but, being instead a subject of controversy almost from the
time he first put pen to paper. Following his detractors, Origen has been presented
as teaching that there was an eternal realm of intellects existing alongside God,
which then fell away from God and into bodies, from which they will eventually be
liberated to return to their original state of unity together and with God. This
depiction, which dominated twentieth-century scholarship, has more recently
been challenged and a new picture is gradually gaining acceptance.⁵⁵ We cannot

⁵⁵ Cf. Ronald E. Heine, Origen: An Introduction to His Life and Thought (Eugene, OR: Wipf and
Stock, 2019), 106–7: ‘Most later scholars, including myself, have presented this as Origen’s view. I now
believe we were mistaken and that a continued careful reading of Origen’s texts will provide further
confirmation of this.’ He refers to Marguerite Harl, ‘La préexistence des âmes dans l’oeuvre d’Origène’,
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here enter into a detailed engagement with the scholarly debate, but will rather try
to present as clear and coherent a picture as possible, with an eye both backwards
to what we have seen so far and forward to Gregory’s On the Human Image.
Origen was not the first Christian writer to focus attention on the opening verses
or chapters of Genesis: according to Eusebius, Rhodo wrote a ‘treatise on the
hexaemeron’—that is, on the six days of creation—as also did Apion and
Candidus, and, according to Anastasius of Sinai, Papias, Clement, Pantaenus,
and Ammonius ‘thought that the entire hexaemeron referred to Christ and the
Church’.⁵⁶ Although there is no record of Origen having written a ‘hexaemeron’,
his seminal and controversial work on this topic, the Commentary on Genesis,
seems to have focused on the first four chapters of Genesis. It is now lost, however,
with only a few fragments surviving in the Catenae and elsewhere.⁵⁷ It seems to
have consisted of thirteen books, the first eight of which had been composed in
Alexandria, in the same period as his On First Principles and the first five
books of his Commentary on John, and the final five books in Caesarea between
232 and 235 .
In his Contra Celsum, begun some time after 246 , Origen refers back to his
earlier work, saying that ‘if anyone wants to see the arguments, with clear
demonstration, that persuade us regarding the creation of the cosmos according
to Moses [περὶ κατὰ Μωϋσέα κοσμοποιΐας], let him take our studies on Genesis
from the beginning of the book down to the words “This is the book of genesis of
humans” [Gen. 5:1]’, further specifying that he had there identified what was ‘the
heaven and earth’ made ‘in the beginning’, ‘the invisible and unformed of the

in Lothar Lies, ed., Origeniana Quarta (Innsbruck-Vienna: Tyrolia, 1987), 238–58, at 238–48; Mark
Edwards, Origen against Plato (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 82–92; Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, ‘ “Preexistence of
Souls”?: The ἀρχή and τέλος of Rational Creatures in Origen and Some Origenians’, Studia Patristica,
56.4, Rediscovering Origen, ed. Markus Vinzent (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 167–226, at 167–81; Panayiotis
Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, Suppl. VC 77 (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 92–4, and my
edition of Origen’s On First Principles, OECT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), vol. 1, lvi–lxii.
See also the other works of Panayiotis Tzamalikos: The Concept of Time in Origen (Bern: Peter Lang,
1991); Origen: Philosophy of History and Eschatology, Suppl. VC 85 (Leiden: Brill, 2007); and
Anaxagoras.
⁵⁶ Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 5.13.8; 5.27; Anastasius of Sinai, Hexaemeron, 6.1, ed. and ET Clement
A. Kuehn and John D. Baggarly, OCA 278 (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 2007), 18, 322–5. It
should also be noted that Theophilus of Antioch has a lengthy section dealing with creation and the
hexaemeron (Ad. Auto. 2.10–30), and that Gen. 1–3 provides the scriptural matrix for much of
Irenaeus’ work explicating Christ and the economy, for which see Thomas Holsinger-Friesen,
Irenaeus and Genesis: A Study of Competition in Early Christian Hermeneutics, JTI Supp. 1 (Winona
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009).
⁵⁷ For a complete collection of fragments and testimonia, see Karin Metzler ed. and German trans.,
Origenes: Die Kommentiering des Buches Genesis, Origenes Werke Mit Deutscher Übersetzung 1/1
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010). See also the survey given by Ronald E. Heine, ‘The Testimonia and
Fragments Related to Origen’s Commentary on Genesis’, ZAC 9 (2005), 122–42. For the contextual
setting of the Commentary on Genesis, see Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in Service of the
Church, CTC (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 104–15.
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earth’, ‘the abyss’, ‘the darkness upon it’, and so on.⁵⁸ A few paragraphs later,
Origen takes up Gen. 5:1 again, combining it now with 2:4—‘this is the book of the
genesis of humans, in the day in which God made the heaven and the earth’—
pointing out that ‘the day’ mentioned here cannot refer back to Gen. 1:1, for that
verse occurs before the appearance of light and God calling the light ‘day’ (Gen.
1:3–5)—and then continues: ‘it is not our present task to explain the doctrine
about intelligible and sense-perceptible things [νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν], and the way
in which the natures of the days have been divided between both forms, or to
study the text of the passage. We would need whole treatises to explain Moses’
account of creation of the cosmos; we did this as well as we could a long time
before writing the present treatise against Celsus’ (Cels. 6.50–1). A little earlier in
the same book, Origen had equated the distinction between ‘intelligible’ and
‘sense-perceptible’ with Paul’s distinction between those ‘things which are seen’
and those ‘which are not seen’, the former being ‘temporal’ and the latter ‘eternal’
(2 Cor. 4:18), further specifying that the latter are ‘intelligible, comprehensible by
the intellect alone’.⁵⁹ Origen thus, as with those we have examined so far,
distinguishes two realms, the intelligible and the sense-perceptible; however, like
Philo, he did not align these realms straightforwardly with the two creation
accounts, for he took the ‘firmament’ and the ‘dry land’, made on the second
and third day, respectively, to be the sense-perceptible ‘heaven’ and ‘earth’ distinct
from, but named after, the ‘heaven and earth’ made on ‘day one’.⁶⁰ The distinction
between the ‘intelligible’ and ‘sense-perceptible’ realms falls rather between ‘day
one’, outside of time, and that which follows, marked as it is by the succession of
time.⁶¹ This, moreover, enables Origen, as it did Philo, to read the two creation
accounts together, especially as it pertains to the human being, differentiating
between the accounts to distinguish different aspects of the human being.
One further preliminary point needs to be made regarding Origen’s awareness
of the limitations of our knowledge in speaking about creation. Ronald Heine
points to a passage from Origen’s Homilies on Isaiah, where Origen specifies what

⁵⁸ Origen, Contra Celsum (Cels.), 6.49; ed. Paul Koetschau, GCS 2 and 3, Origenes Werke 1 and 2
(Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899); ET H. Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), modified.
Heine, Origen: Scholarship, 107–8, points to The Testimony of Truth (NH IX.3, 41.28–42.3; The Nag
Hammadi Library in English, ed. James M. Robinson [Leiden: Brill, 1988], 453), the Apocryphon of John
(NH II.1, 13.14–14.34; Robinson, 112), and Irenaeus’ account of Ptolemy (Haer. 1.4.1–5, and 1.8.2) for
a similar concern to identify what each word refers to.
⁵⁹ Cels. 6.20. Cf. Commentary on John (Com. John) Frag. 13; ed. E. Preuschen, GCS 10, Origenes
Werke 4 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903), 494: our perception is, correspondingly, ‘twofold, sense-perceptible
and intelligible’ (διττοῦ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ὄντος αἰσθητικοῦ τε καὶ νοητικοῦ); by the former we apprehend
bodily objects, with the second incorporeal realities, which are not simply ‘not seen’, but rather those
that ‘by nature are not to be seen’.
⁶⁰ Gen. 1:1, 8–10. Cf. On First Principles (Princ.) 2.9.1. Ed. and trans. J. Behr, OECT (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), translation occasionally modified.
⁶¹ Cf. Homilies on Genesis (Hom. Gen.), 1.2; ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 29, Origenes Werke 6 (Leipzig:
Hinrichs, 1920), 2.17–19; ET Ronald E. Heine, FC 71 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America, 1981).
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can be known.⁶² There, Origen identifies the two seraphim veiling God with their
wings (Isa. 6:2) as ‘my Lord Jesus and the Holy Spirit’, covering both the face of
God, ‘for God’s beginning is unknown’, and also his feet, ‘for what could be
understood as the end in our God?’, and concludes:

Only the middle is visible. What was before this, I do not know. I understand
God from those things that are. What will come about after this, in accordance
with what is coming, I know not. ‘Who has declared to him?’ said Ecclesiastes
[6:12]. ‘Declare to me the former things and the last things that shall be, and I will
say that you are gods’ [Isa. 41:22–3]. Therefore if someone shall tell past things
and shall be able to speak of the last things, he is a ‘god’. Who then besides the
seraphim can say this? Who can say ‘Holy, Holy, Holy!’ besides the seraphim?
But what part of God have they left exposed, so to speak? His middle.⁶³

The beginning and end are veiled; only the middle, the present state of things, is
directly available to us. The end, however, has been revealed, even if it is yet to be
realized. So Origen continues: ‘The coming of my Lord Jesus Christ is being
announced; and so, now “all the earth is full of his glory”.’ Or rather, he adds, ‘it
is not yet full, but will be so’, for ‘in those who sin he does not yet reign, but when
authority even over these has been given to him, when all things have been
subjected to him [cf. Phil. 3:21; 1 Cor. 15:28], then the authority will be fulfilled
when he goes about subjecting all things to himself ’. It is in the light of the end
that has already been announced, that is, the subjection of all to Christ, and then
to God, so that he will be ‘all in all’ (1 Cor. 15:28), that we can make sense of what
we know of ‘the middle’, that which is presently visible, and contemplate the
beginning. As Origen puts it succinctly elsewhere: ‘the phenomenal world is an
image of the intellectual and invisible: the truth is in the future’.⁶⁴
This orientation is repeatedly underscored by Origen, most forcefully in On
First Principles 1.6.2:

Seeing, then, that such is the end, when all enemies will be subjected to Christ,
and when the last enemy, death, will be destroyed and when the kingdom shall be
delivered to the God and Father by Christ, to whom all things have been
subjected [cf. 1 Cor. 15:24–7], let us, I say, from such an end as this contemplate
the beginning of things. For the end is always like the beginning, and, therefore,

⁶² Heine, Origen: An Introduction, 96–7.

⁶³ Origen, Homilies on Isaiah, 1.2; ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 33, Origenes Werke 8 (Leipzig:
Hinrichs, 1925); ET Thomas P. Scheck, ACW 69 (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Newman Press, 2015).
⁶⁴ καὶ φαινόμενος κόσμος εἰκῶν ἐστι τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ ἀορατοῦ· ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια. In
J. B. Cardinal Pitra, Analecta Sacra Spicilegio Solesmensi Parata tome 3, Patres Antenicaeni (Venice:
Mechitaristarum Sancti Lazari, 1883), 30, commenting on Ps. 37:3, ‘Indeed everyone passes through
like an image; surely for nothing they are in turmoil . . .’
66 

as there is one end of all things, so ought there to be understood one beginning of
all things, and as there is one end of many things, so also from one beginning
there are many differences and varieties, which, in turn, through the goodness of
God and by subjection to Christ and through the unity of the Holy Spirit, are
recalled to one end which is like the beginning: that is, all those who ‘bending the
knee at the name of Jesus’ have displayed by this the proof of their subjection to
him, those who are ‘of the heavens and of the earth and of the regions under the
earth’ [Phil. 2:10].

It is important to note that although Origen says that ‘the end is always like the
beginning’, he does not start from the beginning to envision an end that is
straightforwardly a return to the same beginning; it is, rather, ‘from such an
end’ that he proposes to ‘contemplate the beginning of things’. This eschatological
starting point for theological reflection is one he says he has ‘frequently’ affirmed
(Princ. 3.5.4, cited below).⁶⁵ It must also be recognized that the end is said to be
‘like’, not identical to, the beginning, for there has been a path traversed from one
to the other, which in turn implies time and growth. Finally, the combination of
1 Cor. 15:24–8 and Phil. 2:10 to explain this end, with every knee bowing in subjection
to Christ so that God can be ‘all in all’, is one that, as we will see, is fundamental for
Origen’s understanding of the end and, on its basis, the beginning.

4.1 Christ, The Archē, and Intelligible World

As similar as Origen is to Philo on many points, the fundamental difference, of

course, is that he reads Genesis in the light of the end, that is, Christ. As Christ is
‘the wisdom of God’ (1 Cor. 1:24), and it is ‘in wisdom’ that ‘God made all things’
(Ps. 103:24), ‘the beginning’ in which God made heaven and earth is, for Origen,
none other than Christ himself. It is likely that Origen drew this conclusion
already in his Commentary on Genesis;⁶⁶ it is emphatically stated in his first
homily on Genesis.

‘In the beginning, God made heaven and earth’. What is the beginning of all
things, except our Lord and Saviour of all, Jesus Christ the firstborn of every

⁶⁵ This point is forcefully argued by Alexander H. Pierce, ‘Apokatastasis, Genesis 1.26–27, and the
Theology of History in Origen’s De Principiis’, JECS 29 (2021), 169–91.
⁶⁶ Heine (‘The Testimonia’, 124) draws attention to a passage from John Philoponus, who likely
knew Origen’s Commentary on Genesis, which reports: ‘Some say that “in the beginning” means “in
wisdom”. For God “made all things in wisdom” [Ps. 103:24], that is, in the Son. “For Christ is the power
of God and the wisdom of God” [1 Cor. 1:24]. And “all things came to be through him and without him
not one thing came to be” [John 1:3]. And again, “In him all things visible and invisible were created”
[Col. 1:16].’ John Philoponus, De Opificio Mundi, 1.3. Ed. and German translation by C. Scholten, FChr
23, 3 vols (Freiburg i. Br. 1997), 1.90–2. That cf. John knew Origen’s work, ibid. 63, 439.
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creature [1 Tim. 4:10; Col. 1:15]? In this beginning, therefore, that is in his Word,
God made heaven and earth, as the evangelist John also says at the beginning of
his Gospel: In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the
Word was God. This same was in the beginning with God. All things were made
by him and without him nothing was made [John 1:1–3]. Scripture is not
speaking here of any temporal beginning [Non ergo hic temporale aliquod
principium dicit], but it says that the heaven and the earth and all things which
were made were made in the beginning, that is, in the Saviour. (Hom. Gen. 1.1)

Origen clearly understands the term ‘beginning’ (ἀρχή) not as a temporal ‘begin-
ning’, but rather as ‘origin’, ‘first principle’, or ‘source’ (to make this clear, I will
hereafter transliterate the term: archē). In his Homily on the Passover, Origen
points out that there is a difference in the way in which Scripture uses the term
‘archē’ and ‘first’ (πρῶτος). Commenting on Exod. 12:2 (‘This month is for you the
archē of months; it is the first month of the year for you’), Origen argues that
‘properly speaking, “first” applies only when nothing comes before, while “archē”
applies to those which are beginning, even if they come last. What is “first” is
always “archē”, but “archē” is not always “first”.’⁶⁷ He then points out the similar
pairing of words in Christ’s self-identification, ‘I am the Alpha and Omega, the
first and the last, the archē and the end’ (Apoc. 22:13), and concludes that Christ is
the ‘first’ as ‘the first-born of all creation’ (Col. 1:15), but the ‘archē’ as Wisdom,
for Wisdom says of herself, ‘The Lord created me the archē of his ways’ (Prov.
8:22).⁶⁸ As it is ‘in Wisdom’ that God creates, it is as Wisdom that Christ is ‘the
archē of the ways of God’, ‘the archē of the creation of God’ (Apoc. 3:14), or, more
simply and absolutely, ‘the archē’ (Col. 1:18), while he is ‘first’ as ‘the firstborn of
all creation’ (Col. 1:15) and ‘the firstborn of the dead’ (Col. 1:18), a title he points
out which clearly does not apply to him as archē.⁶⁹
Origen gives a further insight into how it is that God made all things ‘in
Wisdom’ when he examines the divine titles or aspects of Christ in On First
Principles 1.2. Here he again takes ‘Wisdom’ as being the first of these titles,
making clear that he is not speaking of Christ as ‘Wisdom’ by a participation in
wisdom but rather as being ‘God’s Wisdom subsisting substantially’. He then
continues:

⁶⁷ Origen, On Pascha [Pasch.] 8.24–32: τ[ὸ μὲν] [γ]ὰρ πρῶ[τον μό]νον μη[δένος] προάγο[ντος κυρίω]ς
λέγ[εται], ἡ δὲ ἀρχὴ ἐπὶ τ[ῶν ἀρ]χεμέ[νων] κἂν τελευταῖ[α γέ]νηται, συμαίνεται. Κ[αὶ ὅ τι] μὲν πρῶτόν
ἐστιν, τοῦ[τ]ο κ[αὶ] ἀρχή ἐστιν, οὐχ ὅ τι δὲ ἀρχή, ἤδη καὶ πρῶτον. Ed. and French trans. O. Guéraud and
P. Nautin, Origène: Sur la Pâque: Traité inédit publié d’après un papyrus de Toura, Christianisme
Antique 2 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979); ET Robert J. Daly, ACW 54 (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).
⁶⁸ Origen, Pasch. 10.4–11.4.
⁶⁹ Cf. Origen, Com. John, 1.117; ET Ronald E. Heine, 80, 89 (Washington, DC: Catholic University
of America Press, 1989, 1993).
68 

And since within this very subsistence of Wisdom was every capacity and form of
the creation that would come to be—both of those things which exist primarily
and of those which occur in consequence, having been formed beforehand and
arranged by the power of foreknowledge regarding these very created things,
which had been as it were outlined and prefigured in Wisdom herself—Wisdom
herself says through Solomon that she was ‘created the beginning of the ways’
[Prov. 8:22] of God, that is, containing within herself the beginning and the
reasons and the species of the entire creation. Now, in the same way in which we
have understood that Wisdom is ‘the beginning of the ways’ of God, and is said to
be ‘created’, that is, forming beforehand and containing within herself the species
and reasons of the whole creation, in the same manner must she be understood to
be the Word of God, as she discloses to all other beings, that is, to the entire
creation, the reason of the mysteries and secrets which are contained within
the Wisdom of God, and so she is called the Word, because she is, as it were, the
interpreter of the secrets of the Intellect. (Princ. 1.2.2–3)

As Wisdom, Christ contains all ‘the beginnings and the reasons and the species’ of
the cosmos that was to be, prefigured or outlined in him, and as such has been
‘created the beginning of the ways of God’; then, as Word, he discloses these
secrets of the Intellect.⁷⁰ Christ is the ‘location’, as it were, of the ‘beginnings,
reasons, and species’ of the things that would come to be, already existing in
himself, the archē, as the Wisdom of God. Christ is, as we will see, the ‘intelligible
world’. In his Commentary on John, Origen employs similar imagery to Philo to
describe this: ‘just as a house or ship are built according to the plans of the
architect, the house and the ship having as their beginning the plans and thoughts
in the craftsman, so all things have come to be according to the principles of what
will be, which were prefigured by God in Wisdom’ and so, he concludes: ‘we must
say that after God had created living Wisdom, if I may put it this way, from the
models in her he entrusted to her [to present] to the things which exist and to
matter [both] their confirmation and forms, but I stop short of saying their
essences’⁷¹—the hesitation presumably being because it is God who is the
‘Maker of heaven and earth’.
The analogy with an architect or a ship-builder is limited, however, for as
Origen insists, in an extract from the Commentary on Genesis regarding the
‘invisible and unformed earth’ made in the archē on day one, God was not in

⁷⁰ Cf. Com. John 1.118: ‘And if we should carefully consider all the concepts applied to him, he is the
archē only insofar as he is Wisdom. He is not even the archē insofar as he is Word, since “the Word”
was “in the beginning,” so that someone might say boldly that Wisdom is older than all the concepts in
the names of “the firstborn of all creation”.’
⁷¹ Com. John 1.113–15: . . . οὕτω τὰ σύμπαντα γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς ἐν σοφίᾳ προτρανωθέντας ὑπὸ θεοῦ
τῶν ἐσομένων λόγους· “Πάντα γὰρ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐποίησε.” καὶ λεκτέον ὅτι κτίσας, ἵν᾽ οὕτως εἴπω, ἔμψυχον
σοφίαν ὁ θεὸς, αὐτῇ ἐπέτεψεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τύπων τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ <παρασχεῖν καὶ> τὴν πλάσιν
καὶ τὰ εἴδη, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐφίστημι εἰ καὶ τὰς οὐσίας.
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need of some pre-existing matter. Inquiring about the power of God, specifically
‘whether God, by willing, gives subsistence to that which he wills, his will not
lacking or being weak, not able to cause to subsist that which he wills’, he asserts,
‘on the ground that he, by his inexpressible power and wisdom, establishes the
qualities (according to all who, on their own ground, introduce providence), when
they did not exist, so as to adorn the universe as he wills, on the same ground also
his will to create is sufficient for as much substance to come into existence as he
needs’.⁷² In the concluding paragraphs of On First Principles, Origen explores
further what is meant by ‘matter’ (ὕλη), noting that it is not used in Scripture ‘for
that substance which is said to underlie bodies’ (Princ. 4.4.6). An exception is
Wisdom of Solomon, where it says, ‘For your all-powerful hand that created the
world out of formless matter [ἀμόρφου ὕλης]’ (Wisd. 11:17), which naturally leads
Origen back to the ‘invisible and unformed [ἀκατασεύαστος]’ earth of Gen. 1:1.
Origen continues by asserting that ‘bodily nature is nothing other than qualities’,
and it is these qualities that are created by God and which are brought together in
various ways to form bodies (Princ. 4.4.7). Bodies, for Origen, are essentially
malleable or transformable, capable of existing in different states—a point of
importance, as we will see, for understanding the consummation of all things
and, on its basis, the beginning and ‘the middle’ state. He continues by saying that
God has created ‘two universal natures, a visible, that is, bodily nature, and an
invisible nature, which is bodiless’, both of which undergo different changes, the
latter changing ‘in mind and purpose, as it is endowed with free will’, the former
undergoing substantial changes, ‘so that, in whatever he wishes to undertake or
fashion or to rework, the Artificer of all things, God, has the service of matter in
every way, so that he can transform and apply it in whatever forms and species he
desires, as the merits of things require. The prophet evidently points to this when
he says “God who makes and transforms all things” ’ (Princ. 3.6.7; Amos 5:8).
A final point with regard to the term archē is that while in the LXX, Wisdom
says of herself that ‘The Lord created me archē’ (Prov. 8:22: ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν), the
Hebrew text has the verb ‘acquire’ or ‘possess’, and Origen knew of other Greek
translations that rendered the verse as such: ‘the Lord acquired me archē . . . .’⁷³ It
is, intriguingly, in this form that he cites the verse in his newly rediscovered
homilies on the Psalms, when discussing Ps. 73:2a: ‘Remember your congregation,
which you acquired from the archē [ἧς ἐκτήσω ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς]’. Referring to Paul’s

⁷² D3, from Eusebius, Prep. Evang. 7.19 (ed. Metzler, 62–4): εἰ θελήσας ὑποστῆσαι ὅ τι βούλεται ὁ
θεός, τῆς θελήσεως αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπορουμένης οὐδὲ ἀτονούσης, οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆσαι ὃ βούλεται. ᾧ γὰρ
λόγῳ τὰς ποιότητας (κατὰ πάντας τούς πρόνοιαν εἰσάγοντας τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ) οὐκ οὔσας ὡς βούλεται εἰς
διακόσμησιν τοῦ παντὸς ὑφίστησι τῇ ἀφάτῳ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει καὶ σοφίᾳ, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
ὅσης χρῄζει ἱκανή ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ βούλησις ποιῆσαι γενέσθαι.
⁷³ Cf. Origen, Hexapla (ed. Frederick Field, Origenis Hexaplorum, 2 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1875), 2.326: κύριος ἐκτήσατό με (using κτάομαι rather than κτίζω).
70 

words about ‘those whom he foreknew’, ‘called’, ‘justified’, and ‘glorified’ (Rom.
8:29–30), Origen comments:

When God foreknew, he foreknew in the archē and by his foreknowledge

acquired everything that was going to come to be present by him, and this is
what is said in ‘Remember your congregation, which you acquired from the
archē’. And I said this, being economical with the word, for I know the archē
from which God acquired each of us; I know that this archē is animate, is alive,
and says ‘God acquired [ἐκτήσατο] me, the archē of his ways, for his works’. The
archē is Christ; [God] acquired from the archē, from Christ, the real archē and
the real end, the real alpha and the real omega [cf. Apoc. 22:13].⁷⁴

God ‘acquired’ Christ as the archē of his works, thereby in his foreknowledge also
‘acquiring everything that was going to come to be present with him’, that is,
everything that, as he had put it in Princ. 1.2.2–3 (cited above), was ‘outlined and
prefigured in Wisdom herself ’, ‘every capacity and form of the creation that would
come to be’, formed and arranged beforehand by the power of God’s
foreknowledge.
This eschatological dimension of the work of Wisdom in creation is brought
out a little further on in the same chapter on Christ in On First Principles, this time
with reference to the description of Wisdom as ‘a breath of the power of God and
the emanation of the purest glory of the Almighty’ (Wisd. 7:25, in Princ. 1.2.10).
Origen brings up again Ps. 103:24 and John 1:3 to conclude that ‘the title of
“Almighty” cannot be older in God than that of Father, for it is through the Son
that the Father is Almighty’—One God, Father, Almighty, as the Creed of Nicaea
puts it. He continues by noting that the Son is also called ‘Almighty’ (Apoc. 1:8),
and then reflects on what ‘the glory of omnipotence’ is:

The God and Father is ‘Almighty’ because he has power over all things, that is,
over heaven and earth, sun and moon, and all things in them. And he exercises
power over them through his Word, for ‘at the name of Jesus every knee bows, of
things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth’ [Phil. 2:10].
And, if ‘every knee bows’ to Jesus, then, without doubt, it is Jesus to whom ‘all
things have been subjected’, and he it is who exercised power over all things, and
through whom ‘all things have been subjected’ to the Father [1 Cor. 15:27–8.]; for

⁷⁴ Origen, Homilies on the Psalms, homily 1.4 on Ps. 73; GCS Origenes 13, 230 (ET 182–3): Ὁ θεὸς
ὅτε προέγνω, ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ προέγνω καὶ ἐκτήσατο τῇ προγνώσει αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ μέλλοντα ἥκειν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν,
καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ λεγόμενον· μνήσθητι τῆς συναγωγῆς σου ἧς ἐκτήσω ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς. Καὶ τοῦτο λέγω
οἰκονομῶν τὸν λόγον· οἶδα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀρχὴν ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἐκτήστατο ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ θεός, οἶδα ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἔμψυχον οὖσαν καὶ ζῶσαν καὶ λέγουσαν· ὁ θεὸς ἐκτήσατό με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ. Ἡ ἀρχὴ
Χριστός ἐστιν· ἐκτήσατο οὖν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς, ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ τοῦ ὄντος ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τέλους, τοῦ ὄντος
ἄλφα καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὦ. Ed. Lorenzo Perrone, GCS NF 19; Origenes Werke 13 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015);
ET Joseph W. Trigg, FC 141 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2020), modified.
     71

it is through Wisdom, that is by Word and Reason, not by force and necessity,
that they have been subjected. And therefore his glory is in the very fact that he
possesses all things, and this is the ‘purest and most clear glory’ of omnipotence,
that by Reason and Wisdom, not by force and necessity, all things have been
subjected.

Although, as we saw earlier, Origen employs the image of an architect building a

house, the ‘omnipotence’ by which the Father is ‘Almighty’ is not simply that of
‘force and necessity’, and, in turn, his creation is not simply inert matter brought
into existence and shaped into forms. God, rather, exercises his ‘omnipotence’
through the persuasion of Word or Reason and Wisdom, and his ‘creation’ (those
whom he has ‘acquired’ from the archē) is those who have been persuaded to
subject themselves willingly to their Creator. Moreover, this is, again, explained by
reference to the combination of Phil. 2:10 and 1 Cor. 15:27–8: when all knees bow
at the name of the one who was exalted above all because of his obedient
acceptance of death upon a cross, then God will, in turn, be ‘all in all’. If the
archē of Gen. 1:1 is ‘our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ’, the creation that is
brought into being, reflecting the will of God perfectly, is eschatological.

4.2 The Human Being, Made in the Image

and Fashioned from the Earth

We do not have any significant passages from Origen’s Commentary on Genesis to

elucidate how he treated the various days of creation.⁷⁵ They are covered in his
first homily on Genesis, where they are presented in terms of the spiritual growth
of the human being. Origen, as already mentioned, does not align the two creation
accounts with the distinction between the intelligible and the sense-perceptible
worlds. His words on these matters are very careful and precise, and need to be
read carefully; as we will see, he occasionally prefaces his thoughts by an extended
caution and exhortation.
Although he was repeatedly accused of teaching that pre-existing incorporeal
souls fell into embodied existence, Origen emphatically denies that he taught any
such thing, ridiculing it as ‘folly’, ‘myth’, ‘false teaching’, ‘introduced by the
Greeks’, borrowed by Pythagoras and Plato from the Egyptians.⁷⁶ He insists that

⁷⁵ Metzler includes from the second book of the Commentary, short passages from John Philoponus
on Gen. 1:9 (D5), from the Collectio Coisliniana on Gen. 1:11 (D6), and an extensive passage from the
Philoc. 23, on Gen. 1:14 (D7), discussed above; from the third book of the Commentary, a passage from
Eusebius Hist. eccl. 3.1.1–3 on Gen. 1:14–18 (D8) discussed below, and from the Philoc. 14 on Gen.
1:16–18 (D9); and from somewhere in the fourth to eighth book of the Commentary, a sentence from
the Catenae on Gen. 1:22 (D10).
⁷⁶ Cf. Cels. 1.13 [Philoc. 18.7]; Cels. 1.20 [Philoc. 18.5], Cels. 5.49; Com. John 6.66.
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if Celsus had understood ‘what is appropriate for a soul which will be in everlast-
ing life, and what it is necessary to think regarding its essence and about its
principles, he would not have ridiculed in this way the immortal entering a mortal
body [τὸν ἀθάνατον εἰς θνητὸν ἐρχόμενον σῶμα]’, adding that his view on this is
‘not according to the Platonic transmigration [μετενσωμάτωσιν] but according to
a more sublime contemplation’, and, further, that Celsus would also have under-
stood how ‘in his great love for humanity [God] made one special descent
[κατάβασιν] to convert those whom the divine scripture mystically calls “the lost
sheep of the house of Israel”, which had strayed down from the mountain’.⁷⁷
What particularly catches Origen’s interest in the two accounts of the origin of
human beings, as it did Philo, is the different verbs used, ‘make’ (ποιέω) and
‘mould’ (πλάσσω), respectively, and the materiality implied by the latter. In his
Homilies on Jeremiah (preserved in Greek), commenting on the words ‘Before
I moulded you in the womb, I knew you’ (Jer. 1:5), Origen points out that the text
of Genesis speaks ‘in a way exceedingly dialectic’ (πάνυ διαλεκτικώτατα) by
differentiating between the verbs ‘to mould’ and ‘to make’. It is, Origen observes,
only ‘when he is created “in accordance with the image” that God says, “Let us
make . . .” ’, whereas, when he takes clay from the earth, God did not ‘make’ but
‘moulded the human being’. Accordingly, God did not say to Jeremiah, ‘Before
I made you in the womb’, because, he explains, ‘what is made [τὸ ποιούμενον] does
not arise in a womb, but what is moulded [τὸ πλάσσόμενον] from the clay of the
earth is created [κτίζεται] in the womb’.⁷⁸ That is, the human ‘made’ by God is not
strictly identical with the human ‘moulded’ from clay and ‘created’ in the womb.
This distinction is the subject of an extensive passage from the Dialogue with
Heraclides, also preserved in Greek. Origen has been asked whether the soul is
blood, on the grounds of the verse ‘the soul of all flesh is its blood’ (Lev. 17:11), but
he hesitates to speak directly about this, as the problem is ‘rather delicate’.⁷⁹ He
urges his audience: ‘I beseech you, therefore, be transformed; resolve to learn that
you can be transformed and put aside the form of swine . . . let us learn from the
Apostle that the transformation depends on us. This is how he puts it: “We all,
with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his
likeness” [2 Cor. 3:18]. If you were a barker, and the Word moulded you and
changed you, you were transformed from a dog into a human. If you were impure,
and the Word touched your soul, and if you offered yourself to be shaped by the

⁷⁷ Cels. 4.17, Matt. 15:24. In Com. John 6.68, Origen proposes to examine how ‘transmigration’
(μετενσωμάτωσις) is different from ‘incarnation’ or ‘embodiment’ (ἐνσωμάτωσις).
⁷⁸ Homilies on Jeremiah, 1.10; ed. Erich Klostermann, rev. P. Nautin, GCS 6, Origenes Werke 3, 2nd
edn. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1983); ET John Clark Smith, FC 97 (Washington, DC: Catholic
University Press, 1998).
⁷⁹ Dialogue with Heraclides (Dial.), 10.20–12.20; ed. Jean Scherer, Entretien D’Origène avec
Héraclide et les évêques ses colleges sur le Père, le Fils, et l’âme, Publications de la Société Fouad I de
Papyrologie, Textes et Documents 9 (Cairo: Institute Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1949); ET
Robert J. Daly, ACW 54 (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992).
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Word, you were changed from a swine into a human’ (Dial. 13.26–14.16). After
such exhortation, Origen continues with his subject, the human being, whether
the soul is its blood, and, by consequence, ‘the doctrine of the two humans’, again
urging his hearers that ‘since we have come to a mystical subject, I appeal to you
not to make me guilty on your account of casting pearls before swine’ (Dial.
14.26–15.1). After further exhortation, and admitting that ‘I am worried about
speaking; I am worried about not speaking . . . You see how long my preamble is to
prepare my hearers. I hesitate to put off speaking, and when I do speak I change
my mind again. What is it that I really want? To treat the matter in a way that
heals the souls of my hearers’ (Dial. 15.9–27).
Only after such lengthy exhortation to be transformed into a human, and
specifying his purpose, does Origen give his account:

The human, therefore, created first [κτιζόμενος πρότερον] was created ‘according
to the image’ in whom is found no matter [οὗ ὕλη οὐκ εὑρίσκεται], for that which
is ‘according to the image’ is not made from matter. ‘And God said, “Let us make
the human being in accordance with our image and according to our likeness and
let them have dominion” ’ and so forth. ‘And God made the human’ not by
‘taking dust from the ground’ as he did the second [ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ δευτέρου], but
made him ‘in accordance with the image of God’. That Moses was not the only
one to know that his being ‘in accordance with the image of God’ is nonmaterial
[ἄϋλον], superior to every bodily existence [κρεῖττον πάσης σωματικῆς
ὑποστάσεως], but that the Apostle also knew this, is shown in his text which
says, ‘Seeing that you have put off the old human with its practices and have put
on the new which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its Creator’
[Col. 3:9–10]. There are, therefore, two humans regarding each of us [Δύο οὖν
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι].⁸⁰

This distinction then leads into a lengthy discussion on the spiritual senses, based
on the homonymity of the word ‘human’, applying both to ‘the outer human’ and
‘the inner’ (Dial. 16.15–16; cf. 2 Cor. 4:16), so that each member or faculty of the
outer human has a corresponding member or faculty in the inner human (Dial.
16.16–24.23). Important in all this, for our purposes, is that Origen is not speaking
of two separate or separable entities (a pre-existing soul and a material body), but,
as Paul, a distinction between ‘the old human’ and the new, ‘the outer human’ and
‘the inner’: the ‘two humans’, with their members and faculties, are ‘regarding
each of us’.

⁸⁰ Dial. 15.30–16.17. Cf. Origen, Commentary on Song of Songs, Prologue. Ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS
33, Origenes Werke 8 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1925), 63.31–68.3; ET R. P. Lawson, ACW 26 (New York/
Mahwah, NJ: Newman Press, 1956), 25–30.
74 

Origen’s primary concern in all this is that we should not identify the ‘making’
of the human being ‘in the image’ of God with the shape or figure in which the clay
is ‘moulded’. We have a lengthy fragment from Origen’s Commentary on Genesis
emphasizing this very point, arguing against those, like Melito, who, he says,
took the scriptural descriptions of the bodily parts of God only ‘according to the
letter’.⁸¹ For Origen, being ‘in accordance with the image’ resides instead ‘in
the rational soul’ (ἐν δὲ τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ), in its various faculties: ‘for there is
in the human a faculty of knowing, of judging and of doing good, of doing
righteousness and of flourishing, and, comprehensively, of completing every good:
these bring about, by God, the “according to the image” in him; for actions
characterize the “according to the image” and not the form of the body’.⁸² It is,
Origen further specifies, by living according to the flesh and doing its works that the
human bears the image of the earthly (cf. Rom. 8:13; Gal. 5:19; 1 Cor. 15:49), while
the one who ‘by the Spirit puts to death the deeds of the body bears the image of
the heavenly’. Only in this way, he concludes, by being merciful, compassionate,
righteous, and holy, as the Father in heaven, will we ‘become in all things an image of
God’ (εἰκὼν γίνεται κατὰ πάντα τοῦ θεοῦ).⁸³ That is, although it is in their intellectual
capacities, not the form of the body, that humans are ‘in accordance with the image’,
this is not set in opposition to the body, for it is in their actions that human beings
demonstrate this likeness. As Origen put it elsewhere, ‘the saint alone is rational’
(Com. John 2.114), where the content of the term ‘rational’ (λογικός) is clearly
derived from the ‘Logos’, Jesus Christ, the image of the invisible God.
There is one intriguing passage in the Commentary on John where Origen not
only differentiates but seems to coordinate the three verbs we have seen used so
far—‘to create’ (κτίζω), ‘to make’ (ποιέω), and ‘to mould’ (πλάσσω)—and intro-
duces a new element:

Because, therefore, the first human fell away from the superior things and desired
a life different from the better life, he deserved to be an archē neither of
something created nor made [οὔτε κτίσματος οὔτε ποιήματος], but ‘of something
moulded [πλάσματος] by the Lord, made [πεποιημένον] to be mocked by the
angels’ [Job 40:19]. Now, our superior existence [ἡ προηγουμένη ὑπόστασις] is in
our being made [κτίσαντος] ‘in accordance with the image’ of the Creator, but
that resulting from a cause [ἡ ἐξ αἰτίας] is in the thing moulded [ἐν τῷ . . .
πλάσματι], which was received from the dust of the earth. And if, forgetful, as
it were, of the superior essence [οὐσίας] in us, we subordinate ourselves to that
which is moulded from dust, even the superior part will take on the image of the

⁸¹ D11, from the Collectio Coisliniana (Metzler, 158–62).

⁸² Metzler, 160.24–6: ἡ γὰρ γνωστικὴ δύναμις ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κριτική τε καὶ εὐποιητική,
δικαιοπρακτική τε καὶ ἐρρωμένη, καὶ ἀπαξαπλῶς παντὸς καλλοῦ ἐπιτελεστική, “κατ᾽ εἰκόνα” ὑπὸ τοῦ
θεοῦ γεγόνασιν αὐτῷ. ὅτι δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα αἱ πράξεις χαρακτηρίζουσι καὶ οὐχὶ ἡ τοῦ σώματος μορφή, . . .
⁸³ Metzler, 162.5–6.
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earthly. But if, once we have understood what has been made ‘in accordance with
the image’ and what has been received ‘from the dust of the earth’, we should
completely incline to him in whose image we have come into existence, we will
also be in accordance with the likeness of God, having abandoned every pas-
sionate desire for matter and bodies, and even for some of those beings who are
according to the likeness. (Com. John 20.182–3)

As Marguerite Harl points out, Origen seems to indicate a hierarchy of terms

describing the different aspects of ‘creation’, a descending gradation of ‘create’
(κτίζειν), ‘make’ (ποιεῖν), and ‘mould’ (πλάσσειν).⁸⁴ This should not be thought of
so much as distinct or discrete acts, but rather as different aspects of God’s act of
creating, much the same way as Origen analyses the different titles of Christ as
various aspects of the one Christ. Our ‘superior existence’ is being created
according to the image of God—a distinction, as we have seen, that resides in
our intellectual faculties, but which is manifest in our actions as embodied beings;
it is ‘superior’ not only in an ontological sense but also in a literary sense (for Gen.
1 comes before Gen. 2). That which is moulded from the earth, on the other hand,
is not simply ‘created or made’, but ‘results from a cause’. To understand what this
‘cause’ is, and the further dimension that it adds to Origen’s understanding of
human embodiment, we must introduce one further word that Origen employs to
speak about the origin of the world and human beings within it. But before that, to
conclude what we have seen so far, it is clear that for Origen, human beings find
themselves caught between the two aspects of their existence, able to incline in
either direction, either downwards, subordinating the superior aspect of their
existence so that even this takes on the image of the earthly, or, abandoning
their desire for things of sense-perception, inclining rather towards the one in
whose image we have come into existence, to be made also in his likeness.
One final and perhaps surprising point, regarding the difference between that
made in the image and that formed from the earth, is the way in which Origen
handles the remaining aspect of how the human being is described in the text of
Scripture. In his Commentary on Matthew, he notes that while Christ had
combined Gen. 1:27 and 2:24 together (Matt. 19:4–5), ‘male and female’ (ἄρρεν
καὶ θῆλη) are in fact said regarding ‘those who came into being according to the
image of God’, while those moulded from the dust of the earth and from the rib
are called ‘man and woman’ (ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ). He further points out that ‘it is never
said that woman was made in the image, nor man, for that matter, but those who
are superior, namely male, and second, female’.⁸⁵ Origen doesn’t follow Philo in

⁸⁴ Harl, ‘Préexistence des âmes’, at 244.

⁸⁵ Com. Matt., 14.16: οὐδέποτε γὰρ γυνὴ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα οὐδὲ ἀνήρ, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν διαφέροντες ἄρρεν οἱ δὲ
δεύτεροι θῆλυ. Ed. Erich Klostermann and Ernst Benz, GCS 40, Origenes Werke 10, two parts (Leipzig:
Hinrichs Verlag, 1935, 1937), 321–3; ET Ronald E. Heine, OECT, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2018), 177–8:
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describing ‘human’ as the genus, and ‘male and female’ as the species, but ‘male’
and ‘female’ are indeed proper designations of those made in the image. He also
seems to have a higher appreciation for the distinction of the sexes than Philo.
That ‘the two become one flesh’, when there is ‘oneness of mind, agreement, and
harmony between husband and wife’, he continues, is a ‘gift of God’ equivalent to
the gift of celibacy spoken about by Paul. In his first homily on Genesis, Origen
further explains the distinction of the human as ‘male and female’ by reference to
the blessing that follows: ‘since, indeed, man could not otherwise increase
and multiply except with the female. Therefore, that there might be no doubt
about his blessing that is to come, the text says “Male and female he made them” ’
(Hom. Gen. 1.14).
Having noted the ‘literal sense’, Origen then goes on in his homily to consider
how, allegorically, ‘the human, made in the image of God, is male and female’. As
the inner human consists of spirit and soul, the former is said to be ‘male’, while
the latter is ‘female’, so that ‘if these have concord and agreement among them-
selves, they increase and multiply, by the very accord among themselves and they
produce sons, good inclinations and understandings or useful thoughts, by which
they fill the earth and have dominion over it’ (Hom. Gen. 1.15). In his
Commentary on Matthew, following many Christian writers before him (noted
above) going back to Paul, Origen also takes the ‘male’ and ‘female’ to refer to
Christ and the Church: ‘he, who in the beginning created the one who is in the
image (as “he is in the form of God”), made him male and the church female, and
gave the “being in the image” to both as to one’.⁸⁶ It is, then, for the sake of the
Church that Christ left the father and his mother (‘for he is a son of the “Jerusalem
above”’) to join himself to his wife, (‘who had fallen hence’) so that, down here,
the two became one flesh, when ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt in us’, forming
‘the body of Christ and individually members of it’.⁸⁷

4.3 The Throwing Down of the World

and the Descent of the Human

Origen was particularly struck by the way in which the writers of the New Testament
employed the word καταβολή. It is used eleven times in the New Testament (once
implied), where in all but one it is in the phrase usually translated ‘the foundation of
the world’; the word, however, really means a ‘throwing down’.⁸⁸ Although the most

⁸⁶ Com. Matt. 14.17 (325.27–32; ET 179): ὁ κτίσας γε ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τὸν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα (ὡς “ἐν μορφῇ” θεου
ὑπάρχων) ἄρρεν αὐτὸν ἐποίησε καὶ θῆλυ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἓν τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἀμφοτέροις χαρισάμενος.
⁸⁷ Ibid; Gal. 4:26, John 1:14; Eph. 5:31; Gen. 2:24, 1 Cor. 12:27. Cf. Origen, Com. Songs, 2.8
(Baehrens, 157–8; ET 149–50).
⁸⁸ Matt. 25:34; Lk. 11:50; John 17:24; Eph. 1:4; Heb. 4:3; 9:26; 11:11; 1 Pet. 1:20; Apoc. 13:8; 17:8; in
Matt. 13:35 ‘of the world’ is implied; it is used one other time, in Heb. 11:11, where it refers to human
reproduction.
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controversial passages of Origen regarding this ‘throwing down’ are in On First

Principles, it is better to start, as Heine suggests, with a lengthy passage from the
nineteenth book of Origen’s Commentary on John, which, although written in his
Caesarean period, and thus after On First Principles, is preserved in the original
Greek.⁸⁹ As we will see, the ‘throwing down of the world’ has as much to do with
human orientation as it does with the relationship between the intelligible realm and
the sense-perceptible world. In this passage, Origen is treating Christ’s words: ‘You
are from below, I am from above; you are of this world, I am not of this world’ (John
8:23). He begins by quoting Christ’s other words, ‘He who is of the earth is of the
earth and speaks of the earth. He who comes from heaven is above all; what he has
seen and heard, to this he bears testimony’ (John 3:31–2), and asks whether being ‘of
the earth’ in the latter text is equivalent to being ‘from below’ in the former (Com.
John 19.127). Origen points out that in John 3, Christ did not put his statements
about being ‘of the earth’ and coming ‘from heaven’ in direct parallel (by saying ‘of
heaven’ instead of ‘comes from heaven’), and suggests as a possible reason for this
that ‘the Saviour was not “of heaven”, especially insofar as he was “firstborn of all
creation”’, while the phrase ‘of heaven’ is used by Paul to speak of the second human
in contrast to the first.⁹⁰ To be ‘from above’, he concludes, is not the same thing as to
be ‘not of this world’.
Likewise, being ‘from below’ and being ‘of the earth’ are also different, in that
while ‘from below’ can refer to a place, it can also refer to ‘a way of thinking’ (Com.
John 19.131). ‘Of the world’ can certainly be used as a spatial designation, for the
visible, material world has places ‘of the world’ that are above and others that are
below. On the other hand, as referring to ‘a way of thinking’, he points out, ‘the
one from below is necessarily of the world, but the one who is of this world is not
necessarily from below’ (Com. John 19.132–3); that is, one who is ‘of this world’
can still be a ‘citizen of the heavens’, and one who is ‘from below’ can change to
become ‘one who is from above and is no longer of this world’ (Com. John
19.134–5). The difference turns, for Origen, upon where one’s heart is: ‘if someone
stores up treasure on earth, he is from below; but if someone stores up treasure in
heaven, that person is born from above and assumes “the image of the heavenly”
. . . He is not of this world, however, who does not love the world nor the things in
the world, but who says, “God forbid that I should boast except in the cross of my
Lord Jesus Christ” ’ (Com. John 19.138–9). The descent and ascent of souls must

⁸⁹ Heine, Origen: An Introduction, 111–12.

⁹⁰ Com. John 19.128: τάχα γὰρ ὁ σωτὴρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἦν, μάλιστα καθ᾽ ὃ “προτότοκος πάσης
κτίσεως” ἦν. τὸ γὰρ “ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ” ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἦν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὡς καὶ ὁ Παῦλός πού φυσιν·
referring to Col. 1:15, and then 1 Cor. 15:47. The Gospel of John might also indicate such a distinction
in the way it speaks of the ascending and descending Son of Man; cf. John Behr, John the Theologian
and His Paschal Gospel: A Prologue to Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 148–60,
218–44.
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therefore, according to Origen, be understood ‘in a more mystical manner not

spatially’ (Com. John 19.144–5).⁹¹
He continues by affirming that there must therefore be ‘another world’ besides
this sense-perceptible one, one which ‘in its entirety is an invisible world, a world
which is not seen, an intelligible world [νοητὸς κόσμος]’, yet which is beheld by the
pure in heart, that is, those being prepared to seek God (Com. John 19.146). This
then raises the question, for Origen, of whether Christ, ‘the first-born of all
creation’ (Col. 1:15) ‘can be a world, and especially in so far as he is “the manifold
wisdom” ’ (Com. John 19.147; Eph. 3:10). He then comments:

For by being the principles [τοὺς λόγους] of absolutely everything according to

which all things made by God in Wisdom have come to be (as the prophet says
‘you made all things in wisdom’) in himself he would also be a ‘world’ that
surpasses the world of sense-perception in its diversity and excels it as much as
the principle stripped of all the material of the whole world differs from the
material world, [a world constituted] not on the basis of matter, but on the basis
of the participation of the things that have been set in order in the Word and
Wisdom, which set matter in order.⁹²

It is here that Origen now introduces the term ‘throwing down’ (καταβολή):

That world has nothing below even as this world has nothing above, to the one
who examines it as to its exact nature. For how can this world, whose creation is a
throwing-down, have anything above? For one must not hear the phrase, ‘Before
the throwing-down of the world’ [John 17:24; Eph. 1:4] in just any way, [but]
advisedly because the saints coined the expression ‘throwing-down’ to express
such a concept, although they could have said, ‘Before the creation of the world’,
and not used the expression ‘throwing down’. The whole world, therefore, and
the things in it are included in the ‘throwing down’. But the genuine disciples of
Jesus, whom he chose out of the world that, by bearing their own cross and
following him, they might no longer be of the world, but come to be outside the
throwing down of the world in its entirety. (Com. John 19.149–50)

⁹¹ Cf. Heine, Origen: Introduction, 113: ‘We should note here that this is not a statement about an
original fall of souls from the heavenly realm that occurred before the earth was created. This is a
statement about the condition that people experience in life because of choosing to live with their
thoughts focused on material realities rather than on immaterial realities.’
⁹² Com. John 19.147: τῷ γὰρ εἶναι παντὸς οὑτινοσοῦν τοὺς λόγους, καθ᾽ οὓς γεγένηται πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ
τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν σοφία πεποιημένα (ὥς φησιν ὁ προφήτης· “Πάντα ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐποίησας”), ἐν αὐτῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ
αὐτὸς κόσμος, τοσούτῳ ποικιλώτερος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κόσμου καὶ διαφέρων, ὅσῳ διαφέρει γυμνὸς πάσης
ὕλης τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου λόγος τοῦ ἐνύλου κόσμου, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῆς μετοχῆς τοῦ λόγου καὶ
σοφίας τῶν κοσμούντων τὴν ὕλην κεκοσμημένων.
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The distinction between the world ‘thrown down’ and the world above is thus not
spatial or even temporal, but rather the distinction between the world of sense-
perception, what we can see physically as it currently is, and the principles (τοὺς
λόγους) of absolutely everything according to which God made all things in
Wisdom, the intellectual world that is Christ. The descent has not been of
incorporeal intellects into material bodies, but rather, in a ‘more mystical manner’,
the turning of attention and desire from the world made by God in Wisdom to the
world that sense-perception sees and desires. And, in turn, the ascent from below
to above is made by bearing the cross and following Christ. As we have already
seen Origen assert: ‘the phenomenal world is an image of the intellectual and
invisible: the truth is in the future’.⁹³
The ‘throwing down of the world’ is also treated extensively in a passage in On
First Principles, although only available as translated by Rufinus. It begins by
noting that the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world ‘by a new and
particular name, terming it the καταβολή of the world’, a word which Rufinus
then explains (to his Roman readers) has been mistranslated into Latin (as
constitutio rather than deicere). Then, after the quotation of a passage from John
(in fact, Matt. 24:21; 25:34, but cf. John 17:24) and Paul (Eph. 1:4), Origen
continues:

It seems worthwhile, therefore, to inquire what is indicated by this new term.

And I am of the opinion that as the end and the consummation of the saints will
be in those [worlds] that are ‘not seen and eternal’ [2 Cor. 4:18.], it must be
supposed, from a contemplation of that very end, as we have frequently pointed
out above, that rational creatures have also had a similar beginning. And if they
had a beginning such as the end for which they hope, they were undoubtedly
from the beginning in those [worlds] that are ‘not seen’ and ‘eternal’. And if this
is so, then there has been a descent from the higher conditions to the lower, not
only on the part of those souls who have by the variety of their own movements
deserved it, but also on that [part] of those who, to serve the whole world, were
brought down from the higher and invisible conditions to these lower and visible
ones, even against their will. ‘Because the creation was subjected to futility, not
willingly, but by the one who subjected it in hope’ [Rom. 8:20], so that both the
sun and the moon and the stars and the angels of God might fulfil an obedient
service for the world; and for those souls which, because of their excessive
spiritual defects needed these denser and more solid bodies, and because of
those for whom this was necessary, this visible world was founded. From this,
therefore, a descent of everyone alike would seem to be indicated by the meaning
of the word, that is, of καταβολή. The whole creation indeed entertains the hope

⁹³ Pitra, Analecta Sacra, 30.

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of freedom, of being ‘set free from the bondage of corruption when the children
of God’ [Rom. 8:21], who either fell away or were scattered abroad, shall be
gathered together into one, or when they shall have fulfilled their other duties in
this world, which are known to God alone, the Artificer of all things. It must be
supposed that the world was created of such a kind and of such a size as to be able
to contain all those souls which were appointed to be trained in this world, and
also those powers which were prepared to attend, to serve, and to assist them. For
it is proved by many assertions that all rational creatures are of one nature; on
which ground alone can the justice of God in all his arrangements concerning
them be defended, when everyone has within himself the reasons he has been
placed in this or that rank of life. (Princ. 3.5.4)

There are a number of important points in this passage. First, Origen again
emphasizes (and notes that he has repeatedly made the point) that it is by looking
to the end that human beings contemplate the beginning, and if the end is similar
to the beginning, then their beginning is in that ‘world’ which was ‘not seen and
eternal’, that is, they are chosen in Christ ‘before the throwing down of the world’
(Eph. 1:4). Second, although the whole creation has been ‘thrown down’, this is
not uniformly the result of sin. As Origen put it in the opening line to his homilies
on Ezekiel, ‘Not everyone who is a captive endures captivity on account of his
sins.’⁹⁴ Some have certainly deserved it, on account of ‘their own movements’ as
the above passage puts it, but others were brought down, sometimes against their
will, to serve others. Third, this descent is described not in terms of incorporeal
intellects or souls taking a body or being embodied, but rather as entering a
‘denser and more solid’ form of embodiment. While some have certainly ‘needed’
this condition, because of their ‘excessive spiritual defects’, the whole of creation
has been subjected to this ‘futility’—not willingly, however, but in hope, as Origen
quotes Paul. As such, in reference to the same verse in his Commentary on John,
Origen suggests that as Paul himself ‘wishes “to remain in the flesh”, not willingly
but in hope’, it is possible that ‘some can exist in a body not in this way’.⁹⁵ What is
meant by bodies become ‘denser and more solid’ is a question that we will return
to later.
The questions we must first address are: why is the world ‘thrown down’ in this
manner, and what relationship might this have to the ‘cause’, mentioned above,
resulting in the body being formed from the dust of the earth? Origen is particu-
larly vexed by any imputation to God of partiality, whether in the form of making
different ‘kinds’ of soul, some destined for salvation and others for damnation, or
in the form of suggesting that he is directly (and arbitrarily) responsible for the

⁹⁴ Homilies on Ezekiel, 1.1; ed. W. A. Baehrens, GCS 33, Origenes Werke 8 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1925);
ET Thomas P. Scheck, ACW 62 (New York: Newman Press, 2010).
⁹⁵ Com. John 1.98–100, Phil. 1:24: δυναμένων τινῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐν σώματι οὐχ οὕτως.
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different conditions in which people find themselves through their birth. Origen’s
answer to this is to emphasize the role of human free will and to clarify the nature
of God’s foreknowledge. Both of these points are treated in a passage from the
third book of his Commentary on Genesis, preserved for us in Greek in the
Philocalia, where Origen is concerned to refute the idea that our fortunes are
determined by the stars (made as ‘signs’, Gen. 1:14). According to Origen: ‘When
God in the archē projected the creation of the world [ἐπιβάλλων ὁ θεὸς τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς
κοσμοποιΐας], inasmuch as there is nothing without a cause, his thoughts traversed
the whole course of the future’, so that he foresaw all the various trains of events
that would occur and which would cause others to occur—without this, however,
implying that he caused them, no more than when we see someone stepping out
onto a slippery path, we can foresee that they will fall without causing that fall.⁹⁶
As Origen concludes, ‘the future event is the cause of God’s particular knowledge
concerning it; for it does not happen because it is known, but it is known because
it will happen’.⁹⁷ On this basis, Origen can argue in a passage from his
Commentary on Romans, also preserved in the Philocalia, with respect to Paul’s
‘election’ by God before his birth (Rom. 1:1; Gal. 1:15), that ‘anyone who is
predestined through the foreknowledge of God is the cause of the events
known’, rather than as a result of ‘the absurd doctrine’ of being saved ‘by nature’,
as his opponents taught (Philoc. 25.1–2). The ‘antecedent causes’ invoked by
Origen to reconcile the diversity in which human beings find themselves with
the justice of God thus do not refer to the actions of souls prior to falling into
bodies, as he was often charged with teaching, but rather to the anteriority of the
foreknowledge of God.⁹⁸
Origen can thus distinguish between what is created by God ‘in the archē’ and
what results from ourselves. In another important passage from On First
Principles, Origen further explains:

When, ‘in the archē’, he created those beings that he desired to create, that is,
rational beings, he had no other reason for creating them other than himself, that
is, his own goodness. As, then, he himself, in whom was neither variation nor
change nor inability, was the cause of all those things which were to be created, he
created all whom he created equal and alike, since there was in himself no ground

⁹⁶ Philoc. 23.8; ed. J. Armitage Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1893); ET
George Lewis (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1911), modified.
⁹⁷ Philoc. 23.8. Cf. Cels. 2.20: ‘We say that the one who made the prediction was not the cause of the
future event, because he foretold that it would happen; but we hold that the future event, which would
have taken place even if it had not been prophesied, constitutes the cause of its prediction by the one with
foreknowledge.’ See also, On Prayer 3. As Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History and
Eschatology, Suppl. VC 85 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 119, argues, regarding the phenomenon of prophecy, in
the intersection of eternity and temporality, causality works backwards: ‘though odd as it may appear, the
prospective fulfilment of certain prophecy is the cause, whereas the utterance of prophecy is the result,
although it temporally precedes the event itself. . . . it is the future that determines the past’.
⁹⁸ Cf. Harl, ‘Préexistence des âmes’, 252.
82 

for variety and diversity. But since these rational creatures, as we have frequently
shown and will nevertheless show yet again in the proper place, were endowed
with the faculty of free will, this freedom of will either incited each one to
progress by the imitation of God or drew him to defection through negligence.
And this, as we have already said before, is the cause of the diversity among
rational creatures, drawing its origin not from the will or judgment of the
Creator, but from the freedom of the individual will. (Princ. 2.9.6)

Our existence is owed to God, or more specifically God’s goodness, while the
condition of our existence results from ourselves and our free will. Yet, Origen
continues from the above passage, God does not simply leave the resulting
diversity to unravel further, but rather ‘drew these diversities of intellects into
the harmony of one world’, as vessels not only of gold and silver but also of wood
and clay, some unto honour and others unto dishonour, all adorning one house
(cf. 2 Tim. 2:20), with ‘divine providence arranging each individual according to
the variety of their movements or of their intellects and purposes’. In this way, he
argues, the Creator will not appear unjust when, ‘according to the antecedent
causes’, each is arranged according to their merit, nor will the particular circum-
stances of each one’s birth or condition be held to be merely accidental, nor again
will one be led into believing in different creators or diverse natures of souls. He
has thus given an account of ‘how the great variety and diversity of the world may
appear to be consistent with the whole rationale of righteousness’, though in
general terms only, ‘for it is’, he cautions, ‘the mark of an ignorant person to
seek, and of a foolish person to give, the particular rationale for each being’ (Princ.
2.9.4, cf. 2.9.8).
One final point regarding the world as it is in this throwing down must be
noted, and that is that the world is arranged suitably for ‘all those souls which were
appointed to be trained in this world’ (Princ. 3.5.4, cited above)—that is, although
resulting from a (future) cause, the throwing down of the world, and those in it, is
pedagogically oriented, leading towards the final return to the end which is ‘like’
the beginning, but not identical with it because of the path that has now been
trodden. The position in which each finds themselves within this orderly arrange-
ment is thus not permanently fixed: there is no distinction of nature between
vessels of honour and those of dishonour; it lies, rather, in the scope of each to
‘purify himself from what is dishonourable’, so as to be ‘a vessel of honour,
consecrated and useful to the master of the house, ready for any good work’
(2 Tim. 2:21; cf. Princ. 3.1.21–4). In this situation, while urging each to ‘be
transformed’ by attending to their higher calling, Origen also, provocatively,
suggests that it would be better for the soul to descend fully into the flesh than
to remain in a middle state, ‘neither hot nor cold’ (Apoc. 3:15): ‘if it adheres to the
flesh, then, at some time it will be satiated and filled with those very evils which it
suffers from the vices of the flesh, and wearied, as it were, by the heavy burden of
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luxury and lust, it may more easily and rapidly be converted from the squalor of
material things to a desire for heavenly things and to spiritual grace’ (Princ. 3.4.3;
cf. 1.3.8). As ‘the spirit wars against the flesh, and the flesh against the spirit, that
we may not do that which we would’ (Gal. 5:17), ‘it is better’, Origen concludes,
‘for a human being to be either in a condition of virtue or wickedness than in
neither of these’, if possible, of course, ‘to be rendered spiritual by adhering to the
spirit; but, if this is not possible, it is more expedient to follow even the wickedness
of the flesh than, fixed in the sphere of its own will, to hold the position of an
irrational animal’ (Princ. 3.4.3). Evil will run its course, being finite, resulting, in
the end, in the return to God.
There is one further passage, in the fourth book of On First Principles, that,
while not using the term ‘thrown down’, explores the contrast between the
intelligible world and the sense-perceptible world not only vertically but also
horizontally, as it were, in terms of two lineages. It has been argued, rightly
I think, that the exposition of ‘first principles’ given in the first three books, the
framework that we have been exploring in the above pages, serves to provide the
framework for the kind of scriptural exegesis that Origen propounds in the fourth
book.⁹⁹ Reading from the light of the end conditions Origen’s reading of the text of
Genesis, and this is played out in the coordination of the beginning and the end,
the below and above, just as it had done for Paul: the first human being, Adam,
was from below, animated earth, while the last Adam, from above, is a life-giving
spirit (1 Cor. 15:45–7), so that while all die in Adam, death having come by a
human being, in Christ all are made alive, through the resurrection of the dead
effected by a human being (1 Cor. 15:22), with the consequence that the perish-
able, animated body, which is sown in weakness and dishonour, is raised as an
imperishable spiritual body in glory and power for ‘what you sow does not come
to life unless it dies’ (1 Cor. 15:35–44). Reading in the light of the end opens up a
double narrative in Scripture, similar to the way, for example, that Joseph’s being
sold into slavery as a sinful action of his jealous brothers is revealed, only at the
end, to have really been the action of God, sending him into Egypt to preserve life
(Gen. 37; 45:4–9). So, when Paul says, ‘Behold Israel according to the flesh’ (1 Cor.
10:18), Origen concludes that ‘there is an Israel according to the Spirit’ (Princ.
4.3.6), a distinction also indicated by Paul’s statement that ‘it is not the children of
the flesh that are the children of God, for not all who are descended from Israel
belong to Israel’ (Rom. 9:8, 6) and the contrast between one who is ‘a Jew openly’
and the one who is ‘a Jew in secret’ (Rom. 2:28–9). Origen then continues:

⁹⁹ Cf. Brian E. Daley, ‘Origen’s De Principiis: A Guide to the Principles of Scriptural Interpretation’,
in John Petruccione, ed., Nova et Vetera: Patristic Studies in Honor of Patrick Halton (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 3–21, at 6, and Behr, Origen, On First Principles, xlv–liii.
84 

Jacob was the father of the twelve patriarchs, and they of the rulers of the people,
and these again of the rest of the Israelites. So, then, the bodily Israelites have
reference to [τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἔχουσιν] the rulers of the people, and the rulers of the
people to the patriarchs, and the patriarchs to Jacob and those still higher up; the
intelligible Israelites, on the other hand, of whom the bodily were a type [οἱ δὲ
νοητοὶ Ἰσραηλῖται, ὧν τύπος ἦσαν οἱ σωματικοί], are they not from the clans, the
clans having come from the tribes, and the tribes from some one individual [i.e.
Jacob] having a birth not of a bodily kind but of the better kind, he too being born
from Isaac, and he being descended from Abraham, all referring back up to
Adam, whom the Apostle says is Christ [πάντων ἀναγομένων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀδαμ, ὃν ὁ
ἀπόστολος εἶναι φησι τὸν Χηριστόν]? For every beginning of lineages as [refer-
ring] to the God of all began lower down from Christ [πᾶσα γὰρ ἀρχὴ πατριῶν
τῶν ὡς πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν κατωτέρω ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ ἤρξατο], who is next to
the God and Father of all, being thus the father of every soul, as Adam is the
father of all human beings. And if Eve is touched on by Paul as referring to the
Church, it is not surprising—Cain being born of Eve and all after him having
reference to Eve—to have here types of the Church, they all being born from the
Church in a preeminent sense.¹⁰⁰

These two lineages, that of the human bodily descent from Adam and that of
the soul descending from Christ, perhaps allude to the difference between the
genealogy given in Matthew, where ‘the genesis of Jesus’ (Matt. 1:1, 18) is
described as a descending line from Abraham, and that of Luke (3:28–38),
which traces the lineage backwards or upwards to Adam the son of God, the
former being the descent of Israel according to the flesh, the latter being the
descent (or rather ascent) of the spiritual Israel, arriving at the end, when all are
subject to Christ, so that ‘Adam is Christ’. In the meantime, before the end, to
quote Origen’s comment one more time: ‘the phenomenal world is an image of the
intellectual and invisible: the truth is in the future’.¹⁰¹

4.4 Embodiment and Transformation

We can now turn to the question of what might be meant by the ‘denser and more
solid bodies’ inhabited by those who need this form of education in their fall away

¹⁰⁰ Princ. 4.3.7; it is notable that this striking passage is preserved in Greek in the Philocalia, but
omitted by Rufinus in his Latin translation. Origen continues by extending this correspondence to
include a corresponding topography; while ‘the mother city’ in Judah is Jerusalem (Princ. 4.3.6), for
Paul ‘our mother’ is ‘the Jerusalem above’ (Princ. 4.3.8; Gal. 4:26; and Heb. 12:22–3); and likewise ‘If
there are spiritual Israelites, it follows that there are also spiritual Egyptians and Babylonians’, as what
Ezekiel says about Pharaoh or the Prince of Tyre clearly does not refer to a human being ruling over
Egypt or Tyre (Princ. 4.3.9; cf. Ezek. 29:1–9; 28).
¹⁰¹ Pitra, Analecta Sacra, 30.
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from the cause of their existence. The question of human embodiment is probably
the most debated aspect of Origen’s teaching.¹⁰² One might have thought that he
had in mind the ‘garments of skin’ with which God clothed Adam and Eve upon
their expulsion from paradise (cf. Gen. 3:21). But in fact, Origen’s references to the
‘garments of skin’ are extremely sparse.¹⁰³ And although Origen was repeatedly
accused of teaching that when incorporeal souls fell, they were embodied by being
clothed in ‘garments of skin’, in a passage from his Commentary on Genesis
preserved in the Catenae, he ridicules this as ‘silly’ and ‘unworthy of God’, for it
would turn God into a tanner, and contradict the scriptural account in which
Adam had previously described Eve as being ‘bone of my bone and flesh of my
flesh’ (Gen. 2:23).¹⁰⁴ Neither can it be the process of dying (νέκρωσις), he adds, for
it would be difficult to explain how God, not sin, caused this, and such an answer
would also require an account of how flesh and bones, which previously existed in
paradise, could have been immortal in themselves. There is no other passage in
Origen’s surviving works that really explains how he might have understood the
‘garments of skin’. However, there is a passage in Procopius of Gaza’s
Commentary on Genesis that might well refer to Origen. Procopius mentions
those who ridicule the idea that God slaughtered cattle or sheep and undertook
the craft of a tanner, and then gives an account of their view:

But the allegorists, after the previously mentioned ridicule, say the one ‘in
accordance with the image’ refers to the soul, and the one ‘formed from the
dust’ refers to the body, composed of fine particles and worthy of the way of life
in paradise, and which some call luminous [τὸ λεπτομερὲς σῶμα . . . ὅ τινες
αὐγοειδὲς ἐκάλεσαν]. The garments of skin, on the other hand, refer to ‘you
clothed me with skin and flesh and enveloped me with bones and sinews’ [Job
10:11]. They say, furthermore, that the soul is borne upon the first luminous
body, which later is clothed with the garments of skin [τῷ δὲ αὐγοειδεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν
ἐποχεῖσθαι πρώτῳ λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ὕστερον ἐνεδύσατο τοὺς δερματίνους
χιτῶνας].¹⁰⁵

Origen uses similar words in his Commentary on Matthew in explaining Christ’s

words about those raised from the dead being ‘like the angels’: their bodies ‘of

¹⁰² See, for examples, the following exchange: Peter W. Martens, ‘Origen’s Doctrine of Pre-Existence
and the Opening Chapters of Genesis’, ZAC 16 (2012), 516–49; Mark Edwards, ‘Origen in Paradise:
A Response to Peter Martens’, ZAC 23 (2019), 163–85; Martens, ‘Response to Edwards’, ZAC 23 (2019),
186–200. Pierce, ‘Apokatastasis, Genesis 1:26–27, and the Theology of History in Origen’s De
Principiis’, 174–5, ftn. 13, astutely suggests that Martens and others have taken Origen ‘to be reasoning
about eschatology on the basis of protology’ rather than the other way round.
¹⁰³ Cf. Anders Lund Jacobsen, ‘Genesis 1–3 as Source for the Anthropology of Origen’, VC 62
(2008), 213–32, at 223.
¹⁰⁴ D 22, from the Collectio Coisliniana (Metzler, 190–2).
¹⁰⁵ Procopius of Gaza, Com. Gen. 3.21; ed. Karin Metzler, GCS NF 22, Prokop von Gaza 1 (Berlin:
De Gruyter, 2015), 151.
86 

humiliation’ are transformed to be like the bodies of angels, ‘ethereal and lumi-
nous’ (αἰθέρια καὶ αὐγοειδὲς φῶς).¹⁰⁶ Given that for Origen, the end is ‘like’ the
beginning, it would not be surprising at all if he had speculated about Adam in
paradise possessing a ‘luminous body’ that is modified in the garments of skin.¹⁰⁷
In explaining the transformation of Christ’s human body and soul in the
resurrection, Origen has recourse to the understanding of matter that we con-
sidered earlier. ‘Matter’, he points out, ‘by its own principle is without quality, but
is clothed with qualities such as the Creator wishes to give it, and that it often puts
aside its former qualities and receives better and different ones’, so that ‘it is
nothing remarkable if in the resurrection the quality of mortality in the body of
Jesus, by the providence of God, should have been changed into an ethereal and
divine quality’.¹⁰⁸ It is, moreover, this capacity of matter to be changed, altered,
and transformed, that explains, for Origen, the different forms of Jesus, appearing
‘without form or comeliness’ to the multitude, in the ‘folly’ of his preaching, but
glorious, luminous, and exceedingly beautiful to those who ascend the mountain
with him.¹⁰⁹ God is, as we have seen Origen quote Amos, the one ‘who makes and
transforms all things’ (Amos 5:8; Princ. 3.6.7).
How the ‘ethereal and luminous body’ in the resurrection, and one like it in the
beginning, relate to the ‘denser and more solid body’ in the ‘throwing down’ of the
sense-perceptible world and the ‘garments of skin’ is simply not explained in any
surviving text of Origen. However, it is likely that his account of the soul in On
First Principles 2.8.3 gives an indication. There he suggests, on the basis of the
supposed etymology of the word ‘soul’ (taking ψυχή as derived from ψυχόω,
which, as a passive verb, can mean ‘to become cool’), that the intellect becomes
a soul through cooling down. Origen further points out that as God is a ‘consum-
ing fire’, whenever Scripture speaks of God in relation to creation, it does so in

¹⁰⁶ Com. Matt., 17.30; Matt. 22:30; Phil. 3:21. See also Cels. 2.60, where Origen explains apparitions
of the dead on the grounds of the existence of the souls ‘in what is called the luminous body’ (τοῦ κατὰ
τὴν ὑφεστηκεῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ αὐγοειδεῖ σώματι ψυχήν).
¹⁰⁷ For the idea of Adam’s luminous body in Jewish thought, see David H. Aaron, ‘Shedding Light
on God’s Body in Rabbinic Midrashim: Reflections on the Theory of a Luminous Adam’, HTR 90
(1997), 299–314; and for an older, but succinct, survey of the ‘ethereal’ body in Neoplatonism and its
background, see E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1963), 313–21. For the ‘garments of skin’ more generally, see Gary A. Anderson, The Genesis of
Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2001), 117–34.
¹⁰⁸ Cels. 3.41: Celsus should listen to what is said by the Greeks: ἐπιστησάτω τοῖς ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων
λεγομένοις περὶ τῆς τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἀποίου ὕλης, ποιότητας ἀμφισκομένης, ὁποίας ὁ δημιουργὸς βούλεται
αὐτῇ περιτιθέναι, καὶ πολλάκις τὰς μὲν προτέρας ἀποτιθεμένης κρείττονας δὲ καὶ διαφόρους
ἀναλαμβανούσης. εἰ γὰρ ὑγιῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τί θαυμαστὸν τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ θνητοῦ κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ
σῶμα προνοίᾳ θεοῦ βουληθέντος μεταβαλεῖν εἰς αἰθέριον καὶ θείαν ποιότητα; cf. Cels. 4.57: ‘All of us who
have accepted the existence of providence maintain that the underlying matter is capable of receiving
qualities which the Creator wills to give it. And by God’s will a quality of one kind is imposed upon this
particular matter, but afterwards it will have a quality of another kind, one, let us say, which is better
and superior.’
¹⁰⁹ Cels. 6.77, referring to Isa. 53:2, 1 Cor. 1:21; Matt. 17:2. Cf. Com. Matt. 12.36–8.
     87

fiery terms (the burning bush, for example, or ‘making’ his ministers ‘burning fire’
in Ps. 103:4), whereas when it speaks of the effects of the adverse powers, and these
powers themselves, it is as ‘cold’. Moreover, when it speaks of that which is lost
and in need of salvation, Scripture speaks of ‘soul’, but when it speaks in terms of
praise or as approaching God, it speaks instead of ‘intellect’, as for instance Paul,
saying, ‘I will pray with the Spirit and I will pray with the intellect’ (Princ. 2.8.2;
1 Cor. 14:15). It is to ‘throw fire upon the earth’ that Christ has come, and so he
sets Simon and Cleopas’ hearts aflame on the road to Emmaus.¹¹⁰ In Origen’s
analogy, borrowed from the Stoics, of iron placed in a fire, where the iron, while
remaining iron, ‘has become wholly fire, since nothing else is discerned in it except
fire’, so too Christ’s own human soul, ‘like iron in the fire, was placed in the Word
forever, in Wisdom forever, in God forever, is God in all that it does, feels, and
understands’, and from him something of the warmth of the Word of God passes
to others.¹¹¹ So too, when all have become subject to Christ, and then to God, such
that God will be ‘all in all’, the rational mind ‘will no longer sense anything else
apart from God: it will think God, see God, hold God; God will be the mode and
measure of its every movement; and thus God will be all to it’ (Princ. 3.6.3). The
‘mystery’ proclaimed by Paul, at the end of his treatment of the resurrection and
the transition from bearing the image of the earthy to that of the heavenly, is this
change: ‘we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last
trumpet. . . . we shall all be changed’ (1 Cor. 15:49–52). It is this transformation
that is the heart of Origen’s vision of the human being and the culmination of
God’s act of creating, as is clear from his long preamble in the Dialogue with
Heraclides discussed above: ‘I beseech you, be transformed!’
There are many points from this survey of Origen’s understanding of creation
and the human being that are of importance for understanding Gregory. For
Origen, the human being is emphatically twofold, so much so that he can speak,
following Paul, of each being ‘two humans’, the inner and the outer, or the old
putting on the new. ‘What is moulded from the clay of the earth is created in the
womb’ (Hom. Jer. 1.10), while that which is accordance with the image is ‘made’
by God, residing in the intellectual capacities of the soul but only as embodied in
virtue. The former belongs to the world as ‘thrown down’, its diversity resulting
from the free actions of those made equally in the image, but a ‘throwing down’
which, in the foresight and providence of God, is a ‘harmonious world’, configured
to be suitable as a realm of instruction where, by the persuasion of the Word or
Reason and Wisdom, all come to learn to subject themselves to Christ, so that he

¹¹⁰ Luke 12:49; 24:32; brought together by Origen in Hom. Jer. 20.8 and Hom. Ex. 13.4, ed.
W. A. Baehrens, GCS 29, Origenes Werke 6 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1920), ET Ronald E. Heine, FC 71
(Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1981).
¹¹¹ Princ. 2.6.6. Chrysippus had previously used the image of iron and fire; cf. Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3–4, for his theory of blending (image of iron and fire at 218.1–2); ed. and ET
Robert B. Todd (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 216.14–218.10 (= SVF 2.473).
88 

can subject all to God, so that God, in turn, can be ‘all in all’. It is, above all, this
eschatological orientation, the end which enables us to discern properly what we
know of the present and contemplate the beginning, that is adopted by Gregory,
with the difference that he sees the point of tension between the two clauses of
Gen. 1:27 (‘God made the human, in accordance with the image of God he made
it’ and ‘male and female he made them’), for as Gregory points out, the latter has
no point of reference in its archetype, for in Christ there is not ‘male and female’
(Gal. 3:28). But both are equally concerned with transformation; indeed, Gregory
concludes his treatise with the same verse repeatedly used by Origen, urging us
‘to put off the old human with its practices and put on the new, which is
being renewed in knowledge according to the image of the one who created it’
(Col. 3:9–10).
 Chapter 3
Gregory’s Treatise, On the
Human Image of God

Written between the death of his brother Basil (September 378) and Easter in the
following year, Gregory’s treatise On the Human Image was composed, so he tells
us in his covering letter to Peter, to complete Basil’s Hexaemeron. While Basil had
made known ‘the world established by God in true wisdom’ to those who are led
by his words to a true contemplation of its ‘sublime adornment’, he had not
continued to ‘the contemplation of the human being’ (Ep. Pet. 1). However,
Gregory does much more than supplement Basil’s own treatment. In this work
and in his own Hexaemeron, a companion piece written about same time,¹
Gregory provides a comprehensive cosmology and anthropology, drawing upon
the traditions of classical philosophy and earlier theology that we have traced from
Anaxagoras to Origen and also inspiring later writers such as Maximos the
Confessor and John Scotus Eriugena.
But in On the Human Image, Gregory also addresses a specific problem. At the
heart of the treatise, structurally and thematically, lies the question of how the
human being is in the image of God: having given, in the first 15 chapters, a
beautiful description of the human being, decked in virtue, as the high point of
creation, Gregory then asks: where, in fact, do we see this? Scripture does not lie
when it says that the human being came to be in accordance with the image of
God, yet neither can the ‘pitiable wretchedness of human nature be likened to the
blessedness of the impassible life’ (De hom. 16.4). Intriguingly, the same prob-
lematic surfaces again a couple of decades later in the ‘anthropomorphite’ con-
troversy. Although the ecclesiastical historian Socrates describes the controversy
as being caused by Theophilus of Alexandria’s assertion, in his Paschal Address
for 399, that the incorporeal God cannot be described in human form, there are
indications that the real issue was the reverse.² According to the dialogue between
Apa Aphou and Theophilus of Alexandria, it was the bishop’s assertion that ‘it is
not the image of God which we humans bear’ which prompted Apa Aphou to go

¹ According to Maraval, ‘Chronology of Works’, it should be placed in the early months of 379, after
the On the Human Image.
² Cf. Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica 6.7. Ed. G. C. Hansen, with M. Širingan, GCS NF 1 (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1995); ET in NPNF 2.
90 

to Alexandria to correct Theophilus.³ When Aphou told him that ‘this sentence is
not correct; for my part, I confess that all humans have been created in the image
of God’, Theophilus replied incredulously: ‘How could you say of an Ethiopian
that he is the image of God, or of a leper or of a cripple or of a blind man?’ And
when Aphou countered to say otherwise would be to contradict the statement in
Genesis, Theophilus argued: ‘Not so! I believe that Adam alone was created in his
likeness and his image, but that the children whom he begot after him do not
resemble him’, adding, ‘I hesitate to say of a human being, subject to sickness and
to tiredness, that he bears the image of the impassible and simple God.’ Pointing to
the eucharistic gifts, which are affirmed to be the body and blood of Christ, Aphou
argued that ‘just as it is necessary to believe this, so also it is necessary to believe
the authority [that says] “the human being was created in the likeness and image
of God” ’, and gave the further example of a king and his image, for although the
portrait is nothing but wood and paint, everyone nevertheless pays it due respect.
That Gregory’s treatise deals with the same issues suggests that although the 390s
was, as Elizabeth Clark memorably described it, ‘the decade of the image’, the
roots of the problem began earlier.⁴
However, Gregory doesn’t resolve this problematic by simply affirming that ‘it
is necessary to believe’ that the human being is in the image of God, despite the
evidence of our eyes. While acknowledging that ‘only the very Truth knows the
true answer to this question’ Gregory seeks an account (logos) which enables both
realities to be affirmed, describing how the human being is indeed the image of
God but also the economy of God that leads, finally, to this reality.
As suggested in Chapter 1, on the basis of the headings in the manuscripts (of
which only two, 16 and 30, are designated as a ‘contemplation’) Gregory’s treatise
is divided into three parts and as we intimated when examining Plato’s Timaeus
these divisions mirror the corresponding threefold account in that work.⁵
Gregory begins, in Chapters 1–15, by presenting a beautiful picture of the
human being as the apex of creation and more than that, the very image of God
(as Timaeus had first given an account of ‘what is crafted by intellect’, Tim. 47e3).

³ The Coptic text is edited with a French translation, by Étienne Drioton, ‘La Discussion d’un moine
anthropomorphite Audien avec le patriarche Théophile d’Alexandrie en l’année 399’, Revue de l’Orient
Chrétien, 2nd series 10 (=20) (1915–17), 92–100, 113–28. The ensuing discussion is on pp. 95–9.
A partial English translation is given by Georges Florovsky, ‘The Anthropomorphites in the Egyptian
Desert’, in idem, Aspects of Church History, Collected Works 4 (Belmont MA: Büchervertiebsanstalt,
1987), 89–96. For further discussion, see Paul A. Patterson, Visions of Christ: The Anthropomorphite
Controversy of 399 CE, STAC 68 (Berlin: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).
⁴ Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian
Debate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 55.
⁵ That Chapter 16 begins a new section of the work has previously been noted; scant attention has
been paid to Chapter 30. Cf. Gerhardt B. Ladner, ‘The Philosophical Anthropology of St Gregory of
Nyssa’, DOP 12 (1958), 61–94, at 78, who holds that Chapter 27 begins a ‘final section, which deals with
the body-mind relationship in view of the resurrection of the bodies’. The structural comparison with
the Timaeus has not, to my knowledge, previously been noted.
  ’  ,       91

In Chapter 16, Gregory explicitly returns to the key scriptural text, Gen. 1:26–7,
with the question: where do we in fact see this? His response is long and complex,
involving changes of voice and detours, explaining the provision of God with
respect to the waywardness of human beings (like Timaeus’ account of ‘the
straying cause’, Tim. 48a7), ensuring that the pleroma, the plenitude of the
human being and human beings, the image of God, is attained at the end.
Finally, in Chapter 30, Gregory gives a medical account of the formation of the
human being in concrete terms, just as Timaeus had ‘put a final head on our story’
(Tim. 69b1) by bringing the two preceding accounts together. Because our con-
cern is with the economy of the text—how the treatise as a whole works, how the
different parts fit and work together, and to what end—it will be necessary to
review the development of Gregory’s argument in detail, only occasionally bring-
ing in other texts of Gregory (his first homily on Ecclesiastes to expound further
the relationship between the beginning and end touched upon in the Letter to
Peter, and his Hexaemeron to illustrate his understanding of creation), reserving
further comment and comparison to other texts, of both Gregory and others, to
the concluding section of this chapter. And although we will see plenty of
similarities with what we have found in the earlier writers we have examined,
they will generally not be noted, nor will parallels with a further range of literature
(which are given in the footnotes to the translation).

1. The Letter to Peter

In his cover letter to Peter, offering him this treatise as a paschal gift, Gregory
promises to complete the work of Basil, ‘who by his own contemplation made the
sublime adornment of the universe accessible to many, making the world estab-
lished by God in true wisdom known to those who are led, by means of his
understanding, to contemplation’ (Ep. Pet. 1), that is, he will now provide ‘the
contemplation of the human being’ (Ep. Pet. 2). The scope of the proposed
contemplation, he points out, is greater than anything else in creation, for the
human being alone is made in the image of God (Ep. Pet. 3). Gregory then makes a
couple of important points regarding how he understands his particular task.
First, that he must examine everything pertaining to the human being, specifically:
‘of what we believe to have taken place previously, of what we now contemplate,
and of what we expect to transpire afterwards’ (Ep. Pet. 3). This threefold
categorization, with three different verbs, echoes what we saw in Origen: while
we can contemplate that which presently is, what comes afterwards is expected,
while that which took place previously is believed. The beginning, middle, and
end, therefore, are not equally in view, subject to similar scrutiny, or placed on the
same plane or horizon of investigation.
92 

Gregory provides a further analysis on the relationship between the end, the
beginning, and the middle, in the concluding paragraphs of his first homily on
Ecclesiastes, written about the same time.⁶ Here he is commenting on verses
1:9–11, beginning with: ‘What is it that has come to be? The same as what shall
be. And what is it that has been made? The same as shall be made’. To the
rhetorical question ‘Do you wish to know what it is that came to be?’, Gregory
replies: ‘Think what it is that will be, and you will know what has been.’⁷ He then
continues more fully and clearly:

‘Think, you human being’, he says, ‘what you will become by exalting yourself
[σεαυτὸν ὑψώσας] through virtue. If you shape your soul in every respect with
good characteristics . . . what will you become as you beautify yourself in such
ways? What loveliness will you put on? If you carefully consider this with your
mind, you will have been taught what came to be in the first [things], which
indeed will truly come to be [τὸ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γενόμενον, ὅ γε ἀληθῶς ἐστι
γενησόμενον], that which is “in the image and likeness of God”’. (295.8–16)

It is by looking to the end, and becoming beautified by exaltation through virtue

(ὑψώσας, with its unmistakable allusions back to Isa. 52:13 and John 3:14; 8:28;
12:34), that we come to know what came to be ‘in the first [things]’ and ‘will truly
come to be’ in the future. Gregory continues by arguing that in using two different
verbs—‘what has come to be’ and ‘what is made’—the Ecclesiast indicates a
distinction between them: ‘the soul has come to be and the body has been
made’ (296.4–8). And this is done, moreover, so that we might understand
‘what is advantageous in each case’. Specifically:

The soul came to be in accordance with the archē [κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς] the same as it will
again appear hereafter, when it has been purified. The body moulded by the
hands of God was made what the resurrection of the dead in due time will reveal
it to be. For such as it is after the resurrection from the dead, just such it was
made at the first [παρὰ τὴν πρώτην]. The resurrection of the dead is nothing but
the complete restoration to the original [state] [εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἀποκατάστασις].
(296.12–18)

Gregory’s theological outlook is thoroughly eschatological. By considering what

we are called to be, exalting ourselves through virtue, we finally, ‘truly’, come to be
in the image, that which was made in the archē.

⁶ Maraval, ‘Chronology of Works’, places it c.379–80 .

⁷ Ed. J. McDonough and P. Alexander GNO 5 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 295.6–8: τί ἐστι τὸ γενόμενον;
νόησον, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἐπιγνώσῃ ὃ γέγονε. ET Stuart G. Hall, in idem, ed., Gregory of Nyssa,
Homilies on Ecclesiastes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993), 45–6, modified occasionally.
  ’  ,       93

Returning to the Letter to Peter, Gregory concludes by giving a further note

regarding how he sees his task:

. . . it is also proper to fit together, from scriptural guidance and from that

discovered by reasoning, the things concerning the human being that seem to
be opposed (as what is now seen pertaining to nature by a kind of necessary
sequence is not the same as those that occurred from the beginning) so that our
whole subject may be consistent with itself in train of thought and order, with
things seemingly contrary being brought together to one and the same end, and
with the divine power finding a hope for things beyond hope and a means of
accomplishing things unworkable. (Ep. Pet. 3)

That which needs fitting together are not Scripture and reason, but rather, using
both of these resources, to try to explain those things about the human being that
seem to be opposed, that is, the scriptural affirmation that God created the human
in his image and likeness, and what we presently and empirically see. Guided by
both Scripture and reason, Gregory hopes to provide an account that brings both
of these truths to one and the same end, so that what seems impossible is brought
into reality.

2. The Human Image of God (1–15)

Gregory opens his treatise by quoting Gen. 2:4, ‘This is the book of the genesis of
heaven and earth’, and devotes a few paragraphs to describing a very dynamic
picture of the world. Everything that appears, he says, was completed and each
separate being had withdrawn to its own place, the heaven above, encompassing
all things, and the heavy bodies drawn downwards, with the earth and water
taking middle place and holding each other back, ‘while the divine art and power
was implanted in the nature of things as a sort of bond and stability for the things
that came to be, guiding the universe by a twofold activity, for by rest and motion
it devised the genesis of the things that were not and the continuance of things that
are’, driving the celestial sphere in a circle, like a wheel around an axle, so that ‘the
circling substance by its rapid motion compresses the solid body of the earth in a
circle’ (De hom. 1.1). Moses’ words that the heaven and earth were made ‘in the
beginning’ thus indicate that they are ‘a kind of beginning of the whole machine’,
‘so that all things appearing in the creation are the offspring of rest and motion,
brought to genesis in accordance with the divine will’ (De hom. 1.2). Moreover,
things that come into being, lying between the opposites of heaven and earth,
mediate between the two and so have a ‘twofold quality’. Air imitates the perpetual
motion and subtlety of the fiery substance, yet it is not alien to solid substance; it is
‘a kind of borderland in the opposition between activities, in itself at once mixing
94 

and dividing things distinct by nature’ (De hom. 1.2). The same also goes for liquid
which, as heavy, is borne downwards, yet has a fluid and mobile activity, so that
‘things most extremely opposite in nature combine with one another, being united
by those mediating between them’ (De hom. 1.3). Indeed, as Gregory puts it, he
says more accurately, ‘the very nature of contrary things is not entirely unmixed
with the properties of the other, so that, I think, everything that appears in the
world mutually converges and the creation, though found in properties of con-
trary things, coheres with itself ’ (De hom. 1.4). What we will shortly see in
Gregory’s understanding of the human being, as a combination of opposites, is
thus writ large in the structure of the cosmos as a whole.
Gregory develops his cosmology at greater length in the Hexaemeron composed
shortly after this treatise.⁸ There, after arguing that matter is nothing other than
properties combined together (Hex. 7; a point also elaborated in De hom. 24),
Gregory notes that Aquila had translated the opening two words of Genesis as ‘in
summary’ (ἐν κεφαλαίῳ), which, he says, has the same meaning as ‘in the archē’
but with a different nuance,

since both equally indicate ‘everything all at once’ [τὸ ἀθρόον]; for in the word
‘summary’ there is the connotation of everything coming into being collectively,
while instantaneity and absence of spacing [ἀδιάστατον] are evoked by the
‘archē’. For archē is alien from any idea of spacing; as a point is the archē of a
line, and the atom [the archē] of mass, so is what is instantaneous [the archē] of
temporal spacing. So the simultaneous foundation of beings [ἡ οὖν ἀθρόα τῶν
ὄντων . . . καταβολὴ], through the indescribable power of God is called by Moses
either ‘archē’ or ‘summary’; it is from that origin that everything is said to have
been composed. (Hex. 8–9)

This being ‘the archē of the cosmogony’ [ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κοσμογονίας] implies, for
Gregory, that God ‘laid down [κατεβάλετο] the starting points and the causes and
the potentialities of all things, collectively and instantaneously, and that in the
initial impulse of his will the essence of each of the beings came together
concurrently’, that is, heaven, ether, stars, fire, air, sea, earth, animals, and plants
(Hex. 9; he notably doesn’t here mention the human being). Everything being seen
by his power of foreknowledge, for ‘he knows everything before it comes into
being’ (Sus. (Θ) 42), and with his power and wisdom as the foundation, ‘a certain
necessary order follows on, according to a certain sequence, with a view to
bringing to completion each part of the world’ (Hex. 9). Gregory returns to the
idea of an instantaneous creation combined with the ordered sequence of their

⁸ Ed. Hubertus R. Drobner, GNO 4.1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009); ET Robin Orton, FC Shorter Works 1
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2021), modified occasionally.
  ’  ,       95

appearance later in the work, when discussing the lights created after the third
day. He phrases the same point slightly differently this time:

everything was constituted simultaneously, in the plenitude of creation, by God’s

initial will [παντὸς ἀθρόως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν κτίσιν πληρώματος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ
θελήματι συστάντος], [and] the ordered series that necessarily arose, in conse-
quence of the wisdom that is found within everything that exists, brought each of
the elements into its manifestation [ἀνάδειξιν] as a consequence of the divine
commands. Moses indicated the totality [τὸ πᾶν] when he summarized it in an
inclusive expression referring to the first subsistence of the sense-perceptible
creation [τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς κτίσεως ὑποστάσει], saying ‘In the archē God
created the heaven and the earth’. Saying, therefore, that God created the
plenitude of beings [τὸ οὖν πλήρωμα τῶν ὄντων], he indicates in his account
that the manifestation [ἀνάδειξιν] of each existing thing happened in a naturally
ordered series. (Hex. 64)

This interplay between a simultaneous creation and its gradual manifestation, and
also the idea of the former constituting a ‘plenitude’, are themes of great import-
ance in On the Human Image of God.
Returning to the first chapter of On the Human Image of God, with the heaven
and earth being ‘finished’ (Gen. 2:1), and all things having ‘arrived at their end’,
Gregory rhapsodizes about the beauty of the world, but concludes by noting that
‘there was no one to share it’ (De hom. 1.5), for ‘the human being had not yet
occupied its place in the world of beings’ (De hom. 2.1). The Maker having
prepared the world as a royal lodging for a king, with all the preparations,
‘presents [ἀναδείκνυσιν] the human being to the world’, to behold the wonders
in it and by his enjoyment know the Benefactor (De hom. 2.1). Alternatively,
Gregory continues, the world is like a banquet prepared by a munificent host, into
which God ‘introduces [εἰσάγει] the human being’ (De hom. 2.2). The verbs that
Gregory uses here are striking, and important for what comes later: he does not
speak here of the ‘creation’ or ‘making’ of the human being, but of the human as
being ‘presented’, ‘introduced’, and ‘occupying’ its place, just as he had spoken in
the Hexaemeron of the ‘manifestation’ of particular things in their proper order
and sequence.
As ‘the work’ of the human being is ‘not the acquisition of things absent but the
enjoyment of things present’, Gregory continues, God ‘establishes for him a
twofold point origin for his formation [διπλᾶς αὐτῷ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰς
ἀφορμὰς καταβάλλεται], blending the divine with the earthy, so that by means
of both he may, congenitally and appropriately, have enjoyment of each, enjoying
God by means of the more divine nature and the good things of the earth by the
sense akin to them’ (De hom. 2.2). In Chapter 3, Gregory further praises the
dignity of the human being as the only act of creation preceded by divine counsel,
96 

and in that ‘what he will be is foreshadowed by the Artist through the writing of
the account [διὰ τῆς τοῦ λόγου γραφῆς], and what kind of being it is fitting he
should be, and to what archetype he should bear a likeness, and for what purpose
he shall come into being, and, having come to be, what activity, and what he shall
rule’—all this is sketched out in Gen. 1:26, before the human comes into being (De
hom. 3.1). Only in the case of the human being ‘does the Maker drawn near with
circumspection’, preparing the material beforehand, likening his form to an
archetypal beauty, and ‘setting before him the goal for which he will come to be’
(De hom. 3.2: προθέντα τὸν σκοπὸν οὗ χάριν γενήσεται). The human being is not
simply made, but has a task set before him.
This goal, Gregory continues in the following two chapters, is the exercise of
royalty, imaging the King of all. It is striking that for Gregory, while the human
being is a ‘vessel fit for the exercise of royalty’, with the ‘superior advantages’ of
having a self-governing soul, ‘swayed autocratically by its own will’, and a body
whose ‘very form’ is ‘adapted for royalty’ (De hom. 4), the human is in the image
not because of these, but through the exercise of virtue that they enable. The
human being is to be ‘a living image, sharing with the Archetype in both rank and
name’, clothed in virtue, instead of a purple raiment, leaning upon immortality
instead of a sceptre, and adorned with the crown of righteousness instead of a
royal diadem (De hom. 4). While the divine beauty does not reside in a particular
shape or form, the Maker of all, as one painting a portrait, ‘by the addition of
virtues, as it were with colours, shows in us his own sovereignty . . . purity, freedom
from passion, blessedness, estrangement from all evil . . . with such lustres did the
Craftsman of his own image mark our nature’ (De hom. 5.1). There are, indeed,
certain other characteristics of divine beauty in which the image shares a likeness:
for as ‘the divinity is intellect and word’ (νοῦς καὶ λόγος), so also we can see in
ourselves ‘word and mind’ (τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν), an imitation (μίμημα) of
the very Intellect and Word. Moreover, as ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:7, 8), if this is
absent ‘the whole stamp of the image is transformed’ (De hom. 5.2). For Gregory it
is emphatically in the free exercise of virtue that the human being manifests their
existence as the image of God. Gregory concludes his discussion about the image
by arguing that the fact that the human being is made as the image of God should
not be taken, in reverse, to imply that the divine acts in a similar way to human
beings, that is, through different faculties. Even in the case of humans, Gregory
points out, this is misleading, for in fact ‘there is one faculty, the implanted
intellect itself, which passes through each of the organs of sense and grasps the
beings beyond’ (De hom. 6.1). Finally, he argues, that the human being is made in
the image also disproves the ‘Anomoean’ teaching about the unlikeness of the
different natures of Father and Son, for it is impossible for a single image to
resemble two different archetypes.
In the following chapters, Gregory turns his attention to the form of the body,
arguing that its very weakness renders the human being suitable for royal rule, but
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one which is exercised through the cooperation, rather than domination, of his
subjects (De hom. 7), that its upright form, looking upwards to the heavens rather
than down towards the ground, is a mark of royal dignity (De hom. 8.1), and that ‘the
ministry of the hands is a particular property of the rational nature’ (De hom. 8.2).
However, pulling himself up short, in terms which echo Timaeus (Tim. 34b10–35a1,
where after discussing the body, Timaeus reminds himself that he should really treat
the soul first), Gregory comments ‘before discussing this point, however, let us
consider the subject passed over, for the subject of the order of the things that
came to be almost escaped us’ (De hom. 8.3; the discussion about hands is deferred
until De hom. 8.8). What catches his attention now is the sequence narrated by
Moses: first the plants sprouting up from the earth, then the irrational animals, and
only after that the human being. By this order, Gregory suggests, ‘Moses reveals a
certain doctrine about hidden things and secretly delivers the philosophy concerning
the soul’ which is ‘that the vital and animating power is contemplated in three
divisions’: the first, simply the faculty of growth and nutrition, which is called ‘the
vegetative’, for it is seen in plants; the second includes also, in addition to the faculty
of growth and nutrition, the ability to regulate sense-perception, such as we find in
irrational animals; while ‘the perfect embodied life is seen in the rational, I mean the
human, nature, which is both nourished and endowed with sense-perception and
partakes of reason and is ordered by intellect’ (De hom. 8.4). Thus Moses, having
introduced inanimate matter, proceeds to speak of animate beings, beginning with
plants, and then animals with sense-perception, and finally the human being, with
‘nature advancing in a certain way sequentially to perfection’. In Gregory’s estima-
tion Paul does the same in his threefold distinction between body, soul, and spirit
(De hom. 8.5; Thess. 5:23), or carnal, animated, and spiritual (De hom. 8.6; 1 Cor. 3:3,
2:14–15). Gregory’s conclusion from all this is that ‘reasonably, nature makes an
ascent, as it were by steps, I mean the various properties of life, from the lower to the
perfect’ (De hom. 8.7). Having spoken about the development or evolution of the
soul, Gregory then returns to the discussion about hands, pointing out that it is
because humans have hands that their mouths can be fashioned for speaking words,
as befits a ‘rational animal’, rather than for grazing grass or tearing meat (De
hom. 8.8).
Gregory’s emphasis on the body continues in the following chapters. Since God,
he says,

has bestowed upon our moulded figure [τῷ πλάσματι ἡμῶν] a certain godlike
grace, by implanting in the image [ἐνθεὶς τῇ εἰκόνι] the likeness of his own good
gifts, for this reason he gave, of his munificence, the other good gifts to human
nature; yet it is not strictly right to say that he ‘gave’ [δέδωκεν] of intellect and
practical wisdom [νοῦ δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως], but that he ‘gave a share’ [μετέδωκε] of
them, adding to the image the proper adornment of his own nature [τὸν ἴδιον
αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως κόσμον ἐπιβαλὼν τῇ εἰκόνι]. (De hom. 9.1)
98 

It is striking that here, for Gregory, intellect and practical wisdom are not the locus
of the image of God in the human being: it is ‘that which is moulded’ (the πλάσμα,
an allusion to Gen. 2:7) that is the image. It is into this image that God implants
the likeness of his own good gifts, which in turn merit the further gifts, or rather
not a gift of but a share in intellect and reason, adding to the image the distinctive
adornment of the divine nature itself. But even this inestimable share would
remain ineffectual without the body, for as Gregory immediately continues:
‘since the intellect is a thing intelligible and incorporeal, its grace would have
been incommunicable and isolated, without its movement being made manifest by
some contrivance’, that is, this ‘instrumental formation’ that, like the vocal organs
struck by a plectrum, indicates by the sound it produces ‘the movement within’
(De hom. 9.1). And so, ‘since the intellect produces the music of reason by means
of this instrumental construction within us, we have become rational [λογικοὶ
γεγόναμεν]’, which would not have happened had our mouths been shaped in
such a way as to supply the needs of the body rather than being ‘well-adapted for
the service of reason’ (De hom. 10.1). It is, then, the body in its very structure, and
its weakness, that enables human beings to ‘become rational’, manifesting the
divine gifts in which they share, a point which is picked up dramatically at the end
of the treatise.
The activity of this bodily instrument is also ‘twofold’, allowing the intellect to
express itself and communicate its movements, but also allowing for all the
impressions which flow in to the ‘inner receptacle’ through the senses, as
entrances into a city, while the intellect ‘distinguishing and examining each of
the things that enters, stores them in their proper departments of knowledge’
(De hom. 10.3–4). In its own nature, the intellect must, therefore be something
other than the senses (De hom. 11.1), but is itself incomprehensible: ‘ “Who has
known the intellect of the Lord?” asks the apostle; and I ask further, who has
understood his own intellect?’ (De hom. 11.2). But this should not be surprising,
he adds, for made in the image of God, it lacks nothing that is perceived in the
archetype, so that if one of the aspects perceived in the divine nature is incom-
prehensibility, this too will be found in the image (De hom. 11.3–4).
Gregory returns to the subject of the soul, especially the rational soul, in
chapters 14–15. But before that he sets out on a long discussion about the location
of the intellect, whether it should be thought of as residing in a particular part of
the body, such as the heart or the brain. His examination of the matter leads him
to consider those occasions where ‘the calculating faculty is blunted in its natural
activity by some bodily accident’ (De hom. 12.3), or when the membranes around
the side are diseased, so producing ‘frenzy’ (De hom. 12.4), or, less dramatically, in
moments of ‘gladness and laughter’, where parts of the body are relaxed, produ-
cing involuntary movements (De hom. 12.5), or, later on, what happens in sleep,
yawning, and the phenomenon of dreams (De hom. 13). Placed discretely within
this extensive excursus (note De hom. 14.1: ‘we have wandered far from our
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subject’), Gregory introduces a discordant element into this first part of his
treatise, which has otherwise been devoted to a wholly positive description of
the human being. His conclusion regarding the placement of the intellect is that it
is not spatially located in one part of the body, but rather that the intellect ‘passing
throughout the instrument and touching each of the parts in a manner appropri-
ate to its intellectual activities, according to its nature’, effects its proper move-
ment on such parts. In those parts, on the other hand, ‘too weak to accept the
movement of its art it remains ineffective and inactive’, for as he concludes, ‘the
intellect is naturally somehow familiar with that which is disposed according to
nature, but to be alien from that which is removed from it’ (De hom. 12.8). This
train of reflection leads Gregory to speak a little about ‘the more refined teachings’
to be learnt from this (De hom. 12.9). They are:

Since the most beautiful and supreme good of all is the divinity itself, to which
incline all things that have the desire [ἔφεσιν] for the beautiful, we therefore say
that the intellect, as being in accordance with the image of the most beautiful, as
long as it partakes so far as possible in its likeness to the archetype also remains in
the beautiful; but if it were in some way to be outside this, it will be stripped bare
of the beauty in which it was. And just as we said that the intellect was adorned by
the likeness of the archetypal beauty, being formed, as though it were a mirror, by
the figure of that which appears in it, so we consider that the nature administered
by the intellect possesses something of the intellect in the same proportion and
that it is adorned by the beauty issuing from the intellect, such that it becomes, as
it were, a mirror of a mirror; by it, the material element of existence, in which
nature is contemplated [τὸ ὑλικὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, περὶ ἣν θεωρεῖται ἡ φύσις], is
ruled and sustained. (De hom. 12.9)

If this order is preserved, he continues, ‘the communication [κοινωνία] of the

true beauty extends proportionally [ἀναλόγως] through the whole series, beau-
tifying by the superior that which comes next’, but if there is ‘an interruption
[διασπασμός] of this beneficial connection’, or when the superior element
follows the inferior, ‘then the unseemliness [τὸ ἄσχημον] of matter itself is
exposed, when it is isolated from nature (for in itself matter is something
formless and unwrought [ἄμορφον . . . ἀκατάσκευον]), and by its formlessness is
also destroyed the beauty of the nature which was beautified by the intellect; and
in this way the transmission of the ugliness of matter reaches back through the
nature to the intellect itself, so that the image of God is no longer beheld in the
figure of that which was moulded’ (De hom. 12.10: ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι καθορᾶσθαι
τοῦ πλάσματος). Instead, turning its back on ‘the lustrous rays of the good’, the
intellect receives into itself ‘the shapelessness of matter’ (De hom. 12.10). This is,
for Gregory, ‘the genesis of evil’, occurring through ‘the withdrawal of the good’:
the intellect, as ‘having come to be in accordance with the image of the good’, is
100 

able itself to be good, and, as long as it does so, ‘the nature sustained by the
intellect is like an image of the image’, with the material part holding together
and regulated by nature; but this will be dissolved and fall apart if it were no
longer to be sustained by the intellect, and so be ‘severed from its connection to
the good’ (De hom. 12.11). This does not happen, Gregory adds, ‘except when
an overturning [ἐπιστροφή] of nature to the opposite state occurs, in which
desire [ἐπιθυμία] does not incline towards the good but towards that which is in
need of being beautified; for it is absolutely necessary that that being made like
to matter, which is destitute of its own form, it should be conformed to it in
respect of its unseemliness and absence of beauty’ (De hom. 12.12). This account
of ‘the genesis of evil’, however, was only given, Gregory immediately adds,
because he was ‘following a certain line of argument, since they were introduced
by our contemplation of the point before us; for the subject of enquiry was
whether the intellectual faculty has its seat in any of the parts within us or
extends equally over them all’ (De hom. 12.13).
After exploring further, as already noted, the subject of sleep, yawning and
dreams (De hom. 13), observing that ‘we have wandered far from our subject’,
he returns to the point that the intellect should not be thought of as residing in
a particular part of the body, ‘but is equally in touch with the whole, producing
its movement according to the nature of the part under its influence’ (De hom.
14.1). Recalling that his exposition had discerned ‘three different forms regard-
ing the vital faculty’—that is ‘the vegetative’, the ‘sense-perceptive’, and ‘third,
the rational and perfect, pervading the whole faculty’—he emphasizes that these
should not be thought of as ‘three souls welded together’: ‘the true and perfect
soul is one by nature, the intellectual and immaterial, which mingles with the
material nature through the senses’ (De hom. 14.2). It is only, he adds, by ‘a
misuse of language’ that, while ‘the soul has its perfection in that which is
intellectual and rational, everything that is not so may indeed have the homo-
nym of “soul”, yet is not really soul but a certain vital energy associated with the
appellation of “soul” ’ (De hom. 15.1–2). But again, he notes, ‘the course of our
argument has diverged to another point’, his concern being to emphasize that
‘the intellect is not confined to any one part of us, but is equally in all and
through all’ (De hom. 15.3). Of the connection between the material and
immaterial, Gregory comments:

The communion of the intelligible with the bodily is a conjunction unspeakable

and inconceivable, neither being within it (for the incorporeal is not enclosed in a
body) nor yet surrounding it from outside (for things incorporeal do not
surround [something else]), but the intellect, approaching our nature in some
inexplicable and incomprehensible way and coming to touch it, is to be thought
of as both in it and around it, neither seated in it nor enfolded within it, but in a
way which we cannot speak or think. (De hom. 15.3)
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All we can say, he concludes, is that while nature is in proper order, the intellect is
active; if any misfortune (πλημμέλημα) comes upon it, then the movement of
thought falters accordingly.
In these first 15 chapters, Gregory has presented us with a wholly positive
picture of the human being as the image of God, the culmination of, and reason
for, creation, whose body is adapted in its very structure for the exercise (through
weakness) of kingly sovereignty, fashioned in such a way as to enable this animal
to become rational, sharing in the intellect and reason that adorns the divine
nature itself, and so to be the living image, decked out in virtue. But of whom is
Gregory speaking? It is notable that Gregory does not speak in the way that Philo
and Origen do, in their own ways, of the ‘intelligible’ or ‘inner’ human, contrasted
with the bodily or outward one (though, as we have seen, in their case they are also
speaking of the single human being in two aspects). Nor has he been speaking
about the ‘prelapsarian’ Adam (for despite allusions to Gen. 2:7, Adam has not
been mentioned), and his analysis of ‘the genesis of evil’—in the midst of a detour
and thoroughly and discretely padded within an extensive discussion about bodily
phenomena, all of which was aimed to show that the intellect pervades the human
being throughout—is not straightforwardly the narration of an event called ‘the
Fall’. Given that he has spoken about ‘the goal’ for which the human being was to
come into existence (De hom. 4), and that it is in the exercise of virtue that the
human being becomes a ‘living image’, is he in this first part speaking of the
eschatological reality that will come to be at the end (and as such, as he put it in his
first homily on Ecclesiastes, is that which was made in the archē)? Or perhaps he is
talking about Christ? His language at the end of De hom. 15 about how the
incorporeal interacts with the body—pervading the body but not being contained
by it, united to it through an ‘unspeakable and inconceivable conjunction’, not
confined to any one part but ‘equally in all and through all’—might be taken to
intimate this. To go further, we must turn to the next section.

3. The Prevision and Provision of God (16–29)

Gregory begins the second part of his treatise, designated as ‘a contemplation’, by

saying: ‘Let us now take up again [ἐπαναλάβωμεν πάλιν] the divine saying, “Let us
make the human being in accordance with our image and likeness” ’ (De hom.
16.1). What follows is not a mere resumption of a continuous analysis. Rather
Gregory now turns to the central problematic of his treatise. The dignity of the
human being is not, as some say, in being ‘a little cosmos’ made of the same
elements as the universe, for so too are gnats and mice; rather, ‘according to the
ecclesiastical teaching’, the dignity is shown in the human being coming to be ‘in
accordance with the image’ of God (De hom. 16.2). However, what is ‘the
definition of the image’, and how can the incorporeal be likened to the body,
102 

the temporal to the eternal, that which grows up with evil with that which is
unmixed with evil (De hom. 16.3)? ‘How, then, is the human being, this mortal
being, subject to passions and short-lived, an image of that undefiled and pure and
everlasting nature?’ (De hom. 16.4). While only ‘the very Truth clearly knows the
true account regarding this’, Gregory nevertheless ventures to explain what ‘we, so
far as we are able, tracking down the truth by guesses and suspicions, apprehend’
regarding these things (De hom. 16.4). To do so, he must navigate his way between
an apparent contradiction, both elements of which must be maintained: that the
divine word doesn’t lie in saying that the human being came to be in accordance
with the image of God, and yet that one cannot liken ‘the pitiable wretchedness of
human nature’ to ‘the blessedness of the impassible life’. Nevertheless, an account
must be given to hold these two truths together, and so, as he put it in the Epistle
to Peter, bring things that seem contradictory ‘to one and the same end’.
So, Scripture must be ‘taken up again’. In so doing, Gregory focuses not on the
difference between the two creation accounts, that made in the image (Gen.
1:26–7) and that moulded from earth (Gen. 2:7), as did Philo and Origen in
their own ways, but on a tension between the clauses of Gen. 1:27: ‘[a] And God
made the human, [b] according to the image of God he made it, [c] male and
female made he them’. These clauses, he says, ‘must be examined with precision’,
and so his analysis must also be given in full and examined precisely:

[16.7] For we find that what came to be [γενόμενον] ‘in accordance with the
image’ is one [ἕτερον μέν], and what is now manifest in wretchedness is another
[ἕτερον δὲ]. ‘God made [ἐποίησεν]’, it says, ‘the human being, in accordance
with the image of God he made it’. The creation of that which came to be ‘in
accordance with the image’ has an end [τέλος ἔχει ἡ τοῦ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα γεγενημένου
κτίσις]; then it makes a repetition [ἐπανάληψιν] of the account regarding
the formation [τοῦ κατὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν λόγου], and says, ‘male and female he
made them’. I think it is known to everyone that this is understood to be outside
the Prototype, ‘for in Christ Jesus’, as the apostle says, ‘there is neither male nor
female’ [Gal. 3:28], but the account [ὁ λόγος] says that the human being is indeed
divided [διηρῆσθαι] into these. Therefore, the formation of our nature is in a
sense twofold [Οὐκοῦν διπλῆ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευὴ], that being
likened to the divine [ἥτε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὡμοιωμένη], [and] that being divided
according to this difference [ἥτε πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην διηρημένη]; for some-
thing like this the account hints at by the syntax of what is written, first saying,
‘God made the human being, in accordance with the image of God he made it’, and
then, adding to what has been said, ‘male and female made he them’, something
that is foreign to what is conceived about God. (De hom. 16.7–8)

In each clause of Gen. 1:27, the word used for God’s action is the same: he ‘made’
(ἐποίησεν). What it is that is ‘made’ in these causes, however, is expounded by
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Gregory with different words.⁹ With Gen. 1:27ab, Gregory uses the word ‘creation’
(κτίσις) for ‘that which has come to be [τοῦ . . . γεγενημένου] in accordance with
the image’. He does not say that this ‘creation’ has ‘come to an end’, but rather ‘has
an end’, that is, it has an end in view, a goal or final cause, which is, as he puts it in
the next sentence, its Prototype, that is, Christ Jesus. It is very important to register
this point: it is Christ who is the Prototype, not Adam, who in fact has not yet been
mentioned, either by Scripture or by Gregory (until De hom. 16.16 and 22.3, in
both cases specifying that he is not talking about Adam). Gregory then takes v. 27c
as being an ‘ἐπανάληψις of the account of the κατασκευὴ’: both words used here
need to be carefully considered. The word ἐπανάληψις can mean either a ‘resump-
tion’ or a ‘repetition’, while the word κατασκευὴ, as noted in Chapter 1, can mean
‘construction’ in the sense of ‘fitting-out’ or ‘preparing’, but also in the sense of
‘state, condition, constitution’ (cf. LSJ s.v.). The result of God’s ‘making’ in v. 27c
is, in Gregory’s words, the ‘division’ of the human being into male and female.
Finally, the conclusion he draws from all this is that ‘the κατασκευὴ of our nature
is in a sense twofold’, that ‘being likened to the divine’ and that divided into male
and female. Gregory continues in the next sentence (De hom. 16.9, cited below) by
reiterating this twofold aspect of the human being, as the ‘span’, sharing in both
the divine, by its intellect, and in the irrational, by its bodily construction, which in
turn is divided into male and female. As such, it would seem that we should take
the word κατασκευὴ, ‘formation’, in the sense of ‘constitution’, so that it is the
structure of human nature that is ‘twofold’ (the rational and intellectual, and the
irrational and corporeal), rather than God’s act of ‘making’, played out in two
distinct stages.¹⁰ As we saw in Gregory’s Hexaemeron, and as we will see again
with regard to the human plenitude discussed shortly, God’s act of making is
instantaneous, encompassing all that is to be, while what comes into being is
‘manifested’ (Hex. 64), and the human being ‘presented’ and ‘introduced’ (De
hom. 2), in proper order, a sequence moreover, in which, according to Moses’

⁹ Wilson translated all these words simply as ‘create’ or ‘creation’: ‘ “God created man . . .” There is an
end of the creation of that which was made in the image; then it makes a resumption of the account of
creation . . .’
¹⁰ Cf. Eugenio Corsini, ‘Plérôme humain et plérôme cosmique chez Grégoire de Nysse’, in
Marguerite Harl, ed., Écriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nysse: Actes du
Colloque de Chevetogne (22–26 Septembre 1969) (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 111–26, at 115: ‘Il ne dit
nullement qu’il y a eu deux créations pour les deux aspects: il dit tout simplement qu’il y a deux
expressions de l’Écriture pour indiquer que l’acte créateur de Dieu s’est porté sur deux aspects différents
de l’homme. Grégoire ne dit pas, non plus, que l’homme «à l’image» n’avait pas de sexe: il veut dire que
dans l’archétype (Dieu) il n’y a pas de sexe et que le sexe est, en conséquence, exclu du κατ᾽ εἰκόνα.’ For
a valiant attempt to argue that the διπλῆ κατασκευὴ denotes a ‘two stage creation’ in De hom. 16, see
Johannes Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory: Philosophical Background and Theological
Significance (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 166–74, yet this leads him to conclude that ‘there ultimately remains
a grave tension between this theory and the role of man as a mediator between the sensible and the
intelligible envisaged in the earlier parts of his writing . . . the rudimentary nature of Gregory’s
Origenism itself is responsible for a number of severe inconsistencies’ (166), and that therefore
‘Gregory here effectively undermines his own previous argument’ (171).
104 

‘philosophy of the soul’, ‘nature makes an ascent’ from the lower to the perfect
(De hom. 8.4–7).
This, in turn, would suggest that ἐπανάληψις has the force of ‘repetition’ not
‘resumption’: rather than continuing to a second stage of a two-step account of
creation, Gen. 1:27c repeats the account of God’s single act of making, but now
under a different aspect, one that includes human existence as male and female.
There would then be a parallel between these two clauses of Genesis (1:27ab and
1:27c), on the one hand, and, on the other, the first 15 chapters and what follows:
this part of the treatise presents a ‘repetition’ of the ‘construction’ of the human
being but under a different aspect or from a different perspective; indeed, it really
only now becomes apparent that he had said nothing about male and female when
describing the human being in the first part of the treatise. Finally, as such, this
second part of Gregory’s treatise corresponds to the second part of Timaeus’
speech, when, realizing that he has so far given an account of ‘what was crafted
by Intellect’, he notes that he must start again, for ‘if one is to speak of how it really
came to be [γέγονεν . . . ὄντως] one would have to introduce the character of the
Straying Cause’ (cf. Tim. 47e3–48b3)—which is precisely what Gregory does in
what follows.
Concluding this examination of the verse of Scripture, Gregory sets out unam-
biguously what its teaching is:

I think that by these words, Holy Scripture conveys to us a certain great and lofty
doctrine [δόγμα]; and the doctrine is this. While two [elements]—the divine and
incorporeal nature [φύσεως], and the irrational and animal life [ζωῆς]—are
separated from each other as extremes, humankind is the span [μέσον]. For
there is to be beheld in the human compound a share of each of those
mentioned—of the divine, the rational and intelligent, which does not admit
the distinction of male and female; of the irrational, the bodily formation and
construction, divided into male and female—for each of them is certainly in all
that partakes of human life [ζωῆς]. But the intellectual takes precedence
[προτερεύειν], as we have learnt from one who gives in detail an ordered account
of the origin of the human being [ἀνθρωπογονίαν]; participation and kinship with
the irrational is concomitant to being human [ἐπιγεννηματικὴν δὲ εἶναι τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ], for he first says that ‘God made the human being in accordance
with the image’ of God, showing by what was said, just as the Apostle says,
that in such a being ‘there is no male and female’, then he adds the particularities
of human nature [τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὰ ἰδιώματα], that ‘male and female he
made them’. (De hom. 16.9)

The explicit teaching of Scripture, for Gregory, is that the human being is the
‘span’ between the divine nature and animal life, participating in both. The
‘precedence’ or ‘priority’ of the intellectual over the irrational, bodily, and sexed,
  ’  ,       105

in the twofold human formation or construction is not, however, chronological

(as would be implied by a two-step creation); indeed, as we have already seen, he
regards Moses’ ‘philosophy of the soul’ in terms of an advance in the other
direction, from the nutritive to the sense-perceptive to, lastly, the intellectual
(De hom. 8.4–7), a pattern we will see again in medical terms at the end of his
treatise. The ‘precedence’ is certainly an ontological priority: it is this that distin-
guishes the human being from the irrational animals and so it should take the
lead; the overturning of this order, indeed, results in the ‘genesis of evil’ (De hom.
12.11). But in this passage, the priority primarily pertains to the literary order, for,
as Gregory explains, it is spoken of first in Moses’ ‘anthropogony’: it is written
first, but it only comes into actual existence at the end.
This being stated first, what then follows, human existence as male and female,
is ἐπιγεννηματικὴν. Wilson, following Dionysius Exiguus’ Latin translation, ren-
dered this word as ‘a provision for reproduction’.¹¹ The word in fact means ‘of the
nature of an ἐπιγέννημα, resulting, consequential’, it is that which comes upon
something else, something that is concomitant to something else; it does not
define what it is to be, in this case, a human being, but is, nevertheless, as
Gregory puts it at the end of the sentence, the ‘particularities of human nature’.¹²
The verbal form of the word is used by Gregory in De hom. 17.4 and 30.33, and in
the latter, as we will see, the subject is again Moses’ ‘anthropogony’. There is no
explicit purpose assigned here, where Gregory presents the teaching of Scripture,
to human existence as male and female; in distinction to God, they are simply ‘the
particularities of human nature’, part of the bodily construction and formation,
and are found in everything that partakes of human life.
Turning next to what we can learn from this, Gregory emphasizes that God,
being good or beyond any good we can understand, created the human being for
no other reason than his own goodness, and bestowed upon human beings all
possible goods, which is summed up in the assertion that the human being is made
‘according to the image’ of God, so that there is in the human being ‘a form of
every beauty, all virtue and wisdom’, and especially the ‘self-determining deliber-
ation’ without which there would be no virtue (De hom. 16.10–11). But there must
also be a difference between the archetype and the image, Gregory notes, for
otherwise they would be the same. Strikingly, however, given what he has just said

¹¹ Dionysius rendered the sentence thus: ‘But from one who speaks about the very order of creation
we have learnt that what is intellectual in us takes precedence before that which we see serves for the
propagation of the human race [taking ἀνθρωπογονία as a reference to sexual reproduction], for in fact
there is some kind of innate conjunction of the human with irrational things for the accomplishing of
generation’. Eriugena, on the other hand, translated the word ἐπιγεννηματικὴν as ‘supergenituam’.
¹² Cf. LSJ s.v. In philosophy, the terms seems to have been a Stoic term, for whom joy, cheerfulness,
and the like are ‘by-products’ of virtue (SVF 3.19.29); according to Cicero, ‘In the other arts, when we
speak of an “artistic” performance, this quality must be considered as in a sense subsequent to and a
result of the action, it is what the Stoics call ἐπιγεννηματικόν’. On Ends (Fin.) 3.9.32; ed. and ET
H. Rackham, LCL 40, Cicero 17 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914).
106 

about the distinctive property of human nature, Gregory does not point to human
existence as male and female as the locus of this difference, but rather to the fact
that, as created, the human being cannot exist without change, ‘for its very passage
from non-being into being is a kind of movement and alteration of the non-
existent being changed by the divine purpose into being’ (De hom. 16.12). As such,
while the attributes bestowed by God upon the human being are indeed his own,
the difference between the two is found in the substratum seen in the uncreated
and created (De hom. 16.13).
It is on this basis that Gregory can now respond to the predicament he posed at
the beginning of the chapter, and he does so by appealing to the wavering, mutable
will of human beings (the equivalent of Timaeus’ ‘straying cause’), foreseen by
God in his prevision of and provision for the waywardness of the human will.
According to Gregory:

Since, then, as the one always remains as it is, while the other, having come into
being though creation, began to exist from alteration and has kinship with such
change, on this account ‘he who knows all things before their genesis’, as the
prophecy says [Sus. (Θ) 42], following, or rather knowing beforehand, by his
faculty of foreknowledge towards what the movement of human choice inclines,
in accordance with its independence and self-determination—since he knows
what is to be, he devised for the image the difference of male and female, which
no longer looks to the divine archetype but, as was said, assimilates
[προσῳκείωται] to the less rational nature. (De hom. 16.14)

What is striking about this paragraph is that it is not only a response to the
problem of why we don’t (immediately) see the image of God in human beings,
but that it is phrased as an aetiological account for what he has just established as
the scriptural teaching regarding the human as a twofold being, intellectual and
corporeal, with the particularities of being male and female. That is, if the purpose
of God is to make a human being in accordance with his image (Gen. 1:26), and in
the Prototype there ‘is not male and female’ (Gal. 3:28), why and for what purpose
did God also make the human being ‘male and female’? That God has done so, and
that the human being is such, is not in question: the issue is why? And his answer
here is that this assimilation to the less rational is a provision made in anticipation
of the divinely foreseen waywardness of the human will.
However, this is immediately followed by Gregory registering a change in his
mode of his discourse:

The reason [τὴν αἰτίαν] for such a device only those who were ‘eyewitnesses’ of
the truth ‘and ministers of the Word’ [Luke 1:2] can know; but we, as far as is
possible, by means of some guesses and images picturing the truth [εἰκόνων
φαντασθέντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν], do not set forth categorically what comes to mind,
  ’  ,       107

but add it in a form of an exercise [ἐν γυμνασίας εἴδει] for our well-disposed
hearers. (De hom. 16.15)

This is strong language indeed, contrasting greatly with the categorical ‘great and
lofty doctrine’ given by Scripture a few paragraphs earlier. The ‘exercise’ that he
offers, moreover, is not simply his best conjecture at that which cannot ultimately
be known except by those who were eyewitnesses, for it is combined with the
assertion that he is not going to say directly what comes to mind, but instead offer
images that ‘picture the truth’.¹³ Gregory offers two further aetiological accounts
of the relationship between God’s prevision and human existence as male and
female (De hom. 17.4–5 and 22); it is only in the latter where he finally states ‘what
comes to our mind’ (De hom. 22.3). The sequence of Gregory’s argument over
these chapters is, moreover, convoluted, with apparent detours tackling a range of
topics (in the same way that when Timaeus’ treats what is only a ‘likely story’ his
account tends to be ‘casual and random’; cf. Tim. 34c2–4), before he is prepared to
state his position.
Gregory begins by observing that the statement ‘God made the human being’
does not in fact refer to Adam; he is introduced later in the narrative (De hom.
16.16). Rather ‘the indefinite character of the term’ indicates, for Gregory, that the
text is not speaking of the particular but the universal, and so ‘we are led by the
universal name of the nature to suppose something such as this, that by divine
foreknowledge and power all humanity is included in the first formation’ (De hom.
16.16: πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κατασκευῇ περιείληται). But, as God does
not make anything indeterminate, each being made by him must have ‘some limit
and measure’ prescribed by the wisdom of God. And so, ‘the entire plenitude of
humanity [ὅλον τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα] was included by the God of all, by
his power of foreknowledge, as in one body’, and this, in turn, means that ‘the
image is not in part of our nature’, but rather ‘extends equally to the whole genus’,
as is shown by the fact that ‘the intellect is seated alike in all’ (De hom. 16.16–17),
that is, in both males and females alike, and in each and all. He then concludes this

¹³ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De Anima et resurrectione (An. et res.), 3.36, where the subject is similarly
the question of the status of the ‘concomitants’ (translated by Silvas as ‘accretions’): ‘All these we reckon
as accretions from without, because no such characteristics are to be found in the beauty of the
archetype. In the meantime, let the following argument of these matters be offered as a kind of training
exercise (ὁ δὲ δὴ περὶ τούτων λόγος ἡμῖν τέως ὡς ἐν γυμνασίῳ προκείσθω), to avoid the sneers of
contentious hearers. The Word tells us that the divine proceeded by a certain gradual and orderly
sequence to the creation of man.’ Ed. Andreas Spira, GNO 3.3 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 40; ET in Anna
M. Silvas, Macrina the Younger: Philosopher of God, Medieval Women: Texts and Contexts, 22
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). The Greek text is not divided into chapters and paragraphs; these are
supplied by Silvas. See also Hex. 9 and De Tridui Spatio, ed. E. Gebhardt, GNO 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1967),
286.15–16; ET Stuart Hall, in Andreas Spira and Christoph Klock, The Easter Sermons of Gregory of
Nyssa: Translation and Commentary: Proceedings of the Fourth International Colloquium on Gregory of
Nyssa, Cambridge, England: 11–15 September, 1978, Patristic Monograph Series, 9 (Cambridge, MA:
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1981), 31–50, at 38.
108 

reflection on the pleromatic character of the human being created in the image
this way:

The human being manifested together with the first formation of the world [ὅ τε
τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευῇ συναναδειχθεὶς ἄνθρωπος], and he who shall
come to be after consummation of all [ὁ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς συντέλειαν
γενησόμενος], both likewise have this: they equally bear in themselves the divine
image. For this reason the whole was called one human being, because to the
power of God nothing has either passed or is to come, but even that which is
looked for is held fast equally with the present by his all-embracing activity. The
whole nature [πᾶσα ἡ φύσις], then, extending from the first [πρώτων] to the last
[ἐσχάτων], is a kind of single image of He Who Is. But the difference between
male and female was additionally fashioned for the creature last, I suppose, for
this reason. (De hom. 16.17–18)

This very strong understanding of the unity of all human beings—past, present,
and future—as one human being is, again, an expression of God’s instantaneous
and comprehensive act of making which unfolds through its own sequence and
order. Embracing all that would come to be, the human being ‘manifested’ at the
beginning, and the one who ‘comes to be after the consummation of all’, bear the
divine image. Here now we see the significance of the fact that to this point
Gregory has not been speaking of Adam, the first particular human being in the
Genesis narrative, but only appearing in its second chapter: to apply a point we
noted when discussing Origen, Adam might be the first, but he is not the archē.¹⁴
The image of God in accordance with whom God makes the human being in Gen.
1:27 is, as we saw in De hom. 16.7, Christ Jesus, the ‘Prototype’. Yet so too is the
one who ‘comes to be’ at the end, but then, ‘after the consummation of all’, in ‘the
entire plenitude of humanity’ foreseen by God from or in the beginning, the archē.
Or, as von Balthasar more elegantly put it: ‘The total Christ is none other than the
total humanity’.¹⁵
Although Gregory says that he will next turn to the reason for creatures also
being fashioned as male and female, he in fact defers that discussion, turning first
to another matter, that is the argument of his ‘opponents’ who teach that as there

¹⁴ Zachhuber (Human Nature, 35–40, 128–44) makes a strong case that Gregory’s understanding
of the ‘plenitude’ of humanity derives ultimately from the idea of a ‘derivative genus’ (‘a class of things
that share their derivation from the same being, which is thus both the first element of the class and of
the genus itself ’, p. 37), developed by Apollinarius, with the important difference that (p. 161) ‘Their
chief divergence appears to consist in the fact that with Apollinarius the principle (ἀρχή) of humanity is
identical with the first human individual, whereas with Gregory it is not. Thus, Apollinarius would
see Adam as both the archē and the first individual person, while for Gregory the archē is as distinct
from Adam as from all other men.’
¹⁵ Hans Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of
Nyssa, trans. Mark Sebanc (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1995 [1944]), 87.
  ’  ,       109

is no account of procreation before the sin, marriage did not exist in paradise, and
so humanity would not have come to plurality if the grace of immortality had not
fallen away and the fear of death impelled the first-formed to provide succession
of the race (De hom. 17.1). Gregory, again accepting that ‘the true account’ is only
known to those like Paul who had been initiated into the mysteries of Paradise,
responds by citing the word of Christ to the Sadducees, that in the resurrection
there will be no more ‘marrying and giving in marriage . . . for they are like the
angels’ (Luke 20:35–6), arguing that ‘if the life [ζωὴ] of those restored is akin to
that of the angels, it is clear that the mode of life [βίος] before the transgression
was something angelic, and hence our ascent to the primordial condition of life
[ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν ἐπάνοδος] is likened to the angels’ (De hom. 17.2).
Gregory seems to be playing here, as we will see more clearly later, between two
different words for ‘life’: ζωὴ, that which characterizes the nature of something (as
for instance it seems to do in De hom. 16.9, cited above) and βίος, which has more
the sense of ‘mode of life’. This would suggest that, at least in this rhetorical
argument, before the transgression humans lived a human life in an angelic
manner, and ascending to this ancient condition it will be such again. And so,
Gregory argues, as the angels clearly exist in multitudes, ‘if there had not come
upon us as a result of sin a turning away and a displacement from equality of
honour with the angels, neither should we have needed marriage for multiplying,
but whatever the mode of increase [τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ τρόπος] is in the nature of the
angels (unspeakable and inconceivable by human guesses, except that it assuredly
exists), it would have operated also in the case of human beings, “made a little
lower than the angels”, increasing humankind to the measure determined by the
will of the Maker’ (De hom. 17.2; Ps. 8:6).
‘Having cleared up these matters’, at least as far as it serves his purpose, Gregory
then offers his second aetiological account of God’s prevision and provision as it
pertains to human existence as male and female:

He who brought all things into being, and modelled the human being as a whole
by his own will into the divine image, did not wait to see the number of souls
made complete in its proper plenitude by the gradual addition of those subse-
quently coming to be, but considering the human nature as a whole, in its
plenitude, by the activity of foreknowledge, and honouring it with an allocation
exalted and equal to the angels, since he foresaw by his visionary power the
[human] will not keeping a straight course towards the good and, because of this,
falling away from the angelic life [ζωὴ], in order that the multitude of human
souls should not be cut short, by falling from that mode [τοῦ τρόπου] by which
the angels increased to a multitude, for this reason he formed in our nature that
device for increase [τῆς αὐξήσεως ἐπίνοιαν ἐγκατασκευάζει τῇ φύσει] appropriate
to those who had slipped into sin, implanting in humanity, instead of the angelic
nobility, the animal and irrational mode of succession from one another. Hence
110 

also, it seems to me, the great David, lamenting the misery of the human being,
mourns over his nature with such words as these, that, ‘the human being in
honour knew it not’ (meaning by ‘honour’ the equality of honour with the
angels), [and] therefore, he says, ‘he was compared to senseless beasts, and
made like them’ [Ps. 48:13]. For the one who received in his nature this genesis
subject to flux on account of his inclination to things material truly became
like a beast [ὄντως γὰρ κτηνώδης ἐγένετο ὁ τὴν ῥοώδη ταύτην γένεσιν τῇ φύσει
παραδεξάμενος διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑλῶδες ῥοπήν]. (De hom. 17.4–5)

The brief aetiology given in De hom. 16.14, which made no connection between
existence as male and female and procreation (human or angelic), is now further
developed, but has also become somewhat circular: God, foreseeing the wayward-
ness of the human will, that it would fall away from the angelic life and their mode
of increase, formed for humans ‘that device for increase’ befitting those who had
fallen into sin, although it is only because God thus creates the human twofold
that they are able to fall away in this way. There is, moreover, an ambiguity in the
last line: Does the human become like a beast when (and because) God implants
this device for increase, or when the (twofold) human no longer directs his will
towards the good, but assimilates himself to the animals, and in that way becomes
like a beast? And if God did indeed form in our nature this device for procreation
before the human turned away from the good, were humans in fact ever able
to multiply ‘as the angels’? And, finally, whom has Gregory been speaking
about so far, or even, for that matter, is he saying what he actually thinks (recall
De hom. 16.15)?
Gregory goes on in the following chapter to give a very nuanced account of how
the passions arise in human beings. It is ‘from this beginning’ (referring back to
the last line of De hom. 17.5, cited above), that ‘the passions of each one issue as
from a spring, to flow over in human life’ (De hom. 18.1). It cannot be, he argues,
that ‘the first beginnings of the impassioned disposition’ derive from that mod-
elled in the divine form; rather, as the irrational animals entered the world first,
‘the human being, for the reason already mentioned, has something of their nature
(I mean regarding genesis)’, and therefore also partakes of the other attributes of
that nature, such as the incensive faculty, cowardice, rashness, and so on (De hom.
18.1). But, while animals possess these attributes for the sake of ‘self-preservation’,
‘when transferred to human life [they] become passions’ (De hom. 18.2). The
human being is, again, twofold, modelled on divine beauty but ‘also bearing, in
the passionate impulses that arise in him, a relationship to the animal-like [form]’
(De hom. 18.3). Because of this, ‘the love of pleasure had its beginning from the
likeness to the irrational animals, but was increased by human transgressions
[πλημμελήμασι], begetting such varieties of sinning for pleasure’ that are not
found amongst the animals; more specifically it is ‘the evil husbandry of the
  ’  ,       111

intellect’ that perverts ‘the impulses of the irrational animals’, turning them into
the vices (De hom. 18.4)—it is the intellect that is the problem, not the body (made
male and female) and its impulses that humans share with the animals. But, on the
other hand, Gregory continues, ‘if the passion were stripped of the alliance with
calculating thoughts, the anger that is left behind is short-lived and weak, like a
bubble, bursting as soon as it comes into being’ (De hom. 18.4). Even more, the
impulses of the irrational nature, rather than becoming vices through misuse by
the intellect, can instead be transformed into virtue: anger produces courage,
cowardice caution, and so on: in fact, ‘every such movement, when elevated by
the loftiness of mind, is conformed to the beauty of the divine image’ (De hom.
18.5). Within the twofold compound that is the human being, however, the soul is
more frequently drawn downwards by the weight of the irrational nature than is
the earthy element raised by loftiness of mind. What we thus more frequently see
is the passions covering over the beauty of the image, though it is nevertheless
possible to see the divine form in those who have ordered their lives aright, such as
Moses (De hom. 18.6–8).
Gregory then turns his reflection to the question of eating, another feature we
share in common with the irrational animals, and those who feel ashamed that our
life is sustained by food (De hom. 18.9). We might, Gregory suggests, hope that
this function (along with procreation) will pass away in the age to come, as is
perhaps suggested by various scriptural verses (Rom. 14:17 and Matt. 4:4), and by
the idea that ‘as the resurrection indicates to us a life equal to the angels, and with
the angels there is no food’ (De hom. 18.9). Gregory, however, points out that
there are many other ways in which ‘eating’ is spoken of in Scripture, and that the
‘tree’ in Paradise, called ‘all’ (τὸ πᾶν ξύλον; cf. Gen. 2:16) from which we are invited
to eat, is none other than Wisdom herself, who is ‘a tree of life’ (Prov. 3:18; De
hom. 19.1–4). Opposed to this tree is the tree of ‘the knowledge of good and evil’
(which also stands at the centre of the garden), offering a mixed fruit, that is, one
that appears to be good but contains evil (De hom. 19.5; Gen. 2:9, 17). Noting that
Scripture makes a distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘discernment’, Gregory
argues that in fact the latter is the higher condition: ‘for to “discern” skilfully “the
good from the evil”, the Apostle says is of a more perfect condition and “of
exercised senses”, on which account he also gives the injunction “test all things”
and says that “discernment” belongs to the “spiritual” ’ (De hom. 20.1; Heb. 5:14;
1 Thess. 5:21; 1 Cor. 2:15). However, as ‘the majority judge the good to be in that
which gratifies the senses’, they are attracted by the appearance of the mixed fruit,
and so receive also the evil within, ‘the knowledge of which, that is, its reception by
experience, is the beginning and ground of death and destruction’ (De hom. 20.3).
It is this ‘evil poison’ working its effect upon the human being, likening the human
being to ‘vanity’ and the result is all that which is ‘painful and wretched’ in our
mode of life (βίος) in its estrangement from likeness to the divine (De hom. 20.4–5;
Ps. 143:3). However, as evil is finite and God infinite, it must needs be, Gregory
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points out, that, as the very character of our nature and life is mutability and
movement, we will all ultimately return to God: ‘as evil does not extend to infinity,
but is bounded by necessary limits, the accession of the good consequently
succeeds the limit of evil, and thus, as we have said, the ever-moving character
of our nature runs its journey once more at last towards the good, chastened by the
memory of its former misfortunes so that it will never again be in the same
circumstances’ (De hom. 21.2). Paradise will be restored, and so too the tree of
life, and the grace and dignity of the image (De hom. 21.4).
It is only now, having explored in a rather rambling manner these different
issues, that Gregory returns, for the third and final time, to the question of God’s
prevision and provision, the relationship between the plenitude of the human
race, as one human being, and particular human beings, and the relationship
between human existence as male and female and procreation, angelic or
human—doing all this now, moreover, in accord with ‘what comes to our mind’
rather than as an ‘exercise’. He begins by posing a problem, in the form of a
question from someone complaining, like a vexed child, about the delay of the
good things promised: ‘What is this reason, in accordance with which the trans-
formation of our painful mode of life [βίος] to that which is desired does not take
place immediately, but that this heavy and corporeal life [ζωὴ] itself waits,
extended to some determined time, for the limit of the consummation of all
things, in order that then the human life [ζωὴ] may be set free, as it were from
the bridle, ascending again, released and free, to the blessed and impassible mode
of life [βίος]? (De hom. 22.2). Saying now ‘what comes to our mind’ in returning
again to Gen. 1:26–7, Gregory begins with the observation that ‘the image of God,
then, that which is contemplated in the universal nature, had its end [τὸ τέλος
ἔσχεν], but as yet, Adam was not’, for it is ‘the earthy moulded figure’ (τὸ γὰρ
γήϊνον πλάσμα) that is called, etymologically, ‘Adam’, as Paul, who knew Hebrew,
designates ‘the human being from the earth “earthy” as though translating the
name Adam into the Greek language’ (De hom. 22.3; 1 Cor. 15:47). Gregory then
continues:

In accordance with the image, then, the human being came to be, that is, the
universal nature [ἡ καθόλου φύσις], the godlike thing; by the omnipotent
wisdom not a part of the whole, but the plenitude of nature as a whole came to be
[γέγονε . . . ἅπαν ἀθρόως τὸ τῆς φύσεως πλήρωμα]. He who holds all limits in his
grasp saw, as the Scripture says, ‘all the ends of the earth in his hands’ [Ps. 94:4], he
‘who knows all things even before their genesis’ [Sus. (Θ) 42] saw, embracing in his
knowledge, how many in number humanity will be in its individuals. Since he
perceived in our moulded figure [ἐν τῷ πλάσματι ἡμῶν] the inclination towards
the worse, and that, voluntarily falling from equality of honour with the angels,
it would appropriate fellowship with the lowly nature, he mingled [κατέμιξε], for
this reason, an element of the irrational with his own image, for the distinction
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between male and female is not in the divine and blessed nature; but, when
transferring [μετενεγκὼν] the property of the irrational formation to the human
being, he bestowed upon our race the power of multiplying [τὸν πλεονασμὸν], not
according to the lofty character of our creation, for it was not when he made that
which was in accordance with the image that he added the power to increase and
multiply, but when he divided it [διέκρινε] by the distinction of male and female
that he then said, ‘Increase and multiply and fill the earth’ [Gen. 1:28]. For such is
not a property of the divine nature, but of the irrational element, as the narrative
indicates, when it narrates that this was first said by God in the case of the
irrational animal [cf. Gen. 1:22]; since if, before putting on our nature the
distinction between male and female, he had added the power for ‘increase’
expressed by this utterance, we should not have needed this form of birth, by
which the irrational animals are born. (De hom. 22.4)

It is the plenitude of human beings, not simply as an abstract category (‘the

universal nature’), but also the ‘number humanity will be in its individuals’, that
is created in accordance with the image. Gregory again appeals to the prevision of
God, foreseeing the voluntary fall from equality with the angels, and his provision
by dividing the human into male and female, a property not belonging to the high
character of human existence as made according to the image but that which is
shared with the animals. But this time Gregory notes a further dimension in the
scriptural text, bringing in the following verse: it is only when God ‘divided’ the
human being into male and female that he bestowed the power of increasing and
multiplying, just as he had earlier done with the animals, so that any suggestion
that humans might have multiplied otherwise is finally, scripturally, and defini-
tively excluded. Only now—after ‘exercising’ our reasoning powers, so that we
might no longer think, like his ‘opponents’, that procreation is for the sake of
preserving the human race (cf. De hom. 17), or that the problem lies with the body
and its impulses shared with the irrational animals rather than with the ‘evil
husbandry of the intellect’ (cf. De hom. 18.4), taking ‘what gratifies our senses’ as
the criterion of the good, but have instead learnt ‘discernment’ (cf. De hom. 20)—
can we perhaps sense how ‘every movement, when elevated by loftiness of mind, is
conformed to the beauty of the divine image’ (De hom. 18.5), for sexual procre-
ation (and it was never otherwise) thus contributes to the completion of the
plenitude of humanity in its individuals that is the divine image of God.¹⁶

¹⁶ Cf. Balthasar, Presence and Thought, 174: ‘The introduction of the realm of possibilities remains
licit, henceforth, only if it is understood as a “mythical” way of expressing the real. We had reason to
believe that the myth of an asexual generation of humanity was understood by Gregory as being just
such.’ Though at an earlier stage in the development of his analysis, Balthasar had commented (73–4):
‘Not that procreation is bad in itself, but it is, as it were, the sacrament of sin.’
114 

Gregory continues by returning to the question of his interlocutor: why the

delay?

