CHAPTER II

UTILITARIANISM

Chapter Objectives

~fter reading this chapter, you should be able to:

1. discuss the basic principles of utilitarian ethics;

2. distinguish between two utilitarian models:the quantitative model of Jeremy Bentham

and the qualitative model of John Stuart Mill; and

3. apply utilitarianism in understanding and evaluating local and international scenarios.

INTRODUCTION
On January 25, 2015, the 84th Special Action Force (SAF) conducted a police
operation at Tukanalipao, Mamasapano in Maguindanao. Al so known as Oplan Exodus, it,
· was intended to serve an arrest warrant for Zulkifii bin Hir or Marwan, a Malaysian terrorist
and bomb-maker who had a $5 million bounty on his head. This mission eventually led
to' a clash between the Philippine National Police's (PNP) SAF, on the one hand, and the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) on the other. Although the _police operation was "successful" because of the death
of Marwan, the firefight that ensued claimed sixty-seven lives including forty-four SAF
troopers, eighteen MILF Fighters, and five civilians. However, the relatively high number of
. SAF members killed in this operation caught the attention of many including the Philippine
media and the legislature.

In one of the Congress investigations that followed this tragic mission, then Senate
President Franklin Drilon and Senator Francis Escudero debated the public hearing of an
audio recording of an alleged conversation that attempted to cover up the massacre of the
_PNP-SAF commandos. Drilon questioned the admissibility of these recordings as evidence
under the Anti-Wire Tapping Law whereas Escudero cited the legal brief of the Free Legal
1-. _Assistance Group (FLAG) arguing that the Anti -Wire Tapping Law protects only the recording
'··and interception of private communications. Drilon cited Section 4 of the Anti-Wire Tapping
Act (RA 4200) and explained that · any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
co~tents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information

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 th erein contained obtained or secured by any person in violati on o f th e we ceding ICctioni
of this Act shall not be admissi ble in evidence in any Judicial, quaSI-Jud,oal, legislative
administrative hearing or investigation." Senator Grace Po e, previou s chairp: rson oft:
Senate committee on public order and dangerous drug s, argued oth erw ise. Sinob; no
Senator Ori/on na ito daw ay illegal, no hindi daw pwede, no ako_daw ay pwedeng maging liab:
kung ito daw ay ipapakinig ko sa Senado'. ako naman, ano ba ,tong mga batas na ,t0 , .. . Ang
mga batas na ito ay para ma/aman natm ang katotohanan at magkaroon tayo ng hustis 0
/tong mga anti-wiretapping or mga recording na ganito, kung hindi pwedeng ilabas so pub/;~
pwede naming gawing basehan so executive session."' '
Senator Poe's response leads us to ask: Can th e government infringe individual
rights? If it is morally permissible for the government to infringe individual rights, when
can the government do sol Dcies it become leg itimate to sacrifice individual rights when
considering the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people?

This case exposes the aftermath of th e Mamasa pano incident and the Senate
investigations. The Senate inquiry proceeding s rai sed questions on th e possibility of wire-
tapping and the intrusion to one's right t o privacy. While th e 1987 Philippine Constitution
does protect one's right to private communication, it did provide some exemptions to its
inviolability. These exemptions include a lawful order of th e court and/o r issues involving
public safety and order.- ln fact, RA 4200 (or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law) and RA 9372 (or
the Human Security Act of 2007) both provided exemptions to the inviolability of the righl
p privacy in instances of treason, espionage, rebellion, and sedition. Whi le this is certainly
a legal issue, can it also constitute a moral concern? By raising the distinction between
moral and legal issues and concerns, do you think that th ese t wo are different? To simplify
things, let us put aside the question of law and let us assume that you were asked to decide
whether wiretapping is morally permissible or not. On w hat instances is w iretapping morally
permissible and on what instances is it not morally permissible?

When considering the moral permissibility of wiretapping, we calculate the costs

and benefits of wiretapping. If we calculate the costs and benefits of our actions, then we
are considering an ethical theory that gives.premium to the consequences of actions as the
basis of morality and as_~uch is utilitarianism: Utilitarianism is an ethical theory thatarguesfor
the goodness of pleasure and the determination of right behavior based on the usefulness
. of the actio~•s consequences. This means that pleasure is good and that the goodness of an
action is determined by its usefulness. Putting these ideas together, utilitarianism claims that
one's actions and behavior are good inasm~ch as they are directed toward the experience of
the greatest pleasure over pain for the greatest number of persons. Its root word is "utility;
which refers to the ~e_s_s of the CQ.l)!ie_g_llences of one's action and behavior. When we
argue that wiretapping is_p err[1issjbJe because doing so results in better public safety, then
we are arguing in a utilitarian way. It is utilitarian because we argue that some individual
rig l!~a.r.1 ~e ~~-':.r!.!!~7d f~ ~~e sake _?f th<;_ greater happiness of th e m any. Jeremy Benilla~'
(1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) are the two foremost utilitari an thinke ·