With the plenitude of human beings, then, preconceived by the activity of

foreknowledge, coming into life by means of this more animal form of birth,
God, who guides all things in a certain order and sequence—since the inclination
of our nature to what is lowly (which he who beholds, equally with the present,
what is to be before it happens) made this form of birth absolutely necessary
[ὅλως . . . ἀναγκαῖον] for humanity—therefore also foreknew the time coextensive
with the formation of human beings: so that the extent of time should be adapted
for the entrance of the predetermined souls, and that the flowing movement of
time should then halt, when humanity is no longer produced by it; and when the
genesis of human beings is completed, time should stop together with the end of
it, and then should take place the reconstitution of all things, and with the
changing of the whole, humanity should also be changed, from the corruptible
and earthy to the impassible and eternal. (De hom. 22.5)

What was seen earlier (De hom. 21) as the wayward movement of human beings
running its course in finite evil, to return, necessarily, to the good but now with
experienced discernment, a higher state than mere knowledge, is now also seen as
the completion of God’s own work of making the human being in his image, the
completion of the plenitude of human beings, the end of time, and ‘the reconsti-
tution of all things’. It is this promise, Gregory says, that the divine Apostle holds
out before us: ‘Behold I tell you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be
changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet’ (1 Cor.
15:51–2), the ‘moment’ and the ‘twinkling of an eye’ designating ‘an instant of
time’, that limit ‘which has no parts or extension’, and the transformation through
the resurrection effecting a change so that ‘the weight of the flesh no longer weighs
downwards nor does its burden hold them to the earth’ and they can arise through
the air, ‘caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and so we shall ever be
with the Lord’ (De hom. 22.6; 1 Thess. 4:17). So, he concludes, we must ‘wait the
time necessarily co-extensive with human increase’ (De hom. 22.7), as did the
Patriarchs, who desired to see the good things and sought the heavenly homeland,
but waited with patience and hope, for as the Apostle said ‘God having foreseen
something better for us, that without us they would not be made perfect’ (De hom.
22.7; Heb. 11:40).
In the remaining chapters of this second part of the treatise, Gregory deals with
various sundry points that arise out of further reflection on the end and the
transformation to be effected through the resurrection. In Chapter 23, he
addresses the point that if one holds that the world had a beginning, one must
also hold that it has an end. Although the heading for Chapter 24 suggests that its
concern is with those who say that matter is co-eternal with God, its main theme
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(though it is ‘a digression’, cf. De hom. 24.3) is one that we considered earlier when
looking at Gregory’s Hexaemeron (and Anaxagoras and Origen), that is, that
matter is nothing other than a combination of intellectual qualities, brought
together by God, and so can be changed into another state. Chapter 25 discusses
the way in which others can be persuaded regarding the resurrection, appealing to
the course of nature, with seeds dying and rising to bear fruit (De hom. 25.5), and
suggesting that the Gospel narratives can be read as a gradually increasing
instruction into the mystery of the resurrection, with Christ first healing illnesses,
then curing one about to die, then raising the dead, and finally, as the Physician,
healing himself (De hom. 25.7–12). In the following two chapters, Gregory argues
that the resurrection is not beyond probability, even with dead bodies dissolving
into the elements of the earth, for he who brought all things into being to begin
with must certainly have the power to bring them back into existence (De hom.
26–7). And then finally, the issue currently being discussed in the churches, he
says, that is whether soul or body has priority (De hom. 28), with Gregory taking
the position that ‘as the human being is one, consisting of soul and body, it is to be
supposed that the principle of his constitution is one and common to both’, so that
‘the whole human plenitude’ can be affirmed ‘to have pre-existed in the power of
God’s foreknowledge (according to the account given a little earlier)’ (De hom.
29.1), just as ‘in the grain, or in any other seed, the whole form of the ear of corn is
potentially included’ (De hom. 29.3).
This image of the seed, in which the fullness of the whole is already contained
and which only comes to its fullness by being sown in the earth, used by Paul to
provide an account of the resurrection and final transformation (1 Cor. 15:35–54),
is something that Gregory uses repeatedly. Here he points out that the coming to
be of both soul and body together, and their growth together, is what we see in the
case of each particular human being: the seed is ‘warm and active’ so that we must
conclude that it is not inanimate. And even if we don’t see in it flesh, bones, hair,
and all the other things we see in human beings, ‘it is potentially each of these
things, although it does not yet visibly appear to be so’, and so also with respect to
the animated part, the faculties of the soul are not yet visible, but rather ‘analo-
gously to the formation and perfection of the body, so also the activities of the soul
grow with the subject’ (De hom. 29.6). In this process, we can see, once again, the
threefold power of the soul that Moses, according to Gregory, narrates:

For just as the body proceeds from a very small original to the perfect state, so
also the activity of the soul, growing in step with the subject, gains and increases
with it. For in its first formation, first of all comes the power of growth and
nourishment alone, as though some root buried in the ground, for the smallness
of the one receiving does not admit of more; then, as the plant comes to light and
shows it shoot to the sun, the gift of the sense-perception blossoms; and when at
last it is ripened and has grown up to its proper height, the rational faculty begins
116 

to shine, just like some fruit, not all appearing at once, but by diligence growing
with the perfection of the instrument, always bearing as much fruit as the power
of the subject grants. (De hom. 29.8)

There is, once again, a proper order and sequence for the growth of both body and
soul: nourished in the womb, when it is sufficiently grown it emerges, through
parturition, into the world of sense-perception, and then in this world (as another
womb, as Maximos, as we will see, puts it) the newborn human takes time to grow
in stature of body and reasoning power of soul, and, further, to learn the
discernment that is needed with regard to sense-perception (for that which
appears is ‘mixed’). As such it is only with time that the power of the soul reaches
perfection with the body. ‘Take heed to yourself ’ says Moses, and Gregory adds
that in doing so ‘you will read, as in a book, the account of the works of the soul’
(De hom. 29.9; Deut. 4:23). Finally, as the end of human beings in this world is to
be placed in the earth, we can learn from what we see in agriculture: what is sown
in the earth—‘kernels of fruit and portions torn from roots, not deadened [by
being deprived] of the vital power naturally residing in them, but preserving in
themselves, hidden, indeed, but certainly living, the property of their prototype’—
is surrounded by the earth, not in such a way as to give it life (for then even dead
wood would grow), but rather such that it ‘makes manifest that which resides
within them, nourishing by its own moisture, perfecting the plant’ in all its
dimensions (De hom. 29.11).

4. The Life of the Human Being (30)

In the third and final part of the work (a lengthy chapter, designated along with
Chapter 16 as ‘a contemplation’), Gregory turns, just as did Timaeus in the third
part of his speech, to a detailed medical account of the human being. Gregory
notes that there are many books on the topic, but as those inside the church prefer
not to hear those outside, he has taken it upon himself to give an account also of
these matters (De hom. 30.1). As mentioned earlier, Cornford, while accepting
that the Timaeus as a whole is not an easy read, thought that ‘the physiological and
medical chapters towards the end would be repellent to many.’¹⁷ It is likely that
this last chapter of Gregory had the same effect; indeed, it is one of the least
commented on parts of this treatise. But, as with the Timaeus, where the third part
puts a ‘head’ on the two preceding parts, both of which only give a partial account
and need to be combined, so too this part of Gregory’s treatise now gives the

¹⁷ Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 20.

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account of the actual constitution of the human being, in anatomical terms, and
how the human being comes into life and grows.
He begins by noting that there are three things pertaining to the nature of the
human body for the sake of which the particular parts are formed: ‘some are for
the sake of living, others for living well, others are adapted towards the succession
of descendants’; those without which we cannot live, such as the brain, the heart,
and the liver, fall in the first category; the organs of sense bestow the gift of living
well and so fall in the second group; while the third group ‘looks to what comes
after and the succession of life’ (De hom. 30.2). Gregory then spends many pages
exploring the anatomical arrangement and purposes of the parts of the body, until
he pulls himself short, commenting that ‘our argument, however, has wandered
far from the matters at hand, going deep into the works of nature’ to describe
the constitution of the organs, ‘those intended for life, and those for the good life,
and any other category after these that we considered in the first division’
(De hom. 30.28).
His purpose, he notes, alluding back to the concluding chapters of the second
part of the work, was to show that ‘the seminal cause of our constitution is neither
a soul without body, nor a body without soul, but that, from animated and living
bodies a being, living and animated from the first, is generated, human nature
receiving it to be cherished, like a nursling, with her own powers’ so that it grows
appropriately in each part, ‘for it immediately displays, by this artistic and
scientific process of formation, the power of the soul interwoven with it, appearing
at first somewhat obscurely, but afterwards increasing in radiance concurrently
with the perfecting of the organism’ (De hom. 30.29).
Gregory then goes on to compare this process to that of a sculptor: intending to
produce the figure of an animal in stone, the sculptor first separates the stone from
its quarry, then chips away the superfluous parts, proceeding through the various
steps of the first outline, when even an inexperienced observer can conjecture
what the final figure will be; and then working again at the material, till at last
‘producing in the material the perfect and exact form, he brings his art to its
conclusion’, and what had been shapeless stone is now a perfect figure of a lion or
a human, ‘not by the material being changed into the figure, but by the figure
being wrought upon the matter’ (De hom. 30.30). In the same way, Gregory
proposes,

we say that the all-contriving nature taking from the kindred matter within
herself the part that comes from the human being crafts the statue [τὴν γὰρ
πάντα τεχνιτεύουσαν φύσιν ἐκ τῆς ὁμογενοῦς ὕλης λαβοῦσαν, ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου μέρος δημιουργεῖν ἀνδριάντα φαμέν]. And just as the form follows upon
the gradual working of the stone, at first somewhat indistinct, but more perfect
after the completion of the work, so also in the carving of the organism the form
of the soul, by the analogy, is displayed in the substratum, incompletely in that
118 

which is incomplete, and perfectly in that which is perfect; but it would have been
perfect from the beginning had nature not been maimed by evil [ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἂν
τέλειον ἦν εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς κακίας ἡ φύσις ἐκολοβώθη]. For this reason our sharing in
that impassioned and animal-like genesis brings it about that the divine image
does not shine forth immediately in the moulded figure, but, by a certain method
and sequence, through those material and more animal-like properties of the
soul, brings to perfection the human being [διὰ τοῦτο ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐμπαθῆ καὶ
ζωώδη γένεσιν κοινωνία οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐκλάμπειν ἐν τῷ πλάσματι τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα
ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽ ὁδῷ τινι καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ διὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν τε καὶ ζωωδεστέρων τῆς
ψυχῆς ἰδιωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ἄγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον]. (De hom. 30.30)

There are two things that need to be carefully considered in this climactic
paragraph. First, the ‘maiming by evil’ that has prevented the end result from
being perfect from the beginning. What this refers to is not stated by Gregory.
However, it is important to note that it is not ‘our nature’ (as Wilson translated it)
that has been ‘maimed’, which might be taken to refer to a ‘fall’. Rather it is
‘nature’ as the ‘all-contriving’, the active agent of the process of that which comes
into being, as it has been frequently throughout the treatise (e.g. De hom. 8.4–7).
Moreover, as we have seen, ‘the genesis of evil’ for Gregory lies in the turning of
intellect from the good to matter, receiving its shapelessness into itself rather than
beautifying matter as ‘an image of an image’ (De hom. 12.9–13); and, as we have
further seen, this has been played out across the second part of the treatise in
terms of the waywardness of the inclination of the human will, learning discern-
ment through experience so that it returns, in the end, to what it was made in the
beginning, the archē. As such, if the analogy with sculpting is to be followed, then
the ‘evil’ which ‘maims’ nature, such that the human being is not brought to
perfection at the beginning but at the end, is more like the recalcitrance of that
upon which nature is working, which in this case is the waywardness of the human
will. Like Timaeus’ ‘straying cause’, it needs to be persuaded by intellect, or, in
Origen’s terms, by the omnipotence of the Almighty Creator working through the
‘persuasion of Word and Wisdom’.
The second point is Gregory’s striking concluding words: it is not simply by
‘sharing in the impassioned and animal-like genesis’ that the human race reaches
the plenitude foreseen by God (cf. De hom. 22.4), but that this entails that the
human being is brought to perfection in a proper order and sequence, and,
Gregory now adds, this happens ‘through those more material and animal-like
properties of the soul’.¹⁸ If it is ‘the evil husbandry of the intellect’ that has

¹⁸ Cf. Eric Daryl Meyer, ‘On Making Fleshly Difference: Humanity and Animality in Gregory of
Nyssa’, Relegere: Studies in Religion and Reception, 7.1–2 (2017), 39–58, at 56: ‘Animal flesh, then, is the
foil that generates the fragile space of human virtue, freedom, and discursiveness, while simultaneously
serving as a threatening example of what may become of those who fail to exercise these gifts.’
  ’  ,       119

perverted all the motions and impulses shared with the animals into forms of
passion not known amongst the animals, it is the intellect which needs training, to
raise all these motions so that they too are ‘conformed to the beauty of the
divine image’ (De hom. 18. 4–5), so that the beauty of the divine image in the
moulded figure can truly shine forth. It is, as we noted earlier, through the body,
both its excellent structure and its weakness, that ‘we have become rational’
(De hom. 10.1).
And so, in the concluding paragraphs of the work, Gregory exhorts his reader
to be like Paul, putting away childish things (1 Cor. 13:11): not that the soul of the
adult is other than that in the child, ‘but that the same soul displays its imperfect
condition in that one and the perfect state in this’ (De hom. 30.31). After
reiterating the account of the ascent of nature through the different levels of life,
Gregory again points out that ‘the true and perfect soul is the human’, whereas
anything else is only called ‘soul’ by ‘customary misuse of language’, for in those
cases the soul is not perfect ‘but only certain parts of the animated activity which,
we have learnt, have also arisen [ἐπιγεγενῆσθαι] in the human being, according to
Moses’ mystical account of the human origin [ἀνθρωπογονίαν], through kinship
[οἰκειότητα] with the impassioned’ (De hom. 30.32–3). And so, Gregory concludes
his work with the same words of Paul that Origen cited in his exhortation to ‘Be
transformed!’ (Dial. 13.26–16.17): if we wish to reach perfection ‘it is necessary “to
put off the old human being” and “put on the one being renewed in accordance
with the image of God” ’ (De hom. 30.33; Col. 3:9–10), and so, ‘let us all ascend
[ἐπανέλθωμεν or ‘return’] to the divine grace in which God created the human
being in accordance with the archē [κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς], saying, ‘Let us make the human
being in accordance with our image and likeness’ (De hom. 30.34).
Gregory has presented us with a very sophisticated analysis of the human being.
It is, however, emphatically not presented as a description of a ‘prelapsarian’
Adam, followed by ‘the Fall’ and ‘postlapsarian’ existence, awaiting for the
redeeming work of salvation, as commentators, myself included, have assumed.¹⁹
At its heart, thematically and structurally, it is an account of the condition in
which we find ourselves, in which it is hard to see the truth of the scriptural
affirmation that the human being is made in the image of God. Structuring his
treatise in parallel with the Timaeus, Gregory offers, in the first part, a vision of the
human being (Chapters 1–15); in the second part, an analysis of the prevision and
provision of God with respect to the wavering inclination of our will and the evil
husbandry of the intellect, sketching out the economy, or the ‘anthropogony’, on
the one hand, traced in the ascent of nature to the more perfect form of life, and,
on the other hand, leading to the completion of the plenitude of the human race as
the image of God, the total Christ, a process which requires, and is co-extensive

¹⁹ See my earlier piece, ‘The Rational Animal: A Rereading of Gregory of Nyssa’s De hominis
opificio’, JECS 7 (1999), 219–47.
120 

with, time itself, resulting in the final transformation heralded by Paul (chapters
16–29); and, in the third part, a description of how this economy is recapitulated
in the life of each human being, from the seed being implanted in the womb and
growing there through the power of nutrition, then coming into the world of
sense-perception, where it continues to grow in both body and soul, learning
discernment by experience and growing in virtue, yet needing to be exhorted to
put away childish things, the old human being, and put on instead the one being
renewed in accordance with the image of God. Gregory does indeed seem to have
accomplished the task he set himself, of bringing together, through scriptural
guidance and human reason, things that appear contrary, ‘to one and the same
end, with the divine power finding a hope for things beyond hope and a means of
accomplishing things unworkable’ (Ep. Pet. 3).

5. ‘The Fall’ and ‘Male and Female’

5.1 The Fall

Having paid close attention to the economy of Gregory’s text, how he develops his
argument, we can now turn to a couple of points that have perplexed interpreters
and see how Gregory’s position fits with those before and after. Firstly, the question
of ‘the Fall’.²⁰ Concluding his analysis of human nature in Gregory, in particular
his strong understanding of ‘universal human nature’, Zachhuber comes to the
conclusion that here ‘there is no room for a Fall of the “nature”: . . . Human
individuals . . . would not have been able to change that nature on account of its
ontological priority (it was complete before Adam was there!)’.²¹ The particular
question that interests Zachhuber is: ‘Does Gregory, then, or does he not, know
of original sin and a single act of disobedience which has caused human nature
to be damaged in such a way that it has affected every human being since?’²²
Noting that there are ‘possible theories of universal sin different from
Augustine’s’, for which one can find some evidence in other texts of Gregory
(De Virginitate for the ‘Neoplatonic pattern’; a number with the ‘Origenist
pattern; and even some that follow an ‘Apollinarian pattern’), Zachhuber con-
cludes: ‘A further view might be identified in De Hominis Opificio 16 where

²⁰ For an exhaustive survey of every possible expression pertaining to ‘the Fall’ in Gregory’s writings,
see Manfred Hauke, Heilsverlust in Adam: Stationen griechischer Erbsündenlehre: Irenäus-Origenes-
Kappadozier (Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1992), 572–692. His conclusion is that while Gregory has all the
‘building blocks’, he lacks the connection of them into a systematic whole and the resolution of the
inner contradictions by a proper theology of grace, so that while some aspects of his thought point
towards a distinct conception of original sin, others are in tension with it (686–7); at most, Gregory ‘is
on the way to original sin’ (692).
²¹ Zachhuber, Human Nature, 174. ²² Ibid., 175.
  ’  ,       121

Gregory all but says that God himself created the “fallen” state in anticipation of
the fall.’²³
But perhaps this is the wrong way of phrasing the question, for, after all,
Gregory has not spoken of ‘a’ or ‘the Fall’ as an event describing ‘a single act of
disobedience’ corrupting human nature and beings thereafter; indeed, as
Zachhuber notes, ‘there was no sign that he attempted an application of his own
genuine theory to this doctrinal question’.²⁴ Rather than succumbing to what
Skinner describes as ‘the mythology of doctrine’, that is, assuming that certain
topics are constitutive for a particular discipline, in this case theology, and looking
to each historical author to see what they said about it, we should perhaps take
Gregory on his own terms.²⁵ To start by looking for the prelapsarian state and the
fall and its effect is to begin with protology, as many interpreters of Gregory (and
also Origen, as we noted in the last chapter) do, rather than eschatology. Looking
to the end to see what it is that the human being is to become—the one who is first
in the foreknowledge of God, the archē that is Christ, but the end in our own
temporal horizon of growth, our telos—Gregory contemplates the current state of
existence, but also provides a vision of the singular economy of God that leads, in
the end, to the outcome envisioned from the beginning. This perspective was not
unique to Gregory, and before him, as we have seen, Origen, but was also, of
course, clearly held by Irenaeus.
In fact, in Against the Heresies 4.37–39, Irenaeus addresses this very point,
responding to his opponents’ complaint: God, they say, should not have created
‘human beings such that they immediately became ungrateful towards him,
because they were created rational and capable of examining and judging and
not like irrational or inanimate creatures which are not able to do anything of their
own will but are drawn by necessity and force towards the good, with one
inclination and tendency, unable to deviate and without the power of judging,
and unable to be anything other than what they were created’.²⁶ The last clause is
the most important, for, as he argues, only a free, independent, and temporal
creature is able to grow, and so change its mode of existence while remaining what
it is by nature: in other words, while an uncreated creature is a logical impossi-
bility, God can create those who come to share in his uncreated life, but this
requires change, growth, and time. And so, Irenaeus argues, if we had been created

²³ Ibid., 176–86; the first quotation is from 176, the second from 186. ²⁴ Ibid., 185.
²⁵ Cf. Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory 8
(1969), 3–53; reprinted in a much abbreviated and extensively revised version in Quentin Skinner,
Visions of Politics, vol. 1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57–89,
esp. 59–67.
²⁶ Haer. 4.37.6. Ed. and French trans. A. Rousseau et al., Haer. 1–3, SC 263–4, 293–4, 210–11 (Paris:
Cerf, 1979, 1982, 1974); Haer. 4 SC 100 (Paris: Cerf, 1965); Haer. 5 SC 152–3 (Paris: Cerf, 1969). ET in
A. Roberts and J. Donaldson eds., ANF 1 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1987 [1887]). For full
exposition, see Behr, Irenaeus of Lyons: Identifying Christianity, CTC (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 144–203.
122 

as his opponents desired, we would have thought that communion with God is ‘by
nature’, rather than a result of their own proper endeavour, care, or study; it would
be misunderstood and no pleasure would be found in it, and so it would have
benefitted neither God nor the human being. Instead, Irenaeus points out, ‘the
violent take it by force’ (Matt. 11:12), and we must run the race (1 Cor. 9:24–7).
Moreover, he notes, something is only truly valued once one has experienced its
loss, such as the faculty of sight by temporary blindness, health by sickness, and,
finally, life by death (Haer. 4.37.7). In all of this, God has been patient, knowing
that, as the prophet put it, ‘your own apostasy shall instruct you’ (Haer. 4.37.7; Jer.
2:19). He concludes this section thus:

God, thus, determined all things beforehand for the perfection of the human
being, and towards the realization and manifestation of his economies, that
goodness may be displayed and righteousness accomplished, and that the
Church may be ‘conformed to the image of his Son’ [Rom. 8:29], and that,
finally, the human being may be brought to such maturity as to see and
comprehend God. (Haer. 4.37.7)

Worked out in and through the life of each individual human being, the conclu-
sion is, as it is with Gregory, corporate: it is the Church that is conformed to Christ
as each human being is brought to see God.²⁷
Irenaeus argues similarly in Haer. 3.20.1–2, using the sign of Jonah to describe
the whole economy, from beginning to end. As ‘strength is made perfect in
weakness’ (2 Cor. 12:9), ‘foreseeing the victory which would be granted to [the
human being] through the Word’, God ‘was patient’ with the human being,
‘allowing’ him ‘from the beginning to be swallowed up by the great whale, who
was the author of the transgression’, not in ignorance of what would happen and
so having to find a remedy later on, but ‘arranging and preparing the economy of
salvation which was accomplished by the Word through the sign of Jonah’, so that
the whole economy is arranged in such a way to acquaint human beings with their
own weakness in order that they might simultaneously know the strength of God,
and having known the experience of death they might thereafter hold ever more
firmly to the source of life. There is, thus, for Irenaeus ‘an author of the trans-
gression’ (though if the analogy with the whale is to hold, God in fact appointed
the whale, just as he also sent Satan to tempt Job), and the human race is indeed in
apostasy, although seen from the point of view of the end, Christ, the apostasy and
death now function pedagogically, the whole being embraced by ‘the sign of

²⁷ For Gregory on the Church as the ‘manifold wisdom of God’, weaving together opposites, life
mingled with death, established by Christ as his body through ‘the addition of those being saved . . .
until we all attain to mature humanity’, see his eighth homily on the Song of Songs (Langerbeck, 255–7;
ET 269).
  ’  ,       123

Jonah’, who represents both the suffering human race and the Saviour. In other
words, the whole economy, including apostasy and death, begins (with God) and
ends (for us) with Jesus Christ, who by his death brings eternal life; or, as Irenaeus
says a little later, ‘Since the Saviour pre-exists, it was necessary that he who would
be saved should come into existence so that the Saviour doesn’t exist in vain’.²⁸
In Haer. 4.39, Irenaeus develops his analysis further by contrasting two differ-
ent types of knowledge: that gained, on the one hand, through experience, and
that, on the other hand, learned through hearsay (Haer. 4.39.1). It is, he points out,
only through experience that the tongue comes to learn of both bitterness and
sweetness, and likewise, it is only through experience of both good and evil,
the latter being disobedience and death, that the mind receives the knowledge
(disciplina) of the good, that is, obedience to God, which is life for human beings.
By experiencing both, and casting off disobedience through repentance, the
human being (as in the case of Jonah) becomes ever more tenacious in obedience
to God, growing into the fullness of life. The alternative, Irenaeus says dramatic-
ally, is that ‘if anyone shuns the knowledge of both of these, and the twofold
perception of knowledge, forgetting himself he destroys the human being’ (Haer.
4.39.1: latentur semetipsum occidit hominem).
Between Haer. 4.37 and 39 lies chapter 38, which tackles the question from a
different angle. Here he suggests that it would have been possible for God to have
created the human being perfect, or as a ‘god’, from the beginning, for all things are
possible to him. Yet, as created, human beings are initially ‘infantile’, and so ‘unaccus-
tomed to and unexercised in perfect conduct’ (Haer. 4.38.1). Just as a mother could
give solid food to a newborn infant, though it would not benefit the infant, ‘so also,’
Irenaeus continues, ‘it was possible for God himself to have made the human being
perfect from the first, but the human being could not receive this, being as yet an
infant’ (Haer. 4.38.1). What is needed is, again, growth, a process of accustoming the
human being to bear the life and glory of God. This pattern of growth is spelled out a
few paragraphs later. By definition, of course, the created cannot be uncreated, but this
is not a restriction upon the omnipotence of God, for this omnipotence is demon-
strated, for Irenaeus, in the way that the created is in fact brought in time to share in
the uncreated life of God, a change in the ‘fashion’ of its existence or the mode of its
life, which requires preparation and training, and it is to this end that the whole
economy has aimed and been tending from the beginning. He begins:

With God power, wisdom, and goodness are demonstrated simultaneously:

power and goodness in that he willingly created and made things previously
not existing; wisdom in having made those things that have come into being
rhythmical and harmonious and elaborate [εὔρυθμα καὶ ἐμμελῆ καὶ

²⁸ Haer. 3.22.3; cf. Behr, ‘ “Since the Saviour Pre-exists”: A Reconsideration of Irenaeus 3.22.3’, StP
109, vol. 6 (Leuven: Peeters, 2021), 43–54.
124 

ἐγκατάσκευα], which, through the superabundance of his goodness, receiving

growth [αὔξησιν] and continuing for a long period [ἐπὶ πλεῖον], obtain the glory
of the Uncreated [ἀγενήτου δόξαν ἀποίσεται], of the God who ungrudgingly
bestows good. By virtue of being created, they are not uncreated; but by virtue
of continuing in being throughout a long course of ages, they shall receive the
power of the Uncreated [δύναμιν ἀγένητου προσλήψεται], of the God who freely
bestows upon them eternal existence. (Haer. 4.38.3)

It is, he continues, by ‘this order and such rhythms and such a movement [that]
the created and moulded human becomes in the image and likeness of God’, with
God ‘planning everything well’, the Son ‘executing’, the Spirit ‘nourishing and
increasing’, and ‘the human making progress day by day, and ascending towards
perfection, that is approaching the Uncreated one’. Then, spelling out these stages:

Now, [1] it was first necessary for the human being to be created;
[2] and having been created, to increase;
[3] and having increased, to become an adult;
[4] and having become an adult, to multiply;
[5] and having multiplied, to become strong;
[6] and having been strengthened, to be glorified;
[7] and being glorified, to see his Master;
for God is He who is yet to be seen, and the vision of God produces incorrupt-
ibility, and “incorruptibility renders one close to God.” (Haer. 4.38.3; Wisd. 6:19)

It is striking that the arc of the economy, as sketched here, is patterned upon the
life of each human being, the ‘seven stages’ of life. Such reflection seems to
have gone back to John the Evangelist, and the discussions he had with ‘the
Elders’, such as Papias, at the end of the first century. Irenaeus alludes to this
elsewhere (cf. Haer. 2.22.4), and Victorinus of Pettau records the same tradition
independently of Irenaeus, saying that Christ ‘consummates his humanity
[humanitatem . . . consummat] in the number seven: birth, infancy, boyhood, youth,
young-manhood, maturity, death’.²⁹ As with Gregory, the lifespan of each human being
recapitulates the whole arc of the economy that culminates in the human plenitude,
in the image and likeness of God.³⁰

²⁹ De Fabrica mundi, 9; for full discussion, see Behr, John the Theologian, 211–13.
³⁰ This recapitulation calls to mind Ernst Haeckel’s formulation that ‘ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny’; although this has been debunked as an account of a possible similarity of the embryonic
development to evolutionary history, it has, however, been picked up by evolutionary anthropologists:
as Mary LeCron Foster put it: ‘both biological evolution and the stages in the child’s cognitive
development follow much the same progression of evolutionary stages as that suggested in the
archaeological record’. Mary LeCron Foster, ‘Symbolism: the Foundation of Culture’ in Companion
Encyclopedia of Anthropology: Humanity, Culture, Social Life, ed. Tim Ingold (London: Routledge,
1993), 366–95, at 386.
  ’  ,       125

It is, thus, at the end that the human being becomes ‘according to the image and
likeness of God’: ‘never at any time did Adam escape the Hands of God’, that is the
Word and the Wisdom of God, to who he speaks saying ‘Let us make the human
being in our image after our likeness. And for this reason, at the end [fine], “not by
the will of the flesh nor by the will of men” [John 1:13], but by the good pleasure of
the Father, his Hands perfected a living human being, in order that Adam might
become in the image and likeness of God’ (Haer. 5.1.3). It is intriguing that for
Irenaeus it is Adam who at the end becomes the perfected living human being, in
the image and likeness of God, whereas for Gregory (at least in De hom. 22.3,
though he does not provide a full, positive exposition of Adam even there), Adam
is the first particular human being, for the head or archē is always Christ, while at
the end Christ encompasses the totality of humanity. The difference can perhaps
be reconciled in terms of how Origen understood Paul to assert that ‘Adam is
Christ’ (Princ. 4.3.7); seen from the point of view of the end Adam is indeed (the
total) Christ, whereas from our own beginning we first know Adam in humanity’s
infancy and subjection to sense-perception and the resulting passions.
A further possible similarity to Irenaeus can perhaps be seen in the way in
which both speak of the relationship between the text of Gen. 1:26–7 and the
human being that is to come about at the end. What the human being ‘will be’, we
saw Gregory say, ‘is foreshadowed by the Artist through the writing of the account
[διὰ τῆς τοῦ λόγου γραφῆς]’, along with what kind of being he should be, his
archetype, and for what purpose he shall come into being (De hom. 3.1). In a
similar manner, Irenaeus describes how Christ recapitulates Adam ‘so that he
might also demonstrate the likeness of enfleshment to Adam [i.e. Virgin birth//
virgin earth], and might become the human being, written in the beginning
[γένηται ὁ γεγραμμένος ἐν ἀρχῇ ἄνθρωπος] “according to the image and likeness
of God” ’.³¹ Or, as he puts it elsewhere, previously it was only ‘said, that the human
being was created according to the image of God, but it was not shown’, and for
this reason, not seeing what the image looks like, the human being ‘easily lost the
similitude’; but when the Word became flesh, he confirms both, truly showing
the image of God, ‘since he became himself what was his image’, and so also ‘he
reestablished the similitude in a sure manner, assimilating the human being to the
invisible Father through the visible Word’ (Haer. 5.16.2). In the same way, for
Gregory, although it was certainly foreshadowed in the writing of Genesis 1:26–7
what the human being was called to be, this was not shown until Christ, enabling
human beings now to put off the old human being and put on the one being
renewed in accordance with the image of God. If this is so, then, while Gregory’s
treatise structurally parallels the Timaeus, he has nevertheless reversed the task of
their respective texts. If Timaeus concludes his speech with a prayer ‘to the god

³¹ Irenaeus, Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 32; trans. John Behr, PPS 17 (New York: Saint
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997); the Greek is Rousseau’s retroversion from the Armenian.
126 

[i.e. the world] who previously of old came to be in reality and just now comes to
be in words’ (Crit. 106a3–4), for Gregory it is that which was in words that comes
to be in reality at the end, doing so through the economy sketched out in
Gregory’s words and the exhortation he gives at the end.
That human beings have been in apostasy ‘from the beginning’, as Irenaeus put
it, yet that this is in fact a pedagogy, is maintained in the later tradition. Indeed,
Maximos puts this idea in a more emphatic form, which does not permit taking
the expression ‘from the beginning’ as meaning no more than ‘from of old’, ‘a long
time ago’, but before which there nevertheless was a primordial age of perfection.
Maximos opens his response to Thalasius’s question about the meaning of a
passage in First Peter, with this striking paragraph:

When God crafted [δημιουργήσας] the nature of human beings, he did not co-
create with it sense-perceptive pleasure and pain [οὐ συνέκτισεν αὐτῇ κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν οὔτε ἡδονὴν οὔτε ὀδύνην], but a certain capacity for pleasure according to
the intellect [δύναμίν τινα κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῇ πρὸς ἡδονήν], by which [the human]
would be able to enjoy him ineffably. Together with coming into being [ἅμα τῷ
γενέσθαι], the first human, by sense-perception [τῇ αἰσθήσει], gave this
capacity—the natural desire [ἔφεσιν] of the intellect towards God—to things of
sense-perception [τὰ αἰσθητὰ], activating, in the very first movement [κατ᾽ αὐτὴν
τὴν πρώτην κίνησιν], an unnatural pleasure [ἡδονήν] through the medium of
sense-perception. Being, in his providence, concerned for our salvation, God
therefore affixed pain alongside this sensible pleasure as a kind of punitive faculty
[ὥσπερ τινὰ τιμωρὸν δύναμιν], whereby the law of death was wisely implanted in
our corporeal nature to curb the folly of the intellect [τῆς τοῦ νοῦ μανίας] moving
desire [ἔφεσιν], against nature, toward sense-perceptible things.³²

Given the simultaneity between the movement towards sense-perceptible things,

squandering the desire for God and the intellectual pleasure he provides, and
‘coming into being’, it would seem that what Maximos is speaking about here
correlates to what Gregory describes as the parturition of the infant: after human
seed has been deposited in the womb, and the body has grown by the soul’s power
of nutrition and growth, it then emerges into the world of sense-perception, where
both body and soul are to grow further, not only in stature but also learning
discernment through experience, and especially coming to learn that what appears
to be good is not the true criterion for what is good, so as to attain proper
intellectual understanding.³³ The world of sense-perception is like a womb,

³² Maximos, Ad Thalassium (Ad Thal.) 61. Ed. C. Laga and C. Steel, CCSG 22 (Turnhout: Brepols,
1990), 86.8–21; ET Maximos Constas, On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture: The Responses to Thalassios,
FC 136 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 434, modified.
³³ See also Gregory of Nyssa, De Mortuis: ‘For since the perfect power of the soul is still not
contained in the infantile body, while the operation of the senses is born immediately perfect together
  ’  ,       127

a space for this further growth, resulting in the emergence of a fully mature human
being. As Maximos puts it:

For it is true—though it may be a jarring and unusual thing to say—that both we

and the Word of God, the Creator and Master of the universe, exist in a kind of
womb, owing to the present conditions of our life. In this sense-perceptible
world, just as if he were enclosed in a womb, the Word of God appears only
obscurely, and only to those who have the spirit of John the Baptist, while, on the
other hand, human beings, gazing through the womb of the material world, catch
but a glimpse of the Word who is concealed within beings (and this, again, only if
they are endowed with John’s spiritual gifts). For when compared to the ineffable
glory and splendor of the age to come, and to the kind of life that awaits us there,
this present life differs in no way from a womb swathed in darkness, in which, for
the sake of us who were infantile in mind, the infinitely perfect Word of God,
who loves mankind, became an infant.³⁴

Returning to Ad Thal. 61, the act of expending the capacity meant for the
enjoyment of God upon things of sense-perception in themselves results in the
pedagogic cycle of pleasure and pain, established by the provision of God,
culminating in death, but a death which Christ has now turned inside out,
changing its ‘use’: when Christ ‘naturally willed to undergo death itself in the
passibility of his human nature, clearly suffering, he converted the use of death, so
that henceforth in him death would no longer be a condemnation of nature but
clearly of sin’, and in this way, ‘the baptised’, that is, those who conform them-
selves to Christ’s death (cf. Rom. 6:3), also ‘acquires the use of death to condemn
sin, which in turn mystically leads that person to divine and unending life’.³⁵
Whereas in our ‘genesis’ (γένεσις) we are passive, our ‘birth’ (γέννησις) into life
through death is active.
Rather than seeing Gregory as having the building blocks of an Augustinian
understanding of ‘the Fall’ and ‘original sin’, but not yet having put them together

with the baby, because of this reasoning in judging of the good is prejudged by sense-perception and
what already appears to the senses is also supposed to be good’ (τούτου χάριν προλαμβάνεται ὑπὸ τῆς
αἰσθήσεως ἡ διάνοια ἐν τῇ τοῦ καλοῦ κρίσει καὶ τὸ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις φανὲν ἤδη καὶ νομισθὲν εἶναι
καλὸν). Ed. Gunter Heil, in GNO 9.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 28–68; ET by Rowan A. Greer in
One Path for All: Gregory of Nyssa on the Christian Life and Human Destiny (Eugene, OR:
Cascade, 2014), 94–117. The text is not divided into sections. Here, Heil 48 (ET 105).
³⁴ Maximos, Ambiguum (Ambig.) 6; ed. and ET Nicholas Constas, On Difficulties in the Church
Fathers: The Ambiguum, DOML 2 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), vol. 1, 72–3,
modified.
³⁵ Maximos, Ad Thal. 61 (95.187–91): αὐτὸν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν θέλων ἐν τῷ παθητῷ τῆς φύσεως
καταδεξάμενος τὸν θάνατον, δηλονότι πάσχων, τὴν τοῦ θανάτου χρῆσιν ἀντέστρεψεν, οὐκ ὄντα λοιπὸν
ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας προδήλως, κατάκρισιν· (99.247–9): εἰς κατάκρισιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας
τὴν αὐτοῦ [i.e. τοῦ θανάτου] καταδέχεται χρῆσιν, πρὸς τὴν θείαν καὶ ἀτελεύτητον ζωὴν μυστικῶς αὐτὸν
παραπέμπουσαν.
128 

coherently, Gregory’s understanding of the economy of creation, from its begin-

ning (in Christ) to its end (in and as Christ), clearly falls within the pattern
developed before him by Irenaeus and after him by Maximos, and also, as we
saw in the previous chapter, with Origen. It is, as we have seen, thoroughly
teleological, based on the pattern of growth that we see in the case of each
human being. It does not attempt to look back to a lost golden age of primordial
perfection in any kind of actualized state, any more than one might, by the
customary misuse of language as Gregory would say, describe a newborn infant
as ‘perfect’. This growth towards perfection of the human being is bound up, for
Gregory, with the dynamics of the cosmos: cosmology and anthropology form an
integral way of thinking for him, just as it did for Anaxagoras, Timaeus and Philo.
But whereas for them the goal of the pedagogy was to produce rational citizens of
the polis or the cosmos, for Gregory (as for Irenaeus, Origen, and Maximos), the
teleology is eschatological, that is, the coming to be of the entire plenitude of
human beings that is the total Christ, the human being, the very image of God,
something achieved, as we have seen Maximos say, but not yet Gregory, through
the conversion of death.

5.2 Male and Female

The question of death, and resurrectional transformation, raises the second

problem perplexing commentators of Gregory, and that is, what becomes of
the distinction between male and female in the resurrection. It has been argued
above, that the division of the human being into male and female is not a second
act in a two-stage creation, belonging only to the second stage so that the
resurrectional transformation is a restoration to what was actually and tempor-
ally from the beginning, and thus a resumption of a sexless existence. If, instead,
existence as male and female is the condition in which God ‘made’ the human
being from the beginning, and is indeed both the means for growth to the
plenitude of human beings and, together with the more material and animal-
like attributes of the soul, the horizon for the growth of each to the perfection of
being human, what then happens to the division into male and female in the
resurrectional transformation? Gregory does not address this issue directly in
On the Human Image; the nearest he gets is when he suggests that the human
need to eat would be fulfilled in the other forms of eating spoken about by
Scripture (De hom. 20). In two other works from around the same period, On the
Soul and Resurrection and especially On Those Who Have Fallen Asleep, how-
ever, Gregory addresses the issue directly.
In On the Soul, Gregory, taking the part of those who object to the teaching of
the resurrection, phrases the problem in a distinctively bodily manner: if there is
to be no procreation in the resurrection (cf. Matt. 22:30), and the resurrectional
  ’  ,       129

life will not be maintained by eating and drinking (cf. Rom. 14:17), then ‘what use
shall there be for these parts of our body, if the activities for which our members
now exist are no longer to be expected in that life?’ Specifically: ‘If the organs for
marriage exist for the sake of marriage, then when this is no more, we shall have
no need of those organs for this purpose’, and similarly for the hands, feet, mouth,
and teeth.³⁶ Gregory is, however, rebuffed by Macrina, as arguing ‘not without
gallantry using the rhetorical art as it is called, running around the truth with
attractively subversive arguments’ (An. et res. 10.64). She resorts to saying that ‘the
true rationale [λόγος] of these things is still laid up in the hidden treasuries of
Wisdom, and will not come to light until we are taught the mystery of the
resurrection by the deed’ (An. et res. 10.66). Pointing out, she continues, that as
the body of one travelling in icy conditions becomes cold, while the bodily
complexion of those under the hot sun becomes darkened, in the same way, if
‘all that was mingled with our human nature from the irrational life was not in us
before our humanity fell through vice into passion, then of necessity when we
abandon passion, we shall also abandon all that is observed in company with it’
(An. et res. 10.74). As such, ‘when we have put off that dead and repulsive tunic
made for use from the skins of irrational animals—for when I hear “skins” [cf.
Gen. 3:21], I take it to mean the aspect of the irrational nature with which we
clothed when we became habituated to passion. . . . And what we received from the
skin of the irrational animals was sexual intercourse, conception, childbearing,
sordidness, breastfeeding, nourishing, excreting, gradual growth into maturity, the
prime of life, old age, disease, and death’ (An. et res. 10.75). The resurrection is not
about the resumption of such activities, however much they have enabled attain-
ing the plenitude of human beings and ‘the gradual growth into maturity’. Rather,
‘the rationale of the resurrection requires only one thing, that a human being is
brought forth through birth [ἓν ζητεῖ μόνον ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγος τὸ φυῆναι διὰ
γεννήσεως ἄνθρωπον], or rather as the Gospel says, that “a human being is born
into this world” ’.³⁷ It is this birth through death that Macrina then further
expounds upon, reflecting upon Paul’s words about that which is sown and raised
in 1 Cor. 15:38–44, especially the play between the continuity and discontinuity
from the seed of corn to the full ear that is raised, a full ear which is implicitly
already there in the seed, but is transformed into its fullness through death and
resurrection. In all this, however, Macrina does not directly return to the question
of male and female.
In his work On Those Who Have Fallen Asleep, Gregory deals extensively with
the question of the role of death in life and the transformation that comes about

³⁶ An. et res. 10.58–9 (Spira, 110.16–111.3). The material discussed in this paragraph extends to the
end of the treatise; hereafter, reference will be given to Silvas’ chapter and section numbers.
³⁷ An. et res. 10.78 (Spira, 114.14–15); John 16:21. For this passage in John, see Behr, John the
Theologian, 211–17.
130 

through resurrection. Those displeased by this forthcoming transformation are, he

says, like those who would prefer to remain as embryos in the womb, ‘for since the
birth-pangs of death serve as the midwife assisting the birth of humans to another
life, when they go forth to that light and draw in the pure Spirit they know by
experience what a great difference there is between that life and the present one,
while those left behind in this moist and flabby life, since they are simply embryos
and not humans [ἔμβρυα ὄντες ἀτεχνῶς καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωποι]’, call the departed
‘unhappy’ (Mort., 47; ET 104–5). Just as with the newborn infant, so too ‘an eye is
opened for him when he leaves what now afflicts him’, and also the other spiritual
senses—hearing (quoting 2 Cor. 12:4), taste (Ps. 33:9), smell (2 Cor. 2:14), and
touch (1 John 1:1)—‘if these and such things are stored up for humans after the
birth through death [τὸν διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τόκον], what is the purpose of grief,
sorrow, and dejection’ (Mort., 47; ET 105)? According to Gregory:

nature always trains us by death [ἐμμελετᾷ τῷ θανάτῳ] and death has been made
to grow together with life as it passes through time. For since life is always moved
from the past to the future, and never does away with what follows afterwards,
death is what always accompanies the life-giving activity by being united with it.
For in past times every life-giving movement and activity certainly ceases. Since,
then, impotence and inactivity are the special property of death, and certainly
this always follows after the life-giving activity, it is not outside the truth to say
that death has been woven together with life. . . . That is why, according to the
words of the great Paul, ‘we die daily’ (1 Cor. 15:31), not remaining constantly
the same in the same house of the body, but from time to time we become
different from something else, by addition and subtraction, being constantly
changed as though to a new body [οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
διαμένοντες οἴκῳ τοῦ σώματος ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστοτε ἄλλοι ἐξ ἄλλου γινόμενοι, διὰ
προσθήκης τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενοι]. Why, then, are we astonished at death when
the life existing through the flesh has been demonstrated to be its constant care
and its training ground? (Mort. 52–3; ET 107–8)

If we were what we became from the archē, Gregory continues, we would not have
needed the garments of skin, for the divine image would have shone upon us
(Mort. 52; ET 108). But, in order to maintain human autonomy and to ensure that
evil would in due course pass away, ‘God’s wisdom found this device to permit
humanity to become what it wished, so that by tasting the evils it desired and
learning by experience what sort of things it had exchanged for the kinds it chose,
it might return willingly by desire to its first blessedness’ (Mort. 54; ET 109).
With regard to the final transformation that will be effected when our desire
returns again to God, Gregory begins urging that ‘since the craftsman of the
universe will at the appropriate time forge the lump of the body into a “weapon of
good pleasure” [Ps. 5:13], “the breastplate of righteousness” as the apostle says,
  ’  ,       131

and the “sword of the Spirit” and the “helmet” of hope, and the whole armor of
God” [Eph. 6:14–17], love your own body [ἀγάπα τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα] according to the
law of the apostle who says “no one has hated his own body”’ (Mort. 61–2; ET 113;
cf. Eph. 5:29). But if, as Paul says, we will have a ‘house not made by hands, eternal
in the heavens’ (2 Cor. 5:1), a worthy ‘dwelling place of God in the Spirit’ (Eph.
2:22), how can that be described physically as our present state of embodiment
can be?

Let no one describe to me the mark, shape, and form of that house not made with
hands according to the likeness of the characteristic marks that now appear to us
and that distinguish us from one another by special properties. For since it is not
only the resurrection that has been preached to us by the divine oracles, but also
that those who are being renewed by the resurrection pledged by divine scripture
must be changed [cf. 1 Cor. 15:51], it is entirely necessary that what we shall be
changed to has been hidden from absolutely everyone and is unknown, because
no example of what is hoped is to be seen in the life we now live.
(Mort. 62; ET 113)

The heaviness now characteristic of the body will be transformed for those ‘whose
elements of their bodies have been changed to a more divine condition’ so that
they may rise in the air to meet the Lord (Mort. 62, ET 113–14; 1 Thess. 4:17). In
this condition, ‘there will be one kind for all when all of us become one body of
Christ, having been shaped by one characteristic mark’ so that ‘since the divine
image shines equally on all, as to what will become ours in the change of nature
instead of such properties we shall appear to be something better than any thought
can guess’ (Mort 63; ET 114).
Then, finally:

But lest our account of this should be left entirely unexercised, we say that since
the difference between male and female functions with our nature for nothing
other than the procreation of children, perhaps it is possible to adopt some guess
worthy of God’s promised blessing of good things by saying about this that the
procreative power of nature will be changed to that service of birth [εἰς τὴν
ἐκείνου τοῦ τόκου ὑπηρεσίαν μεταβήσεται ἡ γεννητικὴν τῆς φύσεως δύναμις] in
which the great Isaiah participated when he said, ‘From fear of you, Lord, we
have received in the womb, have undergone labor-pangs, and have given birth;
we have conceived the spirit of salvation on earth” [Isa. 26:18]. If such a birth is
good, and the procreation of children becomes the cause of salvation, as the
apostle says [cf. 1 Tim. 2:15], someone who has once by such a birth produced as
children for himself a multitude of good things never ceases begetting the spirit of
salvation. (Mort. 63; ET 114)
132 

In a similar way to Origen, then, who took the male and female in the ‘inner
human being’ to refer to the spirit and the soul, respectively, which, if ‘they have
concord and agreement among themselves, they increase and multiply by the very
accord among themselves and they produce sons, good inclinations and under-
standings and good thoughts, by which they fill the earth and have dominion over
it’ (Hom. Gen. 1.15), for Gregory, while the bodily forms of male and female are
transformed into the one body of Christ, in whom there is neither male nor
female, ‘the procreative power of nature’ continues, now elevated by the intellect
rather than brought down by its ‘evil husbandry’, so that even this movement is
conformed to the beauty of the divine image (De hom. 18.4–5), and the spirit of
salvation is constantly begotten.³⁸ To say otherwise, and to try to hold on to our
current experience of what it is to be human, is ultimately futile, for, again, ‘a
human does not always remain the same as himself with respect to the form of his
characteristic mark’, as he is ‘refashioned by the stages of life’, from infancy to
maturity, to old age (Mort. 64; ET 114).
With respect to the question of male and female, we might profitably conclude
by turning once again to Maximos, who develops these reflections of Gregory in
his Ambiguum 41. Maximos opens this text by asserting that ‘the existence
(ὑπόστασιν) of all things that have come into being is distinguished by five
divisions: created/uncreated, intelligible/perceptible, heaven/earth, paradise/
inhabited world’, and finally, ‘the fifth is that according to which the human
being who is above all—like a most capacious workshop containing all things and
naturally mediating through itself all the divided extremities, having been placed
amidst beings according to genesis [κατὰ γένεσιν]—is divided into male and
female’.³⁹ Maximos seems to be playing upon the word genesis, referring both
to how the human being comes to be, and also to the book which relates this.
Mediating between all these extremities the human being has the potential, and
vocation to bring them all into unity, and so ‘establish clearly through itself the
great mystery of the divine goal [τοῦ θείου σκοποῦ]’.⁴⁰ These divisions, it shouldn’t
need stating, are not the result of a ‘fall’, but rather the God-given structure and
framework for the vocation of the human being.

³⁸ For spiritual generation more generally in the Cappadocians, see Verna E. Harrison, ‘Gender,
Generation, and Virginity in Cappadocian Theology’, JTS NS 47 (1997), 38–68.
³⁹ Maximos, Ambig. 41; Constas, vol. 2, 102–21 (and notes on 345–6); and PG 91.1304d–1316a.
Here, vol. 2, 102.20–104.4 (PG 91.1305ab): the clause between the dashes in Greek occurs between
the article and the noun: ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ τι τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικώτατον ἐργαστήριον καὶ πᾶσι
τοῖς κατὰ πᾶσαν διαίρεσιν ἄκροις δι᾿ ἑαυτοῦ φυσικῶς μεσιτεύων ἀγαθοπρεπῶς κατὰ γένεσιν τοῖς οὗσιν
ἐπεισαχθεὶς ἄνθρωπος διαιρεῖται εἰς ἄρρεν καὶ θῦλη. As will become clear, I have heavily modified parts
of Constas’ translation. A further ET by Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor, Early Christian
Fathers (London: Routledge, 1996), 156–62; French translation by Emmanuel Ponsoye, with an
introduction by Jean-Claude Larchet and commentary by Dumitru Staniloae, Saint Maxime le
Confesseur: Ambigua, Collection l’Arbre de Jessé (Paris–Suresnes: Éditions de l’Ancre, 1994),
292–99.
⁴⁰ Constas, 104.7–10 (PG 91.1305b).
  ’  ,       133

In what follows, there are three passages where Maximos addresses how the
distinction between male and female is to be overcome, each of which requires
close attention to matters of translation. The first occurs when describing the task
set before the human being, that is, to unite all things in God, beginning from their
own division by:

τὴν μηδαμῶς ἠρτημένην δηλαδὴ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον τῆς περὶ τὴν
γένεσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου θείας προθέσεως κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρσεν ἰδιότητα τῇ
περὶ τὴν θείαν ἀρετὴν ἀπαθεστάτῃ σχέσει πάντη τῆς φύσεως ἐκτιναξάμενος, ὥστε
δειχθῆναί τε καὶ γενέσθαι κατὰ τὴν θείαν πρόθεσιν ἄνθρωπον μόνον, τῇ κατὰ τὸ
ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ προσηγορίᾳ μὴ διαιρούμενον, καθ᾽ ὃν καὶ προηγουμένως
γεγένηται λόγον, τοῖς νῦν περὶ αὐτὸν οὗσι τμήμασι μὴ μεριζόμενον διὰ τὴν
τελείαν πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον, ὡς ἔφην, λόγον, καθ᾽ ὅν ἐστιν, ἕνωσιν,⁴¹
completely shaking off from nature, by means of a supremely dispassionate
condition of divine virtue, the property according to the female and the male,
which clearly in no way depends, according to the foregoing account [or: the
guiding principle], upon the divine purpose concerning the genesis of the human
being, so that it might be shown to be, and becomes, simply a human being
according to the divine purpose, not divided by the designation according to the
male and the female, in accordance with the principle by which it primarily came
to be, nor divided into the parts that now appear around it, thanks to the perfect
union, as I said, with its own principle, according to which it exists.

Translators and commentators have invariably read this passage, and the two
following, against the background of Gregory’s supposed teaching of a two-stage
creation and the possibility of multiplying sexlessly, ‘as the angels’, and so
rendered the expression τῆς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου θείας προθέσεως in
terms that suggest this: the divine purpose concerning human generation or
procreation. The Greek, however, is simpler and more direct: the divine purpose
concerns ‘the genesis of the human being’. It is not a divine intention about how
humans should multiply (angelically or otherwise), but rather that the human
being should come to be, which alone is given as the divine purpose in Gen. 1:26,
or, as Maximos had put it earlier, the accomplishment of the task set before the
human being to reconcile all things, bringing them into union, and so establish
‘the great mystery of the divine goal’. The preceding words, then, κατὰ τὸν
προηγούμενον λόγον, could refer to the ‘preceding account’, that is, most immedi-
ately, Maximos’ own account of the divisions found in creation needing to be
reconciled, and behind that Gen. 1:26 (the text of Genesis already perhaps being
alluded to earlier); but it can also refer to the ‘governing principle’ of that divine

⁴¹ Constas, 104.23–106.4 (PG 91.1305cd, which has γνῶσιν as the last word rather than ἕνωσιν).
134 

purpose, which, as it concerns the genesis of the human being, is a governing

principle that is common to both male and female. This division into male and
female, Maximos says, is clearly in no way at all dependent [μηδαμῶς ἠρτημένην
δηλαδὴ] upon the divine purpose concerning the genesis of the human being: that
is, this divine purpose is not the reason for the division of the human being into
male and female, for, as Gregory already pointed out, the purpose of Gen. 1:27c
(‘male and female made he them’) is given in Gen. 1:28 (‘increase and multiply’; cf.
De hom. 22.4), and such multiplication, in turn, does not for Maximos (at least
here) seem to contribute to the completion of the plenitude of human beings as it
did for Gregory. In other words, in the opening clauses of this sentence, Maximos
is not speaking about the means or modes of procreation, but rather about the
divine purpose that the human being should come to be: it is this that God
proposes or ‘purposes’ to make (Gen. 1:26), not ‘male and female’ (Gen. 1:27c),
though of course this too is of his making, but for a different purpose (given in
Gen. 1:28). In Ambig. 41, existence as male and female is, nevertheless, established
by God, and forms part of the framework, the fivefold divisions, that the human
is to reconcile. Finally, in the passage under consideration, Maximos says that we
are to ‘shake off from nature the property according to the female and the male’.
Why Maximos puts it in this order is unclear, other than that it forms a chiasm:
female-male—simply human—male-female. But, importantly, this ‘shaking off ’ is
accomplished not through a transition into a sexless existence, but through the
acquisition of virtue and the removal of the ‘designation’ of male and female that
currently divides the human being. In this way, ‘it is shown to be and becomes
simply human [ἄνθρωπον μόνον] in accordance with the divine purpose’.⁴²
After describing how the human being did not accomplish the task set before it,
but rather overturned ‘the natural power to unite what was separated . . . for the
division rather of what was united’, Maximos then turns to Christ’s work of
unification. Christ initiates the universal union of all things with himself: ‘begin-
ning with our own division, he became the perfect human [γίνεται τέλειος
ἄνθρωπος]’, like us in every way except sin (Heb. 4:15), and ‘needing for this
[i.e. becoming the perfect human] nothing of the natural process of marital
intercourse’ (τῆς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν γαμικῆς ἀκολουθίας οὐδόλως εἰς τοῦτο
προσδεηθείς). Maximos continues:

καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δεικνὺς, ὡς οἷμαι, τυχὸν, ὡς ἦν ἄλλος τρόπος τῆς εἰς πλῆθος τῶν
ἀνθρώπων αὐξήσεως προεγνωσμένος Θεῷ, εἰ τὴν ἐντολὴν ὁ πρῶτος ἐφύλαξεν
ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς κτηνωδίαν ἑαυτὸν τῷ κατὰ παράχρησιν τρόπῳ τῶν οἰκείων
δυνάμεων μὴ κατέβαλε

⁴² Is it possible that in the phrase ἄνθρωπον μόνον Maximos enigmatically hints towards Gen. 2:18,
where this is the first and only thing said to be ‘not good’? For this human life of virtue, see Doru
Costache, ‘Living Above Gender: Insights from Maximus the Confessor’, JECS 21.2 (2013), 261–90.
  ’  ,       135

In this way, he showed, I think, that there was perhaps another mode, foreknown
by God, for the growth to the multitude of human beings, had the first human
kept the commandment and not cast himself down to the level of irrational
animals by misusing the mode of his proper power⁴³

Again, Maximos is not simply speaking about ‘the multiplication of human

beings’, which might be taken as suggesting that there was another means for
procreation had things been otherwise, but rather about the αὔξησις towards the
multitude of human beings, a word which simply means ‘growth’ or ‘increase’.
Most importantly, Maximos’ point here is that God could ‘perhaps’ have arranged
things in such a way that the desired number of human beings was attained
otherwise, for all things are possible for God, but that he has in fact chosen the
route we do indeed have. And, moreover, as we have seen, as the way in which we
‘are shown to be and become simply human’ is through the acquisition of virtue,
so attaining the perfection of being human, as exemplified in Christ, it is not the
result of, nor does it even need, ‘the natural process of marital intercourse’.
Maximos then continues the sentence:

καὶ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφοράν τε καὶ διαίρεσιν τῆς φύσεως ἐξωθούμενος,
ἦς πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι, καθάπερ ἔφην, ἄνθρωπος, οὐδόλως προσεδεήθη, ὧν δὲ ἄνευ
εἶναι τυχόν ἐστι δυνατόν.
and so he drove out from nature the difference and division into male and
female, which he in no way needed to become human, as I have said, and without
which existence would perhaps have been possible.

Clearly, for Maximos the distinction between male and female is not needed to
become human—virtue is—and existence without this distinction is ‘perhaps’
possible. He then concludes this sentence by citing, as Gregory does, Gal. 3:28:
‘there is no need for this division to last perpetually, for in Christ Jesus, says the
divine apostle, there is neither male nor female.’
The third mention of this discussion is in the section devoted to describing
Christ’s work of recapitulation, how ‘as human’ Christ appears before the God and
Father, he who, ‘as Word’ can never be separated from the Father, ‘fulfilling as
human, in deed and truth, and with perfect obedience, all that he himself as God
had preordained should take place, having completed the whole plan of God the
Father for us’. Maximos now describes how Christ’s work of unification is effected
in us, beginning again from the division into male and female:

Thus he united, first of all, ourselves in himself, through the removal of the
difference according to the male and the female [τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ

⁴³ Constas, 110.5–21 (PG 91.1308d–1309b).

136 

διαφορᾶς], and instead of men and women [ἀντὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν], in whom
this mode of division is especially evident [ἐνθεωρεῖται μάλιστα], he showed us as
properly and truly to be simply human beings, thoroughly formed according to
him, bearing his image intact and completely unadulterated, touched in no way
by any marks of corruption.⁴⁴

For the first time in this treatise, Maximos now speaks of ‘men’ and ‘women’, and
it is in these that the division between ‘male and female’ is most particularly seen.
Quite what Maximos means by this is not clear, apart from the fact that he is
evidently not equating ‘male and female’ with ‘men and women’, raising the
question of whether he has even been talking about the latter in the previous
passages. One final point of interest in Ambig. 41, for us in this volume, is that in
concluding his description of how Christ has divinely ‘recapitulated all things in
himself ’ (Eph. 1:10), Maximos comments that Christ ‘shows that the whole
creation exists as one, like another human being [μίαν ὑπάρχουσαν τὴν ἄπασαν
κτίσιν δείξας, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον]’ brought to perfection through the con-
vergence of all its parts, united ‘according to the one and simple and undefined
and undifferentiated concept of its derivation from non-being, in accordance with
which the whole of creation admits of one and the same absolutely undiscrimi-
nated logos, that non-being is prior to being’.⁴⁵
Elsewhere in his writings, Maximos almost invariably takes ‘male and female’ in
a ‘spiritual’ sense. For instance, in his Commentary on the Our Father, he simply
and directly takes the ‘male and female’ of Gal. 3:28 to indicate ‘anger and desire’
(τουτέστι θυμός καὶ ἐπιθυμία).⁴⁶ When these contrary dispositions are put aside,
so that the logos is not enslaved by them, he continues, the divine image shines
forth, remoulding the soul to the divine likeness, according to its will. In this way,
‘it comes to be [γενέσθαι] in the great kingdom, subsisting essentially
[συνυφισταμένης οὐσιωδῶς] with the God and Father of all, as a radiant dwelling
place of the Spirit, wholly receiving, if one may so speak, the power of the
knowledge of the divine nature as far as possible’, and it is in this way, finally,
that ‘Christ always wills to be born mystically, becoming incarnate in those being
saved, and rendering the soul begetting him to be a virgin mother, not having, to
speak concisely, according to the comparison, as male and female, the properties
of nature subject to corruption and genesis’.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Constas, 114.1–8 (PG 91.1309d–1312a).

⁴⁵ Maximos, Ambig. 41; Constas, 114.16–23 (PG 91.1312ab).
⁴⁶ Ed. Peter van Deun, CCSG 23 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), 47.342–3; ET George Berthold, CWS
(London: SPCK, 1985), 108, modified.
⁴⁷ Ibid., 50; ET 109. For Maximos’ cosmological understanding of ‘incarnation’, see Jordan Wood,
The Whole Mystery of Christ: Creation as Incarnation in Maximus Confessor (Notre Dame, IN: Notre
Dame Press, 2022).
  ’  ,       137

What then, finally, of existence as men and women (if not male and female) in
the resurrection as understood by the authors we have been considering? Much of
what we have seen in Gregory and Maximos is primarily concerned with modes of
identification: it is by the mark of Christ, that the human being is known, not by
the properties of male and female, and this, they would argue, is based upon
a careful consideration of the different clauses in Gen. 1:27 (and, of course,
Gal. 3:28). It might be helpful to borrow the image of Origen: when iron is in
the fire, although it remains iron, it is no longer known by its own properties but is
now known by the properties of the fire (Princ. 2.6.6). Origen, so far as we can tell,
did not use this image with regard to Gal. 3:28, though he did speak of how, when
God is ‘all in all’, the human being ‘will no longer sense anything else apart from
God: it will think God, see God, hold God; God will be the mode and measure of
its every movement; and thus “God” will be “all” to it’ (Princ. 3.6.3). Gregory, in
the passages especially from De Mortuis considered above, similarly holds that
there will be no ‘mark, shape, and form of that house not made with hands’; it is
only by the characteristic mark of Christ that we are known in the resurrection.
Whether Gregory intends that the resurrectional transformation is such that the
reweaving of the elements of the body (i.e. intellectual properties) actually eradi-
cates bodily differences or whether such differences no longer, as it were, register,
in the way that, to adapt Origen’s image, iron and bronze in the fire would be
indistinguishable, is not clear. But Gregory does allow, as we have seen, that the
procreative power remains, now giving birth to virtue and the spirit of salvation.
Maximos, however, adapts the image of fire in a most interesting way. When a
sword is heated in a fire, he points out:

the quality of sharpness assumes the quality of heat, and the quality of heat that
of sharpness (for just as the fire is united to the iron, so too is the heat of the fire
diffused throughout the cutting edge of the sword), and the iron becomes
burning hot through its union with the fire, and the fire acquires a cutting edge
through its union with the iron. Yet neither of the elements undergoes any
change in the exchange that results from the union, but each remains secure in
its own natural properties, even though it has acquired the property of the other
to which it has been joined.⁴⁸

Maximos’ purpose here is to argue that in the mystery of the divine incarnation
divinity and humanity, united in the one hypostasis, maintain both their natural
properties and energies, or rather, that it is here, in the union, that we see what
their natural properties are, for after all, if the sharpness of the sword has assumed
the quality of heat, the coldness that would have identified the iron, with which the

⁴⁸ Maximos, Ambig. 5; Constas, vol. 1, 54.25–55.8.

138 

sword is made, outside the fire would no longer be present when united with it.
That there ‘is not male and female’ in Christ, as the word of the Apostle, is a given
for our figures; what becomes of men and women, for Maximos, when they finally
become and are shown to be simply human, and how he would adapt the iron
sword and fire analogy, remains another question. Undoubtedly, each of the
figures we have considered take seriously Paul’s mysteriological proclamation
that ‘we all shall be changed’ (1 Cor. 15:51), and would have regarded any attempt
to hold on to our current experience of existence as, in Gregory’s striking image,
embryos wanting to remain in the womb rather than becoming human.
The further legacy of Gregory’s work in Maximos and beyond him in Eriugena
is, however, for another work. Given Gregory’s conclusion prior to his final
exhortation at the end of On the Human Image, that it is ‘through those material
and more animal-like attributes of the soul’ that the human being is brought to
perfection, it seems apt to end this introduction with the words of Stavrogin, the
last line of which was used as an epigraph for this volume:

‘I don’t understand why you consider the possession of a mind, that is, con-
sciousness, the greatest of all possible existences? . . . Why do you reject the
possibility of a secret? Note also that, perhaps, unbelief is natural for man, and
this precisely because he puts mind above all; since mind is a property only of the
human organism, he thereby neither understands nor wishes to understand life
in another form, that is, life beyond the grave—he does not believe that that life is
higher. On the other hand, by nature the sense of despair and wretchedness is
proper to man, for the human mind is so constituted that at every moment it
doubts itself, is not satisfied with himself, and man is therefore prone to consider
his existence inadequate. We are, clearly, transitory beings and our existence on
earth is, clearly, a process, the uninterrupted existence of a chrysalis transitioning
into a butterfly.’⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Dostoevsky, in appendix to eighth volume of sixth printing of The Demons, Stavrogin to Shatov;
quoted in Bulgakov, The Sophiology of Death, essay 1, pp. 1–2, ftn. 1.
 , , ,   139

Manuscripts, Abbreviations, Sigla, and Translation

Manuscripts

A Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 222 (134r–187r)

Æ London, British Library, Burney MS 52 (88v–130r)
B Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 278 (2r–49v)
ß Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1277 (54v–82v)
C Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 113 (79r–138r)
D Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 160 (60r–113v)
E Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 168 (73v–120r)
F Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 134 (95r–150r)
G Oxford Christ Church Library, grec 45 (115r–194r)
H Glasgow, University Library, MS Hunter 447 (1–52), extracts
I Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 192 (111v–166v)
J Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 562 (113v–117r), chapter 12
K Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 206 (1r–34r), incomplete
L Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 240 (65r–109v)
M Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 570 (108r–170v)
N Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San Marco, grec 58 (65v–116r)
O Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 228 (65r–118v)
P Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 476 (64v–116v)
Q Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin grec 235 (121r–208v)
R London, British Library, Royal MS 16 D I (117v–143r)
S Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 144 (98r–174v)
T Rome, Biblioteca Vaticana, grec 408 (89v–161v)
V Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. grec 2066 (299–316v), incom-
plete + Washington, Library of Congress, Ms 60
W Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. grec 2053 (247–283v)
X Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, grec Plut. 4.27 (186v–240v)
Z Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1356—9th-century fragments
(Astruc)
Λ Oxford, Bodleian, Ms Bodl. 238 (185r–197r)
Σ Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. sir. 106 (42r–75r)

Editions and Translations

Ald Aldus (1536)

Dion Dionysius, ed. Forbes (1855–61)
Eri Eriugena, ed. Mandolino (2020)
Forb Forbes (1855–61)
140 , 

Mign Migne PG (1858)

Wils Wilson NPNF (1893)

Indirect Witnesses

Dam John of Damascus, ed. Kotter (1973)

Inc De Incarnatione, ed. Diekamp, rev. Phanourgakis and Chrysos (1981)
Ius Justinian, ed. Schwartz, ACO 3 (1940)
SP Sacra Parallela, ed. Thum (2018)

Abbreviations Used in Critical Apparatus

ac ante correctionem
add. addidit, addiderunt
al. alia
cap. capitula
codd. codices
corr. correxit, correxerunt
def. deficit, deficiens
des. desinit, desinunt
edd. editores
eras. erasit
exp. expunxit
inc. incipit
inscr. inscriptio
l. linea
lit. littera
man. manus
mg in margine
om. omisit, omiserunt
pc post correctionem
pon. ponit, ponunt
rel. reliqui
supr. supra
 ,   141

Sigla

[] Words supplied by the translator.

Translation

The translation provided owes a lot to that of Wilson (NPNF 2.5; 1893), especially
with regard to the passages containing medical and astronomical descriptions. As
noted in the Introduction and in the annotations that follow, it corrects several
significant errors of translation. In general, as with my previous translations,
I have attempted to provide as literal a translation as possible, while still respecting
the rules of English grammar. As such, there are longer sentences, more numerous
sub-clauses, and a greater use of the passive voice than will please some. This is
done, however, in the conviction that the mode of expression, how an author
holds together various clauses in a single sentence, conveying as it does patterns of
thought, is essential to understanding what is being said.
ΤΟΥ ΕΝ ΑΓΙΟΙΣ ΓΡΗΓΟΡΙΟΥ ΝΥΣΣΗΣ
ΠΕΡΙ EIKONOS ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ
ΗΤΟΙ
ΘΕΩΡΙΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΚΑΤΑΣΚΕΥΗΝ ΤΟΥ
ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ
 Saint Gregory of Nyssa
On the Human Image of God
That is
A Contemplation of the Formation of the
Human Being
 144   

Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκοπος Νύσσης.

[1] [125] Εἰ ταῖς διὰ τῶν χρημάτων τιμαῖς ἔδει γεραίρειν τοὺς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν
διαφέροντας, μικρὸς ἂν, καθώς φησιν ὁ Σολομὼν, ὅλος ὁ κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων
ἐφάνη πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τῆς σῆς ἀρετῆς ἰσοστάσιος. Ἐπει δὲ κρείττων ἢ κατὰ
5 πλούτου τιμὴν ἡ χρεωστουμένη τῇ σεμνότητί σου χάρις ἐστίν· ἀπαιτεῖ δὲ τὸ ἅγιον
πάσχα τὴν συνήθη τῆς ἀγάπης δωροφορίαν· [B] προσάγομέν σου τῇ μεγαλοφροσύνῃ
δῶρον, ὦ ἄνθρωπε τοῦ Θεοῦ, μικρότερον μὲν ἢ ὡς ἄξιον εἶναί σοι προσκομίζεσθαι·
τῆς γε μὴν δυνάμεως ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐνδεέστερον. Τὸ δὲ δῶρον λόγος ἐστὶν, οἷον ἱμάτιόν
τι πενιχρὸν ἐκ τῆς πτωχῆς ἡμῶν διανοίας οὐκ ἀπόνως ἐξυφασμένον· ἡ δὲ τοῦ λόγου
10 ὑπόθεσις τολμηρὰ μὲν ἴσως τοῖς πολλοῖς εἶναι δόξει, πλὴν οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ πρέποντος
ἐνομίσθη· μόνος μὲν γὰρ ἀξίως τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ κατενόησεν ὁ κατὰ Θεὸν
κτισθεὶς ὄντως καὶ ἐν εἰκόνι τοῦ κτίσαντος τὴν ψυχὴν μεμορφωμένος, Βασίλειος, ὁ
κοινὸς ἡμῶν πατὴρ καὶ διδάσκαλος, ὃς τὴν ὑψηλὴν τοῦ παντὸς διακόσμησιν
εὔληπτον τοῖς πολλοῖς διὰ τῆς ἰδίας θεωρίας ἐποίησε, τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀληθινῇ σοφίᾳ
15 παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ συστάντα κόσμον γνώριμον τοῖς διὰ τῆς συνέσεως αὐτοῦ τῇ
θεωρίᾳ προσαγομένοις ποιήσας· [C] ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ καὶ τοῦ θαυμάζειν αὐτὸν κατ᾽
ἀξίαν ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντες, ὁμῶς τὸ λεῖπον τοῖς τεθεωρημένοις τῷ μεγάλῳ προσθεῖναι
διενοήθημεν· οὐχ ὡς νοθεύοντες δι᾽ ὑπερβολῆς τὸν ἐκείνου πόνον (οὐδὲ γὰρ θέμις τὸ
ὑψηλὸν ἐκεῖνο καθυβρισθῆναι στόμα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπιφημιζόμενον λόγοις), ἀλλ᾽ ὡς
20 μὴ δοκεῖν ἐλλειπῆ τοῦ διδασκάλου τὴν δόξαν ἐν τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ εἶναι.

[2] Εἰ γὰρ, λειπούσης τῇ Ἑξαημέρῷ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωρίας, μηδεὶς τῶν
μαθητευσάντων αὐτῷ σπουδήν τινα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λείποντος ἀναπλήρωσιν
εἰσηνέγκατο, ἔσχεν ἂν εἰκότως κατὰ τῆς μεγάλης αὐτοῦ δόξης ὁ μῶμος λαβὴν, ὡς
μὴ βουληθέντος ἕξιν τινὰ κατανοητικὴν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς ἐνεργάσασθαι· νυνὶ δὲ κατὰ
25 δύναμιν ἡμῶν ἐπιτολμησάντων τῇ ἐξηγήσει τοῦ λείποντος, εἰ μέν [D] τι τοιοῦτον ἐν
τοῖς ἡμετέροις εὑρεθείη οἷον τῆς ἐκείνου διδασκαλίας μὴ ἀνάξιον εἶναι, εἰς τὸν

2 τῶν om. R κατ᾽] κατὰ L 3 καθώς] ὡς B G L M P R² S T V X σολομὼν] ita Æ I K L M O R V W

X Ald Mign : σολομῶν Forb ὅλος ὁ κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων : sermo sicut ex rebus Eri 4 ἰσοστάσιον
L ἐπει δὲ] ita Æ B C I K L M N O P² Q R S T V W Forb : ἐπειδὴ X Ald Mign κρείττων] ita Æ ß I K
M P O Q R Tac Forb : κρείττον Sac (ω sup. l.) : κρεῖττον V W X Ald Mign 5 πλοῦτον B 6 προσάγομέν]
ita Æ B C I K M N O Q R T W Forb : ἣν προσάγομέν V Wac Eri Ald Mign 7 ὦ ἄνθρωπε τοῦ θεοῦ :
uidelicit homo dei Eri τοῦ] ita Æ B C G I K L M N O P Q R S T V W X Ald Forb : om. Mign ὠς]
ὥστε N προσκομίζεσθαι] προσάγεσθαι R² 9 τι om. Æ C G K S οὐκ ἀπόνως om.
I ἐξυφασμένον οὐκ ἀπόνως B 10 εἶναι ἴσως τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξει Æ C K O : τοῖς πολλοῖς ἴσως
δόξει εἶναι B 11 μὲν] ita Æ B C G I K L M N O P Q R S T V W X Forb : om. Ald Mign γὰρ om.
B ἀξίως om. N 12 βασίλειος] om. G I Pac T X Eri 13 πατὴρ ἡμῶν G K 14 τὸν] ita Æ B C G I K L M N
O P Q R S X Forb : καὶ τὸν V W Ald Mign 15–16 τοῖς διὰ τῆς συνέσεως αὐτοῦ τῇ θεωρίᾳ
προσαγομένοις ποιήσας] διὰ τῆς συνέσεως αὐτοῦ ποιήσας τοῖς τὴν τούτου θεωρίαν B 15 τοῖς post
αὐτοῦ pon. N 16 οἱ] ita B G L N O P R S T V W X Forb : εἰ M : om. Ald Mign 17 ἔχοντες] ἔχομεν
M ὁμῶς] ita Æ B C G I K L M N O P Q R S T V W X Forb : ὁμοῦ Ald Mign 18 ὑπερβολῆς] ita Æ
C G I K L Nmg O P R S X Forb : ὑποβολῆς V W Ald Mign 19 καθυβρίσαι C K O : καθυβρίζεσθαι I 20
ἐλλειπῆ] ita G I K L P Q T V W X Forb : ἐλλιπῆ Ald Mign 21 τῇ ἑξαημέρῷ] ita Æac B C G K L M N O
P Q R S T V W X Forb : τῆς ἐξαημέρου Ald Mign εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωρίας] de conditione hominis
expositio Dion : theoria hominis Eri 23 εἰσηνέγκατο] ita Æ I K L M N O Q R S V W Ald Forb :
εἰσενέγκατο ß G P R (in mg a 2a man. ἀποπλήρωσιν ἀπηνέγκατο) : εἰσενέγκαιτο Mign μεγάλης
αὐτοῦ] ἐκείνου μεγάλης N 24 κατανοητικὴν] διανοητικὴν B G L Nmg P R S T V X 25 μέν τι] μέντοι
B P² : μέν Æ (τ sup. l.) ἐν om. B 26 μὴ ἀνάξιον] ἄξιον Æ C O Q : μὴ om. K εἶναι ἀνάξιον B Dion
    145

Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, to his brother

Peter, the servant of God.

[1] If it is necessary to honour with rewards of money those who excel in virtue,
the whole world of money, as Solomon says,¹ would seem to be small in equiva-
lence to your virtue. Since, however, the favour owed to your Reverence is greater
than can be valued in money, yet the holy Pascha demands the accustomed gift of
love, we offer to your magnanimity, O man of God,² a gift too small indeed to be
worthy of being presented to you, but one not falling short of our ability. The gift
is a treatise, like a mean garment, woven not without toil from our poor mind; the
subject of the treatise, while it will perhaps seem to many to be audacious, yet was
not deemed beyond what is fitting. For he alone has worthily considered the
creation of God who truly was created according to God and whose soul was
formed in the image of the Creator—Basil, our common father and teacher—who
by his own contemplation made the sublime adornment of the universe accessible
to many, making the world established by God in true wisdom known to those
who are led, by means of his understanding, to contemplation; but we, while
falling short even of worthily admiring him, nevertheless intend to add what is
lacking in the reflections of the great one, not interpolating his work by insertion
(it not being right for that lofty mouth to be insulted by being attributed with our
words), but so that the glory of the teacher may not seem lacking among his
disciples.³
[2] As the contemplation of the human being is lacking in his Hexaemeron, if
none of those who had been his disciples contributed any effort towards the
completion of what was lacking, the scoffer would perhaps have had a pretext
against his great fame, for not having wished to produce in his hearers a certain
disposition of understanding. But now that we venture according to our ability

¹ Prov. 17:6. ² That is, Peter; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 1, 77 (Drobner, 5.3; 83.10).
³ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 77 (Drobner, 83–4).
 146   

διδάσκαλον πάντως τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἕξει· εἰ δὲ μὴ καθικνοῖτο τῆς μεγαλοφυοῦς

θεωρίας ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος, ὁ μὲν ἔξω τῆς τοιαύτης ἔσται κατηγορίας, τοῦ μὴ
βούλεσθαι δοκεῖν τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐγγενέσθαι τι δεξιὸν, ἐκφεύγων τὴν μέμψιν, ἡμεῖς
30 δ᾽ ἂν εἰκότως ὑπεύθυνοι δόξαιμεν τοῖς μωμοσκοποῦσιν, ὡς οὐ χωρήσαντες ἐν τῷ
μικροφυεῖ τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν τοῦ καθηγητοῦ τὴν σοφίαν. [3] Ἔστι δὲ οὐ μικρὸς ὁ
προκείμενος ἡμῖν εἰς [128] θεωρίαν σκοπὸς, οὐδέ τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θαυμάτων
τὰ δεύτερα φερόμενος, τάχα δὲ καὶ μείζων ἑκάστου τῶν γινωσκομένων, διότι οὐδὲν
ἕτερον Θεῷ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ὡμοίωται, πλὴν τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κτίσεως. Ὥστε
35 παρὰ τοῖς εὐγνώμοσι τῶν ἀκροατῶν πρόχειρον ἡμῖν τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις
συγγνώμην εἶναι, κἂν πολὺ κατόπιν τῆς ἀξίας ὁ λόγος ἔλθοι· δεῖ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τῶν
περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἁπάντων, τῶν τε προγεγενῆσθαι πεπιστευμένων, καὶ τῶν νῦν
θεωρουμένων, καὶ τῶν εἰς ὕστερον ἐκβήσεσθαι προσδοκωμένων, μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν
ἀνεξέταστον· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἐλλιπεστέρα τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος ἡ σπουδὴ διελέγχοιτο, εἰ τοῦ
40 ἀνθρώπου προκειμένου τῇ θεωρίᾳ, παρεθείη τι τῶν συντεινόντων πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν·
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰ [B] αὐτὰ τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
γεγενημένοις καὶ νῦν περὶ τὴν φύσιν ὁρᾶσθαι διά τινος ἀναγκαίας ἀκολουθίας ἔκ τε
τῆς γραφικῆς ὑφηγήσεως καὶ ἐκ τῆς παρὰ τῶν λογισμῶν εὑρισκομένης συναρτῆσαι
προσήκει, ὡς ἂν συμβαίνοι πᾶσα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἱρμῷ καὶ τάξει τῶν
45 ἐναντίως ἔχειν δοκούντων πρὸς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέρας συμφερομένων, οὕτω τῆς θείας
δυνάμεως ἐλπίδα τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδα καὶ πόρον τοῖς ἀμηχάνοις ἐφευρισκούσης·
σαφηνείας δὲ χάριν, καλῶς ἔχειν ᾠήθην, ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων σοι προθεῖναι τὸν λόγον,
ὡς ἂν ἔχοις πάσης τῆς πραγματείας ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐπιχειρημάτων
εἰδέναι τὴν δύναμιν.

50 Α Ἐν ᾧ τίς ἐστι μερικὴ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου φυσιολογία, καί τις ἁβροτέρα διήγησις
περὶ τῶν προγεγονότων τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως.
Β Διὰ τί τελευταῖος μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

27 καθικνοῖτο] ita Æ L N O P Q R V W X Forb : καθίκνοιτο B C G S : καθίκνοῖτο T : καθικνοῖντο M :

καθίκοιτο Ald Mign 28 ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος om. G L M P Reras S T V W X ἡμέτερος om. I λόγος]
σκοπὸς N (et in mg ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ κεῖται ὁ ἡμέτερος σκοπὸς) 29 γενέσθαι B N ἐκφεύγων] ita C G N O
P Q R S T V W X Forb : ἐκφεῦγον B : ἐκφυγὼν Ald Mign 30 δόξαιμεν] ita C Gpc I K L M N O P Rpc S T
V W X Forb : δόξωμεν Ald Mign : δόξαιμεν ἂν Æ Q 31 ἡμῶν om. Æ I M Q T V W δὲ] ita Æ ß G K
L M N O P Q R S V W X Ald Forb : δ᾽ Mign 32 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ] ita Æ B C I K N O Q R V W Forb : τοῦ
κόσμου G L M P S T X : ἐν κόσμῳ Ald Mign 33 δευτερεῖα Æ B C K N Q γινωσκομένων] ita Æ B C
G K L M N O P Q R S V X Forb : γινομένων I : γιγνωσκομένων Ald Mign 34 ἐκ τῶν ὄντων θεῷ N ἐκ om.
B G L M P R S V X 36 ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀξίας N 37–8 πεπιστευμένων—προσδοκωμένων] προσδοκωμένων
καὶ τῶν νῦν θεωρουμένων W καὶ τῶν νῦν θεωρουμένων] ita Æ B C G I K L M O P Q R S X Forb : post
προσδοκωμένων (l. 38) V Dion Eri Ald Mign 38 εἰς ὕστερον] ita B C G K L M O Q Rac V X Forb :
ἐσύστερον I R² : εἰσύστερον Ald Mign 39 ἂν ἐλλιπεστέρα] ἀνελλιπεστέρα B : ἂν ἐλλειπεστέρα G P
Q T V W X 41 αὐτοῦ] ita Æ B C I K L Npc O Q R S Forb : αὐτὸν V W X Ald Mign 42 τινας V 43
ἀφηγήσεως εὑρισκομένης] ita Æ B C G I K L O P Q R S T V W X Forb : ἐπινοίας εὑρισκομένης M Ald :
εὑρισκομένης ἐπινοίας Mign (N in mg ἐν ἑτέρῳ λείπει τὸ ἐπινοίας) συναρτίσαι Æ C I K N O Q T V
43–4 συναρτῆσαι—ὑπόθεσις] pulchre omnem sibimet materiam conuenit adunare Eri 44 πρὸς ἑαυτὴν
om. Ald Mign ἑαυτὴν] αὑτὴν Μ ἡ om. G 45 οὕτω] ita Æ B C G K L M N O P Q S R Teras V W
X Forb : οὕτω καὶ Ald Mign 46 τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδα om. G πόρον] πόνον ἐφευρισκούσης] εὑρισκομένης
Β 47 ᾠήθην] ὠήθημεν N προσθεῖναι T W 48 ἔχῃς I τῆς om. R ὀλίγοις R καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
V X 49 δύναμιν] ὑπόθεσιν Mign 50–1 de perfectione et pulcritudine mundi et de discordia concordia 4
elementorum Λ 50 ἐν] πρῶτον κεφάλαιον ἐν Æ P G V X Ald : κεφάλαιον πρῶτον ἐν O ἐν—κόσμου
om. N 51 τοῦ om. N 52 quod rationabiliter homo ultimus creaturarum creatus est Λ διατί
G N μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τελευταῖος Ald
    147

upon the exposition of what was lacking, if anything should be found in our work
not to be unworthy of his teaching, it will wholly be ascribed to the teacher, yet if
our treatise does not ascend to his sublime contemplation, he will be free from this
charge, avoiding the blame of seeming not to wish that his disciples become
skilful, while we perhaps may seem to be blamed by the accusers, for being unable
to contain in the smallness of our heart the wisdom of the instructor.⁴ [3] The
scope for contemplation proposed by us is not small, being second to none of the
wonders of the world, perhaps even greater than any of those known, because no
other existing thing is likened to God except the human creation.⁵ As such, we
shall find ready allowance for what we say by the well-disposed among our
hearers, even if our treatise lags far behind the dignity of the subject. For it is
necessary, I suppose, to leave unexamined nothing of all that concerns the human
being—of what we believe to have taken place previously, of what we now
contemplate, and of what we expect to transpire afterwards (for our effort
would be convicted of failing its promise, if, when the human being is proposed
for contemplation, anything contributing to the topic were to be omitted)—but it
is also proper to fit together, from scriptural guidance and from that discovered by
reasoning, the things concerning the human being that seem to be opposed (as
what is now seen pertaining to nature by a kind of necessary sequence is not the
same as those that occurred from the beginning) so that our whole subject may be
consistent with itself in train of thought and order, with things seemingly contrary
being brought together to one and the same end, and with the divine power
finding a hope for things beyond hope and a means of accomplishing things
unworkable.⁶ For the sake of clarity, I think it well to set out the treatise for you by
headings, that you may be able to know in brief the force of each of the arguments
of the whole work.

1. In which is a partial physiological consideration of the nature of the world, and

a more minute account of the things preceding the genesis of the human being.⁷
2. Why the human being is last, after the creation.⁸
3. That the nature of the human being is more honourable than all the visible
creation.⁹

⁴ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 28 (Drobner, 42.5–6).

⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Cant. 2 (Langerbeck, 68.1–11).
⁶ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 6 (Drobner, 6.5–6).
⁷ In the Latin translation of Dionysius Exiguus, as preserved in Bodl. 238, it is given as: ‘Of the
perfection and beauty of the world and of the harmonious discord of the four elements’.
⁸ Bodl. 238: ‘That it was reasonable that the human being should be created last of the creatures’.
⁹ Bodl. 238: ‘That God created the human being with great deliberation’.
 148   

Γ Ὅτι τιμιωτέρα πάσης τῆς φαινομένης κτίσεως ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις.

Δ Ὅτι διὰ πάντων ἐπισημαίνει τὴν ἀρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
55 κατασκευὴ.
Ε Ὅτι ὁμοίωμα τῆς θείας βασιλείας ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Ϛ Ἐξέτασις τῆς τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν συγγενείας, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκ παρόδου τὸ τῶν
Ἀνομοίων διελέγχεται δόγμα.
Ζ Διὰ τί γυμνὸς τῶν ἐκ φύσεως ὅπλων τε καὶ προκαλυμμάτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
60 Η Διὰ τί ὄρθιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ ὅτι διὰ τὸν λόγον αἱ χεῖρες, ἐν ᾧ τις
καὶ περὶ διαφορᾶς ψυχῶν φιλοσοφία.
Θ Ὅτι ὀργανικὸν κατεσκευάσθη τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ τὸ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου
χρείαν.
Ι Ὅτι διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ.
65 ΙΑ Ὅτι ἀθεώρητος ἡ τοῦ νοῦ φύσις.
ΙΒ Ἐξέτασις ἐν τίνι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν νομιστέον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δακρύων καὶ περὶ
γέλωτος φυσιολογία, καὶ θεώρημά τι φυσικὸν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν
φύσιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κοινωνίας.
ΙΓ Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ χάσμης καὶ ὀνείρων αἰτιολογία.
70 ΙΔ Ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος ὁ νοῦς· ἐν ᾧ καὶ διάκρισις τῶν τε σωματικῶν
καὶ ψυχικῶν κινημάτων.
ΙΕ Ὅτι κυρίως ψυχὴ, ἡ λογικὴ καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται· αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ὁμωνύμως
κατονομάζονται· ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ, διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος διήκειν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ
δύναμιν καταλλήλως ἑκάστου μέρους προσαπτομένην.
75 ΙϚ Θεωρία τοῦ θείου ῥητοῦ τοῦ εἰπόντος, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ
ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν· ἐν ᾧ ἐξετάζεται, τίς ὁ τῆς εἰκόνος λόγος, καὶ πῶς ὁμοιοῦται

53 quod cum magna deliberatione deus hominem creaverit Λ φύσις] κτίσις B G P X : conditio Dion
54–5 de regia dignitate humanae formae Λ 56 quomodo ad imaginem dei fact est humana anima Λ
57–8 quod deus non habet membra humana et quod una est imago patris et filii contra eunomianos
Λ 58 ἀνομοίων] ἐναντίων Æ 59 cur homo non sit creatus cum cornibus et aliis munimentis sicut
quaedam alia Λ καλυμμάτων N 60–1 de dignitate humanae formae et quare post alios creaturas
homo creatus sit Λ 60 τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ B N 61 καὶ om. B φιλοσοφία περὶ ψυχῶν διαφορᾶς B
διαφορῶν Æ 62–3 quod forma humani corporis congruat rationalitate mentis Λ 62 τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ
N : τὸ ἀνθρωποῦ G P X σχῆμα] σῶμα Æ G O P X 64 de quinque sensibus corporis Λ 65 definitio
mentis humanae Λ νοῦ] ἀνθρώπου Ald 66–8 quod principale hominis non solum [totum Forb] in
cerebro sed in toto habitat corpore Λ 66 ἐν ᾧ om.N περὶ² om. Æ G P V X 67 καὶ¹ om. Æ
N 67–8 θεώρημά—κοινωνίας faciunt cap. ιγ A B C I K N O Q R T Σ Λ contemplatio
quaedam naturalis de materia et natura et mentis inspectione Dion : quod sicut a deo mens
gubernatur ita a mente materialis uita corporis Λ 69 ιγ : ιδ A B C I K N Q R T Dion
Σ Λ quod corpus nostrum semper sit in motu Λ 70 ιδ : ιε A B C I K N O Q R T Dion
Σ Λ 70–1 quod aliquando mens seruit corpori et de tribus differentiis eius, uitali, spirituali et
rationali Λ 71 καὶ] καὶ τῶν N 72 ιε : ι& A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 72–4 quod utialis
efficientiae irrationabilium non uere sed equivoce dicitur anima et de ineffabili communione
corporis et animae Λ 72 ἡ] ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ καὶ N καὶ¹ om. G P X δὲ Æ G P V X 74
προσαπτομένην] ἐφαπτομένην N 75 ι& : ιζ A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 75–8 quod excellentia
hominis non in eo est quod iuxta philosophos ad imaginem mundi conditus est, sed in eo quod ad
imaginem dei factus est et quomodo ad imaginem dei factus est Λ 75 θεώρημα N τοῦ] ita Æ
N Forb : om. V X Ald 75–6 κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν om. Nac καὶ ὁμοίωσιν om. G N² P V
X καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν] ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν Æ O 76 ᾧ] ᾧ καὶ N πῶς] ita G Npc P X
Forb : εἰ Ald
    149

4. That the formation of the human being throughout signifies his sovereign
authority.¹⁰
5. That the human being is a likeness of the divine royalty.¹¹
6. An examination of the kinship of the intellect to nature; in which also, by
way of digression, the doctrine of the Anomoeans is refuted.¹²
7. Why the human being is by nature destitute weapons and covering.¹³
8. Why the form of the human being is upright, and that the hands are on
account of reason; in which also is a certain philosophical treatment
regarding the difference of souls.¹⁴
9. That the form of the human being was fashioned as an instrument for the
use of reason.¹⁵
10. That the intellect works by means of the senses.¹⁶
11. That the nature of the intellect is invisible.¹⁷
12. An examination concerning in which part the ruling principle should be
considered to be; in which also is a physiological consideration of tears and
laughter, and a physical theory regarding the association of matter, nature,
and the intellect.¹⁸
13. Concerning the causality of sleep, yawning, and dreams.¹⁹
14. That the intellect is not in a part of the body; in which also is a distinction
of the movements of body and soul.²⁰
15. That the rational soul is and is called ‘soul’ properly, while the others are
called so equivocally; in which also is this, that the power of the intellect
extends throughout the whole body, touching appropriately every part.²¹
16. A contemplation of the divine word which says, Let us make the human
being in accordance with our image and likeness;²² in which is examined
what the definition of the image is, and how the passible and mortal is
likened to the blessed and impassible, and how the male and the female are
in the image, these not being in the Prototype.²³

¹⁰ Bodl. 238: ‘Of the kingly dignity of the human form’.

¹¹ Bodl. 238: ‘How the human soul is made in the image of God’.
¹² Bodl. 238: ‘That God does not have human limbs, and that the image of the Father and the Son is
one, against the Eunomians’.
¹³ Bodl. 238: ‘Why the human was not created with horns and other defences like the other [animals]’.
¹⁴ Bodl. 238: ‘Of the dignity of the human form, and why the human was created after the other creatures’.
¹⁵ Bodl. 238: ‘That the form of the human body is congruent with the rationality of the mind’.
¹⁶ Bodl. 238: ‘Of the five bodily senses’. ¹⁷ Bodl. 238: ‘The definition of the human mind’.
¹⁸ Bodl. 238: ‘That the principle of the human being does not reside in the brain but in the whole
body’; and, as Chap. 13 (at De Imag. 12.9): ‘That as the mind is governed by God, so is the material life
of the body by the mind’.
¹⁹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 14): ‘That our body is always in motion’.
²⁰ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 15): ‘That the mind is sometimes in servitude to the body, and of its three
differences, vital, spiritual, and rational’.
²¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 16): ‘That the vital energy of the irrational creatures is not truly but
equivocally called “soul” and of the unspeakable communion of body and mind’.
²² Gen. 1:26.
²³ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 17): ‘That the excellence of the human being does not consist in the fact that,
according to the philosophers, he is made after the image of the world, but in the fact that he is made in
the image of God and how he is made in the image of God’.
 150   

τῷ μακαρίῳ τε καὶ ἀπαθεῖ τὸ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ ἐπίκηρον, καὶ πῶς ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ

ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ, ἐν τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ τούτων οὐκ ὄντων.
ΙΖ Τί χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς ἐπαποροῦντας, εἰ μετὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἡ παιδοποιΐα,
80 πῶς ἂν ἐγένοντο αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰ ἀναμάρτητοι διέμειναν οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄνθρωποι.
ΙΗ Ὅτι τὰ ἄλογα ἐν ἡμῖν πάθη ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν συγγενείας τὰς
ἀφορμὰς ἔχει.
ΙΘ Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, πάλιν ἐν βρώσει καὶ πόσει εἶναι τῶν ἐλπιζομένων
ἀγαθῶν τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν, διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ γεγράφθαι διὰ
85 τούτων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῆν.
Κ Τίς ἡ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ ζωὴ, καὶ τί τὸ ἀπηγορευμένον ἐκεῖνο ξύλον;
ΚΑ Ὅτι ἡ ἀνάστασις οὐ τοσοῦτον ἐκ τοῦ κηρύγματος τοῦ γραφικοῦ, ὅσον ἐξ
αὐτῆς τῆς ἀνάγκης τῶν πραγμάτων ἀκολούθως ἐλπίζεται.
ΚΒ Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, Εἰ καλόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀνάστασις, τί οὐχὶ ἤδη
90 γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ χρόνων τισὶ περιόδοις ἐλπίζεται.
ΚΓ Ὅτι ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως ὁμολογῶν, ἀναγκαίως καὶ περὶ
τοῦ τέλους συνθήσεται.
ΚΔ Ἀντίρρησις πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ τὴν ὕλην.
ΚΕ Πῶς ἄν τις καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσαχθείη πιστεῦσαι τῇ γραφῇ περὶ τῆς
95 ἀναστάσεως διδασκούσῃ.
ΚϚ Ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος ἡ ἀνάστασις.
ΚΖ Ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστιν εἰς τὰ τοῦ παντὸς στοιχεῖα τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος
ἀναλυθέντος, πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσωθῆναι.
ΚΗ Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, προϋφεστάναι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν σωμάτων, ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν,
100 πρὸ τῶν ψυχῶν διαπεπλᾶσθαι τὰ σώματα· εν ᾧ τις καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς κατὰ τὰς
μετεμψυχώσεις μυθοποιΐας.
ΚΘ Κατασκευὴ τοῦ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχῇ τε καὶ σώματι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς
ὑπάρξεως εἶναι.
Λ Θεωρία τις ἰατρικωτέρα περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν κατασκευῆς δι᾽ ὀλίγων.

79 ιζ : ιη A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 79–80 contra eos qui dicunt peccatum utiliter introductum

ad propagationem humani generis et quod per peccatum haec [haec om. Forb] animalem generationem
meruit Λ 80 ἐξ] ἀπ᾽ N 81 ιη : ιθ A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 81–2 quod ceterae quoque passiones
nobis et irrationalibus animantibus communes sunt et quod per earum refrenationem similes deo
dicimur Λ 83 ιθ : κ A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 83–5 cuiusmodi debeat intelligi esse cibus
hominis quo uescebatur in paradise et a quo prohibitus est Λ 83 καὶ] ita Æ G N O P V X Forb : καὶ ἐν
Ald εἶναι post ἀπόλαυσιν (l. 84) pon. Æ N O 84 παραδείσῳ om. V 86 κ : κα A B C I K N O Q R T
Dion Σ Λ quare scriptura uocauerit arborem lignum scientiae boni et mali Λ ἐκεῖνο] ita Æ G N P X
Forb : ἐκεῖ V : om. Ald 87 κα : κβ A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 87–8 quod divinum consilium non
est mutabile Λ 87 ἡ om. P 88 τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκης Æ G N O P V X 87 κβ : κγ A B C I K N O Q
R T Dion Σ Λ 89–90 quod consummata generatione hominum tempus quoque deficiet Λ 89 οὐκ
G P X 91 κγ : κδ A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 91–2 contra eos qui dicunt materiam deo
coeternam Λ 93 κδ : κε A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ quod omnis materia quibusdam
quantitatibus subsistit Λ 94 κε : κ& A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 94–5 de fide resurrectionis
et de tribus mortuis quos dominus Iesus suscitauit Λ 94 καὶ] καὶ ἐκ N 96 κ& : κζ A B C I K N O Q
R T Dion Σ Λ quod quantumcunque absumptum fuerit corpus humanum facile illud colligat
potentia diuina Λ ἀνάστασις] resurrectio mortuorum Dion 97 κζ : κη A B C I K N O Q R T
Dion Σ Λ 97–8 quod quamuis communiter resurgant corpora proprias tamen animas recipient Λ
97 ἀνθρωπείου G P : ἀνθρωπίου X 98 τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστῳ Æ G O P V X 99 κη : κθ A B C I K N O Q R T
Dion Σ Λ 99–101 de diversis opinionibus originis animae Λ 100 διαπεπλάσθαι Æ N O V τις] τις
ζήτησις G P V X 102 κθ : λ A B C I K N O Q R T Dion Σ Λ 102–3 quod deus pariter animam et
corpus hominis fecerit Λ 103 εἶναι] esse uideatur Dion 104 λ : λα A B C I K N Q R T Dion Σ Λ : om.
O de triplici natura corporis Λ τις om. G P V X
    151

17. What we must answer to those who ask: ‘If procreation comes after the sin,
how would souls have come into being if human beings had remained
sinless from the beginning?’²⁴
18. That our irrational passions have their starting point from kinship with the
irrational nature.²⁵
19. To those who say: ‘The enjoyment of the good things hoped for will again
be in food and drink, because from the beginning in Paradise, it is written,
the human being lived by these means.’²⁶
20. What was the life in Paradise, and what was that forbidden tree?²⁷
21. That the resurrection is consequentially hoped for not so much from the
scriptural proclamation but as much from the very necessity of things.²⁸
22. To those who say: ‘If the resurrection is something beautiful and good, why
has it not already happened, but is hoped for in some period of time?’²⁹
23. That one who acknowledges the beginning of the world’s constitution
must necessarily agree also regarding its end.³⁰
24. An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.³¹
25. How one, even of those outside, may be brought to believe the Scripture’s
teaching regarding the resurrection.³²
26. That the resurrection is not beyond probability.³³
27. That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the
universe, for what belongs to each to be saved from the common [pool].³⁴
28. To those who say ‘souls pre-exist bodies’, or the reverse, ‘bodies were
formed before souls’; in which is also a refutation of the myth-making
concerning transmigrations of souls.³⁵
29. An elaboration of the fact that the cause of existence for soul and body is
one and the same.³⁶
30. A brief, more medical, contemplation regarding the formation of our body.³⁷

²⁴ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 18): ‘Against those who say that sin was a useful introduction for the
propagation of the human race; and that by sin it deserved animal generation’.
²⁵ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 19): ‘That our other passions also are common to us and to the irrational
animals, and that by the restraint of them we are said to be like God’.
²⁶ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 20): ‘How the food ought to be understood with which the human was fed in
paradise and from which he was prohibited’.
²⁷ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 21): ‘Why Scripture called the tree “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil” ’.
²⁸ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 22): ‘That the divine counsel is immutable’.
²⁹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 23): ‘That when the generation of humans is finished, time also will come to an end’.
³⁰ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 24): ‘Against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God’.
³¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 25): ‘That matter exists in certain quantities’.
³² Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 26): ‘Of faith in the resurrection and of the three dead persons whom the Lord
Jesus raised’.
³³ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 27): ‘That however much the human body may have been consumed, the
divine power can easily bring it together’.
³⁴ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 28): ‘That although bodies rise together they will however receive their own souls’.
³⁵ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 29): ‘On different views of the origin of the soul’.
³⁶ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 30): ‘That God equally made the body and the soul of the human being’.
³⁷ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 31): ‘Of the threefold nature of the body’.
 152   

Ἐν ᾧ τίς ἐστι μερικὴ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου φυσιολογία, καί τις ἁβροτέρα διήγησις περὶ
τῶν προγεγονότων τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως.
[1.1] Αὕτη ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, φησὶν ἡ γραφή· ὅτε συνετελέσθη
πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον, καὶ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν θέσιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀποκριθὲν
5 ἀνεχώρησεν· ὅτε περιέσχεν ἐν κύκλῳ τὰ πάντα τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα, τὴν δὲ μέσην
τοῦ παντὸς ἀπέλαβε χώραν τὰ βαρέα καὶ κατωφερῆ τῶν σωμάτων, γῆ τε καὶ ὕδωρ,
ἐν ἀλλήλοις διακρατούμενα· σύνδεσμος δέ τις καὶ βεβαιότης τῶν γεγενημένων ἡ θεία
τέχνη καὶ δύναμις τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων ἐναπετέθη, διπλαῖς ἐνεργείαις ἡνιοχοῦσα τὰ
πάντα· (στάσει γὰρ καὶ κινήσει τὴν γένεσιν τοῖς μὴ οὖσι καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τοῖς οὖσιν
10 [D] ἐμηχανήσατο) περὶ τὸ βαρὺ τε καὶ ἀμετάθετον τῆς ἀκινήτου φύσεως, οἷον περί
τινα πάγιον ἄξονα, τὴν ὀξυτάτην τοῦ πόλου κίνησιν, τροχοῦ δίκην, ἐν κύκλῳ
περιελαύνουσα, καὶ δι᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀμφοτέροις συντηροῦσα τὸ ἀδιάλυτον· τῆς τε
κυκλοφορουμένης οὐσίας διὰ τῆς ὀξείας κινήσεως τὸ ναστὸν τῆς γῆς ἐν κύκλῳ
περισφιγγούσης, τοῦ τε στερροῦ καὶ ἀνενδότου διὰ τῆς ἀμεταθέτου παγιότητος
15 ἀδιαλείπτως ἐπιτείνοντος τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν κυκλουμένων τὴν δίνησιν· ἴση δὲ καθ᾽
ἑκάτερον τῶν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις διεστηκότων ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναπειργάσθη, τῇ τε
στασίμῳ φύσει καὶ τῇ ἀστάτῳ περιφορᾷ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γῆ τῆς ἰδίας βάσεως
μετατίθεται, οὔτε ὁ οὐρανός ποτε τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐνδίδωσι καὶ ὑποχαλᾷ τῆς κινήσεως.
[1.2] Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ πρῶτα [129] κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πεποιηκότος σοφίαν, οἷόν τις ἀρχὴ
20 τοῦ παντὸς μηχανήματος προκατεσκευάσθη τῶν ὄντων, δεικνύντος οἶμαι τοῦ
μεγάλου Μωϋσέως, διὰ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ
γεγενῆσθαι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως ἔκγονα τὰ ἐν τῇ κτίσει φαινόμενα
πάντα, κατὰ θεῖον βούλημα παραχθέντα εἰς γένεσιν· τοῦ τοίνυν οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς γῆς
ἐκ διαμέτρου πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον ταῖς ἐνεργείαις διεστηκότων, ἡ μεταξὺ

1–2 ἐν—γενέσεως] de perfectione et pulcritudine mundi et de discordia concordia 4 elementorum Λ 1

ἐν ᾧ—κόσμου om. N ἐν ᾧ—διήγησις om. Æ ἁβροτέρα] clarior Dion Eri 2 τοῦ om. N ἀνθρώπου]
ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς καὶ I 5 περιέσχεν ἐν] περιέσχε K Rac T ἐν om. O 6 ἀπέλαβε] ἔλαβε N 7 ἐν
ἀλλήλοις διακρατούμενα] a se inuicem discreta sun Eri δέ Xpc2 8 ἐναπετέθη] ἐναπετελέθη V 9 τὴν]
τὴν τε G H K M N O P R T V W X 10 ἐμηχανήσατο] ἐχαρίσατο G H Ppc τε] ita A B G H I K L M O P
Q R S X Forb : om. V W Ald Mign ἀεικινήτου N 11 τροχοῦ δίκην om. G H M N P X 12
συντηροῦσα] συνηγοροῦσα N 13 κυκλωφορουμένης O τὸ ναστὸν] τὸν ἄστατὸν O 14 τε om.
N 16 ἐναπεργάσθη P X : ἐναπείργασται B 18 ὁ om. B G L P S T X καὶ Xpc2 19 δὲ om.
T καὶ om. K O Vac (add. 2a man.) πρῶτα] πρῶτα καὶ V οἷόν] οἱ Vac (corr. 2a man.) 20
μηχανήματος] machinantis Eri δεικνύντος] ita Η Κ Μ O R S V W X Ald Mign : δεικνῦντος Forb :
N accent. eras 21 μωσέως V 21–2 γεγενῆσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ B G L M N P S T X 21 τοῦ om.
A 22 γεγενῆσθαι] προγεγενῆσθαι H : πεποιῆσθαι R ἔγγονα R 23 πάντα] ita A B G H I K L M O P
S T W X Forb : πάντα τὰ V Ald Mign κατὰ θεῖον βούλημα] τῷ θείῳ βουλήματι A I K O Q κατὰ] ita
B G H L M P R Sac T Forb : κατὰ τὸ Ald Mign γένεσιν] γένεσιν ἐστιν R 24 τῆς ἐνεργείας Ald Mign
        153

In which is a partial physiological consideration of the nature of the world, and a

more minute account of the things preceding the genesis of the human being.¹
[1.1] This is the book of the genesis of heaven and earth, says the Scripture,² when
everything that appears was completed and each separated being withdrew to its
own place, when the body of heaven encompassed all things around, and those
bodies that are heavy and borne downwards, earth and water, holding each other
back, took the middle place of the universe, while the divine art and power was
implanted in the nature of things as a sort of bond and stability for the things that
came to be, guiding the universe by a twofold activity, for by rest and motion it
devised the genesis of the things that were not and the continuance of the things
that are, driving around in a circle—about the heavy and immutable element of
the immovable nature, as around some fixed axle—the most rapid motion of the
celestial sphere, like a wheel, and preserving the indissolubility of both by their
mutual action, as the circling substance by its rapid motion compresses the solid
body of the earth in a circle, while that which is firm and unyielding by its
unchanging fixedness continually urges on the rotation of those things circling
around it, and equal intensity is wrought in each of those which differ in their
activities, that is, in the stationary nature and in the never-resting revolving vaults
[of heaven], for neither is the earth moved from its own foundation nor does the
heaven ever relax its fervour or slacken its motion.
[1.2] These, moreover, were formed first before others, according to the wisdom
of the Maker, as a kind of beginning of the whole machine, as the great Moses
indicated, I think, by saying that the heaven and the earth were made by God in
the beginning,³ so that all things appearing in the creation are the offspring of
rest and motion, brought to genesis in accordance with the divine will. The
heaven and the earth, then, being diametrically opposed to each other in their

¹ Bodl. 238: ‘Of the perfection and beauty of the world and of the harmonious discord of the four
elements’.
² Gen. 2:4. ³ Gen. 1:1.
 154   

25 τῶν ἐναντίων κτίσις ἐν μέρει τῶν παρακειμένων μετέχουσα, δι᾽ ἑαυτῆς μεσιτεύει τοῖς
ἄκροις, ὡς ἂν ἐπίδηλον γενέσθαι τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τοῦ μέσου
συνάφειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον καὶ λεπτὸν τῆς πυρώδους οὐσίας μιμεῖται μέν πως ὁ
ἀήρ, ἔν τε τῷ κούφῳ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῷ πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ἐπιτηδείως [B] ἔχειν· οὐ
μὴν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάγια συγγενείας ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι, οὔτε ἀεὶ μένων
30 ἀκίνητος, οὔτε διαπαντὸς ῥέων καὶ σκεδαννύμενος· ἀλλὰ τῇ πρὸς ἐκάτερον
οἰκειότητι οἷόν τι μεθόριον τῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐναντιότητος γίνεται, μιγνὺς ἅμα
καὶ διαιρῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ διεστῶτα τῇ φύσει. [1.3] Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἡ ὑγρὰ
οὐσία διπλαῖς ποιότησι πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἁρμόζεται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ βαρεῖά
τε καὶ κατωφερὴς εἶναι, πολλὴν πρὸς τὸ γεῶδες τὴν συγγένειαν ἔχει· τῷ δὲ μετέχειν
35 ῥοώδους τινὸς καὶ πορευτικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὐ πάντη τῆς κινουμένης ἠλλοτρίωται [C]
φύσεως· ἀλλά τις ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τούτου μίξις τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ σύνοδος, τῆς τε
βαρύτητος εἰς κίνησιν μετατεθείσης, καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἐν τῷ βάρει μὴ πεδηθείσης·
ὥστε συμβαίνειν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀκρότατον τῇ φύσει διεστηκότα διὰ τῶν
μεσιτευόντων ἀλλήλοις ἑνούμενα.
40 [1.4] Μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἡ φύσις
ἀμίκτως πάντη πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἔχει, ὡς ἂν, οἶμαι, πάντα πρὸς
ἄλληλα νεύοι τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον φαινόμενα, καὶ συμπνέοι πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ κτίσις
ἐν τοῖς τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰδιώμασιν εὑρισκομένη· τῆς γὰρ κινήσεως οὐ μόνον κατὰ
τὴν τοπικὴν μετάστασιν νοουμένης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τροπῇ καὶ ἀλλοιώσει θεωρουμένης·
45 πάλιν δ᾽ αὖ τῆς ἀμεταθέτου φύσεως τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι κίνησιν [D] οὐ
προσιεμένης· ἐναλλάξασα τὰς ἰδιότητας ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ σοφία, τῷ μὲν ἀεικινήτῳ τὸ
ἄτρεπτον, τῷ δὲ ἀκινήτῳ τὴν τροπὴν ἐνεποίησε· προμηθείᾳ τινὶ τάχα τὸ τοιοῦτον
οἰκονομήσασα, ὡς ἂν μὴ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἴδιον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἄτρεπτόν τε καὶ
ἀμετάθετον, ἐπί τινος τῶν κατὰ τὴν κτίσιν βλεπόμενον, Θεὸν νομίζεσθαι τὸ
50 κτίσμα ποιήσειεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θεότητος ὑπόληψιν σχοίη, ὅπερ ἂν κινούμενον ἢ
ἀλλοιούμενον τύχῃ. Διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ στάσιμός ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ ἄτρεπτος· ὁ δὲ
οὐρανὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ τρεπτὸν οὐκ ἔχων, οὐδὲ τὸ στάσιμον ἔχει· ἵνα τῇ μὲν
ἑστώσῃ φύσει τὴν τροπὴν, τῇ δὲ μὴ τρεπομένῃ τὴν κίνησιν, ἡ θεία συμπλέξασα
δύναμις, καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἀμφοτέρας τῇ ἐναλλάξει τῶν ἰδιωμάτων προσοικειώσῃ, καὶ
55 τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον ὑπολήψεως ἀλλοτριώσῃ· [132] οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἂν τούτων, καθὼς
εἴρηται, τῆς θειοτέρας φύσεως νομισθείη, οὔτε τὸ ἄστατον, οὔτε τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον.

26 ἂν om. I 28 τῷ] τὸ K O Q Rac : τοῦ L 30 ἐκάτερον] ἕτερον Ald Mign 31 μιγνύων R 32 διαιρῶν]
om. Eri ἐν ἑαυτῷ] om. N : ἐν αὐτῷ Ald Mign ἡ om. M 34 τε Xpc2 τῷ] τὸ O 35 πορευτικῆς]
εὐπορευτικῆς vel ἀπορευτικῆς Rac κινουμένης] νοουμένης K O 36 τούτουν X 37 καὶ τῆς κινήσεως
ἐν τῷ βάρει μὴ πεδηθείσης om. O ἐν om. N μὴ] μὴ μὴ X παιδηθείσης V 38 διεστηκότα]
προεστηκότα K O 42 φαινόμενα] φερόμενα A I K O συμπνέει Bpc1 K L M : ξυμπνέοι Mign
44 τοπικὴν] typicam Eri ἀλλοιώσει] ἐν ἀλλοιώσει N 45–6 πάλιν—προσιεμένης] iterumque ipsa
natura dum mouetur non immensurabiliter motum producit Eri 45 δ’αὐτῆς K L Q V X
46 προιεμένης K V 46–7 τῷ . . . τῷ] τὸ . . . τὸ O 48 φύσεως] θείας φύσεως A I K N O Q R Smg1 Dion Eri
49 βλεπόμενον] ita ß G H L O P Q R R S T V W X Forb : βλεπομένων Ald Mign 50 γὰρ] γὰρ ἂν A B N O
Q R Spc ἔτι om. A B 51 ἀλλοιούμενον] παλοιούμενον N 52 ἐκ om. Ald Mign τὸ om. Ald Mign ἔχει]
add. eodem enim motu semper uoluitur Eri 53 φύσει ἑστώσῃ Mign 54 ἀλλήλας A B ἀμφοτέραις
ß ἐπαλλάξει A I K N O 55 οὐθέτερον] ita A R Spc Ald Forb : οὐθ᾽ ἕτερον G H K L O P Q Sac
V W X : οὐδέτερον Mign ἂν om. B R 56 θειοτέρας] θείας L ἀλλοιούμενον] ἀλλοτριούμενον P
        155

activities, the creation being between the opposites, having in part a share in
what is adjacent to it, through itself mediates between the extremes, so that clearly
the connection of the opposites comes to be through the mid-point: for air in a way
imitates the perpetual motion and subtlety of the fiery substance, both in the
lightness of nature and in its suitableness for motion, yet it is not such as to be
alienated from kinship with the solid substance, for it neither remains continually
immobile, not continuously flowing and being dispersed, but becomes, in its affinity
to each, a kind of borderland in the opposition between activities, in itself at once
mixing and dividing things distinct by nature. [1.3] In the same way, the liquid
substance also is attached by twofold qualities to each of the opposites; on the one
hand, as heavy and borne downwards it has close kinship to the earthy, but, on the
other hand, as partaking of a certain fluid and mobile activity it is not altogether
alien from the mobile nature; yet by means of this there is also a kind of mixture
and concurrence of the opposites, weight being transferred to motion and motion
not being hindered by weight, so that things most extremely opposite in nature
combine with one another, being united by those mediating between them.
[1.4] Or rather, according to the accurate account, the very nature of contrary
things is not entirely unmixed with properties of the other, so that, I think,
everything that appears in the world mutually converges and the creation, though
found in properties of contrary things, coheres with itself;⁴ for as motion is not
conceived merely as shifting in place, but is also contemplated in change and
alteration, and again as the immovable nature does not accept the motion of
alteration, the wisdom of God has transposed these properties, and produced
unchangeableness in that which is ever-moving and change in that which is
immovable,⁵ arranging this perhaps with a certain provision, lest the property of
nature, that is, immutability and immobility, when seen in anything of the creation
would cause the creature to be thought God; for that which may happen to be
moved or to undergo change would no longer be suspected of divinity. Therefore,
the earth is stable yet not immutable, while the heaven, on the contrary, not having
mutability yet neither has stability, so that the divine power, by interweaving change
in the stable nature and motion in that not subject to change, might, by the
interchange of attributes, assimilate both to each other and remove from them the
supposition of being divine, for neither of these, as was said—neither that which is
unstable nor that which is changeable—can be considered as being of the more
divine nature.

⁴ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Eccl. 7 (Alexander, 406.2–7; ET 121); Cat. Or. 6.3 (Mühlenberg, 21.16–22);
Heraclitus Fr B 8, 10; Plotinus, Enn. 2.3.7.13–23; 2.3.12.24–32; 4.4.40.1–3; Chrysippus SVF 2.543 (=DL
7.140); Galen, De nat. fac. 1.13 (39).
⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 78 (Drobner, 78.16–22).
 156   

[1.5] Ἤδη τοίνυν τὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἔφθασε τέλος· συνετελέσθη γὰρ, καθώς
φησι Μωϋσῆς, ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὰ διὰ μέσου πάντα, καὶ τῷ καταλλήλῳ
κάλλει τὰ καθέκαστον διεκοσμήθη· ὁ οὐρανὸς μὲν ταῖς τῶν φωστήρων αὐγαῖς,
60 θάλαττα δὲ καὶ ἀὴρ τοῖς νηκτοῖς τε καὶ ἐναερίοις τῶν ζώων, γῆ δὲ ταῖς παντοίαις
τῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων διαφοραῖς, ἅπερ ἀθρόως ἅπαντα θείῳ βουλήματι
δυναμωθεῖσα κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀπεκύησε. Καὶ πλήρης μὲν ἦν τῶν ὡραίων ἡ γῆ, ὁμοῦ τοῖς
ἄνθεσι τοὺς καρποὺς ἐκβλαστήσασα. Πλήρεις δὲ οἱ λειμῶνες τῶν ὅσα τοὺς λειμῶνας
ἐπέρχεται· πᾶσαί τε ῥαχίαι καὶ ἀκρώρειαι καὶ πᾶν ὅσον πλάγιόν τε καὶ ὕπτιον καὶ
65 ὅσον ἐν [B] κοίλοις, τῇ νεοθαλεῖ πόᾳ καὶ τῇ ποικίλῃ τῶν δένδρων ὥρᾳ
κατεστεφάνωτο, ἄρτι μὲν τῆς γῆς ἀνασχόντων, εὐθὺς δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλειον κάλλος
ἀναδραμόντων· ἐγεγήθει δὲ πάντα κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ διεσκίρτα τὰ τῷ προστάγματι
τοῦ Θεοῦ ζωογονηθέντα βοτὰ, κατ᾽ ἀγέλας τε καὶ κατὰ γένη ταῖς λόχμαις
ἐνδιαθέοντα, ταῖς δὲ τῶν μουσικῶν ὀρνίθων ᾠδαῖς ἁπανταχῆ περιηχεῖτο πᾶν ὅσον
70 κατηρεφές τε καὶ σύσκιον. Ἥτε κατὰ θάλατταν ὄψις, ὡς εἰκὸς, ἄλλη τοιαύτη τις ἦν,
ἄρτι πρὸς ἡσυχίαν τε καὶ γαλήνην ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς τῶν κοίλων καθισταμένη,
καθ᾽ ἣν ὅρμοι καὶ λιμένες θείᾳ βουλήσει ταῖς ἀκταῖς αὐτομάτως ἐγκοιλανθέντες,
προσημέρουν τῇ ἠπείρῳ τὴν θάλατταν. Αἵ τε ἡρεμαῖαι τῶν κυμάτων κινήσεις τῷ
κάλλει [C] τῶν λειμώνων ἀνθωραΐζοντο, ὑπὸ λεπταῖς τε καὶ ἀπήμοσιν αὔραις κατ᾽
75 ἄκραν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν γλαφυρῶς ἐπιφρίσσουσαι· καὶ ἅπας ὁ κατὰ τὴν κτίσιν
πλοῦτος, κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ θάλατταν, ἕτοιμος ἦν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μετέχων οὐκ ἦν.

Διὰ τί τελευταῖος μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

[2.1] Οὔπω γὰρ τὸ μέγα τοῦτο καὶ τίμιον χρῆμα, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῷ κόσμῳ τῶν ὄντων
ἐπεχωρίαζεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν εἰκὸς, τὸν ἄρχοντα πρὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναφανῆναι, ἀλλὰ
τῆς ἀρχῆς πρότερον ἑτοιμασθείσης, ἀκόλουθον ἦν ἀναδειχθῆναι τὸν βασιλεύοντα.

57 τὰ om. R 57–8 καθώς— γῆ] ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καθώς φησι μωϋσῆς A I K O Q 58 μωϋσῆς] ὁ
μωϋσῆς N : μωσῆς V ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ om. M οὐρανὸς] ὁ οὐρανὸς N 59 κάλλει] κόσμῳ V ὁ
om. A G H I K N O Q R 60 δὲ] τε R καὶ ἀὴρ—ζώων] atque aer animantibus tam natatilibus
quam uolatilibus mire tripudians Dion : aerque animalibus Eri τοῖς παντοίοις N 61 διαφοραῖς
Xpc2 ἅπαντα ἀθρόως N ἅπαντα] πάντα A I K O Q : om. B θείῳ] τῷ θείῳ A I K O 62 ἦν om.
N τῶν ὡραίων ἡ γῆ] speciebus universis Dion : montibus terra Eri 63 ἐκβλαστήσασα] ἐβλάστησεν
N : συμβλαστήσασα A I K Q R λειμῶνες] λειμῶνες καὶ V 64 τε] δὲ A B I K N O Q R ῥαχίαι]
ῥαχείαι N : τραχείαι Ppc : τραχεῖαι G H L Pac R S T V W X καὶ¹] τε καὶ A B I K N O Q R πλάγιόν]
πάγιόν X : πέλαγιόν N τε om. V 65 τῇ νεοθαλεῖ πόᾳ] τὴν εὐθαλῆ πόαν K (et ῇ . . . ῇ . . . ᾳ sup. l.)
Rac 66 ἀνασχόντων] ita A B G H I K L M O P Q R S T V W X Forb : ἀνισχόντων Ald Mign 67–8
ἐγεγήθει— βοτὰ] humi autem omnia consequenter exultantia issu Dei fecunda pecora rident Eri 65
γεγήθει G N 67 τὰ om. B I K N Q 68 ζωογονηθέντα βοτὰ] ζωογονηθέντα φυτὰ καὶ βοτὰ τὰ
βοσκόμενα καὶ ἀγελιζόμενα εἰς τοὺς δρυμοὺς καὶ τὰ ὄρη ἐνέμοντο R βοτὰ] βοσκήματα N κατὰ
om. R 69 ταῖς δὲ] ταῖς τε N : καὶ ταῖς I : ταῖς A K O Q R ἁπανταχῆ om. N 70 ἥτε] ἥτε καὶ V κατὰ
Xpc2 θάλασσαν N 72 ὅρμοι] ὅρμοι τε A I K N Q R ἐγκοιλωθέντες W : ἐγκοιλαθέντες K T :
ἐκκοιλαθέντες I 73 προσημεροῦσι N θάλασσαν B I R 74 ἀνθωραΐζοντο] ἀντ᾽ ὡραΐζοντο X 74–5
ὑπὸ λεπταῖς—ἐπιφρίσσουσαι] lenibus sollemnitur sonantes Eri 74 τε] ita A B G H I K N O P Q R S Vpc
W X Forb : om. Ald Mign 75 ἅπας] πας Æac N 76 κατὰ om. R θάλατταν] κατὰ θάλατταν V :
θάλασσαν I
1 διὰ—ἄνθρωπος] quod rationabiliter homo ultimus creaturarum creatus est Λ διατί I K L M N O P R
V μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τελευταῖος Ald Mign Cur novissimus post creaturam factus sit
homo Dion 2 χρῆμα] κτῆμα A I K N O Q 3 εἰκὸς ἦν N 4 βασιλεύσοντα S : βασιλέα B
       – 157

[1.5] Now all things had arrived at their own end, for, as Moses says, the heaven
and the earth were finished,⁶ and all things in-between, and each thing was
adorned with their corresponding beauty: the heaven with the rays of the stars,
the sea and air with the living creatures that swim and fly, and the earth with every
variety of plants and animals—to all of which the earth, empowered by the divine
will, gave birth altogether. The earth was full of beautiful things, blossoming forth
at the same time with flowers and fruits. The meadows were full of all that grows
in the meadows; and all the mountain ridges and summits and every hillside and
slope and hollow were crowned with young grass and with the varied produce of
the trees, just risen from the ground, yet shot up at once into their perfect beauty;
and all the animals that had come into life at God’s command were likely rejoicing
and skipping about, running about in the thickets in herds according to their kind,
while every sheltered and shady spot was ringing with the chants of the songbirds.
And at sea, most likely the sight to be seen was similar, as it had just settled to
peace and calm in the gathering together of its depths, where havens and har-
bours, hollowed out by divine counsel on the coasts, brought sea into accord with
land. The gentle motion of the waves vied in beauty with the meadows, rippling
delicately with light and harmless breezes that skimmed the surface; and all the
wealth of creation by land and sea was ready, but there was no one to share it.

Why the human being is last, after the creation.⁷

[2.1] For that great and honourable thing, the human being, had not yet occupied
its place in the world of beings, as it was not reasonable for the ruler to appear
before the ruled; but with the dominion first made ready, it was consistent for the
king to be presented. When, then, the Maker of all had prepared beforehand a

⁶ Gen. 2:1.
⁷ Bodl. 238: ‘That it was reasonable that the human being should be created last of the creatures’.
 158   

5 Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οἷόν τινα βασίλειον καταγωγὴν τῷ μέλλοντι βασιλεύειν ὁ τοῦ παντὸς
ποιητὴς προηυτρέπισεν, αὕτη δὲ ἦν γῆ τε καὶ νῆσοι καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανὸς ὑπὲρ
τούτων ὀρόφου δίκην ἐπικυρτούμενος· πλοῦτος δὲ παντοδαπὸς τοῖς βασιλείοις
τούτοις ἐναπετέθη· πλοῦτον δὲ λέγω πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν, ὅσον ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ
βλαστήμασι καὶ ὅσον αἰσθητικόν τε καὶ ἔμπνουν καὶ ἔμψυχον· [133] εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ
10 τὰς ὕλας εἰς πλοῦτον καταριθμήσασθαι, ὅσαι διά τινος εὐχροίας τίμιαι τοῖς
ἀνθρωπίνοις ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐνομίσθησαν, οἷον χρυσίον τε καὶ ἀργύριον καὶ τῶν λίθων
δὴ τούτων ἃς ἀγαπῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τούτων πάντων τὴν ἀφθονίαν καθάπερ τισὶ
βασιλικοῖς θησαυροῖς τοῖς τῆς γῆς κόλποις ἐγκατακρύψας—οὕτως ἀναδείκνυσιν ἐν
τῷ κόσμῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῶν ἐν τούτῳ θαυμάτων, τῶν μὲν θεατὴν ἐσόμενον, τῶν δὲ
15 κύριον· ὡς διὰ μὲν τῆς ἀπολαύσεως τὴν σύνεσιν τοῦ χορηγοῦντος ἔχειν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ
κάλλους τε καὶ μεγέθους τῶν ὁρωμένων τὴν ἄρρητόν τε καὶ ὑπὲρ λόγον τοῦ
πεποιηκότος δύναμιν ἀνιχνεύειν.
[2.2] Διὰ ταῦτα τελευταῖος μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν εἰσήχθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὡς ἀπόβλητος
ἐν ἐσχάτοις ἀπορριφεὶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἅμα τῇ γενέσει βασιλεὺς εἶναι τῶν ὑποχειρίων
20 προσήκων. Καὶ ὥσπερ τις ἀγαθὸς ἑστιάτωρ [B] οὐ πρὸ τῆς παρασκευῆς τῶν
ἐδωδίμων τὸν ἑστιώμενον εἰσοικίζεται, ἀλλ᾽ εὐπρεπῆ τὰ πάντα παρασκευάσας, καὶ
φαιδρύνας τοῖς καθήκουσι κόσμοις τὸν οἶκον, τὴν κλισίαν, τὴν τράπεζαν, ἐφ᾽ ἑτοίμοις
ἤδη τοῖς πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιτηδείοις ἐφέστιον ποιεῖται τὸν δαιτυμόνα· κατὰ τὸν
αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ πλούσιός τε καὶ πολυτελὴς τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἑστιάτωρ παντοίοις
25 κάλλεσι κατακοσμήσας τὴν οἴκησιν, καὶ τὴν μεγάλην ταύτην καὶ παντοδαπῆ
πανδαισίαν ἑτοιμασάμενος, οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔργον αὐτῷ δοὺς οὐ τὴν
κτῆσιν τῶν μὴ προσόντων ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν παρόντων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διπλᾶς
αὐτῷ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰς ἀφορμὰς καταβάλλεται, τῷ γηΐνῳ τὸ θεῖον ἐγκαταμίξας,
ἵνα δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων συγγενῶς τε καὶ οἰκείως πρὸς ἑκατέραν ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχῃ, τοῦ Θεοῦ
30 μὲν διὰ τῆς θειοτέρας φύσεως, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν γῆν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τῆς ὁμογενοῦς
αἰσθήσεως ἀπολαύων.

5 τινα βασίλειον καταγωγὴν] τι βασίλειον καταγώγιον R τοῦ μέλλοντος N 6 προευτρέπισεν A I

L θάλασσαν I 7 παντοδαπὴς N 8 πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν] πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῇ κτίσει N 11 τε om. G L M N P S
V W X ἄργυρον B 11–12 τῶν λίθων δὴ τούτων] λίθους I 12 ἃς] οὓς B L R 13 ἐγκατακρύψας]
ἐνἀποκρύψας N 14 τῶν—μὲν om. N 17 ἀνεξιχνεύειν A C I K O : ἀνεξιχνιάζειν N 18 μετὰ— ἄνθρωπος]
εἰσήχθη μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος N R : ὁ ἄνθρωπος μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν εἰσήχθη A C I K O Q : in hunc
mundum post creatum novissimus introductus est homo Dion 19 ἐσχάτοις] τοῖς ἐσχάτοις A C I K
O Q βασιλεὺς εἶναι] βασιλεύειν N Q : esse rectorum Dion : rex fieret 20–1 τῶν ἐδωδίμων] delectabilium
Eri 21 ἑστιώμενον] δαιτυμῶμα B εἰσοικίζεται] παρ᾽ αὐτῷ εἰσοικίζεται B εὐπρεπῆ] εὐτρεπῆ A B C N
O R² T V W παρασκευάσας] κατασκευάσας P 22 κλησίαν Gac Pac T V X : ἐκκλησίαν N Rac S²
23 τρυφὴν Æ O δαιτυμόνα] φίλον B 25 κάλλεσι Rmg2 : ἄνθεσι Rac παντοδαπὴν I M R Spc 26
ἑτοιμάσας N ἔργον αὐτῷ δοὺς] dans ei opus eximium custodire mandatum Dion 26–7 οὐ τὴν κτῆσιν
τῶν μὴ προσόντων] non ut ea quae non erant crearet Eri 27 κτῆσιν] κτίσιν Æac G K L O P Rac W X διὰ
τοῦτο καὶ A C I K L N O Q R διπλὰς G K N O P V 28 καταμίξας V 29 ἔχῃ] ἔχει V W X : ἔχῃ τῶν
N 29–30 μὲν Θεοῦ R 30 τὴν om. A N Q
        159

certain royal lodging, as it were, for the future king (this was the land, and islands,
and sea, and the heaven arching over them like a roof) and when all kinds of wealth
had been stored in this palace (and by wealth I mean the whole creation, whatever is
in plants and offshoots, and whatever has sense and is breathing and is animated;
and, if materials should also be counted as wealth, whatever for their beauty are
reckoned precious in human eyes, such as gold, and silver, and such jewels as
humans love—the abundance of all these concealed in the bosom of the earth as in a
royal treasury), he thus presents the human being to the world, to be a beholder of
some of the wonders therein and lord of others, so as to have, by his enjoyment,
knowledge of the Benefactor and, through the beauty and majesty of the things seen,
to search out the power, unspeakable and beyond language, of the Maker.
[2.2] For these reasons the human being was brought into the world last, after the
creation, not being relegated to the end as worthless, but as one for whom it was
fitting to be king over his subjects simultaneously with his genesis.⁸ And just as a
good host does not bring his guest to his house before the preparation of the feast,
but, when he has put everything in good order, and decked his house, his couches,
and his table with their fitting adornments, when things suitable for his refresh-
ment are already prepared, he brings his guest home; in the same way the rich and
munificent Host of our nature, when he had adorned the dwelling place with
beauties of every kind and made ready this great and varied banquet, then
introduces the human being, giving him as his work not the acquisition of things
absent but the enjoyment of things present; and for this reason he establishes for
him a twofold origin of formation, blending the divine with the earthy, so that by
means of both he may, congenitally and appropriately, have enjoyment of each,
enjoying God by means of the more divine nature and the good things of earth by
the sense akin to them.

⁸ Cf. Philo, Opif. 23, 77–8; Nemesius, De nat. hom. 1.4–5 (Morani, 4.45–5.1).
 160   

Ὅτι τιμιωτέρα πάσης τῆς φαινομένης κτίσεως ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις.

[3.1] Ἄξιον δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο παριδεῖν ἀθεώρητον, ὅτι, τοῦ τηλικούτου κόσμου καὶ τῶν
κατ᾽ αὐτὸν μερῶν στοιχειωδῶς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σύστασιν ὑποβληθέντων,
ἀποσχεδιάζεταί πως ἡ κτίσις ὑπὸ τῆς θείας δυνάμεως, ὁμοῦ τῷ προστάγματι
5 ὑφισταμένη· τῆς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς βουλὴ προηγεῖται, καὶ
προτυποῦται παρὰ τοῦ τεχνιτεύοντος διὰ τῆς τοῦ λόγου γραφῆς τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ
οἷον εἶναι προσήκει, καὶ πρὸς ποῖον ἀρχέτυπον τὴν ὁμοιότητα φέρειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι
γενήσεται, καὶ τί ἐνεργήσει γενόμενον, καὶ τίνων ἡγεμονεύσει, πάντα
προδιασκοπεῖται ὁ λόγος, [D] ὡς πρεσβυτέραν αὐτὸν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀξίαν
10 λαχεῖν, πρὶν παρελθεῖν εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἡγεμονίαν κτησάμενον. Εἶπε
γὰρ, φησὶν, ὁ Θεὸς, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν,
καὶ ἀρχέτωσαν τῶν ἰχθύων τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν θηρίων τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν
τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς.
[3.2] Ὢ τοῦ θαύματος· ἥλιος κατασκευάζεται, καὶ οὐδεμία προηγεῖται βουλή·
15 οὐρανὸς ὡσαύτως, ὧν οὐδέν τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν κτίσιν ἴσόν ἐστι, [136] ῥήματι μόνῳ
τὸ τοιοῦτον θαῦμα συνίσταται, οὔτε ὅθεν οὔτε ὅπως οὔτε ἄλλό τι τοιοῦτον
παρασημηναμένου τοῦ λόγου· οὕτω καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον πάντα, αἰθὴρ, ἀστέρες, ὁ
διὰ μέσου ἀὴρ, θάλαττα, γῆ, ζῶα, φυτὰ, πάντα λόγῳ πρὸς γένεσιν ἄγεται· μόνῃ δὲ τῇ
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ περιεσκεμμένως πρόσεισιν ὁ τοῦ παντὸς ποιητὴς, ὡς καὶ
20 ὕλην αὐτῷ τῆς συστάσεως προετοιμάσαι, καὶ ἀρχετύπῳ τινὶ κάλλει τὴν μορφὴν
ὁμοιῶσαι, καὶ προθέντα τὸν σκοπὸν, οὗ χάριν γενήσεται, κατάλληλον αὐτῷ καὶ
οἰκείαν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις δημιουργῆσαι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπιτηδείως πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον
ἔχουσαν.

1 ὅτι—φύσις] quod cum magna deliberatione deus hominem creaverit Λ φαινομένης om.
B φύσις] κτίσις G H O P T Z 2 ὅτι τοῦ] ὅπως τοῦ μὲν L 3 αὐτοῦ L μερῶν] μερῶν τῶν A C
N O Q σύστασιν] om. Dion Eri ὑποβληθέντων] προβληθέντων A B C I K O Q S : ὑποβληθέντων Eac
(προ sup. l.) 4 ἀποσχεδιάζεταί] ὑποσχεδιάζεται E : αὐτοσχεδιάζεται A C I K O κτῆσις
N 5 ὑφισταμένη] συνισταμένη A B C I K L N O R S 6 προτυποῦται] τυποῦται M T V W 7
pc ac
φέρειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα B φέρει R² τίνι S : τι B G H P S X 8 γινόμενον B G H I K L M N P S V W X
9 προδιασκοπεῖται] προδι᾽ ἐσκόπησεν N αὐτὸν] αὐτῷ M V W : om. N 10 κτησάμενος A Æac :
δεξάμενον R 11 ὁ θεὸς φησὶν A I K N O Q καθ᾽] ita A B E G H I K L N O P Q R S V W X Forb :
om. Ald Mign 12 καὶ τῶν θηρίων τῆς γῆς om. N 12–13 καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν—πάσης τῆς γῆς om. M T
V W 15 οὐρανὸς] οὐρανὸς καὶ B οὐρανὸς—ἐστι] caelum similiter in conditione aequale est
Eri ὧν] ᾧ A I K M Q Spc οὐδέν om. A I K N O Q Rac τὴν om. A(?) G H ἴσον] θαυμάτων
N μόνον N R 16 τὸ om. I K N R τοιοῦτο¹ G H P² S V W : τοσοῦτον A I K N O Q R τοιοῦτο²
L M V : om. H 17 παρασημηναμένου τοῦ λόγου] intimatur Dion : praeter significatiuum uerbum
Eri οὕτως R : ὅτε Æ καὶ om. N τὰ om. H L M T W καθέκαστον Æ H I L X πάντα] creaturum
Dion 17–18 αἰθὴρ—ἀὴρ ante οὕτω (l. 17) pon. N θάλασσα I 18–19 μόνῃ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευῇ] μόνη ἡ κατασκευὴ G H P : μόνη δὲ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴ V 19 πρόεισιν Æac I N Pac V
21 προσθέντα X 22 τὴν om. A I K O Q
        161

That the nature of the human being is more honourable than all the visible
creation.⁹
[3.1] But it is right that we should not leave this point unconsidered, that while so
great a world and its parts are laid down in an elementary fashion for the
composition of the universe, the creation is, somehow, enacted offhand by
the divine power, existing at once by his command, while counsel precedes the
formation of the human being and what he will be is foreshadowed by the Artist
through the writing of the account, and what kind of being it is fitting he should
be, and to what archetype he should bear a likeness, and for what purpose he shall
come into being, and, having come to be, what activity, and what he shall rule—all
these things the account lays out beforehand, so that he has a rank assigned before
his genesis, possessing rule over beings before his coming into being, for it says,
God said, ‘Let us make the human being in accordance with our image and in
accordance with our likeness, and let him have rule over the fish of the sea, and the
beasts of the earth, and the birds of the heaven, and the cattle, and of all the earth’.¹⁰
[3.2] What a wonder! A sun is fashioned, and no counsel precedes it; heaven
likewise, and to these no single thing in creation is equal; so great a wonder is
formed by a spoken word alone, with the account indicating neither when, nor
how, nor any such detail. So too in every single case—the aether, the stars, the
intermediate air, the sea, the earth, the animals, the plants—all are brought to
genesis by a word;¹¹ while only to the formation of the human being does the
Maker of all draw near with circumspection, so as to prepare beforehand for him
material for his structure, and to liken his form to some archetypal beauty, and,
setting before him the goal for which he will come to be, to craft for him the nature
appropriate for him and proper for his activities, suitable to the project.

⁹ Bodl. 238: ‘That God created the human being with great deliberation’. For Chapter 3, see Philo,
Opif. 72–5; Basil, Hom. de creat. hom. 1.3 (Hörner, 5–6).
¹⁰ Gen. 1:26. ¹¹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 9 (Drobner, 18.9–11).
 162   

Ὅτι διὰ πάντων ἐπισημαίνει τὴν ἀρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευή.
[4] Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ καταλλήλως τῇ χρείᾳ σχηματίζεται παρὰ τῶν
τεχνιτευόντων τὸ ὄργανον· οὕτως οἷόν τι σκεῦος εἰς βασιλείας ἐνέργειαν ἐπιτήδειον
τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ὁ ἀριστοτέχνης ἐδημιούργησε, τοῖς τε κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν
5 προτερήμασι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ σώματος σχήματι τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρασκευάσας,
οἷον ἐπιτηδείως πρὸς βασιλείαν ἔχειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τὸ βασιλικόν τε καὶ ἐπηρμένον
αὐτόθεν δείκνυσι, πόρρω τῆς ἰδιωτικῆς ταπεινότητος κεχωρισμένον, ἐκ τοῦ
ἀδέσποτον αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον, [C] ἰδίοις θελήμασιν αὐτοκρατορικῶς
διοικουμένην· τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου τοῦτο καὶ οὐχὶ βασιλέως ἐστίν; καὶ ἔτι πρὸς
10 τούτοις, τὸ τῆς δυναστευούσης τῶν πάντων φύσεως εἰκόνα γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἕτερόν
ἐστιν ἢ εὐθὺς βασιλίδα δημιουργηθῆναι τὴν φύσιν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην
συνήθειαν, οἱ τὰς εἰκόνας τῶν κρατούντων κατασκευάζοντες, τόν τε χαρακτῆρα τῆς
μορφῆς ἀναμάσσονται, καὶ τῇ περιβολῇ τῆς πορφυρίδος τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀξίαν
συμπαραγράφουσι, καὶ λέγεται κατὰ συνήθειαν καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν, βασιλεύς· οὕτω καὶ ἡ
15 ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ἀρχὴν τῶν ἄλλων κατεσκευάζετο, διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸν
βασιλέα τοῦ παντὸς ὁμοιότητος, οἷόν τις ἔμψυχος εἰκὼν ἀνεστάθη, κοινωνοῦσα τῷ
ἀρχετύπῳ καὶ τῆς ἀξίας καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος· οὐ πορφυρίδα περικειμένη, οὐδὲ
σκήπτρῳ καὶ διαδήματι τὴν ἀξίαν ἐπισημαίνουσα, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐν
τούτοις ἐστίν· ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς [D] ἁλουργίδος τὴν ἀρετὴν ἠμφιεσμένη, ὃ δὴ
20 πάντων βασιλικώτατον ἐσθημάτων ἐστίν· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ σκήπτρου τῇ μακαριότητι
τῆς ἀθανασίας ἐρειδομένη· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ διαδήματος, τῷ τῆς δικαιοσύνης
στεφάνῳ κεκοσμημένη· ὥστε διὰ πάντων ἐν τῷ τῆς βασιλείας ἀξιώματι δείκνυσθαι
δι᾽ ἀκριβείας πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος ὁμοιωθεῖσαν.

4.6–9 (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ—διοικουμένην): Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi 19.VII (Diekamp,
122.14–15) 4.6–11 (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ—φύσιν): John (of Damascus) Sacra Parallela II¹98/K
cap. A 2, 20 (Thum, 117.3–9) 4.11–17 (ὥσπερ—ὀνόματος): John of Damascus, Imag. 1.49/2.45
(Kotter, 3.153.4–11) 4.11–5.3 (ὥσπερ—θεωρεῖται): John (of Damascus) Sacra Parallela II¹38/K
cap. A 1, 38 (Thum, 67.11–68.5)
1 ὅτι—κατασκευή] de regia dignitate humanae formae Λ 4 τὴν om. I W 5 προτερήμασι]
observationibus Eri 6 μὲν γὰρ om. SP 7 ταπεινώσεως N 8 θελήμασιν] θελήμασιν καὶ A I K N Q :
θελήμασι καὶ O 8–9 αὐτοκρατορικοῖς διοικουμένη N 9 ἄλλου] alius Eri : om. SP ἐστίν] ἔσται A K Q
ἔτι] ἔστιν SP 10 τῶν πάντων om. SP εἰκόνα φύσεως M οὐδὲν] ὅπερ οὐδὲν SP 11 ἢ εὐθὺς SP
βασιλίδα] βασιλέα Æ γὰρ om. Dam. SP 12 συνήθειαν Xmg2 οἱ om. N 14 συμπεριγράφουσι L N V
ac
κατὰ] κατὰ τὴν Æ ἡ om. B I P βασιλεύς] καὶ βασιλεύς Dam οὕτως Æ R O 15 ἀρχὴν τῶν]
τὴν ἀρχὴν Mign κατεσκευάζεται Rac 15–16 διὰ τῆς—ὁμοιότητος om. Dam 16 ἔμψυχος om. N 17
οὐδὲ] οὔτε N V 18 τὴν] τὴν βασιλικὴν SP οὐδὲ] οὔτε V 19 τοιούτοις R ἀλουργίδος G N P R X
20 ἐσθημάτων] τῶν ἐσθημάτων I τοῦ om. N 21 τῷ τῆς om. M T W 22 κοσμουμένη M :
κεκοσμημένος Æ : κοσμημένη W : κατεστρεμμένη V δείκνυσθαι] παραδείκνυσθαι Æ 23
ὁμοιωθεῖσα L R
        163

That the formation of the human being throughout signifies his sovereign authority.¹²
[4] Just as in this life a tool appropriate to its use is fashioned by artists, so also the
best Artist¹³ crafted our nature as it were a vessel fit for the exercise of royalty,
preparing it both with the superior advantages of soul and by the very form of the
body to be such as to be adapted for royalty; for the soul immediately shows its
royal and exalted character, far removed as it is from subordinate lowliness, in that
it is without lord and is self-governed, swayed autocratically by its own will. For to
whom else does this belong, other than to a king? And further, besides these
points, that it has come to be as the image of that Nature which rules over all
means nothing else than that our nature was crafted to be immediately royal. Just
as in human customs, those who fashion images of rulers both mould the figure of
their form and represent the royal rank by the purple robe, and even the image is
customarily called a king, so also human nature, since it was fashioned to rule the
rest, on account of its likeness to the King of all, was established as it were as a
living image, sharing with the Archetype in both rank and name, not robed in
purple, nor indicating rank by sceptre and diadem (for neither is Archetype
arrayed in these), but, instead of the purple robe, clothed in virtue, which is the
most royal of all raiments, and in place of the sceptre, leaning on the blessedness of
immortality, and instead of the royal diadem, adorned with the crown of right-
eousness, so that in everything that belongs to the dignity of royalty it is shown to
be precisely assimilated to the beauty of the archetype.

¹² Bodl. 238: ‘Of the kingly dignity of the human form’.

¹³ Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Protrep. 10.98.3; Pindar, Frag. 57 (Snell).
 164   

Ὅτι ὁμοίωμα τῆς θείας βασιλείας ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

[5.1] Τὸ δὲ δὴ θεῖον κάλλος οὐ σχήματί τινι καὶ μορφῆς εὐμοιρίᾳ, διά τινος εὐχροίας
ἐναγλαΐζεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀφράστῳ μακαριότητι κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν θεωρεῖται. Ὥσπερ τοίνυν τὰς
ἀνθρωπίνας μορφὰς διὰ χρωμάτων τινῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς πίνακας οἱ γραφεῖς μεταφέρουσι, τὰς
5 οἰκείας τε καὶ καταλλήλους βαφὰς ἐπαλείφοντες τῷ μιμήματι, ὡς ἂν δι᾽ ἀκριβείας τὸ
ἀρχέτυπον κάλλος μετενεχθείη πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίωμα· οὕτω μοι νόει καὶ τὸν ἡμέτερον
πλάστην, οἷόν τισι βαφαῖς τῇ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐπιβολῇ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον κάλλος τὴν εἰκόνα
περιανθίσαντα, ἐν ἡμῖν δεῖξαι τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχήν· πολυειδῆ δὲ καὶ ποικίλα τὰ οἱονεὶ
χρώματα τῆς εἰκόνος, δι᾽ ὧν ἡ ἀληθινὴ ἀναζωγραφεῖται μορφὴ· οὐκ ἐρύθημα καὶ
10 λαμπρότης [B] καὶ ἡ ποιὰ τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα μίξις, οὐδέ τινος μέλανος ὑπογραφὴ
ὀφρῦν τε καὶ ὀφθαλμὸν ὑπαλείφουσα, καὶ κατά τινα κρᾶσιν τὰ κοῖλα τοῦ χαρακτῆρος
ὑποσκιάζουσα, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ζωγράφων χεῖρες ἐπετεχνήσαντο,· ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ τούτων
καθαρότης, ἀπάθεια, μακαριότης, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀλλοτρίωσις, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ τοιούτου
γένους ἐστὶ, δι᾽ ὧν μορφοῦται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσις· τοιούτοις
15 ἄνθεσιν ὁ δημιουργὸς τῆς ἰδίας εἰκόνος τὴν ἡμετέραν διεχάραξε φύσιν.

[5.2] Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνεξετάζοις, δι᾽ ὧν τὸ θεῖον κάλλος χαρακτηρίζεται, εὑρήσεις

καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα δι᾽ ἀκριβείας σωζομένην ἐν τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς εἰκόνι τὴν ὁμοιότητα. Νοῦς
καὶ λόγος ἡ θειότης ἐστίν· ἐν ἀρχῇ τε γὰρ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ οἱ κατὰ Παῦλον νοῦν
Χριστοῦ ἔχουσι τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς λαλοῦντα· [C] οὐ πόρρω τούτων καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον· ὁρᾷς
20 ἐν σεαυτῷ καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, μίμημα τοῦ ὄντως νοῦ τε καὶ λόγου. Ἀγάπη
πάλιν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἀγάπης πηγή· τοῦτο γάρ φησιν Ἰωάννης ὁ μέγας, ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ
Θεοῦ ἐστιν καὶ, ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστί· τοῦτο καὶ ἡμέτερον πεποίηται πρόσωπον ὁ τῆς
φύσεως πλάστης· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ, φησὶ, γνώσονται πάντες, ὅτι μαθηταί μου ἐστὲ, ἐὰν
ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους. Οὐκοῦν μὴ παρούσης ταύτης, ἅπας ὁ χαρακτὴρ τῆς εἰκόνος
25 μεταπεποίηται. Πάντα ἐπιβλέπει καὶ πάντα ἐπακούει τὸ θεῖον, καὶ πάντα
διερευνᾶται· ἔχεις καὶ σὺ τὴν δι᾽ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀντίληψιν, καὶ τὴν
ζητητικήν τε καὶ διερευνητικὴν τῶν ὄντων διάνοιαν.

5.2–6 (Τὸ δὲ—τὸ ὁμοίωμα): John of Damascus, Imag. 1.50/2.46 (Kotter, 3.154.3–9)
1 ὅτι—ἄνθρωπος] quomodo ad imaginem dei facta est humana anima Λ 2 δὴ] ita A E G I L M N O
P Q R S T V W X Forb : om. Dam SP Ald Mign 3 ἐναγλαΐζεται] ita codd. Dam Forb : ἀναγλαΐζεται I :
ἐπαγλαΐζεται Rac : ἐναγκαλίζεται K : ἀγλαΐζεται Ald Mign 4 διὰ χρωμάτων τινῶν post γραφεῖς pon.
R μεταμορφοῦσι Æ 5 τε om. N καὶ om. V ἐπαλείφοντες] ita codd. Dam Forb : ἀπαλείφοντες Ald
Mign 6 μετενεχθῆ R 8 περιανθήσαντα E G I K N O P Q T W X ἰδίαν] οἰκείαν I : θείαν K O τὰ om.
N 9 ἀναζωγραφεῖται] διαζωγραφεῖται A B K O Q R T : ζωγραφεῖται I ἐρύθημα] ita Æ ß G I K L M N
O P Q R S V W X Ald Forb : ἐρύθρημα Mign 10 μίξεως V 11–12 ὀφθαλμὸν—ὑποσκιάζουσα]
oculumque subscribit Eri 11 ὀφθαλμὸν] ita A B I K M N O R V W Forb : ὀφθαλμοὺς X Ald Mign
κράσιν ß I : τάξιν E G M P V W X : κρᾶσιν καὶ τάξιν L 12 ἐπετεχνάσαντο A B K O Q R Spc V :
ἐτεχνάσαντο N : ἐπιτεχνάζονται I : ἀπετεχνήσαντο T 14 τοιούτοις] τοῖς τοιούτοις A B I K N O Q Rac
T V 16 συνεξετάζεις M 17 ἐκεῖνο E G I K L M O P Q S T V W X 18 θεότης B E I K L M N O R S
οἱ] οἱ προφῆται Mign 19 ἔχουσιν N V τὸν om. N αὐτοῖς] ἑαυτοῖς R πόρρω] πόρρω δὲ B ὁρᾷς]
ὁρᾷς γὰρ I 20 μιμήματα N T ὄντος A B K N O P 21 ἡ om. Mign 21–2 ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ K 22
ἐστιν] ἐστι A B I K N O Q R X : om. V W Ald Mign 22 τοῦτο] τοιοῦτο I ἡμέτερον] τὸ ἡμέτερον
I 23 πλάστης] λόγος X φησὶ om. V W μαθηταί μου] ἐμοὶ μαθηταί E 24–5 οὐκοῦν—
μεταπεποίηται] nempe igitur dum haec praesens sit omnis character imaginis perficitur 25 πάντων
B E 27 ζητηκήν V : ζωτικήν I N W
        165

That the human being is a likeness of the divine royalty.¹⁴

[5.1] The divine beauty is not in being adorned with a certain shape or excellent
form, but is contemplated in unspeakable blessedness in accordance with virtue. Just
as painters convey human forms in their pictures by means of certain colours,
applying to their copy the appropriate and corresponding tints, so that the beauty
of the archetype may be accurately transferred to the likeness, so also, as I understand
it, our Fashioner also, painting the image to resemble his own beauty by the addition
of virtues, as it were with colours, shows in us his own sovereignty; manifold and
varied are the colours, as it were, by which his true form is portrayed—not red, or
white, or some kind of mixture of these with each other, nor a touch of black that
paints the eyebrow and the eye, and shades, by some combination, the hollows in the
figure, and all such things which the hands of painters contrive—but instead of these,
purity, freedom from passion, blessedness, estrangement from all evil, and whatever
of such a kind through which the likeness to the divine is formed in human beings.
With such lustres did the Craftsman of his own image mark our nature.
[5.2] And if you were to examine also the other points by which the divine beauty
is characterized, you will find that to them too the likeness in our image is
accurately preserved.¹⁵ The divinity is intellect and word: for in the beginning
was the Word,¹⁶ and those, according to Paul, who have the intellect of Christ have
it speaking in them.¹⁷ Humankind too is not far removed from these: you see in
yourself word and mind, an imitation of the very Intellect and Word. Again, God
is love, and the source of love; for this the great John declares, that love is of God,
and God is love.¹⁸ The Fashioner of our nature has made this to be our character
also; for, he says, by this shall all know that you are my disciples, if you love one
another.¹⁹ Therefore, if this be absent, the whole stamp of the image is trans-
formed. The Divine beholds all things and hears all things, and searches out all
things; you too have the ability of apprehending things by means of sight and
hearing and the mind that enquires into beings and searches them out.²⁰

¹⁴ Bodl. 238: ‘How the human soul is made in the image of God’.
¹⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.11–12 (Spira, 34.4–8). ¹⁶ John 1:1.
¹⁷ 1 Cor. 2:16; 2 Cor. 13:3. ¹⁸ 1 John 4:7, 8. ¹⁹ John 13:35.
²⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.34 (Spira, 39.11–16).
 166   

Ἐξέτασις τῆς τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν συγγενείας, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκ παρόδου τὸ τῶν
ἀνομοίων διελέγχεται δόγμα.
[6.1] Καί με μηδεὶς οἴεσθω καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐνεργείας ἐν διαφόροις
δυνάμεσι τὸ θεῖον λέγειν τῶν ὄντων ἐφάπτεσθαι. Οὐ γάρ ἐστι δυνατὸν ἐν τῇ
5 ἁπλότητι τῆς θειότητος τὸ ποικίλον τε καὶ πολυειδὲς τῆς ἀντιληπτικῆς ἐνεργείας
κατανοῆσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πολλαί τινές εἰσὶν αἱ ἀντιληπτικαὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
δυνάμεις, εἰ καὶ πολυτρόπως διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων [140] τῶν κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν
ἐφαπτόμεθα· μία γάρ τις ἐστι δύναμις, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐγκείμενος νοῦς, ὁ δι᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν
αἰσθητηρίων διεξιὼν καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐπιδρασσόμενος· οὗτος θεωρεῖ διὰ τῶν
10 ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ φαινόμενον· οὗτος συνίησι διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀγαπᾷ τε τὸ
καταθύμιον, καὶ τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἀποστρέφεται, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ χρῆται πρὸς ὅ, τι
βούλεται, κρατῶν τε δι᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ ἀπωθούμενος, καθ᾽ ὅπερ ἂν λυσιτελεῖν κρίνῃ τῇ
τοῦ ὀργάνου συνεργίᾳ εἰς τοῦτο συγχρώμενος.
[6.2] Εἰ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν διάφορα τύχῃ τὰ πρὸς αἴσθησιν
15 κατεσκευασμένα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ὄργανα, ὁ διὰ πάντων ἐνεργῶν καὶ κινούμενος
καὶ καταλλήλως ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον κεχρημένος, εἷς ἐστι καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς, ταῖς
διαφοραῖς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν οὐ συνεξαλλάσσων τὴν φύσιν· πῶς ἄν τις ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ
[B] τῶν ποικίλων δυνάμεων τὸ πολυμερὲς τῆς οὐσίας καθυποπτεύσειεν; ὁ γὰρ
πλάσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν, καθώς φησιν ὁ προφήτης, καὶ ὁ φυτεύσας τὸ οὖς, πρὸς τὰ
20 ἐν αὐτῷ παραδείγματα τὰς ἐνεργείας ταύτας οἷόν τινας γνωριστικοὺς χαρακτῆρας
τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεσημήνατο· ποιήσωμεν γὰρ, φησὶν, ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα
ἡμετέραν.
[6.3] Ἀλλὰ ποῦ μοι τῶν Ἀνομοίων ἡ αἵρεσις; τί πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἐροῦσι φωνήν;
πῶς διασώσουσιν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν τὴν κενότητα; ἆρα δυνατὸν
25 εἶναι φήσουσι, μίαν εἰκόνα διαφόροις ὁμοιωθῆναι μορφαῖς; εἰ ἀνόμοιος κατὰ τὴν
φύσιν τῷ Πατρὶ ὁ Υἱὸς, πῶς μίαν κατασκευάζει τῶν διαφόρων φύσεων τὴν εἰκόνα; ὁ
γὰρ ποιήσωμεν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν εἰπὼν, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληθυντικῆς σημασίας τὴν

1–2 ἐξέτασις—δόγμα] quod deus non habet membra humana et quod una est imago patris et filii contra
eunomianos Λ 1 ἐκ παρόδου] ἐν παρόδῳ M 2 διελέγχει R 3 ἐν] ἐν ταῖς R 4 οὐ] οὐ δὲ R ἐστι
om. R 5 θεότητος A B E H I K L N O R V ποικίλον] receptionem Eri πολυειδὲς] πθεοειδὲς X 6
παρ᾽] ita A B E I K L N O Q R S T Forb : om. V W X Ald Mign παρ᾽ ἡμῖν] apud nos Eri αἱ om. Æ G H
K Ppc 7 τὴν om. Ald Mign 8 ἐφαπτώμεθα V Ald Mign δύναμις om. B 9 διεξιὼν] ἐξιὼν
B ἐπιδρασσόμενος] transcurrit Eri 10 φαινόμενον] βλεπόμενον R συνίησι] ita A B E I K L N O
R S T Forb : συννοεῖ G H P X : συνιεῖ V W Ald Mign διὰ τῆς] δι᾽ L 11 κατευθύμιον Ald
Mign χρᾶται R πρὸς] ita A B E K L N O Q R S T Forb : πρὸς τὸ V W Ald Mign 12 τε] δὲ
M W Ald : om. Mign αὐτῆς] ἑαυτῆς Æ H P ἀπωθούμενος] ἀπωθούμενος καὶ B καθ᾽ὅπερ] ita A B
E I L Q S Forb : καθ᾽ ἅπερ P : καθάπερ G H K M O R T V W X : ἅπερ Ald Mign κρίνοι I 13 εἰς om.
G H M P V W X τούτῳ H M 15 κατασκευασμένα G H 16 καὶ¹ om. H M 17 διαφόροις R S τοῦ
om. A B I K N O Q T 18 καθυποπτεύσειεν] ita A B E I K L N O S T Forb : κατοπτεύσειεν V W X Ald
Mign 19 ὁ om. G H M P R S V W X 20 αὐτῷ] ita Æ ß G H K L M N O R S V W Forb Mign : αὐτῶ
P : ἑαυτῷ Q : αὑτῷ Ald γνωστικοὺς Æ T 21 φησὶν om. V W 22 ἡμετέραν] ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽
ὁμοίωσιν A B E I K L O Q R : et similitudinem nostram Dion 23 μοι om. R τί] ἢ τί A B K O Q 24
ἐν] ἐν τούτοις N καινότητα M T : novitatem Dion Eri 25–6 τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν N 26 ὁ υἱὸς τῷ
πατρὶ L 27 ποιήσωμεν] ita A B E G H I K M N O P Q R S V W X Forb : ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον Ald
Mign κατ᾽ εἰκόνα om. N πληνθυτικῆς V
        167

An examination of the kinship of the intellect to nature; in which also, by way of

digression, the doctrine of the Anomoeans is refuted.²¹
[6.1] And let no one suppose me to say that the divine is in touch with beings in a
similar way to human activity, by means of different faculties. For it is not possible
to comprehend in the simplicity of the divinity the varied and diverse apprehend-
ing activity; for neither in our own case are the faculties which apprehend things
many, although we are in touch in many ways, through the senses, with those
things pertaining to life; for there is one faculty, the implanted intellect itself,
which passes through each of the organs of sense and grasps the beings beyond:
this, by means of the eyes, contemplates what appears; this, by means of the
hearing, understands what is said; loves what is to its taste and turns from what is
not pleasant, and uses the hand for whatever it wills, holding or rejecting with it,
using the help of this instrument for whatever it deems to be advantageous.
[6.2] If, then, in the human being, even though the organs formed by nature for
perception may be different, that which works and moves through them all, and
uses each appropriately for the object before it, is one and the same, not changing
its nature by the differences of the activities, how could anyone suppose there to be
a multiplicity of essence in regard to God on the ground of his varied faculties? For
he that fashioned the eye, as the prophet says, and that planted the ear,²² stamped
on the nature of human beings these activities to be as it were indicative charac-
teristics, with reference to their paradigms in himself; for he says, Let us make the
human being in accordance with our image.²³
[6.3] But where, for me, is the heresy of the Anomoeans? What will they say to
such an utterance? How will they defend the vanity of their doctrine in view of the
words cited? Will they say that it is possible that one image should be made like to
different forms? If the Son is by nature unlike the Father, how does he form one
image of the different natures? For he who said, Let us make in accordance our

²¹ Bodl. 238: ‘That God does not have human limbs, and that the image of the Father and the Son is
one, against the Eunomians’.
²² Ps. 93:9. ²³ Gen. 1:26.
 168   

ἁγίαν Τριάδα [C] δηλώσας, οὐκ ἂν τῆς εἰκόνος μοναδικῶς ἐπεμνήσθη, εἴπερ
ἀνομοίως εἶχε πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἀρχέτυπα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν δυνατὸν τῶν ἀλλήλοις μὴ
30 συμβαινόντων ἓν ἀναδειχθῆναι ὁμοίωμα· ἀλλ᾽ εἰ διάφοροι ἦσαν αἱ φύσεις, διαφόρους
ἂν πάντως καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτῶν ἐνεστήσατο, τὴν κατάλληλον ἑκάστῃ
δημιουργήσας· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ μία μὲν ἡ εἰκὼν, οὐχ ἓν δὲ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀρχέτυπον·
τίς οὕτως ἔξω διανοίας ἐστὶν ὡς ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τὰ τῷ ἑνὶ ὁμοιούμενα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα
πάντως ὁμοίως ἔχει; διὰ τοῦτό φησι· (τάχα τὴν κακίαν ταύτην ἐν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῆς
35 ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς ὁ λόγος ὑποτεμνόμενος) ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ
ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν.
Διατί γυμνὸς τῶν ἐκ φύσεως ὅπλων τε καὶ προκαλυμμάτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
[7.1] Ἀλλὰ τί βούλεται τὸ τοῦ σχήματος ὄρθιον; τί δὲ οὐχὶ συμφυεῖς εἰσιν αἱ πρὸς
τὸν βίον δυνάμεις τῷ σώματι, ἀλλὰ γυμνὸς μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν σκεπασμάτων, ἄοπλος
δέ τις καὶ πένης ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐνδεὴς ἁπάντων, ἐπὶ τὸν βίον
5 παράγεται, ἐλεεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μακαρίζεσθαι κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἄξιος, οὐ
προβολαῖς κεράτων καθωπλισμένος, οὐκ ὀνύχων ἀκμαῖς, οὐχ ὁπλαῖς ἢ ὀδοῦσιν ἢ
τινι κέντρῳ θανατηφόρον ἰὸν ἐκ φύσεως ἔχοντι, οἷα δὴ τὰ [141] πολλὰ τῶν ζώων ἐν
ἑαυτοῖς πρὸς τὴν τῶν λυπούντων ἄμυναν κέκτηται, οὐ τῇ τῶν τριχῶν περιβολῇ τὸ
σῶμα κεκάλυπται, καίτοιγε ἴσως τὸν εἰς ἀρχὴν τῶν ἄλλων προτεταγμένον οἰκείοις
10 ὅπλοις ἔδει περιπεφράχθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῆς παρ᾽ ἑτέρων ἐπικουρίας
πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσφάλειαν δέοιτο· νυνὶ δὲ λέων μὲν καὶ σῦς καὶ τίγρις καὶ πάρδαλις
καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχει πρὸς σωτηρίαν τὴν ἐκ φύσεως δύναμιν· καὶ
τῷ ταύρῳ μὲν τὸ κέρας, καὶ τῷ λαγωῷ τὸ τάχος, καὶ τῇ δορκάδι τὸ πήδημα καὶ τὸ
κατὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἀσφαλὲς, καὶ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ζώῳ τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ ἑτέροις ἡ
15 προνομαία, καὶ τοῖς πετεινοῖς τὸ πτερὸν, καὶ τῇ μελίσσῃ τὸ κέντρον, καὶ πᾶσι
πάντως ἕν τι εἰς σωτηρίαν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐμπέφυκε· μόνος δὲ πάντων ὁ
ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ταχυδρομούντων [B] ἀργότερος, τῶν δὲ πολυσαρκούντων
βραχύτερος, τῶν δὲ τοῖς συμφύτοις ὅπλοις ἠσφαλισμένων εὐαλωτότερος· καὶ πῶς,
ἐρεῖ τις, ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν κατὰ πάντων κεκλήρωται;

28 ἐπεμνήσθη] ἐμνημόνευσεν A B I K N O Q R 29 εἶχε] ita A B E I K L N O Q R T Forb : ἔχει G H M P

V W X : ἔχοι Ald Mign οὐδὲ] οὔτε N : οὐ Ald Mign 30 ἓν] om. T : εἰς ἓν Ald Mign 31 ἂν om.
Ald Mign πάντως καὶ τὰς] πάντας Q ἐνεστήσαντο V : ἀνεστήσατο A B I K N O T : ἀνεστήσαντο E
ἑκάστῳ N 32 ἡ om. I Q R 33 οὕτω R 34 ὁμοίως ἔχει] ὁμοίως ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα V : ἔχει τὴν
ὁμοιότητα A B I K N O R 35–36 ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν R 36 ὁμοίωσιν] καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν Q
1 διατί—ἄνθρωπος] cur homo non sit creatus cum cornibus uel aliis munimentis sicut quaedam alia
Λ φύσεως] τῆς φύσεως N καλυμμάτων R 2 οὐχὶ] οὐχὶ καὶ N V 3 ἄνοπλος H N R T V W 4
ἐνδεεῖς X βίον] βίον πορεύεται καὶ B 5 παράγεται] παρὰγίνεται N κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον] om. Q : esse
videatur Dion : quantum apparet Eri ἄξιος κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον B κατὰ] πρὸς R 7 θανατηφόρῳ
K M N V : moritfero Eri τὰ om. N 8 κέκτηνται V 9 κεκάλυπται] περικεκάλυπται R : καλύπτεται
Ald Mign καίτοιγε] καίτοιγε εἴποι τις ἂν B E L R S οἰκείοις] ὡς οἰκείοις B 10 περιπεφράχθαι]
πεφράχθαι A I K N O Q T : perfici Eri 11 σῦς] ὗς Æ G I K M N O P Q V W X : σὺς Ald 12 ἐκ] ἐκ τῆς
N R V 13 μὲν om. Æ I K N O Q T καὶ τῷ λαγωῷ] τῷ δὲ λαγωῷ B 13–14 καὶ τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν
ἀσφαλὲς om. N 14 κατὰ τὸν] ita A B E G I K M P Q R S T Forb : κατ᾽ V Ald Mign 15 προνομαία]
catulorum rapina Eri καὶ τῇ μελίσσῃ τὸ κέντρον om. Q ταῖς μελίσσαις Æ I K N O R T 16 εἰς
σωτηρίαν] τῆς σωτηρίας G M P R W X παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰς σωτηρίαν A B E I K N O Q T V
πάντων] τῶν πάντων N R T V 18 συμφύτοις] ἐμφύτοις L ἠμφεισμένων R2mg 19 τὴν² om. Æ L
       – 169

image, and by the plural signification revealed the Holy Trinity, would not, if the
archetypes were unlike one another, have mentioned the image in the singular: for
it would not be possible for there to be displayed one likeness of things which do
not concur with each other.²⁴ Rather, if the natures were different he would
assuredly have presented different images of them also, making the appropriate
one for each; but if the image is one, while the archetype of the image is not one,
who is so mindless as not to know that things resembling one thing surely
resemble each other also? Therefore he says (the account perhaps cutting short
this wickedness at the very formation of human life), Let us make the human being
in accordance with our image and likeness.
Why the human being is by nature destitute weapons and covering.²⁵
[7.1] But what does the uprightness of his figure mean? And why is it that those
means supporting life are not connatural with the body? Instead, the human being
is brought into life bare of natural covering, an unarmed and poor being, deficient
in all things useful, according to appearances worthy of being pitied rather than
being admired, not armed with prominent horns, nor sharp claws, nor hoofs, nor
teeth, nor possessing by nature any deadly venom in a sting—things such as most
animals have in themselves for defence against those who do them harm—nor is
his body protected with a covering of hair; and yet perhaps it was necessary that
the one positioned for rule over the others should be defended by nature with
arms of his own, so that he might not need assistance from others for his own
safety.²⁶ But, as it is, the lion, the boar, the tiger, the leopard, and all the like have
by nature the means sufficient for their safety: the bull has his horn, the hare his
speed, the deer his leap and unerring sight, and another animal has size, others a
proboscis, the birds their wings, and the bee its sting, and in absolutely everything
there is something implanted by nature for safety. Alone of all, the human being is
slower than those swift of foot, smaller than those of great bulk, more defenceless
than those that are protected by natural arms; and how, one will say, has such a
being obtained the sovereignty over all things?

²⁴ Cf. Basil, Hom. de creat. hom. 1.4 (Hörner, 6.15–8.10); Basil, Hex. 9.6; Philo, Opif. 72–5.
²⁵ Bodl. 238: ‘Why the human was not created with horns and other defences like the other [animals]’.
²⁶ Cf. Philo, Opif. 83; Galen, De usu part. 1.4 (Helmreich, 1, 5–6; ET 1, 71); Origen, Cels. 4.76;
Nemesius, De nat. hom. 1.50 (Morani, 8.15–23).
 170   

20 [7.2] Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν οἶμαι χαλεπὸν δεῖξαι, ὅτι τὸ δοκοῦν ἐπιδεὲς τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν,
ἀφορμὴ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν ὑποχειρίων ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ οὕτω δυνάμεως εἶχεν ὁ
ἄνθρωπος ὡς τῇ μὲν ὠκύτητι παρατρέχειν τὸν ἵππον, ἄτριπτον δὲ ὑπὸ
στερρότητος ἔχειν τὸν πόδα, ὁπλαῖς τισιν ἢ χηλαῖς ἐρειδόμενον, κέρατα δὲ καὶ
κέντρα καὶ ὄνυχας ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρειν· πρῶτον μὲν θηριώδης τις ἂν ἦν καὶ
25 δυσάντητος, τοιούτων αὐτοῦ τῷ σώματι συμπεφυκότων· ἔπειτα δὲ παρεῖδεν ἂν
τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχὴν, οὐδὲν τῆς συνεργίας τῶν ὑποχειρίων δεόμενος· [C] νυνὶ δὲ
τούτου χάριν ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπεζευγμένων ἡμῖν αἱ τοῦ βίου χρεῖαι
κατεμερίσθησαν, ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ποιεῖν τὴν κατ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀρχήν.
[7.3] Τὸ μὲν γὰρ βραδὺ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ δυσκίνητον, τὸν ἵππον τῇ χρείᾳ
30 προσήγαγέ τε καὶ ἐδαμάσατο· ἡ δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς γυμνότης ἀναγκαίαν τὴν τῶν
προβάτων ἐπιστασίαν ἐποίησεν, ἐκ τῆς ἐτησίου τῶν ἐρίων φορᾶς τῆς ἡμετέρας
φύσεως ἀναπληροῦσαν τὸ λεῖπον· τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἡμῖν τὰς πρὸς τὸν βίον καὶ ἐξ
ἑτέρων εἰσάγεσθαι, τὰ ἀχθοφόρα τῶν ζώων ταῖς τοιαύταις ὑπηρεσίαις ὑπέζευξεν·
ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν βοσκημάτων ποηφαγεῖν, ὑποχείριον
35 τῷ βίῳ τὸν βοῦν ἀπειργάσατο, τοῖς ἰδίοις πόνοις τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῖν ἐξευμαρίζοντα· ἐπεὶ
δὲ καὶ ὀδόντων καὶ δήγματος ἦν ἡμῖν χρεία πρὸς τὸ καταγωνίζεσθαί τινα τῶν [D]
ἄλλων ζώων διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀδόντων λαβῆς, πάρεσχεν ὁ κύων μετὰ τοῦ τάχους τὴν
ἰδίαν γένυν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ χρείᾳ, οἷόν τις ἔμψυχος μάχαιρα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γινόμενος·
κεράτων δὲ προβολῆς καὶ ὀνύχων ἀκμῆς ἰσχυρότερός τε καὶ τομώτερος ἐπινενόηται
40 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁ σίδηρος, οὐκ ἀεὶ συμπεφυκὼς ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς θηρίοις ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ᾽
ἐπὶ καιροῦ συμμαχήσας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ μένει· καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς κροκοδείλου
φολίδος, ἔστι μὲν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὅπλον ποιήσασθαι, κατὰ καιρὸν τὴν δορὰν
περιθέμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σχηματίζεται καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς τέχνης ὁ σίδηρος, ὃς
ἐπὶ καιροῦ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπηρετήσας, πάλιν ἐλεύθερον τοῦ ἄχθος ἐπ᾽ εἰρήνης τὸν
45 ὁπλίτην κατέλιπεν· ὑπηρετεῖ δὲ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τὸ πτερὸν τῶν ὀρνέων, ὡς μηδὲ τοῦ
πτηνοῦ τάχους δι᾽ ἐπινοίας [144] ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεσθαι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τιθασσὰ
γίνεται, καὶ συνεργεῖ τοῖς θηρεύουσι· τὰ δὲ δι᾽ ἐκείνων ταῖς χρείαις ἡμῶν δι᾽ ἐπινοίας
ὑπάγεται· ἀλλὰ καὶ πτερόεντας ἡμῖν τοὺς ὀϊστοὺς ἡ τέχνη δι᾽ ἐπινοίας ποιησαμένη,
τὸ πτηνὸν τάχος ταῖς ἡμετέραις χρείαις διὰ τοῦ τόξου χαρίζεται· τὸ δὲ εὐπαθεῖς καὶ
50 εὐτρίπτους ἡμῖν πρὸς τὴν πορείαν εἶναι τὰς βάσεις, ἀναγκαίαν ποιεῖ τὴν ἐκ τῶν
ὑποχειρίων συνεργίαν· ἐκεῖθεν γάρ ἐστι τοῖς ποσὶ περιαρμόσαι τὰ πέδιλα.

20 ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν om. K O τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐπιδεὲς R 22 ὀξύτητι A B K N O Q ἄτρεπτον Æ P² T

26 τῶν] κατὰ τῶν A B I K N O Q T V συνεργείας X 27 ὑποζευγμένων N O Q R V 29 γὰρ om. Ald
Mign βραδὺ] βραχὺ M V ἡμῶν καὶ om. Ald Mign τὸν om. N 30 ἐδαμάσατο] ὠνομάσατο K 31
ἐρίφων W 32 ἀναπληροῦσα B G N O P Q R S V W X τὰς πρὸς] πρὸς τὰς V (τὰς ante πρὸς supr. l. 2a
man.) 33 ταῖς om. N ὑπέζευξεν] συνέζευξε B 34 ἀλλὰ μὴν] σὺν τούτοις δὲ B 35 ζωὴν] γῆν
N ἡμῖν] ἡμῶν R : om. K M O W ἐξευμαρίζοντα] copulat Eri 36 ἦν om. E G I L M P R S X ἡμῖν
om. W Mign 37 τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τινα N λαβῆς] βλάβης V Mign 38 γινόμενος] ita Æ G I L M N P
Q R S V W X Forb : γενόμενος Ald Mign 39 ἀμῆς V τε om. N 39–40 καὶ τομώτερος—οὐκ ἀεὶ]
ἐπινενόηται τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν ὁ σίδηρος καὶ τομώτερος οὐκ εἰς N 39 τομώτερος] robustius
Eri ἐπινενόηται] distribuitur Eri 41 τῆς] ita A B E G I K L M N P Q S V W X Forb : τῆς τοῦ
Ald Mign 42 φολίδος] ita A B E K L M N P² Q R S Forb : φωλίδος V W X Ald Mign 43 εἰ δὲ μὴ]
vide nempe Eri καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο σχηματίζεται Æ I K N O Q R T 44 ἐπὶ καιροῦ] ἐνὶ καιρῷ M ἄχθους
V W X Ald Mign ἐπ’] ἐπὶ O 45 κατέλειπεν O 46 πτηναίου Æ B K O Q : πτήναι A : τῶν πτηνῶν
R τιθασὰ R S T 47 τὰ] τὸ T τὰς χρείας N δι᾽ ἐπινοίας ἡμῶν G M P R V W X 48 ὑπάγεται]
ἐπάγεται N : ἄγεται Q καὶ] καὶ ἐκ τῶν χηνῶν αἱ στρωμναὶ· καὶ ἐκ τῶν γυπῶν R 49 πτηνῶν M 50
εὐτρέπτους N Tac πρὸς τὴν πορείαν ἡμῖν N πορείαν] πορείαν ἡμῶν R
        171

[7.2] But I think it would not be difficult to show that the apparent deficiency of
our nature is an occasion for dominion over the subjects. For if the human being
had such means as to be able to outrun the horse in swiftness, and to have a foot
that, from its solidity, could not be worn out, supported by hoofs or claws of some
kind, and to bear upon himself horns and stings and talons, he would, first, with
such things growing on his body, be a wild-looking and formidable creature; then,
moreover, he would have neglected his rule over the others, not needing the
cooperation of his subjects; but as it is, for this reason the needs of life are divided
among each of those subjugated to us, to make our rule over them necessary.
[7.3] It was the slowness and difficult movement of our body that brought the
horse to supply the need and tamed him; it was the nakedness of flesh that made
necessary the tending of sheep, which compensates for the deficiency of our
nature by its annual produce of wool; it was importing from others the supplies
of life that subjugated beasts of burden to such services; moreover, it was not being
able to eat grass like cattle that caused the ox to be subjected to our life, making life
easy for us by its proper labour; since we needed teeth and a bite to fight against
some of the other animals by the grip of the teeth, the dog gave, along with his
speed, his own jaw for our use, becoming like a living sword for the human being;
stronger and more penetrating than prominent horns or sharp claws is the iron
discovered by human beings, which doesn’t constantly grow with us, as they do
with the animals, but allies itself with us for a period and is left aside afterwards;
and instead of the crocodile’s scaly hide, that very hide can be made into armour,
putting it upon the skin for a time; and if not that, iron is shaped by craft for this
purpose also, which, having served its purpose for a period during a battle, leaves the
armed soldier once again free from the burden during peace; the wing of the birds
also serves our life, so that by inventiveness we are not left behind even by the speed
of wings, for some of them become tame and cooperate with hunters, while others
by contrivance are brought to our needs; moreover, craft, through inventiveness,
makes our arrows feathered and by means of the bow supplies the speed of wings for
our needs; that our feet are easily hurt and worn in travelling makes necessary the
aid from the subjected animals, for from them are the shoes we fit on our feet.
 172   

Διατί ὄρθιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σχῆμα, καὶ ὅτι διὰ τὸν λόγον αἱ χεῖρες, ἐν ᾧ τις καὶ
περὶ διαφορᾶς ψυχῶν φιλοσοφία.
[8.1] Ὄρθιον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ πρὸς τὸν [B] οὐρανὸν ἀνατείνεται καὶ
ἄνω βλέπει· ἀρχικὰ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀξίαν ἀποσημαίνονται· τὸ γὰρ
5 μόνον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἅπασι πρὸς τὸ κάτω
νενευκέναι τὰ σώματα, σαφῶς δείκνυσι τὴν τῆς ἀξίας διαφορὰν, τῶν τε
ὑποκυπτόντων τῇ δυναστείᾳ καὶ τῆς ὑπερανεστώσης αὐτῶν ἐξουσίας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
ἄλλοις ἅπασι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κῶλα τοῦ σώματος πόδες εἰσὶ, διότι τὸ κεκυφὸς ἐδεῖτο
πάντως τοῦ ὑπερείδοντος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς χεῖρες τὰ κῶλα
10 ἐγένοντο· τοῦ γὰρ ὀρθίου σχήματος αὐτάρκης ἦν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν μία βάσις, διπλοῖς
ποσὶν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τὴν στάσιν ἐρείδουσα.
[8.2] Ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ λόγου χρείᾳ συνεργός ἐστιν ἡ τῶν χειρῶν ὑπουργία· καί
τις ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως τὴν τῶν χειρῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εἰπὼν, [C] οὐ τοῦ παντὸς
ἁμαρτήσεται· οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο καὶ πρόχειρον ἀποτρέχων τῇ διανοίᾳ,
15 ὅτι γράμμασι τὸν λόγον διὰ τῆς τῶν χειρῶν εὐφυΐας ἐνσημαινόμεθα· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ
οὐδὲ τοῦτο λογικῆς χάριτος ἄμοιρον, τὸ φθέγγεσθαι διὰ γραμμάτων ἡμᾶς, καὶ
τρόπον τινὰ διὰ χειρὸς διαλέγεσθαι, τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρσι τὰς φωνὰς
διασώζοντας· ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πρὸς ἕτερον βλέπων, συνεργεῖν φημι τὰς χεῖρας τῇ
ἐκφωνήσει τοῦ λόγου.
20 [8.3] Μᾶλλον δὲ πρὶν περὶ τούτου διεξετάσαι, τὸν παρεθέντα λόγον κατανοήσωμεν·
μικροῦ γὰρ ἡμᾶς τὸ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν τῶν γεγονότων διέλαθεν—τίνος χάριν
προηγεῖται μὲν ἡ βλάστη τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένων, ἐπιγίνεται δὲ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν
ζώων, καὶ οὕτω μετὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν τούτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος· [D] τάχα γὰρ οὐ μόνον
τὸ ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου νοούμενον διὰ τούτων μανθάνομεν, ὅτι τῶν ζώων ἕνεκεν ἡ πόα
25 χρήσιμος ἐφάνη τῷ κτίσαντι, διὰ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰ βοτά· οὗ χάριν πρὸ μὲν τῶν
βοσκημάτων ἡ ἐκείνων τροφὴ, πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὑπηρετεῖν μέλλον τῇ
ἀνθρωπίνῃ ζωῇ. [8.4] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δόγμα τι τῶν κεκρυμμένων παραδηλοῦν
διὰ τούτων ὁ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ τὴν περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφίαν δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων
παραδιδόναι, ἣν ἐφαντάσθη μὲν καὶ ἡ ἔξωθεν παίδευσις, οὐ μὴν τηλαυγῶς

1–2 διατί—φιλοσοφία] de dignitate humanae formae et quare post alios creaturas homo creatus sit 1
διατί I K L M N O P R V W : ὅτι Æ ὄρθιον] ὄρθιον δὲ B Q σχῆμα] σχῆμα καὶ πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν
ἀνατείνεται Β 1–2 ἐν ᾧ—φιλοσοφία] καὶ περὶ διαφορᾶς ἐν ᾧ τις ψυχῶν φιλοσοφία W 1 τις om.
B D 3 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου B 3 καὶ²] ἔνθε καὶ V 4 ἀξίαν] ἀρχὴν B ἀποσημαίνονται] ita G K L O P Q S T
X Forb : ὑποσημαίνοντα B E I R : ἐπισημαίνοντα Æ M N V W : ἐπισημαίνονται Ald Forb 5 δ᾽] ita Æ ß
G K M P Q R S W X Forb : δὲ V Ald Mign πᾶσι A B E I K L N O Q T τὸ] τὰ N 6 τῆς om. V 8 πᾶσι
A B I K N O Q R T V κυφὸς W 9 ἑπερείδοντος V ἐπεὶ V τοῦ ἀνθρώπου] ἀνθρώπου R V W :
ἀνθρωπίνης G L M P S T X χεῖρες τὰ] αἱ χεῖρες N V 10 τοῦ γὰρ ὀρθίου] τῳ γὰρ ὀρθίῳ τοῦ A B I K
N O Q R V αὔταρκες R 12 συνεργόν N 13 ἴδιαν T 14 τοῦτο om. K O 15 εὐφυΐας] adminis-
tratione Dion : ingenia Eri μὲν om. N 16 χάριτος om. I 18 διασώζοντας] ἐναρμόζοντας A B I K
N O Q Rac T πρὸς] καὶ πρὸς Æ R ἕτερα N R : ἑτέρους Æ 20 περὶ τούτου] τοῦτο N τούτου] ita
A B E G L M O P Q R S T V W X Forb : τούτων Ald Mign διεξετάσαι] κατ᾽ ἐξετάσαι N παρεθέντα]
παροθέντα Tac : παροφέντα Tpc : παρατεθέντα Æ κατανοήσωμεν] διεξετάσωμεν I 21 διέλαθεν]
παρέλαθε R 22 τῆς om. R 24 τούτων] ita A B E G I K M N O P Q R T V W X Forb : τοῦτο L :
τούτου Ald Mign μανθάνομεν] καταμανθάνομεν N ζώων] μὲν ζώων A B E I K N O Q R T V ἕνεκα
N 26 ἡ om. Ald Mign 27 ἀλλά μοὶ A B I K N O Q R δόγμα δοκεῖ N τῶν κεκρυμμένων] κεκρυμμένον
N 28 μωσῆς V περὶ om. N ψυχῆς] τῆς ψυχῆς N R 29 παραδιδόναι] παραδοῦναι V : ἀποδιδόναι N :
παραδιδόναι ἡμῖν R ἔξωθεν] ἔξω I N R
        173

Why the form of the human being is upright, and that the hands are on account of
reason; in which also is a certain philosophical treatment regarding the difference
of souls.²⁷
[8.1] The human form is upright, and extends aloft towards heaven, and looks
upwards: these things are marks of sovereignty and indicate the royal dignity.²⁸
That the human being alone among beings is such as this, while all others incline
their bodies downwards, clearly indicates the difference of dignity between those
who stoop beneath his dominion and that authority which rises above them: for all
of them, the foremost limbs of their bodies are feet, because that which stoops
assuredly needs that which supports it. But in the formation of the human being
these limbs are hands; for the upright form one base was sufficient for its needs,
supporting its posture securely on two feet.
[8.2] The service of the hands cooperates in other ways with the needs of reason.²⁹
Indeed, if one were to say that the ministry of the hands is a particular property of the
rational nature, he would not be entirely wrong, not only jumping in thought to the
common and ordinary point that we indicate our reasoning, through the dexterity of
the hands, in written letters. That we speak by writing and, in a certain way, converse
by the hand, preserving the sounds by the characters of the alphabet, is not without a
share in the rational gift; but I am referring to something else when I say that the
hands cooperate with bidding of reason.
[8.3] Before discussing this point, however, let us consider the subject passed
over, for the subject of the order of the things that came to be almost escaped us:
for what reason does the growth of things sprouting up from the earth take
precedence, and the irrational animals come next, and then, after the fashioning
of these, the human being? Perhaps we may learn from these things not only the
obvious thought, that the grass appeared to the Creator useful for the sake of
the animals, while the beasts were on account of the human being, and that for this
reason, before the cattle there was their food, and before the human being that
which was to minister to human life. [8.4] But it seems to me that by these points
Moses reveals a certain doctrine about hidden things, and secretly delivers the
philosophy concerning the soul, which outside learning also imagined but did not

²⁷ Bodl. 238: ‘Of the dignity of the human form, and why the human was created after the other
creatures’.
²⁸ Cf. Plato, Tim. 90a, 91e–92a; Xenophon, Mem. 1.4.11; Aristotle, De part. an. 4.10 (686a.27); Basil,
Hom. de creat. hom. 2.15 (Hörner, 66–7); Basil, Hex. 9.2.
²⁹ Cf. Aristotle, De part. an. 4.10 (687a7–18), referring also to Anaxagoras; Xenophon, Mem. 1.4.11;
Galen, De usu part. 1.3 (Helmreich, 1, 3–5; ET 1, 69–71).
 174   

30 κατενόησε· διδάσκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς διὰ τούτων ὁ λόγος, ἐν τρισὶ διαφοραῖς τὴν ζωτικὴν
καὶ ψυχικὴν δύναμιν θεωρεῖσθαι· ἡ μὲν γάρ τις ἐστὶν αὐξητική τε μόνον καὶ
θρεπτικὴ, τὸ κατάλληλον εἰς προσθήκην τῶν τρεφομένων προσάγουσα, ἣν φυτικὴ
τε λέγεται καὶ περὶ τὰ φυτὰ θεωρεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυομένοις ζωτικήν τινα
δύναμιν [145] αἰσθήσεως ἄμοιρον κατανοῆσαι· ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο ζωῆς εἶδός
35 ἐστιν, ὃ καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν οἰκονομῆσαι προσείληφεν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ
φύσει τῶν ἀλόγων ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τρέφεται καὶ αὔξεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
αἰσθητικὴν ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ ἀντίληψιν ἔχει· ἡ δὲ τελεία ἐν σώματι ζωὴ ἐν τῇ
λογικῇ, τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ λέγω, καθορᾶται φύσει, καὶ τρεφομένη καὶ αἰσθανομένη καὶ
λόγου μετέχουσα καὶ νῷ διοικουμένη.
40 [8.5] Γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν ἡμῖν τοιαύτη τις ἡ τοῦ λόγου διαίρεσις· τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέν τι
νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ σωματικὸν πάντως ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν νοητοῦ παρείσθω νῦν ἡ πρὸς τὰ
οἰκεῖα τομή· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ὁ λόγος· [B] τοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἄμοιρον καθόλου
ζωῆς, τὸ δὲ μετέχει ζωτικῆς ἐνεργείας· πάλιν τοῦ ζωτικοῦ σώματος, τὸ μὲν
αἰσθήσει συζῇ, τὸ δὲ ἀμοιρεῖ τῆς αἰσθήσεως· εἶτα τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τέμνεται πάλιν
45 εἰς λογικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον· διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἄψυχον ὕλην οἷον ὑποβάθραν
τινὰ τῆς τῶν ἐμψύχων ἰδέας τὴν φυτικὴν ταύτην ζωὴν συστῆναι λέγει ὁ νομοθέτης,
ἐν τῇ τῶν φυτῶν βλάστῃ προϋποστᾶσαν· εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐπάγει τῶν κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν
διοικουμένων τὴν γένεσιν· καὶ ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκολουθίαν, τῶν διὰ σαρκὸς
τὴν ζωὴν εἰληχότων, τὰ μὲν αἰσθητικὰ καὶ δίχα τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι
50 δύναται, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρως γένοιτο ἐν σώματι, εἰ μὴ τῷ αἰσθητῷ
συγκραθείη· διὰ τοῦτο τελευταῖος μετὰ τὰ βλαστήματα καὶ τὰ βοτὰ
κατεσκευάσθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὁδῷ τινι πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ἀκολούθως [C] προϊούσης
τῆς φύσεως.

30 ἡμᾶς] οἶμαι A B I K N O Q R T : ut arbitror Dion Eri : οἶμαι ἡμᾶς V ζωτικὴν] ζωτικήν τε B I K N O Q

R V 31 καὶ ψυχικὴν] καὶ ἔμψυχον R : om. A L ἡ μὲν γάρ τις ἐστὶν] herbarum siquidem natura
Dion αὐξητική τις ἐστὶν I 31–2 αὐξητική τε μόνον καὶ θρεπτικὴ] quae solummodo incrementum dat et
nutrit et uocatur auctiua et nutritoria Eri 31 τε om. I N μόνον om. I 32 προσθήκας B προσάγουσα]
εἰσάγουσα W φυτικὴ] ita A ß E I K L O R S Wils : germinabilis Dion : germinalis Eri : φυσικὴ B T V W
X Ald Mign Forb 33 τε] ita Æ ß G I K L N O P Q R S T V X Forb : om. Ald Mign 34 κατανοῆσαι
αἰσθήσεως ἄμοιρον R εἶδός ζωῆς R 35 οἰκονομεῖσθαι A B E I K N O Q R S² V 36 μόνον γὰρ
B τρέφεται] τρέφεται τε A B I K Q καὶ αὔξεται om. M αὐξάνεται W 37 τε om. N 38 καθορᾶται
λέγω R καὶ τρεφομένη] τρεφομένη τε Ald Mign 40 δ᾽ ἂν] δὲ R μέν τι] μέντοι B K : τι expunct. R²
41 μὲν om. A B I K N O Q Rac T νῦν] μὲν L 42 τούτων] περὶ τούτων A B I K L N O Q R S T V
44 αἰσθήσει] ἐν αἰσθήσει N συζῇ] coniungitur Eri εἶτα] εἴ X 45 τε om. M ἄψυχον om. M οἷον]
οἱονεὶ A B E I K N O 46 φυτικὴν] ita Æ I K O Q R Wils : germinalem Dion : ψυχικὴν N : φυσικὴν V W
X Ald Mign Forb : naturalem Eri 47 βλαστήσει A B E K N O Q 48 αὐτὴν om. Æ K 49 εἰληχότων]
εἰληφότων A B I K O Q R V : acceperunt Eri : ἀνεἰληφότων N : sortita sunt Dion ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν M : ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν
T 49–50 δύναται εἶναι R 50 δύνανται N ἑτέρως γένοιτο ἐν σώματι] ἐν ἑτέρῳ σώματι γένοιτο A B :
ἑτέρῳ σώματι γένοιτο I K N O Q : ἐν ἑτερῳ γένοιτο σώματι R T : ἑτέρως γένοιτο σώματι E αἰσθητῷ]
αἰσθητικῷ A B Rac (αἰσθητῷ Rpc) : αἰσθητῷ ᾧ T² 51 τὰ¹ om. Q R I τὰ² om. N 52 προϊούσης
ἀκολούθως Æ I K N O Q R T
        175

clearly comprehend. Through these things, the account teaches us that the vital and
animating power is contemplated in three divisions.³⁰ One is simply growth and
nutrition, supplying what is suitable for the increase of those being nourished, which
is called ‘vegetative’ and is contemplated in plants, for one can perceive in growing
plants a certain power of life without a share in sense-perception.³¹ There is another
form of life besides this, which has both that one and adds regulation by sense-
perception, as is in the nature of irrational animals, for not only are they nourished
and grow, but they also have the activity of sense-perception and apprehension. The
perfect embodied life is seen in the rational, I mean the human, nature, which both
is nourished and endowed with sense-perception and partakes of reason and is
ordered by intellect.
[8.5] We might make a division of our subject in some such way: of existing
things, there is the intellectual and there is certainly the bodily.³² But let the
appropriate division of the intellectual be left aside for now, for our argument is
not concerned with these. Of the bodily, some are entirely without a share in life
and some share in vital energy; again, of living bodies, some live with sense-
perception and some without sense-perception; then, that which has sense-
perception is again divided into rational and irrational. For this reason the
lawgiver says that after inanimate matter, as a sort of foundation for the form of
animated things, first this vegetative life was constituted, existing formerly in the
growth of plants; then he proceeds to introduce the genesis of those beings
ordered by sense-perception; and since, following the same sequence, of those
who have received life through the flesh, those with sense-perception are able of
themselves to exist, even without the intellectual nature, while the rational aspect
could not otherwise be embodied except as blended with the sense-perceptive. For
this reason, the human being was fashioned last, after the plants and animals,
nature advancing in a certain way sequentially to perfection.

³⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.37–43 (Spira, 40.11–42.4). The threefold distinction goes back
to Aristotle, De an. 2.3 (413a23–415a13), and is extensively treated by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his
De Anima (cf. esp. Bruns, 8.25–11.5; 29.1–30.17; 80.16–24) and Mantissa §1 (Bruns 105.3–106.5); cf.
Posidonius, Frag. 33 (Kidd, 1, 52; = Galen, Hipp. et Plat. 5.6.37–8, De Lacy, 1, 334); Philo, Opif. 65–6;
Origen, Princ. 2.8.1; see also Porphyry, Isag. 3 (Busse, 10.3–18; ET 10).
³¹ The mss vary between calling this soul φυτικός (‘vegetative’) or φυσική (‘natural’). Aristotle refers
to it as φυτικός (‘vegetative’) in Eth. nic. 1.13.18 (1102b29) and as θρεπτικός (‘nutritive’) in De an. 2.3
(414b2); Alexander of Aphrodisias uses φυτικός (De an., Bruns, 35.24, 38.13, 75.31, 96.9).
³² Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Eccl. 6 (Alexander, 373.21–374.1; ET 100).
 176   

Διὰ πάσης γὰρ ἰδέας τῶν ψυχῶν κατακιρνᾶται τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος·
55 τρέφεται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φυτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος· τῇ δὲ αὐξητικῇ δυνάμει ἡ
αἰσθητικὴ προσεφύη, μέσως ἔχουσα κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν τῆς τε νοερᾶς καὶ τῆς
ὑλωδεστέρας οὐσίας· τοσούτῳ παχυμερεστέρα ταύτης ὅσῳ καθαρωτέρα ἐκείνης·
εἶτά τις γίνεται πρὸς τὸ λεπτὸν καὶ φωτοειδὲς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς φύσεως ἡ τῆς νοερᾶς
οὐσίας οἰκείωσίς τε καὶ ἀνάκρασις· ὡς ἐν τρισὶ τούτοις τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὴν σύστασιν
60 ἔχειν· καθὼς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἀποστόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐμάθομεν, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τοὺς
Ἐφεσίους ἔφη, ἐπευχόμενος αὐτοῖς τὴν ὁλοτελῆ χάριν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου φυλαχθῆναι· ἀντὶ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ [D]
μέρους τὸ σῶμα λέγων, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τῇ ψυχῇ διασημαίνων, τὸ νοερὸν δὲ τῷ
πνεύματι· ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸν γραμματέα διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου παιδεύει ὁ Κύριος,
65 πάσης ἐντολῆς προτιθέναι τὴν εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπην τὴν ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ
διανοίας ἐνεργουμένην· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖ μοι διαφορὰν ἑρμηνεύειν ὁ
λόγος, τὴν μὲν σωματικωτέραν κατάστασιν καρδίαν εἰπὼν, ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν μέσην,
διάνοιαν δὲ τὴν ὑψηλοτέραν φύσιν, τὴν [148] νοεράν τε καὶ διανοητικὴν δύναμιν.
[8.6] Ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς διαφορὰς προαιρέσεων ὁ ἀπόστολος οἶδε, τὴν μὲν σαρκικὴν
70 κατονομάζων, ἣ περὶ γαστέρα καὶ τὰς περὶ ταύτην ἡδυπαθείας ἠσχόληται· τὴν δὲ
ψυχικὴν, ἣ μέσως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν ἔχει, τῆς μὲν ὑπερανεστῶσα, τῆς δὲ
καθαρῶς οὐ μετέχουσα· τὴν δὲ πνευματικὴν, ἣ τὸ τέλειον ἐνθεωρεῖ τῆς κατὰ Θεὸν
πολιτείας· διό φησι πρὸς Κορινθίους, τὸ ἀπολαυστικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμπαθὲς ὀνειδίζων,
ὅτι σάρκινοί ἐστε καὶ τῶν τελειοτέρων δογμάτων ἀχώρητοι· ἑτέρωθι δὲ σύγκρισίν
75 τινα τοῦ μέσου πρὸς τὸ τέλειον ποιούμενος, λέγει· ψυχικὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται
τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος· μωρία γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ πνευματικὸς ἀνακρίνει μὲν πάντα,
αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἀνακρίνεται· ὡς οὖν ἀναβέβηκεν ὁ ψυχικὸς τὸν [B] σαρκικὸν,
κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁ πνευματικὸς τούτου ὑπερανέστηκεν. [8.7] Εἰ οὖν

54 ψυχῶν] ἐμψύχων N : ψυχικῶν R κατακίρναται I K L O ζῶον] ita A B E G N O P Q R S V W X Forb

Mign : ζῶν Ald ὁ ἄνθρωπος] om. Eri 55 φυτικὸν] ita A B E I K N O Q R T Wils : germinalem Dion Eri :
φυσικὸν V W X Ald Forb Mign 57 τοσοῦτον N T ὅσον T 58–9 εἶτά τις—ἀνάκρασις] deinde quaedam
fit societas atque concretio sensualis naturae ad subtile ac lucidum intellectualis essentia Eri 58
αἰσθητικῆς] αἰσθητῆς A B I K O Q T αἰσθητικῆς . . . νοερᾶς] νοερᾶς . . . αἰσθητῆς N 59 οὐσίας om.
N τρισὶ] τοῖς τρισὶ R 60 τὸ] ita Æ ß N O P R S V W X Forb Mign : τὸν Ald 61 ἐφεσίους]
θεσσαλονικεῖς K O Dion ἔφη] φησὶν Æ I K N O Q R T : om. B ἐπευχόμενος] προσευχόμενος V W
Ald Mign ὁλοτελῆ] τελεοτελῆ I 63 τῇ ψυχῇ διασημαίνων] διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημαίνων R δὲ τῷ] ita Æ ß
G N O P R S V W X Forb : τῷ L : τῷ δὲ Ald Mign 65 πάσης ἐντολῆς] πάντων B ψυχῆς καὶ καρδίας
V 66 τὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖ μοι διαφορὰν] δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν μοι διαφορὰν R : δοκεῖ μοι τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν αὐτὴν
N 68 διανοητικὴν] ποιητικὴν V W Ald Mign 69 καὶ om. W προαιρέσεως Ald Mign σαρκίνην M V
W 70 περὶ¹] τὰς περὶ L περὶ ταύτην] μετ᾽ αὐτὴν N : μετὰ ταύτην T 72 ἣ] ἣν X ἐνθεωρεῖ] ᾖ
ἐνθεωρεῖται L N R 73 τὸ ἀπολαυστικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐμπαθὲς] eis studium uoluptariae uitae atque passibilis
Dion : passibilem eorum usum Eri 74 ὅτι] λέγει ὅτι N τελεωτέρων R : τελείων N δογμάτων]
διδαγμάτων A B E I K N O Q R T 75 πρὸς τὸ τέλειον τοῦ μέσου B I K N O Q R τοῦ μέσου om.
A ἄνθρωπος] ὁ ἄνθρωπος L 76 πάντα] τὰ πάντα A B I N O Q R T 77 οὖν] γοῦν R : δὲ N : γὰρ A B I K
O Q ἀναβέβηκεν] ὑπεραναβέβηκεν I R σάρκινον M W 78 τοῦτον N
        177

This rational animal, the human being, is blended of every form of soul: he is
nourished by the vegetative kind of soul; and to the power of growth was added
that of sense-perception, which stands midway according to its own nature
between the intellectual and the more material essence, being as much denser
than the one as it is more refined than the other; then takes place a certain
appropriation and commixture of the intellectual essence with the subtle and
enlightened element of the sense-perceptive nature, so that the human being is
composed of these three, just as we are taught such a thing by the apostle in what
he says to the Ephesians,³³ praying for them that the complete grace of the body
and the soul and the spirit may be preserved at the coming of the Lord, using the
word body for the nutritive part, denoting the sense-perceptive by the word soul,
and the intellectual by spirit. Likewise the Lord also instructs the scribe in the
Gospel that he should set before every commandment the love of God exercised
with all the heart and soul and mind,³⁴ for here also it seems to me that the report
indicates the same difference, calling the more corporeal state heart, the inter-
mediate soul, and the higher nature, the intellectual and reasoning faculty, mind.
[8.6] Hence also the apostle recognizes three different dispositions, naming one
carnal, which is busied with the belly and the pleasures connected with it, another
animated, which holds a middle position with regard to virtue and vice, rising above the
one but without pure participation in the other, and another spiritual, which perceives
the perfection of citizenship according to God: he thus says to the Corinthians,
reproaching their devotion to pleasure and passion, You are carnal³⁵ and incapable
of receiving the more perfect teaching; while elsewhere, making a comparison of the
middle kind with the perfect, he says, but the animated human does not receive the
things of the Spirit, for they are foolishness to him; however, he that is spiritual judges all
things, but himself is judged of no one.³⁶ As, then, the animated is higher than the carnal,
by the same proportion also the spiritual rises above the animated. [8.7] If, therefore,

³³ 1 Thess. 5:23. The Greek manuscripts and Eriugena mention ‘Ephesians’; Dionysius Exiguus
alone corrects the error and gives full verse.
³⁴ Mark 12:30. ³⁵ Cf. 1 Cor. 3:3. ³⁶ Cf. 1 Cor. 2:14–15.
 178   

τελευταῖον μετὰ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἡ γραφὴ γεγενῆσθαι λέγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον
80 ἢ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς ἡμῖν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἐπ’ ἀναγκαίᾳ τινὶ τῇ τῆς τάξεως
ἀκολουθίᾳ τὸ τέλειον ἐν τελευταίοις βλέπων· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ λογικῷ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
περιείληπται, ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ καὶ τὸ φυτικὸν εἶδος πάντως ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ περὶ
τὸ ὑλικὸν θεωρεῖται μόνον· οὐκοῦν εἰκότως καθάπερ διὰ βαθμῶν ἡ φύσις, τῶν τῆς
ζωῆς λέγω ἰδιωμάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν μικροτέρων [C] ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ποιεῖται τὴν ἄνοδον.
85 [8.8] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν λογικόν τι ζῶόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, κατάλληλον ἔδει τῇ χρείᾳ
τοῦ λόγου κατασκευασθῆναι τὸ τοῦ σώματος ὄργανον· καθάπερ τοὺς μουσικοὺς
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ὀργάνων εἶδος τὴν μουσικὴν ἑκπονοῦντας, καὶ οὔτε διὰ
βαρβίτων αὐλοῦντας οὔτε ἐν αὐλοῖς κιθαρίζοντας· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔδει τῷ
λόγῳ κατάλληλον εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὀργάνων κατασκευὴν, ὡς ἂν προσφυῶς ἐνηχοίη
90 πρὸς τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων χρείαν ὑπὸ τῶν φωνητικῶν μορίων τυπούμενος· διὰ τοῦτο
συνηρτήθησαν αἱ χεῖρες τῷ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μυρίας ἐστὶν ἀπαριθμήσασθαι τὰς
κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείας πρὸς ἃς τὰ εὐμήχανα ταῦτα καὶ πολυαρκῆ τῶν χειρῶν ὄργανα
χρησίμως ἔχει, πρὸς πᾶσαν τέχνην καὶ [D] πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν, τὸν κατὰ πόλεμόν τε
καὶ εἰρήνην, εὐαφῶς μετιόντα· ἀλλὰ γε πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως τοῦ λόγου χάριν
95 προσέθηκεν αὐτὰς ἡ φύσις τῷ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ ἄμοιρος τῶν χειρῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν,
πάντως ἂν αὐτῷ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν τετραπόδων καταλλήλως τῇ τῆς τροφῆς χρείᾳ
διεσκεύαστο τοῦ προσώπου τὰ μόρια· ὥστε προμήκη τε τὴν μορφὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ
μυκτῆρας ἀπολεπτύνεσθαι, καὶ προβεβλῆσθαι τὰ χείλη τοῦ στόματος τυλώδη καὶ
σταθερὰ καὶ παχέα, πρὸς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν τῆς πόας ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα· ἐγκεῖσθαι δὲ
100 τοῖς ὀδοῦσι τὴν γλῶτταν, ἄλλην τινὰ τοιαύτην, πολύσαρκον καὶ ἀντιτυπῆ καὶ
τραχεῖαν καὶ συγκατεργαζομένην τοῖς ὀδοῦσι τὸ ὑπ᾽ ὀδόντα γινόμενον· ἢ ὑγράν τε
καὶ [149] διακεχυμένην κατὰ τὰ πλάγια, οἷα ἡ τῶν κυνῶν τε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν
ὠμοβόρων ἐστὶ, τῷ καρχάρῳ τῶν ὀδόντων μεταξὺ τῶν διαστημάτων ἐνδιαρρέουσα·

79 πᾶν] τὴν N 80 φιλοσοφεῖν R T νομοθέτης] νομοθέτης παραδέδωκεν R ἐν ἀναγκαίᾳ Æ I K O R :

ἐναναγκαίᾳ B : ἀναγκαίᾳ N T τῇ om. Æ S τῆς om. Ald Mign 81 γὰρ om. N 82 φυτικὸν] ita A B
E G I K L M O P R S V W X Wils : germinalem Dion : φυσικὸν Ald Mign Forb : naturalis Eri περὶ]
πάντως περὶ N 83 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri διὰ] ὡς διὰ N 85 ante ἐπειδὴ inc. cap. 9 Dion Eri : Λ habet
inscr. quod forma humani corporis congruat rationalitate mentis ἐστιν om. B 86 λόγου] σώματος I
τοὺς] γὰρ τοὺς Æ I L R S 88 βαρβίτων] βαλβίδων G M O P T V W X κατὰ om. N R 88–9 κατάλληλον
εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ I τῷ λόγῳ om. N 90 πρὸς—τυπούμενος] ad eam sonaret in ipsis particularis uerborum
uocibus coaptatis formata Eri διὰ] διὰ τοι R 91 συνήρτησαν N 92 πολυαρκῆ] principalia Eri 93
πρὸς om. N Rac T V W τὸν] τῶν Æ ß G N O P Q S V τε om. N 94 εὐφυῶς N γε] ita Æ ß G I K L
N O P Q R S T W X Forb : om. V W Ald Mign πρὸ] ita Æ ß G I K M N O P Q Rac T V W Forb : καὶ πρὸ
Ald Mign 96 καταλλήλως] καταλλήλως αὐτῷ E 97 διεσκέδαστο A : διεσκεύαστω V : κατεσκευάσατο
T τε om. N R 98 τυλλώδη Ald 99 σταθηρὰ G R παχεῖα V X δὲ] τε N 100 γλῶτταν] ita Æ ß
C D E F G I K L M O P R S V W Forb Mign : γλῶσσαν X Ald ἄλλην τινὰ τοιαύτην πολύσαρκον] ἀλλ᾽ οὐ
τοιαύτην πολύσαρκον δέ τινα A τινὰ] om. Q Rac : post πολύσαρκον pon. B C I K N O πολύσαρκον]
πολύσαρκον τινὰ T ἀντίτυπον E M R : ἀντιτυπεῖαν L 100–101 τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντιτυπῆ R 101 ὑπ᾽] ὑπὸ
τὸν W Ald Mign ὀδόντας R τε om. B 102 οἵα Æ D E F Spc Mign : οἵους A τῶν λοιπῶν om.
M W τῶν³ om. D R S V 103 ὠμοβόρων] αἱμοβόρων D R S T V W ἐστὶ] ἐστὶ ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν N
        179

Scripture says that the human being came into being last, after every animated
being, the lawgiver is doing nothing other than teaching us matters regarding the
soul, seeing that by a certain necessary sequence of order the perfect comes last:
for the others are included in the rational also, while in the sense-perceptive there
is also surely the vegetative form, and that in turn is only contemplated in material
beings. Thus, reasonably, nature makes the ascent, as it were by steps, I mean the
properties of life, from the lower to the perfect.³⁷
[8.8]³⁸ Since, then, the human being is a kind of rational animal, the instrument
of the body must be fashioned to be appropriate for the use of reason. Just as one
may see musicians producing music according to the form of the instruments, and
not piping with harps nor harping upon flutes, in the same way it is necessary that
the formation of these instruments be appropriate for reason, so that when struck
by the vocal organs it might resound fittingly for expressing words.³⁹ On this
account the hands were attached to the body; for though there can be enumerated
very many uses in daily life for which these skilfully contrived and helpful instru-
ments, the hands—that easily follow every art and every activity, alike in war and
peace—are serviceable, yet, before every other [cause], nature added them to our
body pre-eminently for the sake of reason. For if the human being were without
hands, the various parts of his face would certainly have been arranged like those of
the quadrupeds, appropriate for the purpose of feeding, so that its form would have
been lengthened and pointed towards the nostrils, and his lips would have projected
from his mouth, lumpy and stiff and thick, adapted for pulling up grass, and the
tongue would either have lain between the teeth, of a kind with the lips—fleshy and
hard and rough, assisting his teeth in dealing with what comes under them—or it
would have been moist and hanging out at the side like that of dogs and other
carnivorous beasts, projecting through the gaps in his jagged row of teeth. If, then,

³⁷ Cf. Aristotle, Hist. an. 7(8).1 (588b4–50): ‘Nature proceeds from the inanimate to the animals by
such small steps . . . .’ (οὕτω δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀψύχων εἰς τὰ ζῷα μεταβαίνει κατὰ μικρὸν ἡ φύσις); Philo, Opif.
65–6.
³⁸ Both Dionysius Exiguus and Eriugena begin Chapter 9 here. Bodl. 238 has the heading: ‘That the
form of the human body is congruent with the rationality of the mind’.
³⁹ Cf. Galen, De usu part. 1.3 (Helmreich, 1, 4.7–9; ET 1, 69–70).
 180   

εἰ οὖν μὴ παρῆσαν αἱ χεῖρες τῷ σώματι, πῶς ἂν ἔναρθρος τούτῳ ἐνετυπώθη φωνὴ,

105 τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν κατὰ τὸ στόμα μορίων οὐ συνδιασχηματιζομένης πρὸς τὴν
χρείαν τοῦ φθόγγου; ὡς ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἢ βληχᾶσθαι πάντως ἢ μηκάζειν ἢ ὑλακτεῖν
ἢ χρεμετίζειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ βουσὶν ἢ ὄνοις βοᾷν παραπλήσιον, ἤ τινα θηριώδη
μυκηθμὸν ἀφιέναι· νυνὶ δὲ, τῆς χειρὸς ἐντεθείσης τῷ σώματι, εὔσχολόν ἐστι τὸ
στόμα τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ τοῦ λόγου· οὐκοῦν ἴδιον τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως αἱ χεῖρες
110 ἀναπεφῄνασιν, οὕτω τοῦ πλάστου διὰ τούτων ἐπινοήσαντος τῷ λόγῳ τὴν εὐκολίαν.

Ὅτι ὀργανικὸν κατεσκευάσθη τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ τὸ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρείαν.
[9.1] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν θεοειδῆ τινὰ χάριν τῷ πλάσματι ἡμῶν ὁ ποιήσας δεδώρηται,
τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν ἐνθεὶς τῇ εἰκόνι τὰς ὁμοιότητας· διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν λοιπὰ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἔδωκεν ἐκ φιλοτιμίας τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει· νοῦ δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστι
5 κυρίως εἰπεῖν ὅτι δέδωκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μετέδωκε, τὸν ἴδιον αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως κόσμον
ἐπιβαλὼν τῇ εἰκόνι. Ἐπεὶ οὖν νοερόν τι χρῆμα καὶ ἀσώματόν ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς,
ἀκοινώνητον ἂν ἔσχε τὴν χάριν καὶ ἄμικτον, μὴ διά τινος ἐπινοίας φανερουμένης
αὐτοῦ τῆς κινήσεως· τούτου χάριν τῆς ὀργανικῆς ταύτης προσεδεήθη κατασκευῆς,
ἵνα πλήκτρου δίκην τῶν φωνητικῶν μορίων ἁπτόμενος, διὰ τῆς ποιᾶς [C] τῶν
10 φθόγγων τυπώσεως ἑρμηνεύσῃ τὴν ἔνδοθεν κίνησιν. [9.2] Καὶ ὥσπερ τις
μουσικῆς ἔμπειρος ὢν, ἰδίαν ἐκ πάθους μὴ ἔχοι φωνὴν, βουλόμενος δὲ φανερὰν
ποιῆσαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλοτρίαις ἐμμελωδοίη φωναῖς, δι᾽ αὐλῶν ἢ λύρας
δημοσιεύων τὴν τέχνην· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, παντοδαπῶν νοημάτων
εὑρετὴς ὢν, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι τοῖς διὰ σωματικῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπαΐουσι γυμνῇ τῇ
15 ψυχῇ δεικνύειν τὰς τῆς διανοίας ὁρμὰς, καθάπερ τις ἁρμοστὴς ἔντεχνος, τῶν
ἐμψύχων τούτων ὀργάνων ἁπτόμενος, διὰ τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἠχῆς φανερὰ ποιεῖ τὰ
κεκρυμμένα νοήματα.
[9.3] Σύμμικτος δέ τις ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὄργανον αὐλοῦ καὶ λύρας,
ὥσπερ ἐν συνωδίᾳ τινὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀλλήλοις συμφθεγγομένων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πνεῦμα

104 αἱ χεῖρες] τὰ χείλη T ἐνετυπώθη τούτῳ A B C I K N O Q R : formata in eo fieret Eri ἐτυπώθη

D φωνῇ C Dac Gac K Nac 105 τὸ om. F G I L M P S V X στόμα] σῶμα N V συνδιασχηματιζομένη M
106 ἢ¹ om. A B C I K N O Q R T βληχάζειν A μηκάζειν] μυκάζειν A C Dac K N O Sac W : μυκίζειν G P
X : μυκᾶσθαι L 108 μυκηθμὸν] βρυχηθμὸν A B C K N O Q R : βρυχθμὸν I 108–9 εὔσχολον ἐστι τὸ στόμα
τῇ om. T 108 εὔσχολον] εὔκολον R : εὔσχημον L 109 στόμα] στωμα Rac : σῶμα G M P V W X οὐκοῦν]
non ero Eri 110 ἐναπεφήνασιν M τῷ λόγῳ τὴν εὐκολίαν] τὴν εὐκολίαν τοῦ λόγου N τοῦ λόγου Rac T
1 κατεσκευάσθη post χρειάν pon. N τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ τοῦ ἀνθρωποῦ X τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου M σχῆμα]
σῶμα A B E I K O 3 ὁμοιότητας] ἰδιότητας E I M V W 4 ἔδωκεν] δέδωκεν R 5 δέδωκεν] ἔδωκεν
A B I K N O Q T ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μετέδωκε om. X αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως κόσμον] κόσμον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως I :
κόσμον τῆς φύσεως E 6 ἐπειδὴ R 7 ἂν om. D 7–8 μὴ—κινήσεως] dum per nullum organum
intelligentiae sua motus manifestaretur Eri 7 φανερουμένης] φερομένης ß 8 τῆς ὀργανικῆς om.
B προσεδεείθη X : adiecta est Eri 9 μορίων] ὀργάνων N 10 ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ εἴ A B D² I K M N
O Q R S² T 11 ὢν] ita A B D F G I K L M O P Q R S T V W X Forb : om. N : ὢν ἂν Ald Mign ἰδίαν]
ἡδείαν G Rac X : ἡδεῖαν F L P V ἐκ πάθους om. ß ἐκ] ἐκ τοῦ D πάθους] βάθους B ἔχοι] ἔχῃ Fac :
ἔχει Bac I : ἔχων N T 12 ἐπιστήμην] musicam Eri ἀλλοτρίοις Q ἐμμελωδοίη] μελωδοίη A B I K N O
Q : ἐμμελωδοίῃ S : ἐμμελῳδοίη Ald Mign φωνὴν ß δι’ om. V ἢ] καὶ Bac (ἢ sup. l.) : καὶ ß 13 ὁ νοῦς
ὁ ἀνθρώπινος A B I K N O Q T 14 τῷ] τὸ A B C D E F K O τοῖς] τοῖς μὴ X : om. Ald Mign
ἐπανΐουσιν X ἐπαΐουσι γυμνῇ] ἐπαϊούσῃ Ald Mign 15 ψυχῇ] add. dicit quia anima per se ipsam dum
sit incorporea sine corpore dictiones habere sensibiles non potest Eri καθάπερ—ἔντεχνος] quasi per
modulationem quandam haec artificiosius Dion : ueluti quidam coaptatus in arte Eri ἐναρμοστὴς A B
I K O Q ἐντέχνως I P² : ἐντέχνη B T : ἐν τέχνῃ K O Q 16 τούτων om. N φανερὰ ποιεῖ] φανεροποιεῖ
N ποιεῖ] ποιεῖται D I L R² S 19 συνοδίᾳ ß G K L Ald : ᾦδῆ I : συνῳδίᾳ Mign ταὐτὸν] κατ᾽ αὐτὸν Dac Q V
       – 181

our body had no hands, how could articulate sound have been formed in it, seeing
that the formation of the parts of the mouth would not been configured for the use
of speech, so that the human being must of necessity have either bleated, or baaed, or
barked, or neighed, or bellowed like oxen or asses, or uttered some bestial bellowing?
But as it is, with the hand being part of the body, the mouth is at leisure for the
service of the reason. Therefore, the hands are shown to be proper to the rational
nature, the Fashioner having thus devised by their means a facility for reason.
That the human form was fashioned as an instrument for the use of reason.
[9.1] Since, then, our Maker has bestowed upon our moulded figure a certain
godlike grace, by implanting in the image the likenesses of his own good gifts, for
this reason he gave, of his munificence, the other good gifts to human nature; yet it
is not strictly right to say that he ‘gave’ of intellect and practical wisdom, but that
he ‘gave a share’ of them, adding to the image the proper adornment of his own
nature. Since, then, the intellect is a thing intelligible and incorporeal, its grace
would have been incommunicable and isolated, without its movement being
manifest by some contrivance. For this reason, there was need of this instrumental
formation, that, by touching like a plectrum the vocal organs, it might indicate, by
the quality of the sounds struck, the movement within. [9.2] And just as some
experienced musician, who lost his own voice by some illness, yet wanting to make
his skill known, might make melody with the voices of others, so making public
his art through aid of flutes or the lyre, so also the human intellect—an inventor of
all sorts of conceptions, being unable to show, by the naked soul, the impulses of
its mind to those who hear by bodily senses—touches, like some skilful composer,
these animated instruments to make manifest its hidden thoughts by the sounds
produced upon them.
[9.3] The music of the human instrument is a sort of combination of flute and
lyre, sounding together in combination with the others as in a kind of concert.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Inscr. 1.3.22 (McDonough, 33.1–6; ET 91).

 182   

20 διὰ τῆς ἀρτηρίας ἀπὸ τῶν πνευματοδόχων ἀγγείων ἀνωθούμενον, ὅταν ἡ ὁρμὴ τοῦ
φθεγγομένου πρὸς φωνὴν τονώσῃ τὸ μέλος, ταῖς ἔνδοθεν προσαρασσόμενον
προσβολαῖς, αἳ κυκλοτερῶς τὸν αὐλοειδῆ τοῦτον διειλήφασι πόρον, μιμεῖταί πως
τὴν διὰ τοῦ αὐλοῦ γινομένην φωνὴν, ταῖς ὑμενώδεσιν ἐξοχαῖς ἐν κύκλῳ
περιδονούμενον· ὑπερῶα δὲ τὸν κάτωθεν φθόγγον ἐκδέχεται τῷ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν
25 κενώματι, διδύμοις αὐλοῖς τοῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς μυκτῆρας διήκουσι, καὶ οἷον λεπίδων
τισὶν ἐξοχαῖς τοῖς περὶ τὸν ἠθμὸν χόνδροις τὴν φωνὴν περισχίζουσα, γεγωνοτέραν
τὴν ἠχὴν ἀπεργάζεται· παρειὰ δὲ καὶ γλῶττα καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν φάρυγγα διασκευὴ, καθ᾽
ἣν ὁ ἀνθερεὼν ὑποχαλᾶται κοιλαινόμενος, καὶ ὀξυτονῶν ἐπιτείνεται—[152] ταῦτα
πάντα τὴν ἐν ταῖς νευραῖς τοῦ πλήκτρου κίνησιν ὑποκρίνεται ποικίλως καὶ
30 πολυτρόπως, ἐπὶ καιροῦ σὺν πολλῷ τῷ τάχει μεθαρμόζοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τοὺς
τόνους· χειλέων δὲ διαστολὴ καὶ ἐπίμυσις ταὐτὸν ποιεῖ τοῖς διὰ τῶν δακτύλων
ἐπιλαμβάνουσι τοῦ αὐλοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα κατὰ τὴν ἁρμονίαν τοῦ μέλους.

Ὅτι διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ.

[10.1] Οὕτω τοίνυν τοῦ νοῦ διὰ τῆς ὀργανικῆς ταύτης [B] κατασκευῆς ἐν ἡμῖν
μουσουργοῦντος τὸν λόγον, λογικοὶ γεγόναμεν, οὐκ ἂν (ὡς οἶμαι) ἔχοντες τὴν τοῦ
λόγου χάριν εἰ τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ ἐπίπονον τῆς κατὰ τὴν βρῶσιν λατρείας χείλεσι τὴν
5 χρείαν τοῦ σώματος ἐπορίζομεν· νυνὶ δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην λειτουργίαν αἱ χεῖρες εἰς
ἑαυτὰς μετενέγκασαι, εὔθετον τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ τοῦ λόγου τὸ στόμα κατέλιπον.
[10.2] Διπλῆ δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄργανον ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐργασίαν ἠχῆς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς
ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἔξωθεν νοημάτων· καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυται πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν ἡ ἄλλη, ἀλλὰ
παραμένει τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐφ᾽ ᾗ ἐτάχθη παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦσα τῇ γείτονι,
10 οὔτε τῆς ἀκοῆς λαλούσης, οὔτε τῆς φωνῆς ἀκουούσης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀεί τι πάντως
προΐεται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ δεχομένη διηνεκῶς οὐκ ἐμπίπλαται, καθώς φησί που ὁ Σολομών.
[10.3] Ὅ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ [C] μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἄξιον εἶναι καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι, τί τὸ
πλάτος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἔνδοθεν χωρήματος, εἰς ὃ πάντα συρρεῖ τὰ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς
εἰσχεόμενα; τίνες οἱ ὑπομνηματογράφοι τῶν εἰσαγομένων ἐν αὐτῇ λόγων; καὶ ποῖα
20 ἀνωρούμενον V : ἀνεωρούμενον W 21 φθεγγομένου] sonantis arteriam Eri μέλος] μέρος V W
Ald Mign 21–2 ταῖς—προσβολαῖς] interiores ordines eleuans Eri 21 προσρασσόμενον V W 22
προβολαῖς M² N P R² T διειλήφασι] pertranat Eri πως] omnino Eri 23 γενομένην E ἐν om.
N Rac 24 ὑπερώα Æ L M R² : ὑπερῷα S Mign 26 ἠθμὸν] ἰθμὸν B F² : ἴθμον T : ἰσθμὸν I N V :
λαιμὸν E (in mg γρ. ἰσθμὸν) γεγονωτέραν W X 27 ἠχὴν] ἰσχὺν K παρειαὶ R γλῶσσαι
R W τὸν] τὴν A Æ B C D E F Q 28 ὑποχαλᾶται] καὶ ὑποχαλᾶται N T ὀξυτονῶν Vpc2 (ξυ add. 2a
man) 29 καὶ Vpc2 30 τῷ om. N 32 κατὰ] καὶ Ald Mign
1 ἐνεργεῖται N Q T : operatur Eri 2 οὕτως N διὰ τῆς] δι᾽ G P X : om. F ταύτης om. G M P V
W X 3 τοῦ λόγου L ὡς om. D ἔχοντες] σχόντες T 4 βαρύ] βαρύτεροι F M τε om. A B C F K M
N O Q τὴν¹ om. B χείλεσι] ita A B C G I K M N O P Q T V W X Forb : τοῖς χείλεσι Ald
Mign τὴν²] ita A B C D E F G L M N P Q R S T V W X Ald Forb : πρὸς τὴν Mign 5 τῇ χρείᾳ A B
C I K N O Q T νῦν C K O τὴν om. T λειπτουργίαν G P V X 5–6 εἰς ἑαυτὰς αἱ χεῖρες N 6
μετενεγκοῦσαι A B C I K N O Q R T 7 ante διπλῆ inc. cap. 10 D E F G H I L M P S V W X Dion Eri : Λ
habet inscr. de quinque sensibus corporis 9 παραμένει] παραμένει ἑκάστη R ᾗ] ἧς A B C I K M N O
Q T 10 ἀκουούσης οὔτε τῆς φωνῆς λαλούσης B 10–11 ἡ—προΐεται] uox enim semper et
omnino auditui procedit Eri 10 γὰρ ἀεί] γὰρ ἔδρα εἴ V : ἔδρα εἴ F G H P W X γὰρ] γὰρ
φωνὴ R 11 προσΐεται Fmg G P Vac X : προσεΐεται Vpc : προσοίσεται H ἐμπίπλαται] ita
B C D E H I K M N O R S V W X Forb : ἐμπίπλανται A : ἐμπίμπλαται Fpc Ald Mign που φησί
R που] καὶ I ὁ] ita A B C E G I K N O P Q R T X Forb : om. V W Ald Mign σολομῶν ß H I
N P 12 ὅ om. V W καὶ¹ om. R τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ μάλιστα T τῶν] τὸ V ἄξιον εἶναι καὶ
θαυμάζεσθαι] admiratione dignissimum Dion : mirandum Eri καὶ² om. A B C E I K N O Q T 13
ἐκεῖνο A B C E I K N O Q R : illa Dion Eri ἔνδον A B C I K N O Q τὰ om. N 14 οἱ om. N T
       – 183

For the breath, as it is forced up from the lungs through the windpipe when the
impulse of the speaker attunes the member to sound, striking against the internal
protuberances which divide this flute-like passage in a circular manner, imitates in
a way the sound produced by a flute, being driven round in a circle by the
membranous projections; while the palate receives the sound from below its
own cavity, dividing the sound by the two passages that lead to the nostrils, and
by the cartilages about the perforated bone, as it were by some scaly protuberance,
makes its resonance louder; and the cheek and tongue and the construction of the
pharynx—by which the chin is relaxed when drawn in and tightened when
extended—all these answer, in varied and manifold ways, to the movement of the
plectrum on the strings, at the right time with great rapidity harmonizing the tones as
required; while the opening and closing of the lips has the same effect as when they
halt the wind of the flute with the fingers according to the harmony of the melody.

That the intellect works by means of the senses.

[10.1] Since, then, the intellect produces the music of reason by means of this
instrumental construction within us, we have become rational, but would not, as
I suppose, have the grace of reason if we used our lips to supply the needs of the
body, the heavy and burdensome part of the business of providing food. As it is,
however, the hands, appropriating this ministry to themselves, leave the mouth
well-adapted for the service of reason. [10.2]⁴¹ The activity of the instrument,
however, is twofold: one for the production of sound, the other for the reception of
concepts from without; and the one operation does not blend with the other, but
remains in the activity for which it was appointed by nature, not interfering with
its neighbour, either by the hearing speaking or by speech hearing; for the one is
surely always uttering something, while the hearing is continuously receiving but
not filled, as Solomon says somewhere.⁴²
[10.3] The thing about our internal faculties that seems to me both to be
especially noteworthy and wondered at is: what is the breadth of that inner
receptacle into which flows everything that is poured in through the hearing?

⁴¹ Some Greek mss, together with Dionysius Exiguus and Eriugena, begin Chapter 10 here. Bodl. 238
has the heading: ‘Of the five bodily senses’.
⁴² Cf. Eccl. 1:8.
 184   

15 δοχεῖα τῶν ἐντιθεμένων τῇ ἀκοῇ νοημάτων; καὶ πῶς, πολλῶν τε καὶ παντοδαπῶν
ἀλλήλοις ἐπεμβαλλομένων, σύγχυσις καὶ πλάνη κατὰ τὴν ἐπάλληλον θέσιν τῶν
ἐγκειμένων οὐ γίνεται; τὸ ἶσον δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὄψεων ἐνεργείας
θαυμάσειεν· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ διὰ τούτων ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἔξω τοῦ σώματος
ἐπιδράσσεται, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκει τῶν φαινομένων τὰ εἴδωλα, τοὺς χαρακτῆρας
20 τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καταγράφων. [10.4] Καὶ ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολύχωρος εἴη πόλις ἐκ
διαφόρων εἰσόδων τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν συμφοιτῶντας εἰσδεχομένη, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
κατά τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συνδραμοῦνται οἱ πάντες, [D] ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν,
οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἄλλοι δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ τὰς πλατείας ἢ τοὺς
στενωποὺς ἢ τὰ θέατρα, κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἕκαστος γνώμην μεταχωρήσουσι·
25 τοιαύτην τινὰ βλέπω καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ πόλιν τὴν ἔνδοθεν ἐν ἡμῖν συνῳκισμένην, ἣν
διάφοροι μὲν αἱ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴσοδοι καταπληροῦσιν· ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν
εἰσιόντων φυλοκρινῶν τε καὶ διεξετάζων ὁ νοῦς, τοῖς καταλλήλοις τῆς γνώσεως
τόποις ἐναποτίθεται.
[10.5] Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὑποδείγματος, ἔστι πολλάκις ὁμοφύλους
30 τινὰς ὄντας καὶ συγγενεῖς μὴ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς πύλης ἐντὸς γενέσθαι, ἄλλου κατ᾽ ἄλλην
εἴσοδον κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν εἰσδραμόντος, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον ἐντὸς τῆς περιβολῆς τοῦ
τείχους γενόμενοι, πάλιν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων εἰσὶ, [153] πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἰκείως ἔχοντες·
καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλίν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν γινόμενον· οἱ γὰρ ἀπεξενωμένοι τε καὶ ἄγνωστοι
ἀλλήλων μιᾷ χρῶνται πρὸς τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδῳ πολλάκις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ συνάπτει τούτους
35 ἀλλήλοις ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἴσοδον κοινωνία· δύνανται γὰρ καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι
διακριθῆναι πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον· τοιοῦτόν τι βλέπω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν
εὐρυχωρίας· πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ ἐκ διαφόρων τῶν αἰσθητηρίων μία γνῶσις ἡμῖν
συναγείρεται, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος πολυμερῶς πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μεριζομένου·
πάλιν δ᾽ αὖ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἔστιν ἐκ μιᾶς τινος τῶν αἰσθήσεων πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα
40 μαθεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν φύσιν συμβαίνοντα·

15 τε om. V W Ald Mign 16 ἄλλοις T ἐπιλαμβομένων E κατὰ] om. F : τῶν κατὰ T : τῶν κα V 17
τῆς . . . ἐνεργείας] ταῖς . . . ἐνεργείαις A C I K O Q T 18 ἔξωθεν R 19 ἐπιδράσσεται] peragit Eri 21
αὐτὸ] αὐτὸ δὲ E 22 ἐν om. N συνδραμοῦνται] ita A B C D Epc F I K L M N O Q R S T Forb :
συνδραμόντες V W Ald Mign κατὰ τὴν] κατ᾽ A B C I K N O Q T 23 τὰς om. Mign ἄλλοι δὲ]
ita A B D E F I L O Q R S T Forb : ἄλλοι μὲν C : ἄλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν K : ἢ N : ἄλλοι V W X Ald Mign κατὰ om.
N τὰς ἐκκλησίας om. B 24 μεταχωρήσουσι] χωρήσουσι Æ : μεταχωροῦσι Ald Mign 25 νοῦ] ἀνθρώπου
N ἐν om. B R ἣν om. T 26 αἱ om. B διὰ om. R 27 φυλοκρινῶν] ita A B C D E Fpc G H K O
R S V X Forb : φυλοκρίνῶν T : φυλοκρίνων P : φιλοκρινῶν ß Fac M W Ald Mign : φυλοκρινεῖ Nac : φιλοκρινεῖ
Npc2 τε καὶ om. N τοῖς] καὶ τοῖς N 29 κατὰ τὴν] κατ᾽ αὐτὴν L πολλάκις] πολλάκις ἰδεῖν N R 30
μὴ διὰ] μηδὲ Ald Mign αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς αὐτῆς W : om. Æ πύλης] ciuitatem Eri 31 δὲ om. F τῆς
περιβολῆς ἐντὸς E ἐντὸς] ἐκτὸς T περιβολῆς] περιβολῆς καὶ D E 32 γινόμενοι I εἰσὶ] εἰσὶ οἱ Æ B I
K M N O Q T 33 γινόμενον εὑρεῖν D E F G H L M P S V W X γενόμενον N ἀπαξεγνωσμένοι
V ἄγνωστοι 34 ἀλλήλων] ἄγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλους A B I K N O Q R T χρῶνται] χρῶν τε καὶ V
35 δυνατὸν R γενομένους R 36 πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον διακριθῆναι E 37 γὰρ καὶ ἐκ] ἐν X καὶ om. A ß
G H I K M O P Q W τῶν om. Mign 38 συνεγείρεται A B C D E F K συναγείρεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ
πράγματος] eiusdem re congeritur Eri 40 συμβαίνοντα] accedentia Eri
        185

Who are the note-takers of the words that are brought in by it? And what kind of
containers are there for the concepts inserted by the hearing? And how is it that,
with many and various kinds pressing one upon another, there doesn’t occur a
confusion and error in the respective places of things laid up there? One may well
wonder equally regarding the activity of the eyes, for by them also in a similar
manner the intellect apprehends things external to the body and draws to itself
images of things that appear, marking in itself the impression of things which
are seen. [10.4] And just as if there were some large city receiving those coming in
by different entrances, all will not congregate at the same spot in some place in the
city, but some will go to the market, some to the houses, others to the churches, or
the streets, or lanes, or the theatres, each according to his own inclination, I see
some such city of our intellect also established in us, which the different entrances
through the senses fill up, while the intellect, distinguishing and examining each of
the things that enters, stores them in their proper departments of knowledge.
[10.5] And, as in the example of the city, it may often happen that those of the
same race and kin do not enter by the same gate, coming in by different entrances,
as it may happen, but nonetheless, having come within the boundary of the wall,
are brought together again, being akin with each other; and one may find the
reverse happening, for those who are strangers and unknown to each other often
use the same entrance to the city, but their sharing an entry does not bind them
together, for even when within they can be separated to join their kin. Something of
the same kind I see in the open spaces of the intellect, for often the knowledge we
gather from the different organs of sense is one, as the same object is divided in
many ways in relation to the senses, and again, on the contrary, one may learn from
one of the senses many and varied things not relating to each other by nature.⁴³

⁴³ Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns, 61.8–19).