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 Their syste m of e tiiks e mphasizes th e
consequences of actions. This mea ns that
th e goodness or the badness of an action is
based on whether it is usefu l in contributing
to a specific purpose for th e greatest number
of people, Utilitarianism is consequentialist.
This mean s that the moral value of actions
and decisions is based solely or greatly on
th e use fulness of th eir consequences; it is
th e usefulness of results that determines
whether the action or behavior is good
or bad. While this is the case, not all
consequentia list theories are utilitarian.
Fcir Bentham and Mill, utility refers to a way
of understanding the results of people's
actions. Specifically, they are interested on
whether these actions cont ribute or not to
the total amount of resulting happiness in
Jeremy Bentham was born on February
15, 1748 in London, England. He was the teacher of the world. The utilitarian value pleasure and
James Mill, lather or John Stuart Mill. Bentham first happiness; this means that the usefu lness
. wrote about the grealest happiness principle of ethics of actions is based on its promotion of
and was known for a system of penal management happiness. Bentham and Mill understand
called panopticon. He was an advocate of economic happiness as the experience of pleasure for
_ freedom, women's rights, and the separation of church the greatest number of persons, even at the
and stale, among others. He was also an advocate of
expense of some individual's rights ,
animal rights and the abolition of slavery, death penally,
and corporal punishment for children. Bentnam denied
individual legal rights nor agreed with the natural law.
On his death on June 6, 1832, Bentham donated his
corpse to the University College London, where his
auto-icon is in public display up to this day to serve as
his memorial.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

In the book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789_), Jeremy
Bentha;;, begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two "sqvereign masters"
-which he caffs"pl; as-;,",;, and painl The se "masters" are given to us by nature to help us
determine what isgood or bia a nd what ought to be doneand not; they fasten our choices
to their throne. "-·- - •

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 . der the govern.mce of two sovereign rna st e.rs, P<'lln a'llf
Nature has placed mankind un oint out what we ought to do, as well as to determine What
pleasure. It is for them alone to p d d of right and wrong, on the other, the chain Of
e shall do. On the one hand, the stan ar h vern us in all we do, in all we say, In •M
w d their throne. T ey go
causes and effects, are fastene to b'ection, will serve but to demonstrate
we think: every effort we can make to throw off ~ur suh \ empire: but in re ality he WIii rema1~
retend to abJure t e,
aodconfirm it. In words a man m~y ~ o utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes It for
subje~ to it all the while. The pnnc1pf~ 1 hich is to rear the fabric of felldty by the hands
the foun~ation· of that ~stem, _the obJect of w
of-~aSO~ an1 ofiaW.~ , ·

· · - ----._ i b' f to these sovereign masters: pleasure

Thf principle of~ti/ity is about ourfsu ;e\~o; motivation of our actions as guided
d . 0 ne hand the principle re ers o •
an pain. .('_ "_ ·-- , d . ' I asure It is like saying that in our everyday
by our avoidance of pain and our esire or p e · h ·s ainfuL On the other hand, the
actions, we do what is pleasurable and w~ d~__q_t do~ at I produce more happiness than
principle also refers to pleasure as good ,f, and only ,f, they p b t t I . .
unhappiness. This means that it is not enough to experience pleasure, u o a so rnqu1re
whether the things we do make us happier. Having identified the tendency for pleasure and
the avoidance of pain as the principle of utility, Bentham equates_happrne_ss wi th P~~sure.
Mill supports Bentham's principle of utility. He reiterates moral good as happiness
and, consequently, happiness as pleasure.' Mill clarifies that whaCmakes people happy is
intended pleasure and what makes us unhappy is the privation of pleasure. The things that
produce happiness and pleasure are good; whereas, those that produce unhappiness and
pain are bad. Mill explains: ,.,..,.~-