 186   

[10.6] Οἷον κρεῖττον γὰρ ἐν ὑποδείγματι διασαφηνίσαι τὸν λόγον· προκείσθω

ζητεῖσθαί τι περὶ χυμῶν ἰδιότητος, τί μὲν ἡδὺ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν, [B] τί δὲ
φευκτὸν τοῖς γευομένοις ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν εὑρέθη διὰ τῆς πείρας ἥτε τῆς χολῆς
πικρότης καὶ τὸ προσηνὲς τῆς κατὰ τὸ μέλι ποιότητος· φανερῶν δὲ ὄντων τούτων,
45 μίαν εἰσάγει γνῶσιν· τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα πολυμερῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰσοικιζόμενον (ἡ
γεῦσις, ἡ ὄσφρησις, ἡ ἀκοὴ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀφὴ καὶ ἡ ὄψις)· καὶ γὰρ ἰδών τις
τὸ μέλι, καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀκούσας, καὶ τῇ γεύσει λαβὼν, καὶ τὸν ἀτμὸν διὰ τῆς
ὀσφρήσεως ἐπιγνοὺς, καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ δοκιμάσας, τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δι᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν
αἰσθητηρίων ἐγνώρισε. [10.7] Ποικίλα δὲ πάλιν καὶ πολυειδῆ διὰ μιᾶς τινος
50 αἰσθήσεως διδασκόμεθα· τῆς τε ἀκοῆς παντοίας δεχομένης φωνὰς, τῆς τε διὰ τῶν
ὀφθαλμῶν ἀντιλήψεως ἀδιάκριτον ἐχούσης τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν [C]
ἑτερογενῶν θεωρίας· ὁμοίως γὰρ λευκῷ τε προσπίπτει καὶ μέλανι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διεστῶσι τῷ χρώματι· οὕτως ἡ γεῦσις, οὕτως ἡ ὄσφρησις, οὕτως ἡ
διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς κατανόησις, παντοδαπῶν πραγμάτων ἑκάστη διὰ τῆς οἰκείας
55 ἀντιλήψεως τὴν γνῶσιν ἐντίθησιν.

Ὅτι ἀθεώρητος ἡ τοῦ νοῦ φύσις.

[11.1] Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ὁ νοῦς, ὁ ταῖς αἰσθητικαῖς δυνάμεσιν
ἑαυτὸν ἐπιμερίζων, καὶ δι᾽ ἑκάστης καταλλήλως τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν
ἀναλαμβάνων; ὅτι γὰρ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐστὶν, [D] οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί τινα
5 τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀμφιβάλλειν· εἰ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἦν τῇ αἰσθήσει, πρὸς ἓν πάντως εἶχε τῶν
κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἐνεργουμένων τὴν οἰκειότητα, διὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν μὲν αὐτὸν εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ
ποικίλον ἐν τῷ ἀπλῷ θεωρεῖσθαι· νυνὶ δὲ πάντων συντιθεμένων, ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν
ἁφὴν εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ἀκοινωνήτως τε καὶ
ἀμίκτως πρὸς ἄλληλα διακειμένων, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ ἶσον ἑκάστῃ καταλλήλως
10 πάρεστιν, ἕτερόν τινα χρὴ πάντως αὐτὸν παρὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι φύσιν,
ὡς ἂν μή τις ποικιλία τῷ νοητῷ συμμιχθείη.

41 διασαφῆσαι A ß I K N O Q T : σαφηνίσαι L 42 ζητῆσαι K τι ζητεῖσθαί N 43 γευομένοις]

γενομέμοις G L Pac : γεγευμένοις E Rpc : γεγευσμένοις D Rac : λεγευομένοις Q οὐκοῦν] nonne ergo
Eri εὑρεθῆ V W X : ηὑρέθη N τῆς¹ om. N T ἥτε] ἣ N : ἤτε Æ 44 τὸ om. P φανερῶν] διαφόρων Ald
Mign 45–6 ἡ γεῦσις] ἡ πεῦσις B : ἢ γεύσει Mign 46 ἡ ὄσφρησις] ita D E F G H L N P R S T V W X
Forb Ald : ἡ ὄψις A B C I K M O Q Dion Eri : ἢ ὀσφρήσει Mign 46 ἡ ἀκοὴ] ἢ ἀκοῇ Mign πολλάκις δὲ
καὶ ἡ ἀφὴ καὶ ἡ ὄψις] odoratum, etiam frequenter et tactum Dion ἡ ἀφὴ] ἀφὴ L N : τῇ ἀφῇ Mign ἡ
ὄψις] ita D F G H L P S T V X Forb Ald : ἡ ὅρασις E N R : ἡ ὄσφρησις A B C I K M O Q : olfactus Eri : τῇ
ὄψει Mign ἰδών] καὶ ἰδών A ß C K N O Q 48 τῇ¹ om. N 49 αἰσθητηρίων] αἰσθήσεων G H πάλιν
om. N T πολυειδῆ] πολυσχιδῆ N 50 διδασκώμεθα Oac δεχομένης] εἰσδεχομένης E διὰ] διὰ τῆς
I 52 τε γὰρ λευκῷ H τε om. N 53 οὕτως ἡ γεῦσις, οὕτως ἡ ὄσφρησις] sic odoratus, sic gustus Dion
οὕτως ἡ ὄσφρησις om. I 53–4 οὕτως ἡ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς κατανόησις om. Eri
1 νοῦ] ἀνθρώπου Ald Mign : definitio mentis humanae Λ 2 ὁ² om. ß L ὁ ταῖς] ita codd. Forb : ὅταν
V W Ald : ὁ ἐν Mign 5 ἐμφρόνων] εὐφρονούντων F ἓν] ἓν ἂν A B C I K M N O Q R T 6 ἁπλοῦς
A B C O T μὲν αὐτὸν] μὲν αὐτὸς A B C K O T : αὐτὸν μὲν H αὐτὸν om. Q 7 νῦν N πάντων]
πάντως C O 7–8 εἶναι τὴν ἁφὴν R 8 δὲ] δὲ τι N 8–9 ἀκοινωνήτως τε καὶ ἀμίκτως] absque
communione Eri 9 ἴσον Ald Mign 10 τινα] τι Æ I N T πάντως αὐτὸν χρὴ Ald
Mign παρὰ—φύσιν] praeter sensum substituere naturam Eri αἰσθητὴν I Rac V Ald Mign
ac
ὑποθεσθαι P : ὑποθέσθαι N T 11 ποικίλα N τῶν νοητῶν H : τῷ νῷ R : τῶν ὄντων Æ
       – 187

[10.6] For instance—for it is better to make our argument clear by illustration—

let us suppose an enquiry is made into the property of tastes, regarding what is
sweet to the sense and what is to be avoided by those tasting. By experience, then,
both the bitterness of gall and the pleasantness of the quality of honey are
discovered. These things being known, yet the knowledge brought about is one,
the same thing being introduced to our mind in many ways (taste, smell, hearing,
and frequently touch and sight). For when one sees honey, and hears its name, and
receives it by taste, and recognizes its odour by smell, and tests it by touch, he
recognizes the same thing by means of each of the senses. [10.7] On the other
hand, we are instructed about varied and multiform points by each single sense,
with hearing receiving all sorts of sounds, and apprehension through the eyes
exercising its activity by the vision of things of different kinds—for it falls alike on
white and black, and all things that are distinguished by contrariety of colour—so
with taste, so with smell, so with comprehension by touch: each implants in us by
means of its own perception the knowledge of things of every kind.
That the nature of the intellect is invisible.⁴⁴
[11.1] What then, in its own nature, is this intellect that distributes itself into the
sense-perceptive powers, and accordingly receives, through each, the knowledge
of beings? That it is something else besides the senses I suppose no reasonable
person doubts, for if it were identical with sense-perception, it would certainly
reduce the proper character of the activities carried out by sense-perception to
one, on the one hand because it itself is simple, and on the other because no
diversity is contemplated in what is simple. Now, however, as all agree that touch
is one thing and smell another, and as the rest of the senses are similarly so
disposed to each other as to exclude communion or mixture, it must surely be
supposed, since the intellect is appropriately present in each equally, that it is
something other than sense-perceptive nature, so that no diversity may be
attached to the intelligible.

⁴⁴ Bodl. 238: ‘The definition of the human mind’.

 188   

[11.2] Τίς ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου; φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος· ἐγὼ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτό φημι, τίς τὸν
ἴδιον νοῦν κατενόησεν; εἰπάτωσαν οἱ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐντὸς ποιούμενοι τῆς
ἑαυτῶν [156] καταλήψεως, εἰ ἑαυτοὺς κατενόησαν; εἰ τοῦ ἰδίου νοῦ τὴν φύσιν
15 ἐπέγνωσαν; πολυμερής τίς ἐστι καὶ πολυσύνθετος; καὶ πῶς τὸ νοητὸν ἐν συνθέσει;
ἢ τίς ὁ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν ἀνακράσεως τρόπος; ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀσύνθετος; καὶ πῶς
εἰς τὴν πολυμέρειαν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν διασπείρεται; πῶς ἐν μονότητι τὸ ποικίλον; πῶς
ἐν ποικιλίᾳ τὸ ἕν;
[11.3] Ἀλλ᾽ ἔγνων τῶν ἠπορημένων τὴν λύσιν, ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀναδραμὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν
20 φωνήν· Ποιήσωμεν γὰρ, φησὶν, ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν.
Ἡ γὰρ εἰκὼν ἕως ἂν ἐν μηδενὶ λείπηται τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον νοουμένων, κυρίως
ἐστὶν εἰκών· καθ᾽ ὃ δ᾽ ἂν διαπέσῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον ὁμοιότητος, κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο
τὸ μέρος εἰκὼν οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἓν τῶν περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν θεωρουμένων
[B] ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκατάληπτον τῆς οὐσίας· ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τούτῳ τὴν εἰκόνα πρὸς τὸ
25 ἀρχέτυπον ἔχειν τὴν μίμησιν. [11.4] Εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῆς εἰκόνος φύσις κατελαμβάνετο,
τὸ δὲ πρωτότυπον ὑπὲρ κατάληψιν ἦν· ἡ ἐναντιότης τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων τὸ
διημαρτημένον τῆς εἰκόνος διήλεγχεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ διαφεύγει τὴν γνῶσιν ἡ κατὰ τὸν
νοῦν τὸν ἡμέτερον φύσις, ὅς ἐστι κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, ἀκριβῆ πρὸς τὸ
ὑπερκείμενον ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα, τῷ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀγνώστῳ χαρακτηρίζων τὴν
30 ἀκατάληπτον φύσιν.

Ἐξέτασις ἐν τίνι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν νομιστέον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δακρύων καὶ γέλωτος

φυσιολογία, καὶ θεώρημά τι φυσικὸν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν
νοῦν κοινωνίας.
[12.1] Σιγάτω τοίνυν πᾶσα στοχαστικὴ ματαιολογία τῶν μορίοις τισὶ σωματικοῖς
5 τὴν νοητὴν ἐναποκλειόντων ἐνέργειαν· ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι
τίθενται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ τὸν νοῦν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαί φασιν, ἐπιπολαίοις τισὶ
πιθανότησι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπινοίας κρατοῦντες. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ καρδίᾳ προστιθεὶς
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, τὴν κατὰ τόπον αὐτῆς θέσιν ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον, διὰ τὸ
δοκεῖν πως τὴν μέσην τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ἐπέχειν χώραν αὐτὴν, ὡς τῆς [D]
10 προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως εὐκόλως ἐκ τοῦ μέσου πρὸς ἅπαν μεριζομένης τὸ σῶμα,

12 τίς] τίς γὰρ E φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος] ὡς ὁ παῦλος φησιν E 15 ἔγνωσαν N συνθέσει] συναισθήσει
H 16 ὁ τῆς om. T 19–20 τὴν φωνήν τοῦ θεοῦ E 19 θεοῦ] θεοῦ εἰ V 20 γὰρ om. B L Q φησὶν om.
ABCKLOQ ἄνθρωπον φησὶν I T ἄνθρωπον om. D καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν] ἡμετέραν καὶ
καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν B I N R : ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν E : nostram et similitudinem Eri 21 ἐν om. C G I K N O
R 22 ὁμοιότητος] ὁμοιώσεως Ε Ν R 23 οὐκ ἔστιν εἰκὼν B οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri ἐπειδὴ Xmg ἓν] in
Eri 24 τούτῳ] ita A B C G H I K M P Q Rac S V X Forb : τοῦτο D Fac L : τούτου Æ E F² R² T : τούτο W : ἐν
τούτῳ Ald Mign 25 μίμησιν] ὁμοιότητα I 26–7 τὸ διημαρτημένον] quod oportet peccatum Eri 27
ἐπεὶ A C I M N O Q R V W τὸν om. N
Cap. 12 in Munich, BSB, Cod. graec. 562, 113v–117r (sigla J)
1–3 ἐξέτασις—κοινωνίας] quod principale hominis non solum [totum Forb] in cerebro sed in toto
habitat corpore Λ 1 τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν] corporis principale animi Eri ἐν ᾧ om. N γέλωτος] περὶ
γέλωτος Ald Mign 2–3 καὶ θεώρημα—κοινωνίας om. A B C I K N O Q T Dion Eri 5 νοητικὴν R² :
διανοητικὴν J ἀποκλειόντων J 6–7 ἐπιπολαίοις—ἐπινοίας] in quibusdam ciuitatibus suasione tales
opiniones Eri 7 ἐπινοίας] ὑπονοίας A B C I K N O Q Rac T κρατύνοντες A B C D I Jpc2 K L M O Q R
S T προτιθεὶς E L : προσθεὶς N 8 τὴν κατὰ τόπον αὐτῆς θέσιν] τὴν καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν αὐτῆς I θέσιν αὐτῆς
A B C K N O Q T 9 ἐπέχειν] περιέχειν J 10 κινήσεως] δυνάμεως L τὸ om. Mign
       – 189

[11.2] Who has known the intellect of the Lord? asks the apostle;⁴⁵ and I ask
further, who has understood his own intellect? Let them tell us, those who make
the nature of God to be within their comprehension, whether they understand
themselves! Whether they know the nature of their own intellect? Is it something
manifold and much compounded? But how can the intelligible be composite? Or
what is the mode of mixture of things that differ in kind? Or is it simple and
incomposite? But how then is it dispersed into the manifold divisions of the
senses? How is there diversity in singularity? How is the one in diversity?
[11.3] But I find the solution of these difficulties in returning to the very utterance
of God: for he says, Let us make the human being in accordance with our image
and in accordance with our likeness.⁴⁶ The image is properly an image so long as it
lacks nothing of what is conceived in the archetype; but where it falls from its
likeness to the prototype, in that respect it is not an image. Therefore, since one of
the things contemplated regarding the divine nature is incomprehensibility of
essence, it is wholly necessary that in this point also the image should have the
imitation of the archetype. [11.4] For if the nature of the image were compre-
hended, while the prototype is above comprehension, the contrariety of the things
contemplated would prove the defect of the image. But since the nature of our
intellect, which is in accordance with the image of the Creator, evades knowledge, it
has an accurate likeness to the transcendent one, figuring by its own unknowability
the incomprehensible nature.⁴⁷
An examination concerning in which part the ruling principle should be considered
to be; in which also is a physiological consideration of tears and laughter, and a
physical theory regarding the association of matter, nature, and the intellect.⁴⁸
[12.1] Be silent, then, all the conjectural idle talk of those who confine the
intellectual activity to certain bodily parts, some of whom place the governing
principle in the heart, while others say that the intellect resides in the brain,
strengthening such opinions by some plausible superficialities! For the one who
attributes the governing authority to the heart makes its spatial position evidence
of his argument, because it seems somehow to occupy the middle position of the
whole body, since the deliberative movement is easily distributed from the middle
to the whole body, and thus proceeds to activity; and he makes the troublesome

⁴⁵ Rom. 11:34. ⁴⁶ Gen. 1:26. ⁴⁷ Cf. Philo, Opif. 69–70.

⁴⁸ Several of the Greek mss, together with the Latin versions of Dionysius Exiguus and Eriugena,
have only 12.1–8 as Chapter 12, and here only have the first part of the heading: ‘An examination of
which part we should consider the ruling principle to be; in which also is an inquiry concerning tears
and laughter’; Bodl. 238: ‘That the principle of the human being does not reside in the brain but in the
whole body’.
 190   

καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἐνέργειαν προϊούσης· καὶ μαρτύριον ποιεῖται τοῦ λόγου τὴν λυπηράν τε
καὶ θυμώδη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διάθεσιν, ὅτι δοκεῖ πως τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη συγκινεῖν τὸ
μέρος τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν συμπάθειαν. Οἱ δὲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀφιεροῦντες τῷ λογισμῷ,
ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολίν τινα τοῦ παντὸς σώματος τὴν κεφαλὴν δεδομῆσθαι παρὰ τῆς
15 φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἐνοικεῖν δὲ ταύτῃ καθάπερ τινὰ βασιλέα τὸν νοῦν, οἷόν τισιν
ἀγγελοφόροις ἢ ὑπασπισταῖς, τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον·
σημεῖον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τῆς τοιαύτης ὑπονοίας ποιοῦνται, τὸ παράγεσθαι τοῦ
καθεστηκότος τὸν λογισμὸν τῶν κεκακωμένων τὰς μήνιγγας, καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ
πρέποντος [157] γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐν μέθῃ καρηβαρήσαντας.
20 [12.2] Προστιθέασι δὲ καί τινας φυσικωτέρας αἰτίας τῆς τοιαύτης περὶ τὸ
ἡγεμονικὸν ὑπονοίας ἑκάτερος τῶν ταύταις ταῖς δόξαις παρισταμένων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς τὸ πυρῶδες συγγενῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἐκ τῆς διανοίας κίνησιν λέγει, διὰ τὸ ἀεικίνητον
εἶναι καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν· καὶ ἐπειδὴ πηγάζειν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τῆς καρδίας ἡ
θερμότης ὁμολογεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο τῷ εὐκινήτῳ τῆς θερμότητος τὴν τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν
25 ἀνακεκρᾶσθαι λέγων, δοχεῖον τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως τὴν καρδίαν εἶναί φησιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ
θερμὸν περιείληπται. Ὁ δὲ ἕτερος πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις οἷον ὑποβάθραν τινὰ καὶ
ῥίζαν εἶναι λέγει τὴν μήνιγγα (οὕτω γὰρ ὀνομάζουσι τὸν περιεκτικὸν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου
ὑμένα) καὶ τούτῳ πιστοῦται τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· ὡς οὐχ ἑτέρωθι τῆς [B] νοητικῆς
ἐνεργείας καθιδρυμένης, εἰ μὴ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος, ᾧ καὶ τὸ οὖς ἐφηρμοσμένον τὰς
30 ἐμπιπτούσας αὐτῷ φωνὰς προσαράσσει· καὶ ἡ ὄψις κατὰ τὸν πυθμένα τῆς τῶν
ὀφθαλμῶν ἕδρας συμπεφυκυῖα, διὰ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ταῖς κόραις εἰδώλων πρὸς τὸ
ἔσω ποιεῖται τὴν τύπωσιν· καὶ τῶν ἀτμῶν αἱ ποιότητες διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀσφρήσεων
ὁλκῆς ἐν αὐτῷ διακρίνονται· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν αἴσθησις τῇ ἐπικρίσει τῆς
μήνιγγος δοκιμάζεται, ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς ἐκφύσεις τινὰς νευρώδεις ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς
35 αἰσθητικὰς διὰ τῶν αὐχενίων σπονδύλων ἐπὶ τὸν ἰσθμοειδῆ πόρον κατὰ τοὺς
αὐτόθι μύας ἐγκαταμιξάσης.

11 ποιοῦνται N τοῦ λόγου ποιεῖται A B C I K O Q R 12–13 τοιαῦτα πάθη—Οἱ δὲ] τοιαῦτα ἀπάθειαν·
οἱ δὲ K 13 συμπάθειαν] πάθειαν C ἀφαιροῦντες V W 14 δεδωρῆσθαι A B C I K O Q 16
ἀγγελοφόροις] ita F G H J P V W X Forb : ἀγγελιαφόροις A² R S Ald Mign : ἀγγελαφόροις Aac :
ἀγγελιφόροις M : ἀγγελιοφόροις Æ L : ἀγγεληφόροις B C I K N O Q 17 οὗτοι] αὐτοὶ A B C I K O
Q τοιαύτης] αὐτῆς E ὑπονοίας] ἐπινοίας J τὸ] τοῦ G H J P V W X παραγενέσθαι ß 18
καθεστῶτος Ald Mign κεκαμένων Dac : κεκαυμένων N 20 προστίθησι Æ J N R T W αἰτίας
φυσικωτέρας N 21 ἑκάτερος] ἕκαστος N προϊσταμένων D R S : περιϊσταμένων M : προσισταμένων
J 22 ἔχειν συγγενῶς I ἀεικίνητον] εὐκίνητον J : incommunicabilis Eri 23 καὶ¹ om. J 24 ἡ θερμότης
om. N Dion Eri ὡμολόγηται E L M 25 ἀνακρᾶσθαι W 26 δ᾽ I J P X 28 τούτῳ] τοῦτο ß I J
Q πιστοῦται] ita C² G H I J K N O P V W X Forb : πιστοῦνται Ald Mign 29 ᾧ] ἐν ᾧ Æ : ὡς
VW 31 διὰ] διαπέμπει A B C I K M N O Q T ἐκπιπτόντων M 32 ἔσω] εἴσω A B C I K N O Q :
aequaliter Eri ποιεῖται om. A B C I K M N O Q T 33 ἐν αὐτῷ] ἐν ἑαυτῷ D Rac : om. J τὴν om.
L αἴσθησις om. N 34 δοκιμάζεται ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς om. E ἀφ’] ἐφ᾽ N T 35 σπονδύλων] ita ß D G
H I L M P R S T V W X Ald Forb Mign : σφονδύλων A C N O Q : σφενδύλων K : σπονδήλων
J ἰσθμοειδῆ] A B C D K L M N R T Forb : ἰσθοειδῆ ß : ἠσθμοειδῆ Sac : ἠσθμοειδὴ V W : ἰθμοϊειδῆ G :
ἰθμοειδῆ Pac Q X : ἠθμοειδῆ Ald Mign κατὰ] καὶ N O Q T Eri 36 αὐτόθεν Q : inde Eri μυίας
H R² ἐγκαταμίξασα A B C I K M N O Q T
        191

and fierce disposition of a human being a testimony for his argument, because
such affections seem somehow to move this part towards the same affection.
Those, on the other hand, who consecrate the brain to the deliberating faculty, say
that the head has been constructed by nature as a kind of citadel of the whole
body, and that in it the intellect dwells like a king, with a bodyguard of sense
organs surrounding it like messengers and shield-bearers.⁴⁹ And they produce as a
sign of such a supposition the fact that the deliberating faculty of those who have
suffered injury to the cerebral membranes is abnormally distorted and that those
intoxicated with strong drink become ignorant of what is seemly.
[12.2] Each of those who propound these views also puts forward some more
physical reasons regarding the governing principle on behalf of such positions.
One says that the movement which proceeds from the mind is akin to the fiery
nature, because both the fire and the mind are perpetually moving; and since
heat is acknowledged to arise in the region of the heart, claiming on this basis
that the movement of intellect is compounded with the mobility of heat, he
asserts that the heart, in which heat is enclosed, is the receptacle of the intellectual
nature.⁵⁰ The other declares that the cerebral membranes (for so they call the
tissue that surrounds the brain) is as it were a foundation or root of all the senses,⁵¹
and by this makes his own argument trustworthy, on the grounds that the
intellectual activity cannot be seated anywhere else apart from that part where
the ear, connected with it, registers the sounds that fall upon it; and the sight,
naturally belonging to the hollow of the seat of the eyes, produces the internal
impressions from the images that fall upon the pupils; and in it, by the drawing in
of smells, are discerned the qualities of scents; and the sense of taste is tried by the
test of the cerebral membranes, mixing certain neural sensations from itself—
from the similar outgrowth, through the vertebrae of the neck, to the ethmoidal
passage—with the muscles there.

⁴⁹ The image of the citadel occurs in Plato, Philo, Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Calcidius;
the image of bodyguards or spear-bearers in Philo, Alcinous, Galen, and Nemesius. Cf. Plato, Tim.
45ab, 70ab; Resp. 8.560b8; Philo, Opif. 139; Spec. 3.111, 4.93, 4.123; Alcinous, Epi. 17.4; Galen, Hipp. et
Plat. 2.4.17 (De Lacy 120.1–7); De usu part. 8.2. (Helmreich, 1, 445.14–17; ET 1, 387); De foet. form.
3.26 (Nickel, 76.5); Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns, 97.20–3); Nemesius De nat. hom. 6.177
(Morani, 57.8); Calcidius, Pl. Tim. 2.213, 2.220, 2.224, 2.231.
⁵⁰ Cf. Galen, De usu part. 6.7 (Helmreich, 1, 318.15–19; ET 1, 292); Calcidius, Pl. Tim. 2.224;
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns, 39.21–40.3; 98.24–99.6).
⁵¹ Cf. Galen, De usu part. 8.4 (Helmreich, 1, 453.10–16, ET 1, 393); Hipp. et Plat. 6.3.4 (De Lacy,
372.27–32).
 192   

[12.3] Ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιταράσσεσθαι πολλάκις πρὸς τὰς τῶν παθημάτων

ἐπικρατήσεις τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι [C] τῆς κατὰ φύσιν
ἐνεργείας τὸν λογισμὸν ἔκ τινος σωματικῆς περιστάσεως, ἀληθὲς εἶναι φημί· καὶ
40 πηγήν τινα τοῦ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πυρώδους τὴν καρδίαν εἶναι, πρὸς τὰς θυμώδεις ὁρμὰς
συγκινουμένην· καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις, τὸ ὑποβεβλῆσθαι τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις τὴν
μήνιγγα, κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα φυσιολογούντων, περιπτυσσομένην ἐν
ἑαυτῇ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον καὶ τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἀτμοῖς ὑπαλειφομένην, τῶν ταῖς ἀνατομικαῖς
θεωρίαις ἐσχολακότων τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀκούων, οὐκ ἀθετῶ τὸ λεγόμενον· [D] οὐ μὴν
45 ἀπόδειξιν ποιοῦμαι ταύτην τοῦ τοπικαῖς τισι περιγραφαῖς ἐμπεριειλῆφθαι τὴν
ἀσώματον φύσιν.
[12.4] Τάς τε γὰρ παραφορὰς οὐκ ἐκ μόνης καρηβαρίας γίνεσθαι μεμαθήκαμεν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν τὰς πλευρὰς ὑπεζωκότων ὑμένων ἐμπαθῶς διατεθέντων ὁμοίως
ἀρρωστεῖν τὸ διανοητικὸν διορίζονται οἱ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμονες, φρενίτιν τὸ
50 πάθος καλοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ φρένες τοῖς ὑμέσι τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ ὄνομα. Καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς
λύπης ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν γινομένη συναίσθησις ἐσφαλμένως ὑπονοεῖται· οὐ γὰρ τῆς
καρδίας ἀλλὰ τοῦ στόματος τῆς κοιλίας δριμυσσομένου, εἰς τὴν καρδίαν τὸ πάθος ὑπ᾽
ἀπειρίας ἀνάγουσι. Τοιοῦτον δέ τι φασὶν οἱ ἐπεσκεμμένοι δι᾽ ἀκριβείας τὰ πάθη, ὅτι
συμπτώσεως τῶν πόρων καὶ μύσεως ἐν ταῖς λυπηραῖς διαθέσεσι φυσικῶς περὶ ἅπαν
55 γινομένης [160] τὸ σῶμα, πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βάθει κοιλότητας συνωθεῖται πᾶν τὸ πρὸς
τὴν διαπνοὴν κωλυόμενον· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν ἀναπνευστικῶν σπλάγχνων
στενοχωρουμένων τῷ περιέχοντι, βιαιοτέρα πολλάκις ἡ ὁλκὴ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑπὸ
τῆς φύσεως γίνεται, πρὸς τὴν τῶν συμπεπτωκότων διαστολὴν τὸ στενωθὲν
εὐρυνούσης· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄσθμα σύμπτωμα λύπης ποιούμεθα, στεναγμὸν αὐτὸ
60 καὶ ἀναποτνιασμὸν ὀνομάζοντες. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ὑποθλίβειν τὸ περικάρδιον
μέρος, οὐ τῆς καρδίας, ἀλλὰ τοῦ στόματός ἐστι τῆς γαστρὸς ἀηδία, διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς
αἰτίας, λέγω δὴ, τῆς κατὰ τὴν σύμπτωσιν τῶν πόρων, τοῦ χοληδόχου ἀγγείου τὸν
δριμὺν ἐκεῖνον καὶ δακνώδη χυμὸν ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα τῆς γαστρὸς
παρεγχέοντος· ἀπόδειξις δὲ τούτου τὸ ὕπωχρον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἰκτερώδη τοῖς [B]
65 λυπουμένοις τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, ἀπὸ τῆς ἄγαν συνοχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς φλέβας τὸν ἴδιον χυμὸν
τῆς χολῆς ἐπισπειρούσης.

37 ἐπιταράττεσθαι R 38 τῆς κατὰ φύσιν] τὰς φύσεως N φύσιν] τὴν φύσιν Ε 39 σωματικῆς om.
N ἀληθῶς N 40 τὴν καρδίαν εἶναι post ὁρμὰς pon. N θυμοειδεῖς F T 41 κινουμένην T 42
φυσιολογούντων] φιλοσοφούντων H J : naturali disputatione pertractant Dion : philosophantium de
natura Eri ἐν om. Q 44 τὸ τοιοῦτον om. N τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀκούων om. Rac 45 ἀπόδειξιν] ἀπόδειξιν
εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον R ταύτην] talem Eri 45–6 τοῦ τοπικαῖς—φύσιν] localibus puniri circumscriptio-
nibus incomprehensibilem incorporealemque naturam Eri 47 ἐκ μόνης καρηβαρίας] ex capitis Dion :
ex solo corde Eri καρηβαρίας] ita A B C D G H M N P O Q R S V W Forb : καρηβαρείας X Ald
Mign μεμαθήκαμεν γίνεσθαι A B C I K O Q 48 ἀλλὰ] καὶ γὰρ N διατιθέντων L : διατιθεμένων
H 49 φρενίτιν] ita ß H K L M N O Q R S V W Ald Forb : φρενῖτιν X Mign 51 γιγνομένη C I K N
συναίσθησις] om. Dion : combustionem Eri 52 στόματος] αἴματος V W πάθος] βάθος C K O ὑπὸ
Æ I K O 53 ἄγουσι M τοιοῦτο Æ N δι᾽] μετὰ N 54 μυώσεως N : μυστικῶς L φυσικῶς om.
N 55 γιγνωμένης N τὸ²] τὸ διὰ V 56 τὴν om. G H P R W X κολυώμενον W 57 ὑπὸ om. T 59
εὐρυνούσης] ita Æ ß G H I L M O P R S T V W X Forb : εὑρυνούσης Ald Mign τοιοῦτο N ἄσθμα] ita
Æ G H I K L M N O P R S V W X Forb : ἆσθμα Mign αὐτὸ om. T 60 ἀναποτιναγμὸν V 61 ἀηδία]
ἡ ἀηδία D Rac S 62 δὴ] δὲ N T τοῦ πόρου I N χολοδόχου L 64 παρεκχέοντος Q : παραχέοντος
N ἰκτεριώδη A C N O R² 66 ἐπισπειρούσης] ἐνσπειρούσης A B C I K O Q
        193

[12.3] I admit it to be true that the discursive faculty of the soul is often disturbed
with respect to being seized by the passions, and that the calculating faculty is
blunted in its natural activity by some bodily accident; and that the heart is a sort
of source of the fiery element in the body, and is moved with the fierce impulses;
and, in addition to this, hearing the same account from those who devote their
time to anatomical research, I do not reject the statement that the cerebral
membranes form a foundation for the senses, according to the argument of
those who investigate natural phenomena, enfolding in itself the brain and
being steeped in the vapours arising from it. Yet I do not hold this to be a proof
that the incorporeal nature is itself bounded by any spatial limitations.⁵²
[12.4] We know that mental aberrations do not occur from heaviness of head
alone, but those skilled in the healing art declare that the discursive faculty is also
similarly weakened when the membranes undergirding the sides are affected by
disease, calling the disease ‘frenzy’, since the name given to those parts is ‘wits’.⁵³
And the sensation resulting from sorrow is mistakenly supposed to arise in the
heart; for while it is not the heart, but the entrance of the belly that is pained,
people ignorantly refer the affection to the heart. Those who have accurately
studied the affections give some such account as this: by a compression and
closing of the pores, which naturally happens around the whole body in a state
of grief, everything hindered in its passage is driven to the cavities in the depth of
the body, and therefore, with the respiratory organs also constricted by what
surrounds them, the drawing of breath often becomes more violent under the
influence of nature trying to widen what has been contracted so as to dilate the
compressed passages; such breath we hold to be a symptom of grief, and call it a
groan or a shriek. And that, as well, which appears to oppress the region of the
heart is a nausea not of the heart but of the entrance to the stomach, arising from
the same cause (I mean, that of the compression of the pores), as the vessel
containing bile by contraction pours that bitter and pungent juice upon the
entrance of the stomach; a proof of this is that the complexion of those grieving
becomes sallow and jaundiced, as the bile pours its own juice into the veins
because of the excessive pressure.

⁵² Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 2.53; 4.10 (Spira, 30.1–2; 49.16–19).
⁵³ A word play in Greek, in which ‘wits’ is frenes.
 194   

[12.5] Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου γινόμενον πάθος, τὸ κατὰ τὴν εὐφροσύνην φημὶ καὶ
τὸν γέλωτα, μᾶλλον τὸν λόγον συνίστησι. Διαχέονται γάρ πως καὶ λύονται δι᾽ ἡδονῆς
οἱ τοῦ σώματος πόροι τῶν ἔκ τινος ἀκοῆς ἡδείας διαχεθέντων. Ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖ διὰ τῆς
70 λύπης μύουσιν αἱ λεπταί τε καὶ ἄδηλοι τῶν πόρων διαπνοαὶ, καὶ διασφίγξασαι [C]
τὴν ἔνδοθεν τῶν σπλάγχνων διάθεσιν, ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὰς μήνιγγας τὸν νοτερὸν
ἀτμὸν ἀναθλίβουσιν, ὃς πολὺς ἐναποληφθεὶς ταῖς τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου κοιλότησι, διὰ τῶν
κατὰ τὴν βάσιν πόρων ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐξωθεῖται, τῆς τῶν ὀφρύων συμπτώσεως
ἐφελκομένης διὰ σταγόνων τὴν ὑγρασίαν· ἡ δὲ σταγὼν δάκρυον λέγεται· οὕτω μοι
75 νόησον, ἐκ τῆς ἐναντίας διαθέσεως πλέον τοῦ συνήθους εὐρυνομένων τῶν πόρων,
εἰσέλκεσθαί τι πνεῦμα δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βάθος, κἀκεῖθεν πάλιν ἐξωθεῖσθαι παρὰ τῆς
φύσεως διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ στόμα πόρου, πάντων τῶν σπλάγχνων (καὶ μάλιστά γε τοῦ
ἥπατος, ὥς φασι) διά τινος κλόνου καὶ βρασμώδους κινήσεως τὸ τοιοῦτον πνεῦμα
συνεξωθούντων· ὅθεν εὐκολίαν τινὰ τῇ διεξόδῳ τοῦ πνεύματος μηχανωμένη ἡ φύσις,
80 ἀνευρύνει τὸν περὶ τὸ στόμα πόρον, ἑκατέρωθεν περὶ τὸ ἄσθμα τὰς παρειὰς
διαστέλλουσα· ὄνομα δὲ τῷ [D] γινομένῳ γέλως ἐστίν.
[12.6] Οὔτε οὖν διὰ τοῦτο τῷ ἥπατι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν λογιστέον, οὔτε διὰ τὴν
περικάρδιον ζέσιν τοῦ αἵματος ἐν ταῖς θυμικαῖς διαθέσεσιν ἐν καρδίᾳ νομιστέον
εἶναι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν καθίδρυσιν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τὰς ποιὰς τῶν σωμάτων
85 κατασκευὰς ἀνακτέον, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ὁμοτίμως ἑκάστῳ τῶν μορίων κατὰ τὸν
ἄφραστον τῆς ἀνακράσεως λόγον ἐφάπτεσθαι νομιστέον. [12.7] Κἂν τὴν γραφήν
τινες ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῦτο προτείνωνται, τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μαρτυροῦσαν, οὐκ
ἀνεξετάστως τὸν λόγον δεξόμεθα· ὁ γὰρ καρδίας μνησθεὶς, καὶ νεφρῶν
ἐμνημόνευσεν, εἰπών· ἐτάζων καρδίας καὶ νεφροὺς ὁ Θεός· ὥστε ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἢ
90 οὐθετέρῳ τὸ νοερὸν κατακλείουσιν.

[12.8] Ἀμβλύνεσθαι δὲ τὰς νοητικὰς ἐνεργείας ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπρακτεῖν ἐν τῇ

ποιᾷ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος [161] διδαχθεὶς, οὐχ ἱκανὸν ποιοῦμαι τοῦτο τεκμήριον
τοῦ τόπῳ τινὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ νοῦ περιείργεσθαι, ὡς ταῖς ἐπιγινομέναις τοῖς μέρεσι
φλεγμοναῖς τῆς οἰκείας εὐρυχωρίας ἐξειργόμενον· σωματικὴ γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη δόξα, τὸ

67 ἐναντίας Æ R 67–8 καὶ τὸν γέλωτα, μᾶλλον] magis autem risus Eri 68 συνίστημι X λύονται] ita
A B C G H I K M P O Q T V W X Forb : διαλύονται Ald Mign 69 οἱ om. I διαχυθέντων D T (sup.
l.) 69–70 μύουσιν διὰ τῆς λύπης N T 70 τε om. R διαπνοαὶ] ἀναπνοαὶ Q 71 ἔνδον N τὰς
μήνιγγας τὸν νοτερὸν] meniggas (hoc est membranulas cerebri) austeriorem (id est umidiorem)
Eri τὸν νοτερὸν] τὸ νώτερον V νοτερὸν] νοερὸν N : νοτιαῖον R 72–3 διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν βάσιν
πόρων] per naturales poros Eri 74 ἐφελκομένης] ita A B C D G H I K L M O P R S V W X Forb :
ἐξελκομένης Ald Mign ὑγρασίαν] ὑγρὰν οὐσίαν N 75 εὑρυνομένων G N R 76 τι] τὸ N ἐπὶ] εἰς N
πάλιν] πᾶσα A² 77 τὸ om. T καὶ om. R γε] τε N 78 τινος om. I 79 διεξόδου I : ἐξόδῳ H M τοῦ
πνεύματος] τούτο N 80 τὸ¹ om. G H M W X περὶ τὸ ἄσθμα] τῇ περὶ τὸ ἄσωμα εὐκολιᾳ N T
V ἄσθμα] ita Æ H I L N O P S T V W X Forb : ἆσθμα Ald Mign 82 τῷ] ἐν τῷ A B C D I K L M N O
Q R S 83 τοῦ αἵματος om. N 84 ποιὰς om. I 85 ὁμοτίμως] om. Eri ἑκάστῳ τῶν μορίων om.
C K O ἑκάστοῦ A B Q R T 86 ἄφραστον] ἄρατον L 87 ἡμῖν τινες N T πρὸς] εἰς R προτείνονται
Æac J N ἡγεμονικὸν] ἡγεμονικὸν ἐνοικεῖν I 88 τὸν om. W δεξώμεθα L T καρδίαν ß Ald Mign 89
ὁ Θεός om. K 90 οὐθετέρῳ] ita A B C D G I M R Spc V Ald Forb : οὐθ᾽ ἑτέρῳ H K L N O P Q Sac : οὐθ᾽
ἑτέρως J : οὐδετέρῳ Mign 91 ἢ om. X 92 διδαχθεὶς] doces Eri τοῦτο om. A ß I K N O Q T 93 τοῦ
νοῦ om. L περιείργασθαι I ἐπιγιγνομέναις N 94 ἐξειργόμενον] ita Æ ß C I K O Q Forb : ἐξειργομένη
Tac (ου sup. l.) : ἐξειργομένην N : ἐξειργομ . . . Seras : ἐξειργασμένης L : ἐξειργομένης V W X Ald
Mign τὸ] τοῦ T
        195

[12.5] Moreover, the opposite affection, I mean that of gladness and laughter,
contributes further to the argument. For the pores of the body of those who are
dissolved [in levity] by hearing something pleasant are also somehow dissolved
and relaxed through pleasure. Just as in the former case, the slight and imper-
ceptible exhalations of the pores are constrained by grief, and, tightly binding the
internal arrangement of the inner organs, they force up towards the head and
the cerebral membranes the humid vapour which, being retained in excess in the
cavities of the brain, is driven out through the pores at its base towards the eyes,
while the closing of the eyelids expels the moisture as drops, and the drop is called
a tear; so also, I would have you understand that, when the pores, from the
contrary condition, are unusually widened, some air is drawn in through them
into the interior, and thence expelled again by nature through the passage of the
mouth, while all the inner organs (and especially, they say, the liver) together expel
this air by a certain turmoil and agitated movement, from which nature, contriv-
ing to give facility for the exit of the air, widens the passage of the mouth,
extending the cheeks on either side round about the breath, and the result is
called laughter.⁵⁴
[12.6] Therefore, we must neither ascribe the governing principle to the liver nor
think that the seat of the intellect is in the heart, because of the boiling blood
around the heart in those of a wrathful disposition; but we must refer these things
to the character of the formation of our bodies, and must consider that the
intellect equally touches each of the parts according to an inexpressible principle
of mixing.⁵⁵ [12.7] And if regarding this point someone should bring forward the
Scripture, which testifies that the governing principle is in the heart, we will not
receive the statement unexamined; for he who made mention of the heart also
mentioned the kidneys, saying, God tests the heart and the kidneys,⁵⁶ so that they
must confine the intellectual principle either to both together or to neither.
[12.8] Although I know that intellectual activities are blunted, or even made
altogether ineffective in a certain condition of the body, I do not hold this as
sufficient evidence for limiting the faculty of the intellect to any particular place, so
that it would be forced out of its proper space by inflammations arising in nearby

⁵⁴ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Eccl. 2 (Alexander, 310.6–311.2; ET 56); Aristotle, Probl. 35.6 (965a14).
⁵⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 2.46 (Spira, 27.23–28.5); Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101.37–9;
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns, 13.9–17.8).
⁵⁶ Ps. 7:10.
 196   

95 μὴ δύνασθαι προκατειλημμένου τοῦ ἀγγείου διά τινος τῶν ἐμβεβλημένων, ἕτερόν τι

ἐν αὐτῷ χώραν εὑρεῖν· ἡ γὰρ νοητὴ φύσις οὔτε ταῖς κενώσεσιν ἐμφιλοχωρεῖ τῶν
σωμάτων οὔτε τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς σαρκὸς ἐξωθεῖται· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ καθάπερ τι
μουσικὸν ὄργανον ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα δεδημιούργηται, ὥσπερ συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐπὶ
τῶν μελωδεῖν μὲν ἐπισταμένων, ἀδυνατούντων δὲ δεῖξαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς τῶν
100 ὀργάνων ἀχρηστίας οὐ παραδεχομένης τὴν τέχνην (τὸ γὰρ ἢ χρόνῳ διαφθαρὲν ἢ
παρερρηγμένον ἐκ καταπτώσεως ἢ ὑπό τινος ἰοῦ καὶ εὐρῶτος ἠχρειωμένον, [B]
ἄφθογγον μένει καὶ ἀνενέργητον, κἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ προέχειν δοκοῦντος κατὰ τὴν
αὐλητικὴν τέχνην ἐμπνέηται) οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ ὀργάνου διήκων καὶ
καταλλήλως ταῖς νοητικαῖς ἐνεργείαις, καθ᾽ ὃ πέφυκεν, ἑκάστου τῶν μερῶν
105 προσαπτόμενος, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένων τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐνήργησεν, ἐπὶ δὲ
τῶν ἀσθενούντων δέξασθαι τὴν τεχνικὴν αὐτοῦ κίνησιν, ἄπρακτός τε καὶ
ἀνενέργητος ἔμεινε· πέφυκε γάρ πως ὁ νοῦς πρὸς μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν διακείμενον
οἰκείως ἔχειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρενεχθὲν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι.
[12.9] [C] Καί μοι δοκεῖ φυσικώτερον εἶναί τι κατὰ τὸ μέρος τοῦτο θεώρημα, δι᾽ οὗ
110 μαθεῖν ἔστι τι τῶν ἀστειοτέρων δογμάτων· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ κάλλιστον πάντων καὶ
ἐξοχώτατον ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖόν ἐστι, πρὸς ὃ πάντα νένευκεν ὅσα τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν
ἔφεσιν ἔχει, διὰ τοῦτό φαμεν καὶ τὸν νοῦν, ἅτε κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ καλλίστου γενόμενον,
ἕως ἂν μετέχῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ὁμοιότητος καθόσον ἐνδέχεται, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν
τῷ καλῷ διαμένειν· εἰ δέ πως ἔξω γένοιτο τούτου, γυμνοῦσθαι τοῦ κάλλους ἐν ᾧ ἦν·
115 ὥσπερ δὲ ἔφαμεν τῇ ὁμοιώσει τοῦ πρωτοτύπου κάλλους τοῦ κατακοσμεῖσθαι τὸν
νοῦν, οἷόν τι κάτοπτρον τῷ χαρακτῆρι τοῦ ἐμφαινομένου μορφούμενον· κατὰ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὴν οἰκονομουμένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχεσθαι τοῦ νοῦ
λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τῷ παρ᾽ ἐκείνου κάλλει καὶ αὐτὴν κοσμεῖσθαι, οἷόν [D] τι
κατόπτρου κάτοπτρον γινομένην· κρατεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ ταύτης καὶ συνέχεσθαι τὸ
120 ὑλικὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως, περὶ ἣν θεωρεῖται ἡ φύσις.

95 ἐμβεβλημένων] inspiciuntur Eri 96 χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ L νοητικὴ N οὔτε] οὐ A B C O

Q κενώσεσιν] κοιλότησιν A B C D I K L N O Q R S T 98 ὥσπερ] ἅπερ A C I K O : ὅπερ B T 99
μὲν om. J T 100 διαφθαρὲν] ita D G H L P S V X Forb : διεφθορὸς A B C I K N O Q R T : φθαρὲν W Ald
Mign 101 καταπτώσεως] πτώσεως J : καταπαύσεως I 102 κατὰ om. N 103 αὐλητικὴν om. G H
P W X ἐμπνέοντος L : ἐμπεπονεῖται J 104 καθ᾽ ὃ] ita A B C G H I J K L M N O P V W X Forb : καθὸ
Ald Mign καθ᾽ ὃ πέφυκεν post μερῶν pon. A B C I K N O Q T ἑκάστῳ Mign 105–7 ἐπὶ δὲ—
ἔμεινε] in his uero quae infirmantur artificalem sui motum inactuosus et piger manet accipere Eri 106
τεχνικὴν] φυσικὴν N 107 ἀνενέργητον C 108 παραχθὲν I ἀπὸ ταύτης] ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς N ἀπὸ om.
T 109 ante καί inc. cap. 13 cum inscr. θεώρημά τι φυσικὸν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ
τὸν νοῦν κοινωνίας A B C I K N O Q R T : speculatio quaedam de materiae et naturae et animi theoria
Eri : quod sicut a deo mens gubernatur ita a mente materialis uita corporis Λ δοκεῖ] δοκεῖ καὶ A B C I
KMOQT τι] τὸ N τοῦτο] τοῦτο τὸ W 110 τι om. N 111 ἀγαθὸν] τῶν ἀγαθῶν D : πάντων
τῶν ἀγαθῶν N 113–14 ἕως ἂν—διαμένειν] quatenus ad principale exemplum bonum similitudinem
participarit, quantum quidem ipsum in bono licit permanere Eri 113 μετέχει L : μετέχοι M : μετέχεται
C K τῆς—ἐνδέξεται om. C K ὁμοιότητος] ὁμοίωσεως N καθόσον] καθ᾽ ὅσον I L M R : καθόσον μὲν
N 114 γένηται R κάλλους] κάλλους τοῦ O V W X 115 τοῦ² om. O V W X Ald Mign 116 τῷ om.
C 118 παρ᾽ ἐκείνου] παρακειμένῳ V W Ald Mign καὶ αὐτὴν om. N κατακοσμεῖσθαι C G H K O P
X : διακοσμεῖσθαι R 119 κατόπτρου] om. N Rac : κατόπτρῳ T post κρατεῖσθαι V def. ad [ἀσώμα]τὸν;
πῶς (cap. 16, l. 21) δὲ om. L N ὑπὸ ταύτης] ὐπ᾽ αὐτῆς P R
        197

parts (for such an opinion—that when a vessel is already occupied by something

placed in it, nothing else is able to find a place there—is corporeal). For the
intelligible nature does not dwell in the empty spaces of bodies nor is it forced out
by the encroachment of the flesh; but since the whole body has been made like
some musical instrument, as often happens in the case of those who know how to
play but are unable to demonstrate their prowess because the uselessness of the
instrument does not admit their art (for that which is destroyed by time, or broken
by a fall, or made useless by some rust or rot, is mute and inoperable, even if it be
breathed upon by one considered preeminent in flute playing), so also the
intellect, passing throughout the instrument and touching each of the parts in a
manner appropriate to its intellectual activities, according to its nature, produces
its proper effect on those parts disposed according to nature, but upon those parts
too weak to accept the movement of its art it remains ineffective and inactive; for
the intellect is naturally somehow familiar with that which is disposed according
to nature, but to be alien from that which is removed from it.⁵⁷
[12.9]⁵⁸ I also think there is a contemplation of this particular point, closer to
nature, by which one may learn something of the more refined teachings. For
since the most beautiful and supreme good of all is the divinity itself, to which
incline all things that have the desire for the beautiful, we therefore say that the
intellect, as being in accordance with the image of the most beautiful, as long as it
partakes so far as possible in the likeness to the archetype, also remains in
the beautiful; but if it were somehow to be outside this, it will be stripped bare
of the beauty in which it was. And just as we said that the intellect was adorned by
the likeness of the archetypal beauty, being formed, as though it were a mirror,
by the figure of that which appears in it, so we consider that the nature admin-
istered by the intellect possesses something of the intellect in the same proportion
and that it is adorned by the beauty issuing from the intellect, such that it
becomes, as it were, a mirror of a mirror; by it, the material element of existence,
in which nature is contemplated, is ruled and sustained.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 2.53; 4.10 (Spira, 30.1–2; 49.16–19).
⁵⁸ Several of the Greek mss, together with the Latin versions of Dionysius Exiguus and Eriugena,
begin Chapter 13 here, with the heading: ‘A natural theory regarding the association of matter, nature,
and intellect’; Bodl. 238 has: ‘That as the mind is governed by God, so is the material life of the body by
the mind’. Hereafter, those mss which divide the work into 31 chapters increase the numeration of the
chapters by one.
⁵⁹ Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 2.17.
 198   

[12.10] Ἕως ἂν οὖν ἔχηται τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, διὰ πάντων ἀναλόγως ἡ τοῦ ὄντως
κάλλους κοινωνία διέξεισι, διὰ τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου τὸ προσεχὲς καλλωπίζουσα·
ἐπειδὰν δέ τις γένηται τῆς ἀγαθῆς ταύτης συμφυΐας διασπασμὸς, ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὸ
ἔμπαλιν, ἀντακολουθῇ τῷ ὑποβεβηκότι τὸ ὑπερέχον, τότε αὐτῆς τε τῆς ὕλης, ὅταν
125 μονωθῇ τῆς φύσεως, διηλέγχθη τὸ ἄσχημον (ἄμορφον γάρ τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ
ἀκατάσκευον) καὶ τῇ ἀμορφίᾳ ταύτης συνδιεφθάρη τὸ κάλλος τῆς φύσεως, ὃ διὰ τοῦ
νοῦ καλλωπίζεται· καὶ οὕτως ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν νοῦν τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην [164] αἴσχους
διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἡ διάδοσις γίνεται, ὡς μηκέτι τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα ἐν τῷ χαρακτῆρι
καθορᾶσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος· οἷον γάρ τι κάτοπτρον κατὰ νώτου τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν
130 ἰδέαν ὁ νοῦς ποιησάμενος, ἐκβάλλει μὲν τῆς ἐλλάμψεως τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὰς ἐμφάσεις,
τῆς δὲ ὕλης τὴν ἀμορφίαν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναμάσσεται.
[12.11] Καὶ τούτῳ γίνεται τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ γένεσις, διὰ τῆς ὑπεξαιρέσεως
τοῦ καλοῦ παρυφισταμένη· καλὸν δὲ πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν τύχῃ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν
οἰκείως ἔχον· ὅ τι δ᾽ ἂν ἔξω γένηται τῆς πρὸς τοῦτο σχέσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως,
135 ἄμοιρον τοῦ καλοῦ πάντως ἐστίν. Εἰ οὖν ἓν μὲν κατὰ τὸν θεωρηθέντα λόγον τὸ ὄντως
ἀγαθόν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῷ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ καλοῦ γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει τὸ καλὸς
εἶναι· ἡ δὲ φύσις ἡ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ συνεχομένη, καθάπερ τὶς εἰκὼν εἰκόνος ἐστί· [B]—
δείκνυται διὰ τούτων ὅτι τὸ ὑλικὸν ἡμῶν συνέστηκε μὲν καὶ περικρατεῖται ὅταν
οἰκονομῆται ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· λύεται δὲ καὶ διαπίπτει πάλιν, ὅταν χωρισθῇ τοῦ
140 περικρατοῦντος τε καὶ συνέχοντος καὶ διασπασθῇ τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν συμφυΐας.
[12.12] Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἄλλως γίνεται ἢ ὅταν τῆς φύσεως πρὸς τὸ ἔμπαλιν
γένηται ἡ ἐπιστροφὴ, μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας νευούσης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ
χρῆζον τοῦ καλλωπίζοντος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα τῇ πτωχευούσῃ τῆς ἰδίας μορφῆς
ὕλῃ κατὰ τὸ ἄσχημόν τε καὶ ἀκαλλὲς συμμεταμορφοῦσθαι τὸ ὁμοιούμενον.
145 [12.13] Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τινὸς παρεξητάσθη, διὰ τῆς εἰς τὸ
προκείμενον θεωρίας ἐπεισελθόντα· τὸ γὰρ ζητούμενον ἦν, εἰ ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῶν ἐν
ἡμῖν ἡ νοερὰ καθίδρυται [C] δύναμις, ἢ διὰ πάντων κατὰ τὸ ἦσον διήκει· τῶν γὰρ
τοπικοῖς μέρεσι περιειργόντων τὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς σύστασιν τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτῶν

121 οὖν ἂν R οὖν om. H οὖν ἔχηται] συνέχηται T 121–2 ἡ τοῦ ὄντως κάλλους κοινωνία] illius
summi et ueri participatio Dion : ipsa ueri boni societas Eri ὄντος καλοῦ N 123 γίνηται M 124
ἀντακολουθεῖ G H P Rac W X : ἀντακολουθεῖν L : ἀντακολουθήσῃ A B C I K M O Q : ἀντακολουθήσει T :
ἐπακολουθήσει N τῷ ὑποβεβηκότι τὸ ὑπερέχον] supereminenti supereminens Eri τε om. D R 125
διηλέγχθη] ita A C D N O P Q R S T W X Forb : διηλέχθη G H L M : διηλλέχθη B : διηνέχθη Ald Mign
ἄμορφον γάρ] ἀμόρφονταί X τι] τι χρῆμα A C I K M N O Q R T Dion Eri 126 ταύτῃ A C K N R
συνδιεφθάρη] συνεφθάρη Q : συνδιεφθάρει O : συνδιαφθείρεται N ὃ] ita D H L P² R T W Dion Ald Forb
: ᾧ A B C G I K M N O Pac Q S X : in qua Eri : ἣ Mign 128 διάδοσις] μετάδοσις R τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ
L 129 καθορᾶσθαι] καθ᾽ ὁμοιοῦσθαι N τι om. T 130 ἐκλάμψεως W Mign 131 τὴν δὲ τῆς ὕλης A B
C I K N Q R T ἀναμάττεται L 132 ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ I N ὑφεξαιρέσεως ß K : ὑφ᾽ ἐξαιρέσεως G P X :
ὑφαιξερέσεως C O 133 παρυφισταμένη] συνισταμένη L ὅπερ] ὅτι περ A ß C D I K L M N O Q S 134
τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως om. M T W 135 ἄμοιρον] ἄμοιρον πῶς N 136 κάλλους Q γενέσθαι L 137 ἡ²
om. Q εἰκὼν om. C K 139 οἰκονομειται Dac (η sup. l.) : οἰκονομεῖται N Pac W 140
περικρατοῦντος] κρατοῦντος C K O 142 γενήσεται D : γίνηται M ἐπιστροφὴ] ἀποστροφὴ M μὴ]
τῆς T : καὶ μὴ X 143 χρῇζον Mign πτωχευούσῃ] πτωχευούσῃ τῇ I 144 ὁμοιούμενον] ὁμοούσιον
N 145 παρεξετάσθη ß G P R² X 146 ὑπεισελθόντα R2mg : om. G H P Rac W X ἐν om. M W 147
ἴσον O X Mign 148 καὶ om. M N Q T W
        199

[12.10] Thus, so long as one holds to the other, the communication of the true
beauty extends proportionally through the whole series, beautifying by the super-
ior that which comes next; but whenever a certain interruption of this beneficial
connection occurs, or when, on the contrary the superior comes to follow the
inferior, then the unseemliness of matter itself is exposed, when it is isolated from
nature (for in itself matter is something formless and unwrought), and by its
formlessness is also destroyed the beauty of the nature which was beautified by the
intellect; and in this way the transmission of the ugliness of matter reaches back
through the nature to the intellect itself, so that the image of God is no longer
beheld in the figure of that which was moulded; for the intellect, setting the idea of
the Good like a mirror behind its back, deflects the lustrous rays of the good, and
receives into itself the shapelessness of matter.⁶⁰
[12.11] And in this way the genesis of evil occurs, arising through the withdrawal
of the good. Everything is good that is related to the First Good; but that which
comes to be outside its relation and likeness to this, is certainly devoid of the
Good. If, then, according to the argument being considered, that which is truly
good is one, and the intellect, as having come to be in accordance with the image
of the Good, also has the possibility to be good, while the nature, sustained by the
intellect, is like an image of an image, then it is shown that our material part holds
together, and is upheld, when it is administered by nature; but, on the other hand,
it is dissolved and falls apart again when it is separated from that which upholds
and sustains it, and is severed from its connection to the good. [12.12] Such a
condition as this does not arise except when an overturning of nature to the
opposite state occurs, in which desire does not incline towards the good but
towards that which is in need of being beautified; for it is absolutely necessary
that that being made like to matter, which is destitute of its own form, should be
conformed to it in respect of its unseemliness and absence of beauty.
[12.13] But we have discussed these points by following a certain line of argu-
ment, since they were introduced by our contemplation of the point before us; for
the subject of enquiry was whether the intellectual faculty has its seat in any of the
parts within us or extends equally over them all. For those who enclose the

⁶⁰ Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 1.6.5.39–58; 1.8; 3.6.11.

 200   

ὑπολήψεως προφερόντων, τὸ μὴ εὐοδοῦσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν

150 διακειμένων τὰς μήνιγγας· ἀπέδειξεν ὁ λόγος, ὅτι κατὰ πᾶν μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου
συγκρίματος, καθ᾽ ὃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστος ἐνεργεῖν, ἴσως ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις
ἀνενέργητος μένει, μὴ διαμένοντος ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ μέρους· καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐξ
ἀκολουθίας τὸ προτεθὲν παρενέπεσε τῷ λόγῳ θεώρημα, δι᾽ οὗ μανθάνομεν, ἐν τῷ
ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μὲν διοικεῖσθαι τὸν νοῦν, ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου δὲ τὴν ὑλικὴν
155 ἡμῶν ζωὴν, ὅταν ἐν τῇ φύσει μένῃ· εἰ δὲ παρατραπείη τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν
νοῦν ἐνεργείας ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι. [12.14] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν ὅθεν ἐξέβημεν, ὅτι
[D] ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ παρατραπέντων ἐκ πάθους τινὸς τῆς φυσικῆς καταστάσεως, τὴν
οἰκείαν δύναμιν ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ ἔρρωται μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν συνεστώτων, ἀδυνατεῖ δὲ
πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ χωρούντων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ δι᾽ ἑτέρων τὸ περὶ
160 τούτων δόγμα πιστώσασθαι· καὶ εἰ μὴ βαρὺ τῇ ἀκοῇ τῶν προκεκμηκότων ἤδη τῷ
λόγῳ, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὡς ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμεν, δι᾽ ὀλίγων διαληψόμεθα.
Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ χάσμης καὶ ὀνείρων αἰτιολογία.
[13.1] Ἡ ὑλικὴ καὶ ῥοώδης αὕτη τῶν σωμάτων ζωὴ, πάντοτε διὰ κινήσεως
προϊοῦσα, ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν, ἐν τῷ μὴ στῆναί ποτε τῆς
κινήσεως. Καθάπερ δέ τις ποταμὸς κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ῥέων ὁρμὴν, πλήρη μὲν
5 δείκνυσι τὴν κοιλότητα, δι᾽ ἧς ἂν τύχῃ φερόμενος, οὐ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὕδατι περὶ
τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ τόπον ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπέδραμεν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐπερρύη· οὕτω καὶ
τὸ ὑλικὸν τῆς τῇδε ζωῆς διά τινος κινήσεως καὶ ῥοῆς τῇ συνεχείᾳ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων
διαδοχῆς ἀμείβεται, ὡς ἂν μηδέποτε στῆναι δύνασθαι τῆς μεταβολῆς, ἀλλὰ τῇ
ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἀτρεμεῖν ἄπαυστον ἔχειν διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐναμειβομένην τὴν κίνησιν·
10 εἰ δέ ποτε κινούμενον παύσαιτο, [B] καὶ τοῦ εἶναι πάντως τὴν παῦλαν ἕξει.

[13.2] Οἷον διεδέξατο τὸ πλῆρες ἡ κένωσις, καὶ πάλιν ἀντεισῆλθεν ἡ πλήρωσις τῇ

κενότητι· ὕπνος τὸ σύντονον τῆς ἐγρηγόρσεως ὑπεχάλασεν, εἶτα ἐγρήγορσις τὸ

150 διακειμένων] παρακειμένων Q 151 καθ᾽ ὃ] καθὰ Q : καθὸ H R S : καθὼς T ἕκαστον Æ B C G H M N

O P Q S W X 162 ἀνενέργητος] efficientiam Dion : efficax Eri καὶ om. M τούτων] τοῦτο
W Mign 153 παρενέπεσε τὸ προτεθὲν N προτεθὲν] πρότερον M δι᾽ οὗ] διὰ τοῦτο οὖν I ἐν om.
I W 155 παρατραποίει G P X τὸν om. H T 159–60 δι᾽ ἑτέρων τὸ περὶ τούτων δόγμα] per aliam
doctrinam quae de talibus Eri περὶ τούτων] τοιοῦτο T 160 τῇ ἀκοῇ om. C I K O Q Eri τοῖς
προκεκμηκόσιν I : τῷ προκεκμηκότι Q Eri 160–1 τοῦ λόγου M 161 τούτου M Q οἷον G N P δι᾽ ὀλίγων
ὡς ἂν οἷοί τε ὦμενA B C I K M O T διαληψόμεθα δι᾽ ὀλίγων L δι᾽ ὀλίγων om. Q διαληψώμεθα Mign
Cap. 14 Æ ß I K O N Q R T Dion Eri om. L
13.12–25 (ὕπνος— ἄνεσις): John (of Damascus) Sacra Parallela II¹2122/K cap. Υ 3, 8 (Thum,
1122.3–19)
1 περὶ—αἰτιολογία] quod corpus nostrum semper sit in motu Λ 4 κατὰ om. B 6 τόπον ὁρᾶται ἀεὶ
N ἑπέδραμεν M ἐπερρύη] ita Æ ß Bac G H M P² T Forb : ὑπερρύη I K N O Q : ἐπιρρύη L : ἐπερρύει Bpc
Pac W X : ἐπιρρέει D E R S : ὑπερρέει Ald Mign οὕτως Æ N 7 ῥοῆς] ἐπιρροῆς Q 8 ἀμείβεται]
ἐναμείβεται Æ B E I K M N O Q T ἂν om. Æ B I K M N O Q μεταβολῆς] καταβολῆς ß 9 ἀδυναμίᾳ]
ita Æ B I K M N O Q R Forb : δυνάμει W X Ald Mign : in potentia Eri ἔχει K : ἔχοι R² 10 παύσηται
T : παύσοιτο W Ald Mign ἕξει] add. hoc est omnino etiam cessabit Eri 11 οἷον] ueluti Eri καὶ om.
NT ἀντεισῆλθεν] ἐπεισῆλθεν N 12 κενότητι] κενώσει Æ B E I K O Q ἐγρηγορίσεως W εἶτα]
εἶτα ἡ Q
       – 201

intellect in spatial parts of the body and who offer, for the support of this
supposition of theirs, the fact that the mind does not have free rein in the case
of those whose cerebral membranes are in an unnatural condition, our argument
showed that in every part of the human compound, each having a natural activity,
the power of the soul remains equally ineffective if that part does not continue in
its natural condition; and thus our argument, by following its sequence, came
upon the theory just mentioned, by which we learn that in the human compound
the intellect is to be ordered by God, and that by it our material life is governed,
provided that it remains in its natural state, but that if it is perverted from nature,
it is also alienated from the activity of the intellect. [12.14] But let us return again
to the point from which we started, that in those who are not perverted from their
natural condition by some affection, the intellect exercises its own power and is
vigorous in those who stand firm but, on the contrary, it is powerless to those who
do not give space to its activity. We may confirm our doctrine about these things
by yet other arguments, and, if it is not tedious to hear for those who are already
wearied by our treatise, we shall discuss these matters also, so far as we are able, in
a few words.
A rationale of sleep, yawning, and dreams.⁶¹
[13.1] The very life of our bodies, material and subject to flux, always advancing
by way of movement, has the faculty of being in this, that it never rests from
movement. Just as some river, flowing on by its own impulse, keeps the channel in
which it runs filled, yet is not seen in the same water always at the same place, but
part of it flows away while another part flows in,⁶² so also the material element of
our life here undergoes change in the continuity of the succession of opposites by
way of a kind of movement and flux, so that it can never cease from change but, in
the inability to keep still, has its ceaseless alternating movement through similar
things, and if it should ever cease moving, it will assuredly have the cessation also
of being.
[13.2] For instance, emptying succeeds fullness, and again in reverse after emp-
tiness comes a filling-up; sleep relaxes the strain of wakefulness, then waking

⁶¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 14): ‘That our body is always in motion’.
⁶² Cf. Heraclitus, A6 (DK; Plato, Crat. 402a8–10).
 202   

ἀνειμένον ἐτόνωσε· καὶ οὐδέτερον τούτων ἐν τῷ διηνεκεῖ συμμένει, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποχωρεῖ

ταῖς παρουσίαις ἀλλήλων ἀμφότερα· οὕτω τῆς φύσεως ἑαυτὴν ταῖς ὑπαλλαγαῖς
15 ἀνακαινίζουσης, ὡς ἑκατέρων ἐν τῷ μέρει μεταλαγχάνουσαν, ἀδιασπάστως ἀπὸ
τοῦ ἑτέρου μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Τό τε γὰρ διαπαντὸς συντετάσθαι ταῖς
ἐνεργείαις τὸ ζῶον, ῥῆξίν τινα καὶ διασπασμὸν τῶν ὑπερτεινομένων ποιεῖται
μερῶν· ἥτε διηνεκὴς τοῦ σώματος ἄνεσις διάπτωσίν τινα τοῦ συνεστῶτος καὶ
λύσιν ἐργάζεται· τὸ δὲ κατὰ καιρὸν μετρίως ἑκατέρων ἐπιθιγγάνειν, δύναμις πρὸς
20 διαμονήν ἐστι τῆς φύσεως, [C] διὰ τῆς διηνεκοῦς πρὸς τὰ ἀντικείμενα μεταβάσεως
ἐν ἑκατέροις ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἀναπαυούσης. Οὕτω τοίνυν τετονωμένον διὰ
τῆς ἐγρηγόρσεως τὸ σῶμα λαβοῦσα, λύσιν ἐπινοεῖ διὰ τοῦ ὕπνου τῷ τόνῳ, τὰς
αἰσθητικὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς καιρὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀναπαύσασα, οἷόν τινας ἵππους
μετὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας τῶν ἁρμάτων ἐκλύουσα.
25 [13.3] Ἀναγκαία δὲ τῇ συστάσει τοῦ σώματος ἡ εὔκαιρος ἄνεσις, ὡς ἂν ἀκωλύτως
ἐφ᾽ ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πόρων ἡ τροφὴ διαχέοιτο, μηδενὸς τόνου τῇ
διόδῳ παρεμποδίζοντος· καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς διαβρόχου γῆς, ὅταν ἐπιθάλψῃ
θερμοτέραις ἀκτῖσιν ὁ ἥλιος, ἀτμοί τινες ὁμιχλώδεις ἀπὸ τοῦ βάθους ἀνέλκονται·
ὅμοιόν τι γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῇ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς γῇ, τῆς τροφῆς ἔσωθεν ὑπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς
30 θερμότητος ἀναζεούσης· [D] ἀνωφερεῖς δὲ ὄντες οἱ ἀτμοὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀερώδεις
καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκείμενον ἀναπνέοντες, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν γίνονται χωρίοις,
οἷόν τις καπνὸς εἰς ἁρμονίαν τοίχου διαδυόμενος· εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν
αἰσθητηρίων πόρους ἐξατμιζόμενοι διαφοροῦνται, δι᾽ ὧν ἀργεῖ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἡ
αἴσθησις, τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν ἀτμῶν ἐκείνων ὑπεξιοῦσα. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ὄψεις τοῖς
35 βλεφάροις ἐπιλαμβάνονται, οἷόν τινος μηχανικῆς μολυβδίνης, τοῦ τοιούτου λέγω
βάρους, τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐπιχαλώσης τὸ βλέφαρον· παχυνθεῖσα δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις
ἀτμοῖς ἡ ἀκοὴ, καθάπερ θύρας τινὸς τοῖς ἀκουστικοῖς μορίοις ἐπιτεθείσης, ἡσυχίαν
ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας ἄγει· καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ὕπνος ἐστὶν, ἀτρεμούσης

13 οὐδ᾽ ἕτερον G H P : οὔθ᾽ ἕτερον K O Q : οὐθέτερον Æ B I M N R SP συμμένει] συμβαίνει H K M P

R ὑποχωροῦσιν B 14 ἀλλήλων ταῖς παρουσίαις B ἀλλήλων] ἀλλήλοις I ἀμφότερα ἀλλήλων Æ K N
O T οὕτω] οὕ O ταῖς ὑπαλλαγαῖς om. Q 15 τῷ om. M Q ἀδιαπαύστως D L : ἀπαύστως M N Q R
T W : ἀσπάστως (uel ἀσπασίως, ἀσπαστῶς) SP 16 τό τε] τοῦ τε H P W X : τού τε G συντετᾶσθαι ß
N O P R W 17 διασπασμὸν] διαμερισμὸν Q τῶν om. W 18–19 διάπτωσίν τινα τοῦ συνεστῶτος καὶ
λύσιν] casum quendam atque solutionem consistens Eri καὶ λύσιν τοῦ συνεστῶτος M N 19 λῦσιν L :
διάλυσιν M μετρίως] mensurate Eri ἑκατέρων] ἑκατέρωθεν D (transp. post ἐπιθιγγάνειν) E S W : om.
SP ἐπιθιγγάνειν] ἐπιτυγχάνειν Mign 21 ἑτέρων] ἑκατέρων N 21–2 διὰ τῆς ἐγρηγόρσεως
τετονωμένον N τετονωμένον—σῶμα] uegetatum corpus per uigilias natura Eri 22 λῦσιν L M
ἐπινοεῖ] ἐμποιεῖ Mign τοῦ τόνου B 23 ἐκ] διὰ R ἀναπαύουσα D E G H L P S ἵππους] πόλους
Q : πώλους SP : pullos Eri 24 ἁρμάτων] ἀλμάτων R : ἁμάτων N ἐκλύσασα Ald Mign 25 σώματος]
σώματος καὶ M 26 τόνου] πόρου W 26–7 τῇ διόδῳ om. M 27 παρεμποδίζοντος] ita W Ald Mign
ac pc
Forb : παραποδίζοντος Æ B D E G H K N O P Q S X γῆς διαβρόχου N ἐπιθάλψῃ] ita Æ B E G H
I K M O P X Forb : ἐπιθάλπη Q : ἐπιλάμψη W Ald Mign 28 ἐνέλκονται P : ἐξέλκονται Æ B I K M N O
Q Rac T 29 τι om. Q τροφῆς ἔσωθεν ὑπὸ τῆς om. O 30 δε] τε Q κατὰ φύσιν om. L καὶ] τε T 32
τοίχου] τύχου O W διαδυόμενος] δυαλυόμενος M N T : solutus Eri 33 διαφυροῦνται Ald κατὰ Æ
L M R 34 παρόδῳ] παραδόξῳ M γὰρ om. B 35 μηχανικῆς] B D E G H I M N O P Q S T W
X Forb : μηχανῆς Mign μολυβδένης Q : μολιβδίνης Ʋ ß H I M N P² R X : μολυβδείνης G Pac :
μολυβδαίνης W τοῦ om. D λέγω om. Q 36 βάρους λέγω N T τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς om. D τούτοῖς
om. N T 37 ἀτμοῖς τούτοῖς K O ἐπιτεθείσης] ἀποτεθείσης B : ἐναποτεθείης ß 38 κατὰ] κατὰ τὴν
N ἄγει] εἰσάγει Q τοιοῦτο Æ L
        203

braces up what had become relaxed; and neither of these remains continually, but
both give way, each at the other’s coming; thus by their interchange nature renews
herself by partaking of each in turn, passing uninterruptedly from one to the
other. For the living creature to be always exerting itself in its activities produces a
certain rupture and tearing of its overstrained parts, while continual relaxing of
the body effects a certain failure and loosening of its constitution; but to be in
touch with each of these at the proper time in a moderate degree is a staying power
of nature, by the continual transference to the opposite state giving herself in each
of them rest from the other. Thus, finding the body strained through wakefulness,
she devises relaxation for the strain by means of sleep, giving to the faculties of
sense-perception rest from their activities at the appropriate time, loosening them
like horses from the chariots after the race.
[13.3] Rest at proper times is necessary for the constitution of the body, that the
nourishment may be dispersed unhindered to the whole body through the pas-
sages in it, without any strain to hinder its progress. Just as from the sodden earth,
when the sun heats it up with its warm rays, certain misty vapours are drawn up
from its depths, so also a similar thing happens in the earth that is us, when the
nourishment within is heated up by natural warmth, and the vapours, being
naturally upwards-borne and air-like and aspiring to what is above, come to be
in the regions of the head, like smoke penetrating the joints of a wall; then, from
there they are dispersed, being exhaled to the pores of the organs of sense-
perception, and by them the senses are necessarily rendered inactive, giving way
to the passing of these vapours. For the eyes are pressed upon by the eyelids when
some, as it were, leaden contrivance (I mean a weight of this kind) lets down the
eyelid upon the eyes; and the hearing, dulled by these same vapours, as some kind
of door being placed upon the acoustic organs, brings peace from its natural
activities; and such an affection is sleep, with sense-perception being at rest in the
 204   

ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς αἰσθήσεως, [167] καὶ παντάπασιν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως
40 ἀπρακτούσης, ὡς ἂν εὐπόρευτοι γένωνται τῆς τροφῆς αἱ ἀναδόσεις, δι᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν
πόρων τοῖς ἀτμοῖς συνδιεξιοῦσαι.
[13.4] Καὶ τούτου χάριν εἰ στενοχωροῖτο μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἔνδοθεν ἀναθυμιάσεως ἡ περὶ
τὰ αἰσθητήρια διασκευὴ, κωλύοιτο δὲ κατά τινα χρείαν ὁ ὕπνος· πλῆρες γενόμενον
τῶν ἀτμῶν τὸ νευρῶδες, αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ φυσικῶς διατείνεται, ὡς διὰ τῆς ἐκτάσεως
45 τὸ παχυνθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀτμῶν μέρος ἐκλεπτυνθῆναι· οἷόν τι ποιοῦσιν οἱ διὰ τῆς
σφοδροτέρας στρεβλώσεως τὸ ὕδωρ τῶν ἱματίων ἐκθλίβοντες. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ
κυκλοτερῆ τὰ περὶ τὸν φάρυγγα μέρη, πλεονάζει δὲ τὸ νευρῶδες ἐν τούτοις· ὅταν
καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων ἐξωσθῆναι δέῃ τὴν τῶν ἀτμῶν παχυμέρειαν, ἐπειδὴ ἀμήχανόν ἐστι
δι᾽ εὐθείας ἀποκριθῆναι τὸ κυκλοειδὲς μέρος, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ περιφερὲς σχῆμα
50 διαταθείη· τούτου χάριν ἀποληφθέντος ἐν τῇ χάσμῃ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅ τε ὁ
ἀνθερεὼν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω τοῖς γαργαρεῶσιν ὑποκοιλαίνεται, καὶ [B] τῶν ἐντὸς
πάντων εἰς κύκλου σχῆμα διαταθέντων, ἡ λιγνυώδης ἐκείνη παχύτης ἡ
ἐναπειλημμένη τοῖς μέρεσι συνδιαπνεῖται τῇ διεξόδῳ τοῦ πνεύματος. Πολλάκις δὲ,
καὶ μετὰ τὸν ὕπνον οἶδε τὸ τοιοῦτον συμβαίνειν, ὅταν τι τῶν ἀτμῶν ἐκείνων
55 περιλειφθείη τοῖς τόποις ἄπεπτόν τε καὶ ἀδιάπνευστον.

[13.5] Ἐκ τούτων τοίνυν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς δείκνυσιν ἐναργῶς, ὅτι τῆς φύσεως
ἔχεται, συνεστώσης μὲν καὶ ἐγρηγορυίας, καὶ αὐτὸς συνεργῶν καὶ κινούμενος·
παρεθείσης δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ, μένων ἀκίνητος·—εἰ μή τις ἄρα τὴν ὀνειρώδη φαντασίαν
νοῦ κίνησιν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ἐνεργουμένην· ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν, μόνην δεῖν τὴν
60 ἔμφρονά τε καὶ συνεστῶσαν τῆς διανοίας ἐνέργειαν ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀναφέρειν· τὰς δὲ
κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον φαντασιώδεις [C] φλυαρίας, ἰνδάλματά τινα τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν
ἐνεργείας οἰόμεθα τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδει κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν διαπλάττεσθαι·
τῶν γὰρ αἰσθήσεων τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολυθεῖσαν διὰ τοῦ ὕπνου, καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν
ἐνεργειῶν ἐκτὸς εἶναι κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην συμβαίνει· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ
65 τοῦ νοῦ συνανάκρασις γίνεται· τῶν οὖν αἰσθήσεων παυσαμένων, ἀργεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ

40 εὐπόρευτοι] εὔποροί τε N γίνωνται Æ B O : γένοιντο M N Q R T 41 συνδιεξιοῦσαι] ita Æ B I M N

O Q T Forb Ald : συνδιεξιοῦται K : συνεξιοῦσαι D E G H P R S X : συνεξιοῦσα L : συνδιεξιούσης
Mign 42 εἰ στενοχωροῖτο] sciendi sunt loci Eri στενοχωρεῖτο K Mac 43 κωλύοιτο] λύοιτο
I πλήρης T 44 φυσικῶς] ἐφεστηκὸς B ἐκστάσεως M : ἐνστάσεως T 45 ἐκπλατυνθῆναι N 46
σφοδροτέρας] λεπτοτέρας M 47 τὸν] τὴν L Q 48 δέῃ] δέοι R W Ald Mign τὴν] τὴν ἀπὸ D E 49
ἀποκριθῆναι] ita A B C G H I K N O P T X Forb : ἀποτείνεσθαι E : ἀποτεῖναι W Ald Mign μέρος] μέρος
καὶ ἀποτεὶναι N 50 διατεθείη H M N R Tac ἀπολειφθέντος B E L Rac 50–1 ὅ τε—ὑποκοιλαίνεται]
quando infra mentum (in eo enim subsistit) subcollocatur Eri 50 ὅ τε] ita codd. Forb : ὅτε Ald
Mign ὁ om. O W 51 γαργαλεῶσιν G H Pac W ἐπικοιλαίνεται N T 52 πάντως T διατεθέντων
B H I M N O Q T ἰλυγνιώδης R : ἀτμώδης M ἡ² om. T 53 διεξόδῳ] ἐξόδῳ B W 54 τοιοῦτο Æ
H N Q W 55 περιληφθείη Æac B K P² : περιληφθῇ M Q : περιφθείη I ἄπεμπτον H Ald Mign 56
τούτου M τοίνυν] οὖν I 57 ἐγρηγορουμένης R συνεργῶν] ἐνεργῶν Æ B E I K M N O Q R T W 58
παρεθείσης—ἀκίνητος om. W ἆρα G N P Q X 59 ὑπολάβῃ L δεῖ K O : om. N 60 εὔφρονα I L 61
φαντασιώδεις φλυαρίας] phantasias . . . in superfluitates Eri 62 ἐνεργείας] ἐνεργείας ἡμῶν
R συμβαῖνον R διαπλάσσεσθαι N R : διαπλάττεσσθαι Forb 63 ἀπολυθεῖσαν] διαλυθεῖσαν T :
διαλειπουσῶν N τὸν om. O Ald Mign 64 τούτων] τούτο I 65 συνανάκρασις] σύγκρασις N οὖν]
δ᾽ οὖν H : γοῦν N
        205

body and altogether ceasing from its natural movement, so that the digestive
processes of nourishment may have free course for the passing of the vapours
through each of the pores.
[13.4] And for this reason if the apparatus of the organs of sense-perception are
constricted by the rising vapours within and sleep hindered by some occupation,
the nervous system, becoming filled with the vapours, is naturally and spontan-
eously extended so that the part thickened by the vapours is rarefied by the
extension, like those do who squeeze water out of clothes by violent wringing.
And, since the parts around the pharynx are circular, and the nervous tissue
abounds there, when there is need for the thickness of the vapours to be expelled
from those parts, since it is impossible for the circular part to be separated directly,
but only by being distended in the outline of the circumference, for this reason, by
checking the breath in a yawn, which, with the chin moved downwards, forms a
hollow to the uvula, and all the interior parts being stretched into the figure of a
circle, that smoky thickness which had been detained in the neighbouring parts is
emitted together with the passage of the breath. Frequently the like may happen
even after sleep, when anything of those vapours remains in the regions spoken of
undigested and unexhaled.
[13.5] Hence, then, the human intellect clearly shows its natural condition, itself
cooperating and moving [with nature] when braced and awake, yet remaining
unmoved when abandoned to sleep, unless anyone supposes that the phantasy of
dreams is a movement of the intellect exercised in sleep. We would say that only
the conscious and sound activity of the mind should be referred to the intellect; as
to the fantastic nonsense that occurs in sleep, we suppose that some appearances
of the activity of the intellect are accidentally fashioned by the less rational form of
the soul; for the soul, being released by sleep from the senses, also by necessity
comes to be outside the activities of the intellect, as it is through the senses that the
mixing together of the intellect with the human being takes place. Therefore, when
 206   

τὴν διάνοιαν· τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν ἀτόποις τε καὶ ἐν ἀμηχάνοις πολλάκις δοκεῖν

εἶναι τὸν φανταζόμενον· ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, λογισμῷ καὶ διανοίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς
τηνικαῦτα διοικουμένης. [13.6] Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ ταῖς προτιμοτέραις τῶν δυνάμεων
τῆς ψυχῆς ἠρεμούσης (φημὶ δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐνεργείαις·)
70 μόνον τὸ θρεπτικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος ἐνεργὸν κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν [D]
καθ᾽ ὕπαρ γινομένων εἴδωλά τινα καὶ ἀπηχήματα τῶν τε κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν καὶ τῶν
κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐνεργουμένων, ἅπερ αὐτῇ διὰ τοῦ μνημονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδους
ἐνετυπώθη, ταῦτα καθὼς ἔτυχεν ἀναζωγραφεῖσθαι, ἀπηχήματός τινος μνημονικοῦ
τῷ τοιούτῳ εἴδει τῆς ψυχῆς παραμείναντος.
75 [13.7] Ἐν τούτοις οὖν φαντασιοῦται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ εἱρμῷ τινι πρὸς τὴν τῶν
φαινομένων ὁμιλίαν ἀγόμενος, ἀλλὰ πεφυρμέναις τισὶ καὶ ἀνακολούθοις ἀπάταις
περιπλανώμενος. Καθάπερ δὲ κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἐνεργείας, ἑκάστου [169] τῶν
μερῶν ἰδιαζόντως τι κατὰ τὴν ἐγκειμένην αὐτῷ φυσικῶς δύναμιν ἐνεργοῦντος,
γίνεταί τις καὶ τοῦ ἠρεμοῦντος μέλους πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον συνδιάθεσις· ἀναλόγως
80 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, κἂν τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἠρεμοῦν, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τύχῃ, τὸ ὅλον τῷ
μέρει συνδιατίθεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται συνδιασπασθῆναι πάντη τὴν κατὰ φύσιν
ἑνότητα, κρατούσης ἐν μέρει τινὸς τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὴν δυνάμεων διὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας. Ἀλλ᾽
ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότων τε καὶ σπουδαζόντων ἐπικρατεῖ μὲν ὁ νοῦς, ὑπηρετεῖ δὲ ἡ
αἴσθησις, οὐκ ἀπολείπεται δὲ τούτων ἡ διοικητικὴ τοῦ σώματος δύναμις· (ὁ μὲν
85 γὰρ νοῦς πορίζει τὴν τροφὴν τῇ χρείᾳ, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ πορισθὲν ὑπεδέξατο, ἡ δὲ
θρεπτικὴ τοῦ σώματος δύναμις ἑαυτῇ τὸ δοθὲν προσῳκείωσεν·) οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸν
ὕπνον ἀντιμεθίσταταί πως ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ [B] τῶν δυνάμεων τούτων ἡγεμονία, καὶ
κρατοῦντος τοῦ ἀλογωτέρου, παύεται μὲν ἡ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐνέργεια, οὐ μὴν
παντελῶς ἀποσβέννυται· ἐπειγομένης δὲ τηνικαῦτα διὰ τοῦ ὕπνου πρὸς τὴν πέψιν
90 τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀσχολούσης, οὔτε
παντελῶς διασπᾶται ταύτης ἡ κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν δύναμις (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἅπαξ
συμπεφυκὸς διατέμνεσθαι) οὔτε ἀναλάμπειν αὐτῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια δύναται, τῇ τῶν

66 καὶ¹ om. K O W ἀτόποις] τόποις E Ald : ἀπόροις M τε om. Mign ἐν om. Æ B D I K L Q

W Ald δοκεῖν] ἀργὸν M 67 τὸν] τὸ L M T ἐγίνετο Æ B E I K M N O R : ἐγίγνετο T 68 ἀλλὰ] καὶ
R 69 ἡρεμούσης R δὲ] δὴ B H R 71 γινομένων] ita Æ B D E G H O P R S W X Forb : γινομένῳ Q :
γενομένων Ald Mign ἀπηχήματα] ἀπηχήματα συμβαίνειν N τε om. K 72 αὐτῇ] ita Æ B D E G I K
L M N P S T W X Dion Forb : αὐτὴ H O Q R Ald Eri : αὐτῷ Mign μνημονικοῦ] ita Æ ß G H I K M N
O P Q W X Ald Forb : μνημονευτικοῦ Mign τῆς ψυχῆς om. W 73 ταῦτα] ταῦτα μὴ N ἐτύγχανε
ζωγραφεῖσθαι D E G H L N P R S X μνημονικοῦ] μνημονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς G H P X 74 τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ
τοιούτῳ εἴδει E P τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδει B 75 οὖν φαντασιοῦται] coimaginatur Eri 76 πεφορημέναις
G H M Pac Wac X Ald : πεφωρημέναις Wpc 77 περιπλανώμενος] ἐπιπλανώμενος Æ B I K M N O T
δὲ] γὰρ D E G H L M P X ἑκάστου om. Mign 79 ἠρεμοῦντος] ita Æ H K L M N O P S W X Forb Mign
: ἡρεμοῦντος R Ald μέλους] μέρους R W Dion Eri Ald Mign κεινούμενον W συνδιάθεσις] διάθεσις
Æ H 80 ψυχῆς] γῆς K ἠρεμοῦν] ita Æ H L M N O S W X Forb Mign : ἠρεμοῦντο K : ἡρεμοῦν Ald 81
συνδιατίθεται] coaffectari consequitur Eri διασπασθῆναι Æ B I K M N O W πάντη om. B 83 τε]
μὲν L 84 διοικητὴ N 86 θρεπτικὴ] ποριστικὴ M προσοικείωσεν K N O Pac W X οὕτως Æ
N W καὶ om. M N Rac 87 ἀντιμεθίσταταί] participatur Eri ἐν om. T 89 ἐπιγινομένης H :
ἐπιγενομένης M πέμψιν K 90 θρεπτικῆς] threptica (id est nutritiua) Eri 91 οὐ] οὐδὲ H M 92
συμπεφυκὸς] ἐμπεφυκὸς P ἡ αὐτῆς Mign
        207

the senses are at rest, the mind also must be inactive; and a proof of this is that the
dreamer often seems to be in absurd and impossible situations, which would not
happen if the soul were regulated by the calculating faculty and mind. [13.6] But
it seems to me that when the soul is resting with respect to its more excellent
faculties (I mean the activities of the intellect and sense-perception), only the
nutritive part of it is active during sleep, and in it some shadows and echoes of
things which happened while awake (of activities of both sense-perception and
mind) are impressed upon it by the aspect of the soul concerned with memory;
these are pictured haphazardly, as some echo of a memory still lingering in this
aspect of the soul.
[13.7] With these, then, the human being is beguiled, not led to acquaintance
with things that appear by any train of thought, but wandering among confused
and inconsequential delusions. But just as in bodily activities, while each of the
parts individually acts in some particular way according to the faculty which
naturally resides in it, there also arises in the limb at rest a shared state with that
which is in motion, similarly in the case of the soul, even if one part is at rest and
another in motion, the whole is co-affected with the part; for it is not possible that
the natural unity should in any way be severed, even though one of the faculties in
it holds sway in virtue of its activity. But just as, when human beings are awake
and busy, the intellect prevails, and sense-perception serves it, yet the faculty
which regulates the body is not dissociated from them (for the intellect furnishes
the food for its wants, sense-perception receives what is furnished, and the
nutritive faculty of the body appropriates to itself what is given to it), so also in
sleep the governing of these faculties is in some way reversed in us, and while the
less rational aspect prevails, the activity of the others ceases, yet it is not com-
pletely extinguished; but while the nutritive faculty is busied with digestion during
sleep, and occupies all our nature with itself, the faculty of sense-perception is
neither completely severed from it (for that which has once been naturally joined
together cannot be torn asunder), nor can its activity be revived, as it is hindered
by the inactivity of the organs of sense-perception during sleep; and, by the same
 208   

αἰσθητηρίων ἀργίᾳ κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ἐμπεδηθεῖσα· κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τοῦ
νοῦ πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκειουμένου, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη καὶ
95 κινουμένου τούτου, συγκινεῖσθαι λέγειν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἠρεμοῦντι συγκαταπαύεσθαι.

[13.8] Οἷον δέ τι περὶ τὸ πῦρ γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ὅταν μὲν ὑποκρυφθῇ τοῖς ἀχύροις
ἁπανταχόθεν, [C] μηδεμιᾶς ἀναπνοῆς ἀναρριπιζούσης τὴν φλόγα, οὔτε τὰ
προσπαρακείμενα νέμεται οὔτε παντελῶς κατασβέννυται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντὶ φλογὸς ἀτμός
τις διὰ τῶν ἀχύρων ἐπὶ τὸν ἀέρα διέξεισιν· εἰ δέ τινος λάβοιτο διαπνοῆς, φλόγα τὸν
100 καπνὸν ἀπεργάζεται· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῇ ἀπραξίᾳ τῶν αἰσθήσεων κατὰ
τὸν ὕπνον συγκαλυφθεὶς, οὔτε ἐκλάμπειν δι᾽ αὐτῶν δυνατῶς ἔχει οὔτε μὴν παντελῶς
κατασβέννυται, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον καπνοειδῶς κινεῖται, τὸ μέν τι ἐνεργῶν, τὸ δὲ οὐ δυνάμενος.
[13.9] Καὶ ὥσπερ τις μουσικὸς κεχαλασμέναις ταῖς χορδαῖς τῆς λύρας ἐμβαλὼν τὸ
πλῆκτρον, οὐ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν προάγει τὸ μέλος (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μὴ συντεταμένον
105 ἠχήσειεν) ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν χεὶρ τεχνικῶς πολλάκις κινεῖται, πρὸς τὴν τοπικὴν θέσιν [D]
τῶν τόνων τὸ πλῆκτρον ἄγουσα, τὸ δὲ ἠχοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ὅσον ἄσημόν τινα καὶ
ἀσύντακτον ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῶν χορδῶν ὑπηχεῖ τὸν βόμβον· οὕτω διὰ τοῦ ὕπνου τῆς
ὀργανικῆς τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευῆς χαλασθείσης, ἢ καθόλου ἠρεμεῖ ὁ τεχνίτης,
εἴπερ τελείαν λύσιν ἐκ πληθώρας τινὸς καὶ βάρους πάθοι τὸ ὄργανον· ἢ ἀτόνως τε
110 καὶ ἀμυδρῶς ἐνεργήσει, οὐχ ὑποδεχομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ὀργάνου δι᾽ ἀκριβείας τὴν
τέχνην.
[13.10] Διὰ τοῦτο ἥ τε μνήμη συγκεχυμένη καὶ ἡ πρόγνωσις προκαλύμμασί τισιν
ἀμφιβόλοις ἐπιδιστάζουσα, ἐν εἰδώλοις τῶν καθ᾽ ὕπαρ σπουδαζομένων
φαντασιοῦται, καί τι τῶν ἐκβαινόντων πολλάκις ἐμήνυσε· τῷ γὰρ λεπτῷ τῆς
115 φύσεως ἔχει τι πλέον παρὰ τὴν σωματικὴν παχυμέρειαν εἰς τὸ καθορᾶν τι τῶν
ὄντων δύνασθαι· οὐ μὴν δι᾽ εὐθείας τινὸς δύναται [172] διασαφεῖν τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς
τηλαυγῆ τε καὶ πρόδηλον εἶναι τὴν τῶν προκειμένων διδασκαλίαν, ἀλλὰ λοξὴ καὶ
ἀμφίβολος τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δήλωσις γίνεται, ὅπερ αἴνιγμα λέγουσιν οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ὑποκρινόμενοι.

93 ἐμπεδηθείσης K δὲ] δὴ N R : om. D G H L P S X 94 τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος Æ B E M N Q R T τῆς ψυχῆς

om. D I K L O S οἰκειωμένου K O : ὠκειωμένου Æ B I : ἐνοικειουμένου T 95 ἠρεμοῦντι] ita Æ D E
G H K L M O P S T W X Forb : ἡρεμοῦντι I R : ἠρεμοῦντος Ald Mign 96 γενέσθαι G P X πέφυκεν om.
ß μὲν om. A ὑπὸκρυφῇ K O : ὑποκρυβῇ L 97 πανταχόθεν G H L M N P X ἀναπνοῆς] διαπνοῆς Q :
πνοῆς B R 97–8 τὰ προσπαρακείμενα] τὰ πρὸς παρακείμενα L : πρὸς τὰ παρακείμενα Æ B E K M O : τὰ
παρακείμενα I T 98 ἀλλὰ M ἀτμός] καπνὸς N Q : fumus Dion Eri 99 τις om. T τὸν ἀέρα] τῶν
ἀχύρων B δέ τινος] δέ τι T : δ᾽ ἔτι Tpc διαπνοῆς] ἀναπνοῆς L 101 δι᾽ αὐτῶν] διαυγῶς G H P Smg
W X : om. B δυνατὸς Q 102 κατασβέννυται] ἀποσβέννυται K L 103 ταῖς om. D G H L P S
X ἐμβάλλων Æ Q 104 οὐ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν] οὐκ εὔρυθμον R : οὐ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν Ald ἂν om. T μὴ om.
I μὴ συντεταμένον] συγκεχαυνωμένον T : μὴ συντεταμένον ἢ τὸ κεχαυνωμένον A B C I K O 105
ἠχήσειεν· ἀλλ᾽ ἠ μὲν χεὶρ] ἠχήσει· ἐν ἄλλῃ μὲν χειρὶ T πολλάκις τεχνικῶς N 106 ἄσημον] confusus
Dion : ignobilem Eri τινά ἄσημον X 107 ὑπηχεῖν A B C I K M N O Rac T : ὑφηχεῖν Q : ἀπηχεῖ E :
mg2
subsonare Eri 108 κατασκευῆς om. D 109 λύσιν X πληθώρας] πληθούρας G P Q W X :
umiditate Eri 110 οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένου K O 113 ἐπιδιστάζουσα] ita A B C I K M N O Q R (νυ sup. l.)
T Wils : ἐπινυστάζουσα F (δι sup. l.) W X Ald Mign Forb : obruta Dion : dubitans Eri 114 ἐμβαινόντων
I ἐμήνυσε] ἐμνημόνευσεν N : ἐμήνοισεν W 115 καθορᾷν Mign 116 ὡς] ὥστε Q 117 προκειμένων]
λεγομένων Mac R W 118 ἡ δήλωσις τοῦ μέλλοντος T
        209

reasoning, the intellect also being appropriated to the sense-perceptive form of the
soul, it would follow that we should say that the intellect is moved with the latter
when it is moving and rests with it when it is at rest.
[13.8] As naturally happens with fire when it is covered all over with chaff and no
breath fans the flame, it neither consumes what lies beside it, nor is entirely
quenched, but instead of flame it rises to the air through the chaff as vapour; yet
if it should obtain any breath of air, it turns the smoke to flame. In the same way,
the intellect, when hidden by the inactivity of the senses during sleep, is neither
able to shine out through them nor is it completely extinguished, but has, as it
were, a smouldering movement, operating in some respects, yet unable in others.
[13.9] And just as a musician plucking the slackened strings of a lyre with the
plectrum produces no rhythmic melody (for that which is not stretched will not
sound), and although his hand frequently moves skilfully, bringing the plectrum
to the position set for the notes, yet there is no sound, except in so far as there is a
sort of indistinct and irregular hum from the movement of the strings, so also in
sleep, with the instrumental structures of the organs of sense-perception being
relaxed, the artist is either entirely at rest, if the instrument is affected by a
complete relaxation through a certain satiety or heaviness, or will act slackly or
faintly, if the instrument of sense-perception does not accurately receive its art.
[13.10] For this reason memory is confused, and foreknowledge, though ren-
dered doubtful by certain ambiguous veils, is represented in images of our waking
pursuits, and often discloses something of what is going to happen; for by its
subtlety of nature [the intellect] has some advantage—to be able to see things—
over corporeal density; but it is not able to make its meaning clear by direct
methods so that the information regarding the matter in hand should be clear and
evident, but its declaration of what is to come is indirect and ambiguous, what
those who interpret such matters call an ‘enigma’.
 210   

120 [13.11] Οὕτως ὁ οἰνοχόος ἐκθλίβει τὴν βότρυν τῇ κύλικι τοῦ Φαραώ· οὕτω
κανηφορεῖν ὁ σιτοποιὸς ἐφαντάσθη· ἐν οἷς καθ᾽ ὕπαρ ἑκάτερος τὴν σπουδὴν εἶχεν,
ἐν τούτοις εἶναι καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀνείρων οἰόμενος· τῶν γὰρ συνήθων αὐτοῖς
ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὰ εἴδωλα τῷ προγνωστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐντυπωθέντα, παρέσχεν
ἐπὶ καιροῦ τῶν ἐκβησομένων διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης τοῦ νοῦ προφητείας
125 καταμαντεύσασθαι.

[13.12] [B] Εἰ δὲ Δανιὴλ καὶ Ἰωσὴφ καὶ οἱ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους θείᾳ δυνάμει, μηδεμιᾶς
αὐτοὺς ἐπιθολούσης αἰσθήσεως, τὴν τῶν μελλόντων γνῶσιν προεπαιδεύοντο, οὐδὲν
τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν προκείμενον λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις ταῦτα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν ἐνυπνίων
λογίσαιτο, ἐπεὶ πάντως ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολούθου καὶ τὰς καθ᾽ ὕπαρ γινομένας θεοφανείας,
130 οὐκ ὀπτασίαν ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἀκολουθίαν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἐνεργουμένην οἰήσεται.
Ὥσπερ τοίνυν πάντων ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν διοικουμένων, ὀλίγοι τινές
εἰσιν οἱ τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς ἀξιούμενοι· οὕτω κοινῶς πᾶσι καὶ
ὁμοτίμως τῆς ἐν ὕπνοις φαντασίας κατὰ φύσιν ἐγγινομένης, μετέχουσί τινες, οὐχὶ
πάντες, θειοτέρας τινὸς διὰ τῶν ὀνείρων τῆς ἐμφανείας· τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις πᾶσι, κἂν
135 γένηταί τις ἐξ ἐνυπνίων περί τι πρόγνωσις, κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον [C] γίνεται τρόπον.

[13.13] Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ Αἰγύπτιος καὶ ὁ Ἀσσύριος τύραννος θεόθεν πρὸς τὴν τῶν
μελλόντων ὡδηγοῦντο γνῶσιν, ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ διὰ τούτων οἰκονομούμενον·
φανερωθῆναι γὰρ ἔδει κεκρυμμένην τὴν τῶν ἁγίων σοφίαν, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἄχρηστος τῷ
κοινῷ παραδράμῃ τὸν βίον. Πῶς γὰρ ἐγνώσθη τοιοῦτος ὢν Δανιὴλ, μὴ τῶν
140 ἐπαοιδῶν καὶ μάγων πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς φαντασίας ἀτονησάντων; πῶς δ᾽ ἂν
περιεσώθη τὸ Αἰγύπτιον, ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ καθειργμένου τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ, εἰ μὴ
παρήγαγεν εἰς μέσον αὐτὸν ἡ τοῦ ἐνυπνίου κρίσις; οὐκοῦν ἄλλο τι ταῦτα καὶ οὐχὶ
κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς φαντασίας λογίζεσθαι χρή.

120 ἐκθλίβει] ἐν θλίψει B E : ἐνθλίβει Æ W τὴν] τὸν W X τοῦ] τῷ M 122 καὶ om. I οἰόμενοι
B N Q O 123 τὰ εἴδωλα om. M παρέχει K : praestiterunt Dion Eri 125 καταμαντεύσασθαι]
μαντεύσασθαι D G H L P S X : καταμαντεύεσθαι Æ 126 εἰ] οἱ B καὶ οἱ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους θείᾳ δυνάμει]
ipsa quae in illis erat diuina uirtus Eri ἐκείνους] αὐτοὺς M 127 αὐτοὺς] αὐτοῖς Æ ß E I K R O : αὐταῖς
M ἐπιθηλούσης B : ἐπιθλιβούσης N 128 τοῦτο] τούτων B οὐ] οὐδὲ Ald Mign 129 λογίσαιτο]
καταλογίσαιτο I γιγνομένας N : γενομένας K R 130 οὐχ ὀπτασίαν G O P W X : οὐχ ὀπτασίας
N ἐνεργουμένας N οἰήσεται] ποιήσεται P 132 οἱ τῆς θείας ὁμιλίας om. B ἐμφανοῦς] ἀφανοῦς I K
M O οὕτως W 133 γιγνομένης N : γινομένης T 134 διά τινος τῶν ὀνείρων θειοτέρας N τῆς om.
D F G H L N P R S W X ἐμφανείας] θεοφανείας D F G H L P S W X : φανερώσεως N : προγνώσεως R
δ’] δὲ Æ ß K M O Q 135 ἐγγένηται Æ E I K M O Q T : ἐγγίνηται N : ἐπιγένηται B ἐξ ἐνυπνίων]
ἐξυπνίων W 137 ὁδηγοῦντο G P X : ὁδηγοῦνται A B C I K M N O Q W 138 τὴν τῶν ἁγίων
κεκρυμμένην M ἄχρηστον M T : ἄπιστος Æ 139 παραδράμοι Æ I N O Q R : παραδράμειν T γὰρ]
γὰρ ἂν Æ B I K M N O Q R T ἐγνωρίσθη D E F G H L P S X δανιὴλ τοιοῦτος ὢν M μὴ om. N 140
εὕρεσιν] ἐρεύνησιν G H P R W X 141 αἰγύπτιον] αἰγύπτιον ἔθνος Mign : aegyptus Dion Eri
καθειργμένου Xpc (γ supr. l. 2a man.) 142 παρεισήγαγεν N αὐτὸν εἰς μέσον R T μέσους Ald
Mign οὐχὶ] οὐ B N 143 λογίζεσθαι] ἡγεῖσθαι Æ B I K M N Q R T : duci Eri
        211

[13.11] As such, the cupbearer presses the cluster for Pharaoh’s cup; in this way
the baker seemed to carry his baskets: each supposing himself in a dream to be
engaged in those things in which he was busied when awake⁶³; for the images of
their customary occupations imprinted on the prescient element of the soul
provided them for a time the ability to foretell, by this sort of prophecy on the
part of the intellect, what should come to pass.
[13.12] But if Daniel and Joseph and others like them were instructed in advance
by divine power, without any confusion of sense-perception, in the knowledge of
things to come, this counts for nothing for the present argument; for no one would
ascribe this to the power of dreams, since he would then fully suppose, by
consequence, that those theophanies also which took place in wakefulness were
not a vision but a consequence of nature effected spontaneously. Just as, then,
while human beings are guided by their own intellects, there are some few who are
deemed worthy of evident divine company, so also while the phantasies arising in
sleep occur in a common and similar manner for all, some, not all, participate by
means of their dreams in some more divine manifestation; but to all others, even if
a foreknowledge of anything does occur from dreams, it occurs in the manner
spoken of.
[13.13] And again, if the Egyptian and the Assyrian kings were divinely guided to
the knowledge of things to come, the effect arranged by their means is a different
thing; for it was necessary that the hidden wisdom of the saints should be revealed,
that each might not pass his life without benefit for the state. For how could Daniel
have been known for what he was, if the soothsayers and magicians had not been
unequal to the task of discovering the dream? And how could the Egyptian people
have been preserved, with Joseph shut up in prison, if his discernment of the
dream had not brought him into the midst of them? Accordingly, these are
something else, and must not be counted with the common phantasies.

⁶³ Cf. Gen. 40.

 212   

[13.14] Ἡ δὲ συνήθης αὕτη τῶν ὀνείρων ὄψις κοινὴ πάντων ἐστὶ, πολυτρόπως καὶ
145 πολυειδῶς ταῖς φαντασίαις [D] ἐγγινομένη· ἢ γὰρ παραμένει, καθὼς εἴρηται, τῷ
μνημονικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν μεθημερινῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὰ ἀπηχήματα· ἢ πολλάκις
καὶ πρὸς τὰς ποιὰς τοῦ σώματος διαθέσεις ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων κατάστασις ἀνατυποῦται.
Οὕτω γὰρ ὁ διψώδης ἐν πηγαῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐν εὐωχίαις ὁ τροφῆς προσδεόμενος,
καὶ ὁ νέος σφριγώσης αὐτῷ τῆς ἡλικίας καταλλήλως τῷ πάθει φαντασιοῦται.
150 [13.15] Ἔγνων δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἐγὼ τῶν καθ᾽ ὕπνον γινομένων αἰτίαν, θεραπεύων τινὰ
τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἑαλωκότα φρενίτιδι, ὃς βαρούμενος τῇ τροφῇ πλείονι τῆς δυνάμεως
αὐτῷ προσενεχθείσῃ, ἐβόα, τοὺς περιεστῶτας μεμφόμενος ὅτι ἔντερα κόπρου
πληρώσαντες εἶεν ἐπιτεθεικότες αὐτῷ· [173] καὶ ἤδη τοῦ σώματος αὐτῷ πρὸς
ἱδρῶτα σπεύδοντος, ᾐτιᾶτο τοὺς παρόντας ὕδωρ ἔχειν ἡτοιμασμένον, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε
155 καταβρέξαι κείμενον· καὶ οὐκ ἐνεδίδου βοῶν, ἕως ἡ ἔκβασις, τῶν τοιούτων
μέμψεων τὰς αἰτίας ἡρμήνευσεν· ἀθρόως γὰρ ἱδρώς τε πολὺς ἐπερρύη τῷ σώματι,
καὶ ἡ γαστὴρ ὑποφθαρεῖσα τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἐντέροις βαρύτητα διεσήμανεν. Ὅπερ τοίνυν
ἀμβλυνθείσης ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου τῆς νήψεως ἔπασχεν ἡ φύσις συνδιατιθεμένη τῷ πάθει
τοῦ σώματος, τοῦ μὲν ὀχλοῦντος οὐκ ἀναισθήτως ἔχουσα, διασαφῆσαι δὲ τὸ λυποῦν
160 ἐναργῶς, διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς νόσου παραφορὰν, οὐκ ἰσχύουσα· τοῦτο κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς, εἰ, μὴ
ἐξ ἀρρωστίας ἀλλὰ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ὕπνῳ, τὸ διανοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κατηυνάσθη,
ἐνύπνιον ἂν τῷ οὕτως διακειμένῳ ἐγίνετο, ὕδατι μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἱδρῶτος ἐπιρροῆς, [B]
ἐντέρων δὲ βάρει τῆς κατὰ τὴν τροφὴν ἀχθηδόνος σημαινομένης.
[13.16] Τοῦτο καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν τὴν ἰατρικὴν πεπαιδευμένων δοκεῖ,—παρὰ τὰς τῶν
165 παθημάτων διαφορὰς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνυπνίων ὄψεις τοῖς κάμνουσι γίνεσθαι· ἄλλας μὲν
τῶν στομαχούντων, ἑτέρας δὲ τῶν κεκακωμένων τὰς μήνιγγας, καὶ τῶν ἐν πυρετοῖς
πάλιν ἑτέρας, τῶν τε κατὰ χολὴν καὶ τῶν ἐν φλέγματι κακουμένων οὐ τὰς αὐτὰς, καὶ
τῶν πληθωρικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτετηκότων πάλιν ἄλλας· ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ἡ
θρεπτική τε καὶ αὐξητικὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ νοεροῦ
170 συγκατεσπαρμένον αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς ἀνακράσεως, ὃ τῇ ποιᾷ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος
τρόπον τινὰ ἐξομοιοῦται, κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν πάθος ταῖς φαντασίαις
μεθαρμοζόμενον.

144 ὀνειράτων I K O πολυτρόπως καὶ om. N 145 παραμένη O καθὼς εἴρηται om. N 146
ἐπιτηδευμάτων] oportun<it>atum Eri 148 τροφῆς] τρῆφυς B G H 149 καὶ ὁ νέος—φαντασιοῦται
om. G H P X καταλλήλως] ita Æ B D E I K L M N Q R S T Ald Forb : καταλλήλῳ Mign 150 ὕπνον]
ita A C D E F G H L M N O Q R S X Ald Forb : ὕπνων ß W : ὕπνους I K : ὕπνου Mign γινομένων] ita
D G P S W X Forb : γενομένην F : γινομένην H : αἰνιγμάτων A B C E I K M N O Q R T Dion Eri :
γενομένων Ald Mign 150–1 θεραπεύων—φρενίτιδι] nam quidam de necessariis captus phrenesi Dion :
curans quendam captum frenesi his quibus oportebat curari Eri 151 βαρυνόμενος A B C E N O
R T 152 αὐτῷ] αὐτοῦ Ald Mign προσενεχθείσης K M N O Q W X 153 πληρώσαντες] πλήσαντες
N R T ἤδη] δὴ N 154 ἱδρῶτας ß G H R S X : ἱδρώτας P ᾧ τε] ὧπερ τούτου B 155 οὐκ] οὐδ᾽
X ἔκβασις] ἔκστασις I 156 τε γὰρ ἱδρὼς B τε om. I ἐπερρύη] ἐπερρύει B (non ß) F Pac? P ἐπερρύη
τε N 157 ἐν τοῖς om. N διεσήμαινεν G L P W X : διεσήμηνεν I : ὑπεσήμηνεν M : ὑπεσήμανεν B ὅπερ]
ὥσπερ M 158 ἀμβλυθείσης H P Rac T : ἀμβληθείσης I νύψεως] φύσεως L συνδιατιθεμένη] νῦν
διατιθεμένη Q 159 ὀχλοῦντος] ἐνοχλοῦντος Æ B C E I M P Q οὐκ ἀναισθήτως] non etiam sensibiliter
Eri διασαφηνίσασα M δὲ om. M 160 ἰσχύσασα N 161 τῆς ψυχῆς om. D κατευνάσθη Æ Q :
κατηυγάσθη D E F G H K M P R² S 162 οὕτω Æ I N R : τοιούτῳ K O τῆς] τοὺς W 163 δὲ] τὲ
W τῆς om. T κατὰ τὴν τροφὴν] τῶν ἐντέρων D διασημαινομένης Æ B I K O 164 τοῖς . . .
πεπαιδευμένοις Æ I K N O 166 πυρετῷ N 167 φλέγματι] πνεύματι Æ B D Emg κεκακωμένων
M T καὶ² om. M 168 πληθουρικῶν W ἄλλας] ἄλλο N 169 τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις Æ I M N Q R T
Eri τῆς ψυχῆς om. K O ἔχῃ Ald Mign 170 τοῦ σώματος διαθέσι M 171συνεξομοιοῦται Æ B I
K M N O Q R T κατὰ] καὶ Mign
        213

[13.14] But this usual seeing of dreams is common to all, arising in our phantasies
in different modes and forms. For either there remain, as we have said, in the
aspect of the soul concerned with memory, the echoes of daily occupations, or,
frequently, the constitution of dreams is characterized with regard to a particular
condition of the body. Thus, the thirsty person seems to be among springs, the one
in need of food to be amidst festivities, and the youth, his time of life bursting with
desire, is beset with images corresponding to his passion.
[13.15] I also know another cause of the things that happen in sleep. When
attending one of my close friends seized by frenzy, being indignant at the food
being given to him in too great quantity for his strength, he kept crying out,
finding fault with those who were about him for filling intestines with dung and
putting them upon him; and when his body was already hastening towards a
sweat, he blamed those with him for having water ready to soak him as he lay. And
he did not cease crying out until the outcome revealed the causes of these
complaints, for all at once a copious sweat broke out over his body and the
loosening of his bowels explained the weight in the intestines. The same condition,
then, which, while his sobriety was dulled by disease, his nature suffered, being co-
affected by the passion of the body—not being imperceptive of what was amiss,
but not being strong enough to express clearly its pain due to the distraction
resulting from the disease—this, if the discursive faculty of the soul were put to
rest, not from infirmity but from natural sleep, would perhaps appear as a dream
to one so disposed, with the streams of sweat expressed by the water and the
vexation of the food by the weight of the intestines.
[13.16] This view is also held by many of those trained in medicine, that the
visions of the dreams had by the patients accord with the differences of diseases:
the visions of those with a weak stomach are of one kind, another are those of
persons suffering from injury to the cerebral membranes, and those of persons in
fevers are yet another, those of people suffering from bilious and from phlegmatic
affections are not the same, and again those of plethoric persons and persons with
wasting disease are different—from which one may see that the faculty of the soul
pertaining to nutrition and growth has something of the intellectual aspect sown
together in it through commixture, which in some manner is assimilated to the
particular state of the body, by being adapted in its phantasies to the disease which
has seized it.
 214   

[13.17] Ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἠθῶν καταστάσεις τυποῦται τοῖς πολλοῖς [C] τὰ
ἐνύπνια· ἄλλα τοῦ ἀνδρείου καὶ ἄλλα τοῦ δειλοῦ τὰ φαντάσματα· ἄλλοι τοῦ
175 ἀκολάστου ὄνειροι, καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ σώφρονος· ἐν ἑτέροις ὁ μεταδοτικὸς, καὶ ἐν
ἑτέροις φαντασιοῦται ὁ ἄπληστος· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς διανοίας ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀλογωτέρας
διαθέσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας ἀνατυπούσης—οἷς προειθίσθη διὰ
τῆς καθ᾽ ὕπαρ μελέτης, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις ἀναπλαττούσης.
Ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος ὁ νοῦς· ἐν ᾧ καὶ διάκρησις τῶν τε σωματικῶν καὶ
ψυχικῶν κινημάτων.
[14.1] Ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν προκειμένων ἀπεπλανήθημεν· δεῖξαι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος
προέθετο τὸ, μὴ μέρει τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεδέσθαι τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς κατὰ τὸ
5 ἶσον ἐφάπτεσθαι, καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει τοῦ ὑποκειμένου μέρους ἐνεργοῦντα τὴν
κίνησιν· ἔστι δὲ ὅπου καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ὁρμαῖς ὁ νοῦς, οἷον ὑπηρέτης
γινόμενος· καθηγεῖται γὰρ πολλάκις ἡ τοῦ σώματος φύσις, καὶ τοῦ λυποῦντος
αἴσθησιν ἐντιθεῖσα καὶ τοῦ εὐφραίνοντος ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταύτην μὲν τὰς πρώτας
παρέχειν ἀρχὰς, ἢ βρώσεως ὄρεξιν ἤ τινος ὅλως τῶν καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν τὴν ὁρμὴν
10 ἐμποιοῦσαν· τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐκδεχόμενον τὰς τοιαύτας ὁρμὰς, ταῖς οἰκείαις περινοίαις
τὰς πρὸς τὸ [176] ποθούμενον ἀφορμὰς συνεκπορίζειν τῷ σώματι· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ μόνων τῶν ἀνδραποδωδέστερον διακειμένων, οἳ
δουλώσαντες τὸν λόγον ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῆς φύσεως, διὰ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ συμμαχίας τὸ
κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδὺ δουλοπρεπῶς κολακεύουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν τελειοτέρων οὐχ
15 οὕτως γίνεται· καθηγεῖται γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, λόγῳ καὶ οὐχὶ πάθει τὸ λυσιτελὲς
προαιρούμενος, ἡ δὲ φύσις κατ᾽ ἴχνος ἕπεται τῷ προκαθηγουμένῳ.
[14.2] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρεῖς κατὰ τὴν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν διαφορὰς ὁ λόγος εὗρε, τὴν μὲν
τρεφομένην χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, τὴν δὲ τρεφομένην μὲν καὶ αἰσθανομένην, ἀμοιροῦσαν
δὲ τῆς λογικῆς ἐνεργείας, τὴν δὲ λογικὴν καὶ τελείαν διὰ πάσης διήκουσαν τῆς
20 δυνάμεως, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἐκείναις εἶναι καὶ τῆς νοερᾶς τὸ πλέον ἔχειν· [B] μηδεὶς διὰ
τούτων ὑπονοείτω τρεῖς συγκεκροτῆσθαι ψυχὰς ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι, ἐν
ἰδίαις περιγραφαῖς θεωρουμένας, ὥστε συγκρότημά τι πολλῶν ψυχῶν τὴν
ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν εἶναι νομίζειν. Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀληθής τε καὶ τελεία ψυχὴ μία τῇ

173 τυποῦνται T τοῖς om. Mign 175 ὄνειροι] οἱ ὄνειροι I N T 176 διανοίας] διανοίας ἱσταμένης
H ἀλογωτέρας] altero Eri 177 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διαθέσεως Æ B I K M N O Q R T τῇ om R προηθίσθη
G N Pac W X : προσειθίσθη Æ I M R : προσεθίσθη Q : προσεθισθῆ ß : πρὸς ἐθισθεῖ K O : προσεθιάθη
B 178 καὶ ἐν] κὰν N : κἂν T : καὶ Æ ἀναπλασσούσης Q
Cap. 15 Æ ß I K N O Q R T Dion Eri
1–2 ὅτι—κινημάτων] quod aliquando mens seruit corpori et de tribus differentiis eius, uitali seu
spirituali rationali Λ 4 τὸ¹] ὡς N : om. D ἐνδεδέσθαι] ἐνδέχεσθαι K πάντως T 5 ἴσον O X Ald
Mign μέρους] μέλους D G H P R S W X ἐνεργοῦντος D L M R 6 καὶ ὅπου G H L N P R² S T X καὶ
om. Æ B I K O Rac 7 γινόμενος] ita Æ B D G I K L M O P R S T W X Ald Forb : γενόμενος
Mign καθηγεῖσθαι G H P X 9 ἀρχὰς] ὁρμὰς M R βρώσεως] βρώσεως ἢ πόσεως T τῶν om. K
τῶν καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ὅλως B 12 μόνον Æ Dac G H L N O P S W X : om. M ἀνδραποδωδεστέρως R 14
τελεωτέρων M 15 οὕτω H O R S W 15–16 καθηγεῖται—προαιρούμενος] certum est apod quos mens
praecedit in omnibus et ratione potius quam passione id quod oportet exequitur Dion : imperat enim
animus rationi et non patitur quod utile est eligens Eri 17 δὲ om. L τρεῖς post δύναμιν pon. L 18
μὲν] om. I M W : τε N αἰσθανομένην] αὐξανομένην Mign 19 διὰ πάσης] δι᾽ ἁπάσης Ald Mign 20
ὡς om. N Q καὶ ὡς T καὶ om. K τῇ νοερᾷ Æ B I K M O T : ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ N πλεῖον T 21
ὑπονοείτω] ἔχειν ὑπονοείτω M : ἐπινοείτω Q : ὑπολαμβανέτω N συγκεκροτεῖσθαι G N P W X ἐν om.
M 22 περιγραφαῖς] συγγραφαῖς D συγκρότημά τι] συγκρίματι T : conflatum Dion : conformatione
Eri 23 φύσιν om. Q Dion Eri εἶναι φύσιν N τε om. M
       – 215

[13.17] Moreover, most peoples’ dreams are conformed to the state of their
character: the phantasms of the brave are one kind, the coward’s another; the
dreams of the incontinent of one kind, those of the continent another; the liberal
and the avaricious are subject to different phantasies—in no case are these
phantasies framed by the mind, but by the less rational disposition in the soul,
which fashions images, even in dreams, of those things to which each is accus-
tomed by his daily occupation.
That the intellect is not in a part of the body; in which also is a distinction of the
movements of body and soul.⁶⁴
[14.1] But we have wandered far from our subject, for the argument set out to
show that the intellect is not restricted to any part of the body but is equally in
touch with the whole, producing its movement according to the nature of the part
under its influence. There are cases, however, in which the intellect follows the
natural impulses, becoming, as it were, their servant; for often the nature of the
body takes the lead by introducing either the sensation of that which gives pain or
the desire for that which gives pleasure, so that it may be said to furnish the first
beginnings, by producing in us the desire for food or, generally, the impulse
towards some pleasant thing; while the intellect, receiving such impulses, helps
supply the body by its own deliberations with the means for attaining the desired
object. Such is not the case for all, but only those of a more abject disposition, who
enslave the reason to the impulses of nature and slavishly flatter the pleasures of
the senses by the alliance of their intellect; but in the case of the more perfect this
does not happen, for the intellect takes the lead, choosing the expedient course by
reason and not by passion, while their nature follows in the tracks of its leader.
[14.2] Given that our argument discovered three different forms regarding the
vital faculty—one which is nourished without sense-perception, another which is
both nourished and is capable of sense-perception, but is without share in the
reasoning activity, and, third, the rational and perfect, pervading the whole
faculty, so that amongst these forms the advantage belongs to the intellectual—
let no one suppose, because of this, that in the human compound there are three
souls welded together, each contemplated within its own limits, so as to think that

⁶⁴ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 15): ‘That the mind is sometimes in servitude to the body, and of its three
differences, vital, spiritual, and rational’.
 216   

φύσει ἐστὶν, ἡ νοερά τε καὶ ἄϋλος, ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ ὑλικῇ καταμιγνυμένη
25 φύσει· τὸ δὲ ὑλῶδες ἅπαν ἐν τροπῇ τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσει κείμενον, εἰ μὲν μετέχοι τῆς
ψυχούσης δυνάμεως, κατὰ αὔξησιν κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀποπέσοι τῆς ζωτικῆς
ἐνεργείας, εἰς φθορὰν ἀναλύσει τὴν κίνησιν. [14.3] Οὔτε οὖν αἴσθησις χωρὶς
ὑλικῆς οὐσίας, οὔτε τῆς νοερᾶς δυνάμεως χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως ἐνέργεια γίνεται.
Ὅτι κυρίως ψυχὴ ἡ λογικῆ καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ὁμωνύμος
κατονομάζονται· ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος δίηκειν τὴν τοῦ νοῦ δύναμιν,
καταλλήλως ἑκάστοῦ μέρους προσαπτομένην.
[15.1] Εἰ δέ τινα τῆς κτίσεως τὴν θρεπτικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, ἢ πάλιν ἕτερα τῇ
5 αἰσθητικῇ διοικεῖται δυνάμει μήτε ἐκεῖνα αἰσθήσεως μήτε ταῦτα τῆς νοερᾶς
μετέχοντα φύσεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτό τις ψυχῶν πλῆθος καθυποπτεύει—οὐ κατὰ τὸν
διαιροῦντα λόγον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν διαφορὰν δογματίσει· διότι πᾶν τὸ ἐν
τοῖς οὖσι νοούμενον, εἰ μὲν τελείως εἴη ὅπερ ἐστὶ, κυρίως καὶ ὀνομάζεται ὅπερ
λέγεται· τὸ δὲ μὴ διὰ πάντων ὂν ἐκεῖνο ὃ κατωνόμασται, ματαίαν καὶ τὴν
10 προσηγορίαν ἔχει. Οἷον εἴ τις τὸν ἀληθῆ δείξειεν [D] ἄρτον, φαμὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον
κυρίως ἐπιλέγειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ ὄνομα· εἰ δέ τις τὸν ἀπὸ λίθου τεχνηθέντα τῷ
κατὰ φύσιν ἀντιπαραδείξειεν, ᾧ σχῆμα μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἶσον καὶ ἡ τοῦ
χρώματος ὁμοιότης, ὥστε διὰ τῶν πλείστων τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ δοκεῖν,
ἐπιλείπει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ καὶ τροφὴν δύνασθαι εἶναι· παρὰ τοῦτο οὐ κυρίως ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ
15 καταχρήσεως τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ ἄρτου τετυχηκέναι τὸν λίθον λέγομεν· καὶ πάντα
τὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἃ μὴ δι’ ὅλων ἐστὶν ὅπερ λέγεται, ἐκ καταχρήσεως ἔχει τὴν
κλῆσιν.

24 ἡ²] ἣ Æ B D G H K L O P S X καταμίγνυται Æ B D G H K L P S X : καταμίγνοιται O :

συγκαταμιγνυμένη M 25 μετέχει B Gac I M 26 ψυχούσης] ἐμψυχούσης D L M P S W X : ἐμψύχου
G H : ψυχικῆς N κατὰ] κατὰ τὴν I M : κατ᾽ G H L P S X ἀποπέσει H? R2? : ἀποπέση Rac? 27 ἀναλύει
GHNPTX οὖν] om. ß : οὖν ἡ G H P W X
Cap. 16 Æ ß N Q R T Dion Eri
15.7–10 (πᾶν τὸ—προσηγορίαν ἔχει): Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi 22.XI (Diekamp,
140.13–18) 15.16–17 (ἃ μὴ—τὴν κλῆσιν): Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi 22.XΙI
(Diekamp, 141.1–2)
1–3 ὅτι—προσαπτομένην] quod uitalis efficientiae irrationabilium non uere sed equiuoce dicitur
anima et de ineffabili communione corporis et animae Λ 1 ἡ ψυχὴ N ἡ om. B K T δὲ] ita Æ G I
K N O P Q R S Forb : δ᾽ Ald Mign 2–3 ἐν ᾧ—προσαπτομένην om. W 2 ἐν ᾧ om. N διήκειν τοῦ
σώματος D R τοῦ] τοῦ παντὸς N 3 ἑκάστῳ μέρει M 4 ἔχει ἐνέργειαν D G H L P S X ἑτέρᾳ P 5
μήτ᾽ G H L P S X τῆς om. N 6 τις] τί N καθυπτοπεύῃ H : καθυποπτεύσει M : καθ᾽ ὑποπτεύει X 7
διαιροῦντα] αἱροῦντα D G H M S Tpc W Xac : αἰροῦντα L P Xpc : αιροῦντα N : ἐροῦντα Tac : excelsam
Eri πᾶν—πάλιν (cap. 21, l. 18) foliis (post 129v) pluribus avulsis R 9 ὂν] ὢν W 10 ἀληθινὸν
B ἄρτον δείξειεν D G H L P S X 12 ἀντιπαραδείξειεν] ὑποδείξειεν L ᾧ] ὃ Dac S : ὡς T : om. G H
M P X τὸ αὐτὸ] τοιοῦτον N 12 τὸ om. N ἴσον X ἡ om. N T 13 τὸν αὐτὸν] ταυτὸν N : αὐτὸν G H
P X 14 ἐπιλείπει δὲ] ἐπεὶ δὲ λείπει B G H I K N O P T X : ἐπειδὴ δὲ λείπει M W : ἐπειδὴ λείπει
Æ αὐτῷ] αὐτὸ K : om. L εἶναι] δούναι W 15 τὸ λίθον τετυχηκέναι N τὸν λίθον om. K O λέγωμεν
Mign 15–16 καὶ πάντα—λόγον om. I 16 τὰ om. Æ B G H M N P T W X μὴ δι᾽ ὅλων] μὴ δι᾽ ὅλως
G : μὴ δὲ ὅλως N : μηδόλως K ὅπερ] ἅπερ Æ B I K N O ἔχειν N
       – 217

human nature is a sort of conglomeration of several souls. The true and perfect
soul is one by nature, the intellectual and immaterial, which mingles with the
material nature through the senses.⁶⁵ Everything material, being subject to change
and alteration, will, if it participates in the animating faculty, move in accordance
with growth; if, however, it falls away from the life-giving activity, it will dissolve
its movement into corruption. [14.3] Therefore, neither is there sense-perception
without material substance nor is there activity of sense-perception without the
intellectual faculty.
That the rational soul is and is called ‘soul’ properly, while the others are called so
equivocally; in which also is this, that the power of the intellect extends throughout
the whole body, touching appropriately every part.⁶⁶
[15.1] If some things in creation possess the nutritive activity, and others again
are regulated by the sense-perceptive faculty, the former having no share in the
senses nor the latter in the intellectual nature, and if, for this reason, anyone
suspects that there is a plurality of souls, such a one will be positing the difference
of souls not in accordance with their distinguishing definition. For everything we
think of among beings, if it be perfectly what it is, is also properly called by what it
is named; but of that which is not completely what it is named, the appellation is
also in vain. For instance, if someone were to show us true bread, we say that he
properly applies the name to the subject; but if someone were to show us instead
something made out of stone to resemble the natural bread—which had the same
shape and equal size and similarity of colour, so as to appear in most points to be
the same as the prototype, but which lacks the ability of being food—on this
account we say that the stone has the name of ‘bread’ not properly but by a misuse
of language, and that all things which fall under the same description, that are not
wholly what they are called, have their name from a misuse of terms.

⁶⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.1 (Spira, 31.18–32.1); Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns,
94.1–6).
⁶⁶ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 16): ‘That the vital energy of the irrational creatures is not truly but
equivocally called “soul” and of the unspeakable communion of body and mind’.
 218   

[15.2] Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ νοερῷ τε καὶ λογικῷ τὸ τέλειον [177]
ἐχούσης, πᾶν ὃ μὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁμώνυμον μὲν εἶναι δύναται τῇ ψυχῇ, οὐ μὴν καὶ
20 ὄντως ψυχὴ, ἀλλά τις ἐνέργεια ζωτικὴ, τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κλήσει συγκεκριμένη· διὸ καὶ
τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν, ὡς οὐ πόρρω τῆς φυτικῆς ταύτης ζωῆς κειμένην, ὁμοίως
ἔδωκε τῇ χρήσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον νομοθετήσας, ὡς ἀντὶ λαχάνου
τοῖς μετέχουσιν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ, φησὶ, τὰ κρέα φάγεσθε, ὡς λάχανα χόρτου· μικρὸν
γάρ τι πλεονεκτεῖν δοκεῖ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ δίχα ταύτης τρεφομένου τε καὶ
25 αὐξανομένου· παιδευσάτω τοῦτο τοὺς φιλοσάρκους μὴ πολὺ τοῖς κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν
φαινομένοις προσδεσμεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ψυχικοῖς προτερήμασι
προσασχολεῖσθαι, ὡς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ψυχῆς ἐν τούτοις θεωρουμένης, τῆς δὲ
αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις τὸ ἶσον ἐχούσης.
[15.3] [B] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἕτερον ἡ ἀκολουθία παρηνέχθη τοῦ λόγου· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῇ
30 θεωρίᾳ προέκειτο, ὅτι προτιμότερον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ νοουμένων ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ
τὸν νοῦν ἐνέργεια ἢ τὸ ὑλικὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως· ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐχὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ
νοῦς περιέχεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίσης ἐν πᾶσι καὶ διὰ πάντων ἐστίν. Οὔτε ἔξωθεν
περιλαμβάνων οὔτε ἔνδοθεν ἐγκρατούμενος· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπὶ κάδων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν
σωμάτων ἀλλήλοις ἐντιθεμένων κυρίως λέγεται· ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ πρὸς τὸ σωματικὸν
35 κοινωνία, ἄφραστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον τὴν συνάφειαν ἔχει, οὔτε ἐντὸς οὖσα (οὔτε
γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖται σώματι τὸ ἀσώματον) οὔτε ἐκτὸς περιέχουσα· οὐ γὰρ
περιλαμβάνεται τὰ ἀσώματα, ἀλλὰ κατά τινα τρόπον ἀμήχανόν τε καὶ
ἀκατανόητον ἐγγίζων ὁ νοῦς τῇ φύσει καὶ προσαπτόμενος, καὶ ἐν [C] αὐτῇ καὶ
περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖται· οὔτε ἐγκαθήμενος οὔτε περιπτυσσόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
40 εἰπεῖν οὔτε νοῆσαι· πλὴν ὅτι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῆς εἱρμὸν εὐοδουμένης τῆς φύσεως,
καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργὸς γίνεται· εἰ δέ τι πλημμέλημα περὶ ταύτην συμπέσοι, σκάζει κατ᾽
ἐκεῖνο καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἡ κίνησις.

18 οὕτως N καὶ om. T λογικῷ τε καὶ νοερῷ M 19 τοῦτό] τοιοῦτον K N δύναται εἶναι L εἶναι om.
N καὶ om. G H I P X 19–20 οὐ μὴν καὶ ὄντως ψυχὴ om. O 20 ὄντως] κυρίως I τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς
κλήσει συγκεκριμένη] quae per abusionem anima nuncupatur Dion : uocatione animae coutens
Eri συγκεχρημένη Æ B D E I K L N O Q S T 21 φυτικῆς] ita Æ ß G O Wils : ψυχικῆς N :
φυσικῆς W X Ald Forb Mign : seminali Dion : om. Eri 22 χρῆσει] χρῆσει ταύτη Æ 23 φάγεσθε, ὡς
λάχανα χόρτου] ὡς λάχανα φάγεσθε W φάγεσθαι Gac Q : φάγεσαι Æ B 23–4 μικρὸν γὰρ] ὃ καὶ μικρὸν
N : ὃ κἂν μικρὸν P² T 24 δίχα ταύτης] per eandem Eri 25 αὐξομένου I Opc T W παιδευσάτω]
παιδευοῦσα τὸ Q : discant Eri τοῦτο] τοίνυν Æ B K O : om. G H M N P Q T X 26 προσδεσμεῖν]
προσδραμεῖν Ald Mign 27 προσενασχολεῖσθαι E : προσαπασχολεῖσθαι N T : ἀπασχολεῖσθαι D ὡς]
ὡς μὴ T τούτοις] τοῖς τοιούτοις Æ B I K O 28 ἴσον X Ald Mign 30 προύκειτο Æ I K O Q ὅτι] τι
W προτιμότερον] ita Æ B D H I K L M O P² S T W Forb : προτιμώτερον X Ald Mign τῷ om.
M νοουμένων] θεωρουμένων D L 31 τὸν om. O Ald Mign ἢ] ἥπερ N 32–3 οὔτ᾽ . . . οὔτ᾽ G H P S
X 33 ἐγκρατούμενος] κρατούμενος Ald Mign 34 σωμάτων ἀλλήλοις ἐντιθεμένων om. W νοητοῦ] ita
Æ B D G H I K L M O P S T W X Forb : νοῦ Ald Mign 35 τὴν om. N οὔτε¹] οὔτ᾽ G P S X οὔτε²]
οὐδὲ N : οὐ Æ B I K O Q 36 ἐγκρατεῖται] κρατεῖται D G H L P S X οὔτε] οὔτ᾽ G P S X οὐ] οὐδὲ Æ
B K N O : οὔτε T 37 περιλαμβάνεται] περιλαμβάνει Æ : περιλαμβάνει τι Mign τὸ ἀσώματον
Q ἀμήχανόν] inuisibili Dion : superrationabilem Eri 39 οὒτε¹] οὒτ᾽ G H : om. B : οὔτε γὰρ
W ἀλλ᾽ ὡς] ita Æ G H K M N O Pac S W X Ald Forb : ἄλλως I L P² : ἀλλ᾽ Q : ἀλλὰ ὡς
Mign 40 οὒτε] ita G H P Spc X Forb : οὐδὲ Æ B I K M N O Q T W : ἢ Ald Mign νοῆσαι]
ἐννοῆσαι I K αὐτῆς] ἑαυτῆς Q W 41 γίγνεται W πλημμελήματα X ταύτην] αὐτὴν Æ B I K N
O T ἐμπέσοι D G H I K L N O P S : ἐκπέσοι M
        219

[15.2] Therefore, just as the soul has its perfection in that which is intellectual and
rational, everything that is not so may indeed have the homonym of ‘soul’, yet is
not really soul, but a certain vital energy associated with the appellation of ‘soul’.
Thus, also he who gave laws on every matter, likewise gave the nature of animals,
as not far removed from this vegetative life, to the use of the human being, for
them to partake of it instead of vegetables, for he says: You shall eat all kinds of
flesh just as green vegetables. For the sense-perceptive activity seems to have but a
slight advantage over that which is nourished and grows without it. Let this teach
the lovers of the flesh not to bind their mind too closely to what appears to the
senses, but rather to busy themselves with the advantages that pertain to the soul,
as the true soul is contemplated in these, while sense-perception is equally
amongst the animals.
[15.3] The course of our argument, however, has diverged to yet another point,
for the subject of our contemplation was not that the activity of the intellect is of
more dignity among the things conceived of in the human being than the material
element of the concrete being, but that the intellect is not confined to any one part
of us, but is equally in all and through all. It neither surrounds anything from the
outside nor is enclosed within anything, for these phrases are properly applied to
casks or other bodies placed one inside the other. The communion of the
intellectual with the bodily is a conjunction unspeakable and inconceivable,
neither being within it (for the incorporeal is not enclosed in a body) nor yet
surrounding it from outside (for things incorporeal do not surround [something
else]), but the intellect, approaching our nature in some inexplicable and incom-
prehensible way and coming to touch it, is to be thought of as both in it and
around it, neither seated in it nor enfolded with it, but in a way which we cannot
speak or think,⁶⁷ except this: that while nature prospers according to its own
order, the intellect is also active; but if any misfortune befalls the former, the
movement of the mind halts correspondingly.

⁶⁷ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 2.46 (Spira, 27.23–28.5); Gregory of Nazianzus, Ep. 101.37–9;
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns, 13.9–17.8).
 220   

Θεωρία τοῦ θείου ῥητοῦ τοῦ εἰπόντος, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν
καὶ ὁμοίωσιν· ἐν ᾧ ἐξετάζεται, τίς ὁ τῆς εἰκόνος λόγος, καὶ πῶς ὁμοιοῦται τῷ
μακαρίῳ τε καὶ ἀπαθεῖ τὸ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ ἐπίκηρον· καὶ πῶς ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ ἄρρεν
καὶ τὸ θῆλυ, ἐν τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ τούτων οὐκ ὄντων.
5 [16.1] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαναλάβωμεν πάλιν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽
εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν. Ὡς μικρά τε καὶ ἀνάξια τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
μεγαλοφυΐας τῶν ἔξωθέν τινες ἐφαντάσθησαν, τῇ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον
συγκρίσει μεγαλύνοντες, ὡς ᾤοντο, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον· φασὶ γὰρ μικρὸν εἶναι κόσμον
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ παντὶ στοιχείων συνεστηκότα. Οἱ γὰρ τῷ κόμπῳ
10 τοῦ ὀνόματος [180] τοιοῦτον ἔπαινον τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ χαριζόμενοι φύσει, λελήθασιν
ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς περὶ τὸν κώνωπα καὶ τὸν μῦν ἰδιώμασι σεμνοποιοῦντες τὸν ἄνθρωπον·
καὶ γὰρ κἀκείνοις ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων τούτων ἡ κρᾶσίς ἐστι, διότι πάντως ἑκάστου
τῶν ὄντων ἢ πλείων ἢ ἐλάττων τις μοῖρα περὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον θεωρεῖται, ὧν ἄνευ
συστῆναί τι τῶν αἰσθήσεως μετεχόντων, φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. Τί οὖν μέγα, κόσμου
15 χαρακτῆρα καὶ ὁμοίωμα νομισθῆναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον; οὐρανοῦ τοῦ παρερχομένου,
γῆς τῆς ἀλλοιουμένης, πάντων τῶν ἐν τούτοις περικρατουμένων τῇ παρόδῳ τοῦ
περιέχοντος συμπαρερχομένων; [16.2] Ἀλλ’ ἐν τίνι κατὰ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν λόγον
τὸ ἀνθρώπινον μέγεθος; Οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν κτιστὸν κόσμον ὁμοιότητι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ
κατ᾽ εἰκόνα γενέσθαι τῆς τοῦ κτίσαντος φύσεως.
20 [16.3] Τίς οὖν [B] ὁ τῆς εἰκόνος λόγος; ἴσως ἐρεῖς· πῶς ὡμοίωται τῷ σώματι τὸ
ἀσώματον; πῶς τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τὸ πρόσκαιρον; τῷ ἀναλλοιώτῳ τὸ διὰ τροπῆς
ἀλλοιούμενον; τῷ ἀπαθεῖ τε καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ φθειρόμενον; τῷ ἀμιγεῖ

Cap. 17 Æ ß I K N O Q T Dion Eri, et caput hoc inc. ad verba ὡς μικρά (l. 6) in D E F G L M P S X

16.62–17.2 (πρῶτον—ἄνθρωποι): Paris, BN, grec. 1356, fragments (sigla Z) 16.89–98 (ἐπεὶ δὲ—
τὴν γνώμην): John (of Damascus) Sacra Parallela II¹99 / K cap. A 2, 21 (Thum, 117.12–118.5)
1–4 θεωρία—ὄντων] quod excellentia hominis non in eo est quod iuxta philosophos ad imaginem
mundi conditus est, sed in eo quod ad imaginem dei factus est et quomodo ad imaginem dei factus est
Λ 1 θεώρημα T 1–3 τοῦ θείου—ἐπίκηρον· καὶ om. W 1 τοῦ²] ita H M Q T Spc Forb : om. O Ald
Mign εἰπόντος] λέγοντες M 1–2 κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν] ita Forb : κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ
ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν Ald Mign καὶ ὁμοίωσιν] om. Æ B G H I K N O P Q Dion Eri : καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν
D L S 2 ᾧ] ᾗ M λόγος om. O πῶς] ita D G H L P S Forb : εἰ O Mign 4 καὶ τὸ] τε καὶ M τούτων]
τούτῳ K Ald 6 καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν] καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν Q : ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν
L N ἡμετέραν] ἡμετέραν φησιν I 7 τινες τῶν ἔξωθεν G L P S X : ex his quae extra sunt Eri τινες om.
D 8 ὡς ᾤοντο] quasi in ipso existeret Eri τὸ ἀνθρώπινον] τὸν ἄνθρωπον Æ B N O κόσμον εἶναι Æ
B I K O 9 τῷ¹] τὸ O τῷ κόμπῳ] ornamento Eri 11 τὴν μυίαν T 12 τῶν om. T τεσσάρων]
τεττάρων B : τεσσάρων στοιχείων N πάντων Æ ἑκάστῳ I 13 πλείω ἢ ἐλάττω G P X 14 αἰσθήσεων
T μέγα] post Eri 15 περιερχομένου Ald Mign 16 παρακρατουμένων B 17 συμπεριεχομένων
P ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τίνι] ἀλλὰ N 18 κτιστὸν] κτισθέντα D (κτισθε in ras 2a m.) 19 γεγενῆσθαι B C I K
M N O Q T κτίσαντος] κτίσεως B : κτίστου ß 20 τίς—ἐρεῖς] fortassis ergo quae sit imaginis ratio
quaeras Dion εἰκόνος] φύσεως I ἴσως] οὗτος N ἐρεῖς om. B τῷ om. D G P S X 20–1 σώματι τὸ
ἀσώματον] ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ ἐν σώματι I : ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ ἐνσώματον N : incorporeo corporale Dion Eri 21
πῶς om. N
        221

A contemplation of the divine word which says, Let us make the human being in
accordance with our image and likeness. In which is examined what the definition
of the image is, and how the passible and mortal is likened to the blessed and
impassible, and how the male and the female are in the image, these not being in the
Prototype.¹
[16.1] But let us now take up again the divine saying, Let us make the human
being in accordance with our image and likeness. How mean and how unworthy of
the majesty of the human being are the fancies of some of those outside, who
magnify humankind, as they supposed, by comparing it to this world. For they say
that the human being is a little cosmos, composed from the same elements as the
universe.² Those who bestow such praise on human nature by a pompous name,
forget that they are dignifying the human being with the properties of the gnat and
the mouse! They also are a blend of these four elements, for assuredly there is seen
in the animated nature of each being some part, either more or less, of those
elements without which any being with sense-perception would not, by nature,
exist. What great thing is it, then, for the human being to be accounted as a figure
and likeness of the world—of the heaven that passes away, of the earth that
changes, of all the things which are contained in them, which pass away with
the turning of what contains them? [16.2] But in what is the human greatness
according to the ecclesiastical teaching? Not in the likeness to the created world,
but in coming to be in accordance with the image of the nature of the Creator.
[16.3] What, then, you may ask, is the definition of the image? How is the
incorporeal likened to the body? How the temporal to the eternal? That which
is altered by change to the unalterable? That which is subject to passion and

¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 17): ‘That the excellence of the human being does not consist in the fact that,
according to the philosophers, he is made after the image of the world, but in the fact that he is made in
the image of God and how he is made in the image of God’.
² Cf. Plato, Tim. 30a–31a; Aristotle Phys. (8.2.252b26–7); Philo, Quis rer. div. haer. 155; Clement of
Alexandria, Protrep. 1.5.3; Methodius, De res. 2.10.2 (Bonwetsch, 350.9–351.2); Nemesius, De nat. hom.
1.63–4 (Morani, 15.3–6); Basil, Hom. de creat. hom. 2.14 (Hörner, 65.11–15); Gregory of Nazianzus, Or.
28.22; 38.11.
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πάσης κακίας τὸ πάντοτε συνοικοῦν ταύτῃ καὶ συντρεφόμενον; πολὺ γὰρ τὸ μέσον
ἐστὶ, τοῦ τε κατὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον νοουμένου, καὶ τοῦ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα γεγενημένου· ἡ γὰρ
25 εἰκὼν, εἰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν πρὸς τὸ πρωτότυπον ὁμοιότητα, κυρίως τοῦτο κατονομάζεται·
εἰ δὲ παρενεχθείη τοῦ προκειμένου ἡ μίμησις, ἄλλό τι καὶ οὐκ εἰκὼν ἐκείνου τὸ
τοιοῦτόν ἐστι.
[16.4] Πῶς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ ὠκύμορον, τῆς
ἀκηράτου καὶ καθαρᾶς καὶ ἀεὶ οὔσης φύσεώς ἐστιν εἰκών; Ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ
30 περὶ τούτου λόγον μόνη ἂν εἰδείη σαφῶς ἡ [C] ὄντως ἀλήθεια· ἡμεῖς δὲ καθ᾽ ὅσον
χωροῦμεν, στοχασμοῖς τισι καὶ ὑπονοίαις τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνιχνεύοντες, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν
ζητουμένων ὑπολαμβάνομεν. Οὔτε ὁ θεῖος ψεύδεται λόγος, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ εἰπὼν
γεγενῆσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὔτε ἡ ἐλεεινὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ταλαιπωρία τῇ
μακαριότητι τῆς ἀπαθοῦς ζωῆς καθωμοίωται· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον
35 ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἴ τις συγκρίνοι τῷ Θεῷ τὸ ἡμέτερον, ἢ παθητὸν εἶναι τὸ θεῖον ἢ
ἀπαθὲς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ἂν διὰ τῶν ἴσων ὁ τῆς ὁμοιότητος λόγος ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους
καταλαμβάνοιτο· εἰ δὲ οὔτε τὸ θεῖον ἐμπαθὲς οὔτε τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἔξω πάθους ἐστὶν,
ἄρα τις ἕτερος ὑπολέλειπται λόγος, καθ᾽ ὃν ἀληθεύειν φαμὲν τὴν θείαν φωνὴν, τὴν ἐν
εἰκόνι Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι τὸν [D] ἄνθρωπον λέγουσαν.
40 [16.5] Οὐκοῦν αὐτὴν ἐπαναληπτέον ἡμῖν τὴν θείαν γραφὴν, εἴ τις ἄρα γένοιτο διὰ
τῶν γεγραμμένων πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ἡμῖν χειραγωγία. Μετὰ τὸ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι
ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα, καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι ποιήσωμεν, ἐπάγει τοῦτον τὸν
λόγον, ὅτι καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν·
ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς· εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἤδη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὅτι πρὸς
45 καθαίρεσιν τῆς αἱρετικῆς ἀσεβείας ὁ τοιοῦτος προαναπεφώνηται λόγος, ἵνα
διδαχθέντες ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ μονογενὴς Θεὸς κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ, μηδενὶ
λόγῳ τὴν θεότητα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ διακρίνωμεν, ἐπίσης τῆς ἁγίας γραφῆς
Θεὸν ἑκάτερον ὀνομαζούσης, τόν τε πεποιηκότα τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οὗ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα
ἐγένετο.

23 ταύτῃ] αὐτῇ N συντρεφόμενον] conuertitut Eri 24 ἡ] εἰ V 25 εἰ μὲν ἔχει] quippe si seruet Dion :
siquidem si habuerit Eri μὲν om. I ἔχοι Æ D G K L N O P Q S X κυρίως] κυρίως ἂν
N T κατονομάζεται] καὶ ὀνομάζεται Q X Eri : κατονομάζοιτο N T 26 προκειμένου] πρωτοτύπου
N 28 τούτον W 29 ἀκηράτου] ἀφθάρτου L : ἀκηράτου καὶ ἀφθόρου Æ B I K O 31 ἐνιχνεύοντες I :
ἐξιχνεύοντες N T 32 οὔτε] οὐδὲ γὰρ G P W X : οὔτε γὰρ D L M S εἰπὼν θεοῦ W 32–3 γεγενῆσθαι
εἰπὼν Æ B G I K O P Q S V X 33 τὸν ἄνθρωπον] τὸ ἀνθρώπινον G P Q V X ἀνθρωπίνης om. M 34
καθωμοίωται] κατηξίωται D 35 συγκρίνει T 36 ἀνθρώπινον] ἡμέτερον B ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις G M P S V X :
ἐν ἀμφοφτέροις Æ B I K N O T 37 ἐμπαθὲς] ἐν πάθει Æ B C K M N O T πάθους] τοῦ πάθους T 38
ἆρα G I P X ὑπολείπεται Æ B C I K O Q T 40 Οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri αὐτὴν om. L ἡμῖν om. P Q
X θείαν] ἁγίαν Æ B G I K L M O P Q T V X : om. D εἴ τις] ἥτις M T Ald γένηται T 41 ἡμῖν om. Ald
Mign 42 κατ᾽εἰκόνα om. Æ B I K M N O Q T Dion Eri 43 ὅτι om. D G L P Q S X ἄνθρωπον] ἄνθρωπον
καὶ Mign 44 ἄρρεν W ἤδη om. V ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν] quae coram sunt Eri 45 καθαίρεσιν] κατάλυσιν
Q V W Eri προαναφωνεῖται Q 46 ἐποίησε] ἐποίησε ὁ θεὸς M θεὸς] υἱὸς Q θεοῦ om. Æ 47 ἐπίσης]
fideli Eri ἁγίας om. B 48 τε om. Æ B N ἄνθρωπον] οὐρανὸν B 49 γεγένηται Æ B I N O T
        223

corruption to that which is impassible and incorruptible?³ That which constantly

dwells with evil and grows up with it to that which unmixed with any evil? For
great is the span⁴ between that which is conceived regarding the archetype and
that which has come to be in accordance with the image; for the image is properly
so named if it keeps the likeness to the prototype, but if the imitation is removed
from the subject, then it is something else and not its image.
[16.4] How then is the human being, this mortal being, subject to the passions and
short-lived, an image of that undefiled and pure and everlasting nature? But, perhaps,
only the very Truth clearly knows the true account regarding this; yet we, so far as we
are able, tracking down the truth by guesses and suspicions, apprehend these things
regarding those that are sought. Neither does the divine word lie in saying that the
human being came to be in accordance with the image of God, nor is the pitiable
wretchedness of human nature⁵ likened to the blessedness of the impassible life. For
if anyone were to compare that which is ours to God, it would be necessary to confess
one of two things: either that the divine is subject to passion or that humankind is
impassible—as long as the definition of likeness is to be understood equally in both
cases. If, then, the divine is not subject to passion nor is our state beyond passion,
what other account remains whereby we may say that the divine voice speaks the
truth saying that the human being came to be in the image of God?
[16.5] Let us, then, take up again the divine Scripture, for perhaps there may be
some guidance from what is written about that which we seek. After saying, Let us
make the human being in accordance with the image,⁶ besides saying Let us make,
it adds this statement, and God made the human being, in accordance with the
image of God made he him; male and female made he them.⁷ It has already been
said, in the above, that this statement was uttered beforehand for the purging of
heretical impiety, in order that being instructed that the Only-begotten God made
the human being in accordance with the image of God, we should not in any way
distinguish the divinity of the Father and the Son, since Holy Scripture names each
of them equally ‘God’, the one who made the human being and in accordance with
whose image he came to be.

³ Cf. Basil, Hom. de creat. hom. 1.6 (Hörner, 11.6–8).

⁴ The word translated here as ‘span’ is τὸ μέσον, which a little later (De hom. 16.9) Gregory uses to
describe the human being; the word is usually translated as ‘mid-point’ or ‘middle’, indicating not so
much something (a third thing) between two separate points or beings, but as that which also touches
and so includes both, hence I have opted for ‘span’.
⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.70 (Spira, 113.2–3). ⁶ Gen. 1:26. ⁷ Gen. 1:27.
 224   

50 [16.6] [181] Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν περὶ τούτων λόγος ἀφείσθω. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ προκείμενον
ἐπιστρεπτέον τὴν ζήτησιν—πῶς καὶ τὸ θεῖον μακάριον καὶ ἐλεεινὸν τὸ
ἀνθρώπινον, καὶ ὅμοιον ἐκείνῳ τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς ὀνομάζεται. [16.7] Οὐκοῦν
ἐξεταστέον μετ᾽ ἀκριβείας τὰ ῥήματα· εὑρίσκσομεν γὰρ, ὅτι ἕτερον μέν τι τὸ κατ᾽
εἰκόνα γενόμενον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ νῦν ἐν ταλαιπωρίᾳ δεικνύμενον· ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς,
55 φησὶ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. Τέλος ἔχει ἡ τοῦ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα
γεγενημένου κτίσις· εἶτα ἐπανάληψιν ποιεῖται τοῦ κατὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν λόγου, καί
φησιν, ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς. Παντὶ γὰρ οἶμαι γνώριμον εἶναι, ὅτι ἔξω
τοῦτο τοῦ πρωτοτύπου νοεῖται· ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος,
οὔτε ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλύ ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰς ταῦτα [B] διηρῆσθαι ὁ λόγος φησὶ τὸν
60 ἄνθρωπον. [16.8] Οὐκοῦν διπλῆ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κατασκευὴ, ἥτε πρὸς
τὸ θεῖον ὡμοιωμένη, ἥτε πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην διηρημένη· τοιοῦτον γάρ τι ὁ
λόγος ἐκ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν γεγραμμένων αἰνίττεται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὼν ὅτι,
ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· πάλιν δὲ τοῖς
εἰρημένοις ἐπαγαγὼν, ὅτι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς, ὅπερ ἀλλότριον τῶν περὶ
65 Θεοῦ νοουμένων ἐστίν.

[16.9] Οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ δόγμα τι μέγα καὶ ὑψηλὸν διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπὸ τῆς ἁγίας
γραφῆς παραδίδοσθαι· τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι. Δύο τινῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκρότατον
πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστηκότων, μέσον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, τῆς τε θείας καὶ ἀσωμάτου
φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ κτηνώδους [C] ζωῆς· ἔξεστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου τῶν
70 εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι θεωρῆσαι τὴν μοῖραν—τοῦ μὲν θείου τὸ
λογικόν τε καὶ διανοητικὸν, ὃ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορὰν οὐ προσίεται·
τοῦ δὲ ἀλόγου τὴν σωματικὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ διάπλασιν εἰς ἄρρεν τε καὶ θῆλυ
μεμερισμένην· ἑκάτερον γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶ πάντως ἐν παντὶ τῷ μετέχοντι τῆς
ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς· ἀλλὰ προτερεύειν τὸ νοερὸν, καθὼς παρὰ τοῦ τὴν
75 ἀνθρωπογονίαν ἐν τάξει διεξελθόντος ἐμάθομεν· ἐπιγεννηματικὴν δὲ εἶναι τῷ

50 τούτου B I 51–2 πῶς—ὀνομάζεται] quomodo diuinum et beatum et miserum et simile illi hoc a sancta
scriptura nominatur? Eri 52 ἐκείνῳ τοῦτο] τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ D G L P S V X : ἐκείνῳ τούτῳ K O : ἐκείνῳ
B οὐκοῦν] non itaque Eri 53 ἐξεταστέον] ordinanda sunt Eri μετὰ ἀκριβείας Æ ß I K N O W : δι᾽
ἀκριβείας G L M P Q S V X : om. D εὑρήσομεν Mign μὲν om. D 54 δὲ] δὲ τι B ἐποίησεν]
ἐποίησεν οὗν N 54–5 φησὶν ὁ θεὸς N 55–63 τέλος—ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν om. N 56 ἐπανάληψιν] adiungitur
uelut Dion : ΕΠΑΝΑΛΗΜΨΙΝ (id est adiectionem) Eri 57 ἄρρεν Æ B I K O Q W 59 ἄρσεν D G L M
P S X φησὶ διηρῆσθαι ὁ λόγος Æ B I K O W : φησὶ ὁ λόγος διηρῆσθαι M διηρῆσθαι] διαιρεῖσθαι T :
διηρεῖσθαι G Pac V X : διῃρῆσθαι Ald Mign 60 οὐκοῦν] non itaque Eri 61 διῃρημένη Ald Mign τοιοῦτο
Æ K L O 62 αἰνίσσεται Æ B K M O αἰνίττεται—μορφή (cap. 18.8, l. 71) def. V 64 ἐπάγων Æ B C I K
O Q T ἄρρεν Æ B I K O Q W 65 νοουμένων] νόμῳ B 66 ἁγίας] ita Æ B G I K L M O P Q S X Forb :
θείας W Ald Mign 67 δύο] δύο γὰρ Æ B G I K M N O P Q T X 68 ἀνθρώπινον] humanam . . . naturam
Dion τε om. N θείας τε D G L P Q S X 69 φύσεως om. Dion ζωῆς] naturam Dion ἑκατέρας Q 70
τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ συγκρίματι] humana comparatione Eri 71 διανοητικόν τε καὶ λογικὸν L τὴν om. G P X
θῆλυ] τὸ θῆλυ Æ I K N O διαφορὰν—θῆλυ om. Z 72 διάπλασιν] duplicationem Eri εἰς] τὸ κατὰ
N ἄρρεν] τὸ ἄρρεν N T τε om. N Q θῆλυ] τὸ θῆλυ N 73 μεμερισμένον Z γὰρ τούτων ἐστὶ]
πάρεστι τούτων T 74 ζωῆς] substantia Dion ἀλλὰ] ἀλλὰ καὶ D S : ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ L τῷ νοερῷ
M T 74–5 καθὼς—ἐμάθομεν] ei rei quam humanae propagationi seruire uidemus ordine ipso conditionis
exsequente didicimus Dion 74 καθὼς om. Æ ß I K N O Q T Eri παρὰ om. Z 75 ἐν τάξει παρὰ τοῦ τὴν
ἀνθρωπογονίαν Q ἀνθρωπογένειαν Æ : ἀνωπολυγονίαν ß : humanam generationem Eri τάξει] τῇ τάξει
N Q 75–6 ἐπιγεννηματικὴν—συγγένειαν] ad effectum quippe generationis quaedam est hominis cum
irrationabilibus innata coniunctio Dion 75 ἐπιγενηματικὴν Æ ß G L M O P S W X : ἐπιγενητὴν N :
supergenitiuam Eri δὲ om. W 75–6 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι M
        225

[16.6] However, let the argument about these matters be left aside. Let the
enquiry be turned to the question before us: how, the divine being blessed and
humankind pitiable, is the latter called ‘like’ the former by Scripture? [16.7] The
words must be examined with precision. For we find that what came to be in
accordance with the image is one, and what is now manifest in wretchedness is
another. God made, it says, the human being, in accordance with the image of God
he made it. The creation of that which came to be in accordance with the image has
an end; then it makes a repetition⁸ of the account regarding the formation, and
says, male and female he made them. I think it is known to everyone that this is
understood to be outside the Prototype, for in Christ Jesus, as the apostle says,
there is neither male nor female,⁹ but the account says that the human being is
indeed divided into these. [16.8] Therefore, the formation of our nature is in
a sense twofold, that being likened to the divine [and] that being divided
according to this difference; for something like this the account hints at by the
syntax of what is written, first saying, God made the human being, in accordance
with the image of God he made it, and then, adding to what has been said,
male and female he made them, something that is foreign to what is conceived
about God.¹⁰
[16.9] I think that by these words, Holy Scripture conveys to us a great and lofty
doctrine; and the doctrine is this. While two [elements]—the divine and incor-
poreal nature, and the irrational and animal life—are separated from each other as
extremes, the human is the span.¹¹ For there is to be beheld in the human
compound a share of each of those mentioned—of the divine, the rational and
intelligent, which does not admit the difference of male and female; of the
irrational, the bodily formation and construction, divided into male and
female—for each of them is certainly in all that partakes of human life. But the

⁸ ‘Repetition’ translates the word ἐπανάληψιν which can mean either a ‘resumption’ or ‘repetition’
(cf. LSJ); Dionysius Exiguus takes it as indicating an addition (adiungitur uelut), as does Eriugena in his
translation of the work (ΕΠΑΝΑΛΗΜΨΙΝ id est adiectionem), although in the Periphyseon (4.795a) he
takes it as ‘repetition’ (ΕΠΑΝΑΛΗΜΨΙΝ id est repetitionem).
⁹ Gal. 3:38. ¹⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Cant. 7 (Langerbeck, 213.2–6).
¹¹ On μέσον as ‘span’ see footnote 4 above (at chap. 16.3). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.35
(Spira, 39.17–18); Philo, Opif. 135; Plotinus, Enn. 4.8.4.32; Nemesius, De hom. nat. 1.39 (Morani,
2.21–3.5). In the Greek, Gregory places the clause about the human being as the mid-point in the
middle of the sentence.
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ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον κοινωνίαν τε καὶ συγγένειαν· πρῶτον μὲν γάρ φησιν,
ὅτι ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, δεικνὺς διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων,
καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ὅτι ἐν τῷ [D] τοιούτῳ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ οὐκ ἔστιν· εἶτα
ἐπάγει τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὰ ἰδιώματα, ὅτι ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς.
80 [16.10] Τί οὖν διὰ τούτου μανθάνομεν; Καί μοι μηδεὶς νεμεσάτω, πόρρωθεν [184]
προσάγοντι τὸν λόγον τῷ προκειμένῳ νοήματι. Θεὸς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει πᾶν ὅτι πέρ
ἐστι κατ᾽ ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν ἀγαθὸν, ἐκεῖνό ἐστι—μᾶλλον δὲ, παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ
νοουμένου τε καὶ καταλαμβανομένου ἐπέκεινα ὢν, οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλό τι κτίζει τὴν
ἀνθρωπίνην ζωὴν ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν
85 δημιουργίαν τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ὁρμήσας, οὐκ ἂν ἡμιτελῆ τὴν τῆς ἀγαθότητος
ἐνεδείξατο δύναμιν, τὸ μέν τι δοὺς ἐκ τῶν προσόντων αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ φθονήσας τῆς
μετουσίας· ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον τῆς ἀγαθότητος εἶδος ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ἐκ τοῦ καὶ
παραγαγεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς γένεσιν, καὶ ἀνενδεᾶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
ἀπεργάσασθαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολὺς τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν ὁ κατάλογος, οὐ μὲν οὖν
90 ἔστιν ἀριθμῷ ῥᾳδίως τοῦτον διαλαβεῖν. Διὰ τοῦτο [B] περιληπτικῇ τινι φωνῇ τὰ
πάντα συλλαβὼν ὁ λόγος ἐσήμανεν, ἐν τῷ εἰπεῖν, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι τὸν
ἄνθρωπον· ἶσον γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο τῷ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ μέτοχον τὴν
ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἐποίησεν· εἰ γὰρ πλήρωμα μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὸ θεῖον, ἐκείνου δὲ
τοῦτο εἰκών· ἄρα ἐν τῷ πλῆρες εἶναι παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἡ εἰκὼν
95 ἔχει τὴν ὁμοιότητα. [16.11] Οὐκοῦν ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν παντὸς μὲν καλοῦ ἰδέα, πᾶσα δὲ
ἀρετὴ καὶ σοφία καὶ πᾶν ὅτι πέρ ἐστι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον νοούμενον· ἓν δὲ τῶν πάντων
καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀνάγκης εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ὑπεζεῦχθαί τινι φυσικῇ δυναστείᾳ, ἀλλ᾽

76 τὰ ἄλογα N τε om. T μὲν om. Æ B G I K M O P T X 77 θεοῦ] αὐτοῦ D L : τοῦ θεοῦ W Ald Mign
τὸν ἄνθρώπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ D G L P S X 78 ἄρσεν D G L P S X 79 φύσεως] φύσεως ὁρμήσας G M
P W X : φύσεως ἑρμηνεύσας Spcmg ἄρσεν D L S 80 τούτων G M P S X νεμεσσάτω B : νομισάτω Tac :
νεμεσησάτω Tpc : νεμισάτω Z : μωμησάτων D E L Sac 81 τὸν λόγον προσάγοντι I θεὸς] ὁ θεὸς Q τὴν
ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν Z 81–2 πέρ ἐστι] πάρεστι G M 82 τοῦ om. N 83 τε καὶ om. B τε καὶ
καταλαμβανομένου om. T ἐπέκεινα ὢν] praestantior Dion : summitas existens Eri ὢν] ὧν Z : πλὴν
T 84 ἀγαθὸν Æ N τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο] ac per hoc Eri 85 ἡμετέρας] ἀνθρωπίνης Ald
Mign ἡμιτελῆ] εἰ μη τελεῖ W Z 86 μέν τι] μέντοι T τοῦ] τὸ G P X φθονείσας W 87 καὶ om. G K
O P X 88 παράγειν T ὄντως K Opc ἀνενδεῆ Mign 89 ἐπειδὴ SP ἀγαθῶν om. SP 90 ἔστιν
ἀριθμῷ ῥᾳδίως τοῦτον] ἔστιν τοῦτον ἀριθμῷ ῥᾳδίως W ἐστι τοῦτο ραδίως Z ῥᾳδίως] Ald Mign : ῥαδίως
Forb τοῦτον ῥᾳδίως Æ I K M N O Q τοῦτον διαλαβεῖν ῥᾳδίως B SP τινι] ita Æ B I K M N O Forb :
τῇ W Ald Mign : om. D G L P S T X 90–1 τὰ πάντα] ita D G L M P² Q S T Forb : πάντα Æ B K O Pac :
ἅπαντα Ald Mign 91 ἐσήμηνε I ἐν τῷ] τῷ Æ I : τὸ K O 91–2 κατ᾽ εἰκόνα—τῷ εἰπεῖν om. O X 92 ὅτι
om. SP μέτεχον L : μετέχειν G P : μετέχουσαν N Q 92–3 τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν μέτοχον SP 93 εἰ γὰρ
om. T 93–4 ἐκείνου δὲ τοῦτο] ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτου D G I M N P Q Sac X : huius homo Dion : illius autem hoc id
est homo Eri 94 ἄρα ἐν τῷ πλῆρες] ἄρρεν τὸ πλῆρες Z ἄρα] ita G L M N P Q S Forb : ἆρα K X : ἄρ᾽ W SP
Ald Mign πλήρης Æ Q SP : πλήρη T 95 οὐκοῦν] non igitur Eri ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν] ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστι Æ B I K O :
ἔστι μὲν ἡμῖν N : ἔστι μὲν ἐν ἡμῖν SP ἡμῖν om. T μὲν] δὲ W : om. M T SP καλοῦ] ἀγαθοῦ T SP 96
ὅτι] ὅ G N P T X ἐστι] ἂν ἐστι T 96–7 ἓν δὲ—εἶναι] prae omnibus uero quod ab omni necessitate liberi
sumus Dion : in eo item quod sit omnium necessitate liberum Eri 96 πάντων] πάντων ἐστιν T 97
δυναστείᾳ φυσικῇ M : naturali (hoc est materiali) potentiae Eri
        227

intellectual takes precedence, as we have learnt from one who gives in detail an
ordered account of the origin of the human being,¹² participation and kinship
with the irrational is concomitant to being human,¹³ for he first says that God
made the human being in accordance with the image of God, showing by what was
said, just as the Apostle says, that in such a one there is not male and female, then
he adds the particularities of human nature, that male and female he made them.¹⁴
[16.10] What, then, do we learn from this? Let no one be indignant with me if
I bring from afar an explanation of the present matter. God, in his own nature, is
everything that can be conceived of as good; or rather, being beyond any good that
can be conceived or comprehended, he creates the human being for no other
reason than that he is good. And being such, and for this reason setting upon the
construction of our nature, he would not demonstrate the power of his goodness
halfway, giving some of his own attributes, yet grudging participation in others;
but the perfect form of goodness is in this, both in leading the human being out of
non-being into genesis, and in his being made lacking no good gift.¹⁵ Since the
catalogue of the individual goods is extensive, it cannot easily be numbered.
Therefore, the account indicated them all, summarizing them in a comprehensive
phrase, by saying that the human being came to be in accordance with the image of
God, for this is the same as to say that he made human nature participate in all
good, for if the divine is the plenitude of good gifts, and this is the image of that,
then the image has its likeness to the archetype in being filled with every good.¹⁶
[16.11] Thus, there is in us a form of every beauty, all virtue and wisdom, and
every higher thing that can be conceived. Of all these, one is to be free from

¹² The phrase ‘the origin of the human being’ translates Gregory’s single word ‘anthropogony’. The
image of Moses providing an ‘anthropogony’ is used again at the end of the treatise, in 30.33, and earlier in
Josephus, C. Ap. 1.8; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.13.90.4; Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 1.2.4, 6; Praep. Ev. 11.4.4,
11.28.7. Dionysius Exiguus took the word in a different sense, as referring to sexual procreation, translating
this clause as ‘But from one who speaks about the very order of creation we have learnt that what is
intellectual in us takes precedence before that which we see serves for the propagation of the human race’.
¹³ ‘Concomitant’ translates the word ἐπιγεννηματικὴν, for which LSJ gives ‘of the nature of an
ἐπιγέννημα, resulting, consequential’. In philosophy, ἐπιγέννημα seems to be have been used primarily
by the Stoics, for whom joy, cheerfulness, and the like are ‘by-products’ of virtue; cf. SVF 3.19.29 and
3.43.11 (=DL 7.95, 85–6) and Cicero, Fin. 3.9.32: ‘But in the other arts when we speak of an “artistic”
performance, this quality must be considered as in a sense subsequent to and a result of the action, it is
what the Stoics call ἐπιγεννηματικόν.’ In medical terms, ἐπιγέννημα can be used to describe a symptom
accompanying a disease (cf. Galen, Def., ed. Kühn, 19.395). It was translated with this sense by Eriugena
(‘supergenitiuam’). Dionysius Exiguus, in a similar manner to the way he translated ‘anthropogony’ in
the previous clause, renders this clause as ‘for in fact there is some kind of innate conjunction of the
human with irrational things for the accomplishing of generation’, and he was followed by Wilson: ‘his
community and kindred with the irrational is for man a provision for reproduction’. The verbal form of
the word is used in this treatise 30.33, where the subject is again Moses’ ‘anthropogony’.
¹⁴ Cf. Philo, Opif. 76: ‘And when Moses had called the genus “human”, quite admirably did he
distinguish its species, adding that it had been created “male and female”, and this though its individual
members had not yet taken shape.’
¹⁵ Cf. Plato, Tim. 29d–30a; Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat. 5.3–10 (Mühlenberg, 16.16–20.5); Gregory of
Nyssa, An. et res. 7.24 (Spira, 78.6–11).
¹⁶ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 6.22 (Spira, 68.9–14).
 228   

αὐτεξούσιον πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην· ἀδέσποτον γάρ τι χρῆμα ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
ἑκούσιον, τὸ δὲ κατηναγκασμένον καὶ βεβιασμένον [C] ἀρετὴ εἶναι οὐ δύναται.
100 [16.12] Ἐν πᾶσι τοίνυν τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ πρωτοτύπου κάλλους τὸν χαρακτῆρα
φερούσης, εἰ μὴ κατά τι τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχοι, οὐκέτ᾽ ἂν εἴη πάντως ὁμοίωμα ἀλλὰ
ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ διὰ πάντων ἀναδειχθήσεται τὸ ἐν παντὶ ἀπαράλλακτον. Τίνα τοίνυν
αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ θείου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὡμοιωμένου τὴν διαφορὰν καθορῶμεν; ἐν
τῷ, τὸ μὲν ἀκτίστως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστῆναι· ἡ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἰδιότητος
105 διαφορὰ πάλιν ἑτέρων ἰδιωμάτων ἀκολουθίαν ἐποίησε· συνομολογεῖται γὰρ πάντη τε
καὶ πάντως, τὴν μὲν ἄκτιστον φύσιν καὶ ἄτρεπτον εἶναι, καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν· τὴν
δὲ κτιστὴν ἀδύνατον ἄνευ ἀλλοιώσεως συστῆναι· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ
εἶναι πάροδος, κίνησίς τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι, κατὰ τὸ [D]
θεῖον βούλημα μεθισταμένου. [16.13] Καὶ ὥσπερ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ χαρακτῆρα
110 Καίσαρος εἰκόνα λέγει τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, δι᾽ οὗ μανθάνομεν κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρόσχημα τὴν
ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι τοῦ μεμορφωμένου πρὸς Καίσαρα ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὴν διαφορὰν
ἔχειν· οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα λόγον, ἀντὶ χαρακτήρων τὰ ἐπιθεωρούμενα τῇ τε
θείᾳ φύσει καὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κατανοήσαντες ἐν οἷς ἡ ὁμοιότης ἐστὶν· ἐν τῷ
ὑποκειμένῳ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐξευρίσκομεν, ἥτις ἐν τῷ ἀκτίστῳ καὶ τῷ κτιστῷ
115 καθορᾶται.

[16.14] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ὡσαύτως ἔχει ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ διὰ κτίσεως γεγενημένον ἀπὸ
ἀλλοιώσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἤρξατο καὶ συγγενῶς πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχει τροπήν· διὰ
[185] τοῦτο ὁ εἰδὼς τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, καθώς φησιν ἡ προφητεία,
ἐπακολουθήσας, μᾶλλον δὲ προκατανοήσας, τῇ προγνωστικῇ δυνάμει πρὸς ὅ τι ῥέπει
120 κατὰ τὸ αὐτοκρατές τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προαιρέσεως ἡ κίνησις,
ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐσόμενον εἶδεν· ἐπιτεχνᾶται τῇ εἰκόνι τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ
διαφορὰν, ἥτις οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀρχέτυπον βλέπει, ἀλλὰ, καθὼς εἴρηται, τῇ
ἀλογωτέρᾳ προσῳκείωται φύσει. [16.15] Τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιτεχνήσεως
μόνοι μὲν ἂν εἰδεῖεν οἱ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται τοῦ λόγου· ἡμεῖς δὲ,

98 ἔχει N ἀδέσποτον] ἀδέσποτον μὲν Æ B I N W ἡ ἀρετὴ χρῆμα L ἡ om. T 99 καὶ βεβιασμένον

ἀρετὴ] ἀρετῆς Z 101 τι om. Z ἔχοι] ita Æ B D G K L M O P S T X Forb : ἔχει I N : ἔχη Ald : ἔχῃ
Mign οὐκέτ᾽] ita Æ G K L O P Q S X Forb : οὐκ D : οὐκέτι W Ald Mign 102 ταὐτὸν] ipsum atque
aequale Dion : hoc Eri ἐκείνῳ] ἐκεῖνο Ald Mign διὰ πάντων] πάντως N 103 ὁμοιωμένου N :
ὡμοιωμένου Bac (ω post οι in ου a 1a man. mutatum) : ὁμοιουμένου D G L M P S T W : ὁμοιουμένου καὶ
X ἐν om. Q 104 τὸ¹ : τὸν Z ἄκτιστον Q : increata Dion : non creatum Eri 105 πάλιν ἑτέρων]
παλαιωτέρων Z συνωμολόγηται M T : ἐνομολογεῖται G τε om. Æ B I K N O 106 καὶ¹ om. Q εἶναι καὶ
ἂτρεπτον φύσιν D G L P S X καὶ² om. I 107 κτιστὴν] κτίσιν Z ἀδύνατον] μὴ N Q συστῆναι om.
T 108 ἐστὶ τις W τὸ² om. B N 109 μεθισταμένη N τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ] impressam in aere Dion : in
aere Eri τοῦ om. T 110 εἰκόνα] εἰκόνα εἶναι T κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρόσχημα] τὸ σχῆμα Z πρόσχημα] σχῆμα
Æ B I K M N O Q T 112 ἀντὶ χαρακτήρων] imaginationem quae Eri τε om. G N P Q X 114
ἐξευρίσκομεν, ἥτις] ἐξευρισκομένου· τίς Z τῷ om. D G I N P 116 ἐπειδὴ] ἐπεὶ T ἔχει] ἔχει καὶ Ald
Mign ἀπὸ] ita G L M N P S X Forb : ἀπ᾽ O W Ald Mign 117 συγγενῶν W ἔχει] ἔχει πρὸ W 118 φησι
τῇ προφητείᾳ T 119 ἀπακολουθήσας I προκατανοήσας] κατανοήσας N 120 τὸ αὐτοκρατές τε καὶ
αὐτεξούσιον] suam uirtutem suamque potentiam Eri ἡ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προαιρέσεως D G L M P Q S T
X 121 εἶδεν] οἶδεν I T : ἴδεν Q κατὰ] ita Æ B D I K L M P Q S T X Forb : πρὸς N : περὶ κατὰ W : περὶ Ald
Mign ἄρσεν D καὶ] καὶ τὸ L M N O Q 122–3 τῇ ἀλογωτέρᾳ προσῳκείωται] in mutabiliori possidet
Eri 123 προσοικείωται N Pac W ἐπιτεχνάσεως I : ἐπιτεχνίσεως K O : τεχνήσεως D : artificis Dion :
supermachinationis Eri 124 μὲν om. B K O
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necessity, and not in bondage to any natural domination, but to have self-
determining deliberation regarding what we resolve. For virtue is something free
and voluntary; what is constrained and forced cannot be virtue.¹⁷
[16.12] Now as the image bears in all points the stamp of the prototypical beauty,
if it did not have a difference in some respect it would assuredly no longer be a
likeness but, being without divergence in any point, it will be shown to be identical
to it in every way.¹⁸ What difference then do we discern between the divine itself
and that which is likened to the divine? We find it in the fact that one exists
uncreatedly, the other subsists through creation, and the difference of this prop-
erty produces further a sequence of other properties. For it is certainly and
universally confessed that the uncreated nature is also immutable, and always
remains as it is; while the created nature cannot subsist without alteration, for its
very passage from non-being into being is a kind of movement and alteration of
the non-existent being changed by the divine purpose into being.¹⁹ [16.13] And
just as the Gospel calls the stamp upon the coin the image of Caesar,²⁰ from which
we learn that in regard to outward appearance there was a likeness in that which
was modelled on Caesar but a difference in the substratum, so also in the present
account, when, instead of the outward forms, we consider the [attributes] con-
templated in the divine nature and the human, in which there is the likeness, we
find that the difference beheld between the uncreated and the created lies in the
substratum.²¹
[16.14] Since, then, the one always remains as it is, while the other, having come
into being though creation, began to exist from alteration and has kinship with
such change, on this account he who knows all things before their genesis, as the
prophecy says,²² following, or rather knowing beforehand, by his power of
foreknowledge towards what the movement of human choice inclines, in accord-
ance with its independence and self-determination—since he knows what is to be,
he devised for the image the difference according to male and female, which no
longer looks to the divine archetype but, as was said, assimilates to the less rational
nature. [16.15] The reason for such a device only those who were eyewitnesses of
the truth and ministers of the Word can know;²³ but we, as far as is possible, by

¹⁷ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 7.17 (Spira, 76.11–13); Cant. 5 (Langerbeck, 160.17–161.1); cf.
Plato, Resp. 10.617e.
¹⁸ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 2.41 (Spira, 26.10–18); Plato, Crat. 432b.
¹⁹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat. 6.7, 21.1–3 (Mühlenberg, 24.1–6, 55.4–56.10); Origen, Princ. 2.9.2;
4.4.8.
²⁰ Matt. 22:21. ²¹ Cf. Methodius, De res. 2.24 (Bonwetsch, 379–80).
²² Sus. (Θ) 42; cf. Hex. 9 (Drobner, 18.12–14). ²³ Luke 1:2.
 230   

125 καθώς ἐστι δυνατὸν, διὰ στοχασμῶν τινων καὶ εἰκόνων φαντασθέντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
τὸ ἐπὶ νοῦν ἐλθὸν οὐκ ἀποφαντικῶς ἐκτιθέμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν γυμνασίας εἴδει τοῖς
εὐγνώμοσι τῶν ἀκροωμένων προσθήσομεν.
[16.16] Τί τοίνυν ἐστὶν [B] ὃ περὶ τούτων διενοήθημεν; Εἰπὼν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐποίησεν
ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῷ ἀορίστῳ τῆς σημασίας ἅπαν ἐνδείκνυται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον·
130 οὐ γὰρ συνωνομάσθη τῷ κτίσματι νῦν ὁ Ἀδὰμ, καθὼς ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἡ ἱστορία
φησίν· ἀλλ᾽ ὄνομα τῷ κτισθέντι ἀνθρώπῳ οὐχ ὁ τὶς ἀλλ᾽ ὁ καθόλου ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν τῇ
καθολικῇ τῆς φύσεως κλήσει τοιοῦτόν τι ὑπονοεῖν ἐναγόμεθα, ὅτι τῇ θείᾳ προγνώσει
τε καὶ δυνάμει πᾶσα ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κατασκευῇ περιείληπται· χρὴ γὰρ
Θεῷ μηδὲν ἀόριστον ἐν τοῖς γεγενημένοις παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ νομίζειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν
135 ὄντων εἶναί τι πέρας καὶ μέτρον, τῇ τοῦ πεποιηκότος σοφίᾳ περιμετρούμενον.

[16.17] Ὥσπερ τοίνυν ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος τῷ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ποσῷ περιείργεται, καὶ
μέτρον αὐτῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἡ πηλικότης ἐστὶν, ἡ συναπαρτιζομένη [C] τῇ
ἐπιφανείᾳ τοῦ σώματος· οὕτως οἶμαι καθάπερ ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι ὅλον τὸ τῆς
ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα τῇ προγνωστικῇ δυνάμει παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων
140 περισχεθῆναι, καὶ τοῦτο διδάσκειν τὸν λόγον τὸν εἰπόντα, ὅτι καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν μέρει τῆς φύσεως ἡ
εἰκὼν, οὐδὲ ἔν τινι τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὴν θεωρουμένων ἡ χάρις· ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἅπαν τὸ γένος
ἐπίσης ἡ τοιαύτη διήκει δύναμις· σημεῖον δὲ, πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως ὁ νοῦς ἐγκαθίδρυται·
πάντες τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ προβουλεύειν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα δι᾽
145 ὧν ἡ θεία φύσις ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν γεγονότι ἀπεικονίζεται. Ὁμοίως ἔχει ὅ τε τῇ
πρώτῃ τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευῇ συναναδειχθεὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς
συντέλειαν γενησόμενος, [D] ἐπίσης ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν φέρουσι τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα.
[16.18] Διὰ τοῦτο εἷς ἄνθρωπος κατωνομάσθη τὸ πᾶν, ὅτι τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ Θεοῦ
οὔτε τι παρῴχηκεν οὔτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ προσδοκώμενον ἐπίσης τῷ παρόντι τῇ
150 περιεκτικῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἐνεργείᾳ περικρατεῖται. Πᾶσα τοίνυν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν
πρώτων μέχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκουσα, μία τις τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν εἰκών· ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ
ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ τοῦ γένους διαφορὰ προσκατεσκευάσθη τελευταῖον τῷ πλάσματι, διὰ
τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς οἶμαι, ταύτην.

125 εἰκόνων] εἰκότων B O T : indiciis Dion : consequentiis Eri φαντασθέντες] φθάσαντες N : φράσαντες Q W :
uestigia persquentes Dion : silentes Eri 126 ἐλθὸν] ἐλθὼν O W : ἐλθεῖν Z ἀποφατικῶς M N W εἴδει] si
oportet Eri 127 προθήσομεν B I T : προθήσωμεν Q : προ θήσομεν N 129 ἀορίστῳ] ἀοράτῳ L : ἀρίστω
Z ἐπιδείκνυται N 130 συνωνομάσθη τῷ κτίσματι] in conditione nominatus est Dion κτίσματι] κτίσαντι
Ζ ὁ om. Q 131 ὃ τὶς ἀλλ᾽ ὃ H N ὁ τὶς] ὅτι Z τίς ß I K L M P S καθόλου] καθόλον L οὐκοῦν] non igitur
Eri 131–2 τῇ καθολικῇ] τῆς καθολικῆς τῇ Ζ 132 τοιοῦτο Æ 132–3 τε προγνώσει Æ B K
O 135 περιμετρούμενον] καταμετρούμενον D 136 τίς Æ G H I K L M O P S X : om. B 137
συναπαρτιζομένη] ἀπαρτιζομένη D : συναρπαζομένη L 138 ἐν om. B D L ἐνὶ] ἐνὶ τινι Æ B I K M
O Q 138–9 ὅλον τὸ . . . πλήρωμα τῂ] ὅλῳ τῷ . . . πληρώματι T 139 τῷ θεῷ D G H L P S
X 140 περὶενσχεθῆναι N τοῦτον D G H P X διδάσκει D ὅτι om. N καὶ² om. K M O W 141
κατ᾽ ] καὶ κατ᾽ Mign 142 οὐδ᾽ D G H I L P S X κατ᾽ αὐτὴν] καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν B : καθ᾽ αὑτὸν Mign : om. Z 143
διήκει] ἦλθε W δὲ] δὲ ὅτι Mign πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως] πάλιν ὡς αὐτὸς T 144 πάντες] πάντες γὰρ I M καὶ¹]
καὶ τοῦ T τὰ ἄλλα] τἄλλα Æ B D G H I L P S X 145 καθ᾽ αὑτὴν M : καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν Æ B H ὅ τε] ὅτι I : ὃ L
146 κατασκευῇ τοῦ κόσμου N τοῦ κόσμου om. D G H L P Sac (corr. in marg.) X μετὰ] κατὰ Ald
Mign 147 γενησόμενος] γεγενημένος M : ἡγησόμενος K O 149 οὔτε] οὔτε τι D L M 151 τοῦ ὄντος]
substantiae Dion : uere existentis Eri ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος I 152 καὶ] καὶ τὸ D G H I M P S W X διαφορὰ τοῦ
γένους B προκατεσκευάσθη D M P X : προκατασκευάσθη H πλάσματι] πλάσαντι Z
        231

means of some guesses and images picturing the truth, do not set forth categor-
ically what comes to mind, but add it in a form of an exercise for our well-disposed
hearers.²⁴
[16.16] What is it then that we think concerning these matters? When the account
says that God made the human being, all humankind is indicated by the indefinite
character of the term; for the creature was not here also called ‘Adam’, as the narrative
that follows relates, but the name given to the created human is not the particular but
of the universal.²⁵ Thus, we are led by the universal name of the nature to suppose
something such as this, that by divine foreknowledge and power all humanity is
included in the first formation. For it is fitting for God not to think of any of the things
that had come to be by him as indeterminate, but that for each being there should be
some limit and measure marked out by the wisdom of the Maker.
[16.17] Now just as any particular human being is encompassed by his bodily
dimensions, and his magnitude, commensurate with the appearance of his body, is
the measure of his subsistence, so also, I think, that the entire plenitude of
humanity was included by the God of all, by the power of his foreknowledge, as
in one body, and that this is what the account teaches, saying that And God made
the human being, in accordance with the image of God made he him. For the image
is not in part of our nature, nor is the grace in any one of the things contemplated
regarding it, but this power extends equally to the whole genus; a sign of this is
that the intellect is seated in all alike. For all have the power of understanding and
deliberating,²⁶ and all the other attributes through which the divine nature is
reflected in that which came to be in accordance with it. The human being
manifested together with the first formation of the world, and he who shall
come to be after consummation of all, both likewise have this: they equally bear
in themselves the divine image. [16.18] For this reason the whole was called one
human being, because to the power of God nothing has either passed or is to
come, but even that which is looked for is embraced equally with the present by
his all-embracing activity. The whole nature, then, extending from the first to the
last, is a kind of single image of He Who Is. But the difference between male and
female was additionally fashioned last for that which is moulded, I suppose, for
this reason.

²⁴ ‘As an exercise’: cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 6 (Drobner, 13.17–18); An. et res. 3.36 (Spira, 40.6),
where it is also in reference to characteristics not found in the archetype but which are concomitant
(ἐπιγεγενῆσθαι, 3.35; Spira, 40.3); Trid. spat. (Gebhardt, 286.15–16).
²⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 31 (Drobner, 44.8).
²⁶ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 7 (Drobner, 15.3–5).
 232   

Τί χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς ἐπαποροῦντας, εἰ μετὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἡ παιδοποιΐα, πῶς ἂν
ἐγένοντο αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰ ἀναμάρτητοι διέμειναν οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄνθρωποι.
[17.1] Μᾶλλον δὲ, πρὶν τὸ προκείμενον διερευνῆσαι, κρεῖττον ἴσως τοῦ
προφερομένου παρὰ τῶν μαχομένων ἡμῖν ἐπιζητῆσαι τὴν λύσιν· λέγουσι γὰρ, πρὸ
5 τῆς ἁμαρτίας μήτε τόκον ἱστορεῖσθαι μήτε ὠδῖνα μήτε τὴν πρὸς παιδοποιΐαν ὁρμήν·
ἀποικισθέντων δὲ τοῦ παραδείσου μετὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ τιμωρίᾳ
τῶν ὠδίνων κατακριθείσης, οὕτως ἐλθεῖν τὸν Ἀδὰμ εἰς τὸ γνῶναι γαμικῶς τὴν
ὁμόζυγον, καὶ τότε τῆς παιδοποιΐας τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι· εἰ οὖν [B] γάμος ἐν τῷ
παραδείσῳ οὐκ ἦν οὔτε ὠδὶς οὔτε τόκος, ἀνάγκην εἶναί φασιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολούθου
10 λογίζεσθαι, μὴ ἂν ἐν πλήθει γενέσθαι τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὰς, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ θνητὸν
ἡ τῆς ἀθανασίας χάρις μετέπεσε καὶ ὁ γάμος διὰ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων συνετήρει τὴν
φύσιν, ἀντὶ τῶν ὑπεξιόντων τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀντεισάγων· ὥστε λυσιτελῆσαι τρόπον
τινὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐπεισελθοῦσαν τῇ ζωῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἔμεινε γὰρ ἂν ἐν τῇ τῶν
πρωτοπλάστων δυάδι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, μὴ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον φόβου πρὸς
15 διαδοχὴν τὴν φύσιν ἀνακινήσαντος.

[17.2] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτοις πάλιν ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος, ὅστις ποτὲ ὢν τυγχάνει, μόνοις ἂν
εἴη δῆλος τοῖς κατὰ Παῦλον τὰ τοῦ παραδείσου μυηθεῖσιν ἀπόρρητα· ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος
τοιοῦτός ἐστιν. Ἀντιλεγόντων ποτὲ τῶν Σαδδουκαίων τῷ κατὰ [C] τὴν ἀνάστασιν
λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν πολύγαμον ἐκείνην γυναῖκα, τὴν τοῖς ἑπτὰ γενομένην ἀδελφοῖς, εἰς
20 σύστασιν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς δόγματος προφερόντων, εἶτα τίνος μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν
ἔσται πυνθανομένων, ἀποκρίνεται πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁ Κύριος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς
Σαδδουκαίους παιδεύων ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ζωῆς
φανερῶν τὸ μυστήριον. Ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀναστάσει, φησὶν, οὔτε γαμοῦσιν οὔτε
γαμίσκονται, οὔτε γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται· ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι, καὶ υἱοὶ Θεοῦ
25 εἰσι, τῆς ἀναστάσεως υἱοὶ ὄντες· ἡ δὲ τῆς ἀναστάσεως χάρις οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἡμῖν
ἐπαγγέλλεται ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῶν πεπτωκότων ἀποκατάστασιν· ἐπάνοδος γάρ
τις ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν ἡ προσδοκωμένη χάρις, τὸν ἀποβληθέντα τοῦ
παραδείσου πάλιν εἰς αὐτὸν [D] ἐπανάγουσα· εἰ τοίνυν ἡ τῶν ἀποκαθισταμένων
ζωὴ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγγέλων οἰκείως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ πρὸ τῆς παραβάσεως βίος

Cap. 18 Æ I K N O Q T Dion Eri

1–2 τί—ἄνθρωποι] contra eos qui dicunt peccatum utiliter introductum ad propagationem humani
generis et quod per peccatum haec animalem generationem meruit Λ πῶς ἂν—ἄνθρωποι om. W 2
αἱ ψυχαὶ] οἱ ἄν(θρωπ)οι Z ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ Q 4 γὰρ om. N T 5 τόκον] γάμον D E F G L P S W X τὴν
om. D G P X 6 τῇ om. B Q 8 τῷ om. D G L P S X 9 ὠδὶν Æ D K N O P T Sac (ς sup. l.) X : ὠδῖν G :
ὠδίνη L 11–12 ὁ γάμος—ἀντεισάγων] nuptiae per superuenientes est pro oboedientibus reductos
naturam conseruarent Eri 12 ἐξ] ἀντ᾽ Æ B I K O 15 ἀνακαινίσαντος I K M O W 16 πάλιν] πᾶσιν
N μὲν] μὴν Mign μόνος M 17 εἴη δῆλος] ἐπίδολος N δῆλον X τοῦ om. Q δὲ] δ᾽ M 19 ἐκείνην
om. N γυναῖκα ἐκείνην M γεγενημένην N T : γεγαμημένην A B 20 κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς I 20–1 ἔσται μετὰ
τὴν ἀνάστασιν D G L P S X 22 σαδδικαίους W τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει] τῆς μετὰ τὴν
ἀνάστασιν Æ B I K M O Q T Dion Eri ταῦτα] ταύτης D² : om. Dac G P ἐν τῇ om. X 24 γαμίζονται
B L N : ἐκγαμίζονται I : ducent uxores Dion οὔτε] οὐδὲ B I K N O 24–5 εἰσι θεοῦ Æ B K M O
Q 25 εἰσι om. I 26 ἀρχαῖον] ἀρχέτυπον N 27 ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην ἐστὶν M Q ἐστιν om. D G L P
S X 28 εἰς] ἐπ᾽ M T : πρὸς N αὐτὸν] ἑαυτὸν X 29 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι Ald Mign παραβάσεως]
καταπτώσεως M Q : ruinam Dion Eri βίος] ἄνθρωπος M Dion : ὡς Q : om. Eri
        233

What we must answer to those who ask: ‘If procreation comes after the sin, how
would souls have come into being if human beings had remained sinless from the
beginning?’²⁷
[17.1] It is better, perhaps, before investigating the matter, rather to enquire into
the solution brought forward by our opponents; for they say that before the sin
there is no account of childbirth or of travail or of the impulse towards procre-
ation; but that when they were banished from Paradise after the sin, and the
woman was condemned with the punishment of travail, then Adam entered into
marital knowledge with his partner, and then there was the beginning of procre-
ation. If, then, marriage did not exist in Paradise, nor travail nor childbirth, they
say that, by necessary consequence, it must be supposed that human souls would
not have existed in plurality if the grace of immortality had not fallen away to
mortality and marriage preserved our nature by means of descendants, introdu-
cing the offspring of those departing to take their place, so that the sin that entered
in, in a certain way, benefitted the life of human beings, for the human race would
have remained in the pair of the first-formed, had not the fear of death impelled
their nature to provide succession.
[17.2] But in these matters, again, the true account, whatever it may be, can be
clear only to those, like Paul, who are initiated into the ineffable things of
Paradise;²⁸ but our answer is this. When the Sadducees at one time argued against
the account of the resurrection, and, to establish their own doctrine, brought
forward that polygamous woman, who had been wife to seven brothers, and then
enquired whose she will be after the resurrection, the Lord answered their
argument, not only instructing the Sadducees, but also revealing to all who
come after them the mystery of the life in the resurrection: For in the resurrection,
he says, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any
more; for they are equal to the angels, and are children of God, being the children of
the resurrection.²⁹ Now the grace of the resurrection promises us nothing other
than the restoration of the fallen to the primordial state; for the grace looked for is
a kind of ascent to the first life, bringing back again to Paradise him who was cast

²⁷ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 18): ‘Against those who say that sin was a useful introduction for the
propagation of the human race; and that by sin it deserved animal generation’.
²⁸ Cf. 2 Cor. 12:4.
²⁹ Luke 20:35–6; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.58 (Spira, 110.16–20); Methodius, De res. 1, 51.2
(Bonwetsch, 305.6–13).
 234   

30 ἀγγελικός τις ἦν· διὸ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν ἐπάνοδος τοῖς ἀγγέλοις
ὡμοίωται· ἀλλὰ μὴν, καθὼς εἴρηται, γάμου [189] παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ὄντος, ἐν μυριάσιν
ἀπείροις αἱ στρατιαὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων εἰσίν, οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀπτασίαις ὁ Δανιὴλ
διηγήσατο· οὐκοῦν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εἴπερ μηδεμία παρατροπή τε καὶ
ἔκστασις ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ὁμοτιμίας ἐξ ἁμαρτίας ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ
35 ἡμεῖς τοῦ γάμου πρὸς τὸν πληθυσμὸν ἐδεήθημεν· ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν
ἀγγέλων τοῦ πλεονασμοῦ τρόπος (ἄρρητος μὲν καὶ ἀνεπινόητος στοχασμοῖς
ἀνθρωπίνοις, πλὴν ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐστίν) οὗτος ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βραχύ τι παρ᾽
ἀγγέλους ἠλαττωμένων ἀνθρώπων ἐνήργησεν, εἰς τὸ ὡρισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς
τοῦ πεποιηκότος μέτρον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὔξων. [17.3] Εἰ δὲ στενοχωρεῖταί τις,
40 ἐπιζητῶν τὸν τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ψυχῶν τρόπον, εἰ μὴ προσεδεήθη τῆς διὰ τοῦ γάμου
συνεργίας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀντερωτήσομεν [B] καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸν τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ὑποστάσεως
τρόπον, πῶς ἐν ἀπείροις μυριάσιν ἐκεῖνοι, καὶ μία οὐσία ὄντες καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς
ἀριθμούμενοι· τοῦτο γὰρ προσφόρως ἀποκρινούμεθα τῷ προφέροντι, πῶς ἂν ἦν
δίχα τοῦ γάμου ὁ ἄνθρωπος; εἰπόντες, ὅτι καθώς εἰσι χωρὶς γάμου οἱ ἄγγελοι· τὸ
45 γὰρ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι πρὸς τῆς παραβάσεως, δείκνυσιν ἡ εἰς ἐκεῖνο
πάλιν ἀποκατάστασις.
[17.4] Τούτων οὖν ἡμῖν οὑτωσὶ διευκρινηθέντων, ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον
λόγον—πῶς μετὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς εἰκόνος, τὴν [C] κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ
διαφορὰν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπιτεχνᾶται τῷ πλάσματι· πρὸς τοῦτο γάρ φημι χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸ
50 προδιηνυσμένον ἡμῖν θεώρημα· ὁ γὰρ τὰ πάντα παραγαγὼν εἰς τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ὅλον ἐν
τῷ ἰδίῳ θελήματι τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρὸς τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα διαμορφώσας, οὐ ταῖς κατ᾽
ὀλίγον προσθήκαις τῶν ἐπιγινομένων ἀνέμεινεν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον πλήρωμα τὸν
ἀριθμὸν τῶν ψυχῶν τελειούμενον· ἀλλ᾽ ἀθρόως αὐτῷ πληρώματι πᾶσαν τὴν
ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν διὰ τῆς προγνωστικῆς ἐνεργείας κατανοήσας, καὶ τῇ ὑψηλῇ τε
55 καὶ ἰσαγγέλῳ λήξει τιμήσας, ἐπειδὴ προεῖδε τῇ ὁρατικῇ δυνάμει μὴ εὐθυποροῦσαν
πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τὴν προαίρεσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῆς ἀγγελικῆς ζωῆς ἀποπίπτουσαν—ὡς

30 ἀγγελικός] ἄγγελος Q Dion Eri τοῖς om. N 31 μὴν om. M καθὼς εἴρεται om. N 32 ἀπείροις]
ἀπόροις M : ἄπειροι T οὕτως W 33 οὐκοῦν] non igitur Eri κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον] per eundem
hominem Eri αὐτὸν] αὐτὸν ἂν Æ Bpc G I L M Q S W 34 ὁμοτιμίας] πολιτείας I ἐξεγένετο I : γέγονεν
D G L P S X 33 οὐδ᾽ G I P S X : οὔτε N 35 ἐδεήθημεν] alligaremur Eri ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις] alius quidam
Eri 36 ἀγγέλων] ἀγγέλων ὁ D G L M² P S W X ἀνεπινόητος] ἀνενόητος I : ἀπερινόητος T 37 ἐστιν
om. N οὕτως Æ G K M O P Q W X 38 ἀνθρώπων om. M N Q T W Dion Eri 39 εἰ] ἐὰν A B I K
O στενοχωρῆται Æ ßpc Bpc : σταναχωρῆται I : στενοχωρεῖ G L M N P S (ται sup. l.) X Dion Eri 40
ψυχῶν] ita Æ B D G I L O M P S W X Dion Eri Forb : ἀνθρώπων Ald Mign προσεδέθη Q : alligaretur
Eri διὰ om. D G L P S X 41 συνεργείας D L P Q T W X : κοινωνίας K O ἀντερωτήσωμεν G K L O
P Q W X τῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς ἀγγελικῆς N 42 μυριάσιν om. B καὶ¹] καὶ ἐν B μιᾷ ß I K M O
P Dion οὐσία] ὑποστάσει M 43 προσφέροντι Dac N ἦν om. X 44 ἐπειπόντες B χωρὶς γάμου]
ita D G I K L M P Q S X Forb : γάμου χωρὶς W Ald Mign χωρὶς] δίχα τοῦ K O 45 ὁμοίως] ὅμοιον
Mign ἐκεῖνα T 47 οὖν om. O ἡμῖν οὑτωσὶ] οὕτως ἡμῖν Æ B I K N O οὑτωσὶ] ita D G L P S W Forb
: οὕτως Æ B I K M N O Q : οὕτω Ald Mign 48 θῆλυ καὶ ἄρρεν M Q θῆλυ] τὸ θῆλυ I N 49 διαφορὰν
om. M ἐπιτεχνᾶται τῷ πλάσματι] suo dignatus sit excogitare figmento Dion : supermachinatus est . . .
formationi Eri 49–50 τὸ προδιηνυσμένον ἡμῖν θεώρημα] superiorem hanc inspectionem quae a nobis
exprompta est Dion : prius perfectam a nobis theoriam Eri 50 προδιηνυσμένον] προδιηνισμένον O :
διηνυμένον K : προδεικνυσμένον Fac : προδεδεικνυμένον Fpc : προδεικνυόμενον B : προδεδειγμένον
M Dion ἡμῖν om. D πάντα] πάντα ἡμῖν T 51 θείαν] ἰδίαν M N διαμορφώσας] μεταμορφώσας
K M O 52 τὸν] τῷ O 53 ψυχῶν] ἀνθρώπων T αὐτῷ] ἐν τῷ P : αὐτῷ τῷ Æ B I K O 54 τε om.
D G L P S X 55 προΐδε P Q X διορατικῇ N μὴ om. D 56 καλὸν] κακὸν G ἀγγελικῆς]
εὐαγγελικῆς M
        235

out from it.³⁰ If then the life of those restored is akin to that of the angels, it is clear
that the mode of life before the transgression was something angelic, and hence
our ascent to the primordial condition of life is likened to the angels. Yet, as has
been said, while there is no marriage among them, the armies of the angels are in
countless myriads, for so Daniel declared in his visions; therefore, in the same way,
if there had not come upon us as the result of sin a turning away and a
displacement from equality of honour with the angels, neither should we have
needed marriage for multiplying, but whatever the mode of increase is in the
nature of the angels (unspeakable and inconceivable by human guesses, except
that it assuredly exists), it would have operated also in the case of human beings,
made a little lower than the angels,³¹ increasing humankind to the measure
determined by the will of the Maker. [17.3] But if anyone is perplexed, when
enquiring about the mode of the genesis of souls had the human being not
needed the assistance of marriage, we shall ask him in turn about the mode of the
angelic subsistence: how they exist in countless myriads, being one essence and
at the same time numerically many. For we will give a suitable answer to one
who raises the question, how would the human being have been without
marriage, if we say, just as the angels are without marriage; for the restoration
again to that state shows that the human being was like them before the
transgression.
[17.4] Now that we have thus cleared up these matters, let us return to the former
point: how it was that after the formation of the image, God contrived for that
which is moulded the difference of male and female. The reflection we have
completed is, I say, useful for this one. He who brought all things into being,
and modelled the human being as a whole by his own will into the divine image,
did not wait to see the number of souls made complete in its proper plenitude by
the gradual addition of those subsequently coming to be, but considering the
human nature as a whole, in its plenitude, by the activity of foreknowledge, and
honouring it with an allocation exalted and equal to the angels, since he foresaw by
his visionary power the [human] will not keeping a straight course towards the
good and, because of this, falling away from the angelic life, in order that the

³⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.69–70 (Spira, 112.19–113.4); Eccl. 1 (Alexander, 296.16–18;
ET 45); Virg. 12 (Cavarnos, 302.5–9).
³¹ Ps. 8:6.
 236   

ἂν μὴ κολοβωθείη τὸ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πλῆθος, ἐκπεσὸν ἐκείνου τοῦ

τρόπου καθ᾽ ὃν [D] οἱ ἄγγελοι πρὸς πλῆθος ηὐξήθησαν· διὰ τοῦτο τὴν κατάλληλον
τοῖς εἰς ἁμαρτίαν κατολισθήσασι τῆς αὐξήσεως ἐπίνοιαν ἐγκατασκευάζει τῇ φύσει,
60 ἀντὶ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς μεγαλοφυΐας τὸν κτηνώδη τε καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ἐξ ἀλλήλων
διαδοχῆς τρόπον ἐμφυτεύσας τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι. [17.5] Ἐντεῦθέν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ
μέγας Δαυὶδ, κατοικτιζόμενος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ἀθλιότητα, τοιούτοις λόγοις
καταθρηνῆσαι τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐν τιμῇ ὢν οὐ συνῆκε (τιμὴν λέγων τὴν
πρὸς τοὺς ἀγγέλους ὁμοτιμίαν) διὰ τοῦτο, φησὶ, παρασυνεβλήθη τοῖς κτήνεσι τοῖς
65 ἀνοήτοις καὶ ὡμοιώθη αὐτοῖς· ὄντως γὰρ κτηνώδης ἐγένετο ὁ τὴν ῥοώδη [192]
ταύτην γένεσιν τῇ φύσει παραδεξάμενος διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑλῶδες ῥοπήν.
Ὅτι τὰ ἄλογα ἐν ἡμῖν πάθη ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν συγγενείας τὰς ἀφορμὰς
ἔχει.
[18.1] Οἶμαι γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον πάθη οἷον ἔκ τινος
πηγῆς συνδοθέντα πλημμυρεῖν ἐν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ζωῇ· τεκμήριον δὲ τῶν λόγων, ἡ τῶν
5 παθημάτων συγγένεια, κατὰ τὸ ἶσον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐμφαινομένη· οὐ γὰρ
δὴ θέμις τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει τῇ κατὰ τὸ θεῖον εἶδος μεμορφωμένῃ, [B] τῆς ἐμπαθοῦς
διαθέσεως προσμαρτυρεῖν τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ προεισῆλθεν εἰς τὸν
κόσμον τοῦτον ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων ζωὴ, ἔσχε δέ τι διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκεῖθεν
φύσεως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, (τὸ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν λέγω) συμμετέσχε διὰ τούτου καὶ τῶν
10 λοιπῶν τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῃ θεωρουμένων τῇ φύσει· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου ἡ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσις, οὔτε διὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡ ὑπερέχουσα
χαρακτηρίζεται φύσις· δειλία τε καὶ θράσος καὶ ἡ τοῦ πλείονος ἔφεσις καὶ τὸ πρὸς
τὸ ἐλαττοῦσθαι μῖσος καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, πόρρω τοῦ θεοπρεποῦς χαρακτῆρός ἐστι.
[18.2] Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις πρὸς ἑαυτὴν
15 ἐφειλκύσατο. Οἷς γὰρ ἡ ἄλογος ζωὴ πρὸς συντήρησιν ἑαυτῆς ἠσφαλίσθη, ταῦτα
πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον μετενεχθέντα βίον, πάθη [C] ἐγένετο· θυμῷ μὲν γὰρ
συντηρεῖται τὰ ὠμοβόρα, φιληδονίᾳ δὲ τὰ πολυγονοῦντα τῶν ζώων· σώζει τὸν

57 κολοβωθῆ T : κολοβωθήειη Q ψυχῶν τῶν ἀνθωπίνων] ἀνθρώπων ψυχῶν B ἐκπεσὼν ß

Q 58 πρὸς] εἰς T : πρὸς τὸ Ald Mign τὴν om. N 59 κατασκευάζει N 60 μεγαλοφυΐας] συμφυΐας
G P² 61 ἐμοῖ Æ B I K O T 62 δαυίδ] ita Forb : δαβίδ Ald Mign 63 καταθρινῆσαι O 64 τοὺς om. Æ
B I K M O Q T W φησὶ om. D G L P S X παρασυνεβλήθη φησὶ M Q παρασυνεβλήθη] παρ᾽
ἐσυνεβλήθη N Pac W : παρὰ ἐσυνεβλήθη Q 65 καὶ ὡμοιώθη αὐτοῖς] om. Eri 65–6 κτηνώδης ἐγένετο ὁ
. . . παραδεξάμενος] κτηνώδεις ἐγένοντο οἱ [ὡς Æ : ἡ I] . . . παραδεξάμενοι Æ B I K N O T 65 ὁ om. D G
L S W X ῥοώδη] ζωώδη P Sac (ῥο sup. l.) W X Dion Eri 66 ῥοπήν] τροπὴν Pac? Q

Cap. 19 Æ ß K N O Q Dion Eri

1–2 ὅτι—ἔχει] quod ceterae quoque passiones nobis et irrationalibus animatibus communes sunt et
quod per earum refrenationem similes deo dicimur Λ 3 καὶ om. T 4 συναναδοθέντα B πλημμύρειν
N ζωῇ] conuersatione Dion τεκμήριον δὲ τῶν λόγων] τεκμηριοῖ δὲ τὸν λόγον Æ B Fpc I K M N O Q
T : confirmat autem rationem Eri 5 ἴσον I K M N O S W X τε om. N 6 δὴ] μὴ T φύσει om.
K O τὸ om. M N 7 πρώτας om. Q Dion Eri προσῆλθεν Dac I L M : προῆλθεν Dpc2 K N O 8 δέ om.
N 8–9 τῆς ἐκεῖθεν φύσεως] ex eadem formatione Dion : ex uita quae ibi est Eri 9 φύσεως] φύσεως
γένεσιν L καὶ om. B τὸ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν λέγω] iuxta generandi de coitu rationem Dion τὸ . . .
λέγω] τῷ . . . λόγῳ I N O συμμετέσχε] μετέσχε L S : συμμετέχει γὰρ N τοῦτο G L P Q S X 10 ἐν
ἐκείνῃ] ἐκεῖθεν Q 12 καὶ θράσος om. I 13 ἐλαττούμενον N ἅπαντα Æ B I K O T 15 ἐφελκύσατο
G P W X ἑαυτῆς] αὐτῆς D G L P S W X 16 ἐγένοντο M μὲν om. K 17 ὠμοβόρα] αἱμοβόρα
T φιληδονίᾳ] S Forb : φιληδονία W X Ald Mign punctis post σώζει Ald Mign τὸν] τὴν N
       – 237

multitude of human souls should not be cut short, by falling from that mode by which
the angels increased to a multitude, for this reason he formed in our nature that device
for increase appropriate to those who had slipped into sin, implanting in humanity,
instead of the angelic nobility, the animal and irrational mode of succession from one
another. [17.5] Hence also, it seems to me, the great David, lamenting the misery
of the human being, mourns over his nature with such words as these, that, the
human being in honour knew it not (meaning by honour the equality of honour
with the angels), [and] therefore, he says, he was compared to senseless beasts, and
made like them.³² For the one who received in his nature this genesis subject to
flux on account of his inclination to things material truly became like a beast.

That our irrational passions have their starting point from kinship with the
irrational nature.³³
[18.1] For I think that from this beginning the passions of each one issue as
from a spring, to flow over in human life. Proof of my words is the kinship of
passions manifest alike in ourselves and in the irrational animals; for it is not
right to ascribe the first beginnings of the impassioned disposition to that human
nature modelled in accordance with the divine form; but as the life of the
irrational animals entered into this world first, and the human being, for the
reason already mentioned, has something of their nature (I mean regarding
genesis), he therefore also partook of the other [attributes] contemplated in that
nature.³⁴ For the likeness of the human being towards the divine is not by virtue
of anger, nor is the superior nature characterized by pleasure; cowardice also,
and rashness, and the desire of gain, and the hatred of loss, and all the like, are
far removed from the divinely-fitting character. [18.2] These, then, human
nature drew to itself from the irrational side. For these things, with which the
irrational life was armed for self-preservation, when transferred to the human
mode of life became passions: for the carnivorous animals are sustained by anger,

³² Ps. 48:13.
³³ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 19): ‘That our other passions also are common to us and to the irrational
animals, and that by the restraint of them we are said to be like God’.
³⁴ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.12 (Spira, 34.7–11).
 238   

ἄναλκιν ἡ δειλία, καὶ τὸν εὐάλωτον τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις ὁ φόβος, τὸν δὲ πολύσαρκον ἡ
λαιμαργία· καὶ τὸ διαμαρτεῖν οὑτινοσοῦν τῶν καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν, λύπης ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς
20 ἀλόγοις ἐστί· ταῦτα πάντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ τῆς κτηνώδους γενέσεως συνεισῆλθε
τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῇ.
[18.3] Καί μοι συγκεχωρήσθω κατά τινα πλαστικὴν θαυματοποιΐαν διαγράψαι τῷ
λόγῳ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εἰκόνα. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐν τοῖς πλάσμασι τὰς
διαγλύφους μορφὰς ἃς μηχανῶνται πρὸς ἔκπληξιν τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων οἱ τὰ
25 τοιαῦτα φιλοτεχνοῦντες, μιᾷ κεφαλῇ δύο μορφὰς προσώπων ὑποχαράσσοντες·
οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ διπλῆν [D] φέρειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία τὴν ὁμοιότητα—
τῷ μὲν θεοειδεῖ τῆς διανοίας πρὸς τὸ θεῖον κάλλος μεμορφωμένος, ταῖς δὲ κατὰ
πάθος ἐγγινομέναις ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸ κτηνῶδες φέρων τὴν οἰκειότητα· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ
ὁ λόγος ἀποκτηνοῦται, διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον ῥοπῆς τε καὶ διαθέσεως
30 συγκαλύπτων τὸ κρεῖττον τῷ χείρονι· ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν
διανοητικὴν ἐνέργειαν καθελκύσῃ, καὶ ὑπηρέτην τῶν παθῶν γενέσθαι τὸν
λογισμὸν ἐκβιάσηται, παρατροπή τις γίνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ χαρακτῆρος πρὸς τὴν
ἄλογον εἰκόνα, πάσης πρὸς τοῦτο μεταχαρασσομένης τῆς φύσεως, καθάπερ
γεωργοῦντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὰς τῶν παθημάτων ἀρχὰς καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγων εἰς πλῆθος
35 ἐπαύξοντος· τὴν γὰρ παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ συνεργίαν χρήσας τῷ πάθει, πολύχουν καὶ
ἀμφιλαφῆ τὴν τῶν [193] ἀτόπων γένεσιν ἀπειργάσατο.
[18.4] Οὕτως ἡ φιληδονία τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἔσχεν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον ὁμοιώσεως,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πλημμελήμασι προσηυξήθη, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς τῶν κατὰ
τὴν ἡδονὴν ἁμαρτανομένων γεννήσασα, ὅσας ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν.
40 Οὕτως ἡ πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν διανάστασις συγγενὴς μέν ἐστι τῇ τῶν ἀλόγων ὁρμῇ,
αὔξεται δὲ τῇ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίᾳ· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἡ μῆνις, ὁ φθόνος, τὸ ψεῦδος, ἡ
ἐπιβουλὴ, ἡ ὑπόκρισις· [B] ταῦτα πάντα τῆς πονηρᾶς τοῦ νοῦ γεωργίας ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ
γυμνωθείη τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας τὸ πάθος, ὠκύμορός τις καὶ ἄτονος ὁ
θυμὸς καταλείπεται, πομφόλυγος δίκην, ὁμοῦ τε γινόμενος καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπολλύμενος.
45 Οὕτως ἡ τῶν συῶν λαιμαργία τὴν πλεονεξίαν εἰσήνεγκε, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἵππου γαῦρον
γέγονε τῆς ὑπερηφανίας ἀρχή· καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον πάντα τῆς κτηνώδους ἀλογίας

19 ἐν om. N Q T 20 πάντα ταῦτα T 22 συγκεχωρείσθω G N O P : συγκεχωρίσθω B Q

X πλαστικὴν] πλασμευτικὴν B : πλασματικὴν Æ θαυμαστοποιΐαν P 24 διγλύφους Mign 25
ὑποχαράττοντες L M 26 οὕτως M μοι om. K O τὰ ἐναντία] τἀναντία Æ B D G N O P X 27
πρὸς τὸ θεῖον om. I K O 28 πάθος] τὸ πάθος D G L N P S X γινομέναις N 29 ὁ λόγος] ὅλος Æ C Fac
I K M N O : ὅλως B Q : pene Dion 30 τοῦτο N 31 καὶ om. M γενέσθαι τῶν παθῶν W Ald
Mign παθημάτων M Q 32 ἐκβιάσεται K O 33 μεταχαττομένης L : χαρασσομένης Dac P G X :
παραχαρασσομένης Dpc2 34 λογισμοῦ] νοῦ O ὀλίγον N 35 συνέργειαν G Pac W X : ἐνέργειαν
N 38 ἀλλ᾽ ἐν] ἐν δὲ Æ B I K O προσηυξήθη] ἐπηυξήθη M 38–9 κατὰ τὴν] καθ᾽ T 39
ἁμαρτημάτων D N ὅσας] οἵας N 40 τῆς . . . ὁρμῆς N T 41 συμμαχίᾳ] συμπαθείᾳ M ὁ φθόνος
post τὸ ψεῦδος pon. B : post ὑπόκρισις (l. 42) pon. A D E F G L P S X 42 ὑπόκρισις] ὑπόκρισις ὁ δόλος, ἡ
ὑπουλία, ἡ ἀπιστία, ἡ κακοήθεια, τὸ θράσος, ἡ κακηγορία, Æ B C I K (om. ὁ δόλος) O γεωργίας]
ἐνεγείας T : operationis Eri γὰρ om. I 43 ἐκ om. Q συμμαχίας] συνεργίας B ὠκιμότερος G Pac X :
ὠκυμοτώτερος P² 44 καταλιμπάνεται T 45 συῶν] κυνῶν D Emg εἰσήνεγκε] εἰσήγαγεν
I 46 ὑπερηφανείας W τὰ om. L Q X καθ᾽ ἕκαστον πάντα τὰ D G P S X
        239

and those animals that breed prolifically, by their love of pleasure; cowardice
preserves the weak, fear what is easily taken by the more powerful, and greediness
those of great bulk; and to miss anything that tends towards pleasure is for the
animals a matter of pain. All these and suchlike entered the human formation
through the animal-like genesis.
[18.3]³⁵ Allow me to describe the human image by comparison with some
wonderful piece of modelling. For just as one may see those carved shapes in
moulded figures, which craftsmen of such things contrive for the astonishment of
observers, tracing out two forms of faces on a single head, so also, it seems to me,
that the human being bears a twofold likeness to opposite things, being formed, in
the divine aspect of the mind, in accordance with the divine beauty, but also
bearing, in the passionate impulses that arise in him, a relationship to the animal-
like [form]. For frequently even his reason is made animal-like through his
inclination and disposition to the irrational, obscuring the better by the worse.
For whenever someone drags down his discursive activity towards these, and
forces his calculating faculty to become the servant of the passions, a sort of
turning away occurs, from the good stamp towards the irrational image, his whole
nature being traced out anew in accord with this, as his calculating faculty
cultivates the beginnings of the passions and gradually causes them to grow into
a multitude; furnishing passion with its own cooperation, it effects the genesis,
plenteous and abundant, of evils.
[18.4] Thus, the love of pleasure had its beginning from the likeness to the
irrational animal, but was increased by human transgressions, begetting such
varieties of sinning for pleasure as is not to be found among the irrational animals.
Thus, the rising of anger is indeed akin to the impulse of the irrational animals,
but it grows by the alliance of the calculating faculty. For thence come malignity,
envy, deceit, treachery, hypocrisy: all these are the result of the evil husbandry of
the intellect. For if the passion were stripped of the alliance with calculating
thoughts, the anger that is left behind is short-lived and weak, like a bubble,
bursting as soon as it comes into being. Thus, the greediness of pigs introduces
covetousness, and the high spirit of the horse becomes the origin of pride; and all

³⁵ For the following paragraphs (18.3–5), see Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.39–50 and 6.9–10
(Spira, 41–3; 65.9–66.2); and Chapter 12 above.
 240   

ἀφορμηθέντα διὰ τῆς πονηρᾶς τοῦ νοῦ χρήσεως κακία ἐγένετο, [18.5] Ὥσπερ οὖν
καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, εἴπερ ὁ λογισμὸς τῶν τοιούτων κινημάτων ἀντιμεταλάβοι τὸ
κράτος, εἰς ἀρετῆς εἶδος ἕκαστον τούτων ἀντιμεθίσταται· ποιεῖ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θυμὸς
50 τὴν ἀνδρίαν, τὸ δὲ δειλὸν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, καὶ ὁ φόβος τὴν εὐπείθειαν, τὸ μῖσος δὲ τὴν
τῆς κακίας ἀποστροφὴν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαπητικὴ δύναμις τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς καλὸν [C]
ἐπιθυμίαν· τὸ δὲ γαῦρον τοῦ ἤθους ὑπεραίρει τῶν παθημάτων καὶ ἀδούλωτον ὑπὸ
τοῦ κακοῦ διαφυλάσσει τὸ φρόνημα. Ἐπαινεῖ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ἐπάρσεως εἶδος καὶ
ὁ μέγας ἀπόστολος, συνεχῶς ἐγκελευόμενος τὰ ἄνω φρονεῖν· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν,
55 ὅτι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον κίνημα τῷ ὑψηλῷ τῆς διανοίας συνεπαιρόμενον, τῷ κατὰ τὴν
θείαν εἰκόνα κάλλει συσχηματίζεται.
[18.6] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ βαρεῖά τις ἐστὶ καὶ κατωφερὴς ἡ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ῥοπὴ, πλεῖον τὸ
ἕτερον γίνεται· μᾶλλον γὰρ τῷ βάρει τῆς ἀλόγου φύσεως συγκατασπᾶται τὸ
ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἤπερ τῷ ὕψει τῆς διανοίας τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ χοϊκὸν
60 ἀνυψοῦται· διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις ἀγνοεῖσθαι ποιεῖ τὸ θεῖον δῶρον ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς
ἀθλιότης, οἷον προσωπεῖον εἰδεχθὲς τῷ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα κάλλει τὰ πάθη τῆς [D]
σαρκὸς ἐπιπλάσσουσα. [18.7] Οὐκοῦν συγγνωστοί πως εἰσὶν οἱ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα
βλέποντες, εἶτα τὴν θείαν μορφὴν ἐν τούτοις εἶναι οὐκ εὐχερῶς συντιθέμενοι· ἀλλὰ
διὰ τῶν κατωρθωκότων τὸν βίον, ἔξεστι τὴν θείαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰκόνα βλέπειν·
65 εἰ γὰρ ἐμπαθής τις καὶ σάρκινος ὢν ἀπιστεῖσθαι ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς θείῳ κάλλει
κεκοσμημένον· ὁ ὑψηλὸς πάντως τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ καθαρεύων ἐκ μολυσμάτων
βεβαιώσει σοι τὴν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπόληψιν. [18.8] Οἷον
κρεῖττον γὰρ ἐν ὑποδείγματι δεῖξαι τὸν λόγον· ἀπήλειψε τῷ τῆς πονηρίας
μολύσματι τὸ τῆς φύσεως κάλλος τὶς τῶν ἐπὶ κακίᾳ γνωρίμων, Ἰεχονίας τυχὸν ἢ
70 εἴ τις ἕτερος ἐπὶ κακῷ μνημονεύεται· ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Μωϋσῇ καὶ τοῖς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον καθαρὰ
διεφυλάχθη ἡ [196] τῆς εἰκόνος μορφή. Ἐν οἷς τοίνυν οὐκ ἠμαυρώθη τὸ κάλλος, ἐν

47 ἐγίνετο G P X 48 ἀντιμεταλαμβάνοι T : ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο N : ἀντιλάβοιτο M : ἀντιμεταβάλοι D :

ἀντιμεταβάλλοι G L P S τὸ² om. N 49 ποιεῖ] ποιεῖ μὲν B Q μὲν om. B 50 ἀνδρείαν B G K M O P
W : ἀνδρείαν Sac (ϊ sup. l.) καὶ om. M μίσος N 51 τῆς κακίας om. M ἀποστροφὴν] ἀποτροπὴν Q :
reditum Eri 52 ὑπὲραίρεται N ὑπὸ] ἀπὸ Æ B I K O T 53 διαφυλάττει D L : φυλάσσει B τὸ τοιοῦτο
Æ N Q : τῷ τοιούτῳ K O τῆς ἐπάρσεως τὸ τοιοῦτον L 54 συνεχῶς om. Q : assidue Eri 55 πᾶν—
συνεπαιρόμενον] semper altitudo intelligentiae per ipsam mota confinitatem Eri τοιοῦτο Æ Q S
W τὴν om. T 57 ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ] ἐπεὶ δὲ D G L P S X πλέον D G L P S X 57–8 τὸ ἕτερον] τὸ ἔργον
Æ T : τῆς ἁμαρτίας B (sed exp. a 1a man.) : om. ß 58–60 μᾶλλον—ἀνυψοῦται om. W 59 ἤπερ]
ἥπερN : εἴπερ G I L P : ἤπερ Xpc2 60 ἀνυψοῦται] ἀνοχλεῖται T 61 κατὰ τὴν] κατ᾽ N πάθη]
παθήματα Æ ß M N O Q T W 62 ἐπιπλάττουσα B I L M οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri 64 εἰκόνα ἐν τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις D G L P X 66–7 ὁ ὑψηλὸς—βεβαιώσει] si excelsus omnino uirtute firmabit Eri 66 καὶ om.
D G P X ἐκ om. M 68 ἀπήλειψε] ἐπήλειψε M Q : ἐπέκρυψε N τῷ] τὸ O 69 τις post τῶν pon. Æ
B M Q : post γνωρίμων L O 70 ἕτερος εἴ τις N 71 μορφή] ἀρχή W
        241

the particular forms originating from the irrationality of the animals become
vices by the evil use of the intellect.³⁶ [18.5] So also, therefore, on the contrary,
if the calculating faculty instead assumes control over these movements, each of
them is transposed to a form of virtue. For anger produces courage, cowardice
caution, fear obedience, hatred aversion from vice, the faculty of love the desire of
the truly beautiful; high spirit in character raises thought above the passions and
guards it from bondage to evil. The great Apostle also praises such a form of
elevation, urging us always to think about those things that are above.³⁷ And so one
finds that every such movement, when elevated by the loftiness of mind, is
conformed to the beauty of the divine image.
[18.6] But since the tendency to sin is heavy and bears downward, the
opposite more often happens. For the governing principle of the soul is dragged
downwards by the weight of the irrational nature much more than is the heavy
and earthy element raised up by the loftiness of mind. Therefore, our wretch-
edness often causes the divine gift to be unknown, spreading the passions of
the flesh, like some ugly mask, over the beauty of the image. [18.7] Those,
therefore, are in some sense excusable, who do not readily admit, when they
look upon such cases, that the divine form is in them. But it is possible to see the
divine image in human beings through those who have correctly ordered their
mode of life. For if one who is impassioned and fleshly makes it unbelievable [to
think that] the human being has been adorned as it were, with divine beauty,
surely one of lofty virtue and pure from pollution will confirm for you the better
conception of human beings. [18.8] For instance (for it is better to explain our
argument by an example), one of those noted for evil—Jechoniah, perhaps, or
some other remembered for evil—has expunged the beauty of his nature by the
pollution of wickedness, but in Moses, and those like him, the form of the image
was kept pure.³⁸ In those, then, where the beauty has not been obscured, there is

³⁶ Cf. Philo, Opif. 73. ³⁷ Col. 3:2.

³⁸ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 3.22–3 (Spira, 36.9–17); Vit. Moys. 2.318–19 (Musurillo,
143.14–144.3).
 242   

τούτοις ἐναργὴς ἡ τῶν λεγομένων πίστις ἐστὶν, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Θεοῦ μίμημα
γέγονεν.
[18.9] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαισχύνεταί τις τυχὸν, τῷ διὰ βρώσεως ἡμῖν καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν
75 ἀλόγων τὴν ζωὴν συνεστᾶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάξιον ἡγεῖται τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ κατ᾽
εἰκόνα Θεοῦ πεπλᾶσθαι δοκεῖν· ἀλλ᾽ ἐλπιζέτω τῆς λειτουργείας ταύτης ἀτέλειαν
δοθήσεσθαι τῇ φύσει ποτὲ, κατὰ τὴν προσδοκωμένην ζωήν. Οὐ γάρ ἐστι, καθώς
φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ βρῶσις καὶ πόσις, οὐδὲ ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ ζήσεσθαι
μόνῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ Κύριος προηγόρευσεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ
80 διὰ στόματος Θεοῦ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἰσάγγελον ἡμῖν ὑποδεικνυούσης τὸν
βίον, βρώσεως δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις οὐκ οὔσης, ἱκανὴ [B] πίστις τοῦ
ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι τῆς τοιαύτης λειτουργίας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸν καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν
ἀγγέλων ζησόμενον.
Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, πάλιν ἐν βρώσει καὶ πόσει εἶναι τῶν ἐλπιζομένων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
ἀπόλαυσιν, διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ γεγράφθαι διὰ τούτων τὸν ἄνθρωπον
ζῆν.
[19.1] [C] Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τις οὐκ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος ἐπανελεύσεσθαι λέγει
5 τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἴγε πρότερον μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν ἦμεν, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης
λειτουργίας ἀφεθησόμεθα. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ, τῆς ἁγίας ἀκούων γραφῆς, οὐ μόνον σωματικὴν
ἐπίσταμαι βρῶσιν, οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ σαρκὸς εὐφροσύνην· ἀλλά τινα καὶ ἑτέραν οἶδα
τροφὴν, ἀναλογίαν τινὰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσαν, ἧς ἡ ἀπόλαυσις ἐπὶ μόνην
τὴν ψυχὴν διαβαίνει· φάγετε τῶν ἐμῶν ἄρτων, ἡ σοφία τοῖς πεινῶσι διακελεύεται·
10 καὶ μακαρίζει τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην βρῶσιν πεινῶντας ὁ Κύριος· καὶ εἴ τις διψᾷ, φησὶν,
ἐρχέσθω πρός με καὶ πινέτω· καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἡσαΐας πίετε εὐφροσύνην τοῖς δυνατοῖς
[D] ἐπαΐειν τῆς μεγαλοφυΐας αὐτοῦ ἐγκελεύεται· ἔστι δέ τις καὶ ἀπειλὴ προφητικὴ
κατὰ τῶν τιμωρίας ἀξίων, ὡς λιμῷ κολασθησομένων· ὁ δὲ λιμὸς, οὐκ ἄρτου τίς ἐστιν
ἀπορία καὶ ὕδατος, ἀλλὰ λόγου ἐπίλειψις· οὐ λιμὸν γὰρ ἄρτου, φησὶν, ἢ δίψαν
15 ὕδατος, ἀλλὰ λιμὸν τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι λόγον Κυρίου.

72 ἐνεργὴς Q : ἀληθὴς M ὅτι] ὅτι ὁ K M N O S 74 ἐπαισχύναιτέ W τῷ] τὸ B N O P² Q T ἡμῖν om.

Æ 75 συνεστάναι Æ I K M S T W Ald Mign : καθεστάναι X 76 πεπλάσθαι Æ I K M O S V
X Mign δοκεῖν πεπλᾶσθαι D λειτουργίας ß G P W X 77 δοθείσεσθαι W τῇ φύσει δοθήσεσθαι
M καθὼς om. D G L P S V X 78 οὐδ᾽ G I P X 78–9 ζήσεσθαι μόνῳ] ita Æ B D G L P Q S V X Forb :
μόνῳ ζήσεσθαι O W Ald Mign 78 ζήσεται D 79 τὸν ἄνθρωπον] ἄνθρωπος D προσηγόρευσεν B Dac
G N O Ppc V W 80 ὑποδεικνυούσης] ἀποκεικνυούσης C

Cap. 20 Æ I N O Q Dion Eri

19.25–21.16 (διορατικωτέροις—ἀλλ᾽ἀναγκαίοις): Paris, BN, grec. 1356, fragments (sigla Z)
Cap. 19–29 desunt K
1–3 πρὸς—ζῆν] cuiusmodi debeat intelligi esse cibus hominis quo uescebatur in paradise et a quo
prohibitus est Λ 1 καὶ πόσει om. N πόσει] ita Æ B D G I L M P Q S Forb : ἐν πόσει Ald Mign εἶναι]
post ἀπόλαυσιν (l. 2) pon. Æ B I M N O Q Dion Eri: om. W 2–3 διὰ τὸ—ζῆν om. W 2 ἐξ ἀρχῆς om.
I τῷ om. D I 4 ἀλλ᾽ om. Q τις om. I πάλιν om. M 5 μετὰ] μετὰ δὲ M 7 καὶ ἑτέραν τινὰ B καὶ
om. N Q 7–8 τροφὴν οἶδα B 7 οἶδα] οἷμαι N 8 ἡ om. Q 9 τὴν om. M Q φάγετε] φάγετε γὰρ I
τὸν ἐμὸν ἄρτον Æ B D I O P² Q T V διακελεύεται] παρακελεύεται M N T 9–12 καὶ μακαρίζει—
ἐγκελεύεται om. X 10 τοιαύτην] αὐτὴν B φησὶν om. D G L N O P S T 11 πρός με] ita Æ G I L M
N P S V W Ald Forb : πρὸς μὲ Mign 12 ἐπαΐειν] ita Æ ß G I L N P Q S V : ἐπαείειν W : ἐπακούειν M :
ἐπὶ T 13 τιμωρίας ἀξίων] τιμωρηθησομένων T λιμῷ] λιμῷ καὶ δίψει N τίς ἐστιν] τινός ἐστιν M T :
μόνον D 14 ἢ] καὶ Æ B I O T : οὐδὲ N 15 λόγων Ald Mign
       – 243

made clear the faithfulness of what was said, that the human being has come to
be as an imitation of God.
[18.9] But it may be that someone is ashamed that our life, in accordance with the
likeness of the irrational animals, is sustained by food, and for this reason
considers the human being unworthy of being supposed to have been moulded
in the image of God. But it may be hoped that exemption from this function will
one day be given to our nature, in the life that is looked for. The Kingdom of God is
not food and drink, as the apostle says;³⁹ neither does the human being live by bread
alone, the Lord declared, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.⁴⁰
Moreover, as the resurrection indicates to us a mode of life equal to the angels, and
with the angels there is no food, there is sufficient grounds for believing that the
human being, who will live in likeness to the angels, will be delivered from such a
function.
To those who say: ‘The enjoyment of the good things hoped for will again be in food
and drink, because from the beginning in Paradise, it is written, the human being
lived by these means.’⁴¹
[19.1] But perhaps someone will say that the human being will not return again
to the same form of life, if we formerly existed by eating but hereafter will be
released from such a function. I, however, when I hear the Holy Scripture, do not
understand only bodily food or the cheerfulness of the flesh; but I know another
kind of food also, having some sort of analogy to that of the body, the enjoyment
of which extends to the soul alone: Eat of my bread, is the bidding of Wisdom to
the hungry; and the Lord blesses those who hunger for such food, and says, If
anyone thirst, let him come unto Me, and drink: and drink joy, the great Isaiah
charges those able to hear his sublimity.⁴² There is a prophetic threatening also
against those worthy of vengeance, that they shall be punished with famine; but
the famine is not a lack of bread and water, but a lack of a word: not a famine of
bread, he says, nor a thirst for water, but a famine of hearing a word of the Lord.⁴³

³⁹ Rom. 14:17. ⁴⁰ Matt. 4:4.

⁴¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 20): ‘How the food ought to be understood with which the human was fed in
paradise and from which he was prohibited’.
⁴² Prov. 9:5; Matt. 5:6; John 7:37; cf. Isa. 12:3. ⁴³ Amos 8:11.
 244   

[19.2] Οὐκοῦν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ φυτείας τῆς ἐν Ἐδὲμ (τρυφὴ δὲ ἡ Ἐδὲμ ἑρμηνεύεται)
ἄξιόν τινα προσήκει τὸν καρπὸν ἐννοῆσαι, καὶ τρέφεσθαι διὰ τούτου μὴ ἀμφιβάλλειν
τὸν ἄνθρωπον· καὶ μὴ πάντως τὴν παροδικὴν καὶ ἀπόρρυτον ταύτην τροφὴν ἐπὶ τῆς
τοῦ παραδείσου διαγωγῆς ἐννοεῖν· ἀπὸ παντὸς, φησὶ, ξύλου τοῦ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ
20 βρώσει φάγῃ. [19.3] Τίς δώσει τῷ ὑγιεινῶς πεινῶντι τὸ ξύλον ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἐν τῷ
παραδείσῳ, τὸ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ περιληπτικὸν, ᾧ ὄνομά ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, [197] οὗ
χαρίζεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν μετουσίαν ὁ λόγος; τῷ γὰρ γενικῷ τε καὶ
ὑπερκειμένῳ λόγῳ πᾶσα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰδέα πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συμφυῶς ἔχει, καὶ ἕν τι τὸ
ὅλον ἐστί. Τίς δέ με τῆς συμμιγοῦς τε καὶ ἐπαμφοτεριζούσης τοῦ ξύλου γεύσεως
25 ἀποστήσει; πάντως γὰρ οὐκ ἄδηλον τοῖς διορατικωτέροις, τί τὸ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο οὗ
καρπὸς ἡ ζωὴ, καὶ πάλιν, τί τὸ ἐπίμικτον τοῦτο οὗ πέρας ὁ θάνατος· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ
παντὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν ἀφθόνως προθεὶς, λόγῳ τινὶ πάντως καὶ προμηθείᾳ τῆς τῶν
ἐπικοίνων μετουσίας ἀπείργει τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
[19.4] Καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸν μέγαν Δαυὶδ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν Σολομῶντα διδασκάλους
30 τῆς τοῦ λόγου τούτου παραλαβεῖν ἐξηγήσεως· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ τῆς
συγκεχωρημένης τρυφῆς μίαν ἡγοῦνται τὴν χάριν, αὐτὸ τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν, ὃ δὴ
καὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν· Δαυὶδ [B] μὲν λέγων, Κατατρύφησον τοῦ Κυρίου·
Σολομὼν δὲ τὴν σοφίαν αὐτὴν, ἥ τις ἐστὶν ὁ Κύριος, ξύλον ζωῆς ὀνομάζων.
[19.5] Οὐκοῦν ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ τῆς ζωῆς ξύλῳ τὸ πᾶν ξύλον, οὗ τὴν βρῶσιν τῷ κατὰ
35 Θεὸν πλασθέντι ὁ λόγος δίδωσιν· ἀντιδιαιρεῖται δὲ τῷ ξύλῳ τούτῳ ἕτερον ξύλον, οὗ
ἡ βρῶσις καλοῦ καὶ κακοῦ γνῶσίς ἐστιν, οὐκ ἰδιαζόντως ἑκάτερον τῶν κατὰ τὸ
ἐναντίον σημαινομένων ἐν μέρει καρποφοροῦντος, ἀλλά τινα συγκεχυμένον καὶ
σύμμικτον καρπὸν ἐξανθοῦντος ταῖς ἐναντίαις συγκεκραμένον ποιότησιν· οὗ
κωλύει μὲν τὴν βρῶσιν ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς, συμβουλεύει δὲ ὁ ὄφις, ἵνα τῷ
40 θανάτῳ κατασκευάσῃ τὴν εἴσοδον· καὶ πιθανὸς γίνεται συμβουλεύσας, εὐχροίᾳ

16 οὐκοῦν] numquid Eri τοῦ θεοῦ om. T 17 τὸν καρπὸν ἐννοῆσαι προσήκει W Ald Mign 18 τὴν om.
Q ταύτην καὶ ἀπόρρυτον M ἀπόρρητον B L τρυφὴν Dion 19 τοῦ¹ om. I διαγωγῆς ἐννοεῖν] τρυφῆς
ἐννοῆσαι V W ἐννοῆσαι D G L P S X παντὸς] παντὸς γὰρ M φησι om. O Q T ξύλου φησι Æ B I
M N W 20 φάγῃ] φαγῇ G P T V : φάγῇ Sac ὑγεεινῶς Forb τὸ²] τῷ V 22 τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ] τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου : om. B τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὴν μετουσίαν] τὴν μετουσίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ D μετουσίαν] περιουσίαν
V W λόγος] νόμος Æ B I M N O Q Dion Eri 23 συμφυῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν D ἑαυτὴν] αὐτὴν D G L P
S τι om. M N Q T Dion Eri 24 τε om. D G P X 25 ἀπιστήσει O τι om. N τὸ om. Z πᾶν] πᾶν
εἴη T οὗ] ᾧ M 26 τι om. N οὗ πέρας ὁ θάνατος om. N T V W Z Eri 27 προσθεὶς G N P 28
ἐπικοίνων] κοινῶν N 29 κἀμοὶ T post μέγαν reliqua desunt V δαυίδ (et l. 32)] ita Forb : δαβίδ Ald
Mign σοφὸν] sapientissimum Dion διδάσκαλον Æ B D G I M O P X Eri : om. Dion 30 λόγου] νόμου
Æ M O Q Dion Eri 31 συγκεχωρισμένης B τροφῆς G L P Q S X Dion Eri τὴν om. D L ὄντως]
ὄντως ὂν Æ B N O T W : ὄντως ὃν Q 31–2 ὃ δὴ καὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν om. I M Q T 32 πᾶν] πᾶσιν
X 33 σολομῶν Æ ὁ κύριος ἐστὶν N 34 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri ξύλῳ τὸ πᾶν ξύλον] ξύλον τῷ παντὶ
ξύλῳ I 35 λόγος] νόμος Æ B I M O Q Dion Eri ἀντιδιαιρεῖ M T ξύλον ἕτερον M 36 ἡ om.
T καλοῦ] καλοῦ τε D L Q ἑκατέρου N 37 καὶ om. D 38 ταῖς om. N 40 γέγονε Æ I M N O Q T
W Dion : om. B σύμβουλος N
        245

[19.2] Therefore, one should understand the fruit in Eden (and Eden means
‘delight’) as something worthy of God’s planting and not doubt whether the
human being was nourished by it. And one should certainly not, with respect to
the course of life in Paradise, understand transitory and perishable nourishment:
of every tree for food in Paradise, he says, you may eat.⁴⁴ [19.3] Who will give to
one with a wholesome hunger that tree that is in Paradise, which includes all good,
the name of which is ‘the all’;⁴⁵ of which the account bestows a share to the human
being? For in the generic and transcendent word [i.e. ‘all’], every form of good is in
harmony with itself, and the whole is one. And who will keep me back from the
mixed and doubled tasting of the tree? For surely it is not unclear to the more
perceptive what ‘the all’ is whose fruit is life, and again, what the mixed is whose
limit is death; for he who ungrudgingly holds out the enjoyment of ‘the all’ debars,
surely for some reason and forethought, the human being from participation in
things that are common.
[19.4] It seems to me that I may take the great David and the wise Solomon as
my teachers in the interpretation of this passage: for both understand the
grace of the permitted delight to be one, the truly good itself, which is indeed
also ‘all’ good: David, when he says, Delight in the Lord, and Solomon, when he
names Wisdom herself, which is the Lord, a tree of life.⁴⁶ [19.5] Thus, the all
tree, which the account gives as food to the one moulded by God, is the same as the
tree of life.⁴⁷ There is opposed to this tree another tree, the food of which is the
knowledge of good and evil,⁴⁸ not as if bearing as fruit, individually in turn, each of
these things signified as opposites, but in that it produces some kind of blended
and mixed fruit, compounded of opposite qualities, of which the Prince of life
forbids eating, but the serpent counsels, so that he might prepare an entrance for
death. And his counsel was persuasive, covering over the fruit with a certain

⁴⁴ Gen. 2:16.
⁴⁵ Gregory is playing here on the words used in Gen. 2:16, ἀπὸ παντὸς ξύλου, ‘from every tree’ (as
RSV): the word usually translated as ‘every’ means ‘all’, and as such can be taken as the designation of
the (singular) tree, i.e. ‘the all tree’.
⁴⁶ Ps. 36:4; Prov. 3:18. ⁴⁷ Gen. 2:9. ⁴⁸ Gen. 2:9, 17.
 246   

τινὶ καὶ ἡδονῇ τὸν καρπὸν περιχρώσας, ὡς ἂν ὀφθείη τε ἡδέως καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν πρὸς
τὴν γεῦσιν ὑπερεθίσειεν.
Τίς ἡ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ ζωὴ, καὶ τί τὸ ἀπηγορευμένον ἐκεῖνο ξύλον;
[20.1] Τί οὖν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ὃ καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ συγκεκραμένην ἔχει τὴν γνῶσιν,
ταῖς δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἡδοναῖς ἐπηνθισμένον; ἆρα μὴ πόρρω τῆς ἀληθείας
παραστοχάζομαι, τῇ τοῦ γνωστοῦ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῆς θεωρίας συγχρώμενος.
5 Οἶμαι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς νοεῖσθαι τὴν γνῶσιν, ἀλλά τινα
διαφορὰν ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς συνηθείας εὑρίσκω, γνώσεώς τε καὶ διακρίσεως· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ διακρίνειν ἐπιστημόνως τὸ καλὸν ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦ, τελειοτέρας ἕξεως εἶναί φησιν ὁ
ἀπόστολος, καὶ γεγυμνασμένων αἰσθητηρίων· διὸ καὶ πρόσταγμα ποιεῖται πάντα
δοκιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ τὸ διακρίνειν ἴδιον [D] εἶναι φησίν· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις οὐ
10 πανταχοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ τὴν εἴδησιν ὑφηγεῖται κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀλλὰ
τὴν πρὸς τὸ κεχαρισμένον διάθεσιν· ὡς, ἔγνω Κύριος τοὺς ὄντας αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸν
Μωϋσέα φησὶν, ὅτι ἔγνων σε παρὰ πάντας· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν κακίᾳ κατεγνωσμένων
λέγει ὁ τὰ πάντα εἰδὼς, ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔγνων ὑμᾶς.
[20.2] Οὐκοῦν τὸ ξύλον, ἀφ᾽ οὗ [200] ἡ σύμμικτος γνῶσις καρποφορεῖται, τῶν
15 ἀπηγορευμένων ἐστί· μέμικται δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ὁ καρπὸς ἐκεῖνος, ὁ συνήγορον
ἔχων ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ὄφιν, τάχα κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ὅτι οὐ γυμνὸν πρόκειται τὸ
κακὸν, αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν φαινόμενον· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἄπρακτος ἦν ἡ
κακία, μηδενὶ προσκεχρωσμένη καλῷ τῷ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτῆς ἐφελκομένῳ τὸν
ἀπατώμενον· νυνὶ δὲ σύμμικτός πως ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις, ἐν μὲν τῷ βάθει τὸν
20 ὄλεθρον οἷόν τινα δόλον ἐγκεκρυμμένον ἔχουσα, ἐν δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀπάτῃ
καλοῦ τινα φαντασίαν παραδεικνύουσα. Καλὸν δοκεῖ τοῖς φιλαργύροις ἡ τῆς ὕλης
εὔχροια· ἀλλὰ ῥίζα πάντων τῶν κακῶν ἡ φιλαργυρία γίνεται. Τίς δ᾽ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν
δυσώδη βόρβορον τῆς ἀκολασίας κατώλισθεν, εἰ μὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν καλόν τε καὶ αἱρετὸν
[B] ᾤετο ὁ τῷ δελέατι τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ πάθος κατασυρόμενος; οὕτω καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν

41 πρὸς] ὑπὲρ N 42 ὑπερεθίσειεν] ὑπερθίσειεν L : ὑπερθήσειεν G P (ε sup. ή) X : ὑπερκινήσειεν N

Cap. 21 Æ ß I N O Q T Dion Eri

1 τίς—ξύλον] quare scriptura uocauerit illa arborem lignum scientia boni et mali Λ ἐκεῖνο] ita
Æ B D G H I M N O P Q T Forb : om. Ald Mig ξύλον ἐκεῖνο W 2 ὃ] ὃ καὶ T τε om. M N T 3
αἰσήσεων M T ἐπηνθισμένον] insitum Eri 4 παραστοχάζομαι] ita Æ B D G I L N O P Q S T X Ald
Forb : στοχάζομαι M : παραστοχάσομαι Mign τῆς om. M 5 γνῶσιν] γνῶ Z 6 εὑρίσκων L τε καὶ
διακρίσεως om. L 7 ἐπιστημόνως] ἐπιστηομινκῶς N : ἐπιστημόνως ὡς L τελεωτέρας Æ 8
αἰσθητηρίων] τὰ αἰσητήρια M προστάγματα Q 9 τὸ om. Æ P ἡ] εἰ O 10 τε om. T κατὰ τὸ
σημαινόμενον ὑφηγεῖται Æ B I M N O Q T W Dion : καὶ το σημαινόμενον ὑφηγεῖται Z ὑφηγεῖται]
om. Eri 11 ὡς] ὡς τὸ I 12 ὅτι om. N O Q Dion δὲ om. B Dion κατεγνωσμένων]
ac
διεγνωσμένων D G P X : κατεγνωσμένον S (διε sup. l.) 13 τὰ om. Æ B I N O Q T W 14
οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri 15 μέμικται] ἐνμέμικται B ὁ] ὡς T : om. N 16 λόγον τοῦτον] ἑαυτοῦ λόγον
Q 17 ἐφ᾽] ἀφ᾽ N ἦ] ἢ G L : εἰ P W X 18 προσκεχρημένη H : προσκεχωρισμένη O : συνκεχρωσμένη
T 19 νυνὶ] νοῦν·εἰ T ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις ἐστὶν Æ B I M O Q T W Dion Eri μὲν] μένων W 20 δόλον]
δοκὸν ß : λόχον Æ N O T W : λόγον I M 21 παραδεικνύουσα] παραδεικνύσα O : παραδεικνύουσαν Z :
παραδεικνύουσα ὥσπερ ἡ φιλαργυρία καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτά τινα· καὶ γὰρ H 22 φιλαργυρία] φιλαρία
Z 23 ἀκολασίας] πορνείας ἢ φιληδονίας N κατωλίσθησεν T τε] τι Mign αἱρετὸν] ἀγαθὸν
N 24 ὁ om. Æ ß I O Dion δελέατι] δελεάματι Æac D
       – 247

attractiveness and delight, so that it might appear pleasant and stimulate the
appetite for a taste.
What was the life in Paradise, and what was that forbidden tree?⁴⁹
[20.1] What then is that which has the knowledge of good and evil blended
together, and is decked with the pleasures of sense?⁵⁰ I am not aiming wide of
the truth in employing, as a starting point for my contemplation, the meaning of
‘knowable’.⁵¹ It is not, I think, ‘science’ which Scripture here means by ‘know-
ledge’; for I find a certain distinction, from customary scriptural use, between
‘knowledge’ and ‘discernment’. For to discern skilfully the good from the evil, the
Apostle says is of a more perfect condition and of exercised senses;⁵² on which
account he also gives the injunction test all things,⁵³ and says that discernment
belongs to the spiritual.⁵⁴ But ‘knowledge’ does not always indicate, by its signi-
fication, ‘science’ and ‘intelligence’, but the disposition towards what is pleasing, as
in, The Lord knows those that are his,⁵⁵ and as he says to Moses, I knew you above
all,⁵⁶ while of those condemned in their wickedness, the one who knows all things
says, I never knew you.⁵⁷
[20.2] The tree, therefore, from which is borne the fruit of mixed knowledge, is
among those things which are forbidden; and that fruit, which has the serpent as
its own advocate, is mixed of opposites, perhaps so that evil is not proposed
nakedly, itself appearing in its own nature. For evil would be unsuccessful if did
not avail itself of beauty, enticing the one deceived to a desire of it; but as it is, the
nature of evil is mixed in some way, keeping destruction, like some bait, hidden in
its depth, but displaying some illusion of good in the deceit of appearances. The
attractiveness of the matter seems good to those who love money, yet, the love of
money is a root of all evil.⁵⁸ Who would sink into the stinking mire of licentious-
ness, were it not that he, whom this bait drags into passion, thinks pleasure a good
and acceptable thing? Thus also, the other sins keep their destruction hidden, and

⁴⁹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 21): ‘Why Scripture called the tree “the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil” ’.
⁵⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat. 21.4–5 (Mühlenberg, 56.10–57.6).
⁵¹ Cf. Gen. 2:9, where the tree is called ‘the tree of the knowable [γνωστὸν] of good and evil’.
⁵² Heb. 5:14. ⁵³ 1 Thess. 5:21. ⁵⁴ 1 Cor. 2:15. ⁵⁵ Num. 16:5; 2 Tim. 2:19.
⁵⁶ Exod. 33:12. ⁵⁷ Matt. 7:23. ⁵⁸ 1 Tim. 6:10.
 248   

25 ἁμαρτημάτων ἐγκεκρυμμένην ἔχοντα τὴν διαφθορὰν, αἱρετὰ παρὰ τὴν πρώτην

δοκεῖ, διά τινος ἀπάτης τοῖς ἀνεπισκέπτοις ἀντ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ σπουδαζόμενα.
[20.3] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τῷ τὰς αἰσθήσεις εὐφραίνοντι κρίνουσι,
καί τις ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἶναι καλοῦ· τούτου χάριν ἡ
πρὸς τὸ κακὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν γινομένη ἐπιθυμία, καλοῦ καὶ κακοῦ γνῶσις ὑπὸ
30 τῆς γραφῆς ὠνομάσθη, συνδιάθεσίν τινα καὶ ἀνάκρασιν ἑρμηνευούσης τῆς γνώσεως.
Οὔτε ἀπολύτως κακὸν, διότι περιήνθισται τῷ καλῷ, οὔτε καθαρῶς ἀγαθὸν, διότι
ὑποκέκρυπται τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ σύμμικτον δι᾽ ἑκατέρων τοῦ ἀπηγορευμένου ξύλου τὸν
καρπὸν εἶναί φησιν, οὗ τὴν γεῦσιν εἰς θάνατον ἄγειν [C] εἶπε τοὺς ἁψαμένους·
μονονουχὶ φανερῶς τὸ δόγμα βοῶν, ὅτι τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἀγαθὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ μονοειδές
35 ἐστι τῇ φύσει, πάσης διπλόης καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον συζυγίας ἀλλότριον· τὸ δὲ
κακὸν ποικίλον τε καὶ κατεσχηματισμένον ἐστὶν, ἄλλό τι νομιζόμενον, καὶ ἕτερον διὰ
τῆς πείρας ἀναφαινόμενον· οὗ τὴν γνῶσιν, τουτέστι τὴν διὰ τῆς πείρας ἀνάληψιν,
θανάτου καὶ διαφθορᾶς ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὑπόθεσιν γίνεσθαι.
[20.4] Διὰ τοῦτο προδείκνυσιν ὁ ὄφις τὸν πονηρὸν τῆς ἁμαρτίας καρπὸν, οὐχ ὡς
40 εἶχε φύσεως τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐπιδείξας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠπατήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος
τῷ προδήλῳ κακῷ) ἀλλὰ, διά τινος ὥρας τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγλαΐσας καί τινα κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν ἐγγοητεύσας τῇ γεύσει, πιθανὸς ἐφάνη τῇ γυναικὶ, καθώς [D] φησιν
ἡ γραφή· καὶ εἶδε γάρ φησιν ἡ γυνή ὅτι καλὸν τὸ ξύλον εἰς βρῶσιν καὶ ὅτι ἀρεστὸν
τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἰδεῖν, καὶ ὡραῖόν ἐστι τοῦ κατανοῆσαι· καὶ λαβοῦσα τοῦ καρποῦ
45 αὐτοῦ ἔφαγεν· ἡ δὲ βρῶσις ἐκείνη θανάτου μήτηρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γέγονεν· αὕτη
τοίνυν ἡ σύμμικτός ἐστι καρποφορία, σαφῶς τοῦ λόγου τὸν νοῦν ἑρμηνεύοντος, καθ᾽
ὃν καλοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ γνωστὸν ὠνομάσθη τὸ ξύλον ἐκεῖνο· ὅτι κατὰ τὴν τῶν
δηλητηρίων κακίαν τῶν παραρτυθέντων τῷ μέλιτι, καθὸ μὲν καταγλυκαίνει τὴν
αἴσθησιν, καλὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ· καθὸ δὲ φθείρει τὸν προσαπτόμενον, κακοῦ παντὸς
50 ἔσχατον γίνεται. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐνήργησε κατὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζωῆς τὸ πονηρὸν

25 διαφθορὰν] διαφορὰν I Pac (corr. 1a man.) Dion Eri πρώτην] πρώτην γνῶσιν N : primam
delectationem 26 ἀντὶ N ἀγαθῶν M 27 κρίνονται H 28 καὶ] καὶ μία Q 27 τις om. Æ B I
O ὁμωνυμία] ἐπωνυμία Q εἶναι om. Æ B I M N O T W 29 τὸ om. Æ B M Q γενομένη
Q καλοῦ] καλοῦ τε M 29–30 ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς om. D 30 ἀνάκρασιν] συνανάκρασιν Æ B I O 32
τοῦ] τῶν τοῦ Z 33 εἶπε εἰς θάνατον ἄγειν Æ B I M N O Q T W ἀγαγεῖν T εἶπε ἄγειν L ἁψαμένους]
γευσαμένους N 34 μονονουχὶ] μόνον· οὐχὶ Z : solummodo non Eri φανερῶς om. D ὂν] ὃν Q : ὢν
B (sed non ß) : om. Ald Mign 35 τὴν φύσιν M 36 καταισχηματισμένον O ἐστὶν om. T ἄλλό τι
νομιζόμενον] alicui commixtum Eri 37 ἀναφενόμενον N : φαινόμενον M : apparens Eri τὴν² om. D G
H P X διὰ τῆς πείρας] τῆς διαπείρας D (eras. διὰ) 38 καὶ¹ om. M διαφθορᾶς] διαφορᾶς Pac : φθορᾶς
DILO γενέσθαι I O 39–40 οὐχ ὡς—ἐπιδείξας] sic ex propatulo malum non habere naturam
ostendens Eri 40 προφανῶς Q : περιφανοῦς M ἐπιδείξας] ὑποδείξας B N 41 ὥρας om. N ἀγλαΐας
N 42 γεύσει] γεύσει καὶ D 43 καὶ¹ om. B P² γὰρ om. M ἡ γυνή φησιν W Ald Mign φησιν om.
M 44 ἰδεῖν] τοῦ ἰδεῖν O ἐστι post ἀρεστὸν (l. 43) pon. M : om. B 45 αὐτοῦ om. M γέγονεν τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις Æ B O : γέγονε προδήλως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις I γέγονεν] ἐγίνετο D : γίνεται M 46 ἡ om. D G
P W X ἑρμηνεύσαντος Æ B I M O Q T 47 ἐκεῖνο om. M 48 τῶν παραρτυθέντων τῷ μέλιτι] quae in
melle fiunt Eri παρατυθέντων τῷ μέλιτι] τῷ μέλι κεκραμμένων Q 49 προσαψάμενον Æ B I M N O Q
T 50 ἔσχατον] αἴσχιον N ἐνήργησε] ἐνείργησε W : ἐνήργησαν Z
        249

seem at the first sight acceptable, making themselves, by some deceit, eagerly
sought after by the unwary instead of what is good.
[20.3] Therefore, since the majority judge the good to be in that which gratifies
the senses, and there is a certain homonymy between that which is and that which
appears to be ‘good’, for this reason the desire arising towards evil, as though
towards the good, is named by Scripture the knowledge of good and evil, ‘know-
ledge’, as we have said, expressing a certain mixed disposition.⁵⁹ It means that the
fruit of the forbidden tree is not absolutely evil, for it is decked with good, nor
purely good, for evil is hidden within it, but as compounded of both; [Scripture]
said that tasting of it leads those who touch it to death, almost proclaiming aloud
the doctrine that the truly existing good is in its nature simple and single in form,
alien from all duplicity and from conjunction with its opposite, while evil is varied
and fairly adorned, reckoned to be one thing but shown by experience to be
another, the knowledge of which, that is, its reception by experience, is the
beginning and ground of death and destruction.
[20.4] Therefore, the serpent points out the evil fruit of sin, not showing the evil
in its own nature clearly (for the human being would not have been deceived by
manifest evil) but, through some radiance beautifying what appears and enchant-
ing the taste by a certain sensual pleasure, he presents it to the woman winningly,
just as the Scripture says: and the woman, it says, saw that the tree was good for
food and that it was pleasing to the eyes to see and beautiful to perceive, and, taking
the fruit of it, she ate:⁶⁰ this eating became the mother of death to human beings.
This, then, is the compounded fruit-bearing; the account clearly expresses the
meaning that that tree was called of the knowledge of good and evil because, like the
evil of poisons prepared with honey, it appears to be good, insofar as it produces a
sense of sweetness in the senses, but is the worst of all evil, insofar as it destroys the
one who touches it.⁶¹ When, then, the evil poison worked its effect upon the life of
the human being, then the human being—that noble thing and name, the copy of

⁵⁹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Cant. 12 (Langerbeck, 348.12–352.5). ⁶⁰ Gen. 3:6.

⁶¹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat. 7.3 (Mühlenberg, 29.13–16).
 250   

δηλητήριον, τότε ὁ [201] ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μέγα καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὄνομα, τὸ τῆς θείας
φύσεως ἀπεικόνισμα, τῇ ματαιότητι, καθώς φησιν ὁ προφήτης, ὡμοιώθη.
[20.5] Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν εἰκὼν πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν νοουμένων ᾠκείωται· τὰ
δὲ ὅσα περὶ τὸν βίον λυπηρά τε καὶ ἄθλια, πόρρω τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖόν ἐστιν ὁμοιώσεως.
Ὅτι ἡ ἀνάστασις οὐ τοσοῦτον ἐκ τοῦ κηρύγματος τοῦ γραφικοῦ, ὅσον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς
τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκης ἀκολούθως ἐλπίζεται.
[21.1] Ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἰσχυρὸν ἡ κακία ὡς τῆς [B] ἀγαθῆς ὑπερισχύσαι
δυνάμεως· οὐδὲ κρείττων καὶ μονιμωτέρα τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ σοφίας ἡ τῆς φύσεως
5 ἡμῶν ἀβουλία· οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι δυνατὸν, τὸ τρεπόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον τοῦ ἀεὶ
ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ πεπηγότος ἐπικρατέστερόν τε καὶ μονιμώτερον
εἶναι· ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν θεία βουλὴ πάντη τε καὶ πάντως τὸ ἀμετάθετον ἔχει· τὸ δὲ τρεπτὸν
τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ κακῷ πάγιον μένει. [21.2] Τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ πάντως
κινούμενον, εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἔχοι τὴν πρόοδον, διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον τοῦ
10 διεξοδευομένου πράγματος οὐδέποτε λήξει τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ πρόσω φορᾶς· οὐδὲ γὰρ
εὑρήσει τοῦ ζητουμένου πέρας οὐδὲν, οὗ δραξάμενον στήσεταί ποτε τῆς κινήσεως·
εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον τὴν ῥοπὴν σχοίη, ἐπειδὰν διανύσῃ τῆς κακίας τὸν [C] δρόμον,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκρότατον τοῦ κακοῦ μέτρον ἀφίκηται, τότε τὸ ἀεικίνητον τῆς ὁρμῆς
οὐδεμίαν ἐκ φύσεως στάσιν εὑρίσκον, ἐπειδὰν διαδράμῃ τὸ ἐν κακίᾳ διάστημα, κατ᾽
15 ἀνάγκην ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τρέπει τὴν κίνησιν· μὴ γὰρ προϊούσης κακίας πρὸς τὸ
ἀόριστον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαίοις πέρασι κατειλημμένης, ἀκολούθως ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
διαδοχὴ τὸ πέρας τῆς κακίας ἐκδέχεται· καὶ οὕτω, καθὼς εἴρηται, τὸ ἀεικίνητον
ἡμῶν τῆς φύσεως πάλιν ὕστατον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἀνατρέχει πορείαν, τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν
προδεδυστυχημένων πρὸς τὸ μὴ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς ἴσοις γενέσθαι σωφρονιζόμενον.

52 ἀπεικόνισμα] ἀπεικονίσματι Z τῇ ματαιότητι post ὡμοιώθη (l. 52) pon. B ὁ προφήτης φησὶν
M Q 53 ἡ μὲν] ἡμῖν Z ᾠκείωται] οἰκείωται N Q W 54 δὲ] δ᾽ G I L S X ὅσα] ὅσα τῶν Æ L M N S
T W ἄθλια] ἄθλια καὶ D G Pac S X ὁμοιώσεως] οἰκειώσεως D G L P S X

Cap. 22 Æ ß I N O Q T Dion Eri

1–2 ὅτι—ἐλπίζεται] quod divinum consilium non est mutabile Λ 1 τοσοῦτον] τοιοῦτον D 1–2
ἐξ αὐτῆς—ἐλπίζεται] ex ipsa rerum necessitate speratur Dion 2 ἀνάγκης τῶν πραγμάτων W Ald
Mign ἀκολούθως om. N W ἐλπίζεται om. D 4 κρείττω Dac G P S X : κρεῖττον N W : κρείττον
Q τοῦ om. Ald Mign 5 οὐδὲ] οὔτε Æ B M T : οὐ I δυνατὸν om. I O τε om. D G P X 7 τε om. G H
MQT 8 οὐδ᾽ I τῷ om. N κακῷ] κατ᾽αὐτὴν I 9 ἔχει Æ H I M N T ἀόριστον] eximietatem
Eri 10 πράγματος] πνεύματος Æ B I O τὰ] τὸ Æ ß I M N O Q W 11 τοῦ om. Mign οὗ
δραξάμενον] οὐδ᾽ ἀρξάμενον M W στήσεταί] στήσαι τέ B ßac ποτε om. N 12 εἰ δὲ—σχοίη] om.
Eri τὸ ἐναντίον] τοὐναντίον I ῥοπὴν] τροπὴν T σχοίει G P ἐπειδὰν] ἠ ἐπειδὰν Z διανύσει B (sed
non ß) : διανοίσει G P 13 τὸ²] τε I τῆς ὁρμῆς τὸ ἀεικίνητον W : τὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἀεικίνητον Ald
Mign 14 φύσεως στάσιν] στάσεως φύσιν M διαδράμῃ] ἐκδράμῃ N T 15 προϊούσης] προϊούσης τῆς
Æ B D I M N O Q πρὸς] ita Æ ß G I L N O P Q S T W X Forb : ἐπὶ Ald Mign 16 ἀλλὰ
N πέρασι] πέρμασι Nac? : τέρμασι Npc2 κατειλημμένης] προειλημμένης N T 17 ἐκδέχεται] ἐκχεῖται
T οὕτως O W 18 τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν I πάλιν ὕστατον] παλίσυρτον M : πάλιν συντόνως Æ B I O :
πάλιν εἰς ἑαυτὸ Q : πάλιν N Rac T : iterum firmiter Eri ἀνατρέχει] ἀνατρέπει O : ἐπανατρέχει M Q
R W πορείαν] πορείαν ὕστερον R 19 προδεδυστηχημένων O ἐν] ἐναλῶναι Q Ald
Mign γενέσθαι] ἐγγενέσθαι D : om. Q Ald Mign
       – 251

the divine nature—was likened, as the prophet says, to vanity.⁶² [20.5] The image,
therefore, is appropriated to the better part of those aspects conceived about
ourselves; but all that which is painful and wretched in our mode of life is far
removed from the likeness to the divine.
That the resurrection is consequentially hoped for not so much from the scriptural
proclamation but as much from the very necessity of things.⁶³
[21.1] But wickedness is not so strong as to prevail over the power of good, nor is
the thoughtlessness of our nature stronger and more abiding than the wisdom of
God; for it is impossible that that which is mutable and alterable should be
stronger and more abiding than that which is always as it is and established in
the good. But the divine counsel certainly and absolutely possesses immutability,
while the changeability of our nature does not remain steadfast even in evil.
[21.2] That which is always in motion, if its progress is towards the good, will
never cease, because of the infinity of the course to be traversed, from moving
towards what lies ahead; for it will not find any limit of that which it seeks, such
that when it has grasped it, it will then bring rest from movement.⁶⁴ But if its
tendency is in the opposite direction, whenever it has traversed the course of
wickedness and reached the extreme limit of evil, then that which is ever-moving,
finding no resting point for its natural impulse, since it has run through the interval
in wickedness, by necessity turns its movement towards the good. For as evil does not
extend to infinity, but is bounded by necessary limits, the accession of the good
consequently succeeds the limit of evil, and thus, as we have said, the ever-moving
character of our nature runs its journey once more at last towards the good,
chastened by the memory of its former misfortunes so that it will never again be
in the same circumstances.⁶⁵

⁶² Ps. 143:4. ⁶³ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 22): ‘That the divine counsel is immutable’.
⁶⁴ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Or. Cat. 21.2–3 (Mühlenberg, 55.21–56.10).
⁶⁵ Cf. Irenaeus, Haer. 3.20.1–2; Origen, Princ. 3.4.3.
 252   

20 [21.3] Οὐκοῦν ἔσται πάλιν ἐν καλοῖς ὁ δρόμος ἡμῖν, διὰ τὸ πέρασιν ἀναγκαίοις
περιωρίσθαι τῆς κακίας τὴν φύσιν. Καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ δεινοὶ τὰ μετέωρα, τοῦ μὲν
φωτὸς πάντα λέγουσι τὸν κόσμον εἶναι κατάπλεων, [D] τὸ δὲ σκότος τῇ ἀντιφράξει
τοῦ κατὰ τὴν γῆν σώματος ἀποσκιαζόμενον γίνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ τὸ
σχῆμα τοῦ σφαιροειδοῦς σώματος, κατὰ νώτου, τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος κωνοειδῶς
25 κατακλείεσθαι· τὸν δὲ ἥλιον, πολλαπλασίονι τῷ μεγέθει τὴν γῆν ὑπερβάλλοντα,
πανταχόθεν αὐτὴν ταῖς ἀκτῖσιν ἐν κύκλῳ περιπτυσσόμενον, συνάπτειν κατὰ τὸ
πέρας τοῦ κώνου τὰς τοῦ φωτὸς συμβολὰς· ὥστε (καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν) εἰ γένοιτό τινι
δύναμις διαβῆναι τὸ μέτρον, εἰς ὅσον ἐκτείνεται ἡ σκιὰ, πάντως ἂν ἐν φωτὶ γενέσθαι
μὴ διακοπτομένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ σκότους· οὕτως οἶμαι δεῖν καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν διανοεῖσθαι, ὅτι
30 διεξελθόντες τὸν τῆς κακίας ὅρον, ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ ἄκρῳ γενώμεθα τῆς [204] κατὰ τὴν
ἁμαρτίαν σκιᾶς, πάλιν ἐν φωτὶ βιοτεύσομεν, κατὰ τὸ ἀπειροπλάσιον ὡς πρὸς τὸ τῆς
κακίας μέτρον τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσεως περιττευούσης. [21.4] Πάλιν οὖν ὁ
παράδεισος, πάλιν τὸ ξύλον ἐκεῖνο, ὃ δὴ καὶ ζωῆς ἐστι ξύλον· πάλιν τῆς εἰκόνος ἡ
χάρις καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξία. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τούτων ὅσα νῦν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου χρείαν
35 παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑπέζευκται, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας τινὸς βασιλείας ἐστὶν ἡ
ἐλπὶς, ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀπορρήτοις μένει.
Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, Εἰ καλόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀνάστασις, τί οὐχὶ ἤδη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ
χρόνων τισὶ περιόδοις ἐλπίζεται.
[22.1] Ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τῶν ἐξητασμένων ἐχώμεθα· ἴσως γάρ τις πρὸς τὸ
γλυκὺ τῆς ἐλπίδος πτερωθεὶς τὴν διάνοιαν, ἄχθος ἡγεῖται καὶ ζημίαν, τὸ μὴ θᾶττον
5 ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐκείνοις γενέσθαι, ἃ ὑπὲρ αἴσθησίν τε καὶ γνῶσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐστὶ,
καὶ δεινὴν ποιεῖται τὴν διὰ μέσου πρὸς τὸ ποθούμενον τοῦ χρόνου παράτασιν· ἀλλὰ
μὴ στενοχωρείσθω καθάπερ τις τῶν νηπίων, τὴν πρὸς ὀλίγον ἀναβολὴν τῶν καθ᾽
ἡδονὴν δυσχεραίνων· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ σοφίας τὰ πάντα οἰκονομεῖται,
ἀνάγκη πᾶσα μηδὲν ἄμοιρον ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν γινομένων αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς
10 ἐν αὐτῷ σοφίας. [22.2] Ἐρεῖς οὖν, Τίς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ, [C] καθ᾽ ὃν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπὶ

20 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri ἐν] ἐν τοῖς T ἡμῖν] ἡμῶν N R 21 γὰρ om. N 22 λέγουσι om. N
κατάπλεον B (sed non ß) : κατάπλεω N : ἀνάπλεω M : καὶ πλείω D G L P Sac X 23 ἀποσκιαζόμενον]
σκιαζόμενον M 24 κατὰ νώτου] considero Eri κωνοειδῶς] καινοειδοῦς B 25 πολλαπλασίως N :
πολλαπλάσιον T ὑπερβάλλεσθαι X 26 ἐν κύκλῳ ταῖς ἀκτῖσιν N R W 25 ἐν om. N συνάπτει
L κατὰ om. I 27 συμβουλὰς R ὥστε] ὡς οὔ Rac εἰ καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν I ὑπόθεσιν] materiam
Eri 28 εἰς om. B D G P X ἂν om. N T 29 δεῖν] δεῖ T : om. B (sed non ß) ἡμῶν] ἡμῶν αὐτῶν
R 30 διεξελθόντες] ἐξελθόντες D M ἐν om. T γενόμεθα O 31 ἐν] ἐν τῷ Æ B N O R ὡς κατὰ τὸ
ἀπειροπλάσιον Mign 32 κακίας] σκίας R Dion 33 τὸ] τὸ πᾶν Q R Dion Eri ὃ δὴ καὶ] τῆς T 34 ἡ
om. M τούτων] τούτων οὐδὲν Q Ald Mign 35–6 ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας—μένει] spes irrationabilis sed in alterius
cuiusdam uitae ineffabilibus manere Eri 35 βασιλείας om. Q Dion ἐστὶν om. G L P Q S X ἡ om B G
LMPSX

Cap. 23 Æ I N O Q R T : cap. inc. inferius ἐχώμεθα (l. 3) Q Dion : def. Eri

1–2 πρὸς—ἐλπίζεται] quod consummata generatione hominum tempus quoque deficiet Λ 1 τι] τε
N Q : ἐστι L τί] διατί D G P Q X : om. W οὐκ D G I L O P R S X 2 χρόνοις Æ B I N O T W τισὶν
W περιόδοις] καὶ περιόδοις Æ B I N O T 3 ἐχόμεθα L P² Q T 3–54 ἴσως—τὸ ἀνθρώπινον] def.
Eri 4 ἡγήσεται I 5 γίνεσθαι N ἃ om. G P X τε om. Q T 6 διὰ] διὰ τοῦ R 7 τὴν om. D G
P X ὀλίγην D E 7–8 καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν] κακῶν D E R2mg 8 ὑπὸ] διὰ M 10 οὖν] οὖν μοι O τίς] τί W : τί
καὶ B οὗτος om. R εὐθὺς οὐκ W
       – 253

[21.3] Our course, therefore, will again be in what is good, because the nature of
evil is bounded by necessary limits. Just as experts in astronomical phenomena say
that the whole cosmos is full of light, and that darkness casts its shadow by the
interposition of the body of the earth, but that, according to the figure of
the spherical body, behind it this darkness is shut off from the rays of the sun in
the shape of a cone, while the sun, being larger than the earth many times in size,
enfolding it all round on all sides with its rays, unites at the limit of the cone the
streams of light, so that, by hypothesis, if anyone had the power to surpass the
measure to which the shadow extends, he would certainly be in light unbroken by
darkness⁶⁶—so also, I think, we ought to understand this regarding ourselves that,
passing through the boundary of evil, whenever we have come to the furthest point
of the shadow of sin we shall again live in light, as the nature of the good is infinitely
more abundant than the measure of wickedness. [21.4] Therefore again Paradise;
again that tree, which is indeed the tree of life; again the grace of the image and the
dignity of sovereignty. It does not seem to me that the hope is for those things that
are now subjugated by God to human beings for the needs of our mode of life, but
for another kingdom, the account of which abides in unspeakable mysteries.

To those who say: ‘If the resurrection is something beautiful and good, why has it
not already happened, but is hoped for in some period of time?’⁶⁷
[22.1] Let us give our attention, however, to the next point of our discussion. It
may be that someone, giving his mind wings to soar towards the sweetness of our
hope,⁶⁸ considers it a burden and a loss that we do not more speedily come to be in
those good things which are above human sense-perception and knowledge, and
[so] makes the extension of time intervening until that which is desired a cause for
complaint. But do not be anxious, like children annoyed at the brief delay of
something pleasurable; for since all things are administered by reason and wis-
dom, it must not be supposed that anything that happens is bereft of reason itself
and the wisdom in it. [22.2] You will say then: What is this reason, in accordance

⁶⁶ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 32 (Drobner, 45.14–20); An. et res. 2.10–18 (Spira, 16.15–18.19); Basil,
Hex. 9.1. Aristotle, Meteor. 1.8 (345b1–9); Pliny Nat. hist. 2.49–52; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Meteor.
A8 (Hayduck, 38.7–13).
⁶⁷ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 23): ‘That when the generation of humans is finished, time also will come to
an end’.
⁶⁸ Cf. Ps. 54:7; Plato, Phaedr. 249c4–6.
 254   

τὸ ποθούμενον ἡ τοῦ λυπηροῦ βίου μετάστασις γίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς χρόνους τινὰς
ὡρισμένους ἡ βαρεῖα καὶ σωματώδης αὕτη παραταθεῖσα ζωὴ, ἀναμένει τὸ πέρας
τῆς τοῦ παντὸς συμπληρώσεως, ἵνα τὸ τηνικαῦτα καθάπερ χαλινοῦ τινος
ἐλευθερωθεῖσα ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ζωὴ, πάλιν ἄνετός τε καὶ ἐλευθέρα πρὸς τὸν μακάριον
15 καὶ ἀπαθῆ βίον ἐπαναδράμοι;

[22.3] Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐγγίζει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν ζητουμένων ὁ λόγος, αὐτὴ ἂν εἰδείη
σαφῶς ἡ ἀλήθεια· ὃ δ᾽ οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθε διάνοιαν, τοιοῦτον ἐστί. Λέγω δὴ,
τὸν πρῶτον πάλιν ἐπαναλαβὼν λόγον· ποιήσωμεν, φησὶν ὁ Θεὸς, ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽
εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν· καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ
20 ἐποίησεν αὐτόν· ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἡ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει
θεωρουμένη, [D] τὸ τέλος ἔσχεν· ὁ δὲ Ἀδὰμ οὔπω ἐγένετο· τὸ γὰρ γήϊνον πλάσμα
κατά τινα ἐτυμολογικὴν ὀνομασίαν Ἀδὰμ λέγεται, καθώς φασιν οἱ τῆς Ἑβραίων
φωνῆς ἐπιΐστορες· διὸ καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος, διαφερόντως τὴν πάτριον τῶν Ἰσραηλιτῶν
πεπαιδευμένος φωνήν, τὸν ἐκ γῆς ἄνθρωπον χοϊκὸν ὀνομάζει, οἱονεὶ μεταβαλὼν τὴν
25 τοῦ Ἀδὰμ κλῆσιν εἰς τὴν Ἐλλάδα φωνήν.

[22.4] Γέγονεν οὖν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ καθόλου φύσις, τὸ θεοείκελον χρῆμα·
γέγονε δὲ τῇ παντοδυνάμῳ σοφίᾳ οὐχὶ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαν ἀθρόως τὸ τῆς
φύσεως πλήρωμα. Εἶδεν ὁ πάντων τῶν περάτων περιδεδραγμένος, καθώς φησιν ἡ
γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα, ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ πέρατα τῆς γῆς· εἶδεν ὁ εἰδὼς τὰ πάντα καὶ
30 πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, ἐμπεριλαβὼν [205] τῇ γνώσει ὅσον κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽
ἕκαστον ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κατενόησεν ἐν τῷ πλάσματι ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς
τὸ χεῖρον ῥοπὴν, καὶ ὅτι, τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀγγέλους ὁμοτιμίας ἑκουσίως ἀπορρυὲν,
τὴν πρὸς τὸ ταπεινὸν κοινωνίαν προσοικειώσεται· διὰ ταῦτα κατέμιξέ τι καὶ τοῦ
ἀλόγου τῇ ἰδίᾳ εἰκόνι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ θείᾳ τε καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν
35 καὶ θῆλυ διαφορά· ἀλλὰ, τῆς ἀλόγου κατασκευῆς ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μετενεγκὼν
τὸ ἰδίωμα, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ὑψηλὸν τῆς κτίσεως ἡμῶν τὸν πλεονασμὸν τῷ γένει
χαρίζεται· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἐποίησε, τότε τὴν τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ
πληθύνεσθαι δύναμιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ προσέθηκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε διέκρινε τῇ κατὰ τὸ

11 μετάστασις] κατάστασις S 12 βαρεία N ἀναμένῃ I 13 τὸ om. M Q 14 πάλιν om. L μακάριον]

μακάριον τε M 15 ἐπαναδράμη D G P² T X : ἐπαναδράμοιεν M : ἐπαναδράμει Pac 16 τῆς ἀληθείας
N αὕτη L : αὐτὴ δ’ N 17 τοιοῦτο Æ : τοῦτο I O δὴ] δὲ Æ B I M N O Q R T W X 18 ἐπαναλαβὼν]
ἐπαναδραμὼν L ὁ θεὸς om. R 19 ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν D Q R : ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν
L N 20 οὖν om. N ἡ² om. G L N τῇ om. M 21 τὸ² om. D 22 ἐτοιμολογικὴν O W X λέγεται
ἀδὰμ W Ald Mign 24 ἐκ om. T μεταβάλλων T 26 γέγονεν οὖν] γέγονε τοίνυν D G L P S X εἰκόνα]
εἰκόνα θεοῦ N R ὁ ἄνθρωπος om. N 27 γέγονε δὲ om. M ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαν] ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα ἅπαν Æ B I O : ἀλλὰ
πᾶν N Rac T ἀθρόως] εὐθέως D G L P S X τὸ om. W 28 ἡ om. R λέγουσα] λέγουσα ὅτι M
αὐτοῦ] σου T : αὐτοῦ εἶναι Æ B I O Q τῆς] ἐπὶ τῆς M : εἶναι τῆς W καὶ om. Æ B I M N O Q R T
W 30 γενέσεως αὐτῶν] γενέσθαι D G L P S X ἐμπεριλαβὼν] ἐκπεριλαβὼν ß G O P T W X : καὶ
περιλαβὼν R τὴν γνῶσιν T κατ᾽ ] κατὰ G L P S X 30–1 καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ἕκαστον Ald : καθέκαστον ß
I 31 ἔσται] ἐστι M N Q R T W ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Æ B M Rac W : ἐπειδὴ δὲ I T ἐν om. N 33 τῆς . . .
κοινωνίας L προσῳκειώσατο M ταῦτα] τοῦτο Æ B I M N O Q R T W καὶ om. D 34 τε om.
N 35 καὶ] ἢ R ἀλόγου] τοῦ λόγου B μετενεγκὼν] ἐπενεγκὼν L 37 τὸ] τὸν T : om. Æ B I M N O Q
Rac W τότε] τότε καὶ D L τοῦ] τοῦ θεοῦ W 37–8 αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε B G² L² P² Sac X καὶ
πληθύνεσθαι om. I 38–9 τὴν . . . διαφορὰν N Q T
        255

with which the transference of our painful mode of life to that which is desired
does not take place immediately, but that this heavy and corporeal life itself waits,
extended to some determined time, for the limit of the consummation of all
things, in order that then the human life may be set free, as it were from the
bridle, ascending again, released and free, to the blessed and impassible mode
of life?
[22.3] Well, whether our answer is near the truth of what is sought, the Truth
itself may clearly know; but what comes to our mind is this. Taking up again the
first text, I say: Let us make, says God, the human being in accordance to our image
and likeness; and God made the human being, in accordance with the image of God
he made him.⁶⁹ The image of God, then, that which is contemplated in the
universal human nature, had its end; but as yet, Adam was not.⁷⁰ For the earthy
moulded figure, by an etymological designation, is called ‘Adam’, as those
acquainted with the Hebrew language say; therefore, the Apostle, who was espe-
cially learned in his native Israelite language, names the human being from the
earth earthy, as though translating the name Adam into the Greek language.⁷¹
[22.4] In accordance with the image, then, the human being came to be, that is,
the universal nature, the godlike thing; by the omnipotent wisdom not a part of
the whole, but the plenitude of nature as a whole came to be. He who holds all
limits in his grasp saw, as the Scripture says, all the ends of the earth in his hands,
he, who knows all things even before their genesis, saw, embracing in his know-
ledge, how many in number humanity will be in its individuals.⁷² Since he
perceived in our moulded figure the inclination towards the worse, and that,
voluntarily falling from equality of honour with the angels, it would appropriate
fellowship with the lowly nature, he mingled, for this reason, an element of the
irrational with his own image, for the distinction between male and female is not
in the divine and blessed nature; but, when transferring the property of the
irrational formation to the human being, he bestowed upon our race the power
of multiplying, not according to the lofty character of our creation, for it was not
when he made that which is in accordance with the image that he added the power
to increase and multiply, but when he divided it by the distinction between male

⁶⁹ Gen. 1:26–7. ⁷⁰ Cf. Philo, Opif. 76. ⁷¹ 1 Cor. 15:47.

⁷² Ps. 94:4; Sus. (Θ) 42; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 9 (Drobner, 18.13–16).
 256   

ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορᾷ, τότε φησίν, αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε καὶ πληρώσατε τὴν
40 γῆν· [B] τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἴδιον ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀλόγου ἐστὶ, καθὼς ἡ
ἱστορία παρασημαίνεται, πρότερον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλόγων εἰρῆσθαι ταῦτα παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ
διηγησαμένη· ὡς, εἴ γε πρὸ τοῦ ἐπιβαλεῖν τῇ φύσει τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ
διαφορὰν τὴν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης δύναμιν εἰς τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
προσέθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου τῆς γεννήσεως εἴδους προσεδεήθημεν, δι᾽ οὗ
45 γεννᾶται τὰ ἄλογα.

[22.5] Τοῦ τοίνυν προκατανοηθέντος διὰ τῆς προγνωστικῆς ἐνεργείας πληρώματος

τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ζωωδεστέρας γενέσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ζωὴν μέλλοντος παριέναι, ὁ
τάξει τινὶ καὶ εἱρμῷ διακυβερνῶν τὰ πάντα [C] Θεὸς, ἐπειδὴ ὅλως τὸ τοιοῦτον τῇ
ἀνθρωπότητι τῆς γεννήσεως εἶδος ἀναγκαῖον ἐποίησεν ἡ πρὸς τὸ ταπεινὸν τῆς
50 φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐπίκλισις, ἣν εἶδε πρὶν γενέσθαι ὁ ἐπίσης τῷ ἐνεστῶτι τὸ μέλλον
βλέπων, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν σύμμετρον τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων χρόνον
προκατενόησεν· ὥστε τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν προορισθεισῶν ψυχῶν συναπαρτισθῆναι τὴν
τοῦ χρόνου παράτασιν, καὶ τότε στῆναι τὴν ῥοώδη τοῦ χρόνου κίνησιν, ὅταν μηκέτι
φύηται δι᾽ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον· τελεσθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων γενέσεως, τῷ
55 τέλει ταύτης συγκαταλῆξαι τὸν χρόνον, καὶ οὕτω τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀναστοιχείωσιν
γενέσθαι, καὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ τοῦ ὅλου συναμειφθῆναι καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, ἀπὸ τοῦ
φθαρτοῦ καὶ γεώδους ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀΐδιον.
[22.6] Ὅ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος κατανοήσας, προειπεῖν διὰ [D] τῆς πρὸς
Κορινθίους ἐπιστολῆς τὴν αἰφνίδιον τοῦ χρόνου στάσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἔμπαλιν τῶν
60 κινουμένων ἀνάλυσιν, ἐν οἷς φησιν· ἰδοὺ μυστήριον ὑμῖν λέγω· πάντες μὲν οὐ
κοιμηθησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα, ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ, ἐν τῇ
ἐσχάτῃ σάλπιγγι· τοῦ γὰρ πληρώματος, ὡς οἶμαι, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως κατὰ
τὸ προγνωσθὲν μέτρον εἰς πέρας ἐλθόντος, διὰ τὸ μηκέτι λείπειν τῷ τῶν ψυχῶν
ἀριθμῷ μηδὲν εἰς ἐπαύξησιν, ἐν ἀκαρεῖ τοῦ χρόνου γενήσεσθαι τὴν ἐναλλαγὴν τῶν
65 ὄντων ἐδίδαξεν (ἄτομον ὀνομάσας καὶ ῥιπὴν ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ ἀμερὲς ἐκεῖνο [208] τοῦ
χρόνου καὶ ἀδιάστατον πέρας·) ὡς μηκέτι δυνατὸν εἶναι τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔσχατόν τε καὶ
ἀκρότατον τῆς ἀκμῆς ἐπιβάντι τοῦ χρόνου, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὑπολείπεσθαι τῇ ἀκρότητι
μέρος, τὴν περιοδικὴν ταύτην διὰ θανάτου μεταβολὴν κτήσασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μόνον

39 θῆλυ] τὸ θῆλυ N T 42 ἐπιβάλλειν T 44 τοῦ om. N γενέσεως Æ ß O Q R T προσεδέθημεν T 46

τοῦ] ita Æ B I M N O Rac T W Forb : τούτου Ald Mign : om. D G P Rpc X προκατανοηθέντος]
κατανοηθέντος T ἐνεργείας] ἐνεργείας τοῦ D G P S W X 47 γεννήσεως Q 48 θεὸς om. M τοιοῦτο
ac
Æ 49 εἶδος τῆς γεννήσεως T γενέσεως Æ ß I N O R εἶδος om. D G L P S X 50 τὸ μέλλον]
μᾶλλον Q 51 τῆς κατασκευῆς N R T χρόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων T 52 προορισθεισῶν] ita Æ D G N O
P R S T Forb : περιορισθεισῶν Ald Mign συναπαρτισθῆναι] ἀπαρτισθῆναι N 55 οὕτως W 55–6
γενέσθαι ἀναστοιχείωσιν N 56 συναμειφθῆναι] συναναμιχθῆναι W 58 κατανοήσας] προκατανοήσας
ac
IOP 59 τὴν² om. T 60 λέγω ὑμῖν I 62 τοῦ] τοῦ τε M ὡς om. R 63 μηκέτι] μηκέτι λοιπὸν
D R² 64 ἐν] ἐν τῷ T ἀκαρεῖ] ἀκαριαίῳ N R τοῦ om. N γενέσθαι D Pac T ἐναλλαγὴν] ἀλλαγὴν Æ
B I O Q 65 ἐκείνου Æ ß I M O 65–6 τοῦ χρόνου om. N 66 δυνατὸν] δυνάμενον T τῷ] τῷ Xpc2 : τὸ
G H N O Q 66 post διὰ N def. ad cap. 23 (l. 4) διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὑπολείπεσθαι] non deest Eri μηδὲν] μὴ
T 68 τὴν] τι T κτίσασθαι P
        257

and female that he then said, Increase and multiply and fill the earth.⁷³ For such is
not a property of the divine nature, but of the irrational, as the narrative indicates,
when it narrates that this was first said by God in the case of the irrational
animals;⁷⁴ since if, before putting upon our nature the distinction between male
and female, he had added the power for increase expressed by this utterance, we
should not have needed this form of birth, by which the irrational animals
are born.
[22.5] With the plenitude of human beings, then, preconceived by the activity of
foreknowledge, coming into life by means of this more animal form of birth, God,
who guides all things in a certain order and sequence—since the inclination of our
nature to what is lowly (which he who beholds, equally with the present, what is to
be before it happens) made this form of birth absolutely necessary for humanity—
therefore also foreknew the time coextensive with the formation of human beings,
so that the extent of time should be adapted for the entrance of the predetermined
souls, and that the flowing movement of time should then halt, when humanity is
no longer produced by it. And when the genesis of human beings is completed,
time should stop together with the end of it, and then should take place the
reconstitution of all, and with the changing of the whole, humanity should also be
changed, from the corruptible and earthy to the impassible and eternal.⁷⁵
[22.6] This, it seems to me, is what the divine Apostle was considering when he
foretold, in his epistle to the Corinthians, the sudden stoppage of time and the
deliverance of moving things into the opposite state, when he says, Behold, I tell
you a mystery: we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the
twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet.⁷⁶ For when, I suppose, the plenitude of
human nature has arrived at the limit, in accordance with the foreknown measure,
because there is no longer anything wanting in terms of growth in the number of
souls, he taught that the change of beings will take place in an instant of time
(calling that limit of time which has no parts or extension a moment and the
twinkling of an eye); so that it will no longer be possible for one who has set foot
upon the last and extreme edge of time (for nothing is lacking from that extremity)
to obtain this circling change by death, but only when the trumpet of the

⁷³ Gen. 1:28. ⁷⁴ Cf. Gen. 1:22.

⁷⁵ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 9.20–3 (Spira, 96.17–97.15).
⁷⁶ 1 Cor. 15:51–2; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.29 (Spira, 104.1–5).
 258   

ἠχήσειεν ἡ τῆς ἀναστάσεως σάλπιγξ, ἡ τὸ τεθνηκὸς ἀφυπνίζουσα καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ζωῇ

70 καταλειφθέντας καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν ἐξ ἀναστάσεως ἀλλοιουμένων πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν
ἀθρόως μεταβάλλουσα, ὡς μηκέτι τὸ βάρος τῆς σαρκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω βρίθειν καὶ τῇ
γῇ παρακατέχειν τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ μετάρσιον δι᾽ ἀέρος φοιτᾷν· ἁρπαγησόμεθα γὰρ,
φησὶν, ἐν νεφέλαις εἰς ἀπάντησιν τοῦ Κυρίου εἰς ἀέρα, καὶ οὕτως πάντοτε σὺν Κυρίῳ
ἐσόμεθα.
75 [22.7] Οὐκοῦν ἀναμεινάτω τὸν χρόνον τὸν ἀναγκαίως τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ αὐξήσει
συμπαρατείνοντα· [B] καὶ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀβραὰμ πατριάρχαι, τοῦ μὲν ἰδεῖν τὰ
ἀγαθὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔσχον, καὶ οὐκ ἀνῆκαν ἐπιζητοῦντες τὴν ἐπουράνιον πατρίδα,
καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν ἔτι τὴν χάριν εἰσὶ, τοῦ Θεοῦ
κρεῖττόν τι περὶ ἡμῶν προβλεψαμένου, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Παύλου φωνήν, ἵνα μὴ, φησὶ,
80 χωρὶς ἡμῶν τελειωθῶσιν· εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖνοι φέρουσι τὴν ἀναβολὴν οἱ πόρρωθεν διὰ
μόνης πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἰδόντες τὰ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ ἀσπασάμενοι, καθὼς μαρτυρεῖ
ὁ ἀπόστολος, τὸ ἀσφαλὲς τῆς τῶν ἐλπισθέντων ἀπολαύσεως ἐν τῷ πιστὸν ἡγήσασθαι
τὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον θέμενοι· τί χρὴ πράττειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡμᾶς, οἷς τυχὸν οὐδὲ ἡ
πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἐλπὶς ἐκ τῶν βεβιωμένων ἐστίν; ἐξέλιπε δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡ τοῦ
85 προφήτου ψυχὴ, καὶ ὁμολογεῖ διὰ τῆς ψαλμωδίας τὸ ἐρωτικὸν τοῦτο πάθος,
ἐπιποθεῖν λέγων καὶ ἐκλείπειν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς αὐλαῖς τοῦ Κυρίου
γενέσθαι, κἂν ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις δέῃ παραρριπτεῖσθαι· ὡς μεῖζον ὂν καὶ
προτιμότερον τὸ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἔσχατον εἶναι, τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἐν τοῖς ἁμαρτωλοῖς τοῦ
βίου σκηνώμασιν· ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἠνείχετο τῆς ἀναβολῆς, μακαρίζων μὲν τὴν ἐκεῖ
90 διαγωγὴν, καὶ τὴν ἐν βραχεῖ μετουσίαν χιλιάδων χρόνου προτιμοτέραν
ποιούμενος· κρεῖσσον, γὰρ φησὶν, ἡμέρα μία ἐν ταῖς αὐλαῖς σου ὑπὲρ χιλιάδας·
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐδυσχέραινε [D] τῇ ἀναγκαίᾳ περὶ τῶν ὄντων οἰκονομίᾳ, ἱκανόν τε εἰς
μακαρισμὸν ᾤετο τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ δι᾽ ἐλπίδος ἔχειν τὰ ἀγαθά· διό φησιν ἐπὶ
τέλει τῆς ψαλμωδίας· Κύριε τῶν δυνάμεων, μακάριος ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐλπίζων ἐπὶ σέ.

69 τοὺς τεθνηκότας M 70 καταληφθέντας Æ D L O Sac 71 ἀθρόως] ἀχρόνως T : repente Eri

μεταβληθήσεσθε C O : μεταβληθήσεσθαι Æ B L R T 73 ἐν νεφέλαις om. T εἰς ἀπάντησιν] obuiam
Dion Eri εἰς ἀέρα] om. Eri οὓτω Æ I W 75–109 οὐκοῦν—προεμπορεύεσθαι def. Eri 77 ἀνῆκαν] ἂν
T ἐπιζητοῦντες] ζητοῦντες Æ 78 ἐν τῷ] ἐπὶ τὸ I ἔτι] ἐπὶ L T 79 περὶ ἡμῶν κρεῖττον τι Æ B I
M O Q R T W κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παύλου φωνήν] καθὼς ὁ παῦλός φησιν D : post τελειωθῶσιν (l. 80) pon.
I τοῦ om. Æ B O φησὶ om. Æ B D I L O R S T 81 ἀσπασάμενοι] διασπασάμενοι B μαρτυρεῖ]
om. T : μαρτυρεῖ φησι ß R T 82 ἀπολαύσεως om. X ἐν τῷ πιστὸν ἡγήσασθαι om. M ἡγεῖσθαι
L 82–3 ἡγήσασθαι τὸν] ἡγ σ W (lit. eras.) 84 ἐξέλιπε] ἐξέλιπε δὲ R 85 ψυχὴ] φωνὴ B πάθος] τοῦ
πάθους D L Q R 86 λέγων] λέγειν D P : λέγει G 87 δέῃ] δέοι B I M O R παραῥίπεσθαι W :
παραριπτεῖσθαι G P Sac X : παραρρίπτεσθαι M R : παρὰῥιπτείσθαι Q ὂν om. D T 88 ἐν² om. T 89
ἠνέσχετο T 90 βραχεῖ] βραχεῖ ταύτης I 91 κρείσσων Æ I O R γὰρ om. Mign 92 ἐδυσχέραινε]
ἐδυσχέρανε M : ἐδυσχέραινε ἐν Æ B τε] δὲ Æ B I M O Q R T W 94 κύριε] κύριε ὁ θεὸς W Ald
Mign ἄνθρωπος] ὁ ἄνθρωπος Æ σέ] σοι D G L P T Spc X
        259

resurrection sounds, awakening the dead and transforming those who remain in
life, according to the likeness of those who have undergone the change through
resurrection, at once to incorruptibility, so that the weight of the flesh no longer
weighs downwards nor does its burden hold them to the earth, but they arise aloft
through the air, for we shall all be caught up, he says, in the clouds to meet the Lord
in the air, and so we shall be ever with the Lord.⁷⁷
[22.7] Therefore, let him wait the time necessarily co-extensive with human
increase. For even the Patriarchs with Abraham, while they had the desire to see
the good things and did not cease seeking the heavenly homeland, as the Apostle
says, yet nevertheless are still in the state of hoping for that grace, God having
foreseen something better for us, according to the saying of Paul, that without us
they would not be made perfect.⁷⁸ If, then, those—who, by faith only and hope, saw
the good things afar off and embraced them, as the apostle bears witness, placing
their certainty of the enjoyment of the things hoped for in the fact that they
considered him faithful who has promised⁷⁹—bear the delay, what ought most of us
to do, for whom, perhaps, from the passage of our life there is no hope of better
things? Even the prophet’s soul fainted with desire, and in psalmody he confesses
this passionate love, saying his soul longs, even faints to be in the courts of the Lord,
even if he must be rejected to a place among the last, as it is a greater and more
honourable thing to be among the last than to be first among the sinful tabernacles
of this mode of life; yet he was nevertheless patient of the delay, considering the
life there blessed and accounting a brief participation in it more honourable than
thousands of time, for, he says, one day in the courts is better than thousands; but
he was not annoyed at the necessary economy concerning beings and thought it
sufficient blessedness for human beings to have those good things even by way of
hope; on which account he says at the end of the psalmody, O Lord of hosts, blessed
is the human being hoping in you.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ 1 Thess. 4:17. ⁷⁸ Heb. 11:40. ⁷⁹ Heb. 11:13. ⁸⁰ Ps. 83:3, 11, 13.
 260   

95 [22.8] Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἡμᾶς στενοχωρεῖσθαι χρὴ περὶ τὴν ἐν βραχεῖ τῶν
ἐλπιζομένων ἀναβολῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἀπόβλητοι τῶν ἐλπιζομένων γενοίμεθα
τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις προείποι τινὶ τῶν ἀπειροτέρων, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν
καιρὸν τοῦ θέρους ἡ τῶν καρπῶν γενήσεται συλλογὴ, καὶ πλήρεις μὲν αἱ ἀποθῆκαι,
μεστὴ δὲ τῶν ἐδωδίμων ἡ τράπεζα τῷ τῆς εὐθηνίας ἔσται καιρῷ, μάταιος ἂν εἴη ὁ
100 ἐπισπεύδων τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν παρουσίαν, [209] δέον σπέρματα καταβάλλειν καὶ δι᾽
ἐπιμελείας ἑαυτῷ τοὺς καρποὺς ἑτοιμάζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καιρὸς, καὶ βουλομένου καὶ
μὴ, πάντως κατὰ τὸν τεταγμένον ἐπιστήσεται χρόνον· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αὐτὸν ὄψονται,
ὅ τε προετοιμάσας ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῶν καρπῶν ἀφθονίαν, καὶ ὁ πάσης παρασκευῆς
ἔρημος καταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς ὥρας· οὕτως οἶμαι δεῖν, προδήλου πᾶσι διὰ τοῦ θείου
105 κηρύγματος ὄντος ὅτι ἐνστήσεται τῆς ἐναλλαγῆς ὁ καιρὸς, μὴ χρόνους
πολυπραγμονεῖν (οὐ γὰρ ἡμῶν εἶπεν εἶναι τὸ καιροὺς γνῶναι καὶ χρόνους) μηδὲ
λογισμούς τινας ἀναζητεῖν, δι᾽ ὧν σαθρώσει τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς
ἀναστάσεως· ἀλλὰ τῇ πίστει τῶν προσδοκωμένων ἐπερειδόμενον, διὰ τῆς ἀγαθῆς
πολιτείας τὴν μέλλουσαν χάριν προεμπορεύεσθαι.
Ὅτι ὁ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως ὁμολογῶν, ἀναγκαίως καὶ περὶ τοῦ
τέλους συνθήσεται.
[23.1] Εἰ δέ τις, τὴν νῦν τοῦ κόσμου φορὰν εἱρμῷ τινι διεξαγομένην βλέπων, δι᾽ ἧς
τὸ χρονικὸν θεωρεῖται διάστημα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγοι τὴν προαγγελθεῖσαν τῶν
5 κινουμένων στάσιν γενήσεσθαι· δῆλος ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστι, μηδὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ γεγενῆσθαι
παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν πιστεύων· ὁ γὰρ ἀρχὴν τῇ κινήσει διδοὺς,
οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλει πάντως καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους· καὶ ὁ τὸ τέλος μὴ προσδεχόμενος, οὐδὲ
τὴν ἀρχὴν παρεδέξατο· ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας τῷ ῥήματι νοοῦμεν
τοῦ Θεοῦ, πιστεύοντες (καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος) εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων [C] τὰ
10 βλεπόμενα γεγονέναι· τῇ αὐτῇ πίστει χρησόμεθα περὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ τὴν

95 περὶ τὴν ἐν βραχεῖ] τῇ I τὴν] τῶν O 95–6 τῆν . . . ἀναβολῆν] ita Æ B D G M P R T W X Forb : τῆς
. . . ἀναβολῆς Ald Mign 96 ἐλπιζομένων] προσδοκωμένων Æ B I M O Q R T W γενοίμεθα] γενώμεθα
QRT 98 πλήρις O 99 τῷ] τὸ O 100 καταβαλεῖν D G L P R Sac W X : βάλλειν Æ 101 ἐμμελείας
M ἑτοιμάσασθαι ß μὲν om. T 101–2 καὶ βουλομένου καὶ μὴ, πάντως] πάντως καὶ μὴ βουλομένου R
102 ἐπιστήσεται] ἐπιστῶ D : ἐπείγεται T 103 τῶν καρπῶν τὴν D 104 ἔρημος] ἄμοιρος
R καταληφθεὶς] ita Æ B D G L M O P Q Rpc S Tpc W X Dion Forb : καταλειφθεὶς Ald
Mign δεῖν] δεῖ I : δὴ B : om. Æ O 105 ὄντος—καιρὸς om. T ὄντως M ἐναλλαγῆς] ἀλλαγῆς Æ
B I M O Q W 106 οὐ] οὐδὲ Ald Mign γνῶναι] εἶναι X χρόνους] τοὺς χρόνους T 107 σαθρώσει]
σαθρώσει τις Ald Mign 108 ἀναστάσεως] ἀναστάσεως γίνεσθαι R 109 προσεμπορεύεσθαι T

Cap. 24 Æ ß I O Q R T Dion Eri

23.6–7 (ὁ γὰρ—τέλους): John (of Damascus) Sacra Parallela II¹52 / K cap. A 1, 52 (Thum, 86, 10).
1–2 ὅτι—συνθήσεται] contra eos qui dicunt materiam deo coeternam Λ 1 ὅτι—ὁμολογῶν]
κόσμου συστάσεως ὁμολογῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν O 2 τέλους] τέλους κόσμου T 3 διεξαγομένην] ἐξαγομένη
Æ B 4 προσαγγελθεῖσαν T 5 γενέσθαι Æ B I O : γεγενῆσθαι M Q : γίνεσθαι T ἐστι ὁ τοιοῦτος
I μηδ᾽ I L 6 τῷ θεῷ B γὰρ] γὰρ τὴν R² : om. SP τῆς κινήσεως M δοὺς Æ B Q R T
SP 7 ἀμφιβάλλοι L πάντως om. SP καὶ¹ om. Æ B I L M N O R T W Dion SP τοῦ] ita Æ ß G I
L M N P R S W X Ald Forb : om. Mign 8 παρὰδέξαιτο N 8–9 τῷ ῥήματι νοοῦμεν τοῦ Θεοῦ] νοοῦμεν
ῥήματι Θεοῦ Æ B C I O T : νοοῦμεν τῷ ῥήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ Q R W : τῷ ῥήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ M τοῦ Θεοῦ
πιστεύοντες νοοῦμεν N 9 εἰς τὸ] ita Æ B D G L M O P Q R S T W X Ald Forb : ἀπὸ τῶν I : ἐν τῷ N : ἐκ
τῶν Mign ἐκ φαινομένων] ita Æ ß G L M O P R S W X Ald Forb : ἐκφαινομένων D Nac : ἐκφαινομένῳ
N² : ἐκφαινόμενον Q T : φαινομένων Mign 9–10 τὸ βλεπόμενον N T : τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα L 10
χρησώμεθα Æ B Dac N O P S T τοῦ ῥήματος I N Q R² : τῷ ῥήματι Rac τοῦ²] τοῦ καὶ M : τὸ D G
Ppc X
       – 261

[22.8] Neither, then, should we be troubled at the brief delay of the things hoped
for, but give diligence that we may not be cast out of the things hoped for. Just as, if
one were to tell some inexperienced person beforehand that the gathering of the
crops will take place in the season of the summer and the stores will be filled and
the table be abundantly supplied with food in the time of plenty, it would be a
foolish person who would hasten the coming of the season when he [instead]
ought to sow seeds and prepare the crops for himself by diligent care; for the
season will surely come, whether he wills it or not, at the appointed time; and it
will be seen differently by the one who has prepared for himself an abundance of
fruits and by him who, at that hour, is found destitute of any preparation. So also
I think it is necessary, as by the divine proclamation it is clear to all that the time of
change will come, not to trouble oneself about dates (for, he said, it is not for us to
know times and dates⁸¹), nor to seek calculations, by which one will sap the soul of
hope in the resurrection, but to rest upon faith in the things expected, purchasing
in advance, through good citizenship, the grace that is to come.
That one who acknowledges the beginning of the world’s constitution must neces-
sarily agree also regarding its end.⁸²
[23.1] But if someone, seeing the present course of the world carrying on in a
certain sequence, by which temporal extension is contemplated, should say that it
is not possible that the predicted cessation of moving things should happen,
neither, clearly, does such a one believe that the heaven and the earth came to
be in the beginning by God; for one who grants a beginning of movement surely
does not doubt regarding its end, and one not accepting the end, neither admits
the beginning. But just as it is by believing that we understand that the ages were
framed by the Word of God, as the Apostle says, so that things which are seen came
to be from those that do not appear,⁸³ we use the same faith regarding the word of

⁸¹ Acts 1:7.
⁸² Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 24): ‘Against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God’. For chapters
23–4, cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 9.2–13 (Spira, 91.19–94.16); Hex. 7 (Drobner, 14.13–16.11);
Origen, Princ. 4.4.7–8; Basil, Hex. 2.2.
⁸³ Heb. 11:3.
 262   

ἀναγκαίαν τῶν ὄντων στάσιν προαγορεύσαντος. [23.2] Τὸ δὲ πῶς ἐξαιρετέον τῆς

πολυπραγμοσύνης· καὶ γὰρ κᾀκεῖ πίστει κατηρτίσθαι τὸ βλεπόμενον ἐκ τῶν
μηδέπω φαινομένων κατεδεξάμεθα, παραδραμόντες τῶν ἀνεφίκτων τὴν ζήτησιν·
καίτοι περὶ πολλῶν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἀπορεῖν ὑπετίθετο, οὐ μικρὰς παρέχων τὰς
15 ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεπιστευμένων ἀμφιβολίαν.

[23.3] Ἐξῆν γὰρ κᾀκεῖ τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, ἐκ τῶν εὐλόγων κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον
ἀνατρέπειν τὴν πίστιν, πρὸς τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀληθῆ τὸν περὶ τῆς ὑλικῆς κτίσεως
εἶναι λόγον, ὃν ἡ ἁγία πρεσβεύει γραφὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι
διαβεβαιουμένη τὴν γένεσιν· οἱ γὰρ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παριστάμενοι λόγῳ, συναΐδιον
20 εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ [D] τὴν ὕλην κατασκευάζουσι, τοιούτοις ἐπιχειρήμασι πρὸς τὸ
δόγμα χρώμενοι—εἰ ἁπλοῦς ὁ Θεὸς τῇ φύσει καὶ ἄϋλος, ἄποιός τε καὶ ἀμεγέθης
καὶ ἀσύνθετος καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα περιγραφῆς ἀλλοτρίως ἔχων· πᾶσα δὲ ὕλη ἐν
διαστηματικῇ παρατάσει καταλαμβάνεται, καὶ τὰς διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων
καταλήψεις οὐ διαπέφευγεν, ἐν χρώματι καὶ σχήματι καὶ ὄγκῳ καὶ πηλικότητι
25 καὶ ἀντιτυπίᾳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρουμένοις γινωσκομένη, ὧν οὐδὲν
ἐν τῇ θεία [212] φύσει δυνατόν ἐστι κατανοῆσαι· τίς μηχανὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἀΰλον τὴν ὕλην
ἀποτεχθῆναι; ἐκ τοῦ ἀδιαστάτου τὴν διαστηματικὴν φύσιν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποστῆναι
ταῦτα πιστεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα κατὰ τὸν ἄρρητον λόγον, οὕτω προῆλθεν
εἰς γένεσιν· εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὑλῶδες ἦν, πῶς ἄϋλος ὁ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ὕλην ἔχων;
30 ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα δι᾽ ὧν ἡ ὑλικὴ φύσις χαρακτηρίζεται· εἰ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ἡ
ποσότης, πῶς ἄποσος ὁ Θεός; εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ σύνθετον, πῶς ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀμερὴς καὶ
ἀσύνθετος; ὥστε ἢ ὑλικὸν εἶναι κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν ὑποστῆναι τὴν
ὕλην, ὁ λόγος βιάζεται· ἢ εἰ τοῦτό τις φεύγοι, ἔξωθεν ἐπεισενεχθῆναι τὴν ὕλην αὐτῷ
πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ παντὸς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπάναγκες.
35 [23.4] Εἰ οὖν ἔξω τοῦ Θεοῦ ἦν, ἄλλό τι [B] παρὰ τὸν Θεὸν πάντως ἦν,
συνεπινοούμενον κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀϊδιότητος λόγον τῷ ἀγεννήτως ὄντι· ὥστε δύο

11 προαγορεύοντος N R : προαγορεῦσαν D E G P X : προσαγορεύσαντος S T 11–12 ἐξαιρετέον τῆς

πολυπραγμοσύνης] curiosi est quaerere Dion 11 ἐξαίρετον D G P X : eximium est Eri 12 κᾀκεῖ] ἐκεῖ
Æ B I M N O Rac W : καὶ ἐκεῖ R² τὰ βλεπόμενα Q Dion 13 μηδέπω] οὐδέπω D E : μήπω Æ B I : μὴ
M Q R φαινομένων] βλεπομένων D E G I L P S T X 14 πολλῶν] πολλῶν καὶ R ὑποτίθεται
L παρέχων] ἔχων Æ τὰς] ita Æ B G I L M N O P R S T W X Ald Forb : om. Mign 15 πρὸς] εἰς
D E G L P S X πιστευομένων I L 18–19 διαβεβαιουμένη ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι N 19 περιϊστάμενοι Q :
παριστάμενον W : praestant Eri 20 τὴν ὕλην τῷ θεῷ N R T ἐπιχειρήμασι] rethoricis conclusionibus
Eri 21 δόγμασι B ἄποιος] ἄποσος Æ B C M N O Q R T Dion 22 κατὰ] πρὸς N ἐν om. D G L P
S X 23 διαστηματικὴ G P X παραστάσει N : διατάσει B καταλαμβάνονται Rac 24 διαπέφυγεν
W 24–5 ἐν χρώματι—ἀντιτυπίᾳ] in colore et figura, mole quoque et qualitate et impressionne uel
duritia Dion : in re atque tumore et quantitate et solidate Eri 24 καὶ¹] καὶ ἐν Q 25 τοῖς] τῆς W 26
τις μηχανὴ] τῇ μηχανῇ T : τὶς μηχανικὴ B 27 ἀποτεχθῆναι] ἀποτεχθῆναι καὶ B I διαστατικὴν D E
F G P S X φύσιν] ὕλην M 28 πιστεύεται] ita Æ B D G L M N O P Q S W X Forb : τίς πιστεύσειε R :
πεπίστευεται Ald Mign δῆλον ὅτι] ita B G L N O P R S W X Forb : δηλονότι Ald Mign οὕτως X 29
ἑαυτῷ] ita Æ D G I L M O P Q S W X Forb : αὑτῷ B Mign : αὐτῷ ß Ald 30 τ᾽ ἄλλα L : τἆλλα Æ R 32
κατὰ O τὸ] τοῦ Æ B G M O P Q R S W X 33 φεύγει I L ἐπεισηνεχθῆναι W 34 τὴν om. D G L P
S X 35 ἔξω] ἔξωθεν B M R ἦν om. Q 36 τῷ ἀγγήτως ὄντι κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀϊδιότητος λόγον
R ἀγεννήτως] ἀγενήτως G P S : ἀγεννήτῳ L
        263

God foretelling the necessary cessation of beings. [23.2] The question of how
must be put beyond curiosity; for even in the case mentioned, it was by faith that
we accepted that things which are seen were framed from those that do not yet
appear, passing by the search into things beyond reach. And yet our reason
suggests difficulties on many points, presenting no slight occasions for doubt
regarding things believed.
[23.3] For in that case, too, it is possible for those prone to arguing to overturn the
faith by reasonable argumentation, so that we should not think true the statement
conveyed by Holy Scripture regarding material creation, confirming that all beings
have their genesis from God. Those who stand by the opposite view, holding
matter to be co-eternal with God, use arguments such as these to support their
own doctrine: if by nature God is simple and immaterial, without quantity and
without size and without combination, and is otherwise than having circumscrip-
tion by figure, while all matter is apprehended in extension measured by intervals
and does not escape apprehension by the senses, but is known in colour and figure
and bulk and magnitude and resistance, and the other things contemplated
regarding it, none of which it is possible to conceive in the divine nature—what
mechanism is there for matter to be constructed from the immaterial? Or for
nature that is extended [to come] from the non-extended? If these things are
believed to have existence from that source, it is clear that, being in him in
accordance with some inexpressible principle, it thus comes to genesis; but if
that which is material was in him, how can he be immaterial while having matter
in himself? Similarly with all the other marks by which material nature is
characterized: if there is quantity in God, how is God without quantity? If that
which is compound is in him, how is he simple and without parts and without
combination? So, the argument compels the conclusion that either, by necessity,
he is himself material because matter exists from him, or, if one avoids this, that it
is necessary to suppose that matter was imported by him from outside for the
construction of the universe.
[23.4] If, then, it was external to God, there surely was something else besides
God, conceived, in accordance with the principle of eternity, together with him
 264   

ἄναρχα καὶ ἀγέννητα κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀλλήλοις τῷ λόγῳ συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι, τοῦ

τεχνικῶς ἐνεργοῦντος καὶ τοῦ δεχομένου τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν ταύτην ἐνέργειαν· καὶ εἴ
τις ἐκ τῆς ἀνάγκης ταύτης ἀΐδιον ὑποτίθοιτο τῷ Δημιουργῷ τῶν πάντων ὑποκεῖσθαι
40 τὴν ὕλην, ὅσην ὁ Μανιχαῖος εὑρήσει τῶν ἰδίων δογμάτων τὴν συνηγορίαν, ὃς τὴν
ὑλικὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀντιπαρεξάγει τῇ ἀγαθῇ φύσει; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐκ
τοῦ Θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, τῆς γραφῆς λεγούσης ἀκούοντες, πεπιστεύκαμεν· καὶ τὸ ὅπως ἦν
ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον, οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν περιεργάζεσθαι, πάντα τῇ
θείᾳ δυνάμει χωρητὰ πεπιστευκότες—καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὑποστήσεσθαι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι πρὸς
45 τὸ [C] δοκοῦν ἐπιβαλεῖν τὰς ποιότητας.

[23.5] Οὐκοῦν ἀκολούθως, ὡς ἀρκεῖν ἡγούμεθα τοῖς οὖσι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος
ὑπόστασιν, τὴν τοῦ θείου θελήματος δύναμιν· οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἀναστοιχείωσιν τῶν
συνεστώτων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγοντες δύναμιν, εἰς οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος τὴν πίστιν
παραληψόμεθα· καίτοιγε δυνατὸν ἴσως ἦν, εὑρεσιλογίᾳ τινὶ τοὺς περὶ τῆς ὕλης
50 ἐρεσχελοῦντας πεῖσαι, μὴ δοκεῖν ἐρήμην κατατρέχειν τοῦ λόγου.

Ἀντίρρησις πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ τὴν ὕλην.

[24.1] Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔξω τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον εὑρισκομένων ἡ περὶ τῆς ὕλης
ὑπόληψις φέρεται, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ τε καὶ ἀΰλου ταύτην ὑποστῆναι πρεσβεύουσα·
πᾶσαν γὰρ εὑρήσομεν ἐκ ποιοτήτων τινῶν συνεστῶσαν τὴν ὕλην, ὧν εἰ γυμνωθείη
5 καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν οὐδαμοῦ τῷ λόγῳ καταληφθήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἕκαστον ποιότητος εἶδος
λόγῳ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χωρίζεται· ὁ δὲ λόγος νοητή τίς ἐστι, καὶ οὐχὶ σωματικὴ
θεωρία· οἷον προκειμένου ζώου τινὸς ἢ ξύλου τῇ θεωρίᾳ ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ὑλικὴν
ἐχόντων τὴν σύστασιν, πολλὰ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ κατ᾽ ἐπίνοιαν διαιρέσει
κατενοήσαμεν, ὧν ἑκάστου πρὸς τὸ συνθεωρούμενον [213] ἀμίκτως ὁ λόγος ἔχει·
10 ἕτερος γὰρ ὁ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ ἕτερος τοῦ βάρους ὁ λόγος, ὁ τῆς ποσότητος πάλιν

37 ἄναρχα] anarcha (hoc est principio carentia) Eri ἀγέννητα καὶ ἄναρχα D E F G L P S X ἀγέννητα]
ἀγένητα Æ G I L M P S X 34–5 κατὰ ταὐτὸν] κατ᾽ αὐτὸν G Q τῷ λόγῳ om.
T συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι] καταλαμβάνεσθαι N : συμπαραλαμβάνεσθαι D E τοῦ] τοῦ τε B W 38
τεχνικῶς] τεχνίτου I 39 ἀΐδιον] συναΐδον Æ B E I N O πάντων] ita Æ B D G I L M O P R S T W
X Forb : ἁπάντων Ald Mign ὑποκεῖσθαι om. N T 40 ὕλην] ὕλην πλείστην L S T εὑρήσοι A (sed
non Æ) D G² P S τῶν ἰδίων δογμάτων εὑρήσει N τὴν¹ om. O τὴν² om. Æ ß N Q R 41
οὐσίαν] ita B D E F G L M P R² S X Forb : αἰτίαν O W Dion Eri Ald Mign ἀγένητον Æ G I L M O P
S² ἀντιπαρεξάγει] παρεξάγει D E F G P X : ἀντεπεξάγει M : ἀντιπαρέξει R καὶ om. I 42 ἀκούοντες
λεγούσης D G L P S X ἀκούοντες] ἀκούειν M ὅπως] πῶς Æ B N O T 43 τὸ] τῷ Æ : om.
Q R² ἡμέτερον] ἡμέτερον ὅν Q περιεργάσασθαι R 43–4 πάντα—πεπιστευκότες] diuinam naturam
creatricem credentes esse cunctorum Dion 44 χωρητὰ] plena Eri ὑποστήσεσθαι] ita Æ B D G I L O
P R² S T W X Ald Forb : ὑποστήσασθαι Mign τοῦ ὄντος I 45 ἐπιβάλλειν M Q R T : ὑποβάλλειν Æ B I
O : om. N τὰς ποιότητας] περὶ τὰς ποιότητας χρήσασθαι N 46 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri ἀκολούθως
om. D G P X ὡς ἀκολούθως I ὡς om. N Q T ἡγούμεθα] ἡ γὐνη B : ἡ γυνὴ ß 47 οὔτως G M P R
S W X 48 συνεστηκότων R ἀνάγοντες] ἐναγόντες I : om. M πίστιν] ἐπιστείμην Q : disciplinae Dion
: disciplinam Eri 49 καίτοιγε inc. novum cap. R ἦν om. M εὑρεσιλογίᾳ τινὶ] εὑρεσιλογίαις τισὶ
B τινὶ om. N 50 ἐρεσχηλοῦντας Q : ἐρεσχολοῦντας I

Cap. 25 Æ ß I N O Q R T Dion : def. Eri

1 ἀντίρρησις—ὕλην] quod omnis materia quibusdam quantitatibus subsistit Λ 3 φέρεται]
φαίνεται S Ald Mign τε om. N ὑποστῆναι] εἶναι D G H P S X 4 γὰρ om. T εὑρίσκομεν D G
H L P S X συνεστῶσαν] ὑφεστῶσαν M 5 τοῦ λογοῦ N ἕκαστος B 6 λόγῳ] λόγῳ τε T οὐχὶ] οὐ Æ
B D I L N O R T 7 προκειμένου om. T τινὸς ζώου I N O 8 τοῦ ὑποκειμένου N 9 ἕκαστος B M :
ἕκαστον Æ I O θεωρούμενον W 10 ὁ¹ om. D G H L P Q R S X ὁ τοῦ βάρους λόγος W λόγος] λόγος
καὶ D πάλιν] πάλιν ἕτερος S2mg
       – 265

who exists ingenerately, so that two unoriginate and ingenerate principles, each
identical with the other, are presupposed by the argument: the one operating
constructively and that receiving this skilful operation. And if anyone, by the
necessity of this argument, should suppose an eternal matter as the substratum for
the Creator of all, how great a support the Manichaean (who opposes material
essence, by virtue of ingenerateness, to the good nature) will find for his particular
teachings. Yet we do indeed believe that all things are of God, as we hear the
Scripture saying; and as to the question of how it was in God, a question beyond
our reason, we do not seek to pry, believing that all things are contained by the
divine power, both to give existence to what is not and to overlay qualities to the
being for appearance.
[23.5] Consequently, then, just as we suppose the power of the divine will
sufficient to bring beings into subsistence from non-being, so also we will not
base our belief on anything beyond probability in referring the reconstitution of
what is assembled to the same power. Moreover, it might perhaps be possible, by
some skilful use of words, to persuade those who speak frivolously about matter
not to appear to inveigh against our argument!
An argument against those who say that matter is co-eternal with God.⁸⁴
[24.1] The notion representing matter as subsisting from the intelligible and
immaterial is not outside the bounds of what we find to be consistent. For we
will find that all matter is composed of certain qualities; if it were stripped of these
it, in itself, could in no way be grasped by idea.⁸⁵ Moreover, in idea, each kind of
quality is separated from the substratum; and the idea is an intellectual and not
bodily contemplation. For instance, if some animal or tree is presented for
contemplation, or any other thing having material constitution, in the division
of it by aspect we perceive many things about the substratum, and the idea of each
of them is not confused with that which we also contemplate: for the idea of colour
is one and of weight another, and again that of quantity and the particularity of the
quality of touch: for ‘softness’ and ‘two cubits long’, and the rest of the things

⁸⁴ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 25): ‘That matter exists in certain quantities’.
⁸⁵ The method of ‘abstraction’ that follows goes back to Aristotle, Metaph. Ζ 7.3.3–6 (1029a8–34); it
was used as a method of arriving at the One (cf. Alcinous, Epi. 10.5; Clement, Strom. 5.11.71.2); for its
application to matter, see Origen, Princ. 4.4.7; Cels. 3.41, 4.57.
 266   

καὶ ὁ τῆς ποιᾶς κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἰδιότητος· ἥτε γὰρ μαλακότης καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ καὶ τὰ
λοιπὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τῷ σώματι κατὰ τὸν λόγον συμφέρεται·
ἑκάστου γὰρ τούτων ἴδιος, καθό ἐστιν, ὁ ἑρμηνευτικὸς ὅρος ἐπινοεῖται, οὐδὲν
ἐπικοινωνῶν ἄλλῃ τινὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον θεωρουμένων ποιότητι.
15 [24.2] Εἰ τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ χρῶμα, νοητὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία καὶ ἡ ποσότης καὶ
τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἰδιωμάτων, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων εἰ ὑφαιρεθείη τοῦ
ὑποκειμένου, πᾶς ὁ τοῦ σώματος συνδιαλύεται λόγος· ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη, ὧν τὴν
ἀπουσίαν τῆς τοῦ σώματος λύσεως αἰτίαν εὕρομεν, τούτων τὴν συνδρομὴν
ἀποτίκτειν τὴν ὑλικὴν φύσιν [B] ὑπολαμβάνειν· ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα, ᾧ τὸ
20 χρῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ ἀντιτυπία καὶ ἡ διάστασις καὶ τὸ βάρος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
τῶν ἰδιωμάτων οὐ πρόσεστιν, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι
παρὰ τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον εὑρίσκεται· οὕτω κατὰ τὸ ἀντίστροφον, ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν
συνδράμῃ τὰ εἰρημένα, τὴν σωματικὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀπεργάζεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ νοητὴ
τῶν ἰδιωμάτων τούτων ἡ κατανόησις, νοητὸν δὲ τῇ φύσει τὸ θεῖον· οὐδὲν ἀπεικὸς, ἐκ
25 τῆς ἀσωμάτου φύσεως τὰς νοερὰς ταύτας ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων γένεσιν
ὑποστῆναι, τῆς μὲν νοητῆς φύσεως τὰς νοητὰς ὑφιστώσης δυνάμεις, τῆς δὲ τούτων
πρὸς ἄλληλα συνδρομῆς τὴν ὑλώδη φύσιν παραγούσης εἰς γένεσιν. [24.3] Ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὸ πάρεργον ἡμῖν παρεξητάσθω· ἡμῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν [C] πίστιν
ἐπανακτέον τὸν λόγον, δι᾽ ἧς ἔκ τε τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑποστῆναι τὸ πᾶν ἐδεξάμεθα, καὶ
30 πάλιν εἰς ἄλλην τινὰ μεταστοιχειοῦσθαι κατάστασιν παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς διδαχθέντες,
οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλομεν.
Πῶς ἄν τις καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσαχθείη πιστεῦσαι τῇ γραφῇ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως
διδασκούσῃ.
[25.1] Ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως τις πρὸς τὰ διαλυθέντα σώματα βλέπων, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέτρον τῆς
ἰδίας δυνάμεως τὸ θεῖον κρίνων, τὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγον ἀδύνατον εἶναί φησι, καὶ
5 στήσεσθαι τὰ νῦν κινούμενα καὶ ἀναστήσεσθαι τὰ νῦν μὴ κινούμενα μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι
λέγων. [25.2] Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον ποιείσθω τεκμήριον [D]

11 ποιᾶς] ποιότητος N 12 εἰρημένων] προειρημένων T συμφύρεται N 13 ἑκάτῳ Q καθό ἐστιν ἴδιος

I καθὸ] ita Æ B H L N P R S Forb : καθὼς Ι Μ : καθ᾽ ὃ O W X Ald Mign ὅρος] λόγος D N Q R² :
ration Dion : causa Eri 14 ἄλλῳ W ποιοτήτων T 15 ποσότης] ποιότης N 16 δὲ om. M 17 πᾶς
om. N ἀκούλουθον W ἂν] δ᾽ ἂν N 18 ἀπουσίαν] ὑφαίρεσιν R T εὕρωμεν H : ηὕραμεν Pac X :
εὕραμεν G : εὑρίσκομεν N 19 ὡς γὰρ] ὥσπερ T 20 χρῶμα] res (ΟΥΣΙΑ) Eri καὶ τὸ βάρος] post
σχῆμα (l. 20) pon. N : om. D G H P X : τὸ βάρος τε I 21 τῶν] τῶν τοιούτων R πρόσεστιν] πρόεστιν
G P X 22 τὸ ἀντίστροφον] τὸν ἀντίστροφον λόγον B δ᾽ om. I 23 συνδράμοι M κατεργάζεται
N T ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ] ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν I M εἰ om. Æ B N O Rac T : ἡ W νοητὴ] νοητὴ μὲν R 24 τούτων om.
Q τῇ φύσει om. I οὐδὲν] οὐδὲν ἆρα N 26 ὑφεστώσης ß H M R 27 ἀλλήλας B 28 παρεξητάσθη ß
G H N Pac : ἐξητάσθη N : συνεξετάσθω Rac (παρε sup. l.) : ἐξητάσθω R² S ἡμῖν δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πίστιν]
ἐπὶ τὴν πίστιν δὲ πάλιν I 29 ἀνακτέον T 30 τινὰ om. M κατάστασιν] στάσιν D

Cap. 26 Æ I N Q R T Dion : def. Eri

1–2 πῶς—διδασκούσῃ] de fide resurrectionis et de tribus mortuis quos dominus Iesus suscitauit
Λ 1 καὶ] καὶ ἐκ N τῶν ἔξωθεν om. I προαχθείη Dpc O T : προσαχθῆ Q τῇ γραφῷ πιστεῦσαι
R 2 διδασκούσης N : om. T W 4 ἰδίας] οἰκείας B 5 νῦν om. A (sed non Æ) D L καὶ
ἀναστήσεσθαι τὰ νῦν μὴ κινούμενα om. Dac I N μὴ¹ Xpc2 (post κινούμενα X add. καὶ ἀναστήσεσθαι
τὰ νῦν κινούμενα sed exp.) μὴ²] μὴ δὲ D R T 6 λέγοι W καὶ om. N ποιείσθω om. D G
P X τεκμήριον ποιείσθω E
       – 267

spoken of, are not conflated with each other in idea nor with the body; the
explanatory definition conceived for each of these is particular, according to
what it is, having nothing in common with any other quality of those aspects
contemplated about the substratum.
[24.2] If, then, colour is something intellectual, and resistance also is intellectual,
and so with quantity and the other such properties, [so that] if each of these
should be withdrawn from the substratum the whole idea of the body is dissolved,
it would be consistent to suppose that the concurrence of those things, the absence
of which we found to be a cause of the dissolution of the body, generates material
nature. For as that is not a body which has not colour and figure and resistance
and extension and weight and the rest of the properties, while each of these, in its
particularity, is found to be not the body but something else besides the body, so
also conversely, whenever the things spoken of are in concurrence they effect
bodily existence. Moreover, if the perception of these properties is intellectual, and
the divinity is also intellectual in nature, there is nothing unreasonable [in
supposing that] these intellectual occasions for the genesis of bodies subsist
from the incorporeal nature, the intellectual nature on the one hand giving
subsistence to the intellectual potentialities, and the mutual concurrence of these
bringing material nature to genesis. [24.3] But let us put aside such matters, as
being a digression; we must direct our treatise, once again, to the faith by which we
accept that the universe subsists from non-being, and do not doubt when we are
taught by the Scripture that it will again be changed into some other state.

How one, even of those outside, may be brought to believe the Scripture’s teaching
regarding the resurrection.⁸⁶
[25.1] Perhaps someone, looking at the dissolution of bodies, and assessing the
divine by the measure of his own power, asserts that the idea of the resurrection is
impossible, saying that it cannot be that those things which now move should
become stationary and that those which are now not moving should be raised
again. [25.2] Let such a one, however, take as the first and greatest evidence of the

⁸⁶ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 26): ‘Of faith in the resurrection and of the three dead persons whom the Lord
Jesus raised’.
 268   

τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀληθείας τὸ τοῦ κήρυκος αὐτῆς ἀξιόπιστον· ἡ δὲ τῶν
λεγομένων πίστις ἐκ τῆς τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν προρρηθέντων ἐκβάσεως τὸ ἀσφαλὲς
ἔχει· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πολλούς τε καὶ παντοδαποὺς παρέθετο λόγους ἡ θεία γραφὴ,
10 δυνατόν ἐστιν ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ ψεύδους ἢ ἀληθείας τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν εἰρημένων
θεασαμένους, δι᾽ ἐκείνων καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως δόγμα κατανοῆσαι. Εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ψευδεῖς οἱ λόγοι καὶ διεσφαλμένοι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐλέγχονται, οὐδὲ
τοῦτο πάντως ἐκτὸς ψεύδους ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα μαρτυροῦσαν ἔχει τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ τὴν πεῖραν, ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη δι᾽ ἐκείνων καὶ τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως
15 πρόρρησιν ἀληθῆ νομίσαι. Οὐκοῦν [216] ἐπιμνησθῶμεν ἑνὸς ἢ δυοῖν τῶν
προκατηγγελμένων, καὶ ἀντιπαραθῶμεν τοῖς προρρηθεῖσι τὴν ἔκβασιν, ὥστε
γνῶναι δι᾽ αὐτῶν εἰ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁ λόγος βλέπει.
[25.3] Τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅπως ἤνθει κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὁ Ἰσραηλίτης λαὸς, πάσαις ταῖς
κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην δυναστείαις ἀντεγειρόμενος; οἷα ἦν τὰ βασίλεια κατὰ τὴν τῶν
20 Ἱεροσολύμων πόλιν; οἷα τὰ τείχη, οἱ πύργοι, ἡ τοῦ ἱεροῦ μεγαλουργία; ἅπερ καὶ τοῖς
μαθηταῖς τοῦ Κυρίου ἄξια θαύματος ἐνομίσθη, καὶ κατανοεῖν ἀξιοῦσι τὸν Κύριον,
θαυμαστικῶς περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διατεθέντες, ὡς ἡ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἱστορία δηλοῖ,
λέγοντες πρὸς αὐτόν, ποταπὰ τὰ ἔργα καὶ ποταπαὶ αἱ οἰκοδομαί· ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐσομένην
περὶ τὸν τόπον ἐρήμωσιν καὶ τὸν ἀφανισμὸν τοῦ κάλλους ἐκείνου πρὸς τοὺς τὸ παρὸν
25 θαυμάζοντας ὑποδείκνυσι, λέγων μηδὲν [B] τῶν φαινομένων μετ᾽ ὀλίγον
ὑπολειφθήσεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸν τοῦ πάθους καιρὸν, αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες
ἐπηκολούθουν θρηνοῦσαι τὴν ἄδικον ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ψῆφον (οὔπω γὰρ εἰς τὴν τῶν
γινομένων οἰκονομίαν ἀπέβλεπον) ὁ δὲ συμβουλεύει τὰ μὲν περὶ αὐτὸν γινόμενα
σιωπᾶν· μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δακρύων ἄξια· ὑπερθέσθαι δὲ τὸν ὀδυρμὸν καὶ τὸν θρῆνον εἰς
30 τὸν ἀληθῆ τῶν δακρύων καιρὸν, ὅταν περισχεθῇ τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν ἡ πόλις καὶ εἰς
τοσοῦτον συνοχῆς ἔλθῃ τὰ πάθη ὡς μακαριστὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν μὴ γενόμενον· ἐν οἷς
καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τεκνοφάγον προεμήνυσεν ἄγος, εἰπὼν μακαρισθήσεσθαι κατὰ τὰς

7 ἀνάστασιν] διάστασιν A (sed non Æ) G P X κήρυκος] κηρύγματος W Eri Ald Mign 8 τῶν λοιπῶν
om. R ἀσφαλὲς] ἀληθὲς R 9 τε om. Æ B I M N O Q R W παρέθετο] παρέχεται Q λόγους
παρέθετο M 10 ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ ψεύδους ἢ ἀληθείας] ut ueritas sustineat mendaces Eri ἔχῃ] ἔχει Q W :
ἔχοι Æ L M N : post ἀληθείας (l. 10) pon. N 11 περὶ om. M 12 ψευδεῖς—ἀληθείας] mendaces
sermones ueritates et deceptores Eri 13 ἐκτὸς] ἐκτὸς τοῦ Æ B I N O Q R T W τὰ ἄλλα] τἄλλα I L :
τἆλλα R 13 ἔχει] ἔχουσι M 13–14 τῆς ἀληθείας N 14 τὴν] τὸν O 15 νομίζειν B νομισθῆναι D E I :
νοῆσαι L W οὐκοῦν] non igitur Eri δυοῖν] δύο Æ B I O : δευτέρου N 17 δι᾽ αὐτῶν] utrum Dion :
eorum Eri 18 ἤνθει] interponebatur Eri 19 τῶν om. Æ N R 20 ἱεροσολυμιτῶν Æ B I M N O Q
W Eri 22 περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα θαυματστικῶς T W 23 πρὸς αὐτὸν om. Q Eri ποδαπὰ ἔργα καὶ
ποδαπαὶ οἰκοδομαί N 25 ὑποδεικνύει N 26 παρὰ] περὶ Q καιρὸν τοῦ πάθους D G L P S X 27 ἐπ᾽
αὐτῷ ἄδικον N 28 μὲν om. B αὐτοῦ N 29 ὑπερθέσθαι δὲ] ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν δὲ θέσθαι M 31 τοσοῦτο
M Q ἔλθοι G L P S X μακαρισμὸν I : μακάριον M ἡγεῖσθαι] εἶναι N γενόμενον] ita Æ B D G I M N
O P S T W X Ald Forb : γεννώμενον R Mign 32 τεκνοφαγίαν O Q προεμύνησεν B (non ß) : ἐμήνυσεν
N ἄγος] ἄγονος L : ἄγονον M μακαρισθήσεται L : μακαρίζεσθαι Æ
        269

truth regarding the resurrection the trustworthiness of the herald of this. Now the
faith in what is said derives its certainty from the outcomes of the other things
predicted. Since the Holy Scripture delivers many and various statements, it is
possible, by reviewing how the rest of the utterances stand regarding falsehood
and truth, to understand, in the light of them, the doctrine concerning the
resurrection. For if in other matters the statements are proved to be false and to
have failed being true, then certainly neither is this outside falsehood; but if all the
others have experience to vouch for their truth, it would be consistent to deem as
true, on their account, the prediction concerning the resurrection also. Therefore,
let us recall one or two of the other predictions made and compare the outcome
with the things foretold, so that we may know, through them, whether the idea of
the resurrection points to the truth.
[25.3] Who does not know how the people of Israel flourished of old, raised up
against all the power of the world? Or of what kind were the palaces in the city of
Jerusalem? Of what kind were the walls, the towers, the majestic structure of the
Temple? Things deemed worthy of admiration even by the disciples of the Lord,
so that they expected the Lord to take notice of them, being disposed to wonder at
what was seen, as the Gospel narrative clearly shows, when they said to him: What
works and what buildings!⁸⁷ But he indicates to those who wondered at the present
state of things the future desolation of the place and the disappearance of that
beauty, saying that after a little while nothing of what was seen would be left. And
again, at the time of the Passion, the women following him lamented the unjust
sentence against him (for they could not yet see the economy of what was
happening); but he bids them to be silent regarding the things done to him, for
it does not deserve their tears, but to reserve their wailing and lamentations for the
true time of tears, when the city should be compassed by besiegers, and their
suffering reach so great a strait that they should consider him blessed who had not
come into existence; in this he also denounced beforehand the abomination of
eating children, saying that in those days the womb should be blessed which never
bore.⁸⁸ Where then are those palaces? Where is the Temple? Where are the walls?
Where are the defences of the towers? Where is the power of the Israelites? Were

⁸⁷ Cf. Mark 13:1. ⁸⁸ Cf. Luke 23:27–9.

 270   

ἡμέρας ἐκείνας τὴν γαστέρα τὴν ἄγονον. Ποῦ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνα τὰ βασίλεια; ποῦ τὸ
ἱερόν; ποῦ τὰ τείχη; ποῦ τῶν πύργων αἱ προβολαί; ποῦ δὲ ἡ τῶν Ἰσραηλιτῶν
35 δυναστεία; [C] οὐχ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πᾶσαν μικροῦ δεῖν τὴν οἰκουμένην ἄλλος ἀλλαχῆ
διεσπάρησαν; τῇ δὲ τούτων καταστροφῇ συνηρειπώθη καὶ τὰ βασίλεια;
[25.4] Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προμηνῦσαι ὁ Κύριος, οὐ τῶν
πραγμάτων χάριν—τί γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἦν τοῖς ἀκούουσι κέρδος τῶν πάντως
ἐκβησομένων ἡ πρόρρησις; ἔγνωσαν γὰρ ἂν τῇ πείρᾳ, καὶ μὴ προμαθόντες τὸ
40 γενησόμενον—ἀλλ᾽ ὥστε διὰ τούτων αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν μειζόνων πίστιν εἰς
ἀκολουθίαν ἐλθεῖν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις διὰ τῶν ἔργων μαρτυρία, καὶ τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις
ἀληθείας ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις.
[25.5] [D] Ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τινος γεωργοῦ τὴν τῶν σπερμάτων ὑφηγουμένου δύναμιν,
ἀπιστεῖν συμβῇ τὸν γεωργίας ἀπείρατον, αὐτάρκης ἂν εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἦν
45 τῷ γεηπόνῳ ἐν ἑνὶ σπέρματι τῶν ἐν τῷ μεδίμνῳ κειμένων δείξαντι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ
περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐγγυᾶσθαι· ὁ γὰρ ἰδὼν τὸν ἕνα πυρὸν ἢ τὴν κριθὴν ἢ ὅ τι περ ἂν ἐν
τῷ πληρώματι τοῦ μεδίμνου τύχῃ, μετὰ τὸ καταβληθῆναι τῇ βώλῳ στάχυν
γενόμενον, οὐκέτ᾽ ἂν διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπιστήσειεν· οὕτως ἱκανή
μοι δοκεῖ πρὸς μαρτυρίαν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν μυστηρίου, ἡ τοῖς λοιποῖς
50 τῶν εἰρημένων συνομολογουμένη ἀλήθεια. [25.6] Μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς
ἀναστάσεως ἡ [217] πεῖρα, ἣν οὐ διὰ λόγων τοσοῦτον ὅσον δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων
ἐδιδάχθημεν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ μέγα καὶ ὑπὲρ πίστιν ἦν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν θαῦμα,
διὰ τῶν κατωτέρων τῆς θαυματοποιΐας ἀρξάμενος ἠρέμα πως τὴν πίστιν ἡμῶν
προσεθίζει τοῖς μείζοσι.
55 [25.7] Καθάπερ γάρ τις μήτηρ καταλλήλως τιθηνουμένη τὸ νήπιον, τέως μὲν
ἁπαλῷ τε καὶ ὑγρῷ τῷ στόματι τὸ γάλα διὰ τῆς θηλῆς ἐντίθησιν· ὀδοντοφυοῦντι

34 προβολαί] περιβολαὶ N δὲ om. B N τῶν ἰσραηλιτῶν ἡ M N 35 οἱ] ὁ N μικροῦ om. N δεῖν om.
B N ἀλλαχοῦ M 36 καταστροφῇ] καταστροφῇ μικροῦ I συνηριπώθη B D L O Spc T : συνηρηπώθη
N : συνηρριπώθη Rpc2 : συνηρρειπώθη Sac : συνερριπώθη G P Smg W X : συνεριπώθη Q S2mg :
συνερρυπώθη M καὶ om. N 37 μοι γὰρ N R 38 τοσοῦτον om. I O τοῖς ἀκούουσι ἦν
I O πάντων X 39 ἐκβησομένων] ἐκβήσεσθαι μελλόντων N γὰρ om. I W προμαθόντες] μαθόντες
R 40 γεννησόμενον Q : ἐκβησόμενον B ἀλλ᾽ ὥστε] ἄλλως τε L καὶ διὰ τούτων αὐτοῖς N αὐτοῖς]
αὐτοὺς I τὴν περὶ τῶν μειζόνων πίστιν εἰς] εἰς τῆν περὶ τῆς τῶν μειζόνων πίστεως I πίστιν om.
M 41 ἐλθεῖν] ἐλθεῖν ἀλήθειαν M διὰ τῶν ἔργων om. M 42 ἀληθείας] ἀκολουθίας D E R2mg 44
συμβῇ] συμβαίη M : συνέβη Q Sac τὸν] τὸν τῆς Mign ἀπείραστον M : ἁπείρητον B αὔταρκες Æ
B I L M N O Q S ἂν] γὰρ I : ἆν ἦν L : ἦν N τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπόδειξιν N τῆς om. M N ἧν] ἂν N : om.
L 45 ἐν¹ om. N S κειμένων] ἐγκειμένων N δείξαντι om. D G P X 46 πυρὸν] πυρὸν καὶ τὴν ὀλύραν
T τὴν] ita Æ B D G I M N O P Q R T X Forb : τὴν μίαν S W Ald Mign περ] ὅπερ Æ B I T : οὗπερ
N 47 τύχῃ] τύχοι L M P R καταβληθῆναι] ita Æ B D G I M N O P R T W X Forb : ἐγκαταβληθῆναι
S Ald Mign βόλῳ G Nac (ω sup. l.) Pac Q W : culmo Eri 48 γινόμενον I οὐκέτ᾽] ita Æ B D I L M O
P Q R S X Forb : οὐκ G : οὐκέτι W Ald Mign 49 μυστηρίου] μαρτυρίου R 50 συνομολογουμένη om.
B 51 ἣν] ἦν G L P X διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν Æ B I M N O Q R T W 53 κατωτέρω G L P S X 53–4
προσεθίζει τὴν πίστιν ἡμῶν D G L P S X 54 προσερεθίζει M : προεθίζει T : nutribat Eri 55 καθάπερ]
καὶ καθάπερ Æ γάρ om. Æ B N τιθηνουμένη] lactans Dion Eri τέως] ἕως B L 56 τε om. D τὸ
om. D² ἐντίθησιν] ἐνίησιν Q
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they not scattered in different places over almost all the world; and in their
overthrow the palaces also brought to ruin? [25.4] For it seems to me that the
Lord forewarned these things and others like them not for the sake of the
matters themselves—for what great advantage to the hearers was the prediction
of what was certainly going to happen? They would have known by experience,
even if they had not previously learnt of what would come—but in order that
by these means faith might also follow concerning more important matters;
for the testimony through events in the former cases is also a proof of the truth
in the latter.
[25.5] For just as if a farmer were explaining the power of seeds and it were to
happen that someone inexperienced in farming should disbelieve him, it
would be sufficient for proof of the truth of the matter for the agriculturist
to show him the power in one seed of those lying in the bushel and give this as
a pledge for the rest. For one who saw the single grain of wheat or barley, or
whatever should be in the plenitude of the bushel, after being cast into the clod
of earth, become an ear, by means of the one would no longer disbelieve
concerning the others.⁸⁹ So also, the truth acknowledged regarding the other
statements seems to me to be sufficient for evidence of the mystery of the
resurrection. [25.6] Still more is this the case with the experience of resurrection
itself, which we have been taught not so much by words as by events themselves.
Since the marvel of resurrection was great and beyond belief, beginning gradually
by lesser instances of his miraculous power, he accustoms our faith, as it were, for
the greater instances.
[25.7] Just as a mother, nursing her babe appropriately, supplies milk by her
breast to its mouth while still tender and soft; and when it begins to have teeth and
to grow she introduces bread, not hard or such as it cannot chew, so that the
tender and unpractised gums may not be chafed by rough food, but softening it
with her own teeth, she makes it commensurate to and appropriate for the ability
of the eater; and then as its ability increases by growth she gradually leads on the

⁸⁹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.102–6 (Spira, 120.2–121.4).

 272   

δὲ ἤδη καὶ αὐξανομένῳ προσάγει τὸν ἄρτον, οὐ τραχύν τε καὶ ἀκατέργαστον, ὡς ἂν

μὴ περιξανθείη τῷ σκληρῷ τῆς τροφῆς τὸ τῶν οὔλων ἁπαλόν τε καὶ ἀγύμναστον,
ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀδοῦσι καταλεάνασα, σύμμετρόν τε καὶ κατάλληλον τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ
60 προσφερομένου ἐποίησεν· εἶτα κατὰ προσθήκην τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπιδιδούσης,
προσεθισθὲν τοῖς ἁπαλωτέροις ἠρέμα τὸ νήπιον [B] προσάγει τῇ στερεωτέρᾳ
τροφῇ· οὕτω τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην μικροψυχίαν ὁ Κύριος, οἷόν τι νήπιον ἀτελὲς διὰ τῶν
θαυμάτων τρέφων καὶ τιθηνούμενος, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν ἀπεγνωσμένῃ νόσῳ τὴν τῆς
ἀναστάσεως προοιμιάζεται δύναμιν, ὃ μέγα μὲν ἦν τῷ κατορθώματι, οὐ μὴν
65 τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀπιστεῖσθαι λεγόμενον· ἐπιτιμήσας γὰρ τῷ πυρετῷ σφοδρῶς τὴν
πενθερὰν τοῦ Σίμωνος καταφλέγοντι, τοσαύτην ἐποίησε τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν
μετάστασιν, ὡς πρὸς τὸ διακονεῖν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐνισχύσαι τὴν ἤδη τεθνήξεσθαι
προσδοκωμένην.
[25.8] Εἴτα μικρόν τι τῇ δυνάμει προστίθησι, καὶ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τὸν υἱὸν ἐν
70 ὁμολογουμένῳ κινδύνῳ κείμενον (οὕτω γάρ φησιν ἡ ἱστορία, ὅτι ἤμελλε τελευτᾶν,
τοῦ πατρὸς βοῶντος, κατάβηθι πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν τὸ παιδίον) ἐνεργεῖ πάλιν τοῦ
τεθνήξεσθαι πεπιστευμένου [C] τὴν ἀνάστασιν· ἐν μείζονι τῇ δυνάμει τὸ θαῦμα
κατεργασάμενος, τῷ μηδὲ πλησιάσαι τῷ τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ πόρρωθεν τῇ τοῦ
προστάγματος ἰσχύϊ τὴν ζωὴν ἀποστεῖλαι.
75 [25.9] Πάλιν δι᾽ ἀκολουθίας τοῖς ὑψηλοτέροις ἐπαναβαίνει θαύμασι. Πρὸς γὰρ τὴν
παῖδα τοῦ ἀρχισυναγώγου ὁρμήσας, ἑκὼν ἔδωκε τῇ ὁδοιπορίᾳ σχολὴν, τὴν ἴασιν τῆς
αἱμορροΐας δημοσιεύων λαθοῦσαν, ὡς ἂν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ κατακρατήσειε τῆς
νοσούσης ὁ θάνατος. Ἄρτι τοίνυν τῆς ψυχῆς χωρισθείσης τοῦ σώματος, καὶ
θορυβουμένων ἐν τῇ γοερᾷ κραυγῇ τῶν ἐπικωκυόντων τῷ πάθει, καθάπερ ἐξ
80 ὕπνου τῷ προστακτικῷ λόγῳ διανίστησι πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν τὸ κοράσιον, ὁδῷ
τινι καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν.
[25.10] [D] Εἶτ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπερβαίνει τῷ θαύματι, καὶ δι᾽ ὑψηλοτέρας δυνάμεως
ὁδοποιεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως πίστιν. Νάϊν τινὰ πόλιν κατὰ τὴν

57 ἤδη om. D G L P S X τε om. Æ B N Q R 59–60 τοῦ προσφερομένου] τὸν προσφερόμενον I : parvuli

cibum Dion : oblati (uidelicet panis) Eri 60 εἶτα] εἶτα καὶ T προσθήκην] τὴν προσθήκην
N 61 προσεθισθὲν] προεθισθὲν Æ : προσεθισθὲν τι I : additum Eri 61–2 τῷ νιπίῳ προσάγει τὴν
στερεωτέραν τροφὴν I 61 στερροτέρᾳ D M 62 οὕτως Æ M W μακροψυχίαν W 63 καὶ
τιθηνούμενος] lactansque Eri 63–4 ἐν—δύναμιν] in incognitam resurrectionis paulisper praecedit
uirtutem Eri 63 ἐν om. Æ ἀπεγνωσμένῳ νοσήματι M 64 ἦν τῷ κατορθώματι] ἐν τῷ
κατορθώματι ἦν N 65 οἷον] ὥστε R 67 διακονῆσαι I ἐνισχῦσαι G M P R W : ἐνίσχυσε T 67–8
προσδοκωμένην τεθνήξεσθαι Ald Mign 68 προσδοκωμένην om. Rac 69 προστίθησι om. B υἱὸν] υἱὸν
ἰασάμενος N Q 70 κείμενον] κείμενον σώζει Q Dion οὕτως Æ G P X ἤμελλε] ita Æ ß D G M N
P T W X Forb : ἔμελλε O S Ald Mign 71 βοῶντος] καταβοῶντος N παιδίον] παιδίον μου D G L P S W
X 71–3 ἐνεργεῖ—κατεργασάμενος] operatur iterum in credito quod moriturus esset maiori resurrec-
tionis miraculum perficiens Eri 72 πεπιστευμένου] πιστευομένου I : προσδοκωμένου D M (επιστευ sup.
l.) : πιστευομένου προσδοκωμένου L 73 κατεργαζόμενος N T 74 πράγματος X 75 δι᾽ ] διὰ
B ἐπαναβαίνει] ἐπιβαίνει D G L P R² S X : προσβαίνει O 76 ἀρχισυναγώγου] ἀρχισυναγώγου αὐτὸς
Q : principis Dion : centurionis Eri 77 αἱμορρούσης N Rac? : αἱμορροούσης Q λαθοῦσαν] λανθάνουσαν
Æ B I N O R T W 78 ἄρτι—σώματος om. W τῆς ψυχῆς om. N 79 ἐν] ἐπὶ S ἐπικωκυόντων]
prohibentibus Eri 80 προσταγματικῷ I N O Rac τὴν om. D 82 εἶτα Æ G I L N O P S X δι᾽ ] διὰ
W 83 ναεὶν M : ναΐμ G P κατὰ] κατὰ τὰ N
        273

babe, accustomed to tender food, to more solid nourishment; so also the Lord,
fostering and nursing through miracles the human weakness of soul, as some babe
not fully grown, first makes a prelude of the power of the resurrection by the case
of a desperate disease, which prelude, though great in achievement, yet was not
such that the report of it would be disbelieved: for by rebuking the fever which was
fiercely consuming the mother-in-law of Simon, he effected such a great removal of
the evil so as to enable her, who was already expecting to approach death, to
minister to those present.⁹⁰
[25.8] Next he makes a slight addition to the power, and when the nobleman’s
son lay in acknowledged danger (for so the narrative says, that he was about to die,
as his father cried, come down, before the child dies⁹¹), he again effects the
resurrection of one believed about to die; accomplishing the miracle with greater
power in that he did not even approach the place, but sent life from afar off by the
force of his command.
[25.9] Again, in what follows he ascends to higher wonders. For having set out to
the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, he voluntarily made a pause on the
journey, making public the hidden cure of the woman with an issue of blood, that
in this period death might overcome the sick girl. When, then, her soul had been
separated from the body, and those lamenting over the sickness were making a
tumult with their mournful cries, he raises the maiden to life again, as if from
sleep, by his word of command, leading on human weakness, by a sort of path and
sequence, towards greater things.
[25.10] Next, he surpasses these acts with a miracle, and by a more exalted act of
power he guides human beings to faith in the resurrection. Scripture tells of a

⁹⁰ Luke 4:38–9. For Chapter 25.7–12, see Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.30–3 (Spira, 104.7–105.2).
⁹¹ John 4:49.
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Ἰουδαίαν ἱστορεῖ ἡ γραφή· παῖς ἦν ἐν ταύτῃ μονογενὴς χήρᾳ τινὶ, οὐκέτι τοιοῦτος
85 παῖς οἷος ἐν μειρακίοις εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ἐκ παίδων εἰς ἄνδρας τελῶν. Νεανίαν αὐτὸν
ὀνομάζει ὁ λόγος. Πολλὰ δι᾽ ὀλίγων διηγεῖται ἡ ἱστορία· θρῆνος ἄντικρύς ἐστι τὸ
διήγημα· χήρα, φησὶν, ἦν τοῦ τεθνηκότος ἡ μήτηρ· ὁρᾷς τὸ βάρος τῆς συμφορᾶς, πῶς
ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὸ πάθος ὁ λόγος ἐξετραγῴδησε; [220] τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον; ὅτι οὐκ ἦν
αὐτῇ παιδοποιΐας ἐλπὶς, τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκλείποντι συμφορὰν θεραπεύουσα· χήρα γὰρ ἡ
90 γυνή· οὐκ εἶχε πρὸς ἕτερον ἀντὶ τοῦ κατοιχομένου βλέπειν· μονογενὴς γὰρ ὁ τόκος·
ὅσον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κακὸν, παντὶ ῥᾴδιον συνιδεῖν τῷ μὴ ἀπεξενωμένῳ τῆς φύσεως·
μόνον ἐν ὠδῖσιν ἐκεῖνον ἐγνώρισε, μόνον ταῖς θηλαῖς ἐτιθηνήσατο· μόνος αὐτῇ
φαιδρὰν ἐποίει τὴν τράπεζαν, μόνος ἦν τῆς κατὰ τὸν οἶκον φαιδρότητος ὑπόθεσις,
παίζων, σπουδάζων, ἀσκούμενος, φαιδρυνόμενος, ἐν προόδοις, ἐν παλαίστραις, ἐν
95 συλλόγοις νεότητος· πᾶν ὅ τι μητρὸς ὀφθαλμοῖς γλυκύ τε καὶ τίμιον μόνος ἐκεῖνος ἦν,
ἤδη τοῦ γάμου τὴν ὥραν ἄγων, ὁ τοῦ γένους ὅρπηξ, ὁ τῆς διαδοχῆς κλάδος, ἡ
βακτηρία τοῦ γήρως. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἡλικίας προσθήκη [B] ἄλλος θρῆνος ἦν· ὁ
γὰρ νεανίαν εἰπὼν, τὸ ἄνθος εἶπε τῆς μαρανθείσης ὥρας, ἄρτι τοῖς ἰούλοις
ὑποχλοάζοντα, οὔπω τοῦ πώγωνος διὰ βάθους ὑποπιμπλάμενον, ἔτι τῷ κάλλει
100 τῶν παρειῶν ὑποστίλβοντα. Τί τοίνυν πάσχειν εἰκὸς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τὴν μητέρα; οἱονεὶ
πυρὶ τοῖς σπλάγχνοις ἐγκαταφλέγεσθαι; ὡς πικρῶς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ παρατείνειν τὸν
θρῆνον, περιπλεκομένην προκειμένῳ τῷ πτώματι, ὡς μὴ ἂν ἐπισπεῦσαι τῷ νεκρῷ
τὴν κηδείαν ἀλλ᾽ ἐμφορεῖσθαι τοῦ πάθους, ἐπιπλεῖστον αὐτῷ τοὺς ὀδυρμοὺς
παρατείνουσαν· οὐδὲ τοῦτο παρῆκεν ὁ λόγος· ἰδὼν γὰρ αὐτὴν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, φησὶν,
105 ἐσπλαγχνίσθη, καὶ προσελθὼν ἥψατο τῆς σοροῦ, οἱ δὲ βαστάζοντες ἔστησαν· καὶ
λέγει τῷ νεκρῷ, νεανίσκε, σοὶ λέγω, ἐγέρθητι, [C] καὶ παρέδωκεν αὐτὸν τῇ μητρὶ
αὐτοῦ ζῶντα. Ἤδη τοίνυν οὐκ ἐν ὀλίγῳ διαστήματι τοῦ νεκροῦ γεγενημένου, καὶ
ὅσον οὐδέπω ἐναποτεθέντος τῷ τάφῳ, γίνεται παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου τὸ μὲν θαῦμα μεῖζον,
τὸ δὲ πρόσταγμα ἶσον.

84 ἐν ταύτῃ] ἐν αὐτῇ Q R : ἐνταῦθα N T τινὶ] τινὶ ὢν D G P T X : τινὶ ὧν Q 85 παῖς om. N οἶος] ὡς

M ἄνδρα D G L P S X αὐτὸν] γὰρ αὐτὸν O : τὸν τοιοῦτον M 86 ἄντικρύς] oppositus Eri 87 ἡ om.
Q 88 ὁ λόγος om. M N Q R Dion Eri ἐτραγώδησε R λεγόμενον] dicitur unicus Eri 89
παιδοποιείας N ἐκλείποντι] λείποντι M Q θεραπεύουσαν B γὰρ] γὰρ ἦν Æ B R T 90
κατοιχομένου] κατοιχουμένου W : ἀποιχομένου L ὁ τόκος] ipse Eri 91 ῥᾳδίως Q ἀποξενομένῳ
G P X : ἀπεξενομένῳ Q 92 ὠδίσιν P R X ἐγνώρισε ἐκεῖνον B μόνον] μόνον ἐν L ἐτιθηνάσατο
W 93 ἐποίει τὴν Xpc2 ἐποιεῖτο Æ B O : ἐποιεῖ I τὴν οἰκίαν R ὑπόθεσις] ita Æ B D G I L P S X Forb :
ἡ ὑπόθεσις O W Ald Mign 94 σπουδάζων παίζων T σπουδάζων] σπεύδων N φαιδρυνόμενος om.
N παλλίστραις N 95 τι] τι ἐν N ὀφθαλμοῖν Ald Mign 96 τῆς διαδοχῆς ὁ N 97 γήρως] γήρους
Ald Mign ἡλικίας] ἀληθείας M ἦν] ἐστιν I M N O : ἐστὶν Æ B R T 98 εἶπε] εἶπε τῆς ἡλικίας οὔπω
T² 99 ὑποχνοάζοντα Æ B C Smg διὰ βάθους om. D ὑποπιπλάμενον D² : ὑποπιμπλάμενου
N² 100 παριῶν N Q πάσχειν] post εἰκὸς pon. M : post μητέρα L εἰκὸς] εἰκὸς ἦν Ald
Mign οἱονεὶ] οἵῳ Æ B I M N O Q R T W 101 τοῖς σπλάγχνοις] τὰ τῶν σπλάγχνῶν
W ἐγκαταφλέγεσθαι] ἐγκατακαίεσθαι M 102 θρῆνον] θρῆνον καὶ R περιπλεκομένην]
περιτηκομένον Æ B C I M N Q Rac T Dion : περιτηκομένην O ἂν] ἐὰν B : ἐᾶν Æ ß I M R S
T ἐπισπεῦσαι] πιστεῦσαι T 103 αὐτῷ] αὐτῇ N 104 παρατείνουσαν] ἐπιτείνουσαν L παρῆκεν
ὁ λόγος] πεποίηκεν ὁ λέγων B² αὐτὴν ὁ ἰησοῦς φησὶν] αὐτὴν φησὶν ὁ ἰησοῦς D G I L P O R S X : φησὶν
αὐτὴν ὁ κύριος Æ : αὐτὴν φησὶν M : αὐτὴν φησὶν ὁ κύριος ἰησοῦς Q : αὐτὴν φησιν ὁ κύριος Dion φησὶν
om. B 105 βαστάσαντες Ald Mign 106 νεανίσκε] νεανία W Ald Mign σοι λέγω νεανίσκε B D G L
P S X 106–7 αὐτοῦ ζῶντα τῇ μητρὶ N 107 αὐτοῦ om. Æ B M N R T W τοῦ νεκροῦ οὐκ ἐν ὀλίγῳ
διαστήματι B ἐν om. N νεκροῦ om. T γενομένου T 108 οὔπω Æ M N παρὰ τοῦ] παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ
Ald Mign 109 πρόσταγμα] πρᾶγμα Spcmg ἴσον I M N P S X
        275

certain city called Nain in Judaea; a certain widow there had an only child, no
longer such a child as to be among boys but already passing from childhood to
adulthood: the narrative calls him a young man.⁹² The story describes a lot
through a few words: the tale is a clear lamentation. It says the mother of the
dead man was a widow. Do you see the weight of her misfortune, how the text sets
out in a few words the tragedy of her suffering? For what does the word mean?
That she had no more hope of childbearing, to heal the misfortune of his passing;
for the woman was a widow, not able to look to another instead of him who had
departed, for he was her only child. And how great an evil is this anyone may
easily see who is not utterly estranged from nature. Him alone she had known in
travail; him alone she had nursed at her breast; he alone made her table cheerful;
he alone was the reason for brightness in her home, playing, studying, learning,
beaming, in processions, in sports, in gatherings of youths; he alone was every-
thing that is sweet and precious in a mother’s eyes; now, arriving at the age of
marriage, he was the scion of her stock, the shoot of its succession, the staff of her
old age. Moreover, even the additional details of his time of life are another
lament. Describing him as a young man, speaks of the flower of his faded beauty,
as just producing the first growth of a beard, not yet with a full, thick beard, but
still shining with the beauty of his cheeks. What, then, did his mother likely suffer
for him? How would her heart be consumed, as it were, with fire? How bitterly
would she prolong her lament over him, embracing the corpse lying before her,
extending her lamentation for him as far as possible, so as not to hasten the funeral
of the dead, but to be filled with sorrow! Nor does the narrative pass this by: for
Jesus seeing her, it says, had compassion; and he came and touched the bier; and the
bearers stood still; and he said to the one dead ‘Young man, I say to you arise’, and
he delivered him alive to his mother. There was not then but a short time since he
had become dead, but was rather all but laid in the tomb; the miracle wrought by
the Lord is greater, but the command the same.

⁹² Cf. Luke 7:11–17.

 276   

110 [25.11] Ἔτι πρὸς τὸ ὑψηλότερον ἡ θαυματοποιΐα προέρχεται, ὡς ἂν μᾶλλον

προσεγγίσειε τὰ φαινόμενα τῷ ἀπιστουμένῳ περὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν θαύματι. [D]
Ἀσθενεῖ τις τῶν συνήθων τῷ Κυρίῳ καὶ φίλων· Λάζαρος ὄνομα τῷ ἀσθενοῦντι·
καὶ παραιτεῖται ὁ Κύριος τὴν τοῦ φίλου ἐπίσκεψιν, πόρρω τοῦ νοσοῦντος γενόμενος,
ὡς ἂν εὕροι χώραν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τῇ τῆς Ζωῆς ἀπουσίᾳ τὸ ἴδιον ἐργάσασθαι διὰ τῆς
115 νόσου ὁ θάνατος· μηνύει τοῖς μαθηταῖς ὁ Κύριος κατὰ τὴν Γαλιλαίαν τὸ περὶ τὸν
Λάζαρον πάθος· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁρμὴν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε διαναστῆσαι τὸν κείμενον·
περιδεεῖς δὲ ἦσαν ἐκεῖνοι διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων ὠμότητα, χαλεπὸν καὶ κινδυνῶδες
ποιούμενοι τὸ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰουδαίας ἐν μέσῳ τῶν φονώντων γενέσθαι· καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο μέλλοντες καὶ ἀναβαλλόμενοι, χρόνῳ ποιοῦνται τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας
120 ἐπάνοδον· κατεκράτει γὰρ ἡ ἐξουσία, καὶ ἤγοντο παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου οἱ μαθηταὶ,
οἱονεὶ τὰ προτέλεια τῆς καθολικῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐν Βηθανίᾳ μυηθησόμενοι.
Τέσσαρες ἦσαν ἤδη μετὰ τὸ πάθος αἱ [221] ἡμέραι· πάντα πεπλήρωτο τῷ
κατοιχομένῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα· τάφῳ κατεκρύβη τὸ σῶμα· ἐξῳδήκει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς
ἤδη καὶ πρὸς διαφθορὰν διελύετο, μυδῶντος ἐν τῷ εὐρῶτι τῆς γῆς καὶ διαπίπτοντος
125 ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης τοῦ σώματος· φευκτὸν ἦν τὸ πρᾶγμα, βιαζομένης τῆς φύσεως τὸ
διαλυθὲν εἰς δυσωδίαν ἀποδιδόναι πάλιν τῷ ζῇν. Τότε τὸ ἀπιστούμενον τῆς
καθολικῆς ἀναστάσεως ἔργον δι᾽ ἐναργεστέρου τοῦ θαύματος εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἄγεται·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ νόσου τις ἀνίσταται χαλεπῆς, οὐδὲ πρὸς ταῖς τελευταίαις ὢν ἀναπνοαῖς
εἰς τὴν ζωὴν ἐπανάγεται, οὐδὲ παιδίον ἀρτιθανὲς ζωοποιεῖται, οὐδὲ μέλλων τῷ τάφῳ
130 προσάγεσθαι νεανίας πάλιν ἐκ τῆς σοροῦ ἀναλύεται· ἀλλ᾽ ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐξώρων, νεκρὸς,
ἕωλος, ἐξῳδηκὼς, ἤδη καὶ λελυμένος, ὡς μηδὲ τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ
προσεγγίσαι [B] τῷ τάφῳ τὸν Κύριον διὰ τὴν ἐγκειμένην ἀηδίαν τοῦ διαπεπτωκότος
σώματος, μιᾷ κλήσει ζωοποιηθεὶς πιστοῦται τὸ κήρυγμα τῆς ἀναστάσεως, τουτέστι

111 προσεγγίζοιεν W 112 ἀσθενεῖ] ἡ ἀσθενεί Q : ἠσθένει Ald Mign συνήθει B τοῦ κυρίου D G
P X καὶ om. D G L P S X 114 εὕρῃ M ἀπἐργάσεσθαι O : ἐργάζεσθαι W Ald Mign 115 γαλιλαῖαν
N 116 ὁρμὴν] ὁρμὴν ποιεῖται R τε om. I διαναστῆναι B 117 περιδεεῖς δὲ ἦσαν ἐκεῖνοι] undique
uero illi conuenerant Eri δὲ om. B D G M P Q X 118 ποιούμενοι] ἡγούμενοι R ἐπὶ τῆς ἰουδαίας om.
N φονειτῶν W : φονευτῶν M Rac? 119 τοῦτο] τούτων W ἀναβαλλόμενοι] ἀναβαλλόμενοι οὐ R²
T χρόνῳ ποιοῦντα] ita R² W Ald Mign Forb : χρονοποιοῦνται B D G I O P Rmg X : χρονοποιοῦσι
M 120 κατεκράτει] ita Æ B D G I L P Q R S T W X Ald Forb : κατ᾽ ἐκράτει N : κατεκρατήθη M :
κατεκράθῃ Mign παρὰ] ὑπὸ M R οἱ μαθηταὶ παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου R 121 πρωτόλεια I P² Rac : πρωτέλεια
R² μυηθησόμενοι] discituri Eri 122 ἤδη ἦσαν R ἤδη om. B T αἱ om. D L R πεπλήρωτο]
ἀπεπλήρωτο D G P X : πεπλήρωται M 123 τὸ σῶμα om. B ἐξῳδήκει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς] exterius
quantum consequens erat apparet Eri 124 πρὸς] εἰς B διαφθορὰν] φθορὰν D G I L O P
S X διελέλυτο G P S X 125 ὑπ’] ὑπὸ Æ ß N R W : ὑπὸ τῆς M φευκτέον Æ B O Q T 126
ἀποδιδόναι πάλιν τῷ ζῆν] ἀποδοῦναι M : om. Æ B N Q Rac T W Dion Eri τῷ] τὸ G L X 127
ἐνεργεστέρου ß G M P S T W X Ald 128 οὐδὲ] οὐ Æ B I M N O Q R T W τις] τινὸς N ἀνίσταται]
ἀπανίσταται Æ B I O χαλαιπῆς W 129 μέλλων] ὁ μέλλων B 130–1 ἀνὴρ—ἐξῳδηκὼς] uir prae-
maturus putrescens atque defluens Dion : uir extra quod consequens erat transiens Eri 130 τῶν
ἐξώρων] ἔξωρος I νεκρὸς om. M 131 ἕωλος] αἴολος N : om. M ἐξοιδηκὼς G N Rac X : ἐξωδικὼς
Q ἤδη καὶ λελυμένος om. I λελυμένος] διαλελυμένος Æ εἶναι] εἶναι συγχωρῆσαι Æ R 131–2
τὸ προσεγγίσαι] ita Æ B I M N O Q R S² T W Forb : πρὸς τὸ ἐγγίσαι G L P Sac X : προσεγγίσαι Ald
Mign
        277

[25.11] His wonder-working proceeds to a still more exalted act, that the phe-
nomena may more closely approach the doubted miracle concerning the resur-
rection. One of the Lord’s companions and friends is ill; Lazarus is the sick man’s
name; and the Lord declines visiting his friend, being far away from the sick man,
that in the absence of the Life, death might find room and power to do his own
work through the disease.⁹³ In Galilee the Lord informs his disciples of the
suffering of Lazarus, but also of his own setting out to him, to raise up the one
laid low. They were very afraid on account of the cruelty of the Jews, thinking it a
difficult and dangerous matter to be again in Judaea, in the midst of those seeking
to kill him. And thus, tarrying and delaying, they in time made their return from
Galilee, for his authority prevailed; and the disciples were led by the Lord to be
initiated in Bethany in the preliminary mysteries, as it were, of the general
resurrection. Four days had already passed since the calamity; all the customary
rites had been performed for the departed; the body was hidden in the tomb—it
was probably already swollen and dissolving into corruption, as the body moul-
dered in the dank earth and necessarily decomposed. It would be a repulsive thing
were nature compelled to bring back to life what was already dissolving into a foul
smell. Then the doubted work of the general resurrection is brought to proof by a
more manifest miracle: someone is not raised from severe sickness, nor brought
back to life when at the very last breath, nor is a child just dead brought to life, nor
a young man about to be taken to the tomb released from his bier, but a man past
the prime of life—a corpse, rotten, swollen, and already decomposed, so that not
even his close friends could bear for the Lord to draw near the tomb because of the
odiousness of the body lying there—being brought to life by a single call: this

⁹³ Cf. John 11.

 278   

τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ προσδοκώμενον, ὃ ἐπὶ μέρους τῇ πείρᾳ ἐμάθομεν· καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν
135 τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀναστοιχειώσει, φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος, αὐτὸν καταβήσεσθαι τὸν Κύριον
ἐν κελεύσματι, ἐν φωνῇ ἀρχαγγέλου, καὶ διὰ σάλπιγγος εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν τοὺς νεκροὺς
διαναστήσειν· οὕτω καὶ νῦν οἷόν τινα ὕπνον τὸν θάνατον τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ προστάγματος
ὁ ἐν τῷ τάφῳ ἀποσεισάμενος, καὶ ἀποτινάξας ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην διαφθορὰν
τῇ νεκρότητι, ἄρτιος καὶ σῶος τοῦ τάφου ἐξάλλεται, μηδὲ τῷ δεσμῷ τῶν περὶ τοὺς
140 πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας κειριῶν κωλυθεὶς πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον.

[25.12] [C] Ἆρα μικρὰ ταῦτα πρὸς πίστιν τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν ἀναστάσεως; ἢ ζητεῖς
καὶ δι᾽ ἑτέρων βεβαιωθῆναί σοι τὴν περὶ τούτου κρίσιν; ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ μὴ μάτην τοῖς
κατὰ Καπερναοὺμ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς ἐκ προσώπου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ Κύριος τοῦτο πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν λέγων· πάντως ἐρεῖτέ μοι τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην, ἰατρὲ, θεράπευσον
145 σεαυτόν· ἔδει γὰρ ἐν ἑτέροις σώμασι προσεθίσαντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῷ κατὰ τὴν
ἀνάστασιν θαύματι, ἐν τῷ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ βεβαιῶσαι τὸν λόγον. Εἶδες ἐν
ἑτέροις ἐνεργὸν τὸ κήρυγμα—τοὺς τεθνήξεσθαι μέλλοντας, τὸ παιδίον τὸ τοῦ ζῆν
ἄρτι παυσάμενον, τὸν πρὸς τῷ τάφῳ νεανίαν, τὸν διεφθορότα νεκρὸν, πάντας κατὰ τὸ
ἶσον ἑνὶ προστάγματι πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἀναλύοντας. Ζητεῖς καὶ τοὺς διὰ τραυμάτων
150 καὶ αἵματος ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ γεγονότας, μή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἀτονία τῆς [D] ζωοποιοῦ
δυνάμεως κωλύει τὴν χάριν; ἴδε τὸν ἐν ἥλοις διαπερονηθέντα τὰς χεῖρας· ἴδε τὸν τὴν
πλευρὰν λόγχῃ διαπαρέντα· διένεγκε τοὺς δακτύλους σου διὰ τοῦ τύπου τῶν ἥλων·
ἔμβαλε τὴν χεῖρά σου τῷ ἐκ τῆς λόγχης τραύματι· στοχάζῃ πάντως ἐπὶ πόσον εἰκὸς
ἦν εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τὴν αἰχμὴν διαδῦναι, διὰ τοῦ πλάτους τῆς ὠτειλῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσω
155 πάροδον λογιζόμενος· ἡ γὰρ εἴσοδον χειρὸς ἀνθρωπίνης χωρήσασα πληγὴ, πόσον
ἐντὸς τοῦ βάθους γενέσθαι τὸν σίδηρον ὑποδείκνυσιν. Εἰ οὖν οὗτος ἐγήγερται, [224]
εὔκολον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀποστολικὸν ἐπιφθέγξασθαι, πῶς λέγουσί τινες ὅτι ἀνάστασις
νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν;

134 τοῦ om. R τῆς πείρας Æ B I M O Q Rac T : διὰ τῆς πείρας N 136 ἀρχαγγέλου] ἀγγέλου
Q τοὺς νεκροὺς εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν D G L M P Q S X 137 διαναστῆσαι M : διανίστησιν Æ I N O :
ἀναστήσεσθαι B 138 ἀποτεινάξας G I Q X : ἀποτιναξάμενος L ἐπιγενομένην] ita Æ D G I L N O P Q
R S X Forb : ἐπιγινομένην W Ald Mign 139 σῶος] σῶος ἐκ Q τῶν δεσμῶν D G P R² S W X 139–40
τῶν . . . κειριῶν] τῷ . . . περικειμένῳ M 140 τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τοὺς πόδας B M κειριῶν] κειρίων Æ ß Gmg
I L R² : τενίων Q : ταινιῶν N2? Pac Rpc : τενείων G X : ταινικως Rac? κωλυθεὶς] κωλυόντων D G L P
S X 141 ταῦτα] ταῦτα τὰ B : ταῦτα ἐστιν N ἢ] ita Æ B D I L M N O P R S T W X Forb : εἰ Eri
Mign 142 τούτου] τούτων L M μὴ] μὴδέ D G L P S X 143 καπερναοὺμ] ita ß I L M N O P Q R S T²
X Forb : καπαρναοὺμ G : φαρναοὺμ Æ Ald : καφαρναοὺμ W Mign 143–4 πρὸς ἑαυτον τοῦτο D G L P
S X 144 ἑαυτὸν] σὲ αὐτὸν L 145 προεθίσαντα M : προσεθίσαντας Q : propagantem Eri 146 θαύματι
om. W τῷ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ] τῇ ἰδίᾳ σαρκὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν Æ B I O ἀνθρώπῳ] ὑποδείγματι D E G L
P Rpc X : ὑποδείγματι ἀνθρώπῳ W : ἀνθρώπῳ ὑποδείγματι T 146–7 εἶδες—κήρυγμα] multis specierum
modis praedicationem Dion ἐνεργὸν ἐν ἑτέροις R 147 ἐνεργῶν L : ἐνεργὼν G : ἔργον Q τοῦ . . .
μέλλοντος N T τεθνήξασθαι D τὸ² om. R 148 τὸν πρὸς τῷ τάφῳ] πρὸς τὸν τάφον W διαφθαρέντα
D G P T X πάντα D 149 ἴσον I M N P S X ἑνὶ] ἐν D G P X ἀναλύοντος D P : ἀναλύσαντας Æ B I
R² 150 τούτων] τούτῳ B 151 κωλύει] ita Æ B D G I L M O P Q R S T W X Forb : κωλύση N : λύῃ Ald
Mign ἴδε] ita Æ B D G I L M O P Q R S W X Forb : om. N : εἶδε Ald Mign ἐν om. T ἴδε] ita Æ B D
G I L M N O P Q R S W X Forb : εἶδε Ald Mign 151–2 τῇ πλευρᾷ R 152 λόγχῃ] τῇ λόγχῃ T τοῦ
τύποῦ] ita Æ B D G I M N O P Q R X Forb : τῶν τύπων S W Ald Mign 153 τῷ] τῷ ἐκ τῷ B (non
ß) τῆς om. D G P X στοχάζει W πόσον] ita Æ B D G M N O P Q R S X Forb Ald : πόσων
Mign 154 διαδύναι B L R O : διὰδοῦναι N τὴν om. T 155 ἀνθρωπίνης χειρὸς N O χωρίσασα
P πληγῆ N 156 τοῦ βάθους om. M γενέσθαι τοῦ βάθους N βάθους om. T γενέσθαι] γεγενῆσθαι
Ald Mign τὸν σίδηρον γενέσθαι D I L οὖν om. N οὗτος] αὐτὸς O 157 εὔκολον] εὔραιρον Æ B Emg
N Q Rpc T W εὔκολον—ἐπιφθέγξασθαι om. I O ἐὑποφθέγξασθαι W
        279

confirms the proclamation of the resurrection, that is, that which is expected as
general, which we learn by the experience of a part. For just as in the reconstitu-
tion of all things, the Apostle says that the Lord himself will descend with a shout,
with the voice of the archangel,⁹⁴ and by a trumpet raise up the dead to incorrupt-
ibility, so too now the one in the tomb shakes off death at the voice of the
command, as if it were a sleep, shaking off from himself the corruption that had
come upon him by the process of death, leaping out from the tomb whole and
sound, not hindered in his departure by the bonds of the grave-cloths round his
feet and hands.
[25.12] Are these things too small for faith in the resurrection of the dead? Or do
you seek that your determination about this should be confirmed by yet other
proofs? But it seems to me that the Lord did not speak in vain to those in
Capernaum, when, as in the person of human beings, he said to himself, You
will surely say to me this proverb: Physician heal yourself.⁹⁵ For it was right, after
accustoming humans to the miracle of the resurrection in other bodies, to confirm
the word in the human being that is himself. You saw the proclamation effective in
others—those about to die, the child who had just ceased to live, the young man
near the grave, the putrefying corpse, all alike released to life by one command. Do
you seek for those who have come to death by wounds and bloodshed, in case any
feebleness of the life-giving power hinders the grace? Behold him whose hands
were pierced with nails; behold him whose side was transfixed with a spear; pass
your fingers through the print of the nails; thrust your hand into the wound from
the spear⁹⁶—you can surely guess how far within it is likely the point would reach,
if you reckon the passage inwards by the breadth of the wound, for the wound that
grants entry to a human hand indicates to what depth the iron entered. If, then, he
has been raised, well may the Apostle’s words be exclaimed: How say some that
there is no resurrection of the dead?⁹⁷

⁹⁴ 1 Thess. 4:16. ⁹⁵ Luke 4:23. ⁹⁶ Cf. John 20:27. ⁹⁷ 1 Cor. 15:12.

 280   

[25.13] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν πᾶσα μὲν πρόρρησις τοῦ Κυρίου διὰ τῆς τῶν γεγονότων
160 μαρτυρίας ἀληθὴς ἐπιδείκνυται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ λόγῳ μεμαθήκαμεν μόνον ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ αὐτῶν
τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ζωὴν ἐξ ἀναστάσεως ἐπανελθόντων, ἔργῳ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας
ἐλάβομεν· τίς ὑπολείπεται τοῖς μὴ πιστεύουσιν ἀφορμή; οὐκ ἐρρῶσθαι φράσαντες
τοῖς διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης παρακρουομένοις τὴν ἀκατάσκευον
πίστιν, ψιλῆς ἑξόμεθα τῆς ὁμολογίας, μαθόντες ἐν ὀλίγῳ διὰ τοῦ προφήτου τὸν
165 τρόπον τῆς χάριτος, δι᾽ ὧν φησιν· ἀντανελεῖς τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκλείψουσι, καὶ
εἰς τὸν χοῦν αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέψουσιν· ἐξαποστελεῖς τὸ Πνεῦμά σου, καὶ κτισθήσονται,
[B] καὶ ἀνακαινιεῖς τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς· ὅτε καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι τὸν Κύριον ἐπὶ τοῖς
ἔργοις αὐτοῦ λέγει, ἐκλειπόντων τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς· πῶς γάρ τις ἐξ
ἁμαρτίας ὀνομασθήσεται, τῆς ἁμαρτίας οὐκ οὔσης;
Ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος ἡ ἀνάστασις.
[26.1] Ἀλλ᾽ εἰσί τινες οἳ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν ἀτονίαν πρὸς τὰ
ἡμέτερα μέτρα τὴν θείαν δύναμιν κρίνοντες, τὸ ἡμῖν ἀχώρητον οὐδὲ Θεῷ δυνατὸν
[C] εἶναι κατασκευάζουσι. Δεικνύουσι γὰρ τῶν τε ἀρχαίων νεκρῶν τὸν ἀφανισμὸν,
5 τῶν τε διὰ πυρὸς ἀποτεφρωθέντων τὰ λείψανα, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις τὰ σαρκοβόρα
τῶν ζώων τῷ λόγῳ προφέρουσι, καὶ τὸν ἰχθὺν τῷ ἰδίῳ σώματι τὴν σάρκα τοῦ
ναυαγήσαντος ἀναλαβόντα, καὶ τοῦτον πάλιν τροφὴν ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον καὶ εἰς
τὸν τοῦ βεβρωκότος ὄγκον μετακεχωρηκότα διὰ τῆς πέψεως· καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα
μικροπρεπῆ καὶ τῆς μεγάλης τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἀνάξια ἐπ᾽ ἀνατροπῇ
10 τοῦ δόγματος διεξέρχονται, ὡς οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ὁδῶν δι᾽
ἀναλύσεως ἀποκαταστῆσαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἴδιον. [26.2] Ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὰς
μακρὰς αὐτῶν τῆς λογικῆς ματαιότητος περιδρομὰς ὑποτεμνόμεθα, [D]
ὁμολογοῦντες τὴν μὲν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε, γίνεσθαι, καὶ
οὐ μόνον τὴν γῆν κατὰ τὸν θεῖον λόγον εἰς τὴν γῆν ἀναλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ
15 τὸ ὑγρὸν προσχωρεῖν τῷ ὁμοφύλῳ, καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς τὴν
μεταχώρησιν γίνεσθαι, κἂν τοῖς σαρκοβόροις ὀρνέοις, κἂν τοῖς ὠμοτάτοις θηρίοις

159 μὲν om. I 160 ἀλλ᾽] ita Æ B D G I N O P Q R T W X Forb : ἀλλὰ καὶ S Ald Mign 161 ἐπαγγελίας]
ἀληθείας N 162 λάβωμεν Rac πιστεύσασιν N οὐκ] οἶς S ἐρρῶσθαι] ita codd. Ald Forb : ἐρρῶσθαι
οὖν I : ἔρρωσθε Mign φράσασι M 163 τοῖς om. B τῆς om. L S ἀκατάσκευον] simplicitatem
Dion : imperfectam Eri 164 πίστιν] πίστιν ἀγαπήσωμεν καὶ Q ψιλῆς] purissimam Dion : nudam
Eri ἐξώμεθα I : δεξώμεθα Rac 165 ὧν] οὗ M 166 αὐτῶν] αὐτὸν M 168 ἐκλιπόντων M τῶν
om. B M

Cap. 27 Æ ß I N O Q R T Dion : def. Eri

1 ὅτι—ἀνάστασις] quod quantumcunque absumptum fuerit corpus humanum facile illud colligat
potentia diuina Λ 2 οἳ] οἱ Mign ἀτονίαν] ἀσθένειαν ἀτονεῖν M 3 κρίνοντες δύναμιν R ἡμῖν] ἡμῖν
ὂν R ἀχώρητον] ἀδύνατον M 4 δείκνυσι Q τε om. L 5 πυρὸς] τοῦ πυρὸς Q ἀποτεφρωθέντων]
τεφρωθέντων D G L P S X 6 τῷ λόγῳ om. N προσφέρουσι Æac D I O Q Rac τῷ] ἐν τῷ R ἰδίῳ]
οἰκείῳ D G L M P Q S X 7 ἀναλαμβάνοντα Æ ß I O : ἀπολαβόντα R 8 βεβρωκότος] πεπτωκότος
G P 9 σμικροπρεπῆ B I καὶ ἐξουσίας om. B 10 διεξέρχονται] ἐξέρχονται B πάλιν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
W Ald Mign 11 ἀποκαταστῆναι B τὸ om. Æ ἐν ὀλίγῳ] ἑνὶ λόγῳ B I O T 12 μικρὰς M Rac τῆς
λογικῆς αὐτῶν I λογικῆς] πιθανῆς Æ B I O ὑποτεμνώμεθα Mign 13 ὁμολογοῦμεν I μὲν om.
I γενέσθαι ß Q 16 γενέσθαι N Q : γίγνεσθαι Ald Mign κἂν¹] καὶ N ὠμοτάτοις] ὠμοῖς R
       – 281

[25.13] Since, then, every prediction of the Lord is shown to be true by the
testimony of events, while we have not only learnt this by word, but also received,
from those very people who have returned to life by resurrection, the proof of the
promise in deed, what occasion is left to those who disbelieve? Shall we not bid
farewell to those who, by philosophy and vain deceit,⁹⁸ pervert the unartificial faith,
and hold fast the simple confession,⁹⁹ learning in brief from the prophet the mode
of the grace through what he says: You take away their breath, and they die, and
return to the earth; you send forth your Spirit and they will be created, and you will
renew the face of the earth, at which time, he says, the Lord rejoices in his works,
sinners having perished from the earth;¹⁰⁰ for how will anyone be called by the
name of sin, when sin does not exist?
That the resurrection is not beyond probability.¹⁰¹
[26.1] There are, however, some who, through the feebleness of human reason-
ing, assessing the divine power by our own measure, maintain that what is beyond
our capacity is not possible even to God.¹⁰² They point to the disappearance of the
dead of old, and to the remains of those reduced to ashes by fire; and further,
besides these, they bring forward in idea the carnivorous beasts, and the fish that
takes into its own body the flesh of one shipwrecked, while this again becomes
food for human beings and passes, by digestion, into the bulk of the one who eats
it. And they rehearse many such petty things, unworthy of the great power and
authority of God, to overthrow of the doctrine, as though God were not able, once
again by the same means, to restore to the human being his own. [26.2] But we
briefly cut short their long convolutions of logical folly by acknowledging that the
dissolution of the body into its component parts does take place, and not only
does the earth, according to the divine Word, depart to the earth,¹⁰³ but the air and
the moisture also revert to their kind, and there takes place the withdrawal of each
element in us to its kind; and even if the human body becomes mingled with the

⁹⁸ Col. 2:8. ⁹⁹ Cf. Heb. 10:23. ¹⁰⁰ Ps. 103.29–30, 31, 35.
¹⁰¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 27): ‘That however much the human body may have been consumed, the
divine power can easily bring it together’. For this chapter, cf. Athenagoras, De res. 3–8.
¹⁰² Cf. Methodius, De res. 2.29 (Bonwetsch, 386). ¹⁰³ Cf. Gen. 3:19.
 282   

ἀναμιχθῇ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα διὰ τῆς βρώσεως, κἂν ὑπὸ τὸν ὀδόντα τῶν ἰχθύων
ἔλθῃ, κἂν εἰς ἀτμοὺς καὶ κόνιν μεταβληθῇ τῷ πυρί· ὅπου δ᾽ ἄν τις καθ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν
περιενέγκῃ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐντὸς τοῦ κόσμου πάντως ἐστί· τοῦτον δὲ τῇ
20 χειρὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ περικρατεῖσθαι ἡ θεόπνευστος διδάσκει φωνή· εἰ οὖν σύ τι τῶν ἐν τῇ
σῇ παλάμῃ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς, ἆρ᾽ οἴει τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως [225] ἀτονωτέραν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ
Θεοῦ γνῶσιν, ὡς μὴ ἂν ἐξευρεῖν τῶν ἐμπεριεχομένων ὑπὸ τῆς θείας σπιθαμῆς τὴν
ἀκρίβειαν;
Ὅτι δυνατόν ἐστιν εἰς τὰ τοῦ παντὸς στοιχεῖα τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος
ἀναλυθέντος, πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστῳ ἀποσωθῆναι.
[27.1] Ἀλλὰ τυχὸν πρὸς τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντὸς βλέπων, δύσκολον οἴει, τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν
ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς στοιχεῖον ἀναχεθέντος, καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ τε καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοῦ
5 γεώδους ὡσαύτως τοῖς ὁμοφύλοις ἐγκαταμιχθέντων, πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ οἰκεῖον
ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον [B] ἀναδραμεῖν. [27.2] Εἶτα οὐ λογίζῃ διὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
ὑποδειγμάτων, τὸ μηδὲ τοῦτο τῆς θείας δυνάμεως ὑπερβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρους; εἶδές
που πάντως ἐν ταῖς ἀνθρωπίναις οἰκήσεσι κοινὴν ἀγέλην ζώων τινῶν, ἐκ κοινοῦ
συνισταμένην· ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν πάλιν πρὸς τοὺς κεκτημένους αὐτὴ καταμερίζηται, ἥτε
10 πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους συνήθεια καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα σημεῖα τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστῳ
ἀποκαθίστησι· τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ περὶ σεαυτὸν ἐννοῶν, οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεις τοῦ
πρέποντος· φυσικῇ γάρ τινι σχέσει καὶ στοργῇ πρὸς τὸ συνοικῆσαν σῶμα τῆς
ψυχῆς διακειμένης, ἐστί τις κατὰ τὸ λεληθὸς αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς συνανακράσεως τοῦ
οἰκείου σχέσις τε καὶ ἐπίγνωσις, οἷον σημείων τινῶν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως
15 ἐπικειμένων δι᾽ ὧν ἡ κοινότης [C] ἀσύγχυτος μένει, διακρινομένη τοῖς ἰδιάζουσι·
τῆς τοίνυν ψυχῆς τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ ἴδιον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν πάλιν ἑλκούσης, τίς πόνος, εἰπέ
μοι, τῇ θείᾳ δυνάμει κωλύσαι τῶν οἰκείων τὴν συνδρομὴν, ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ τῇ τῆς
φύσεως ὁλκῇ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἐπειγομένων; τὸ γὰρ ἐπιδιαμένειν τινὰ τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ
μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν, σημεῖα τοῦ ἡμετέρου συγκρίματος δείκνυσιν ὁ κατὰ τὸν ᾅδην

17 διὰ τῆς—ἰχθύων] κἂν διὰ τῆς βρώσεως τῶν ἰχθύων ὑπὸ τὸν ὀδόντα D L P S X : κἂν διὰ τῆς κέφαλος
G τῶν ὀδόντων Q ἰχθύων] θηρίων T 18 δ᾽] γὰρ N Q 19 τῷ λόγῳ om. O τοῦτο M τῇ] ἐν τῇ
M 20 φωνή] γραφὴ D E OacP R S X 21 ἆρα Æ I N O : ἄρα R 21–2 τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν I

Cap. 28 Æ I N O Q R Dion : def. Eri

1–2 ὅτι—ἀποσωθῆναι] quod quamuis communiter resurgant corpora proprias tamen animas
recipient Λ 1 δυνατόν] ἀδύνατον W X ἐστιν om. Q ἀνθρωπείου D E L P S X 2 ἑκάστῳ τὸ
ἴδιον Ald Mign ἀνασωθῆναι L : σωθῆναι M 3 ἀλλὰ—καθ᾽ ὑπτίου (l. 48) def. N, folio
ac
avulso ἀποβλέπων I 4 ἀναχθέντος B D E (ε sup. l.) I R W : ἀνενεχθέντος L : ἀναλυθέντος M τε
om. T τοῦ om. R 5 ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ πάλιν Æ ß I O R 5–6 τὸ ἴδιον ἔπὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον Æ B I M Q R T 7 τὸ
om. X 8 οἰκήσεσι Xpc ζώων τινῶν om. M Dion Eri 9 πρὸς τοὺς κεκτημένους πάλιν D E αὐτὴ πρὸς
τοὺς κεκτημένους πάλιν L P S X αὐτὴ] αὐτὴν M : αὕτη ß I L P S X : αὐτῆ Rac (corr. a pr. m) : om.
DE καταμερίζεται Æ Q Rac (corr. a pr. m) : καταμερίζῃ L : ἀναμερίζηται M 10 οἰκείους] ita Æ B D
E M O P Q R S T X Forb : οἴκους Ald Mign συνήθεις B : συγγένεια W ἑκάστῳ] ἑκάστῳ
11 ἀποκαθίστω T τοιοῦτό Æ L O περὶ] τὸ περὶ B σαυτὸν D L P X : σαὐτὸν S : ἑαυτὸν
B ἁμαρτήσῃ Æ I O Q T 12 τινι] τι B σχέσει] uinculo Dion : coniunctione Eri 13 τις] τι
O συνανακράσεως] νῦν ἀνακράσεως B I M Q T Dion Eri 14 τινῶν σημείων D E L P S X Dion
Eri παρὰ] περὶ B 16 ἐφ᾽] πρὸς B ἑαυτὴν] αὑτὴν Q : ἑαυτῆς D E T πάλιν om. O 17 δυνάμει]
δυνάμει μὴ Æ B I R T Dion Eri κωλῦσαι I P R : κωλύσας L οἰκείων] οἰκείων ἁπάντων I τῇ² om.
Æ D E I L M O R² S T τῆς om. L S 18–19 τῇ ψυχῇ σημεῖα τινα καὶ μετὰ τὴν διάλυσιν I
       – 283

carnivorous birds or with the most savage beasts by becoming their food, and even
if it passes through the teeth of fish, and even if it be changed by fire into vapour
and dust, wherever one may by hypothesis carry off in idea the human being, he
surely remains in the world, and the world, the inspired voice teaches, is held in
the hand of God. If, then, you are not ignorant of any of the things in the palm of
your hand, do you think that the knowledge of God is feebler than your own
power, that it should not discover the most minuscule of things encompassed by
the divine span?
That it is possible, when the human body is dissolved into the elements of the
universe, for what belongs to each to be saved from the common [pool].¹⁰⁴
[27.1] But perhaps, looking at the elements of the universe, you think it a difficult
thing, once the air in us has been dispersed into its kindred element, and the
warmth, and the moisture, and the earthy have similarly been mingled with their
own kind, that from the common source there should return to the particular
what is proper to it. [27.2] Do you not reckon, then, that, from human examples,
even this does not surpass the limits of divine power? You have surely seen
somewhere among human habitations a common herd of some animals, collected
from every quarter; but when it is divided again among its owners, familiarity with
their homes and the marks put upon them restores to each his own. If you
understand yourself also as something like this, you will not stray from what is
fitting; for as the soul is disposed by a certain natural relation and care for the body
wedded to it, there is hidden in it, by virtue of their commixture, a certain relation
to and recognition of its own, as though some marks had been placed upon it by
nature, by means of which the commonality remains unconfused, separated by the
identifying signs. As, then, the soul attracts again to itself what is its kin and its
own, what toil, tell me, for the divine power would hinder the concurrence of
kindred things, when they are urged on to their own by a certain ineffable
attraction of nature? For that some signs of our compound remain in the souls

¹⁰⁴ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 28): ‘That although bodies rise together they will however receive their own
souls’. For Chapter 27, see Gregory of Nyssa, An et. res. 1.8–10; 5.4–23 (Spira, 7.11–20; 52.20–57.20).
 284   

20 διάλογος, τῶν μὲν σωμάτων τῷ τάφῳ παραδοθέντων, γνωρίσματος δέ τινος

σωματικοῦ ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμείναντος, δι᾽ οὗ καὶ ὁ Λάζαρος ἐγνωρίζετο καὶ οὐκ
ἠγνοεῖτο ὁ πλούσιος.
[27.3] Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἕξω τοῦ εἰκότος ἐστὶ, πάλιν πιστεύειν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ πρὸς τὸ
ἴδιον τὴν ἀνάλυσιν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἀνισταμένων σωμάτων, καὶ μάλιστά γε τῷ
25 φιλοπονώτερον τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν κατεξετάζοντι. [D] Οὔτε γὰρ δι᾽ ὅλου ἐν ῥύσει καὶ
μεταβολῇ τὸ ἡμέτερον—ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἄληπτον ἦν καθόλου τὸ μηδεμίαν στάσιν ἔχον ἐκ
φύσεως—ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστερον λόγον, τὸ μέν τι ἔστηκε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ δι᾽
ἀλλοιώσεως πρόεισιν· ἀλλοιοῦται μὲν γὰρ δι᾽ αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ μειώσεως τὸ σῶμα,
οἷον ἱμάτιά τινα τὰς καθεξῆς ἡλικίας μετενδυόμενον· ἕστηκε δὲ διὰ πάσης τροπῆς
30 ἀμετάβλητον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εἶδος, τῶν ἅπαξ ἐπιβληθέντων αὐτῷ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως
σημείων οὐκ ἐξιστάμενον, ἀλλὰ πάσαις ταῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τροπαῖς μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων
ἐμφαινόμενον γνωρισμάτων. [27.4] Ὑπεξαιρείσθω δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἡ ἐκ πάθους
ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ τῷ εἴδει ἐπισυμβαίνουσα· οἷον γάρ τι προσωπεῖον ἀλλότριον ἡ κατὰ
τὴν νόσον ἀμορφία διαλαμβάνει τὸ εἶδος, [228] ἧς τῷ λόγῳ περιαιρεθείσης, καθάπερ
35 ἐπὶ Νεεμὰν τοῦ Σύρου ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἱστορηθέντων, πάλιν τὸ
κεκρυμμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους εἶδος διὰ τῆς ὑγείας ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνεφάνη γνωρίσμασι.
[27.5] Τῷ τοίνυν θεοειδεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ τὸ ῥέον ἐν τῇ ἀλλοιώσει καὶ μεθιστάμενον,
ἀλλὰ τὸ μονιμόν τε καὶ ὡσαύτως [B] ἔχον ἐν τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς συγκρίματι, τοῦτο
προσφύεται· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰς κατὰ τὸ εἶδος διαφορὰς αἱ ποιαὶ τῆς κράσεως
40 παραλλαγαὶ διαμορφοῦσιν, ἡ δὲ κρᾶσις οὐκ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τὴν τῶν στοιχείων
μίξιν ἐστὶ—στοιχεῖα δέ φαμεν τὰ τῇ κατασκευῇ τοῦ παντὸς ὑποκείμενα, δι᾽ ὧν
καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον συνέστηκε σῶμα—ἀναγκαίως τοῦ εἴδους οἷον ἐκμαγείῳ
σφραγίδος τῇ ψυχῇ παραμείναντος, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐναπομαξάμενα τῇ σφραγίδι τὸν
τύπον, ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀγνοεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς ἀναστοιχειώσεως ἐκεῖνα δέχεται
45 πάλιν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἅπερ ἂν ἐναρμόσῃ τῷ τύπῳ τοῦ εἴδους· ἐναρμόσειε δὲ πάντως

20 μὲν] μὲν γὰρ D τῷ om. D E P S X 20–1 σωματικοῦ τινος W 21 ὁ om. L 21–2 ὁ πλούσιος οὐκ
ἠγνοεῖτο M 23 οὐκοῦν] non igitur Eri οὐδὲν] οὐκ Æ B I O R T 24 ἀνάλυσιν] διάλυσιν D E γενέσθαι
T γε om. D E P W X τῷ] τὸ W X 25 ἡμῶν] ἡμῖν O κατεξετάζοντι] ἐξετάζοντι D E οὔτε] οὐδὲ
M δι᾽ ὅλου] διόλου Æ I L : δι᾽ ὅλων M Q 26 ἦ] si Eri ἂν ἄληπτον] reprehensibile Eri τὸ . . . ἔχον] τὸ
. . . ἔχων Q : τῷ . . . ἔχον Pac : τοῦτο . . . ἔχον Ppc : τῷ . . . ἔχειν Ald Mign 27 ἀκριβέστατον L τι om. T 28
μὲν om. I O τε om. M R 29 πάσης om. I 30 ἐφ᾽] ἀφ᾽ Q ἑαυτὸ L S : ἑαυτῶν Pac 31 ἐξισταμένων
T 32 ὑφεξαιρείσθω P : ὑπεξῃρήσθω Æ B L M O S T τῷ λόγῳ Æ B I M O 33 ἡ¹ om. Q 35 ναιεμὰν O P :
νεεμὰν Sac (αι sup. l.) : νεμὰν W 36 ὑγιείας P S : ὑγίας Q 38 τὸ μόνιμον] τὸ ἀεὶ μένον R : μόνον
T τοῦτο] ita B D L O P R S T W X Forb : τούτῳ Ald Mign 40 διαμορφοῦσιν] ita Æ B D
E I L M O P Q R S W X Forb : μεταμορφοῦσιν Ald Mign ἡ δὲ] ἥτε Q κράσις I L P R
S X 41 δὲ] μὲν B ὧν] ἣν T 42 σύνετσι Rac : συνέστη R² οἷον] οἷον ἐν Æ B P S T
ac?
W X ἐκμαγεῖος R : ἐκμαγείου L 43 σφραγῖδος Æ I M S σφραγῖδι M S τὸν om.
Q 44 ὑπ’] ἀπ᾽ Q αὐτῆς] ea (uidelicet anima) Eri ἀγνοεῖτε Oac (αι supr. l.)
ἀναστοιχειώσεως] resurrectionis Dion 45 τῷ τύπῳ τοῦ εἴδους] formae ipsi Dion : formae
characteri Eri ἐναρμόσῃ I : ἐναρμόση B W : ἐναρμόσει Æ M O Q R
        285

even after the dissolution, is shown by the dialogue in Hades, with the bodies
having been delivered to the tomb, but some bodily token remaining, by which
both Lazarus was recognized and the rich man was not unknown.¹⁰⁵
[27.3] There is, therefore, nothing beyond probability in believing that there will
be a return from the common [pool] to the particular for the bodies that rise again,
especially for one who examines our nature with careful attention. For neither
does our being consist altogether in flux and change, for that which had no
stability at all by nature would be absolutely incomprehensible; but, according
to the more accurate account, something of what is in us is stable, [while] the rest
goes through a process of alteration: for the body, on the one hand, is altered by
way of growth and diminution, changing, like garments, the vesture of its succes-
sive statures, while the form, on the other hand, remains in itself unaltered
through every changing, not varying from the marks once imposed upon it by
nature, but appearing with all its own identifying marks in all the changes of
the body. [27.4] We must exempt from this account, however, the alteration to
the form resulting from disease; for the deformity resulting from sickness takes
possession of the form, like some strange mask, but when this is removed by the
word, as in the case of Naaman the Syrian or of those whose who are mentioned in
the Gospel, the form that had been hidden by the disease is once again by means of
health brought to light with its own identifying marks.¹⁰⁶
[27.5] It is not that which is subject to flux and change in alteration, but that
which is stable and always remaining as it is in our composite being that is closely
associated with the deiform aspect of the soul. And since the various kinds of
combination produce differences of form (combination is nothing other than the
mixture of elements; by elements we mean the substrata for the construction of
the universe, from which the human body is also composed), while the form
necessarily remains in the soul as the impression made by a seal, those things
which have received the impression of the stamp from the seal are not unknown
by the soul, but at the time of the reconstitution, it receives back to itself those
things which correspond to the stamp of the form; and certainly those things
which were stamped by the form in the beginning would so correspond. Thus, it is

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Luke 16:24–31; Irenaeus, Haer. 2.34.1. ¹⁰⁶ Cf. 4 Rgns 5; Matt. 8:16, etc.
 286   

ἐκεῖνα ὅσα κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐνετυπώθη τῷ εἴδει· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος ἐστὶ, πάλιν
ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ πρὸς τὸ καθέκαστον ἐπαναλύειν τὸ ἴδιον.
[27.6] Λέγεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ὑδράργυρον προχεθεῖσαν τοῦ περιέχοντος [C] καθ᾽ ὑπτίου
τινὸς καὶ κονιορτώδους χωρίου, εἰς λεπτὰ σφαιρωθεῖσαν κατὰ τὴν γῆν
50 διασκίδνασθαι, πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἐμμιγνυμένην· εἰ δέ τις πάλιν τὸ
πολλαχῆ κατεσπαρμένον εἰς ἓν συναγείρειεν, αὐτομάτως ἀναχεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ
ὁμόφυλον, οὐδενὶ μέσῳ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν μίξιν διειργομένην. Τοιοῦτόν τι χρῆναι
νομίζω καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σύγκριμα διανοεῖσθαι, εἰ μόνον γένοιτο παρὰ τοῦ
Θεοῦ τὸ ἐνδόσιμον, αὐτομάτως τὰ κατάλληλα μέρη τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐπανακίρνασθαι,
55 μηδεμιᾶς ἐργωδίας τῷ ἀναστοιχειοῦντι τὴν φύσιν διὰ τούτων ἐγγινομένης.
[27.7] Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ φυομένων, οὐδένα πόνον ὁρῶμεν τῆς φύσεως ἐπὶ
τὸν πυρὸν ἢ τὴν κέγχρον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν σιτηρῶν ἢ χεδροπῶν σπερμάτων, ἐν τῷ
μεταβάλλειν εἰς καλάμην καὶ ἀθέρας καὶ ἀστάχυας· [D] ἀπραγματεύτως γὰρ κατὰ
τὸ αὐτόματον ἡ κατάλληλος τροφὴ ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν σπερμάτων
60 ἰδιότητα μεταβαίνει. Εἰ οὖν κοινῆς πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις τῆς ἰκμάδος ὑποκειμένης,
ἕκαστον τῶν δι᾽ αὐτῆς τρεφομένων τὸ κατάλληλον ἔσπασεν εἰς τὴν τοῦ οἰκείου
προσθήκην, τί καινὸν εἰ καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγῳ, παρ᾽ ἑκάστου τῶν
ἀνισταμένων, καθὼς ἐπὶ τῶν σπερμάτων, συμβαίνει οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ οἰκείου
ὁλκήν; [27.8] Ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων δυνατὸν εἶναι μαθεῖν, μηδὲν ἔξω τῶν τῇ πείρᾳ
65 γνωριζομένων τὸ κήρυγμα περιέχειν τῆς ἀναστάσεως.

[27.9] Καίτοιγε τὸ γνωριμώτατον τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐσιωπήσαμεν—αὐτὴν λέγω τὴν

πρώτην τῆς συστάσεως ἡμῶν ἀφορμήν. Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε τὴν θαυματοποιΐαν τῆς

46 ἐνετυπώθη τῷ εἴδει] speciei probantur inserta Dion : in forma characterizata sunt

Eri οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri οὐδὲν] οὐδὲ R : om. Q τοῦ εἰκότος] τούτου M 47 τὸ¹] τὸν Æ
B I M O Q R² T W ἐπαναλύει R 48 προσχεθεῖσαν Q Rac Sac : προτεθεῖσαν P 49 λεπτὰς
M 50 διασκίνδνασθαι W οὐδὲν] οὐδὲ ἕν I ἐνμιγνυμένην P : ἐπιμιγνυμένην D E :
ἐγκαταμιγνυμένην R 51 συναγείρῃ D : συναγείρει P 52 τοιοῦτο Æ O τι om. B D P X 53
τοῦ om. I L 54 ἐπανακιρνᾶσθαι M W : παρακίρνασθαι Q : ἐπανακρίνεσθαι B : ἐπανακρίνασθαι
Rac (sed corr. a pr. m.) : reflorerent Eri 56 ἐν om. L R S οὐδὲν ἄπονον Q 57 τὸν πυρὸν]
τὴν πυρρὸν M χεδροπῶν ἢ σιτηρῶν D E χεδρόπων Dac N : χεδρωπῶν M O P Q : χιδροπῶν
D² L : χιδρωπῶν R T : χεδροποιὼν B : χεδροποιῶν ß W : ἤγουν ὀσπρίων I 58 καὶ om.
R ἀθέρας] ita L O Q S W X Ald Forb : ἀθέρα Æ B D E N : ἀθέρ I (α sup. l.) : ἐθέρα P :
θεραν Tac : ἀνθέρα R : ἀνθέρικας M Tpc : ἀθέρικας Mign καὶ²] τοὺς E ἀστάχυας] στάχυας D E
M P Q X 59 ἡ om. M 60 κοινῇ M ἰκμάδος] ἰκμάδος ἐγγινομένος ἢ N 61 ἔσπασε τὸ
κατάλληλον πρὸς D E L P S X 62 εἰ om. Æ B I M N O Q παρ’] ἐφ᾽ D E P S X 63 οὕτω]
ita Æ I L O P Q R S X Forb : οὕτως W Ald Mign
        287

not outside probability that one’s own should once more return from the common
[pool] to each.
[27.6] It is said also that quicksilver, when poured out from the vessel that
contains it down a dusty slope, forms small globules and scatters over the ground,
mingling with none of the things it encounters; but if one should collect at one
place the substance dispersed in many directions, it spontaneously flows back to
its kindred substance, if nothing intervening separates it from mixing with its own.
Something of this kind, I think, ought to be understood also of the human
composite, that, if the signal is but given by God, the appropriate parts
would spontaneously be reunited with those belonging to them, without any
obstruction arising from them to him who reconstitutes nature. [27.7] In the
case of plants growing in the ground also, we do not see any toil on the part
of nature towards the wheat or the millet or any other of the seeds of grain or
pulse, in changing them into stalk or spike or ears; for the proper nourishment
passes without trouble, spontaneously, from the common [pool] to each of the
seeds. If, then, while the moisture supplied to all the plants is common, each of
those plants which is nourished by it draws the appropriate supply for its own
growth, what new thing is it if in the account of the resurrection also, as in the case
of the seeds, it happens that for each of those who arise there is the attraction of
what is its own? [27.8] As such, it is possible to learn from all sides that the
preaching of the resurrection contains nothing beyond those things known to us
by experience.
[27.9] And yet we have been silent on the most remarkable point concerning
ourselves: I mean the very first beginning of our constitution. Who does not know
 288   

φύσεως, τί λαβοῦσα ἡ μητρώα νηδὺς, τί ἀπεργάζεται; [229] ὁρᾷς ὅπως ἀπλοῦν

τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁμοιομερές ἐστι τὸ εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ σώματος τοῖς
70 σπλάγχνοις καταβαλλόμενον· τὴν δὲ ποικιλίαν τοῦ κατασκευαζομένου συγκρίματος,
τίς λόγος ἐκδιηγήσεται; τίς δ᾽ ἂν, μὴ τῇ κοινῇ φύσει τὸ τοιοῦτον μαθὼν, δυνατὸν
ἡγήσαιτο τὸ γινόμενον, ὅτι τὸ βραχύ τε καὶ ἀντ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἐκεῖνο τοῦ τοσούτου
πράγματός ἐστιν ἀρχή; μέγα δέ φημι, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὴν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα βλέπων
διάπλασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ πρὸ τούτου θαυμάζειν ἄξιον, αὐτὴν λέγω τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ
75 αὐτὴν θεωρούμενα.

Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας προϋφεστάναι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν πρὸ τῶν
ψυχῶν διαπεπλάσθαι τὰ σώματα· ἐν ᾧ τις καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς κατὰ τὰς
μετεμψυχώσεις μυθοποιΐας.
[28.1] Τάχα γὰρ οὐκ ἔξω τῆς προκειμένης ἡμῖν πραγματείας ἐστὶ, τὸ διεξετάσαι τὸ
5 ἀμφιβαλλόμενον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις περὶ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τῶν
πρὸ ἡμῶν δοκεῖ οἷς ὁ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπραγματεύθη λόγος, καθάπερ τινὰ δῆμον ἐν
ἰδιαζούσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὰς ψυχὰς προϋφεστάναι λέγειν· προκεῖσθαι δὲ κἀκεῖ τά τε τῆς
κακίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑποδείγματα· καὶ παραμένουσαν μὲν ἐν τῷ καλῷ τὴν ψυχὴν,
τῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα συμπλοκῆς μένειν ἀπείρατον· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀπορρυῇ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
10 μετουσίας, πρὸς τὸν [C] τῇδε βίον κατολισθαίνειν, καὶ οὕτως ἐν σώματι γίνεσθαι.
Ἕτεροι δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὸν Μωϋσέα τάξει τῆς κατασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου προσέχοντες,
δευτέραν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος κατὰ τὸν χρόνον φασίν· ἐπειδὴ πρῶτον
λαβὼν ὁ Θεὸς χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔπλασεν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐψύχωσε διὰ
τοῦ ἐμφυσήματος· καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ προτιμοτέραν ἀποδεικνύουσι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν
15 σάρκα, τῆς ἐπεισκρινομένης τὴν προδιαπεπλασμένην· λέγουσι γὰρ διὰ τὸ σῶμα τὴν

68 φύσεως] φύσεως ἡμῶν R τί λαβοῦσα ἡ μητρώα νηδὺς] quid in utero informe accipit
Eri μητρῶα P ἀπειργάσατο N R ὁρᾷς] ita Æ B E I M N O P Q R T X Forb : ὀυχ
ὁρᾷς W : ἢ ὀυχ ὁρᾷς Ald Mign ὅπως] om. T : πῶς Ppc R ἁπλοῦν ὅπως L 69 τρόπον] καὶ
τρόπον P W X τινὰ τρόπον Q 71 τίς] τίς ἄρα Æ B E : τίς ἆρα I O 71–3 τίς δ᾽ ἂν—ἀρχή]
quis nisi communi natura discens quod talens potens est quod factum est narrarit quia illud
paruum ac prope nihil tantae rei fit principium Eri 71 τοιοῦτο Æ L N O W 72 ἡγήσατο B O
T : ἡγήσεται R γενόμενον M βραχύ τε καὶ] βραχύτερον L τε] γε T : om. D E τοῦ om.
T 73 ἀρχή] ἡ ἀρχή N 74 πρὸ τούτου] τούτου μᾶλλον I : τούτου O 75 θεωρούμενα] θεωρούμενα
πάντα N (ἄ sup. π)

Cap. 29 Æ I N O Q R T Dion
28.4–14 (τάχα—ἐμφυσήματος): Justinian, Ep. ad Mennam (ACO 3, 199.22–31) 28.28–74 (οἱ τῷ
προτέρῳ—σώμασι): Justinian, Ep. ad Mennam (ACO 3, 199.32–200.37) 28.4–17, 28.20–29.98
(τάχα—γίνεται, ἐπεὶ—βλαστημάτων ἐγένετο): John (of Damascus), Sacra Parallela II¹39 / K cap. A 1,
39 (Thum, 68.8–74.21)
1–3 πρὸς—μυθοποιΐας] de diversis opinionibus originis animae Λ 1 τῶν σωμάτων τὰς ψυχὰς Æ
B N R T W τὸ] ἐν τῷ W 1–2 διαπεπλάσθαι τὰ σώματα τῶν ψυχῶν M 2 διαπεπλάσθαι Æ I L M P R²
S W X : διεπλάσθαι B : διεπλάσθη ß : διαπεπλᾶσθαι Ald Mign καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τις M 4 τάχα] ἀλλὰ Æ
B I O διεξετάσαι] ἐξετάσαι D E P S W X SP 5 διαμφιβαλλόμενον SP ἐν om. T Ius τοῖς] τισὶ Ius
τῶν] τοῖς T : om. D P X 5–6 δοκεῖ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν Æ B I N O Q R T W Ius SP 6 δοκεῖ om. M ἀρχῶν]
ἀρχαίων D E N P S X : ψυχῶν M λόγος om. L δῆμον] pestilientiam Dion (forte λοῖμον) 7 πολιτείᾳ]
πόλει D E Pac? X Ius τε om. Ius 8 καὶ] καὶ τὰ Æ B N O Q R SP μὲν om. D P X ἐν om. S 9
ἀπείσρατον O καὶ om. Æ B I M N (sed add. a pr. m) O Q R T Dion Ius Eri ἀπορρύει B O Pac Rac 11
μωσέα Ius τῇ κατασκευῇ M R ἀνθρώπου] τελείου ἀνθρώπου M 12 ἐπειδὴ] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ R 13 χοῦν ὁ
θεὸς L ἔπλασε τὸν ἄνθρωπον W Ald Mign ἔπλασεν] ἐποίησεν D εἶθ’] ἔπειτα Ius 14 ἐμφυσήματος]
προσφυσήματος M SP : ἐμπροσφυσήματος Q 15 εἰσκρινομένης N διαπεπλασμένην D M P
       – 289

the miraculous working of nature, what the maternal womb receives, what it produces?
You see how what is implanted in the womb to be the beginning of the constitution of
the body is, in a way, simple and homogenous; but what language can describe the
variety of the composite body being formed? And who, not learning of such a thing in
nature generally, would think that which does take place is possible, that that small
thing, and nothing else, is the beginning of something so great? Great, I say, not only
considering the bodily construction, but what is more worthy of marvel than this,
I mean the soul itself and the things we contemplate regarding it.
To those who say ‘souls pre-exist bodies’, or the reverse, ‘bodies were formed before
souls’; in which is also a refutation of the myth-making concerning transmigrations
of souls.¹⁰⁷
[28.1] It is perhaps not beyond our present subject to discuss the matter debated
in the churches regarding soul and body. Some of those before us, by whom the
topic of principles has been treated, have thought it appropriate to say that souls
pre-existed as a people in a polity of their own, and that there are set forth there
the paradigms of vice and virtue, and that the soul residing there in goodness
remains without experience of conjunction with the body, but if it flows away
from its participation in the good, it falls down to this present mode of life and so
comes to be in a body.¹⁰⁸ Others, taking note of the order, as related by Moses, of
the formation of the human being, say that the soul is chronologically second to
the body, since God first taking dust from the earth, fashioned the human being,

¹⁰⁷ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 29): ‘On different views of the origin of the soul’.
¹⁰⁸ Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 245c–249d. Although many authors, from the time of Thales, had dealt with
the question of ‘principles’ or ‘first principles’, and Longinus had written a text with this as the title (cf.
Porphyry, Vita Plot. 14; Clement of Alexandria mentions that he intends to: Strom. 3.3.13.2, 21.2; cf.
5.14.140.3), Justinian, in 543, took these lines to be a reference to Origen (cf. Ep. Mennam; ACO 199).
Yet in his letter to the Council of 553, while again attributing such teaching to Origen, in words that
echo this passage and which are lifted verbatim from Theodoret of Cyrrhus, the originators of such
teaching are identified otherwise: ‘and again Pythagoras and Plato, after asserting there is a whole
company of bodiless souls [δῆμόν τινα ψυχῶν ἀσωμάτων], say that those who fall into some sin or other
are made to descend into bodies as a punishment. Plato in consequence called the body a fetter and a
tomb.’ Letter in Georgius Monachus, Chronicon, ed. de Boor, 2, 631–2 (Price, 2.283); cf. Theodoret,
affect. 5.13 (Canivet, 1, 229–30); Plato, Gorg. 493a. And then, a few lines later: ‘So Pythagoras, Plato,
Plotinus and their followers, who agreed that souls are immortal, declared that they exist prior to bodies
and that there is a great company of souls [ἀθανάτους εἶναι τὰς ψυχὰς . . . προϋπάρχειν ταύτας ἔφησαν
τῶν σωμάτων καὶ δῆμον εἶναι ψυχῶν (Theodoret add. ἀναρίθμων), of which those that transgress
descend into bodies.’ Chronicon, de Boor 2, 632–3 (Price, 2.283); cf. Theodoret, haer. 5.9 (PG
83.480c). Origen, of course, repeatedly denied that he taught any such thing, deriding it as ‘folly’,
‘myth’, ‘false teaching’, ‘introduced by the Greeks’, borrowed from the Egyptians by Pythagoras and
Plato: cf. Cels. 1.13 (= Philoc. 18.7); Cels. 1.20 (= Philoc. 18.5), Cels. 5.49; Com. John 6.64–73; see also
Cels. 3.75, 5.29; 7.32; 8.30; Com. Matt. 10.20, 13.1–2; and the passages presented by Pamphilus, Apol.
173–88. Origen claimed that the proper view of ‘the essence and principles’ of the soul, ‘the immortal
entering a mortal body’, is ‘not according to the Platonic transmigration, but according to a more
sublime contemplation’ (οὐ κατὰ τὴν Πλάτωνος μετενσωμάτωσιν ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄλλην τινὰ ὑψηλοτέραν
θεωρία, Cels. 4.17), so that ‘incarnation’ is different from ‘reincarnation’ (ἐνσωμάτωσις—
μετενσωμάτωσις, Com. John 6.86). Gregory of Nyssa, no doubt, was aware of this, just as Basil and
Gregory certainly were when excerpting passages from Cels. for their Philocalia. See further: An. et res.
8.3–6; 8.20–1; 9.13–14 (Spira, 80.8–81.9; 84.14–85.9; 94.16–95.3); Vit. Moys. 2.40 (Musurillo,
44.11–19); Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 37.15.
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ψυχὴν γενέσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἄπνουν τε καὶ ἀκίνητον εἴη τὸ πλάσμα· πᾶν δὲ τὸ διά τι

γινόμενον, ἀτιμότερον πάντως ἐστὶ τοῦ δι᾽ ὃ γίνεται, καθὼς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον λέγει ὅτι
πλεῖόν ἐστι τῆς τροφῆς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος, διότι τούτων [D] ἕνεκεν
ἐκεῖνα—οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐνδύματος χάριν κατεσκευάσθη τὰ
20 σώματα, ἀλλὰ, τούτων ὄντων, ἐκεῖνα διὰ τὴν χρείαν προσεξηυρέθη. [28.2] Ἐπεὶ οὖν
ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ὑπολήψεσιν ὁ λόγος ὑπαίτιος, τῶν τε προβιοτεύειν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν
ἰδίᾳ τινὶ καταστάσει μυθολογούντων καὶ τῶν ὑστέρας τῶν σωμάτων
κατασκευάζεσθαι νομιζόντων, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη μηδὲν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι
λεγομένων περιϊδεῖν ἀνεξέταστον. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δι᾽ ἀκριβείας τοὺς ἑκατέρωθεν
25 γυμνάζειν λόγους καὶ πάσας ἐκκαλύπτειν τὰς ἐγκειμένας ἀτοπίας ταῖς ὑπολήψεσι,
μακροῦ ἂν δέοιτο καὶ λόγου καὶ χρόνου· δι᾽ ὀλίγων δὲ, καθώς ἐστι δυνατὸν, ἑκάτερον
τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεψάμενοι, [232] πάλιν τῶν προκειμένων ἀντιληψόμεθα.
[28.3] Οἱ τῷ προτέρῳ παριστάμενοι λόγῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέραν τῆς ἐν σαρκὶ ζωῆς τὴν
πολιτείαν τῶν ψυχῶν δογματίζοντες, οὔ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καθαρεύειν
30 δογμάτων τῶν περὶ τῆς μετενσωματώσεως αὐτοῖς μεμυθολογημένων· εἰ γάρ τις
ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσειε, πρὸς τοῦτο κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνάγκην τὸν λόγον αὐτοῖς εὑρήσει
κατασυρόμενον. Φασί τινα τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις σοφῶν εἰρηκέναι, ὅτι ἀνὴρ γέγονεν ὁ
αὐτὸς, καὶ γυναικὸς σῶμα μετημφιάσατο, καὶ μετ᾽ ὀρνέων ἀνέπτη, καὶ θάμνος ἔφυ,
καὶ τὸν ἔνυδρον ἔλαχε βίον—οὐ πόρρω τῆς ἀληθείας, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν κρίσιν,
35 φερόμενος ὁ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτα λέγων· ὄντως γὰρ βατράχων τινῶν ἢ κολοιῶν
φλυαρίας ἢ ἀλογίας ἰχθύων ἢ δρυῶν ἀναισθησίας ἄξια τὰ τοιαῦτα δόγματα, τὸ
μίαν ψυχὴν [B] λέγειν διὰ τοσούτων ἐλθεῖν.
[28.4] Τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἀτοπίας αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία, τὸ προϋφεστάναι τὰς ψυχὰς
οἴεσθαι· δι᾽ ἀκολούθου γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ τοιούτου δόγματος ἐπὶ τὸ προσεχές τε καὶ

16 γεγενῆσθαι N R τε] τι T : om. D E L P S πλάσμα] σῶμα I 17 γενόμενον L δι᾽ ὃ] διὸ M R : δι᾽ ὅτι
T γέγονε D E L P S X 18 πλείων B D E M R : πλεῖον Sac (ω sup. l.) ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τροφῆς
M N διότι] διότι οὐ T ἕνεκα D I L N P X 19 ἐκεῖνο M γὰρ om. L 19–20 τὸ σῶμα D E 20
ὄντων om. D L προσεξηυρέθη διὰ τὴν χρείαν N προσεξευρέθη Æ B E I M O X : προεξευρέθη L N :
προσεξερεύθη R : προσεξηυρέθη Sac (ε sup. l.) 21 ἐν om. I ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα R 22 τινὶ om. Æ
I καταστάσει] τάξει Æ B O Q : διατάξει I 22–3 καὶ τῶν—νομιζόντων om. SP 23 κατεσκευάσθαι
M : κατεσκευᾶσθαι Q 23–4 λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς δόγμασι Ald Mign 23 τοῖς om. M 25 ἐγκαλύπτειν
Q Rac W X ἐκκειμένας T : ἐγγινομένας R 26 καὶ¹ om. N λόγου καὶ χρόνου] ita D E I L M O P Q R S
X Forb : χρόνου καὶ λόγου W SP Ald Mign ἑκατέρων Q 27 προκειμένων] εἰρημένων Q Dion Eri
ἀντιληψώμεθα L 28 τὴν om. T 29 δακοῦσι Ius 30 δογμάτων om. Ius τῶν om. T περὶ τῶν τῆς
N (et in mg, a pr. m.: ἐν ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς μετεμψυχώσεως) μετενσωματώσεως] μετεμψυχώσεως
Ius αὐτοῖς om. Ius μυθολογημένων SP 32 φασί] ita D L P X Forb : φασὶ γὰρ Æ I N O S : ὅν
φασί W SP Ald Mign : quod aiunt Dion Eri ὅτι] ὅτι καὶ Æ B I M N O Q R T W Ius SP 32–3 ὁ αὐτὸς
om. Ius 33 σῶμα μετημφιάσατο] ἠμφιάσατο σῶμα N : σῶμα ἠμφιάσατο T Ius θάμνοις D E Pac : ἐν
θάμνοις T ἔφυ] ἐφοίτα D E : ἔφυτα L 34 κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν κρίσιν] recessit nostrum iudicum Eri γε
om. D L P S X Ius 35 ἑαυτοῦ] ita Æ B D I L M N O P R S W X Forb : αὐτοῦ Ald : αὑτοῦ Mign 36
φλυαρίας] καὶ φλυαρίας S δόγματα] ῥήματα SP 39 προσέχετε SP
        291

and then animated it by breathing into it,¹⁰⁹ and by this argument they show that
the flesh is more noble than the soul, that which was previously formed than what
is additionally introduced. For they say that the soul came to be for the body, so
that the moulded figure might not be breathless and motionless; and that every-
thing that comes to be for the sake of something else is surely less precious than
that for which it comes to be, just as the Gospel says that the soul is more than food
and the body more than clothing,¹¹⁰ because the latter things exist for the sake of
the former; for the soul was not formed for the sake of food nor our bodies for
clothing, but when the former things exist, the latter were provided for their needs.
[28.2] Since then the argument involved in both these positions—of those who
mythologize about souls previously living in some special state, and of those who
think that they were formed later than the bodies—is open to charge, it is perhaps
necessary to let none of the statements in these doctrines pass by unexamined. But
to wrestle with the arguments on each side with precision, and to reveal all the
absurdities residing in the assumptions, would require a great deal of both
argument and time; we shall, however, briefly survey, as far as it is possible,
each of the views mentioned, and then resume again our subject.
[28.3] Those who stand by the former argument, and dogmatize that the polity of
souls is prior to their life in the flesh, do not seem to me to be clear of the Greek
mythological doctrines about their successive embodiments; for if one search
carefully, he will find that their argument is, by every necessity, brought down
to this. They say that one of their wise men said that he, the very same, became a
man, was changed into a body of a woman, and flew with the birds, and grew as a
bush, and obtained the life of an aquatic creature¹¹¹—the one saying these things
about himself did not, so far as I can judge, stray far from the truth; for doctrines
such as this, saying one soul passed through so many changes, really are fitting for
the nonsense of frogs or jackdaws, or the stupidity of fish or the insensibility of
trees!
[28.4] The cause of such stupidity is this, supposing souls to pre-exist; for the first
principle of such a doctrine, leading on the argument by consequence to the next
and adjacent step, passes even to talking such fables. For if the soul, being dragged

¹⁰⁹ Gen. 2:7. ¹¹⁰ Matt. 6:25.

¹¹¹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 8.4–5, 31 (Spira, 80.12–81.6; 87.5–12); for Pythagoras, see
Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 14; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 45; Diogenes Laertius, 8.4. See also Empedocles,
Frag. B117 (DK, 358–9); Orpheus, Frag. 224b (Kern, 241=Proclus, In Plat. Resp., ed. Kroll, 2.339.4–9);
Plato, Phaed. 81e–82b; Calcidius, Pl. Tim. 2.197.
 292   

40 παρακείμενον τὸν λόγον προάγουσα, μέχρι τούτου τερατευομένη διέξεισιν· εἰ γὰρ διά
τινος κακίας ἀποσπασθεῖσα τῆς ὑψηλοτέρας ἡ ψυχὴ πολιτείας, μετὰ τὸ (καθώς
φασιν) ἅπαξ γεύσασθαι τοῦ σωματικοῦ βίου πάλιν ἄνθρωπος γίνεται· ἐμπαθέστερος
δὲ πάντως ὁ ἐν σαρκὶ βίος ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τὸν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀσώματον· ἀνάγκη πᾶσα,
τὴν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γενομένην βίῳ, ἐν ᾧ πλείους αἱ πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰσὶν ἀφορμαὶ,
45 ἐν πλείονί τε κακίᾳ γενέσθαι καὶ ἐμπαθέστερον ἢ πρότερον διατεθῆναι· ἀνθρωπίνης
δὲ ψυχῆς πάθος, ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἄλογόν ἐστιν ὁμοίωσις· τούτῳ δὲ προσοικειωθεῖσαν [C]
αὐτὴν, εἰς κτηνώδη φύσιν μεταρρυῆναι· ἅπαξ δὲ διὰ κακίας ὁδεύουσαν, μηδὲ ἐν
ἀλόγῳ γενομένην τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν προόδου λῆξαί ποτε· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ στάσις
ἀρχὴ τῆς κατ᾽ ἀρετήν ἐστιν ὁρμῆς· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἐν ἀλόγοις οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ
50 χεῖρον ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλοιωθήσεται, πάντοτε πρὸς τὸ ἀτιμότερον προϊοῦσα καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ
χεῖρον τῆς ἐν ᾗ ἐστι φύσεως ἐξευρίσκουσα· ὥσπερ δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητὸν
ὑποβέβηκεν, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ἡ μετάπτωσις γίνεται.
[28.5] [D] Ἀλλὰ μέχρι τούτου προϊὼν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς, εἰ καὶ ἔξω τῆς ἀληθείας
φέρεται, ἀλλά γε διά τινος ἀκολουθίας τὸ ἄτοπον ἐξ ἀτόπου μεταλαμβάνει· τὸ δὲ
55 ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη διὰ τῶν ἀσυναρτήτων αὐτοῖς τὸ δόγμα μυθοποιεῖται. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ
ἀκολουθία παντελῆ διαφθορὰν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποδείκνυσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἅπαξ τῆς ὑψηλῆς
πολιτείας ἀπολισθήσασα, ἐν οὐδενὶ μέτρῳ κακίας στῆναι δυνήσεται, ἀλλὰ, διὰ τῆς
πρὸς τὰ πάθη σχέσεως, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον μεταβήσεται· ἀπ᾽
ἐκείνου δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν φυτῶν ἀναισθησίαν μετατεθήσεται· τῷ δὲ ἀναισθήτῳ
60 γειτνιᾷ [233] πως τὸ ἄψυχον· τούτῳ δὲ τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἕπεται· ὥστε καθόλου διὰ
τῆς ἀκολουθίας πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ μεταχωρήσει· οὐκοῦν ἀμήχανος αὐτῇ
πάλιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται ἡ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἐπάνοδος· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ θάμνου ἐπὶ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπανάγουσιν. Οὐκοῦν προτιμοτέραν τὴν ἐν θάμνῳ ζωὴν τῆς
ἀσωμάτου διαγωγῆς ἐκ τούτων ἀποδεικνύουσι.

40 τὸν om. SP 41 ἀποσπασθεῖσα] ὑποσπασθεῖσα B 41–2 ἡ ψυχὴ—ἄνθρωπος γίνεται] anima (sicut

asserunt) efficitur homo Dion : anima homo efficitur Eri μετὰ—πάλιν om. M Nac (in Nmg2) Q R T W
Ius SP 42 φασιν] φησιν D I M Nmg P S X 43 ἐν σαρκὶ] ἔνσαρκος N ὁμολογεῖται om. N (in Nmg2 ante
βίος) : ὡμολόγηται R T Ius τὸν] τὸν ἤδη B I ἀΐδιον] ἀειδῆ Q Rac T W : ἴδιον O ἀνάγκη πᾶσα]
necessarium est omnem animam Eri 44 γενομένην] ita Æ B L M N O P Q S W X Forb : γινομένην
R Ald Mign βίῳ] βίῳ ψυχὴν M 45 τε] τινι τῷ Ius γίνεσθαι R ἢ] τοῦ D L P S X : ἢ τοῦ W ἢ
πρότερον om. Q Ius 46 δὲ om. L ἡ om. T 47 μεταρρυῆναι] καταρρυῆναι B (a 2a m.) ὁδεύουσαν]
ὁδεύουσαν καὶ D L μηδ᾽ L : μὴ δὲ SP 48 γινομένην O R : γεγενημένην SP λῆξαί] λήξειν Ius γὰρ]
δὲ D 49 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri ἀεὶ om. Ius 51 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ Q αἰσθητικὸν I 52 οὕτως
M N R SP ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον om. Ius ἡ om. D L M P S X μετάπτωσις] μετάστασις I : μετάβασις Q :
casus Dion Eri 53 ἀλλὰ] ἀλλὰ τὸ R 54 τὸ¹ om. Æ B I Nac O Q R SP 54–5 ἄτοπον—ἤδη : ἤδη ἄτοπον
ἐξ ἀτόπου μεταλαμβάνει· οὐδὲ ἐντεῦθεν καὶ Q 55 συναρτήτων Q τὸ om. Nac Pac Q 56 παντελῶς
R διαφθορὰν] φθορὰν L : διαφορὰν I SP 58 τὸ om. R 59 τῶν φυτῶν om. M μετατεθήσεται]
μεταχωρήσει M 60 γειτνιᾷ om. Ius τὸ ἄψυχον·] exanime Dion : inanimale Eri τούτῳ δὲ] τοῦτο
δὲ P : τῷ δὲ ἀψύχῳ N : exanime autem Dion : post hoc autem (id est inanimale) Eri καθόλου]
διόλου Ius 61 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri ἀμήχανον M 62 ἐξ ἀνάγκης om. Ius ἡ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον ἔσται
D L P S X 63 ἄνθρωπον] ἄνθρωπον πάλιν B οὐκοῦν] non igitur Eri 64 διαγωγῆς] ζωῆς O
ἀποδεικνύσιν SP
        293

away from the more exalted polity by some wickedness, after once having tasted
(as they say) corporeal mode of life, becomes a human being again, [and if] the
mode of life in the flesh is acknowledged, as it certainly is, to be more subject to
passion compared with the eternal and incorporeal, by every necessity, then, that
which comes to be in such a mode of life, in which there are more occasions to sin,
comes to be disposed in great wickedness and more subject to passion than before,
and, as passion for the human soul is likeness to the irrational, being assimilated to
this it descends to the animal nature; and that once it sets out through wickedness,
it never, having become irrational, ceases its advance towards evil, for the cessa-
tion of evil is the beginning of the impulse towards virtue, and in irrational
creatures virtue does not exist. Thus, by necessity, it will always be changed for
the worse, continually proceeding to what is more dishonoured and ever finding
what is worse in the nature in which it is. Just as the sense-perceptive is lower than
the rational, so too there is a change from this to the insensate.
[28.5] Now, proceeding so far, even if it is carried outside the truth, their
argument nevertheless derives one absurdity from another absurdity by a kind
of logical sequence; but henceforth their doctrine mythologizes through incoher-
ent points. Logical sequence points to the complete destruction of the soul; for that
which has once fallen away from the exalted polity will not be able halt at any
measure of evil, but, through its relation to the passions, it will pass from the
rational to the irrational, and from there it will be transferred to the insensibility of
plants, and the inanimate is adjacent, somehow, to the insensate, and following
this, the non-existent. So that by this sequence they will absolutely have the soul
pass into non-being.¹¹² Therefore, the return to the better state will again be, by
necessity, impossible for it, and yet they have the soul return from the bush to the
human being. They thus prove that the life in a bush is more precious than the
incorporeal course of life.

¹¹² Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 8.25–6 (Spira, 86.2–10).

 294   

65 [28.6] Δέδεικται γὰρ, ὅτι ἡ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον γενομένη πρόοδος τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς τὸ
κατώτερον κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑποβήσεται. Ὑποβέβηκε δὲ τὴν ἀναίσθητον φύσιν τὸ
ἄψυχον, εἰς ὃ δι᾽ ἀκολουθίας ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἄγει· ἀλλ᾽
ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο οὐ βούλονται· ἢ τῷ ἀναισθήτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐγκατακλείουσιν, ἢ εἴπερ
ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον αὐτὴν ἐπανάγοιεν βίον, προτιμότερον (καθὼς εἴρηται)
70 [B] τὸν ξυλώδη βίον τῆς πρώτης ἀποδείξουσι καταστάσεως, εἴπερ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἡ
πρὸς κακίαν κατάπτωσις γέγονεν, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπάνοδος γίνεται.
[28.7] Οὐκοῦν ἀκέφαλός τις καὶ ἀτελὴς ὁ τοιοῦτος διελέγχεται λόγος, ὁ τὰς
ψυχὰς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν πρὸ τῆς ἐν σαρκὶ ζωῆς βιοτεύειν κατασκευάζων καὶ διὰ κακίας
συνδεῖσθαι τοῖς σώμασι· τῶν δέ γε νεωτέραν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι
75 λεγόντων, προκατεσκευάσθη διὰ τῶν κατόπιν ἡ ἀτοπία. [28.8] Οὐκοῦν
ἀπόβλητος ἐπίσης ὁ παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων λόγος· διὰ δὲ τοῦ μέσου τῶν ὑπολήψεων
εὐθύνειν οἶμαι δεῖν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ἡμέτερον δόγμα· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, τὸ μήτε κατὰ
τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἀπάτην ἐν κακίᾳ τινὶ βαρηθείσας τὰς τῷ παντὶ συμπεριπολούσας
ψυχὰς, ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ συμπαραθέειν τῇ ὀξύτητι τῆς τοῦ πόλου [C] κινήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν
80 γῆν καταπίπτειν οἴεσθαι. [D] Μηδ᾽ αὖ πάλιν οἱονεὶ πήλινον ἀνδριάντα
προδιαπλάσαντας τῷ λόγῳ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τούτου ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεσθαι
λέγειν· ἦ γὰρ ἂν ἀτιμοτέρα τοῦ πηλίνου πλάσματος ἡ νοερὰ φύσις ἀποδειχθείη.
Κατασκευὴ τοῦ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχῇ τε καὶ σώματι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑπάρξεως
εἶναι.
[29.1] Ἀλλ᾽ ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ διὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότος,
μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινὴν τῆς συστάσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς
5 ἑαυτοῦ προγενέστερός τε καὶ νεώτερος γένοιτο, τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ προτερεύοντος
ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἐφυστερίζοντος· ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν προγνωστικῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμει
(κατὰ τὸν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον) ἅπαν προϋφεστάναι τὸ ἀνθρώπινον

65 ὅτι ἡ πρὸς] ὡς ἡ εἰς N ἡ om. Ius γινομένη ß I M N O Q R : γιγνομένη T ἡ πρόοδος Ius 67

ἀκολουθίαν B ἀνάγει M 68 βούλεται Æ ἐγκατακλείσουσιν Æ 69 αὐτὴν] om. I : αὐτὴν καὶ
οὐράνιον T ἐπαναγάγοιεν T 69–70 προτιμότερον—βίον quaedam excidisse uidentur SP 70 τῆς]
τῆς αἰθερίας B ἀποδείξωσι Q : δείξουσιν SP 71 ἐγένετο D L M P S X 72 οὐκοῦν] non igitur
Eri τις] τι M : τε N R 73 πρὸ] πρὸς τὸ P X 74 συνδεῖσθαι] ἐνδεῖσθαι Ius γε νεωτέραν] γενναιοτέραν
Rac? Tac 74–5 λεγόντων εἶναι SP 75 προκατεσκεύασται I O Q οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri 76 ἐπίσης]
dixeris Eri παρ’] παρὰ W ἀμφοτέροις T 77 post δόγμα inc. cap. 30 R μηδὲ Q 78 περιπολούσας
B Nac 79 συμπαραθεῖν Æ B I N O T : συμαράγειν M : συμπαρέχειν Q : concurrere Dion : concurrendi
Eri 81 προδιαπλάσαντας] ita Æ B C F M N² P Q R T W X Forb : προδιαπλάσαντα D E I L S :
προσδιαπλάσαντας Nac : προδιαπλάσας A : προδιαπλασθέντα Ald Mign ἕνεκεν] ita Æ ß I L M N O P
Q R S W X Ald Forb : ἕνεκα Mign 82 πλάσματος] σώματος Q R ἡ] ἢ M ἀποδειχθῇ T
Cap. inc. post οἴεσθαι (Cap. 28, l. 80) A B D E F L M N P S T W Forb

Cap. 30 Æ I N O Q R Dion
1 κατασκευὴ—εἶναι] quod deus pariter animam et corpus fecerit Λ 1 ψυχῇ τε] ψυχῆς οἴεσαι
B σώματι] subsistentiae Eri
3 τοῦ¹ om. I SP συνεστῶτος SP 4 αὐτῷ D L Npc P S X τὴν κοινὴν τῆς συστάσεως I 5
νεώτερος] μεταγενέστερος D² προτερεύοντος] προτέρου ὄντος Æ 6 δ᾽ I μὲν om. B δυνάμει τοῦ
θεοῦ N 7 κατὰ—ἅπαν om. SP ἅπασαν B
       – 295

[28.6] It has been shown that the passage towards the worse which takes place in
the soul will likely be extended downwards. Lower than the insensate nature is the
inanimate, towards which, by consequence, the principle of their doctrine leads
the soul; but since they will not have this, they either exclude the soul from the
insensate, or, if they are to bring it back from there to the human mode of life, they
claim, as has been said, that the life of a tree is more honourable than the first
state—if, that is, the fall towards wickedness took place from the one, and the
return towards virtue takes place from the other. [28.7] Therefore, this argument
of theirs, which maintains that the souls are living by themselves before their life in
the flesh and that through wickedness they are bound to bodies, is shown to be
without beginning and without conclusion; regarding those who say that the soul
is later than the body, the absurdity was already demonstrated through what
follows. [28.8] Thus, the argument of both is to be equally rejected. I think that we
ought to direct our own doctrine in the way of truth through the middle of these
assumptions. This is, that it should not be supposed, following the Greek error,
that the souls, revolving with the movement of the universe but being weighed
down by some wickedness, fall to earth by the inability to keep up with the
swiftness of the movement of the celestial sphere. Neither are we to say, in our
account, that the human being was fashioned beforehand like some clay statue, the
soul coming into being for the sake of this; for in that case the intellectual nature
would be shown to be less precious than the clay figure.
An elaboration of the fact that the cause of existence for soul and body is one and
the same.¹¹³
[29.1] Rather, as the human being is one, consisting of soul and body, it is to be
supposed that the principle of his constitution is one and common to both, so that
he should not be both older and newer than himself, with the bodily element
coming first in him and the other coming later, but instead to affirm the whole
human plenitude to have pre-existed in the power of God’s foreknowledge

¹¹³ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 30): ‘That God equally made the body and the soul of the human being’.
Forbes had Chapter 29 begin with the last sentence of the previous paragraph. Several manuscripts,
together with the Latin translations of Dionysius Exiguus and Eriugena, followed by Migne, place
it here.
 296   

πλήρωμα λέγειν, συμμαρτυρούσης εἰς τοῦτο τῆς προφητείας τῆς λεγούσης, εἰδέναι
τὰ πάντα τὸν Θεὸν πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν· ἐν δὲ τῇ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δημιουργίᾳ μὴ
10 προτιθέναι τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, μήτε πρὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν, μήτε τὸ
ἔμπαλιν· ὡς ἂν μὴ στασιάζοι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῇ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον
διαφορᾷ [236] μεριζόμενος. [29.2] Διπλῆς γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν νοουμένης, κατὰ
τὴν ἀποστολικὴν διδασκαλίαν, τοῦ τε φαινομένου ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κεκρυμμένου· εἰ
τὸ μὲν προϋπάρχοι τὸ δὲ ἐπιγένοιτο, ἀτελής τις ἡ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος
15 ἀπελεγχθήσεται δύναμις, οὐ τῷ παντὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀθρόον ἐξαρκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ
διαιρουμένη τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος περὶ ἑκάτερον τῶν ἡμισευμάτων ἀσχολουμένη.
[29.3] Ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σίτῳ φαμὲν ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν σπερμάτων, ἅπαν
ἐμπεριειλῆφθαι τῇ δυνάμει τὸ κατὰ τὸν στάχυν εἶδος, τὸν χόρτον, τὴν καλάμην,
τὰς διὰ μέσου ζώνας, τὸν καρπόν, τοὺς ἀνθέρικας, καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐν τῷ τῆς
20 φύσεως λόγῳ προϋπάρχειν ἢ προγίνεσθαί φαμεν τῇ φύσει τοῦ σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ
τάξει μέν τινι φυσικῇ τὴν ἐγκειμένην τῷ σπέρματι δύναμιν φανεροῦσθαι, [B] οὐ μὴν
ἑτέραν ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι φύσιν—κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σπορὰν
ἔχειν ὑπειλήφαμεν, ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς συστάσεως ἀφορμῇ συνεσπαρμένην τὴν τῆς
φύσεως δύναμιν· ἐξαπλοῦσθαι δὲ καὶ φανεροῦσθαι διά τινος φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας
25 πρὸς τὸ τέλειον προϊοῦσαν, οὐ προσλαμβάνουσάν τι τῶν ἔξωθεν εἰς ἀφορμὴν
τελειώσεως· ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὸ τέλειον δι᾽ ἀκολουθίας προάγουσαν· ὡς μήτε ψυχὴν
πρὸ τοῦ σώματος μήτε χωρὶς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μίαν
ἀμφοτέρων ἀρχὴν, κατὰ μὲν τὸν ὑψηλότερον λόγον, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ
βουλήματι καταβληθεῖσαν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἕτερον, ἐν ταῖς τῆς γενέσεως ἀφορμαῖς
30 συνισταμένην.

[29.4] Ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τὴν κατὰ τὰ μέλη διάρθρωσιν ἐνιδεῖν τῷ πρὸς τὴν σύλληψιν
τοῦ σώματος ἐντιθεμένῳ πρὸ τῆς διαπλάσεως· [C] οὕτως οὐδὲ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς
ἰδιότητας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δυνατόν ἐστι κατανοῆσαι, πρὶν προελθεῖν εἰς ἐνέργειαν· καὶ

8 λέγειν πλήρωμα A D E L Mpc P S X λέγειν] λέγει D R εἰς] πρὸς N εἰς τοῦτο om. D E τῆς om.
I Q λεγούσης om. I 9 τὰ om. Æ B I M Nac O Q R T SP 10 πρὸ om. Q 10–11 μήτε τὸ ἔμπαλιν]
neque iterum ante animam corpus Eri 11 στασιάζη ß I : στασιάζει B 12 μεριζόμενος] γνωριζόμενος
M 13 τε om. R κεκρυμμένου] κρυπτομένου O 14 προϋπάρχοι] ὑπάρχοι M : προυπάρχει
B ἐπιγίνοιτο D F L N P Q S W X : ἐπιγίνεται R 15 ἀπελεγχθήσεται] ἀπελέγχοιτο B :
ἀποδειχθήσεται D E : ἀπελεχθήσεται SP ἐξαρκοῦσα] ἐπαρκοῦσα L 16 περὶ] περὶ τὸ B 18
ἄσταχυν N O 19 ἀθέρικας SP ἐν om. D P S X 20 προγενέσθαι D L P S X : προσγίνεσθαι Ʋ
M N T 21 φανεροῦσθαι δύναμιν L 22 ἐπεισκρίνεσθαι] ἐπισπείρεσθαι T σπορὰν] seminationem (hoc
est generationem uel creationem) Eri 23 ἔχειν σπορὰν A D E F L P S X ἔχειν] ἔχει L : om. T ἔχειν
ὑπειλήφαμεν] ita Æ B I M N Q R Forb : ὑπειλήφαμεν ἔχειν W Ald Mign ὑπειλήφαμεν] παρειλήφαμεν
D Eac (E ὑπ sup. l.) ἐν om. SP συνεσπαρμένην] συνεσπαρμένην μὲν κατὰ Q Eri : συνεσπαρμένην
μὲν T 25 προϊοῦσα SP 26 ἀκολουθίαν X προσάγουσαν Aac O Tpc ὡς] ὥστε I μήτε] μήτε τὴν
T 27 χωρὶς] χωρὶς τῆς B 29 τὸν] τὸ R γεννήσεως SP ἀμορφίαις T 31 ὡς—ἐνιδεῖν] ut enim non
est unum per membra diuisionem artuum scire Eri τὴν om. D E X τὰ om. Mign διάθρωσιν
SP ἐνιδεῖν] ἰδεῖν O 31–2 τῶν . . . ἐντιθεμένων T 32 ἐντιθεμένῳ τοῦ σώματος N ἐντιθεμένη
X πρὸ] πρὸ διὰ W οὕτως om. SP τῆς ψυχῆς] τυχῆς Nac 33 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ om. Nac προελθεῖν]
ἐλθεῖν Nac
        297

(according to the account given a little earlier), to which the prophecy bears
witness, saying that God knows all things before their genesis,¹¹⁴ and not, in the
crafting of each, to place one before the other, neither the soul before the body, nor
the contrary, so that the human being may not be at strife against himself, being
divided by a chronological time. [29.2] For as our nature is conceived of as
twofold, according to the apostolic teaching—the visible human being and the
hidden one¹¹⁵—if one pre-existed and the other came to be later, the power of the
Craftsman will be convicted of being in some way imperfect, as not being
completely sufficient for the whole task at once, but dividing the work and busying
itself with each of the halves in turn.
[29.3] But just as we say that in the grain, or in any other seed, the whole form of
the ear of corn is potentially included—the leaves, the stalk, the joints in the
middle, the fruit, the beard—and do not say in our account of its nature that any of
these things pre-existed or came into being before the nature of the seed, but
rather that the power abiding in the seed is manifested in a certain natural order,
not that another nature is introduced, in the same way we suppose the human
seed, at the first occasion of its construction, to have been sown with the poten-
tiality of its nature, and that it is unfolded and manifested by a certain natural
sequence as it proceeds to its perfect state, not taking to itself anything external as
a means for being perfected, but advancing itself by sequence to the perfect state.
So that it is not true to say either that the soul exists before the body, or that the
body exists without the soul, but that there is one beginning of both, which, on the
one hand, according to the lofty account, was laid as a foundation in the first will
of God, and, on the other hand, according to the other account, is established in
the occasions of genesis.
[29.4] As one cannot observe the articulation of the limbs in that which is
implanted for the conception of the body before its being formed, so neither is
it possible to perceive in the same the properties of the soul before they advance to

¹¹⁴ Sus. (Θ) 42.

¹¹⁵ Cf. 1 Pet. 3:4; Rom. 7:22; 2 Cor. 4:16; Eph. 3:16. Cf. Origen, Dial. 16–24; Com. Songs Prologue
(Baehrens, 62.31–68.3; ET Lawson, 25–30).
 298   

ὥσπερ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀμφιβάλοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἄρθρων τε καὶ σπλάγχνων διαφορὰς
35 ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐντεθὲν σχηματίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλης τινὸς δυνάμεως ἐπεισερχομένης, ἀλλὰ
τῆς ἐγκειμένης φυσικῶς πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην μεθισταμένης· οὕτω καὶ περὶ
ψυχῆς ἀναλόγως ἔστι τὸ ἶσον ὑπονοῆσαι, ὅτι κἂν μὴ διά τινων ἐνεργειῶν ἐν τῷ
φαινομένῳ γνωρίζηται, οὐδὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ
μέλλοντος συνίστασθαι ἀνθρώπου ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐστὶ τῇ δυνάμει, λανθάνει δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ
40 εἶναι δυνατὸν πρὸ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀκολουθίας ἀναφανῆναι· οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ἔστι μὲν
ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ φαινομένη, φανήσεται [D] δὲ διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἑαυτῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν
ἐνεργείας, τῇ σωματικῇ αὐξήσει συμπροϊοῦσα. [29.5] Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ νεκροῦ
σώματος ἡ πρὸς τὴν σύλληψιν δύναμις ἀποκρίνεται ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἐμψύχου καὶ ζῶντος· διὰ
τοῦτό φαμεν εὔλογον εἶναι μὴ νεκρὸν καὶ ἄψυχον οἴεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ ζῶντος εἰς ζωῆς
45 ἀφορμὴν προϊέμενον· τὸ γὰρ ἐν σαρκὶ ἄψυχον, καὶ νεκρόν ἐστι πάντως· ἡ δὲ νεκρότης
κατὰ στέρησιν ψυχῆς γίνεται· οὐκ ἂν δέ τις ἐπὶ τούτου πρεσβυτέραν τῆς ἕξεως εἴποι
τὴν στέρησιν, εἴπερ τὸ ἄψυχον, ὅπερ νεκρότης ἐστὶ, τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναί τις
κατασκευάζοι πρεσβύτερον. [237] Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἐναργέστερον ζητοίη τεκμήριον
τοῦ ζῆν ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος ὅπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κατασκευαζομένου γίνεται ζώου, δυνατόν
50 ἐστι καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλων σημείων δι᾽ ὧν τὸ ἔμψυχον ἐκ τοῦ νεκροῦ διακρίνεται, καὶ περὶ
τούτου κατανοῆσαι· τεκμήριον γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ποιούμεθα, τὸ θερμὸν
εἶναί τινα καὶ ἐνεργὸν καὶ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κατεψυγμένον τε καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐπὶ τῶν
σωμάτων, οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἰ μὴ νεκρότης ἐστίν.
[29.6] Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἔνθερμόν τε καὶ ἐνεργὸν θεωροῦμεν τοῦτο περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον
55 ποιούμεθα, τὸ μηδὲ ἄψυχον εἶναι διὰ τούτων συντεκμαιρόμεθα· ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ κατὰ τὸ
σωματικὸν αὐτοῦ μέρος, οὐ σάρκα φαμὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ὀστέα καὶ τρίχας καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὸ
ἀνθρώπινον καθορᾶται, ἀλλὰ τῇ δυνάμει μὲν εἶναι τούτων ἕκαστον, οὔπω δὲ κατὰ τὸ
ὁρώμενον [B] φαίνεσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ψυχικοῦ μέρους, οὔπω μὲν τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς καὶ ὅσα περὶ ψυχὴν καθορᾶται, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ χώραν
60 ἔχειν φαμὲν, ἀναλόγως δὲ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κατασκευῆς τε καὶ τελειώσεως, καὶ τὰς

34 ἀμφιβάλλοι Æ Pac O Q(?) : διαμφιβάλλοι M 35 ἐντεθὲν] ἐντεῦθεν Æ P T 36 φυσικῶς] φύσεως N

ταύτην] ita Æ B E I M N O Q Rpc S Forb : ταύτης A D F L P Rac T W X Ald : αὐτῆς Mign οὕτως M N
R SP περὶ] περὶ τῆς Æ B O 37 ἴσον I M S X νοῆσαι T τινων] τῶν N 38 γνωρίζεται I Rac
καὶ² om. Æ D E F L P S W X 39 ἐκείνῳ] ἐκείνῃ M 40 πρὸ] πρὸς Mign οὕτως Æ R ἡ om.
T ἔστι] ita Æ ß I L M O P R S W X Ald Forb : ἐστι Mign 41 ἑαυτῆς] ἑαυτῇ I R : αὐτῇ M SP 43
ἐπεισκρίνεται SP ζῶντος] ζῶντος καὶ S 43–4 διὰ τοῦτό— ζῶντος om. X 44 εἶναι] ἂν R : εἶναι καὶ I L
S οἴεσθαι] οἴεσθαι εἶναι N : εἶναι Q Eri εἰς] πρὸς I 44–5 ζωῆς ἀφορμὴν] ζῶσαν μορφὴν M 45
σαρκὶ] ζωῇ O ἡ δὲ νεκρότης] εἰ δὲ νεκρὸν T 46 ψυχῆς στέρησιν N ψυχῆς] τῆς ψυχῆς D E 48
κατασκευάζει ß Ald Mign ἐναργέστερον] ἐναργὲς M : ἐνεργέστερον D (ερ 2a man.) Nac P Rac
X ζητοίει O 49 ζώου om. D 50 ἐκ] ὃ ἐκ SP 51 γὰρ] δὲ X 52 ἐνεργὸν] ἐνεργοῦντα M 54
ἐπειδὴ] ἐπεὶ N 55 ποιούμεθα] ποιησόμεθα M μηδ᾽ I 56 αὐτὸ] αὐτῷ I R τρίχα L 56–7 τὸν
ἄνθρωπον L 57 καθορᾶται] θεωρεῖται L M εἶναι om. O τούτῶν ἕκαστον εἶναι W Ald Mign 58
φαίνεται T οὕτως M P X SP 58–9 οὔπω—θυμοειδὲς] nondum quidem totum animosum scilicet
Eri 58 καὶ²] καὶ τὸ R 59 ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς] θυμοειδὲς καὶ θυμικὸν Ι ψυχὴν] τὴν
ψυχὴν Æ B T ἐκείνῃ M 60 ἔχει SP
        299

activity; and just as no one would doubt that what is implanted is shaped into the
different varieties of limbs and internal organs—not by some other power being
imported, but by that residing in it naturally, transforming the same to this
activity—so also, analogously, it may equally be supposed in the case of the soul,
that even if it is not made known by any apparent activity, it is nonetheless in it.
For even the form of the human being to come is in it potentially, but concealed
because it is not possible for it to be made visible before the necessary sequence of
events, so also the soul is in it, even though not visible, and will become apparent
by means of its own proper and natural activity, as it advances along with the
bodily growth. [29.5] Since the potential for conception is secreted not from a
dead body, but from one which is animate and living, for this reason we say it is
reasonable that what is sent forth from a living being to be the occasion of life is
not supposed to be dead and inanimate; for in the flesh that which is inanimate is
surely dead, and the condition of death arises from the withdrawal of the soul.¹¹⁶
Would not one in this case be saying that the withdrawal is older than possession,
if, that is, he maintains that the inanimate state, which is the condition of death, is
older than the soul? And, if anyone should seek for still clearer evidence of the life
that becomes the beginning of the living creature being fashioned, it is possible to
gain an idea regarding this through other signs as well, by which what is animate is
distinguished from what is dead. For in the case of human beings we consider it
evidence of life that one is warm and active and moving; but the chill and
motionless state in the case of bodies, is nothing other than the condition of death.
[29.6] Since then we see that of which we are speaking to be warm and active, we
thereby draw the further inference that it is not inanimate; but, just as, with
respect to its corporeal part, we do not say that it is flesh and bones and hair and
all that is observed in humankind, but that it is potentially each of these things,
although it does not yet visibly appear to be so, so also, with respect to the
animated part, the rational faculty and the desirous and the incensive and
anything else pertaining to the soul are not yet visible, yet we assert that they
have their place in it, and that analogously to the formation and perfection of the

¹¹⁶ Cf. An. et res. 2.3 (Spira, 14.16–22; ET 178); Cat. Or. 11.1 (Mühlenberg, 39.15–18).
 300   

τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείας τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ συναύξεσθαι. [29.7] Ὥσπερ γὰρ τελειωθεὶς ὁ

ἄνθρωπος, ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν ἔχει διαφαινομένην τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν· οὕτως ἐν
ἀρχῇ τῆς συστάσεως τὴν κατάλληλόν τε καὶ σύμμετρον τῇ παρούσῃ χρείᾳ
συνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ διαδείκνυσιν, ἐν τῷ κατασκευάζειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ
65 διὰ τῆς ἐντεθείσης ὕλης τὸ προσφυὲς οἰκητήριον· οὐδὲ γὰρ εἶναι δυνατὸν λογιζόμεθα,
ἀλλοτρίαις οἰκοδομαῖς τὴν ψυχὴν ἐναρμόζεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ
σφραγίδα πρὸς ἀλλοτρίαν ἁρμοσθῆναι γλυφήν. [29.8] [C] Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα
ἐκ βραχυτάτου πρὸς τὸ τέλειον πρόεισιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια
καταλλήλως ἐμφυομένη τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, συνεπιδίδωσι καὶ συναύξεται· προηγεῖται
70 μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κατασκευῇ οἶον ῥίζης τινὸς ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακρυφθείσης ἡ
αὐξητική τε καὶ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις μόνη· οὐ γὰρ χωρεῖ τὸ περισσότερον ἡ τοῦ
δεχομένου βραχύτης· εἶτα, προελθόντος εἰς φῶς τοῦ φυτοῦ καὶ ἡλίῳ τὴν βλάστην
δείξαντος, ἡ αἰσθητικὴ χάρις ἐπήνθησεν· ἁδρυνθέντος δὲ ἤδη καὶ εἰς σύμμετρον
μῆκος ἀναδραμόντος, καθάπερ τις καρπὸς διαλάμπειν ἡ λογικὴ δύναμις ἄρχεται, οὐ
75 πᾶσα ἀθρόως ἐκφαινομένη, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ ὀργάνου τελειώσει δι᾽ ἐπιμελείας
συναύξουσα, τοσοῦτον ἀεὶ καρποφοροῦσα ὅσον χωρεῖ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἡ δύναμις.
[29.9] Εἰ δὲ ζητεῖς ἐν [D] τῇ τοῦ σώματος πλάσει τὰς ψυχικὰς ἐνεργείας, πρόσεχε
σεαυτῷ, φησὶ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ καθάπερ ἐν βίβλῳ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων τὴν
ἱστορίαν· αὐτὴ γάρ σοι διηγείται ἡ φύσις, λόγου παντὸς ἐναργέστερον, τὰς ποικίλας ἐν
80 τῷ σώματι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσχολίας ἔν τε ταῖς καθόλου καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους κατασκευαῖς.
[29.10] Ἀλλὰ περιττὸν οἶμαι λόγῳ τὰ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διεξιέναι, καθάπέρ τι τῶν
ὑπερορίων διηγουμένους θαυμάτων· τίς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν βλέπων, [240] λόγῳ δεῖται τὴν
οἰκείαν φύσιν διδάσκεσθαι; δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστι, τὸν τῆς ζωῆς τρόπον κατανοήσαντα
καὶ ὡς πρὸς πᾶσαν ζωτικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει τὸ σῶμα καταμαθόντα,
85 γνῶναι περὶ τί κατησχολήθη τὸ φυτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τοῦ
γινομένου διάπλασιν· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τούτου φανερὸν εἶναι τοῖς οὐκ ἀνεπισκέπτοις,
τὸ μὴ νεκρόν τε καὶ ἄψυχον ἐν τῷ ἐργαστηρίῳ γενέσθαι τῆς φύσεως ὃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ

61 συναύξεσθαι] συναίρεσθαι M 62 ἔχει διαφαινομένην] διαφαινομένην ἔχει Bpc ß τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς SP
63 χρείᾳ om. O 64 συνεργίαν Æ I L N P² S ἑαυτοῦ] ἑαυτὴν T αὐτὴν] ἑαυτὴν Dac Fac P X 65 οὐδὲ]
οὐ B 67 σφαγῖδα I M O S γὰρ] δὲ Æ B² ß I M N O Q R T : om. Bac SP 68 οὕτως Æ R τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ
N 69 ἐμφυομένη] ἐμφαινομένη B 70 αὐτῆς] αὐτῇ M ἐν om. Æ B I M N O Q Rac T W SP
κατακρυβείσης L 72 τοῦ φυτοῦ] τούτου A (sed non Æ) D E F L Nmg P S X 73 διαδείξαντος
Q SP ἐπήνθησεν] superadicitur Eri ἁδρυνθέντος] ἀδρυνθέντος Æ N Rac : ἀνδρυνθέντος A Dac O Q
W X : ἀνδρινθέντος B : ἀδρυθέντος D² E F S : ἀνδρυθέντος Pac : ἀδρυθέντος Ppc δὲ om. B E 77
ψυχικὰς] τῆς ψυχῆς A (non Æ) D E F L P S X πρόσχες I O 78 μωϋσῆς] ὁ μωϋσῆς R βιβλίῳ ß I M
Q R W ἔργων] ἐνεργειῶν Æ B E I M N O Q R T : operationes Dion Eri 79 αὕτη R σοι] σε L P
S X ἐνεργέστερον B N Rac W ποικιλίας P 80 τῷ om. D L P R² S X τε om. M ἐν² om. L M P Q
S X κατασκευαῖς] ita A D E F L M Nmg P S W X Forb : διασκευαῖς Æ O R SP Ald Mign 82 ὑπερορίων]
ὑπερόγκων N Rac? T διηγούμενον T θαυμάτων] πραγμάτων M λόγῳ] λόγων Q Dion : om.
L δεῖται] δεῖ περὶ Q 83 οἰκείαν] ἰδίαν Æ B I M N O Q R T W SP ζωῆς] κατασκευῆς
M κατανοήσαντας Q 84 ζωτικὴν] βιωτικὴν M καταμανθάνοντα D E : καταμαθόντας Q 85–6 τὸ
φυτικὸν—διάπλασιν] animae primordialis seu potius germinalis illa potentia Dion 85 τὸ φυτικὸν τῆς
ψυχῆς] germinalis animae uita Eri φυτικὸν Æ B I O Rac : φυσικὸν al. codd. SP Ald Forb
Mign 86 γενομένου ß N οὐκ om. Æ
        301

body, so also the activities of the soul grow with the subject. [29.7] For just as a
perfected human being has an especially marked activity of the soul in greater
matters, so also at the beginning of his constitution he clearly shows in himself the
cooperation of the soul appropriate and commensurate with the present need, in
preparing for itself its proper dwelling place by means of the implanted matter; for
we do not reckon that it is possible for the soul be adapted to a strange building,
just as it is not possible for the stamp in the wax to be matched to an engraving of
something else. [29.8] For just as the body proceeds from a very small original to
the perfect state, so also the activity of the soul, growing in step with the subject,
gains and increases with it. For in its first formation, first of all comes the power of
growth and nourishment alone, as though some root buried in the ground, for the
smallness of the one receiving does not admit of more; then, as the plant comes to
light and shows it shoot to the sun, the gift of sense-perception blossoms; and
when at last it is ripened and has grown up to its proper height, the rational faculty
begins to shine, just like some fruit, not all appearing at once, but by diligence
growing with the perfection of the instrument, always bearing as much fruit as the
power of the subject grants.¹¹⁷
[29.9] If, however, you seek to trace the activity of the soul in the moulding of the
body, take heed to yourself, as Moses says,¹¹⁸ and you will read, as in a book, the
account of the works of the soul; for nature itself expounds to you, more clearly
than any discourse, the varied occupations of the soul in the body, in the acts of
construction both general and particular. [29.10] But I deem it superfluous to
declare at length in word things regarding ourselves, as though expounding some
wonder beyond ourselves: for who, when looking at himself, needs words to be
taught his own nature?¹¹⁹ For it is possible for one who considers the mode of life,
and learns how well suited the body is for every vital activity, to know with what
the vegetative aspect of the soul was occupied from the first-fashioning of what
came to be, so that thereby it is also clear to those who are not inattentive, that it
was not a dead or inanimate thing, implanted by separation from the living body

¹¹⁷ Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (esp. Bruns, 74.17–21; 81.13–22). ¹¹⁸ Deut. 4:23.
¹¹⁹ Cf. Basil, Hom. de creat. hom. 2.14 (Hörner, 66.6–7).
 302   

ζώου φυτείαν ἐκ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος ἀποσπασθὲν ἐνετέθη. [29.11] Καὶ γὰρ καὶ
τῶν καρπῶν τὰς ἐντεριώνας καὶ τὰς τῶν ῥιζῶν ἀποσπάδας οὐ νεκρωθείσας τῆς
90 ἐγκειμένης τῇ φύσει ζωτικῆς δυνάμεως τῇ γῇ καταβάλλομεν, ἀλλὰ συντηρούσας ἐν
ἑαυταῖς κεκρυμμένην μὲν ζῶσαν δὲ πάντως, τοῦ πρωτοτύπου τὴν ἰδιότητα· τὴν δὲ
τοιαύτην δύναμιν οὐκ ἐντίθησιν [B] ἡ περιέχουσα γῆ ἔξωθεν παρ᾽ ἑαυτῆς
ἐπεισκρίνουσα—ἦ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν ξύλων εἰς βλάστην προήγετο—ἀλλὰ
τὴν ἐγκειμένην ἔκδηλον ἀπεργάζεται, διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἰκμάδος τιθηνουμένη, εἰς ῥίζαν
95 καὶ φλοιὸν καὶ ἐντεριώνην καὶ τὰς τῶν κλάδων ἐκφύσεις τὸ φυτὸν τελειοῦσα· ὅπερ
οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν γίνεσθαι, μή τινος φυσικῆς δυνάμεως συνεντεθείσης, ἥτις τὴν συγγενῆ
καὶ κατάλληλον ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων τροφὴν εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἕλκουσα, θάμνος ἢ δένδρον
ἢ στάχυς ἤ τι τῶν φρυγανικῶν βλαστημάτων ἐγένετο.

88 σώματος] ὕδατος I ἐνετέθη] ἀνετέθη I : ἐτίθη Q 89 ἐντερώνας SP 90 δυνάμεως ζωτικῆς

N συντηρούσης M 91 ἑαυταῖς] αὐταῖς M Q ζῶσαν] σώζουσαν R τῷ πρωτοτύπῳ L P S W
X : occulti Eri : om. Dion 93 βλάστησιν R προηγάγετο R T : προήχετο Æac ἀλλὰ] ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ
T 94 ἐπικειμένην Ald Mign οἰκείας] ἰδίας Æ B I N O T SP 95 ἅπερ O 96 ἦν om. E γενέσθαι Æ
D E I O Q συντεθείσης M 97 κατάλληλον] κατάλληλον γῆν N τῶν παρακειμένων] accumbentibus
humoribus Eri τροφὴν] οἱονεὶ τροφὴν N (sed exp.) ἑαυτὴν] αὐτὴν T : σεαυτὴν Rac 98 ἢ στάχυς om.
D E L ἤ τι] ἐπὶ X ἤ τι τῶν φρυγανικῶν om. D E φρυγανικῶν] fotarum Eri τῶν φρυγανικῶν
βλαστημάτων] ex huiusmodi rebus Dion ἐγένετο] ἐπεγένετο R T
        303

for the growth of a living being, in the workshop of nature. [29.11] Moreover, we
sow in the earth kernels of fruits and portions torn from roots, not deadened [by
being deprived] of the vital power naturally residing in them, but preserving in
themselves—hidden indeed, but certainly living—the property of their prototype;
the surrounding earth does not implant such a power from without, introducing it
from itself (for then even dead wood would proceed to growth), but it makes
manifest that which resides within them, nourishing by its own moisture, per-
fecting the plant into root and bark and pith and the shoots of branches. This
could not happen were not some natural power implanted within, which, drawing
to itself its natural and appropriate nourishment from the surroundings, becomes
a bush or a tree or an ear of grain or one of the sprouting shrubs.
 304   

Θεωρία τις ἰατρικωτέρα περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν κατασκευῆς δι᾽ ὀλίγων.
[30.1] Ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἀκριβῆ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν διασκευὴν διδάσκει μὲν ἕκαστος
ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ὧν ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ζῇ καὶ αἰσθάνεται, τὴν ἰδίαν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν διδάσκαλον ἔχων.
Ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν βίβλοις φιλοπονηθεῖσαν τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφοῖς περὶ τούτων
5 ἱστορίαν ἀναλαβόντι, πάντα δι᾽ ἀκριβείας μαθεῖν· ὧν οἱ μὲν ὅπως ἔχει θέσεως τὰ καθ᾽
ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, διὰ τῆς ἀνατομῆς ἐδιδάχθησαν· οἱ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ὅ τι γέγονε
πάντα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κατενόησάν τε καὶ διηγήσαντο· ὡς ἀρκοῦσαν ἐντεῦθεν
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κατασκευῆς τὴν γνῶσιν τοῖς φιλοπόνοις γενέσθαι. Εἰ δέ τις
ἐπιζητοίη πάντων αὐτῶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν διδάσκαλον γίνεσθαι, ὡς εἰς μηδὲν τῆς
10 ἔξωθεν φωνῆς ἐπιδέεσθαι (οὗτος γὰρ τῶν πνευματικῶν [D] προβάτων ὁ νόμος,
καθώς φησιν ὁ Κύριος, τὸ ἀλλοτρίας φωνῆς μὴ ἀκούειν), διὰ βραχέων καὶ τὸν περὶ
τούτων λόγον διαληψόμεθα.
[30.2] Τρία περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐνοήσαμεν φύσιν, ὧν χάριν τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν
ἐν ἡμῖν κατεσκεύασται. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ ζῆν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν, ἕτερα δὲ πρὸς
15 τὴν διαδοχὴν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐν ἡμῖν τοιαῦτά ἐστιν
ὧν ἄνευ συστῆναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ζωὴν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἐν τρισὶ μορίοις
κατενοήσαμεν· ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ καὶ καρδίᾳ καὶ ἥπατι. Ὅσα δὲ προσθήκη τις ἐστὶ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν καὶ φιλοτιμία, τῆς φύσεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν δι᾽ ἐκείνων τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ χαριζομένης,
[241] τὰ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ὄργανα· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν ζωὴν ἡμῖν οὐ
20 συνίστησιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ λειπόντων τινῶν πολλάκις, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἐστιν ὁ
ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλ᾽ ἀμήχανον δίχα τούτων τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, τῶν κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἡδέων
τὴν μετουσίαν ἔχειν. Ὁ δὲ τρίτος σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ τὴν διαδοχὴν βλέπει.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ παρὰ ταῦτα, ἃ πρὸς διαμονὴν κοινὰ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπόκειται, τὰς
καταλλήλους προσθήκας δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἐπεισάγοντα, ὡς κοιλία καὶ πνεύμων, ὁ μὲν τῷ

Cap. 31 Æ I N O Q R T Dion
30.90–6 (ἐπειδὴ—πνεῦμα): John (of Damascus), Sacra Parallela II¹1218 / K cap K 1, 19 (Thum,
687.3–11) 30.250–1 (ἀλλὰ— φύσεως): John (of Damascus), Sacra Parallela II¹40 / K cap. 1, 40 (Thum,
74.24–5) 30.253–78 (τὸ γὰρ προκείμενον—τέλειον): John (of Damascus), Sacra Parallela II¹40 /
K cap. 1, 40 (Thum, 74.25–75.27)
1 θεωρία—ὀλίγων] de triplici natura corporis Λ
1 τις om. D H P X ἱστορικωτέρα K O δι᾽ ὀλίγων om. N 2 διασκευὴν] κατασκευὴν M 3 ὁρᾷ
τε] ὁρᾶται M Q Rac φύσιν ἑαυτοῦ Æ B M N Q R S T W 4 ἐν] ἐν τοῖς B 5 ἱστορίαν] ἰατρείαν
H ἀναλαμβάνοντι N Rac δι᾽] μετὰ A (sed non Æ) D E F H L P S W X ὅπως] πῶς M ἔχῃ K O
Q Rac? T 5–6 καθ᾽ ἕκαστιν K M S : καθέκαστα B : καθέκαστον Ald Mign 6 καὶ om. I K O 7 τὰ om.
T 9 αὐτῶν] αὐτῷ Æ B C I K M O Q T γενέσθαι Æ B C H I K O W 9–10 ὡς εἰς—ἐπιδέεσθαι] om.
Eri 9 εἰς] ἂν Rac? : om. B I M τῆς om. B 10 ἐπιδέεσθαι] ἐπιδέσθαι T : ἐπιδύεσθαι Ald : ἐπιδεῖσθαι
Mign οὗτος] οὕτως Q Rac ὁ νόμος om. X 11 φωνῆς μὴ ἀκούειν] ita A B D E F H L P S X Forb : μὴ
ἀκούειν φωνῆς Æ O W Ald Mign 13 ἐνενοήσαμεν Q καθέκαστον Æ H L M R : καθέκαστα B 14
ζῆν¹] ζῇν Mign διὰ] πρὸς N ζῇν καλῶς M ζῆν²] ζῇν Mign πρὸς] περὶ N 15 ἐπιγιγνομένων
N ἔχειν Æ L Pac S οὖν—διαθάλπει (l. 39) def. K O 16 συστῆναι] στῆναι T τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην
συστῆναι ζωὴν A (non Æ) D E F H L P S X : τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ζωὴν συστῆναι I 18 ἐν om. N καὶ¹ om.
N τῶν om. D H L P S X 18–19 καὶ φιλοτιμία τῶν ἀγαθῶν I 18 τῆς φύσεως om. D ζῆν] ζῆν καὶ
D H P X τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δι᾽ ἐκείνων B τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ om. Nac 19 τὴν μὲν ζωὴν ἡμῖν] ita Æ B D H I
M N P Q R T W X Forb : τὴν ζωὴν μὲν Ald Mign μὲν om. L S 20 λειπόντων] ita Æ ß D H I M N Q R S
(ι add. sup. l.) T W X Forb : λιπόντων Ald Mign ὁ om. T 21 ἀλλ᾽] ὅμως R : ἀλλὰ καὶ S δίχα τούτων
τῶν ἐνεργειῶν] ex his quae operantur Eri 22 σκοπὸς] τρόπος R πρὸς om. D T 23 διαμονὴν]
διαμονὴν καὶ D H L P R² S W X τοῖς πᾶσιν κοινὰ N 24 μὲν] μὲν ἐν L S W
        305

A brief, more medical, contemplation regarding the formation of our body.¹

[30.1] Now the exact structure of our body each one teaches himself from what he
sees and lives and perceives, having his own proper nature as a teacher. It is also
possible to learn everything with accuracy by taking up the research, contained in
books, concerning these things laboured over by those wise in such matters. Some
of these learnt by dissection the position of the individual organs in us; others also
considered and expounded the reason for which all the parts of the body came
to be; so that the knowledge of the human formation gathered thus suffices for the
industrious. But if anyone further seeks that the Church should be his teacher on
all these points, so that he may not be in need of anything from the voice of those
outside (for this is the law of the spiritual sheep, as the Lord says, that they do not
hear another voice²), we shall briefly take in hand the account of these
matters also.
[30.2] There are three things we conceive of regarding the nature of the body, for
the sake of which each of our particular parts were formed. Some are for the sake
of living, others for living well, others are adapted towards the succession of
descendants. All things, then, in us which are of such a kind that without them
it is not possible to sustain human life, we consider as being in three parts: in the
brain and the heart and the liver. On the other hand, all that are a kind of an
addition of goods and bounties on the part of nature, bestowing on the human
being the gift of living well through them, are the organs of sense-perception; for
such things do not constitute our life, since even where some are often lacking the
human being is none the less living; but without these activities it is impossible to
have a share in the pleasures of life. The third looks to what comes after and the
succession of life.³ There are also certain other organs besides these, which, in
common with the others, are subordinated to purpose of the continuance of life,
importing by their own means the appropriate supplements, such as the stomach
and the lungs, the latter fanning by breath the fire in the heart, the former

¹ Bodl. 238 (as Chap. 31): ‘Of the threefold nature of the body’. ² Cf. John 10:5.
³ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 10.57 (Spira, 100.9–14); Galen, De usu part. 6.7 (Helmreich, 1,
318.8–15, ET 1, 292), 14.1 (Helmreich, 2, 283.142–285.6; ET 620–1).
 306   

25 πνεύματι τὸ ἐγκάρδιον πῦρ ἀναρριπίζων, ἡ δὲ τοῖς σπλάγχνοις τὴν τροφὴν

εἰσοικίζουσα. [30.3] Οὕτω τοίνυν τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν κατασκευῆς διῃρημένης, ἔστιν
ἀκριβῶς κατανοῆσαι, ὅτι οὐ μονοειδῶς ἡμῖν δι᾽ ἑνός τινος ἡ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν δύναμις
διεξάγεται, ἀλλὰ πλείοσι μορίοις ἡ φύσις [B] τὰς πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν ἡμῶν ἀφορμὰς
ἐπινείμασα, ἀναγκαίαν ποιεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τὴν παρ᾽ ἑκάστου συνεισφοράν· ὥστε καὶ
30 ὅσα πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ κάλλος ἡ φύσις ἐπετεχνάσατο, πλείω τε ἐστὶ
ταῦτα καὶ πολλὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει. [30.4] Ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι διελέσθαι
πρότερον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρῆναι τῶν πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν τῆς ζωῆς συντελούντων ἡμῖν
τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ παντὸς σώματος ὕλη, κοινὴ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
μέλεσιν ὑποκειμένη, σιγάσθω τανῦν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν συντελέσει ἡ
35 καθόλου φυσιολογία πρὸς τὴν μερικὴν θεωρίαν. [30.5] Ὁμολογουμένου τοίνυν παρὰ
πᾶσι τοῦ πάντων ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν στοιχειωδῶς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θεωρουμένων τὴν
μοῖραν, τοῦ τε θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψύχοντος καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας συζυγίας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑγρόν
[C] τε καὶ ξηρὸν νοουμένης, τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡμῖν διαληπτέον.
[30.6] Οὐκοῦν ὁρῶμεν τρεῖς τὰς διοικητικὰς τῆς ζωῆς δυνάμεις· ὧν ἡ μὲν διαθάλπει
40 τὸ πᾶν τῇ θερμότητι, ἡ δὲ ὑπονοτίζει τῇ ἰκμάδι τὸ θερμαινόμενον, ὡς ἂν τῇ
ἰσοκρατίᾳ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων ποιότητος ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου συντηροῖτο τὸ ζῶον, μήτε
τοῦ ὑγροῦ καταφρυγομένου τῷ πλεονασμῷ τῆς θερμότητος μήτε τοῦ θερμοῦ
σβεννυμένου τῇ ἐπικρατείᾳ τοῦ καθυγραίνοντος· ἡ δὲ τρίτη δύναμις συνέχει δι᾽
ἑαυτῆς κατά τινα συμβολήν τε καὶ ἁρμονίαν τὰ διακεκριμένα τῶν ἄρθρων, τοῖς
45 παρ᾽ ἑαυτῆς συνδέσμοις ἁρμόζουσα [D] καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιπέμπουσα τὴν αὐτοκίνητόν τε
καὶ προαιρετικὴν δύναμιν, ἧς ἐπιλειπούσης, πάρετον γίνεται καὶ νεκρῶδες τὸ μέρος,
τοῦ προαιρετικοῦ πνεύματος ἀμοιρῆσαν. [30.7] Μᾶλλον δὲ, πρὸ τούτων ἄξιον
κατανοῆσαι τὸ τεχνικὸν τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δημιουργίᾳ τοῦ σώματος.
Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ σκληρόν τε καὶ ἀντίτυπον τὰς αἰσθητικὰς ἐνεργείας οὐ καταδέχεται,

26 οὕτως Æ N 24–5 τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν κατασκευῆς] ita A Æ B D E F H I M P Q R S W X Forb : τῆς

κατασκευῆς τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν Ald Mign 27 ὅτι] ὡς R 28 ἡ φύσις post ἡμῶν (l. 28) pon. N φύσις] φύσις
καὶ M πρὸς] εἰς M τὴν om. D 29 ἐπινείμασα] inspirans Eri ποιεῖ om. R ποιεῖ—συνεισφοράν]
τὴν παρ᾽ ἑκάστου τὴν [τὴν exp.] πρὸς τὸ ὅλον συνεισφορὰν ἐποιήσατο R 30 κάλος H Rmg
ἐπετεχνήσατο M Q W 31 ἔχοι Q 32 ἡμῶν συντελούντων M 33 σώματος om. Nac T ὕλη om.
T καθέκαστον I R 34 τανῦν] νῦν A D E F H L P S X : τὰ νῦν Æ R οὐδὲ Nac R ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν
σκοπὸν] ita A D E F H L M P Q R S X Forb : πρὸς τὸν σκόπον ἡμῖν W Ald Mign ἡμῖν] ἡμῶν N 36
πάντως R τῶν στοιχειωδῶς] στοιχείων τῶν R θεωρουμένων ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ H L P S X θεωρουμένων
om. D 37 τε om. M N P Q R καὶ²] καὶ τοῦ Q 39 οὐκοῦν] non ergo Eri τὰς om. T διοικήσεις
L διαθάλπει] θάλπει K N O : διαλάμπει B 41 ἰσοκρατίᾳ] ita B D E F H I K L M O P Q S X Ald Forb :
ἰσοκρασίᾳ N R : ἰσοκρατείᾳ Mign συντηροῖ D : συντηροίη R : συντηρεῖ B : συρροῖτο M τὸ om.
W 43 τῇ ἐπικρατήσει Æ B I K M O Q R T W : τῷ πλεονασμῷ N καθυγραίνοντος] ὑγραίνοντος R :
ὑγρότητος N 46 ἧς—μέρος] dum administrationem artuum reliquens deficit neglectum
corpus Eri ἐπιλιπούσης D M S πάρετον] ita Æ ß H N O Q R S X W Forb : πάραιτον P X :
περάτον Ald Mign γίνεται] τὸ σῶμα γίνεται Q μέρος] μέρος τὸ N : μέρος οὐ Q 48 ἐν] ἐπ᾽ H P
S 49 τε om. Æ B I K M N O Q R T ἐνεργείας] συνεργείας O οὐ καταδέχεται] οὐκ ἀναδέχεται Æ B I
ac
KMNOQR T
        307

introducing nourishment for the internal organs.⁴ [30.3] When our formation is
thus divided, then, one must understand accurately that the power for living is not
conducted uniformly by any single organ in us, but that nature, by distributing the
means for our existence among several parts, makes the contribution of each
necessary for the whole, just as the things which nature contrives for the security
and beauty of life are also numerous and differ greatly among themselves.⁵
[30.4] But I think we ought first to discuss briefly the first principles of the things
that contribute to the constitution of our life. The material of the whole body, the
substratum common to each of the parts, may be left unremarked for now, for a
discussion regarding natural substance in general will not contribute to our
purpose regarding the consideration of the particular parts. [30.5] As, then, it is
acknowledged by all that there is in us a share of everything contemplated as
elements in the world—of heat and of cold, and of the other pair conceived,
moisture and dryness—we must discuss them severally.⁶
[30.6] We see, then, that the powers which regulate life are three, of which one by
its heat warms everything, and the other by its moisture keeps damp that which is
warmed, so that the living being is held in an intermediate condition by the equal
balance of the qualities of the opposing powers (with neither the moisture being
dried up by the excess of heat nor the warmth being quenched by the prevalence of
that which is moist), and the third power holds together, through itself, the
separate members of the assemblage in a certain concord and harmony, connect-
ing them by bonds, which it itself supplies, and sending into them all that self-
moving and self-determining faculty, lacking which the part becomes riven and
deadened, left destitute of the self-determining spirit. [30.7]⁷ Or rather, before
dealing with these, it is proper to consider the skilled workmanship of nature in
the actual crafting of the body. For as that which is hard and resistant is not able to

⁴ Cf. Plato, Tim. 70b–d; Galen, De usu part. 4.1 (Helmreich, 1, 195, ET 1, 204), 6.2 (Helmreich, 1,
300.20–301.17; ET 1, 279–80).
⁵ Cf. Galen, De usu part. 9.8 (Helmreich, 2, 23.2–7; ET 1, 439).
⁶ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, An. et res. 1.9–10 (Spira, 7.11–19).
⁷ For the following paragraphs, see Galen, De usu part. 5.9 (Helmreich, 1, 276.26–278.13; ET 1,
263–4), 8.5 (Helmreich, 1, 458.25–459.6; ET 1, 396–7), 8.6 (Helmreich, 1, 461.1–463.15; ET 398–400),
9.14 (Helmreich, 2, 42.6–43.2; ET 1, 453–4), 11.28 (Helmreich, 2, 172.18–173.8: ET 2, 542–3), 12.2
(Helmreich, 2, 183.17–26; ET 2, 551), 16.2 (Helmreich, 2, 380.24–381.13; ET 2, 684); Hipp. et Plat.
1.10.12–14 (De Lacy, 1, 98).
 308   

50 ὡς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐπί τε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὀστέων καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ φυτῶν, ἐν οἷς ζωῆς μέν τι
κατανοοῦμεν εἶδος ἐν τῷ αὔξειν καὶ τρέφεσθαι, οὐ μὴν παρεδέξατο ἡ ἀντιτυπία τοῦ
ὑποκειμένου τὴν αἴσθησιν· τούτου χάριν ἔδει καθάπερ κηροειδῆ τινα κατασκευὴν
ὑποτεθῆναι ταῖς κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἐνεργείαις, δυναμένην τοῖς ἀντιληπτικοῖς τύποις
ἐνσφραγισθῆναι, μήτε συγχεομένην δι᾽ ὑπερβαλλούσης ὑγρότητος (οὐ γὰρ [244] ἂν
55 διαμένοι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ τυπούμενον) μήτε ἀντιτυποῦσαν ἐν τῇ ἀμετρίᾳ τῆς πήξεως
(ἀσήμαντον γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τύπους ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνύπεικτον) ἀλλὰ μέσως ἔχουσαν
μαλακότητός τε καὶ στερρότητος, ὡς ἂν μὴ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν
ἐνεργημάτων, τῆς αἰσθητικῆς λέγω κινήσεως, ἀμοιροίη τὸ ζῶον. [30.8] Ἐπειδὴ
τοίνυν τὸ μαλακόν τε καὶ εὔεικτον, μηδεμίαν τὴν ἐκ τῶν στερρῶν ἔχον συνεργίαν
60 ἀκίνητον ἂν ἦν πάντως καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτον κατὰ τοὺς θαλασσίους πνεύμονας· διὰ
τοῦτο καταμίγνυσιν ἡ φύσις τῷ σώματι τὴν τῶν ὀστέων στερρότητα, καὶ ταῦτα
πρὸς ἄλληλα διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς ἁρμονίας ἑνώσασα, τοῖς τε διὰ τῶν νεύρων
συνδέσμοις τὰς συμβολὰς αὐτῶν ἐπισφίγξασα, οὕτως αὐτοῖς τὴν δεκτικὴν τῶν
αἰσθήσεων περιέφυσε σάρκα, δυσπαθεστέρᾳ τε καὶ εὐτονωτέρᾳ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ [B]
65 διειλημμένην.

[30.9] Ταύτῃ τοίνυν τῇ στερρᾷ τῶν ὀστέων φύσει, οἷον στύλοις τισὶν ἀχθοφόροις,
ὅλον τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθεῖσα τὸ βάρος, οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον ἐνέφυσε τῷ παντὶ τὸ ὀστέον· ἦ
γὰρ ἂν ἀκίνητός τε καὶ ἀνενέργητος ἔμεινεν, εἰ οὕτω κατασκευῆς εἶχεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
καθάπέρ τι δένδρον ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς τόπου μένον, μήτε τῆς τῶν σκελῶν διαδοχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ
70 πρόσω προαγούσης τὴν κίνησιν μήτε τῆς τῶν χειρῶν ὑπουργίας χρησιμευούσης τῷ
βίῳ· νυνὶ δὲ μεταβατικὸν εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τὸ ὄργανον διὰ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης

50 οἷς] οἷς καὶ M μέν τι ζωῆς N 51 κατανοούμενον N : κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον T αὔξειν] αὔξειν τε
M παρεδέξατο] ita A Æ B C D E H I K M N O P Q R T W X Forb : ἐδέξατο M : παρεδέξατο ἐναντίως
Nmg S Ald Mign ἀντιτυπία] σκληρότης Fsup.l. Pmg 52 ἔδει] δεῖ N καθάπερ ἔδει Rac τινα κηροειδῆ
M τινα] τὴν N 53 τὰς . . . ἐνεργείας Q κατ᾽ ] κατὰ τὴν P ἀντιληπτικοῖς] ἀντιτυπικοῖς B 54 οὐ]
οὐδὲ A ἂν om. A 55 διαμένοι] ita Æ C I K L N O Q S T W Forb : διαμείνοι M R Ald Mign :
διαμείνῃ D E H : διαμείνει P X : διαμήνει A : διαμένει B : διαμένῃ F² : ἀναμένῃ F¹ ἐν² om. N 55–6
πήξεως] πήξεως ἀσήμαντον εἶναι Æ B C E I K O 56 ἀσήμαντον—ἀνύπεικτον] quia quod nescit cedere
imaginem nequit impressione excipere Dion πρὸς τοὺς τύπους] ad characteres Eri 57 ἂν om.
B τὴν om. D H N P S T X 59 τὴν] τῶν L Tac : om. B D E στερρῶν] ἑτέρων T συνεργίαν] ita Æ C D
E F H I K L M N O P² R S Forb : συνέργειαν A Pac Q X : ἐνέργειαν W Ald Mign 60 ἂν om. Nac ἦν]
εἴη R θαλαττίους L M 61 ὀστέων] ὀστέων ἀντιτυπίαν τε καὶ N 62 πρὸς ἄλληλα om. N ἁρμονίας]
συμφυοῦς M ἑνώσασα] ἡνώσατο B 63 οὕτω H L P S X αὐτοῖς] τοῖς αὐτοῖς A D E F H L P S X 64
δυσπαθεστέρᾳ τε καὶ εὐτονωτέρᾳ] ita A C D E F I K O P R S² T W (δυσπαθετέρᾳ) X Forb :
δυσπαθεστέραν τε καὶ εὐτονωτέραν ß H Ald Mign τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ] τῆς ἐπιφανείας Pac : om. T 67
ἐνέφυσε] ἐπέφυσε M : ἀνέφυσε L ἦ] ἢ H N P 68 τε om. Q οὕτως Æ N Rac 69 ἐφ’] ἀφ᾽ I² K μένων
B L M 70 προαγούσης] προαγούσης τῆς φύσεως Bac (sed non ß) 71 νῦν N μεταβατικὸν]
καταβατικὸν B πρακτικὸν] προακτικὸν B C O
        309

contain the activity of the senses (as one can see in the case of our own bones, and
in that of plants in the earth, in which we can indeed perceive a certain form of life,
in that they grow and receive nourishment, yet in reverse the resistant character of
their substrate does not allow them sense-perception), for this reason it was
necessary that some wax-like formation, as it were, should be supplied for the
activities of the senses, capable of being impressed with the stamp of things able to
be apprehended, neither becoming confused by the excess of moisture (for the
impress would not remain in moist substance), nor resisting by disproportionate
solidity (for that which is unyielding is unmarked by the impresses), but holding a
middle state between softness and hardness, so that the living being might not be
destitute of the most beautiful of all the activities of nature, I mean the movement
of sense-perception. [30.8] Since, then, something soft and yielding, having no
assistance from the hard parts, would certainly be unmoving and without articu-
lation, like sea molluscs,⁸ for this reason nature mixes into the body the hardness
of the bones, and uniting these by close connection one to another, knitting their
joints together by the bonds of the sinews, and thus makes the flesh, which is
receptive to the senses, grow around them, furnished with a harder and tauter
appearance.
[30.9] While placing, then, the whole weight of the body on the firm nature of the
bones, as on columns bearing something, [nature] did not implant the bones
undivided through the whole structure, for in that case the human being would
have remained without movement or activity, if he had been so constructed, just
like a tree remaining on one spot, with neither the alternating of legs to advance its
movement further, nor the ministry of the hands serving the mode of life. But as it
is she contrived that the organism should be made capable of walking and working
by means of this device, by the self-determining spirit which extends through the

⁸ Cf. Aristotle, De part. an. 4.5 (681a18–20).

 310   

ἐμηχανήσατο, τῷ προαιρετικῷ πνεύματι τῷ διὰ τῶν νεύρων διήκοντι τὴν πρὸς τὰς
κινήσεις ὁρμήν τε καὶ δύναμιν ἐνθεῖσα τῷ σώματι· [C] ἐντεῦθεν ἡ τῶν χειρῶν
ὑπουργία, ἡ ποικίλη τε καὶ πολύστροφος καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἐπιτηδεία·
75 ἐντεῦθεν αἱ τοῦ αὐχένος περιστροφαὶ καὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπικλίσεις τε καὶ ἀνανεύσεις
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν γένην ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τῶν βλεφάρων διαστολὴ ἅμα νοήματι γινομένη
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρθρων αἱ κινήσεις, νεύροις μέν τισιν ἀνασπωμένοις ἢ χαλωμένοις,
καθάπερ ἐκ μηχανῆς τινος ἐνεργοῦνται· ἡ δὲ διὰ τούτων διεξιοῦσα δύναμις
αὐτοκέλευστον ἔχει τινὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν, προαιρετικῷ πνεύματι κατά τινα φύσεως
80 οἰκονομίαν ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνεργουμένη· ῥίζα δὲ πάντων ἀπεδείχθη καὶ ἀρχὴ
τῶν κατὰ τὰ νεῦρα κινήσεων, ὁ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον περιέχων νευρώδης ὑμήν.
[30.10] Οὐκέτι οὖν ἡγούμεθα δεῖν πολυπραγμονεῖν, περί τι [D] τῶν ζωτικῶν
μορίων τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ἐν τούτῳ δειχθείσης τῆς κινητικῆς ἐνεργείας· ὅτι δὲ
μέγιστόν τι συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος, ἐναργῶς τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου
85 συμβαῖνον δηλοῖ· εἰ γάρ τινα τρῶσιν ἢ ῥῆξιν ὁ περὶ αὐτὸν ὑμὴν πάθοι, εὐθὺς
ἐπηκολούθησε τῷ πάθει ὁ θάνατος, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀκαρὲς τῆς φύσεως ἀντισχούσης
τῇ τρώσει, ὥσπερ, θεμελίου τινὸς ὑποσπασθέντος, ὅλον τὸ οἰκοδόμημα
συγκατεσείσθη τῷ μέρει· οὗ τοίνυν παθόντος πρόδηλός ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ζώου
διαφθορὰ, τοῦτο κυρίως ἂν τῆς ζωῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχειν ὁμολογοῖτο.
90 [30.11] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν παυσαμένων τοῦ ζῆν, κατασβεσθείσης τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῇ
φύσει θερμότητος, τὸ νεκρωθὲν καταψύχεται, [245] διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ θερμῷ τὴν
ζωτικὴν αἰτίαν κατενοήσαμεν· οὗ γὰρ ἐπιλελοιπότος ἡ νεκρότης ἐπηκολούθησεν,
ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τῇ παρουσίᾳ τούτου συνεστάναι τὸ ζῶον ὁμολογεῖσθαι· τῆς δὲ
τοιαύτης δυνάμεως οἱονεὶ πηγήν τινα καὶ ἀρχὴν τὴν καρδίαν κατενοήσαμεν, ἀφ᾽ ἧς
95 αὐλοειδεῖς πόροι πολυσχιδῶς ἄλλος ἐξ ἄλλου διαφυόμενοι, παντὶ τῷ σώματι τὸ
θερμόν τε καὶ πυρῶδες διαχέουσι πνεῦμα. [30.12] Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντως καὶ τροφὴν ἔδει
τινὰ τῷ θερμῷ συμπαρεῖναι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως—οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ

72 τῷ προαιρετικῷ πνεύματι τῷ] τοῦ προσηνῶσαι πνεύματι γὰρ B (sed non ß) 73 ἡ om. L ἡ τῶν
χειρῶν om. Nac 74 πολύστροφος] περίστροφος B C I K O πᾶσαν] ἅπασαν M 75 περιστροφαὶ]
ἐπιστροφαὶ N Rac ἐπικλήσεις P Q Rac Sac X τε om. N T καὶ ἀνανεύσεις om. T 76 ἐνέργεια om.
ac
N διαστολὴ] διατροφὴ L νοήματι] νεύματι Ald Mign γιγνομένη N : γενομένη B 77 νεύροις] ita Æ
B H I K L M N O Q R S T X Forb : ἐν νεύροις W Ald Mign μὲν om. N Q ἀνασπωμένοις]
ἀναπεμπομένοις N 78 ἐνεργοῦσιν Tpc διεξιοῦσα] ἐξιοῦσα D E R : ἐξουσιάζουσα N : ἐξ ἴσου Q :
digna Eri 79 τινὰ ἔχει R τινὰ] ἀεὶ Q προαιρετικῷ πνεύματι] prompto spiritu Eri πνεύματι]
πνεύματι τῷ διὰ τῶν νεύρων διήκοντι I L 80 καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ita K O P S X Forb : καθέκαστον W Ald
Mign ἐνεργουμένην Æ C E I K O R T : ἐνεργουμένοις B : ἐνεργοῦσαν N ἀπεδείχθη] ἀνεδείχθη Æ καὶ
ἀρχὴ ἀπεδείχθη B 82 οὐκέτ᾽ D H P R S X : οὐκ ἔτ᾽ L M : οὐκ ἔτι K τι] ita Æ B D H I K L M N O R S T
W X Ald Forb : τε Mign : om. P Q 83 τὸ τοιοῦτον] τί τοιοῦτον M : τοῦτο K O : om. I ἐστιν om.
I R τούτῳ] τούτοις H P ἐνεργίας K δὲ om. K 84 μέγιστόν iterum inc. G ἐξ ἐναντίας R T :
ἐξεναντίας N 86 ἀκερὲς Wac 87 τῇ τρώσει] τῷ πάθει τῆς τρώσεως N ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ δὲ N Q 88
παντὸς om. N 89 τὰς αἰτίας D E F G H L P S X ὁμολογεῖτο B I G 90 ἐπεὶ B I M Q T : ἐπὶ K δὲ om.
Nac SP 91 τὸ] τὸ σῶμα Q SP : τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῃ T καταψύγεται B 92 αἰτίαν] ἐνέργειαν D E
R² 93 συνεστᾶναι G N P : συστῆναι SP ὁμολογεῖται X 94 οἱονεὶ] εἰονεὶ B (non ß) : οἷον Ald
Mign κατανοεῖσθαι B ἀφ’] ἐφ’ W 95 αὐλοειδῶς I : αὐλοειδῶς τινὲς N : αὐλώδεις
SP πολυσχεδῶς H S διαφυομέναι Wac : διαφυομένος Rac? τῷ om. SP 96 θερμόν τε καὶ πυρῶδες]
πυρῶδες καὶ θερμόν Ald Mign ἐπεὶ] ἐπειδὴ Æ I K N O πάντως om. B 97 τῷ θερμῷ om. Q παρὰ
om. Rac ἐνδέχηται K ἑαυτὸ T
        311

nerves implanting in the body the impulse and power for movement, and hence
the service of the hands, so varied and so versatile and adapted for every thought;
from this comes, as by some mechanism, the turnings of the neck and the bending
and raising of the head and the action of the chin and the separation of the eyelids,
occurring with a thought, and the movements of the other joints, by the tightening
or relaxing of certain nerves. The power that extends through these has a sort of
self-bidden impulse, working with the self-determining spirit by a sort of economy
of nature in each particular part; but the root of all and the principle of the
movements of the nerves is shown to be the nervous tissue that surrounds the
brain. [30.10] We suppose, then, that it is no longer necessary to concern
ourselves regarding which of the vital members is such a thing, when the energy
of movement is shown to be in this. But that the brain contributes a great amount
to life is shown clearly by the occurrence of the opposite: for if the tissue
surrounding it suffers any wound or lesion, death immediately follows the injury,
nature not being able to endure the wound even for a moment, just as, when a
foundation is removed, the whole building collapses with the part; as, then, when
this member suffers it is clearly the destruction of the whole living being, it may
properly be acknowledged to contain the cause of life.
[30.11] And, since, in those who have ceased to live, when the heat implanted in
our nature is quenched, what has died grows cold, for this reason we recognize the
vital cause also in the heat, for we must by all necessity acknowledge that the living
being subsists by the presence of that which when it has failed the condition of
death follows. And we understand the heart to be, as it were, the spring and
principle of such a force, as from it pipe-like passages, growing one from another
split into many parts, diffuse the warm and fiery spirit to the whole body.⁹
[30.12] And since certainly some nourishment must also be provided by nature
for the element of heat—for it is not possible for the fire to continue by itself,
without being nourished by what is appropriate¹⁰—therefore the channels of the

⁹ Cf. Plato, Tim. 70ab; Galen, De usu part. 6.7 (Helmreich, 1, 318.15–319.14; ET 1, 292–3).
¹⁰ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 53 (Drobner, 64.12).
 312   

μένειν, μὴ διὰ τοῦ καταλλήλου τρεφόμενον—διὰ τοῦτο οἱ τοῦ αἵματος ὀχετοὶ,

καθάπερ ἐκ πηγῆς τινος τοῦ ἥπατος ἀφορμηθέντες, τῷ θερμῷ πνεύματι πανταχῆ
100 κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συμπαροδεύουσιν, ὡς ἂν μὴ, μονωθὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἕτερον, διαφθείρῃ
τὴν φύσιν, [B] πάθος γενόμενον. Παιδευέτω τοῦτο τοὺς ἀτακτοῦντας περὶ τὸ ἶσον,
διδαχθέντας παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ὅτι ἡ πλεονεξία φθοροποιόν τι πάθος ἐστίν.
[30.13] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ μόνον ἀπροσδεές ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη πτωχεία τῶν
ἔξωθεν πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν σύστασιν ἐπιδέεται, διὰ τοῦτο ταῖς τρισὶ ταύταις δυνάμεσι δι᾽
105 ὧν ἔφαμεν ἅπαν οἰκονομεῖσθαι τὸ σῶμα, ἐπίρρυτον ἔξωθεν ἐπεισάγει τὴν ὕλην,
διαφόροις εἰσόδοις τὸ κατάλληλον αὐταῖς εἰσοικίζουσα. [30.14] Τῇ μὲν γὰρ πηγῇ
τοῦ αἵματος, ἥτις τὸ ἥπάρ ἐστι, τὴν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς χορηγίαν ὑπέθηκε· τὸ γὰρ
ἐπεισαγόμενον ἀεὶ διὰ ταύτης τὰς τοῦ αἵματος πηγὰς βρύειν ἐκ τοῦ ἥπατος
παρασκευάζει, καθάπερ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους χιὼν διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἰκμάδος τὰς κατὰ
110 τὴν ὑπώρειαν αὔξει πηγὰς, διὰ τοῦ βάθους [C] τὸ οἰκεῖον ὑγρὸν ἐπὶ τὰς κάτω φλέβας
συνθλίβουσα. [30.15] Τὸ δὲ ἐγκάρδιον πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ γείτονος ἐπεισάγεται
σπλάγχνου, ὃ καλεῖται μὲν πνεύμων, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος δοχεῖον, διὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης
ἀρτηρίας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ στόμα διηκούσης τὸ ἔξωθεν πνεῦμα ταῖς ἀναπνοαῖς
ἐφελκόμενον· ᾧ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἡ καρδία ἐνειλημμένη, (κατὰ μίμησιν τῆς τοῦ
115 ἀεικινήτου πυρὸς ἐνεργείας ἀδιαλείπτως καὶ αὐτὴ κινουμένη) οἷόν τι ποιοῦσιν ἐν
τοῖς χαλκείοις αἱ φύσαι, ἕλκει τε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐκ τοῦ παρακειμένου πνεύματος
πληροῦσα τῇ διαστολῇ τὰς κοιλότητας, καὶ, τὸ πυρῶδες ἑαυτῆς ἐκριπίζουσα, ταῖς
ἐχομέναις ἀρτηρίαις ἐμπνεῖ· καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦσα οὐ διαλείπει, τὸ μὲν ἔξωθεν διὰ τῆς
διαστολῆς εἰς τὰς ἰδίας κοιλότητας ἕλκουσα, τὸ δὲ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῆς διὰ τῆς συμπτώσεως
120 [D] ταῖς ἀρτηρίαις εἰσκρίνουσα.

[30.16] Ὅ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τῆς αὐτομάτου ταύτης ἀναπνοῆς αἴτιον ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι·
πολλάκις γὰρ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἄσχολός ἐστι πρὸς ἑτέρους ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἠρεμεῖ,
λυθέντος ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ ἀναπνοὴ τοῦ ἀέρος οὐ διαλείπει, μηδ᾽

98 μένειν om. B ὀχετοὶ] ὑδραγωγοὶ R 99 ἐκ om. Æ ß I K M N O T τινος πηγῆς Æ B I K O τινὸς

H M N P R ἀφορμισθέντες Rac 99–100 πανταχῆ κατὰ] κατὰ πᾶν N 101 γινόμενον I L R τοῦτο om.
X ἴσον H I X 102 διδαχθέντες I Sac 103 ἐστι] τι Æ I O Q 105 σῶμα] ζῶον L ἐπεισάγει ἔξωθεν Æ
B I K O R 106 εἰσόδοις] ὁδοῖς A D E G H M P Q X αὐταῖς] αὐτοῖς I : αὐτῆς M 107 χορηγείαν
W ἐπέθηκε D E 108 ἐκ] ita codd. Forb : διὰ W Ald Mign 109 παρασκευάζει] κατασκευάζει T ἡ
om. Æ οἰκίας W 112 ἔστι] ita Æ ß H I K L M O P R S W X Ald Forb : ἐστὶ Mign δοχεῖον] τὸ δοχεῖον
B ἀρτηρίας] 113 αὐτηρίας W τῆς om. A (non Æ) B D E G H P X 114 ἐνειλημμένη] συνειλημμένη
N κατὰ] κατὰ τὴν M 109 τοῦ om. Mac 114–15 ἀεικινήτου τοῦ D E G H L P Q R S X 115 αὕτη
K 116 φῦσσαι L : φῦσαι Æ R W S ἕλκεται T τε om. N T ἐκ om. Q πνεύματος] ita codd. Ald Forb :
πνεύμονος Mign 117 ἑαυτῆς] αὐτῆς G H ἐκρίπτουσα R 118 ἐχομέναις] ἐγκειμέναις D E R² :
ἐπιχεομέναις Rac 119 συμπτώσεως] concasum hoc est per contractionem Eri 122 μὲν γὰρ ὁ
B ἄσχολος] ἄσχολος τε R πρὸς om. B ἑτέρους] ἑτέροις M N Q R : ἑτέραις G H P X : ἕτερα I : om.
B 123 ἀναπνοὴ δὲ N ἀναπνοὴ] πνοὴ Q 123–4 μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν] μηδοτιοῦν M : om. B
        313

blood, issuing from the liver as from a spring, accompany the warm spirit
everywhere in its way throughout the body, that the one may not by isolation
from the other destroy the nature, becoming a disease.¹¹ Let this instruct the
undisciplined regarding fairness, as they learn from nature that covetousness is a
destructive disease.
[30.13] But since the divinity alone is free from needs, while human poverty
requires external aid for its own subsistence, nature therefore, in addition to those
three powers by which we said that the whole body is administered, brings in
imported matter from without, introducing by different entrances that which is
appropriate for them. [30.14] For to the spring of the blood, which is the liver, she
furnishes its supply by food; for what is brought constantly in this way furnishes
the springs of blood to issue from the liver, just as the snow on the mountain by its
own moisture increases the springs in the lower ground, forcing its own moisture
through the depths into the veins below. [30.15] The breath in the heart is
supplied by means of the neighbouring organ, which is called the lungs and is a
receptacle for air, drawing the breath from without through the windpipe placed
in it, which extends to the mouth. The heart being placed in the midst of this
organ (and itself also moving incessantly in imitation of the activity of the ever-
moving fire), draws to itself, somewhat as the bellows do in the forges, a supply
from the adjacent air, filling its recesses by dilatation and, while it fans its own
fiery element, breathes upon the adjoining tubes; and it does not cease to do this,
drawing the external air into its own recesses by dilatation and by compression
infusing the air from itself into the tubes.¹²
[30.16] And this seems to me to be the cause of this spontaneous respiration of
ours. For often the intellect is occupied with other matters, or is entirely at rest
when the body is relaxed in sleep, but the respiration of air does not cease, even

¹¹ Cf. Galen, De usu part. 6.10 (Helmreich, 1, 324.17–20; ET 1, 296), 16.13–14 (Helmreich,
2.431.21–343.13; ET 2, 720–2).
¹² For this, and the following paragraph, see Galen, De usu part. 6.7 (Helmreich, 1, 316.14–19; ET 1,
291), 6.10 (Helmreich, 1, 324–333; ET 1, 296–304), 6.15 (Helmreich, 1, 350.15–351.5; ET 1, 316).
 314   

ὁτιοῦν συνεργούσης εἰς τοῦτο τῆς προαιρέσεως· οἶμαι γὰρ, ἐπειδὴ περιείληπται τῷ
125 πνεύμονι ἡ καρδία καὶ προσπέφυκεν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ ὀπίσθιον ἑαυτῆς μέρος, ταῖς
ἰδίαις διαστολαῖς καὶ συμπτώσεσι συγκινοῦσα τὸ σπλάγχνον, τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος ὁλκήν τε
καὶ ἐμπνοὴν ἐκμηχανᾶσθαι τῷ πνεύμονι· ἀραιὸς γάρ τις ὢν καὶ πολύπορος καὶ
πάσας τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ κοιλότητας πρὸς τὸν πυθμένα τῆς ἀρτηρίας ἀνεστομωμένας
[248] ἔχων, συστελλόμενος μὲν καὶ συμπίπτων, τὸ ἐναπολειφθὲν τοῖς κοίλοις πνεῦμα
130 κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐκπιέζων προΐεται· ὑποχωρῶν δὲ καὶ ἀνοιγόμενος, ἐπισπᾶται τῇ
διαστάσει πρὸς τὸ κενούμενον διὰ τῆς ὁλκῆς τὸν ἀέρα. [30.17] Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῆς
ἀπροαιρέτου ταύτης ἀναπνοῆς αἰτία, ἡ τοῦ ἀτρεμεῖν τὸ πυρῶδες ἀδυναμία· ἐπειδὴ
γὰρ ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἐνέργεια, τούτου δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ
καρδίᾳ κατενοήσαμεν, τὸ διηνεκὲς τῆς ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ κινήσεως τὴν ἀδιάλειπτον
135 τοῦ ἀέρος ὁλκήν τε καὶ ἐκπνοὴν διὰ τοῦ πνεύμονος ἀπεργάζεται· διὸ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν
ἐπιταθέντος τοῦ πυρώδους, τὸ ἄσθμα τῶν διακαιομένων τῷ πυρετῷ συνεχέστερον
γίνεται, ὥσπερ ἐπειγομένης τῆς καρδίας τὸν ἐγκείμενον ἐν αὐτῇ φλογμὸν τῷ
νεαρωτέρῳ πνεύματι κατασβεννύειν.
[30.18] [B] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πενιχρά τίς ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν
140 σύστασιν διὰ πάντων ἐπιδεὴς, οὐκ ἀέρος μόνον ἰδίου πτωχεύει καὶ πνεύματος τοῦ τὸ
θερμὸν διεγείροντος, ὅπερ ἔξωθεν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζώου συντήρησιν διηνεκῶς
ἐπεισάγεται· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὑπερείδουσαν τὸν τοῦ σώματος ὄγκον τροφὴν
ἐπίκτητον ἔχει. Διὰ τοῦτο σιτίοις τε καὶ ποτοῖς ἀναπληροῖ τὸ ἐνδέον, ἑλκτικήν
τινα τοῦ λείποντος δύναμιν καὶ ἀπωστικὴν τοῦ περιττεύοντος ἐνθεῖσα τῷ σώματι,
145 οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο τοῦ ἐγκαρδίου πυρὸς μικρὰν παρεχομένου τῇ φύσει συνέργειαν.
[30.19] Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ κυριώτατον τῶν ζωτικῶν μορίων κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα
λόγον ἡ καρδία ἐστὶν ἡ τῷ θερμῷ πνεύματι ζωπυροῦσα τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μέρη,
πανταχόθεν αὐτὴν ἐνεργὸν εἶναι [C] τῷ δραστικῷ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ πλάστης ἡμῶν
ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἂν μηδὲν αὐτῆς μέρος ἄπρακτόν τε καὶ ἀνόνητον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς

124 συνεργούσης] συναιρούσης N εἰς] πρὸς Q R προαιρέσεως] προτάσεως W περιείληπται]

προείληπται Dac R² : προσείληπται D² 125 ἑαυτῆς] αὐτῆς B D K L O Q 126 συγκρινοῦσα Dac :
συγκρίνουσα D² τῶν σπλάγχνων R 127 ἐμπνοὴν] ἐκπνοὴν Æ B C E I K M N O Q W Dion
Eri ἐκμηχανήσασθαι M N ἀρεὸς X 128 αὐτῷ] ἑαυτῷ R ἀναστομομένας B : ἀναστομωμένας
ß 129 ἐναποληφθὲν G H M Ppc S : ἐναπολυθὲν Q 130 ἐκπιέζων] ἐκπιαίζων W 131 κινούμενον Æ
B C I K M N O Q Dion Eri 132 ἀπροαιρέτου] αὐτοπροαιρέτου W αἰτία] ἡ αἰτία R τὸ πυρῶδες] τοῦ
ἀέρος D F G H L P S X 133 ἐστι om. Æ ß D(?) N O R T τὴν om. Æ κίνησιν] κίνησιν ἐστιν Æ B I
K M N O R T ἐνέργεια] ἐνέργεια καὶ M 134 μέρει τούτῳ] βάρει τούτου N 135 ὁλκήν] ὁρμὴν Ald
Mign ἐκπνοὴν] ita Æ C E I K L M N O Q S T W Forb : ἀναπνοὴν B Rac : ἐμπνοὴν X Ald Mign διὰ τοῦ
πνεύμονος] μόνον B : μόνος ß πνεύμονος] ita codd. Ald Forb : πνεύματος Mign 136 ἐπιταθέντος]
ἐπισταθέντος H : ἐπιτεθέντος Rac ἄσθμα] ita Æ G H O P R S W X Forb : ἆσθμα Ald Mign πυρετῷ]
πυρετῷ σωμάτων Q 137 γίγνεται N ἐν αὐτῇ] αὐτῇ M : ἑαυτῇ Æ B N : ἐν ἑαυτῇ I : ἑαυτῆς K O 139
ἡμῶν ἐστὶν Æ B I K M R T ἡμῶν] om. Eri ἰδίαν] φυσικὴν R² 140 ἰδίου om. D G H P X τοῦ om.
K 142 ἐνεισάγεται G H P Sac X 143 τε om. I 144 ἐλλείποντος K O 145 συνεργίαν ß D I K M N O
Ppc : συνέργιαν Æ : ἐνέργειαν L S 147 πνεύματι] om. Eri ζωπυροῦσα—μέρη] τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
ζωπυροῦσα μερῶν I καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ita D G K S Forb : καθέκασον Ald Mign 148 ἡμῶν om. N 149
ἐνεποίησεν I ἀνόητον H K
        315

though the will gives no cooperation to this end. I suppose that, since the heart is
surrounded by the lungs and in the back part of its own structure is attached to
them, moving that organ by its own dilatations and compressions, the inhaling
and exhaling of the air is brought about by the lungs; for being slight and porous
and having all their recesses opening at the base of the windpipe, when they
contract and are compressed the air that remains in their cavities, being squeezed,
goes out, and, when they expand and open, they draw the air, by their distention,
into the void by suction. [30.17] This then is the cause of this involuntary
respiration, the impossibility that the fiery element should keep still; for since
the activity of movement is proper to heat, we understand the beginnings of heat
to be in the heart, the continual movement of this organ producing the incessant
inspiration and exhalation of the air through the lungs. Therefore, also, when the
fiery element is unnaturally enlarged, the breathing of those burning up with fever
becomes more rapid, as though the heart were endeavouring to quench the flame
lying in it by fresher breath.
[30.18] But since our nature is poor and in need of supplies from all quarters for
its own constitution, it not only lacks air of its own and breath which arouses heat,
which it brings in from without for the preservation of the living being, but
the nourishment supporting the bulk of the body is something acquired.
Therefore, it supplies the deficiency by food and drink, implanting in the body a
certain faculty for appropriating what it requires and rejecting what is superfluous,
and for this purpose, the fire of the heart gives to nature no small assistance.¹³
[30.19] For since, according to the account given, the heart which kindles by its
warm breath the individual parts is the most important of the vital organs, our
Fashioner caused it to be operative with its efficacious power at all points, so that
no part of it might be left ineffectual or unprofitable for the administration of the

¹³ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. Cat. 37.4–5 (Mühlenberg, 94.5–95.1); Galen, De usu part. 4.7
(Helmreich, 1, 200.11–203.9; ET 208–9); De nat. fac. 3.4–8.
 316   

150 οἰκονομίαν καταλειφθείη· διὰ τοῦτο κατόπιν μὲν ὑποβᾶσα τὸν πνεύμονα, διὰ τῆς
διηνεκοῦς κινήσεως, καθέλκουσά τε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὸ σπλάγχνον, ἀνευρύνει πρὸς τὴν
ὁλκὴν τοῦ ἀέρος τοὺς πόρους, ἀποθλίβουσά τε πάλιν, ἐκπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἐναπειλημμένον
παρασκευάζει· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἑαυτῆς προσφυεῖσα τῷ χωρήματι τῆς ἄνω
γαστρὸς, ἔνθερμον αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἐνεργείας κινουμένην ποιεῖ· οὐκ εἰς
155 πνεύματος ὁλκὴν ἀνεγείρουσα, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ὑποδοχὴν τῆς καταλλήλου τροφῆς· πλησίον
μὲν γὰρ πεφύκασιν ἀλλήλων αἱ εἴσοδοι τοῦ πνεύματός τε καὶ τῆς τροφῆς,
ἀντιπαρεξιοῦσαι κατὰ τὸ πρόμηκες ἡ ἑτέρα πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν, καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ μέτρῳ
[D] κατὰ τὸ ἄνω πέρας συναπαρτίζονται, ὥστε καὶ συνεστομῶσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας
καὶ ἑνὶ στόματι τοὺς πόρους ἐναπολήγειν· ὅθεν τῷ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς τῷ δὲ τοῦ
160 πνεύματος ἡ εἴσοδος γίνεται.

[30.20] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βάθος οὐκέτι διαπαντὸς τὸ προσφυὲς παραμένει τῆς συζυγίας
τῶν πόρων· μέση γὰρ τῆς ἑκατέρων ἕδρας ἡ καρδία παρεμπεσοῦσα, τῷ μὲν πρὸς
ἀναπνοὴν τῷ δὲ πρὸς τροφὴν τὰς δυνάμεις ἐντίθησι· πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ πυρῶδες
ἐπιζητεῖν τὴν ὑπεκκαίουσαν ὕλην, ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὸ δοχεῖον τῆς τροφῆς κατ᾽
165 ἀνάγκην συμβαίνει· ὅσῳ γὰρ διάπυρον διὰ τῆς γείτονος γίνεται θερμασίας,
τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐφέλκεται τὰ τὸ θερμὸν ὑποτρέφοντα. Τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην ὁρμὴν
ὄρεξιν ὀνομάζομεν. [30.21] [249] Εἰ δὲ περιδράξαιτο τῆς ἀρκούσης ὕλης τὸ
περιεκτικὸν τῆς τροφῆς, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἠρεμεῖ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἀλλὰ καθάπερ
ἐν χωνευτηρίῳ σύντηξίν τινα τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖ, καὶ διαλύσασα τὰ συνεστῶτα καὶ
170 ἀναχέασα, καθάπερ ἐκ χοάνης τινὸς μεταχεῖ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφεξῆς πόρους· εἶτα τὸ
παχυμερέστερον τοῦ εἰλικρινοῦς διακρίνασα, τὸ μὲν λεπτὸν δι᾽ ὀχετῶν τινων ἐπὶ
τὰς τοῦ ἥπατος ἄγει πύλας, τὴν δὲ ὑλώδη τῆς τροφῆς ὑποστάθμην εἰς τοὺς
εὐρυχωροτέρους πόρους τῶν ἐντέρων ἀπώσατο, καὶ, τοῖς πολυτρόποις αὐτῶν

150 καταληφθείη B Q 151 πρὸς om. M 152 τοῦ πόρου M ἀποθλίβουσα] ita A D E F(?) G H N P R²
S X Forb : ἀναμοχλίζουσα Æ B C K O : ἀναμοχλεύουσα I : ἀναχλιάζουσα M : ἀναχλίζουσα Tac :
ἀνακαχλάζουσα T2? : ἀποθλίβουσα ἀναχλίζουσα Rac? : ὑποθλίβουσα L : ἀνοχλίζουσα W Ald Mign τε]
δε 153 χωρήματι] στόματι N (ἐν ἄλλοις χωρήματι N1mg) 154 πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ἐνεργείας] τὰς πρὸς
τᾶς ἐνεργείας τὰς ἰδίας B 155 ἀνεγείρουσα] διεγείρουσα I καταλλήλους I τρυφῆς L 156 μὲν om.
O ἀλλήλων πεφύκασιν D G H L P S W X 157 ἀντιπαρεξάγουσαι N : ἀντιπαρεξιοῦσα M κατὰ] ita
D G H L M N P Rac S T W X Dion Forb : δὲ κατὰ O Eri Ald Mign 158 πέρας] ita Æ B C D E F G H I
K L N² O P R² S X Dion Forb : om. W Ald Mign συνανεστομῶσθαι B E R 159 ἑνὶ] in Eri τὸ μὲν . . .
τὸ δὲ Æ L M Pac Q R Tac 160 πνεύματος] σώματος K O ἡ om. M Q 161 τὸ² om. M παραμένῃ
K O τῇ συζυγίᾳ Æ B C E N O Q R T W 162 ἑκατέρωθεν M παραπεσοῦσα B N 162–3 τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ
δὲ Q R Tac 163 ἀναπνοὴν] τὴν ἀναπνοὴν Æ B I K M N O Q R τροφὴν] τὴν τροφὴν Æ B I K M N O Q R
W 164 τῆν om. B 165 ὅσῳ] ὅσον I R διάπυρον] ἄπειρον Ald : ἔμπυρον Mign θερμασία Nac :
θεραπείας M 166 τοσοῦτο Nac O Q : τοσοῦτον L R : τοσούτο P 168 περιεκτικὸν] ὀρεκτικὸν Dpc
L ἠρεμεῖ] ita G H L N O R X Forb : ἡρεμεῖ W Ald Mign 169 σύνπηξίν X διεστῶτα X 170
ἀναχέασα] διαχέασα M : ἀναχύσασα B χοάνης] χώμης Æ Q R μεταχεῖ] participat Eri τοὺς om.
B post πόρους rel. des. K τὸ om. I 171 εἱλικρινοῦς I M N R² διακρίνουσα L ἐπὶ] εἰς om.
N 172 τοῦ om. B ἄγει] ἀπάγει A D E F G H L P S W X ὑλώδη] ἰλυώδη Æ B C E M Nac O R :
λυώδη T : ξυλώδη Tmg 173 πόρους τῶν ἐντέρων] ita A D E F G H L M P Q S W X Forb : τῶν ἐντέρων
πόρους O Ald Mign πόρους om. Æ καὶ τοῖς] τοῖς δὲ M πολυστρόφοις T²
        317

whole organism. Therefore, standing behind the lungs and drawing that organ to
itself by its continuous movement, it dilates the passages for the inhalation of the
air and compressing them again it effects the exhalation of the air taken in; while,
in front, attached to the space above the stomach, it warms it and sets it in motion
towards its own activity, rousing it, not to inhale air, but to receive its appropriate
nourishment; for the entrances for both breath and food have been produced
nearby one another, extending lengthwise one alongside the other, and end
together in their upper parts by the same measure, so that they are furnished
with contiguous openings and the passages culminate together in one mouth,
from which the entrance of food is by one opening and that of breath through the
other.¹⁴
[30.20] Internally, however, the closeness of the conjunction of the passages is not
maintained throughout; for the heart, intervening between the base of the two,
implants in the one the faculty for respiration and in the other the faculty for
nourishment. Now the fiery element is naturally inclined to seek the material
serving as fuel, and this also necessarily happens regarding the receptacle of
nourishment; for the more it becomes heated by the neighbouring warmth, the
more it draws to itself what nourishes the heat. And this sort of impulse we call
appetite. [30.21]¹⁵ But if the organ which contains the food should obtain suffi-
cient material, not even in this way does the activity of the fire become still; it
rather produces a sort of melting of the material, just as in a foundry, and,
dissolving the solids and pouring them out, as it were from a funnel, it transfers
them to the neighbouring passages; then, separating the coarser from the purer
material, it leads the fine part through certain channels to the gates of the liver,
and expels the sedimentary matter of the food to the wider passages of the bowels;
and, by turning it over in their manifold windings, retains the food for a time in
the intestines, lest, if it were easily jettisoned by a straight passage it might

¹⁴ Cf. Plato, Tim. 78b.

¹⁵ For this paragraph, see Plato, Tim. 72c–73a; Aristotle, De part. an. 3.14 (675b22–6); Galen, De usu
part. 4.1–2 (Helmreich, 1, 195–7; ET 1, 204–5), 4.17–18 (Helmreich, 1, 237–45 ; ET 1, 235–41).
 318   

ἑλιγμοῖς ἀναστρέφουσα, χρόνῳ παρακατέχει τὴν τροφὴν τοῖς σπλάγχνοις, ὡς ἂν μὴ,

175 δι᾽ εὐθύτητα τοῦ πόρου ῥᾳδίως ἀποβαλλόμενον, εὐθὺς ἀνακινοίη τὸ ζῶον πρὸς
ὄρεξιν, καὶ μηδέποτε παύοιτο τῆς τοιαύτης ἀσχολίας κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλόγων φύσιν
ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
[30.22] [B] Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἥπατι μάλιστα τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ συνεργίας ἦν χρεία πρὸς
τὴν τῶν ὑγρῶν ἐξαιμάτωσιν, ἀφέστηκε δὲ τοῦτο τῆς καρδίας κατὰ τὴν θέσιν (οὐδὲ
180 γὰρ ἦν, οἶμαι, δυνατὸν, ἀρχήν τινα καὶ ῥίζαν ζωτικῆς οὖσαν δυνάμεως, περὶ τὴν
ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν στενοχωρεῖσθαι) ὡς ἂν μή τι τῆς οἰκονομίας ἐν τῇ ἀποστάσει τῆς
θερμαντικῆς οὐσίας παραβλαβείη, πόρος νευρώδης (ἀρτηρία δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον παρὰ
τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα σοφῶν ὀνομάζεται) ἀναδεξάμενος τῆς καρδίας τὸ ἔμπυρον πνεῦμα
φέρει παρὰ τὸ ἧπαρ, αὐτοῦ που παρὰ τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν ὑγρῶν συνεστομωμένος, καὶ
185 ἀναζέσας διὰ τῆς θερμότητος τὴν ὑγρασίαν, ἐναποτίθεταί τι τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς τοῦ πυρὸς
συγγενείας, τῇ πυροειδεῖ χρόᾳ τὸ τοῦ αἵματος εἶδος καταφοινίξας. [30.23] Εἶτ᾽
ἐκεῖθεν ἀφορμηθέντες δίδυμοί τινες ὀχετοὶ, τὸ [C] οἰκεῖον ἑκάτερος σωληνοειδῶς
περιέχοντες, πνεῦμά τε καὶ αἷμα (ὡς ἂν εὐπόρευτον εἴη τὸ ὑγρόν, τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ
κινήσει συμπαροδεῦον καὶ κουφιζόμενον) ἐφ᾽ ἅπαν τὸ σῶμα πολυσχιδῶς
190 κατασπείρονται, εἰς μυρίας ὀχετῶν ἀρχάς τε καὶ διαφύσεις κατὰ πᾶν μέρος
κατασχιζόμενοι· μιχθεῖσαι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τῶν ζωτικῶν δυνάμεων αἱ δύο ἀρχαὶ,
ἥτε τὸ θερμὸν πανταχῆ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐπιπέμπουσα, καθάπερ τινὰ
δασμὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων τῇ ἀρχηγικωτέρᾳ τῆς ζωτικῆς οἰκονομίας δυνάμει
δωροφοροῦσιν.
195 [30.24] Ἔστι δε αὕτη ἡ κατὰ τὰς μήνιγγας καὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον θεωρουμένη, ἀφ᾽ ἧς
πᾶσα μὲν ἄρθρου κίνησις, πᾶσα δὲ μυῶν συνολκὴ, πᾶν δὲ προαιρετικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ
τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μορίοις ἐπιπεμπόμενον, ἐνεργόν τε καὶ [D] κινούμενον τὸν γήϊνον
ἡμῶν ἀνδριάντα καθάπερ ἐκ μηχανῆς τινος ἀποδείκνυσι. Τοῦ τε γὰρ θερμοῦ τὸ
καθαρώτατον καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὸ λεπτότατον, παρ᾽ ἑκατέρας δυνάμεως διά τινος

174 ἑλιγμοῖς] ita W Ald Forb Mign : ἐλιγμοῖς Æ ß H P S X : εἰλιγμοῖς R : ἰλιγμοῖς Q ἀναστρέψασα Q :
ἀνατρέφουσα G : ἀποστρέφουσα Æ 175 εὐθύτητα] εὐθείας I Nac? O Q R : εὐθέος Æ M T
ἀποβαλλόμενον] ita codd. Forb : ἀποβαλλομένη Q : ἀποβαλόμενον Ald Mign εὐθὺς] εὐθέως
IO 178 ἐπειδὴ O δὲ om. B μάλιστα καὶ τῷ ἥπατι M συνεργείας G L Pac W X 179 δὲ]
γὰρ M : om. X οὐδὲ] ita codd. Forb : οὐ Ald Mign 181 ἑτέραν om. I O τι om. M T 182 τὸ
τοιοῦτον] ita D E F G H I L M R S X Forb : τὸ τοιοῦτο Q W : τῷ τοιούτῷ A : τῶν τοιοῦτων P : τοῦτο Æ ß
O Ald Mign 183 τὰ τοιαῦτα] ita Æ B C D E F G H I L N² P R² S X Forb : εἰς ταῦτα M : ταῦτα W Ald
Mign ἀναλεξάμενος B C O : ἀναξάμενος I ἔμπυρον om. M 185 ἐναποτίθεταί] ἀποτίθεται N τι
om. B I M O Q 186 χροίᾳ B : χροιᾷ Æ ß M R εἶτ᾽] ita ß G I L M Q S X Forb : εἰτ᾽ B D H P : εἴτ᾽ R : εἶτα
Æ O Ald Mign : om. T 187 σωληνοειδῶς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκάτερος I 188 εὐπόρρυτον I εἴη] εἶναι A D F G
H L P S X τῇ] ita Æ D G H I L M N O P Q R S W X Forb : τε Ald Mign 189 καὶ] τε καὶ
I πολυσχεδῶς H Bac (ι sup. l.) 190 κατασπείρωνται I μυριάδας M ὀχετῶν om. T ἀρχὰς
ὀχετῶν I τε om. I διαφύσεις] διαχύσεις A D E F G H N P R² X 191 κατασχιζόμενοι] ita A Æ
B D E F G H L M N P R S T X Forb : κατασχιματιζόμενοι W : καταδιασχιζόμενοι Q : διασχιζόμενοι C O
Ald Mign αἱ om. T 192 ἡ om. B T W 193 δασμὸν] ita Æ B C D E F G H I L Nmg O P Q R² S T W X
Ald Forb : δεσμὸν M Rac : δεσμῶν A : διαμερισμὸν N : δανεισμὸν Mign ἀρχικωτέρα Æ L N O :
ἀρχηκωτέρᾳ Q οἰκονομίας] ἐνεργείας D R² 194 δορυφοροῦσιν Rac 195 δε] ita B G H L N O P Q R S
W X Forb : δ᾽ Ald Mign αὐτὴ Q μήνιγγας] membranas Eri 196 μὲν] μὲν οὖν N συνολκὴ] ὁλκὴ
M καὶ om. Æ ß I M N O Q Rac W Dion Eri : eras. B D 197 καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ita L O W X Forb :
καθέκαστον Ald Mign μορίοις] ὁρίοις T 198 ἀποδεικνύουσι M W 199 καθαρώτερον N
        319

immediately stir up again the living being to an appetite, and the human being, in
accordance with the nature of an irrational animal, might never cease from this
kind of occupation.
[30.22]¹⁶ Since the liver has a special need of the cooperation of heat for the
conversion of the fluids into blood, but this organ is by position distant from
the heart (for it would not be possible, I think, being a certain principle or root
of the vital power, for it to be hampered by proximity to another principle), in
order that it may not be damaged because of the distance from the administration
of the heat-giving substance, a muscular passage (and this is called, by those
skilled in such matters, the artery), receiving the heated breath from the heart,
conveys it to the liver, having its opening somewhere besides the entry-point for
the fluids, and, as it warms the moist element by its heat, it introduces into the
liquid something akin to fire, reddening the form of the blood with the fiery tint.
[30.23] Then, giving rise to certain twin channels from there, each enclosing its
own current like a pipe, dispersing air and blood (that the liquid may have free
course when accompanied and lightened by the movement of heat) in many
directions over the whole body, being separated at every part into countless
branches and partitions of channels; while, when the two principles of the vital
powers are mixed together (both that which disperses heat and that which
supplies moisture to every bodily part) they make, as it were, a sort of compulsory
contribution from their own nature to the supreme force of the vital economy.
[30.24] Now this force is that perceived in the cerebral membranes and the brain,
from which it comes that every movement of a joint, every contraction of the
muscles, and every deliberate influence exerted upon the members of each person,
renders our earthen statue active and mobile as though by some mechanism. For
the most pure form of heat and the most subtle form of liquid, being united by

¹⁶ For this paragraph, see Galen, De usu part. 4.2–6 (Helmreich, 1, 196–201; ET 1, 204–8), 4.14
(Helmreich, 1, 228–31; ET 1, 229–32).
 320   

200 μίξεώς τε καὶ ἀνακράσεως ἑνωθέντα, τρέφει τε καὶ συνίστησι διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν τὸν
ἐγκέφαλον· ἀφ᾽ οὗ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ καθαρώτατον ἐκλεπτυνομένη ἡ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἀνάδοσις,
ὑπαλείφει τὸν περιεκτικὸν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ὑμένα, ὃς ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τὸ βάθος αὐλοειδῶς
διήκων, διὰ τῶν καθεξῆς σπονδύλων ἑαυτὸν τὲ καὶ τὸν ἐγκείμενον αὐτῷ μυελὸν
διεξάγων, τῇ βάσει συναπολήγει τῆς ῥάχεως· πάσαις ὀστέων τε καὶ ἁρμονιῶν
205 συμβολαῖς καὶ μυῶν ἀρχαῖς οἷόν τις ἡνίοχος αὐτὸς ἐνδιδοὺς τῆς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν. [30.25] [252] Διὰ τοῦτό μοι
δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρας ἠξιῶσθαι φρουρᾶς, κατὰ μὲν τὴν κεφαλὴν διπλαῖς ὀστέων
περιβολαῖς ἐν κύκλῳ διειλημμένος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς σπονδύλοις ταῖς τε τῶν ἀκανθῶν
προβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς πολυτρόποις κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα διαπλοκαῖς, δι᾽ ὧν ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ
210 πάσῃ φυλάττεται, διὰ τῆς περιεχούσης αὐτὸν φρουρᾶς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχων.

[30.26] Ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῆς καρδίας στοχάσαιτο, ὅτι, καθάπερ τὶς οἶκος
ἀσφαλὴς, αὐτὴ διὰ τῶν στερροτάτων περιηρμόσθη, ταῖς τῶν ὀστέων ἐν κύκλῳ
περιοχαῖς ὠχυρωμένη· κατόπιν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ῥάχις, ταῖς ὠμοπλάταις
ἑκατέρωθεν ἠσφαλισμένη· καθ᾽ [B] ἑκάτερον δὲ πλάγιον ἡ τῶν πλευρῶν θέσις
215 περιπτύσσουσα, τὸ μέσον δυσπαθὲς ἀπεργάζεται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, τὸ στέρνον
καὶ ἡ τῆς κλειδὸς συζυγία προβέβληται, ὡς ἂν πανταχόθεν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἀπὸ
τῶν ἔξωθεν διοχλούντων φυλάσσοιτο.
[30.27] Οἷον δὲ κατὰ τὴν γεωργίαν ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, τῆς ἐκ νεφῶν ἐπομβρίας ἢ τῆς τῶν
ὀχετῶν ἐπιρροῆς διάβροχον ποιούσης τὸ ὑποκείμενον· κῆπος δέ τις ὑποκείσθω τῷ
220 λόγῳ, μυρίας μὲν δένδρων διαφορὰς παντοδαπὰς δὲ τῶν ἐκ γῆς φυομένων ἰδέας ἐν

200 τὸν ἀτμὸν B 201 τὸ] ita Æ ß D G H I L M N O P Q R S W X Ald Forb : om. Mign καθαρώτερον
N R 202 ὑμένα] membrana Eri 203 σφονδύλων O τὲ] ita Æ B D G H I L M N O P Q R S W X Forb :
δὲ Ald Mign αὐτῷ] ἐαυτῷ D : ἐν αὐτῷ B I O 204 βάσει] φύσει M 204–5 πάσαις—ἀρχαῖς] om.
Eri 204 τε om. H N Q Rac W 205 μυῶν] medullarum Dion καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ita L O S Forb :
καθέκαστον W X Ald Mign 206 ὁρμὴν] ὁρμὴν τε Æ B I O R τὴν om. Æ I O 207 φρουρᾶς] ita
codd. Forb : φρουρᾶς καὶ Ald Mign 208 ἐν¹] ἐπὶ Q 208–9 ἐν¹—προβολαῖς om. I 208 σφονδύλοις
O τε om. B L W 209 τὸ om. B 210 φυλάσσεται I N O Q R τὸ om. L 211 ὅτι] ὅτιπερ D G H L
P X τὶς] ita Ald Forb : τίς H : τις D G P S W X Mign 212 αὐτὴ] ita B D G H P Q R X Forb : αὐτῇ L S :
αὕτη O W Ald Mign στερροτέρων M N περιήρμοσται R 213 ὠχυρωμένος Æ Q Rac μὲν om.
D 213–14 ταῖς—ἠσφαλισμένη] aequalibus latitudinibus hinc inde munita Eri 213 τοῖς G H L M P R²
S X 214 ἑκατέρωθεν] ἀμφοτέρωθεν Æ B C I M N O Q ἑκατέρωθεν ἠσφαλισμένη] ἀσφάλεια
ἀμφοτέρων ἑκάτερον] ἕτερον T 215 τὸ]² τὸ τε Æ ß I N O T 216 αὐτὴ B : αὐτῆς N ἀπὸ] ὑπὸ
N 217 φυλάττοιτο D G H P S 218 δὲ] δὴ M N Q ἔστιν Æ I M O Mign 219 ἐπιρροῆς] ἐπομβρίας
B 220 μὲν om. N δὲ] τε N τῶν] τὰς O ἰδέας] τὰς ἰδέας D
        321

their respective forces through a certain mixture and combination, nourish and
sustain the brain by their vapours, by which, in turn, being rarefied to the most
pure condition, the exhalation that proceeds from that organ anoints the tissue
containing the brain, which, reaching from above downwards like a pipe, extend-
ing (itself and the marrow which is contained in it) through the successive
vertebrae, terminates together at the base of the spine, giving, like a charioteer,
to all the meeting points of bones and joints and the branches of muscles the
impulse and power of movement and rest for each particular part. [30.25] For
this reason also, it seems to me, that it has been granted a more secure defence,
being set apart, in the head, by a double shelter of bones around it, in the vertebrae
of the neck formed by the projections of the spine, and by the diverse inter-lacings
of the form of those vertebrae, by which it is kept safe in freedom from all injury,
enjoying safety by the defence surrounding it.¹⁷
[30.26] Likewise one might suppose of the heart, that, like some safe house, it is
itself fitted with the most solid defences, fortified by the enclosing walls of the
bones around it; for in the rear there is the spine, fortified on either side by the
shoulder-blades, and on each side the enfolding position of the ribs makes that
which is in-between difficult to injure; while in front the breast-bone and the
juncture of the collar-bone stand on defence, so that its safety may be guarded at
all points from external troubles.
[30.27] One may see something of this in husbandry, when the heavy rain from
the clouds or the overflow from the rivers causes the land beneath it to be sodden.
Let us suppose for our argument a garden, nourishing in it countless varieties of

¹⁷ Plato, Tim. 75c; Galen, De usu part. 8.9 (Helmreich, 1, 479.3–480.11; ET 410–11).
 322   

ἑαυτῷ τρέφων, ὧν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ ποιότης καὶ ἡ τῆς χρόας ἰδιότης ἐν πολλῇ
διαφορᾷ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνθεωρεῖται· τοσούτων τοίνυν κατὰ τὸν ἕνα χῶρον τῷ
ὑγρῷ τρεφομένων, ἡ μὲν ὑπονοτίζουσα τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δύναμις μία [C] τις ἐστὶ
κατὰ τὴν φύσιν· ἡ δὲ τῶν τρεφομένων ἰδιότης εἰς διαφόρους τὸ ὑγρὸν μεταβάλλει
225 ποιότητας· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ πικραίνεται μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀψίνθῳ, εἰς φθοροποιὸν δὲ χυμὸν ἐν τῷ
κωνείῳ μεθίσταται· καὶ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ γίνεται, ἐν κρόκῳ, ἐν βαλσάμῳ, ἐν μήκωνι· τῷ
μὲν γὰρ ἐκθερμαίνεται, τῷ δὲ καταψύχεται, τῷ δὲ μέσην ἔχει ποιότητα· καὶ ἐν δάφνῃ
καὶ ἐν σχίνῳ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις εὔπνουν ἐστὶν, καὶ ἐν συκῇ δὲ καὶ ὄχνῃ
κατεγλυκάνθη, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμπέλου βότρυς καὶ οἶνος ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ τοῦ μήλου
230 χυλὸς καὶ τὸ τοῦ ῥόδου ἐρύθημα καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν τοῦ κρίνου καὶ τὸ κυανίζον τοῦ ἴου
καὶ τὸ πορφύρεον τῆς ὑακινθίνης βαφῆς καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα κατὰ τὴν γῆν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, ἐκ
μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἰκμάδος ἀναβλαστάνοντα, εἰς τοσαύτας διαφορὰς κατά τε τὸ
σχῆμα [D] καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὰς ποιότητας διακρίνεται·—τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ κατὰ τὴν
ἔμψυχον ἡμῶν ἄρουραν θαυματοποιεῖται παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὰ τοῦ
235 Δεσπότου τῆς φύσεως. Ὀστέα καὶ χόνδροι, φλέβες, ἀρτηρίαι, νεῦρα, σύνδεσμοι,
σάρκες, δέρμα, πιμελαὶ, τρίχες, ἀδένες, ὄνυχες, ὀφθαλμοὶ, μυκτῆρες, ὦτα—πάντα
τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μυρία πρὸς τούτοις ἄλλα διαφόροις ἰδιώμασιν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων
κεχωρισμένα μιᾷ τῇ τῆς τροφῆς ἰδέᾳ καταλλήλως τῇ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεται φύσει, ὡς
ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὴν τροφὴν προσεγγίσασαν, ᾧπερ ἂν ἐμπελάσῃ, κατ᾽
240 ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, οἰκείαν καὶ συμφυῆ τῇ τοῦ μέρους ἰδιότητι γινομένην. Εἰ
γὰρ κατὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν γένοιτο, τῷ ὁρατικῷ μορίῳ [253] συγκατεκράθη, καὶ τῶν
περὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν χιτώνων ταῖς διαφοραῖς οἰκείως εἰς ἕκαστον κατεμερίσθη· εἰ δὲ
τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἀκοὴν μέρεσιν ἐπιρρυῇ, τῇ ἀκουστικῇ καταμίγνυται φύσει· καὶ ἐν
χείλει γενόμενον χεῖλος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐν ὀστέῳ πήγνυται, καὶ ἐν μυελῷ ἁπαλύνεται,

221 χροιᾶς R ἰδιότης] ἰδέα M 222 καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ita G O X Forb : καθέκαστον Ald Mign θεωρεῖται
D F G H P S X 223 ἡ—ἕκαστον] ueluti singula subirrigans Eri καθέκαστον Æ M R Ald 223–4 ἐστὶ
κατὰ τὴν φύσιν] ita A D E F G H L M N P S X Forb : κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν O W Ald Mign 224 τὴν om.
D E εἰς] εἰς πολλὰς καὶ N 225 δὲ om. L 226 ἐν κρόκῳ, ἐν βαλσάμῳ] in balsamo in croco
Dion 226–7 τῷ . . . τῷ . . . τῷ] τὸ . . . τὸ . . . τὸ M N Q R T 227 ἐκθερμαίνεται] θερμαίνεται D E G H
P X καταψύχεται] ψύχεται D E L ἔχει] ἴσχει Æ B C I N O Rac : infundit Eri 228 σχίνῳ] ita A Æ
B C D² E F G H N O P Q R S T X Dion Ald Forb : σχοίνῳ Mign : schino Eri εὔπνουν] ἔμπνουν B Dac
E H Rac W καὶ³] ita A Æ2? C D E F G H L N² P R S X Forb : om. O W Ald Mign δὲ] τε N R καὶ⁴] et
(ΟΓΧΝΗ est species spiri quam uolemam latini uocant: hinc Virgilius grauibus uolemis) Eri [cf. Verg.
Georg. 2.88] ὄχνῃ] ὄγχνῃ Æ B N R² : ὄχνῃ et γ sup. l. ß P S 229 διὰ] ὁ Æ B C E I O T : ὁ διὰ
R² καὶ² om. Æ B C E I O T 230 χυλὸς] χυμὸς N Q Rac ἐρύθημα] ita codd. Forb : ἐρύθρημα Ald
Mign τοῦ κρίνου λαμπρὸν W Ald Mign τοῦ² om. T 231 πορφύρεον] ita A Æ B C D E Fac
(προφυρίζον sup. l.) I M N O R S T Forb : προφύραιον G H : προφυραῖον W X Ald Mign ὑακινθίνης] ita
A Æ C D E F G I L M N O Q S T W Forb : οἰακινθίνης P X : ὑακινθίνου H : ὑακίνθης B Ald : ὑακιν R (θν
sup. l.) : ὑακίνθου Mign πάνθ’] πάντα Æ B I L M N O Q W 232 εἰς] καὶ X τε] δὲ T : om. Q 235
τῆς om. Mign καὶ] τε καὶ N : scilicet Dion : om. Eri χόνδρος T φλέβαις O : om. Eri φλέβες
ἀρτηρίαι] καὶ φλέβες καὶ ἀρτηρίαι H 236 δέρματα M πιμελαὶ—ὄνυχες om. L πιμέλη I : aruina
musculi Dion : adipes Eri ἀδένες τρίχες I ἀδένες] ἀδεναὶ I : ὀδόντες Rmg : om. Dion : adenes
Eri μυκτῆρες] om. Eri 237 ἄλλα] ἄλλα καὶ L ἰδιώμασιν] ita Æ B C D E F G H I O P R S T X Forb :
ἰδιότησιν A Ald Mign 238 τῇ om. L O Q καταλλήλῶς τῇ τῆς τροφῆς ἰδέᾳ N 239 ᾧπερ] ὅπερ D G
H L P X ἂν] γὰρ B ἐμπελάσῃ] ἐνπελάση Q : ἐμπελάσει B : ἐν πελάσει L : πελάσῃ N 240 συμφυᾶ
I ἰδιότητι] οἰκειότητι N Mac (ἰδ sup. l.) 241 κατὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν] ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ I τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν
W X ὁρατικῷ] spectivae Eri συγκατεκρίθη B Fpc S : συνανεκράθη M : συνκράθη C : συνεκράθη
O 242 τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν D Rac : τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς M : ὁ ὀφθαλμὸν O (ω supr. l.) εἰς om. D 243 κατὰ
τὴν] κατ᾽ D G H P S X ἐπιρρυῇ] ἐπιρρύει B C : ἐπιρρυεῖ G O Pac Rac X : ἐπιρροὴ T καταμίγνυται]
ἐπμίγνυται N
        323

trees and all the forms of plants that grow from the earth, of which one can see in
each the figure and the quality and the particularity of colour in great variety—so
many things, then, in one place are nourished by the moisture, the power which
moistens each being one in nature, but the particularity of the plants being
nourished changes the moisture into different qualities: for the same moisture
becomes bitter in wormwood, and is changed into a deadly juice in hemlock,
and becomes different in other plants, in saffron, in balsam, in the poppy; in one it
becomes hot, in another cold, in another it obtains the middle quality; and in
laurel and mastic and in such things it is scented, and in the fig and the pear it is
sweetened; and by passing through the vine it becomes a cluster of grapes and
wine; and the juice of the apple, the redness of the rose, the radiance of the lily, the
blue of the violet, the purple of the hyacinthine dye, and all that one sees upon the
earth, while arising from one and the same moisture, yet are separated into so
many varieties in respect of figure and form and quality. The same sort of wonder
is wrought in our animated soil by nature, or rather by the Lord of nature: bones
and cartilages, veins, arteries, nerves, ligatures, flesh, skin, fat, hair, glands, nails,
eyes, nostrils, ears—all such things as these and countless others in addition, while
separated from one another by different properties, are nourished by the one form
of nourishment in ways appropriate to their own nature, so that the nourishment,
approaching each of the subjects, is changed according to that to which it
approaches, becoming suitable for and akin to the particularity of the part.¹⁸ For
if it is near the eye, it blends with the visual part and is suitably distributed to each
by the differences of the membranes around the eye; or, if it flows to the auditory
parts, it is mingled with the acoustic nature; or if it is in the lip, it becomes lip; and
it grows solid in bone, and grows soft in marrow, and is made tense with the sinew,

¹⁸ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Hex. 49 (Drobner, 62. 7–14).

 324   

245 καὶ τονοῦται μετὰ τοῦ νεύρου, καὶ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ συμπεριτείνεται, καὶ εἰς ὄνυχας
διαβαίνει, καὶ εἰς τριχῶν γένεσιν λεπτοποιεῖται τοῖς καταλλήλοις ἀτμοῖς· εἰ μὲν διὰ
σκολιῶν προάγοιτο πόρων, οὐλοτέρας τε καὶ κατηγκυλωμένας τὰς τρίχας ἐκφύουσα,
εἰ δὲ δι᾽ εὐθείας ἡ τῶν τριχοποιῶν ἀτμῶν γένοιτο πρόοδος, τετανάς τε καὶ εὐθείας
προάγουσα.
250 [30.28] Ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν προκειμένων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἀποπεπλάνηται, τοῖς ἔργοις
ἐμβαθύνων τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὑπογράφειν ἐπιχειρῶν ὅπως ἡμῖν καὶ ἐξ ὁποίων
συνέστηκε τὰ [B] καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τά τε πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ εἴ τι
μετὰ τούτων ἕτερον κατὰ τὴν πρώτην διαίρεσιν ἐνοήσαμεν. [30.29] Τὸ γὰρ
προκείμενον ἦν δεῖξαι τὴν σπερματικὴν τῆς συστάσεως ἡμῶν αἰτίαν μήτε
255 ἀσώματον εἶναι ψυχὴν μήτε ἄψυχον σῶμα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ζώντων
σωμάτων ζῶν καὶ ἔμψυχον παρὰ τὴν πρώτην ἀπογεννᾶσθαι ζῶον· ἐκδεξαμένην δὲ
τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, καθάπερ τινὰ τροφὸν ταῖς οἰκείαις δυνάμεσιν αὐτὴν
τιθηνήσασθαι· τὴν δὲ τρέφεσθαι κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα καὶ καταλλήλως ἐν ἑκατέρῳ μέρει
τὴν αὔξησιν ἐπίδηλον ἔχειν· εὐθὺς μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς τεχνικῆς ταύτης καὶ
260 ἐπιστημονικῆς διαπλάσεως τὴν συμπεπλεγμένην αὐτῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνδείκνυται
δύναμιν, ἀμυδρότερον μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκφαινομένην, καθεξῆς δὲ τῇ τοῦ
ὀργάνου τελειώσει [C] συναναλάμπουσαν.
[30.30] Οἷον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν λιθογλύφων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν· πρόκειται μὲν γὰρ τῷ τεχνίτῃ
ζώου τινὸς εἶδος ἐν λίθῳ δεῖξαι· τοῦτο δὲ προθέμενος, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν λίθον τῆς
265 συμφυοῦς ὕλης ἀπέρρηξεν, εἶτα περικόψας αὐτοῦ τὰ περιττὰ, προήγαγέ πως διὰ τοῦ
πρώτου σχήματος τῇ μιμήσει τῇ κατὰ πρόθεσιν· ὥστε καὶ τὸν ἄπειρον διὰ τῶν
φαινομένων τοῦ σκοποῦ τῆς τέχνης καταστοχάσασθαι· πάλιν ἐπεργασάμενος,
προσήγγισε πλέον τῇ ὁμοιότητι τοῦ σπουδαζομένου· εἶτα τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἀκριβὲς
εἶδος ἐγχειρουργήσας τῇ ὕλῃ, εἰς πέρας τὴν τέχνην προήγαγε· καὶ ἔστι λέων ἢ
270 ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ παρὰ τοῦ τεχνίτου γενόμενον, ὁ πρὸ βραχέος ἄσημος
λίθος· οὐ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὸ εἶδος ὑπαμειφθείσης ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπιτεχνηθέντος τῇ

245 συμπαρατείνεται D G H I N O P S T X ὄνυχα Æ B C I M O Q R T 246 τοὺς καταλλήλους ἀτμοὺς

I Nac? Q 247 προάγοιντο L T W : προάγοι το N (ν forte eras.) : προάγοι τῶν Æ B C M O
Q κατηγκυκλωμένας O 248 γίνοιτο N R πρόοδος γένοιτο A D E F G H P S X τετανὰς] ita
codd. Forb : τεταμένας Rac W Ald Mign 250 ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος Æ I N O R ἀπεπλάνηται Dac Q 251
ἐμβατεύων L W 251–3 καὶ ὑπογράφειν—ἕτερον] et quodammodo quae in nobis constituta sunt et quae
extrinsecus efficiunt quae per singula quae ad uiuendum sunt conantes subscribere, etiam cum his alia
quaedam Eri 251 ὅπως] ὅπως τε O καὶ ἐξ ὁποίων ἡμῖν I O καὶ² om. W 252 καθ᾽ ἕκαστον] ita L O
P Forb : καθέκαστον W X Ald Mign καὶ¹] τε καὶ I τὰ om. D E N R T πρὸς om. N R T ζῆν εὖ
L εἴ τι] ἔτι L M 252–3 τι . . . ἕτερον] τινα . . . ἕτερα Q 253 τούτων] τοῦτο D G H L P S W X διαίρεσιν]
αἵρεσιν Q ἐνοήσαμεν] ἐννοήσαμεν W : ἐνομίσαμεν T : ἐποιήσαμεν D E G H P X : ἐποιήσαμεν Fac
(ἐνοήσαμεν sup. l.) 255 ἀψύχων Tac : ἐμψύχων T² ἐξ om. D Nac P(?) X τε om. SP 256 σωμάτων]
om. Eri ζῶν] ζῶον Q : ζῶσαν R : ζῶν τε H : animantum Eri ζῶον] ζωὴν Æ Q R : om. B I M Nac O T
SP : constitutionem Eri δὲ] τε D G H L N² P S W X 257 δυνάμεσιν] τροφαῖς Q Eri αὐτὴν δυνάμεσιν
Æ B I N O R αὐτὴν] eam (dico causam) Eri 258 τρέφεσθαι] τρέφεσθαι τε Æ B C E I L M N O R κατ᾽
ἀμφότερα] utramque uero partem (materiam uidelicet et utiam) Eri καὶ om. SP ἐν om. D ἑκατέρῳ]
ἑκάστῳ Æ B C E I O R T 260–1 δύναμιν ἐνδείκνυται N 261 ἀμυδρωτέραν L μὲν om. O κατὰ] παρὰ
Æ B C I M N O Q R T SP ἐκφαινομένην] ἐμφαινομένην N : ἐκφαινομένην καὶ SP 263 δὲ] δὴ Æ B Q : δὲ
τι R 264 ἐν] ἐν τῷ N 265 προσήγαγε ß H M N O Rac S T SP 266 τῇ] τὸ I : τοῦ B C N O Rac SP
πρόθεσιν] τὴν πρόθεσιν B ἄπειρον] ἀνεπιστήμονα ἄπειρον B : ἀνεπιστήμονα καὶ ἄπειρον R 266–7 τοῦ
φαινομένου Nac Dion 267 σκοποῦ] σκοτίου Q : κρυπτοῦ M ἐπεργασάμενος] ἀπεργασάμενος L Pac :
ἐπεξεργασάμενος M : προσεξεργασάμενος I : προσεργασάμενος Æ B C O 268 ἀκριβῶς T 269–70 ἢ
ἄνθρωπος om. Mign 270 τύχοι M 271 ἐπιτεχνιθέντος G I : ἐπὶ τεχνιτευθέντος N
        325

and is extended with the surface, and passes into the nails; and is rendered fine for
the growth of hair, by the corresponding exhalations—if it proceeds through
winding passages, it produces hair that is more curly and wavy, but if the course
of the exhalations that produce hair is straight, it induces flat and straight hair.¹⁹
[30.28] But our argument, however, has wandered far from the matters at hand,
going deep into the works of nature, and endeavouring to describe how and from
what our particular organs are constituted, those intended for life and those for
good life, and any other category after these that we considered in the first
division. [30.29] The purpose was to show that the seminal cause of our consti-
tution is neither a soul without body, nor a body without soul, but that, from
animated and living bodies a being, living and animated from the first, is gener-
ated, human nature receiving it to be cherished, like a nursling, with her own
powers; it is nourished in both respects and makes its growth manifest appropri-
ately in each part, for it immediately displays, by this artistic and scientific process
of formation, the power of the soul interwoven with it, appearing at first somewhat
obscurely, but afterwards increasing in radiance concurrently with the perfecting
of the organism.²⁰
[30.30] One may see this with stone-carvers: the artist’s purpose is to produce in
stone the figure of some animal; proposing this, he first severs the stone from its
kindred matter, then, by chipping away the superfluous parts, he advances
somehow through the first outline to the imitation that is his purpose, so that
even someone inexperienced may, by what appears, conjecture the aim of the art;
and again, working at it, he brings it closer to the likeness of the object in view;
then, lastly, producing in the material the perfect and exact form, he brings his art
to its conclusion and that which shortly before was shapeless stone is a lion, or a
human, or whatever it may be that was made by the artist, not by the material
being changed into the figure, but by the figure being wrought upon the matter. To
suppose something similar in the case of the soul would not be far from prob-
ability; for we say that the all-contriving nature, taking from the kindred matter
within herself the part that comes from the human being, crafts the statue.²¹ And

¹⁹ Cf. Plato, Tim. 76bc; Aristotle, De part. an. 2.14–15 (658ab); Galen, De usu part. 11.14
(Helmreich, 2, 155.6–15; ET 2, 531).
²⁰ Cf. Philo, Opif. 67; Origen, Princ. 1.1.6.
²¹ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Inscr. 1.11.131–7 (McDonough, 115–17; ET 163–5); Plato, Phaedr. 252d7;
Plotinus, Enn. 1.6.9; Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 27.7.
 326   

ὕλῃ. [D] Τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ λογισάμενος, τοῦ εἰκότος οὐχ
ἁμαρτήσεται· τὴν γὰρ πάντα τεχνιτεύουσαν φύσιν ἐκ τῆς ὁμογενοῦς ὕλης
λαβοῦσαν, ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος δημιουργεῖν ἀνδριάντα φαμέν.
275 Ὥσπερ δὲ τῇ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐργασίᾳ τοῦ λίθου τὸ εἶδος ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀμυδρότερον
μὲν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην, τελειότερον δὲ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ ἔργου συμπλήρωσιν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν
τῇ τοῦ ὀργάνου γλυφῇ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
προφαίνεται, ἀτελὲς ἐν τῷ ἀτελεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ τελείῳ τέλειον· ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἂν τέλειον
ἦν εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς κακίας ἡ φύσις ἐκολοβώθη· διὰ τοῦτο ἡ πρὸς τὴν [256] ἐμπαθῆ καὶ
280 ζωώδη γένεσιν κοινωνία οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐκλάμπειν ἐν τῷ πλάσματι τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα
ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽ ὁδῷ τινι καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ διὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν τε καὶ ζωωδεστέρων τῆς
ψυχῆς ἰδιωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ἄγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον.
[30.31] Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον δόγμα καὶ ὁ μέγας ἀπόστολος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Κορινθίους
διδάσκει, λέγων· Ὅτε ἤμην νήπιος, ὡς νήπιος ἐλάλουν, ὡς νήπιος ἐφρόνουν, ὡς
285 νήπιος ἐλογιζόμην· ὅτε δὲ γέγονα ἀνὴρ, κατήργηκα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου· οὐκ ἄλλης ἐν τῷ
ἀνδρὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπεισελθούσης παρὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ μειρακίῳ νοουμένην, ἡ
νηπιωδεστέρα καταργεῖται διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀνδρώδης ἐγγίνεται· ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς, ἐν
ἐκείνῳ μὲν τὸ ἀτελὲς, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ διαδεικνυούσης τὸ τέλειον. [30.32] Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ
φυόμενά τε καὶ αὐξάνοντα ζῆν λέγομεν, πάντα δε τὰ ἐν μετουσίᾳ ζωῆς καὶ φυσικῆς
290 [B] ὄντα κινήσεως οὐκ ἄν τις ἄψυχα φήσειεν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τελείας ψυχῆς μετέχειν τὴν
τοιαύτην ζωήν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· γενομένη γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ψυχική τις ἐνέργεια, μέχρι
τῶν κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν κινημάτων οὐκ ἔφθασε· πάλιν δὲ κατὰ προσθήκην δύναμίς τις
ψυχικὴ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐγγινομένη, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ τοῦ τέλους ἐφίκετο, λόγου τε καὶ διανοίας
χάριν ἐν ἑαυτῇ μὴ χωρήσασα. [30.33] Διὰ τοῦτό φαμεν τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ τελείαν
295 ψυχὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εἶναι, διὰ πάσης ἐνεργείας γνωριζομένην· εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο
μετέχει ζωῆς, ἐν καταχρήσει τινὶ συνηθείας ἔμψυχον λέγομεν, ὅτι μὴ τελεία ἐν
τούτοις ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἀλλά τινα μέρη ψυχικῆς ἐνεργείας, ἃ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
κατὰ τὴν μυστικὴν τοῦ Μωϋσέως ἀνθρωπογονίαν ἐπιγεγενῆσθαι, διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ
ἐμπαθὲς οἰκειότητα μεμαθήκαμεν· [C] διὰ τοῦτο συμβουλεύων ὁ Παῦλος τοῖς
300 ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ δυναμένοις, τῆς τελειότητος ἔχεσθαι, καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὅπως ἂν τοῦ

272 τοιοῦτο Æ N O τι] τις B C M N O P² : τί τις I : τε A ὁ om. X SP εἰκότος] εἶναι τὸ T 273

ἁμαρτήσει B M φύσιν] φύσιν καὶ X 274 λαβοῦσαν] ἀναλαβοῦσαν R ἑαυτῇ] αὐτῇ L Rac ἐκ om.
N δημιουργεῖν] δημιουργεῖν τὸν N : δημιουργεῖ SP 276 παρὰ om. Æ 276–300 τελειότερον—τρόπον
def. Eri 276 τελεώτερον H τοῦ om. B L οὕτως L 277 τοῦ¹] τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου L ψυχῆς] γλυφῆς
M 278 τῷ¹ om. M ἀτελεῖ] ἀτελεῖ ὂν N τῷ² om. G M P Q R S W X : des. Q 280 γέννησιν D E F G
H P S W X : γεννήσει A ἐκλάμπειν] ἀναλάμπειν R τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα ἐν τῷ πλάσματι Ald Mign (repugn.
codd.) 281 τε om. Ald Mign 283 τοιοῦτο Æ L N O 283–4 τῇ . . . λέγων] τῷ . . . λόγῳ Æ B I M O
R 284–5 ὡς νήπιος—ἐλογιζόμην] ita A B C D E F G H L M P R S T W X Forb : ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος ἐφρόνουν
ὡς νήπιος ἐλογιζόμενην ὡς νήπιος Æ I N O : ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος ἐλογιζόμενην ὡς νήπιος Ald Mign 285
κατήργηκα] κατήργησα Ald Mign τὰ τοῦ νηπίου καρήργηκα G H P R S X ἄλλης] ἄλλης δὲ L 286 τῆς
om. Æ B O R 287 κατήργηται M ἀνδρώδης] ἀνδρειότης D E : ἀνδρειώδης F G H S X γίνεται D E ἐν
om. L 288 διαδεικνύσης Æ I N O : δεικνυούσης R T : δεικνούσης L 289 τε om. Æ αὔξοντα A D E F G H
M N P S X δε] ita Æ G H I L M N O P R S X Ald Forb : τε Mign τὰ om. T ζωῆς] ζωτικῆς N 293
ψυχικὴ om. T ἐγγιγνομένη L : ἐγγενομένη M αὐτὴ] αὕτη B I N ἐφίκεται A Dac F G H P S : ἐφικνεῖται D²
E L T : ἀφήκεται X post καὶ des. I 294 ἀληθῆ καὶ τελείαν] τελείαν τε καὶ ἀληθῆ N 295 τὴν om.
Mign γνωριζομένην] χωριζομένην M 296 τινὶ om. D ὅτι μὴ] ita codd. Ald Forb : μὴ ὅτι Mign 297
ἐστὶν] ἦν R ἡ om. M P W X 298 κατὰ] μετὰ L 299 Παῦλος] μέγας Παῦλος B αὐτοῦ δυναμένοις] ita
codd. Forb : αὐτοῦ βουλομένοις Ald : βουλομένοις Mign 300 post τρόπον habet T ὁ θεὸς εἰπὼν, ὅτι
ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς οὐκ εἶχε φύσεως τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐπιδείξας· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠπατήθη ὁ
ἄνθρωπος τῷ προδήλῳ κακῷ κινήσει δοὺς· οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλει πάντως ὅπως ἂν τοῦ σπουδαζομένου τύχοιεν
ὑποτίθεσθαι λέγων· ἀπεκδύσασθε τὸν παλαιὸν et rel. des.
        327

just as the form follows upon the gradual working of the stone, at first somewhat
indistinct, but more perfect after the completion of the work, so also in the carving
of the organism the form of the soul, by the analogy, is displayed in the substra-
tum, incompletely in that which is incomplete, and perfectly in that which is
perfect; but it would have been perfect from the beginning had nature not been
maimed by evil. For this reason our sharing in that impassioned and animal-like
genesis brings it about that the divine image does not shine forth immediately in
the moulded figure, but, by a certain method and sequence, through those
material and more animal-like properties of the soul, brings to perfection the
human being.
[30.31] Some such doctrine as this the great Apostle also teaches in his Epistle to
the Corinthians, saying, When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a
child, I thought as a child; but when I became an adult I put away childish things;²²
not that the soul which arises in the adult is conceived otherwise than that which
we know to be in the boy, [as if] the childish mind is abolished when the adult
mind intervenes, but that the same soul displays its imperfect condition in that
one and the perfect state in this. [30.32] For just as we say that those things which
sprout and grow are alive, and no one would say that all things that participate in
life and natural movement are inanimate, yet one does not say that such life
partakes of a perfect soul, for although a certain animate activity exists in plants, it
does not attain to the movements of sense-perception, and, again, though a certain
further animate power arises in the irrational animals, neither does this reach
perfection, for it does not contain in itself the grace of reason and mind.
[30.33] Therefore, we say that the true and perfect soul is the human, known
by every activity. If anything else shares in life we speak of it as animate by a sort of
customary misuse of language, because in these cases the soul is not perfect, but
only certain parts of the animated activity, which, we have learnt, have also arisen
in the human being, according to Moses’ mystical anthropogony, through kinship
with the impassioned. Therefore, Paul, advising those able to hear him to lay hold
of perfection, proposes the way by which they may attain to that which is earnestly

²² 1 Cor. 13:11.
 328   

σπουδαζομένου τύχοιεν ὑποτίθεται, λέγων ἀπεκδύσασθαι δεῖν τὸν παλαιὸν

ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος.
[30.34] Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανέλθωμεν πάντες ἐπὶ τὴν θεοειδῆ χάριν ἐκείνην ἐν ᾗ ἔκτισε τὸ κατ᾽
ἀρχὰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ Θεὸς, εἰπών· ὅτι ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ
305 ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν· ᾧ ἡ δόξα καὶ τὸ κράτος εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν.

301 ὑποτίθεται] ὑποδεικνύει N post ἀπεκδύσασθαι des. W 302 ἐνδύσασθαι] ita A Æ B C D E

F G H L M O P S X Forb : ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν νέον R Ald Mign 303 ἐπανέλθωμεν] ἐπανέλθοιμεν
Æ B C D Epc (οι sup. l.) F L N : ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν B N R 303–4 τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τὸν] τὸν
κατ᾽ἀρχὰς D E 305 ὁμοίωσιν] καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν Æ B N O καὶ τὸ κράτος om. Æ B N
O Dion κράτος] κράτος νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ R : potentia Patri et Filio et Sancto Spiritui Eri
        329

desired, saying it is necessary to put off the old human being and put on the one
being renewed in accordance with the image of the Creator.²³
[30.34] Now may we all ascend to that divine grace in which God at the first
created the human being, saying, Let us make the human being in accordance with
our image and likeness; to whom be glory and might unto ages of ages. Amen.

²³ Col. 3:9–10.
 Appendix

In their work on the manuscript tradition of Basil’s Hexaemeron, Emmanuel Amand de

Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg identified three different collections in which that work
appears.¹ The first is the ‘small’ collection, including Basil’s Hexaemeron and the two
homilies On the Words: Let us Make the Human Being (also called Homilies on the
Creation of the Human Being; CPG 3217) to which the apocryphal homily On Paradise
(CPG 3217) is sometimes added. The second is the ‘normal’ collection, in which Basil’s
Hexaemeron is supplemented by Gregory’s On the Human Image of God and sometimes his
Hexaemeron. The third is a larger collection, bringing together all the texts that are in the
small and normal collection: Gregory’s On the Human Image of God, the Hexaemeron,
the two homilies On the Words: Let us Make the Human Being, and occasionally the
Hexaemeron and On Paradise. Of the manuscripts that they list, 68 contain Gregory’s
treatise (18 in the large collection; 50 in the normal collection), 14 of which had been used
by Forbes. This appendix provides a full list of these 68 manuscripts, together with the
details they supplied and further details gained from the collation undertaken for this
volume. The online database ‘Pinakes|Πίνακες Textes et manuscrits grecs’ lists 166 manu-
scripts of Gregory’s treatise.²

9th to 10th Centuries

Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 413, 374v–413r (M–R, 117–19: E 2, normal)
Missing Ep. to Peter. 374v–375r list of 31 headings. 375v–413r complete treatise, entitled
περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου.
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 2053, 247r–283v (M–R, 124–5: G 1, normal)
No initial title. 248r (M–R and Pinakes have 247r) Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ
Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 248rv Ep. to Peter. 248v Τοῦ ὁσίου πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου
Νύσης. σύνταξις κεφαλαίων λ, but no list of headings. 248v–283v treatise in 30 chapters, with
headings and numbers ornately marked out. Text breaks off a few lines before the end of the
treatise, at last line of 283v, with ὑποτίθεται, λέγων ἀπεκδύσασθαι (PG 44, 256 C 4).
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 2066, 299r–316v (M–R, 115–17 E 1, normal)
No initial title. 299r Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης.
299r–300r Ep. to Peter. 300r–301r list of 30 headings with numbers in margin. 301r heading

¹ Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta and Stig Y. Rudberg, Basile de Césarée: La tradition manuscrite
directe des neuf homélies sur l’Hexaéméron, TU 123 (Berlin: Akademie, 1980).
² https://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr (accessed 23 October, 2021); the information it supplies, however,
should be treated with caution: it lists the 8th to 9th century Athens, EBE 223 as containing exclusively
works by Basil but also as including Gregory’s treatise; and it dates Moscow, Musée historique, grec 81
Vladimir to the 10th century, which as M–R observe is correct for folios 2–120, but folios 121–235, in
which we have Gregory’s work, date to the 12th century.
332 

Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπίσκοπου Νύσης, then title of first chapter. 301r–316v incomplete text,
containing first eleven chapters and part of chapter 12; text of treatise breaks off at last line
of 316v, with κάτοπτρον γινομένην κρατεῖ (PG 44, 161 D 1). Chapters’ divisions are clearly
indicated by line of ornamentation and the chapter numbers are written in the margin.
Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale di San Marco, grec. 58, 65v–116r (M–R, 119–21: E 3, normal)
65v title in red uncials: Τοῦ μακαρίου καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης· εἰς τὴν
ἀναπλήρωσιν τῶν προκειμένων τῆς ἐξαημέρου. 65v–66v: πρόλογος τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ
Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκοπος Νύσης. 66v–67v list of 31 headings, under the title:
κεφάλαια ἐμπιλόσοφα περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κτίσεως· καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου δὲ μερικῶς·
ἅπερ ἦν λείποντα τῇ ἐξαημέρῳ· ἥν προείρηκεν ὁ μακάριος καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις Βασίλειος. 67v–116r
text in 31 chapters, with scholia.

10th Century
Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, grec. 4.27, 186v–240v (M–R 27–9: A 3, normal)
Dated to the first part of the 10th century. No initial title. 186v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ
Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 186v–187v Ep. to Peter. 187v–188v list of 30
headings with numbers. 188v–240v treatise in 30 chapters with numbers in the margins, and
scholia.
Genova, Biblioteca Franzoniana, grec 17, 209v–305v (M–R, 126–9: G 2, large)
Second part of 10th century. No general title of treatise. 209v–211r Ep. to Peter. 211r–212v
list of 30 headings. 213r–305v treatise in 30 chapters, beginning with heading of
chapter 1.
Lesbos, Gymnase de Mytilène, grec 1, 54v–85v (M–R, 42–3: A 6, normal, M–R)
Perhaps late 10th or early 11th century. 54v–85v incomplete text.
Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, grec 189, 50v–126v (M–R, 39–40: A 4, normal)
Probably last part of 10th century. 50v–52r Ep. to Peter. 52r–53v list of 30 headings; 54r–
126v treatise in 30 chapters.
Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, grec 359, 75r–103v (M–R, 64–5: B 3, normal)
Probably beginning of 10th century. 75r–103v order of folios disrupted; Ep. to Peter; list of
headings and fragments.
Moscow, Bibliothèque de l’Université, grec 1, 83v–153v (M–R, 136–8: E 5, normal)
First part of 10th century. 83v–85r Ep. to Peter. 85r–86r list of 31 headings; 86r–153v treatise
in 31 chapters.
Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec. 144, 98r–174v (M–R, 56–7: A*15, normal)
Dated to the second part of the 10th century. No initial title. 98v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ
Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 98v–100r Ep. to Peter. 100r–101r list of 30
headings. 101v–174v treatise in 30 chapters, with numbers in the margins. 174v explicit in
black uncials: τοῦ ἐν ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου νύσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec. 476, 64v–116v (M–R, 22–5: A 1, normal)
Dated to the first part of the 10th century. No initial title. 64v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ
Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσης. 64v–65v Ep. to Peter. 65v–66v list of 30
headings. 66v–116v treatise in 30 chapters, with numbers in the margins, and scholia.
  333

116v explicit: Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης θεώρια εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου, written around an image of the cross.
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec. 408, 89v–161v (M–R, 36–7: C 1, normal)
Dated to the second part of the 10th century. No initial title. 89v Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ
Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος Νύσσης. 89v–91r Ep. to Peter. 91r–92v list of 31
headings. 92v–161v treatise in 31 chapters, with numbers written in the margins and scholia.

10th to 11th Centuries

Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, grec 4.18, 137r–219r (M–R, 201–4: G 5, large)
137r–138v Ep. to Peter. No list of headings. 138v–219r treatise in 30 chapters; folios 138–45
are inserted between folios 153 and 154.
Oxford, Bodleian, Barocci grec 228, 65r–118v (M–R, 138–41: E 6, normal)
65r two dodecasyllables in the hand of the copyist:
ὡς αὐτάδελφος καὶ ὁμότροπος πέλων,
πληροῖ τὸ λεῖπον τοῦ σοφοῦ Βασιλείου.
65r title: περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου τοῦ μακαρίου Γρηγορίου ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου. 65r:
Τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐν κυρίῳ χαίρειν. 65r–66r
Ep. to Peter. 66r–67r list of 31 headings. 67r–118v treatise in 31 chapters, with numbers in
margin, and scholia. 118v, explicit in black uncials: Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης ἀδελφοῦ
τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin grec. 235, 121r–208v (M–R, 249–52: I 1,
normal)
No initial title. 121r Τῷ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος νύσης εἰς
τὸν ἄνθρωπον. 121r–123r Ep. to Peter. 123r–124v list of 31 headings. 124v–208v treatise in 31
chapters, with numbers in the margins. Text breaks off a few lines before the conclusion of
chapter 31, with ἐν τῷ ἀτελεῖ καὶ ἐν (PG 44, 255 D 10).
Patmos, Monastery St John, grec 47, 67v–121v (M–R, 79–80: C 2, normal)
67v–68v Ep. to Peter. 69rv list of 30 headings. 70r–121v treatise in 30 chapters, entitled εἰς
τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν.
Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 160, 60r–113v (M–R, 80–1: C 3, normal)
Beginning damaged; Ep. to Peter missing. 60r Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου
ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης κεφάλαια τριάκοντα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν followed by
list of 30 headings. 61r–113v, text of treatise missing first seven chapters and first part of
chapter 8.

11th Century
Athens, Ἐθνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, grec 415, 94v–96v (M–R, 142–3: E 8, large)
Restored in 16th. Only contains the Ep. to Peter.
Athos, Iviron, grec 335, 136v–152v, 161r–258r (M–R, 81–2: C 4, normal)
136v–139r Ep. to Peter. 139r–141v list of 31 headings. 141v–152v, 161r–258r treatise in 31
chapters with each title written in full in uncials.
334 

Athos, Lavra, grec B.77, 66r–120v (M–R, 82–3: C 5, normal)

Perhaps end of 11th century. 66r title: Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου περὶ εἰκόνος· εἰς τὰ ἐλλειφθέντα
τῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Βασιλείου ἐπισκόπου γεγραμμένων εἰς τὴν ἑξαήμερον. 66r–67v
Ep. to Peter. 67r–68r list of 31 headings. 68r–120v incomplete text in 31 chapters, lacking
end of chapter 31.
Athos, Lavra, grec. B.105, 78r–172v (M–R, 83–5: C 6, normal)
Perhaps copied in 1092. 78r title in uncials red ink: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου
Νύσσης· λόγος κεφαλαιώδης εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 78r–79r Ep. to Peter. 79r–80v
list of 30 headings. 89r–140r treatise in 30 chapters.
Athos, Vatopedi, grec. 54, 83r–146r (M–R, 85–6: C 7, normal)
83r–84r Ep. to Peter. 84r–146r treatise in 30 chapters, with titles written in margins.
Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, grec 833, 51r–122v (M–R, 45–6: A 8, normal)
51r–52v Ep. to Peter; no list of headings; 52v–122v treatise in 30 chapters; text (and the
manuscript) breaks off a few lines before end: ψυχὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εἶναι (PG 44, 256
B 8–9).
Modène, Biblioteca Estense, grec 72, 109r–208r (M–R, 96–7: D 1, normal)
Incomplete text preceded by Ep. to Peter.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Coislin grec 228, 62r–74v, only 12 chaps. (M–R,
90–1: C*10, normal)
62rv Ep. to Peter. 63r–74v incomplete treatise, entitled: Γρυγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης
ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν. Chapters are numbered
in the margin, and their titles marked in the text in red ink; treatise breaks off at end of 74v,
towards the close of chapter 12, with words καθορᾶσθαι τοῦ πλάσματος (PG 44, 164A2–3).
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 405, 111r–229v (M–R, 91–2: C*11, normal)
111r–112v Ep. to Peter. 113r–114r same letter copied by a later hand (11th–13th cent.).
114r–115v list of 30 headings. 116r–203v complete treatise in 30 chapters.
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 407, 117v–199r (M–R, 51–2: A 12, normal)
117v–119r Ep. to Peter. 119r–120v list of 30 headings. 121r–199r complete treatise in 30
chapters.

12th Century
Athos, Koutloumousiou, grec 4, 101r–171v (M–R, 204–5: G 6, normal)
101r–102v Ep. to Peter. 102v–103v list of 30 headings. 103v–171v treatise in 30 chapters; last
folio torn, thus missing end of chapter 30.
Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale, 11.354, 73r–124v (M–R, 255–7: I 3, normal)
73r general title in red ink: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Νύσης ἡ
γένεσις. 73r–74r list of 30 headings. 74r–75r Ep. to Peter. 75r–124v treatise in 30 chapters;
treatise (and manuscript) breaks off at end of chapter 29 with κεκρυμμένην μέν, ζῶσαν (PG
44, 240 A 14).
Escurial, Biblioteca de El Escorial, Ψ II.18 (grec 453), 70v–118v (M–R, 69–70: B 6, normal)
70v–71v Ep. to Peter. 71v–72v list of 30 headings. 72v–118v complete treatise in 30
chapters.
  335

Lesbos, Monastery of St John, grec 6, 117–90 (M–R, 148–9: E 12, large)

Title: . . . πρὸς Πέτρον τὸν ἴδιον ἀδελφόν· καὶ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ
Βασιλείου τουτέστιν εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
Moscow, Musée historique, grec 81 Vladimir, 189r–234v (M–R, 150: E 13, normal)
189r–191r Ep. to Peter. 191r title, Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευήν followed by list of 31 headings. 191r–243r treatise in 31 chapters; last chapter damaged.
Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, grec 18, 91v–168r (M–R, 176–7: F 2, normal)
Copied before 13 Sept. 1175. 91v title in red ink: Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ
Βασιλείου θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν. 91v–93r Ep. to Peter. 93r–94v list of
30 headings; 94v–168r treatise in 30 chapters.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 479, 76r–140v (M–R, 97–9: D 2, normal)
Probably copied in first part of century, restored and supplemented in 15th century.
76r–77r title in red ink: Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρυγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης, ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου
Βασιλείου, εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον θεωρία, followed by Ep. to Peter; 77v–78v list of 31 headings.
79r–140v treatise in 31 chapters.
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pii II grec 25, 77r–80v fragment (M–R, 205–8: G 6,
large)
Chapter 1 is damaged at the beginning; chapters 2–5 complete; chapter 6 incomplete: 77r
begins καὶ τῇ ποικίλῃ τῶν δένδρων ὥρᾳ (PG 44, 132 B 1); 80v ends ποιήσωμεν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον
κα (PG 44, 140 B 6).

13th Century
Athens, Ἐθνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, grec 433, 220r–259v (M–R, 224–6: H 1, normal)
Manuscript restored in 15th century. 220rv Ep. to Peter. 220v–221v list of 30 headings,
κεφάλαια τριάκοντα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν. 221v–258v treatise in 30 chapters;
treatise, and manuscript, breaks off in the middle of chapter 30, at bottom of 259v with ἐκ
μηχανῆς τινὸς ἀποδείκνυσι (PG 44, 249 D1–2).
Athos, Dionysiou, grec 55 (93), 74r–142v (M–R, 152–3: E 15, normal)
74r–75r Ep. to Peter. 75r–76r list of 31 headings, title and incipit for each chapter. 76r–142v
treatise in 31 chapters, entitled: Τοῦ μακαρίου καὶ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου
ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς.
Escurial, Biblioteca de El Escorial, Ψ II.12 (grec 447), 74r–126v (M–R, 70: B 7, normal)
74rv Ep. to Peter. 74v–75v list of 30 headings. 76r–126v, complete treatise, titled εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ
τῆς ἑξαημέρου, in 30 chapters.
Escurial, Biblioteca de El Escorial, Ψ III.5 (grec 460), 124v–215v (M–R, 177–8: F 3, normal)
124v–126v Ep. to Peter. 126v–215v treatise in 30 chapters; incomplete, breaking off with
ἐρύθημα καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν τοῦ κρίνον (PG 44, 252 C 12).
Oxford Christ Church Library, grec. 45, 115r–194r, 13th (M–R, 57–8: A*16, normal)
115r–116v Ep. to Peter. 116v–118r list of 30 headings; 118r–194r text in 30 chapters, with
scholia. 194r explicit: τοῦ ἐν ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and this dodecasyllable verse:
+ ὁ σταυρὸς ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος καλῶν πέλει.
336 

Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, grec 69 (B 3.3), 72r–115v (M–R, 157–8: E 19, large)
72r–73r Ep. to Peter. 73r–115v list of headings followed by treatise.
Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 134, 95r–150v (M–R, 101–2: D 4,
large)
Dated by ÖNB to 1200 Constantinople; by Pinakes to c.1300. No initial title. 95r τῷ ἀδελφῷ
δούλῳ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐπίσκπος νίσης. 95r–96v Ep. to Peter. 96v–98r list of
30 headings. 98r–150v text; headings and numbers, in margins, in red ink.

14th Century
London, British Library, Harleianus 5576, 52r–72r (M–R, 58–9: A*17, normal)
52r list of 12 first chapters. 53r title Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου
Νύσσης εἰς τὰ ἐπίλοιπα τῆς ἑξαημέρου. 53r–53v Ep. to Peter. 53v–72r treatise in 30 chapters,
breaking off at end of 72r with: τὸ φυτὸν τελειοῦσας ὅπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν (PG 44, 240 B 6–7).
Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, grec 96 (B 63 sup.), 87r–136v (M–R, 179–80: P F 4, normal)
87r–88v Ep. to Peter. 88v incomplete list of first six headings. 89r blank. 89v–136v, incom-
plete treatise, lacking most of chapter 30, breaking off at end of 136v with words ἔστι δὲ καὶ
ἄλλα τινὰ (PG 44, 241 A 7).
Moscow, Musée historique, grec 126 Vladimir, 70r–111v (M–R, 144–6: E 9, normal)
70rv Ep. to Peter; 71r–111v list of 30 headings; treatise in 30 chapters, entitled: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις
πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου τοῦ Νύσσης ὑπόθεσις εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν, ἐν λόγοις
ἤγουν ἐν κεφαλαίοις λ᾽
Moscow, Musée historique, grec 132 Vladimir, 96r–148v (M–R, 160–1: E 21, normal)
Dated 1339. 96r–148v Κεφάλαια τριάκοντα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διάπλασιν; list of 30
headings; treatise in 30 chapters.
Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 192, 111v–166v (M–R, 232–4: H 4,
normal)
Dated c.1370. 111v title: Τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης, εἰς τὴν ἑξαήμερον· τοῦ
μακαρίου Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου βασιλείου περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου
τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ ἀδελφῳ δούλῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ Πέτρῳ γρηγόριος ἐν Κυρίω χαίρειν. 111v–112v Ep. to
Peter. 112v–113v list of 31 headings. 114r–166v treatise in 31 chapters, with headings and
numbers (placed before the heading) in red ink.
Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 240, 65r–109v (M–R, 155: E 17, normal)
Dated by BSB and Pinakes to the 15th century; by M–R to the 14th century. 65r title: Τοῦ ἐν
ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσης κεφάλαια τριάκοντα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευήν. 65r–66r Ep. to Peter. 66r–109v text divided into 30 chapters; headings marked
by large capital in the margin together with number, in red ink.
Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. graec. 570, 108r–170v (M–R, 161–3: E 22, large)
108r τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης πρὸς Πέτρον ἴδιον ἀδελφὸν εἰς τὰ
λοιπὰ τῆς ἐξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῷ Βασιλείου· τουτέστιν εἰς τὴν κατακσκευὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου. Ep. to Peter. List of 30 headings; treatise in 30 chapters.
Oxford, Bodleian, Aucarium E.1.6 (Misc. graecus 20), 319r–363r (M–R, 212–5: G 10, large)
319rv Ep. to Peter, damaged at beginning (beginning at PG 44, 125 B 6). 319v–320v list of 31
headings. 320v–363r text in 31 chapters.
  337

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 503, 165r–203r (M–R, 226–30: H 2, large)
165rv Ep. to Peter; Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Γρηγορίου τῆς Νύσσης πρόγραμμα εἰς τὴν περὶ διαπλάσεως τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου φιλοσοφίαν ἢ φυσιολογίαν. 165v–203r treatise in 31 chapters; titles of chapters
written in margins in red ink.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 956, 90v–143v (M–R, 230–2: H 3, large)
90v title in red ink: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης πρὸς Πέτρον
τὸν ἴδιον ἀδελφοῦ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἑξαημέρου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Βασιλείου, τουτέστιν εἰς τὴν
κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 90v–91v Ep. to Peter. 92r–93r list of 30 headings. 93r–143v
treatise in 30 chapters.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 940, 140r–177v (M–R, 257–9: I 4, normal)
140r–141r Ep. to Peter: Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Γρηγορίου πρόγραμμα εἰς τὴν περὶ διαπλάσεως τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου φυσιολογίαν. 141rv list of 31 headings. 142r–177v treatise in 31 chapters, with
the title: Τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυσιολογία περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς, ἤτοι εἰς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῆς
ἑξαημέρου. Titles not repeated in text nor margin; the chapter number is indicated in
margin with red ink.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 777 A, 246v–327v (M–R, 259–63: I 5, large)
14th to 15th century. 246v–248r Ep. to Peter. Title: Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρόγραμμα εἰς τὴν περὶ
διαπλάσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φυσιολογίαν. 248r–249v list of 31 headings. 249v–327v Τοῦ αὐτοῦ
φυσιολογία τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς, ἤτοι εἰς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῆς ἑξαημέρου. Treatise in
31 chapters.
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 1277, 54v–82v (M–R, 102–4: D 5, large)
54v–55r list of 30 headings. 55r–56r Ep. to Peter: Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου
ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν· πρὸς τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀδελφὸν
αὐτοῦ Πέτρον. 56r–82v treatise in 30 chapters, with chapter numbers in the margins.
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 1857, 111r–139r (M–R, 72–3: B 8, large)
No title. Ep. to Peter. Treatise breaks off in chapter 21 (PG 44, 201 B 1); some marginal
scholia; folios 139v–142v blank.

15th Century
Bucarest, Bibliothèque de l’Academie de Romanie, grec 559 (165), 104v–165r (M–R, 165–6:
E 25, large)
Ep. to Peter. List of 30 headings; treatise in 30 chapters.
Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, grec 10.12, 117v–176r (M–R, 93–4: C*12, normal)
117v–119r Ep. to Peter. 119v–121r list of 31 chapters. 121r–176r treatise in 31 chapters:
Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ μέγαλου Βασιλείου· εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
κατασκευήν.
Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4806 (grec O. 87), 155r–245r (M–R, 215–17: G 11, large)
115r–242r treatise in 30 chapters; text incomplete with lacunae. 242v–245r Ep. to Peter.
Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, grec 668 (Q. 14 sup.), 96r(90r)–162v(156v) (M–R, 74: B 9,
normal)
96r Τὸ ἐπίλοιπον τῶν ὁμιλιῶν τῆς ἑξαμέρου Γρηγορίου Νύσης: εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου κεφάλαια τριάκοντα καὶ δύο ὧν τὸ πρῶτὸν περὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
96r–97v list of 32 headings. 97v–99r Ep. to Peter. 99r–162v treatise in 32 chapters.
338 

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, grec 968, 135r–204v (M–R, 106–8: D 7, large)
135r Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἀρχιεπισκόπου Νύσσης θεωρία εἰς τὴν του
ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν. 135r–136v Ep. to Peter. 136v–138v list of headings. 138v–204v
treatise; titles of chapters written in full in red ink in the text.
Sinai, St Catherine, grec 328, 60r–100v (M–R, 241–2: H9, normal)
60r–61r Ep. to Peter. 61rv list of 30 headings.
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, grec 1568, 108r–193v (M–R, 169–70: E 28, large)
108r–109v Ep. to Peter. 109v–111r list of 30 headings. 111r–193v treatise in 30 chapters, εἰς
τὰ ἐπίλοιπα τοῦ ἑξαημέρου. 113v, two dodecasyllables in the hand of the copyist.
Καὶ Γρηγορίου τοῦ σοφοῦ πέρας φθάνει
ἔκφρασις ἀνθρώπου νῦν ἠγλαϊσμένη.
Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 113, 79r–138r (M–R, 180–1: F 5,
normal)
Dated 27/8/1412. 79r title: περὶ εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπου· τοῦ μακαρίου Γρηγορίου ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ
ἁγίου Βασιλείου τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ ἀδελφῷ δούλῳ Θεοῦ πέτρῳ ἐπισκόπῳ Γρηγόριος ἐν Κυρίῳ
χαίρειν. 79r–80r Ep. to Peter. 80r–81r list of 31 headings; 81v–138r, treatise in 31 chapters.
Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, theol. gr. 168, 73v–120r (M–R, 237–8: H 7,
normal)
Dated M–R to 15th century; Pinakes to the 14th century. Lacking Ep. to Peter and list of
headings; begins immediately, 73v, with title: εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευήν.

16th Century
Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Palatinus graecus 327, 64r–123r (M–R, 60–1: A*18,
normal)
List of headings, followed by Ep. to Peter and treatise.
 Bibliography

Gregory of Nyssa, On the Human Image of God

Editions
Editio Princeps: Gregorii Nazanzeni Theologi orationes novem elegantissimae, Gregorii
Nysseni liber de homine, quae omnia nunc primum, emendatissima, in lucem prodeunt
(Aldus, 1536); and in the final colophon: Venetiis, in aedibus haeredum Aldi, et Andreae
Asulani soceri. MDXXXVI.
Löwenklau (Levvencklaius), Johannes, ed., Γρηγορίου τοῦ Νύσσης ἐπισκόπου θαυμαστὴ
βίβλος, περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου. Opus admirandum Gregorii Nysseni antistitis de
hominis opificio, interprete Iohanne Levvenklaio, annotationibus estiam necessariis
additis. Liber medicinae, philosophiae sacrarumque litterarum studiosis perutilis
(Basel: Ioannis Oporini, 1567).
Forbes, George Hay, ed., Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Γρηγορίου ἐπισκόπου Νύσσης (ἀδελφοῦ
τοῦ μεγάλου Βασιλείου) τὰ εὑρισκόμενα πάντα. Sancti patris nostri Gregorii Nysseni
Basilii Magni fratris quae supersunt omnia. In unum corpus collegit, ad fidem codd.
mss. recensuit, Latinis versionibus quam accuratissimis instruxit et genuina a supposititiis
discrevit, Tomus primus, Fasc. 1 and 2 (Burntisland: Pitsligo Press, 1855, 1861).
Migne, J.-P., ed., PG 44.125–256 (Paris, 1858).

Versions
Latin: Dionysius Exiguus. See Forbes.
Latin: John Scottus Eriugena. Ed. Cappuyns, M., ‘Le “De imagine” de Grégoire de Nysse
traduit par Jean Scot Érigène’, in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 32
(Louvain, 1965), pp. 205–62; ed. Giovanni Mandolino, in Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae,
Carmina; De Imagine, ed. Michael W. Herren, Andrew Dunning, Giovanni Mandolino,
and Chiara O. Tommasi, CCCM 167 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020), 67–165.
Syriac: ‘La versione siriaca del “De opificio hominis” di Gregorio di Nissa’: T. Clementoni,
on Chapters 13–14, SROC 5 (1982), 81–101, 157–71; M. R. De Deo, further on
Chapter 14, SROC 3 (1983) 39–56, 181–95; F. Grassi, on Chapters 9–11, SROC 7
(1984), 25–50, 191–206; and A. Bonanni, on Chapter 22, SROC 10 (1987), 149–70.
Slavonic: ed. Sels, Lara, Gregory of Nyssa, De hominis opificio О Образѣ Чловѣка: The
Fourteenth-Century Slavonic Translation: A Critical Edition with Greek Parallel and
Commentary, Bausteine zur Slavischen Philologie und Kulturgeschichte NF 21 (Köln:
Böhlau, 2009).

Translations
Wilson, Henry Austin, in William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson, Select Writings and
Letters of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, NPNF, second series, vol. 5 (1893; reprinted Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 387–427.
LaPlace, Jean, and Jean Daniélou, Grégoire de Nysse: La création de l’homme, SC 6 (Paris:
Cerf, 2002 [1943]).
340 

Guillaumin, J. Y., and A. G. Hamman, Grégoire de Nysse: La création de l’homme (Paris:

Desclée de Brouwer, 1982).
Salmona, B., Gregorio di Nissa. L’uomo, Collana di testi patristici 32 (Rome: Città Nuova,
1982, reprinted 2000).
Лурье, В., Об устроении человека (St Petersburg, 2000).

Editions and Translations of Other Works of Gregory

Catechetical Oration (Cat. Or.). Ed. Ekkehard Mühlenberg, GNO 3.4 (Leiden: Brill, 1996);
ET, with parallel Greek text, Ignatius Green, PPS 60 (Yonkers: St Vladimir’s Seminary
Press, 2019).
Homilies on Ecclesiastes (Eccl.). Ed. P. Alexander GNO 5 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 277–442; ET
Stuart G. Hall, in idem, ed. Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on Ecclesiastes (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1993), 31–144.
Hexameron (Hex.). Ed. Hubertus R. Drobner, GNO 4.1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009); ET Robin Orton,
FC Shorter Works 1 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2021).
On the Inscriptions of the Psalms (Inscr.). Ed. James McDonough, GNO 5 (Leiden: Brill,
1986), 24–175; ET Ronald E. Heine, OECS (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
Letters (Ep.). Ed. G. Pasquali, GNO 8.2, 2nd edn. (Leiden: Brill, 1998); ET Anna M. Silvas,
Suppl. VC 83 (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
On the Life of Moses (Vit. Moys.). Ed. Herbert Musurillo, GNO 7.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1991); ET
Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson, CWS (New York: Paulist Press, 1978).
Homilies on the Song of Songs (Cant.). Ed. Hermann Langerbeck, GNO 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1986);
ET, with parallel Greek Text, Richard A. Norris, WGRW 13 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2012).
On the Soul and Resurrection (An. et res.). Ed. Andreas Spira, GNO 3.3 (Leiden: Brill, 2014);
ET in Anna M. Silvas, Macrina the Younger: Philosopher of God, Medieval Women: Texts
and Contexts, 22 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 117–246.
On Those Who Have Fallen Asleep (Mort). Ed. Gunter Heil, in GNO 9.1 (Leiden: Brill,
1967), 28–68; ET by Rowan A. Greer in One Path for All: Gregory of Nyssa on the
Christian Life and Human Destiny (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2014), 94–117.
On Virginity (Virg.). Ed. John P. Cavarnos, GNO 8.1 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 215–343; ed. with
French trans. Michel Aubineau, SC 119 (Paris: Cerf, 1966); ET Virginia Woods Callahan,
FC 58 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 6–75.
On the Three Day Period (Trid. spat.). Ed. E. Gebhardt, GNO 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1967),
273–306; ET Stuart Hall, in Andreas Spira and Christoph Klock, The Easter Sermons
of Gregory of Nyssa: Translation and Commentary: Proceedings of the Fourth
International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, Cambridge, England: 11–15 September,
1978, Patristic Monograph Series, 9 (Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation,
1981), 31–50.

Editions and Translations of Ancient Texts

Alcinous, Epitome (Epi). Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon, ed. J. Whittaker
(Paris: Belles Lettres, 1990); ET J. Dillon, The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993).
Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture (Mixt.). Ed. I. Bruns, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis
praeter commentaria scripta minora, CAG, Suppl. 2.2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1892); ed. and
ET Robert B. Todd (Leiden: Brill, 1976).
  341

Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Soul (De an.). Ed. Ivor Bruns, CAG, Suppl. 2.1 (Berlin:
Reimer, 1887); Partial ET Victor Caston, ACA (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); full ET
Athanasios P. Fotinis (PhD thesis: Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1978).
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement (Mantissa). Ed. Robert W. Sharples, Peripatoi:
Philologisch-historische Studien zum Aristotelismus, 21 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008); ET
Robert W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to On the Soul, ACA
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Meteorology (Meteor.). Ed. M. Hayduck, CAG, Suppl. 3.2
(Berlin: Reimer, 1899); ET Eric Lewis, ACA (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
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Greek Manuscripts’, in Liv Ingeborg Lied and Marilena Maniaci, eds., Bible as Notepad:
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Stead, Suppl. VC 19 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 227–46.
Wood, Jordan, The Whole Mystery of Christ: Creation as Incarnation in Maximus Confessor
(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2022).
Young, Frances M., ‘Adam and Anthropos: A Study of the Interaction of Science and the
Bible in Two Anthropological Treatises of the Fourth Century’, VC 37 (1983), 110–40.
Young, Robin D., ‘Gregory of Nyssa’s Use of Theology and Science in Constructing
Theological Anthropology’, Pro Ecclesia 2.3 (1993), 345–63.
Zachhuber, Johannes, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and
Theological Significance (Leiden: Brill, 2014 [2000]).
Zachhuber, Johannes, ‘Once Again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals’, JTS NS 56.1 (2005),
75–98.
Zachhuber, Johannes, ‘The Soul as Dynamis in Gregory of Nyssa’s On the Soul and
Resurrection’, in Marmodoro and McLynn, eds., Exploring Gregory of Nyssa, 142–59.
 Index of Ancient Sources

Where texts are not divided into books and chapters, in either editions or translations, reference is
given to the page number of the edition cited in the Bibliography.

I: Scripture 40 211 n.63

Genesis 45:4–9 83
1–3 63 n.56 Exodus
1:1 53, 64, 69, 71, 153 12:2 67
1:2 53 33:12 247
1:3–5 64 Leviticus
1:5 52 17:11 72
1:6–8 54
Numbers
1:8–10 64
1:9 71 n.75 16:5 247
1:11–12 58 Deuteronomy
1:11 71 n.75 4:23 116, 301
1:14–18 71 n.75 4 Reigns
1:14 71 n.75, 81 5 285 n.105
1:16–18 71 n.75
Psalms
1:22 13, 257 n.74
5:13 130
1:26–7 49, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 91, 102, 112,
7:10 195
125, 255
8:6 109, 235
1:26 52, 56, 96, 106, 133, 134, 149, 161, 167,
33:9 130
189, 223
36:4 245
1:27 30, 59 n.52, 62, 75, 88, 103, 104, 108, 134,
48:13 237
137, 223
54:7 253 n.68
1:28 113, 134, 257
73.2 69
2:1 95, 157
83:3 259
2:2 57
83:11 259
2:3 57
83:13 259
2:4–5 57, 61
93:9 167
2:4 58, 64, 93, 153
94:4 112, 255
2:6 58
103:4 87
2:7 55, 56, 59, 59 n.52, 60, 62, 98,
103:24 66, 70
101, 291
103:29–30 281 n.99
2:9 111, 245, 247
103:31 281 n.99
2:16 111, 245 n.45
103:35 281 n.99
2:17 111, 245
143:3 111
2:18 134 n.42
143:4 251
2:23 85
2:24 75, 76 Proverbs
3 50 3:18 111, 245
3:6 249 8:22 67, 68, 69
3:19 281 n.102 9:5 243
3:21 85, 129 17:6 39, 145
5:1 63, 64 Ecclesiastes
37 83 1:8 183 n.42
356    

Ecclesiastes (cont.) 7:11–17 275 n.92

1:9–11 92 11:50 76 n.88
6:12 65 12:49 87
Job 16:24–31 285 n.104
10:11 85 20:35–6 109, 233
23:27–9 269 n.88
Wisdom
24:32 87
6:19 124
7:25 70 John
11:17 69 1:1 165
1:1–3 67
Amos
1:3 66 n.66, 70
5:8 69, 86
1:13 125
8:11 243
1:14 76
Isaiah 3:14 92
6:2 65 3:31–2 77
12:3 243 n.42 4:49 273
26:18 131 7:37 243
41:22–3 65 8:28 77, 92
52:13 92 10:5 305 n.2
53:2 86 12:34 92
Jeremiah 13:35 165
1:5 72 16:21 129
2:19 122 17:24 76 n.88, 78, 79
20:27 279 n.95
Ezekiel
29:1–9; 28 84 n.100 Acts
1:7 261
Susanna (Θ)
42 106, 112, 255, 229, 297 Romans
1:1 81
Matthew 2:28–9 83
1:1 84 6:3 127
1:18 84 7:22 297 n.114
4:4 111, 243 8:13 74
5:6 243 8:20 79
6:25 291 8:21 80
7:23 247 8:29–30 70
8:16 285 n.105 8:29 122
11:12 122 9:6 83
13:35 76 n.88 9:8 83
15:24 72 11:34 189
17:2 86 14:17 111, 129, 243
19:4–5 75
22:21 229 1 Corinthians
22:30 85–8, 128 1:21 86
24:21 79 1:24 66
25:34 76 n.88, 79 2:14–15 97, 177 n.36
2:15 111, 247
Mark 2:16 165
12:30 177 3:3 97, 177 n.35
13:1 269 n.87 9:24–7 122
Luke 10:18 83
1.2 106, 229 12:27 76
3:28–38 84 13:11 119, 327
4:23 279 14:15 87
4:38–9 273 15:12 279 n.97
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15:22 83 4:17 114, 131, 259

15:24–8 66 5:21 111, 247
15:24–7 65 5:23 97, 177
15:27–8 70, 71 1 Timothy
15:28 65 2:15 131
15:31 130 4:10 67
15:35–54 115 6:10 247
15.35–44 83
15:38–44 129 2 Timothy
15:45–7 83 2:19 247
15:47 77 n.90, 112, 225 2:20 82
15:49–52 87 2:21 82
15:49 74 Hebrews
15:51–2 114, 257 4:3 76 n.88
15:51 131, 138 4:15 134
2 Corinthians 5:14 111, 247
2:14 130 9:26 76 n.88
3:18 72 10:23 281 n.98
4:16 73, 297 n.114 11:3 261
4:18 64, 79 11:11 76 n.88
5:1 131 11:13 259
12:4 130, 233 n.28 11:40 114, 259
12:9 122 12:22–3 84 n.100
13:3 165 1 Peter
Galatians 1:20 76 n.88
1:15 81 3:4 297 n.114
3:28 56, 88, 102, 106, 135, 136, 137 1 John
3:38 225 1:1 130
4:26 76, 84 n.100 4:7 96, 165
5:17 83 4:8 96, 165
5.19 74
Apocalypse
Ephesians 1:8 70
1:4 76 n.88, 78, 79, 80 3:14 67
1:10 136 3:15 82
2:22 131 13:8 76 n.88
3:10 78 17:8 76 n.88
3:16 297 n.114 22:13 67, 70
5:29 131
5:31 76 II: Gregory of Nyssa
6:14–17 131 An. et res.
Philippians 1.8–10 283 n.103
1:24 80 1.9–10 307 n.6
2:10 66, 70, 71 2.3 299 n.115
3:21 65, 85–8 2.10–18 253 n.66
2.41 229 n.18
Colossians 2.46 195 n.55, 219 n.67
1:15 67, 77 n.90, 78 2.53 193 n.52, 197 n.57
1:16 66 n.66 3.1 217 n.65
1:18 67 3.11–12 165 n.15
2:8 281 3.12 237 n.34
3:2 241 3.22–3 241 n.38
3:9–10 73, 88, 119, 329 3.34 165 n.20
1 Thessalonians 3.35 225 n.11
4:16 279 3.36 107 n.13, 231 n.24
358    

An. et res. (cont.) 8–9 94

3.37–43 175 n.30 9 94, 107 n.13, 161 n.11, 229 n.22,
3.39–50 239 n.35 255 n.72
4.10 193 n.52, 197 n.57 28 147 n.4
5.4–23 283 n.103 31 231 n.25
6.9–10 239 n.35 32 253 n.66
6.22 227 n.16 49 323 n.18
7.17 229 n.17 53 311 n.10
7.24 227 n.15 64 95, 103
8.3–6 289 n.108 77 23, 54, 145 n.3
8.4–5 291 n.111 78 155 n.5
8.20–1 289 n.108 De hom.
8.25–6 293 n.111 1–15 30, 49
8.31 291 n.111 1.1 93
9.2–13 261 n.82 1.2 93, 94
9.13–14 289 n.108 1.3 94
9.20–3 257 n.75 1.4 94
10.29 257 n.76 1.5 95
10.30–3 273 n.90 2 103
10.57 305 n.3 2.1 95
10.58–9 129 2.2 95
10.58 233 n.29 3.1 96, 125
10.64 129 3.2 96
10.66 129 4 96, 101
10.69–70 235 n.30 5.1 96
10.70 223 n.5 5.2 96
10.74 129 6.1 96
10.75 129 7 97
10.78 129 8.1 97
10.102–6 271 n.89 8.2 97
Hom. Cant. 8.3 97
2 147 n.5 8.4–7 104, 105, 118
5 229 n.17 8.4 97
7 225 n.10 8.5 97
8 122 n.27 8.6 97
12 249 n.59 8.7 97
Hom. Eccl. 8.8 39 n.25, 97
1 92, 235 n.30 9.1 38, 97, 98
2 195 n.54 10.1 98, 119
6 175 n.32 10.3–4 98
7 155 n.4 11.1 98
11.2 98
Epistles
11.3–4 98
Ep. to Peter 12–13 49
1 24, 89, 91 12.3 98
2 91 12.4 98
3 28, 91, 93, 120 12.5 98
Ep. 29 25 12.8 99
12.9–13 118
Ep. 30 25
12.9 99
Hex. 12.10 99
1 145 n.2 12.11 100, 105
6 147 n.6 , 231 n.24 12.12 100
7 94, 231 n.26, 261 n.82 12.13 100
     359

13 98, 100 24.3 115

14.1 98–99, 100 25.5 115
14.2 100 25.7–12 115
15 29, 101 26–7 115
15.1–2 100 28 115
15.3 100 29.1 115
16 29, 30 29.3 115
16.1–9 49 29.6 115
16.1 101 29.8 115–16
16.2 101 29.9 116
16.3 102 29.11 116
16.4 89, 102 30 29, 30, 49
16.7–8 102 30.1 116
16.7 108 30.2 117
16.9 103, 104, 109 30.28–9 50
16.10–11 105 30.28 117
16.12 106 30.29 117
16.13 106 30.30 50, 117–18
16.14 106, 110 30.31 119
16.15 106–7, 110 30.32–3 119
16.16–17 107 30.33 105, 119, 227 n.12
16.16 103, 107 30.34 119
16.17–18 108 Inscr.
17 113 1.3.22 181 n.40
17.1 109 1.11.131–7 325 n.21
17.2 109
17.4–5 107, 109–10 De Mortuis
17.4 105 47 130
17.5 110 48 126–7 n.33
18 29 52–3 130
18.1 110 52 130
18.2 110 54 130
18.3 110 61–2 131
18.4–5 119, 132 62 131
18.4 29, 111, 113 63 131
18.5 111, 113 64 132
18.6–8 111 Or. Cat.
18.9 111 5.3–10 227 n.15
19.1–4 111 6.3 155 n.4
19.5 111 6.7 229 n.19
20 113, 128 7.3 249 n.61
20.1 111 11.1 299 n.115
20.3 111 21.1–3 229 n.19
20.4–5 111 21.2–3 251 n.64
21 114 21.4–5 247 n.50
21.2 112 37.4–5 315 n.13
21.4 112 Trid. spat.
22 107 286.15–16 107 n.13, 231 n.24
22.2 103, 107, 112, 125
22.4 40, 112–13, 118, 134 Virg.
22.5 114 12 235 n.30
22.6 114 Vit. Moys.
22.7 114 Pref. 30
24 94 2.40 289 n.108
360    

Vit. Moys. (cont.) Metaph.

2.318–19 241 n.38 7.3.3–6 265 n.85
6.25–7.3 30 n.76 Meteor.
III: Other Ancient Sources 1.8 253 n.66
De part. an.
Alcinous
2.14–15 325 n.19
Epi.
3.14 317 n.15
10.5 265 n.85
4.5 309 n.8
17.4 191 n.49
4.10 39, 173 n.28, 173 n.29
Alexander of Aphrodisias Phys.
De Anima 8.2.252b26–7 221 n.2
8.25–11.5 175 n.30 Probl.
13.9–17.8 219 n.67 35.6 195 n.54
29.1–30.17 175 n.30
Athenagoras
35.24 175 n.31
De res. 3–8 281 n.101
38.13 175 n.31
39.21–40.3 191 n.50 Basil
61.8–19 185 n.43 Hex.
74.17–21 301 n.116 2.2 261 n.82
75.31 175 n.31 9.1 253 n.66
80.16–24 175 n.30 9.2 173 n.28
81.13–22 301 n.116 9.6 169 n.24
94.1–6 217 n.65 Hom. de creat. hom.
96.9 175 n.31 1.3 161 n.9
97.20–3 191 n.49 1.4 169 n.24
98.24–99.6 191 n.50 1.6 223 n.3
Mantissa 2.14 221 n.2, 301 n.118
105.3–106.5 175 n.30 2.15 173 n.28
Meteor. Calcidius
A8 253 n.66 Pl. Tim.
Mixt. 2.197 291 n.111
3–4 87 n.111 2.213 191 n.49
Anaxagoras 2.220 191 n.49
B4 37, 38 2.224 191 n.49
B8 35 n.10 2.231 191 n.49
B11 38 2.224 191 n.50
B12 34, 35, 35 n.8, 38 Cicero
B14 37, 38 Fin.
B15 35 n.8 3.9.32 105 n.12, 227 n.13
Anastasius of Sinai Clement of Alexandria
Hexaemeron Protrep.
6.1 63 n.56 1.5.3 221 n.2
Apocryphon of John 10.98.3 163 n.13
13.14–14.34 64 n.58 Strom.
3.3.13.2 289 n.108
Aristotle
3.3.21.2 289 n.108
De an.
4.13.90.4 227 n.12
2.3 175 n.30, 175 n.31
5.11.71.2 265 n.85
Eth. nic.
5.14.140.3 289 n.108
1.13.18 175 n.31
Gen.corr. Diogenes of Apollonia
314a18–21 35 n.6 B3 40 n.30
Hist. an. Empedocles
7(8).1 179 n.37 117 291 n.111
     361

Eriugena Or.
Periphyseon 2.17 197 n.59
4.795a 225 n.8 27.7 325 n.21
Eusebius 28.22 221 n.2
Hist. eccl. 37.15 289 n.108
1.2.4 227 n.12 38.11 221 n.2
1.2.6 227 n.12 Heraclitus
3.1.1–3 71 n.75 A6 201 n.62
5.13.8 63 n.56 B8 155 n.4
5.27 63 n.56 B10 155 n.4
Praep. Ev. Iamblichus
11.4.4 227 n.12 Vit. Pythag. 14 291 n.111
11.28.7 227 n.12
Irenaeus
Galen Haer.
Def. 1.4.1–5 64 n.58
19.395 227 n.13 1.8.2 64 n.58
De nat. fac. 2.22.4 124
1.13 (39) 155 n.4 2.34.1 285 n.104
Hipp. et Plat. 3.20.1–2 122–3, 251 n.65
1.10.12–14 307 n.7 3.22.3 123
5.6.37–8 175 n.30 4.37.6 121
6.3.4 191 n.51 4.37.7 122
De nat. fac. 4.38.1 123
3.4–8 315 n.13 4.38.3 123–4
De usu part. 4.39.1 123
1.3 173 n.29, 179 n.39 5.1.3 125
1.4 169 n.26 5.16.2 125
4.1–2 317 n.15 Dem.
4.1 307 n.4 32 125
4.2–6 319 n.16
Justinian
4.7 315 n.13
Ep. ad 553
4.14 319 n.16
631–2 289 n.108
4.17–18 317 n.15
632–3 289 n.108
5.9 307 n.7
Ep. ad Mennam
6.2 307 n.4
199 289 n.108
6.7 191 n.50, 305 n.3, 311 n.9, 313 n.12
6.10 313 n.11, 313 n.12 Josephus
6.15 313 n.12 C. Ap.
8.4 191 n.51 1.8 227 n.12
8.5 307 n.7 Maximos the Confessor
8.6 307 n.7 Ad Thal.
8.9 321 n.17 61 126–7
9.8 307 n.5 Ambigua
9.14 307 n.7 5 137
11.14 325 n.19 6 127
11.28 307 n.7 41 132–6
12.2 307 n.7 Or. Dom.
14.1 305 n.3 47.342–3 136
16.2 307 n.7 50 136
16.13–14 313 n.11 Methodius
Gregory of Nazianzus Res.
Ep. 1.51.2 233 n.29
101.37–9 195 n.55, 219 n.67 2.10.2 221 n.2
362    

Methodius (cont.) 14.17 76

2.24 229 n.21 17.30 85–8
2.29 281 n.101 Com. John
Nemesius 1.98–100 80
De nat. hom. 1.113–15 68 n.71
1.4–5 159 n.8 1.117 67 n.69
1.39 225 n.11 1.118 68 n.70
1.50 169 n.26 2.114 74
1.63–4 221 n.2 6.64–73 289 n.108
6.177 191 n.49 6.66 71 n.76
Origen 6.68 72 n.77
Hexapla 6.86 289 n.108
2.326 69 n.73 19.127 77
Com. Gen. 19.128 77
D3 68–9 19.131 77
D5 71 n.75 19.132–3 77
D6 71 n.75 19.134–5 77
D7 71 n.75 19.138–9 77
D8 71 n.75 19.144–5 78
D9 71 n.75 19.146 78
D10 71 n.75 19.147 78
D11 74 19.149–50 78
D22 85 20.182–3 74–5
Hom. Gen. Frag. 13 64 n.59
1.1 66–7 Cels.
1.2 64 n.60 1.13 71 n.76, 289 n.108
1.14 76 1.20 71 n.76, 289 n.108
1.15 76, 132 2.20 81 n.97
Catenae on Gen. 2.60 86 n.106
1:22 71 n.75 3.41 86, 265 n.85
Hom. Exod. 3.75 289 n.108
13.4 87 n.110 4.17 72, 289 n.108
Hom. Ps. 4.57 86 n.108, 265 n.85
1.4 (Ps. 73) 70 4.76 169 n.26
In Ps. (Pitra) 5.29 289 n.108
37:3 65, 79, 84 n.101 5.49 71 n.76, 289 n.108
Exp. Prov. 6.20 64
PG 17, 197c9–11 39 6.49 64 n.58
Com. Songs 6.50–1 64
Prol. 73 n.80, 297 n.114 6.77 86
2.8 76 n.87 7.32 289 n.108
Hom. Isa. 8.30 289 n.108
1.2 65 Dial.
Hom. Jer. 10.20–12.20 72 n.77
1.10 72, 87 13.26–16.17 119
20.8 87 n.110 13.26–14.16 73
Hom. Ezek. 14.26–15.1 73
1.1 80 15.9–27 73
Com. Matt. 15.30–16.17 73
10.20 289 n.108 16.15–16 73
12.36–8 86 n.109 16.16–24.23 73
12.38 39 n.29 16–24 297 n.114
13.1–2 289 n.108 Ora.
14.16 75 3 81 n.97
     363

Pasch. 15 52
8.24–32 67 16 52
10.4–11.4 67 17–18 52
Princ. 19 52
1.1.6 325 n.20 20–1 53
1.2 67 23 53, 159 n.8
1.2.2–3 68, 70 24 52, 59, 62
1.2.10 70–1 25 53, 56
1.3.8 83 26 53
1.6.2 65–6 28 53
2.6.6 87, 137 29 53
2.8.1 175 n.30 31 54
2.8.2 87 33–4 54
2.8.3 86 35 54
2.9.1 64 n.60 36 54
2.9.2 229 n.19 38–44 54
2.9.4 82 45 54
2.9.6 81–2 46–7 54
2.9.8 82 65–8 62
3.1.21–4 82 65–6 175 n.30, 179 n.37
3.4.3 83, 251 n.65 65 54, 55
3.5.4 66, 79–80, 82 67 55, 325 n.20
3.6.3 87, 137 68 55
3.6.7 69, 86 69–71 59 n.52
4.3.6 83, 84 n.100 69–70 189 n.47
4.3.7 84, 125 69 55, 56, 59, 60, 62
4.3.8 84 n.100 70–1 56
4.3.9 84 n.100 72–5 161 n.9, 169 n.24
4.4.6 69 72 56
4.4.7–8 261 n.82 73 56, 62, 241 n.36
4.4.7 69, 265 n.85 75 56
4.4.8 229 n.19 76 56, 227 n.14, 255 n.70
Philoc. 77–83 62
14 71 n.75 77–8 57, 159 n.8
15.19 39 79–81 57
23 71 n.75 82 57, 59
23.8 81 83–8 57
25.1–2 81 83 169 n.26
Orpheus 89 57
Frag. 224b 291 n.111 90 57
129 58
Pamphilus
130 58
Apol. 173–88 289 n.108
132–3 58
Philo 134 55, 58
Opif. 135 59, 60, 62, 225 n.11
1 51 136 60
2 51 137 60
3 51 139 60, 191 n.49
8 51 146 60
9 51 151–2 61
10 51 151 61
12 51 152 61
13 52 153–4 61
364    

Philo (cont.) 30a6–c1 42

156 61 30c5–d1 42
170–2 51 31a1–b2 42
176 62 34b3–9 43
Quis rer. div. haer. 34b10–35a1 43, 97
155 221 n.2 34b10 41
Spec. 34c2–4 42, 107
3.111 191 n.49 35a1–9 43
4.93 191 n.49 35a9 47
4.123 191 n.49 37c6–38b5 43
Philoponos, John 39e3–40a2 43, 48
Opif. Mun. 40a2–d5 43
1.3 66 n.66 40d6–41a3 43
41a5–b8 43
Pindar
41c8–d3 43
Frag. 57 163 n.13
41d4–42d2 47
Pliny 41d4–e1 43
Nat. His. 41e1–42a3 43
Pref. 33 28 n.69 41e2–3 47
2.49–52 253 n.66 41e5 47
Plato 42a3–b1 44
Crat. 42a4 47
402a8–10 201 n.62 42a5 47
432b 229 n.18 42b1–c4 44
Crit. 42c4–d2 44
106a3–4 41, 49, 125–6 42d2 47
Gorg. 42e1–4 45
493a 289 n.108 42e2–3 47
Phaed. 43b1–2 44
81e–82b 291 n.111 43d3–47e2 44
96c 33 n.1 44a4–5 44
97c4 40 44a7–b1 44
99c7–8 40 44a8 45
107c1–115a8 40 44b1–7 44
Phaedr. 44b8–c1 41
245c–249d 289 n.108 44c4–5 41, 44
249c4–6 253 n.68 44c7 41
252d7 325 n.21 45ab 191 n.49
Tim. 46c7 46
27a5–6 30 n.77, 41, 49 46d1 46
27d5–29d3 41 46e6 46
28a1–3 42 47d7–e2 45
28a7–c2 42 47e3–69a5 41
28c3–29a6 42 47e3–48b3 30, 46, 47, 104
29a5–6 45 47e3 90
29a6–b2 42 47e4 41
29b2–c1 42 47e7 30
29d–30a 227 n.15 48e2–49a6 47
29d7–47e2 41 48a7 91
29e1–30a2 42 69a6–92c9 41, 47
29e2–30a2 45 69a7–b2 41
30a–31a 221 n.2 69a8–b2 30
30a2–6 42 69b1 47, 91
     365

70ab 191 n.49, 311 n.9 Vit. Pythag.

70b–d 307 n.4 45 291 n.111
72c–73a 317 n.15 Posidonius
75c 321 n.17 Frag. 33 175 n.30
76bc 325 n.19
78b 317 n.14 Procopius of Gaza
89d2–4 48 Com. Gen.
89e3–90a2 48 3.21 85
90a 173 n.28 Simplicius
90a2–b1 48 In Phys.
90b1–d5 48 1.4 35 n.8, 35 n.10, 37, 38, 40 n.30
90d5–7 48 3.4 34, 36
90e–92d6 41 Socrates
90e6–91a1 48 Hist. eccl.
91a1–d5 48 6.7 89 n.2
91d6–92c3 49 SVF
91e–92a 173 n.28 2.473 87 n.111
92c4–9 49 2.543 155 n.4
Resp. 3.19.29 105 n.12, 227 n.13
8.560b8 191 n.49 3.43.11 227 n.13
10.617e 229 n.17 Test. of Truth
Plotinus 41.28–42.3 64 n.58
Enn. Theodoret
1.6.5.39–58 199 n.60 Affect.
1.6.9 325 n.21 5.13 289 n.108
1.8 199 n.60 Haer.
2.3.7.13–23 155 n.4 5.9 289 n.108
2.3.12.24–32 155 n.4
3.6.11 199 n.60 Theophilus of Antioch
4.4.40.1–3 155 n.4 Ad. Auto.
4.8.4.32 225 n.11 2.10–30 63 n.56
Porphyry Victorinus of Pettau
Isag. De Fabrica mundi
3 175 n.30 9 124
Vita Plot. Xenophon
14 289 n.108 Mem.
26 28 n.70 1.4.11 173 n.28, 173 n.29
 Index of Modern Authors

Aaron, D. H. 86 n.107 Gerson, L. P. 28

Altenburger, M. 3 n.4, 5 n.9, 5 n.12, 6 n.20 Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 19 n.39
Anderson, Gary A. 86 n.107 Grassi, F. 4 n.7
Andrist, Patrick 19 n.39 Guillaumin, J. Y. 6 n.21
Astruc, Charles 10
Aubineau 24, 25 n.61, 26 Haeckel, Ernst 124 n.30
Hamman, A. G. 6 n.21
Balthasar, H. U. von 108, 113 n.16 Harl, M. 62–3 n.55, 75, 81 n.98
Behr, J. 26 n.66, 62–3 n.55, 77 n.90, 83 n.99, Harrison, Verna E. 132 n.38
119 n.19, 121 n.26, 123 n.28, 124 n.29, Hauke, M. 120 n.20
129 n.37 Heine, R. E. 62–3 n.55, 63 n.57, 64, 64 n.58,
Bonanni, A. 4 n.7 66 n.66, 77, 78 n.91
Hoffmann, P. 19 n.39
Cappuyns, M. 5 Holsinger-Friesen, T. 63 n.56
Casey, R. P. 4 n.7 Hörner, H. 3, 7
Cassien M. 25 Howley, J. A. 19 n.39, 28 n.70
Cavarnos, J. P. 24
Clark, Elizabeth 90 Jacobsen, A. L. 85 n.103
Clementoni, T. 4 n.7 Jaeger, W. 3, 11 n.36, 24 n.60, 25
Coogan, J. 19 n.39, 26 n.66, 28 n.70 Jansen, L. 19 n.39
Cornford, F. M. 40–1 n.32, 45 n.35, 46 n.36, Jeauneau, É. 5
48, 116 Johansen, T. K. 40–1 n.32, 46
Corsini, E. 103 n.10
Costache, D. 134 n.42 Kern, Cyprien 6 n.19
Crawford, M. R. 26 n.66 Kochlamazanashvili, E. 4 n.7
König, Jason 19 n.39
Daley, B. E. 83 n.99 Krabinger, J. G. 6
Dames, N. 19 n.39, 28, 29
Daniélou, J. 6 n.21 Ladner, G. B. 90 n.5
De Deo, M. R. 4 n.7 Laks, A. 38 n.24
Dolidze, T. 4 n.7 LaPlace, J. 6 n.21
Dodds, E. R. 86 n.107 LeCron Foster, M. 124 n.30
Doody, A. 28 n.69 Levine, P. 5 n.10
Dostoevsky, F. M. 138 Lied, L. I. 19 n.39
Drioton, É. 90 n.3 Löwenklau, J. 5, 6, 8, 21, 23
Lurie, B. 6 n.23, 23 n.55
Edwards, M. 62–3 n.55, 85 n.102
Esbroeck, M. van 4 n.7 Mandolino, G. 5, 18, 19
Maniaci, M. 19 n.39
Florovsky, G. 90 n.3 Mann, F. 3 n.4, 5 n.9, 5 n.12, 6 n.20
Forbes, G. H. 4, 5–6, 8, 9, 16–19 Maraval, P. 4 n.6, 23, 54, 89 n.1, 92 n.6
Fredouille, J.-C. 19 n.39 Marmodoro, A. 33 n.1, 35 n.7
Martens, P. W. 85 n.102
Gadamer, H.-G. 40–1 n.32 Mendieta, E. A. de 8, 21, 52
Genette, G. 19 n.39 Metzler, K. 63 n.57, 71 n.75
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/1/2023, SPi

    367

Meyer, E. D. 118 n.18 Salmona, B. 6 n.22, 23 n.55

Migne, J. P. 6 Schröder, B.-J. 19 n.39
Morellus, C. 5 Schwartz, E. 26 n.66
Most, G. W. 38 n.24 Sedley, D. 33 n.1, 35 n.6, 38, 39,
Musurillo, H. 30 n.75, 30 n.76 40, 40 n.30, 40–1 n.32, 46,
46 n.36, 47 n.40
Nasrallah, J. 4 n.7 Sels, L. 4 n.7, 7 n.24, 21 n.46
Sider, D. 35 n.8, 37 n.18
O’Meara, Dominic J. 40–1 n.32 Silvas, A. M. 25 n.63
Skinner, Q. 121
Parmentier, M. 4 n.7 Spira, A. 24 n.57
Pasquali, G. 25 n.63 Staats, R. 24 n.60
Patterson, Paul A. 90 n.3
Pearse, Roger 19 n.39 Tommasi, C. 18, 20 n.41
Perry, W. 6 n.15, 16, 17 Tzamalikos, P. 33, 33 n.1, 35 n.5, 35 n.6, 38, 39,
Petitmengin, Pierre 19 n.39 40, 62–3 n.55, 81 n.97
Pierce, A. H. 66 n.65, 85 n.102
Pitra, J. B. 6 Whitmarsh, T. 19 n.39
Pusey, E. B. 6 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von 3
Wilson, H. A. 6 n.18, 8, 103 n.9, 105, 118, 141,
Ramelli, I. L. E. 62–3 n.55 226 n.13
Riggsby, A. M. 19 n.39, 28 n.69 Wood, J. 136 n.47
Röder, J. A. 25
Rudberg, S. Y. 8, 21, 52 Zachhuber, J. 103 n.10, 108 n.14, 120–1
Runia, David T. 50 n.44, 52 n.45, 53, 54 n.48, Zanetti, U. 4 n.7
58 n.50, 59, 59 n.52, 59 n.54 Zeyl, D. J. 40–1 n.32, 47, 48 n.43