The creed which accepts as thefoundaticin of mo'rals, utility or the greatest happiness princlp~
~) h?J.dfthat actiO~s are right in proportion as they'ten~ -toproITl,ote h'appiness; ~rong as they
1:eriito prOduce ihe reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the abs~nce
of ~In; by ~nhappiness; pain and the privation of Pleasure. To give a dear view of the moral
1.~ ·:·i;~t ~~·by .the th_eo1; much_,~ '.ore fe~uires ,to be _sa,i d/in" pilrticular, wh~t thing$ it ,
i;
:,_;}n the idea~ ,~f pain}ndP.lea; ure, .~nd to what e)(t~nt, this /~ft an open questi,o~.
·ese -_ supplementary ~xplanations do -~~t::3ffect:the" theory of life on which this theor,'
' is grounded~namely, that plealtirtand·freedom from pain are the. only thi~gs
-~~nds; and that au desirable,!,h'.n~s·_("".,~:ic~ ar~ _7s numer~us ir1 the utilitarian asin
he_~~) ~re desir~_ble _:eit'h. e-~~or.pJr~:su,,~e i:n_h~ie," t'"Jhemselves or as a ·means to

.;i i 1~~r~:.t titi '.'j,f;:;1&!':!~Ii~\?r_.lc . - - · · , - <'·~ .....71(,);1,

Clearly, Mill ar.gues that we act and do things because we find them pleasurable
and we avoid doing things because they are painful. If we find our actions pleasurable, Mill
explains, it is because they are inherently pleasurable in th.emselves or they eventually lead
to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham and Mill characterized
I

30 Ethics: Foundations of Moral Valuation

I

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mor:il v;ilue ;i:. utilit y ,md,undcrstood it as whatever produced happiness or plea sure 311d
the ;ivold1111cc o( p;iin. The nex t step is to understand the nature of plea sure and pain to
Identify a criterion for distinguishing pleasures and to calculate th e resultant pleasure or
pain; It Is in relation to th ese aforementioned th emes that a distinction occurs between
Bentham and MIii.
What Bentham identified as th e
natural moral preferability of pleasure, Mill
refers to as a theory of/ife. If we consider, for
example, w hat moral agents do and how
they assess their actions, then it is hard
to deny the pursuit for happiness and the
avoidance of pain. For Bentham and Mill,
the pursuit for pleasure and the avoidance
of pain are not only important principles-
th ey are in fact the only principle in assessing
an ac tion's morality. Why is it justifiable to
wiretap private conversations in instances of
treason, rebellion, espionage, and se dition?
Why is it prefera bl e to alleviate pove rty or
eliminate criminality? Why is it noble to
build schools and hospitals? Why is it good
to improve the quality of life and the like?
Th ere is no other answer than the principle
of utility, that is, to increa se happiness and
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) decrease pain.

What kind of pleasure is morally

John Stuart Mill was born on May 20, 1806
in Pentonville, London, United Kingdom. He was the preferable and valuable? Are all pleasures
son of James Mill, a friend and disciple of Jeremy necessarily and ethically good? Does this
Bentham. John Stuart Mill was home-schooled. He mean that because eating or exe rcising
studied Greek at the age of three and Latin at the is good, it is morally acceptable to eat
age of eight. He wrote a history of Roman Law at age
and exercise excessively? While utilitarian
eleven, and suffered a nervous breakdown at the age
supporters do not condone excessive
of twenty. He was married to Harne! Taylor after twenty-
one years of fnendship. His ethical theory and his pleasures while oth ers are suffering, it
defense of ulilitanan views are found in his long essay cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds
entitled Ufi/ifarianism (1861). Mill died on May 8, 1873 why some persons indulge in extravagant
In Avignon, France from erysipelas. pleasures at the expense of others. Suppose
nobody is suffering, is it morally permissibl e
on utilitarian principles to maximize
pleasure by wanton intemperance? Whil e
Bentham and Mill agree on the moral value of pleasure, they do not have the same view on
these questions.

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 In determining the mornl preferability of actions, BentlJJlll prov_i~es a frarnewQr~
.
'
for eva luating pl easure and pain commonly called (elicific ca lculus. F~hoflc calculus h I
ommon currency framework that calculates the pleasure that some acti ons can Produce.1
~his framework, an ac tion can be evaluated on the basis of intensity or strength of pleasi./
duration or length of the experience of pleasure; certainty, uncertainty, or the likelihoodt~
pleasure will occur; and propinquity, remoteness, or how soon there will be pleasure. The~
indicators allow us to measure pleasure and pain in an action. However, when We are t
evaluate our tendency to choose these actions, we need to consider two more dimension:
fecundity or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind, and PUrl
or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite ki nd - Lastly:'when
considering the number of persons who are affected by pleasure or pain, another dimenslo,,
is to be considered-extent.' Felicific calculus allows th e eva luation of all actions and their
resultant pleasure. This mean s that action s are evaluated on this single sca le regardless of
preferences and values_ In this sense, pl easure and pain can o~ ly quantitatively differ but
not qualitatively differ from other experi ences of pleasure and pain accordingly.

Mill dissents from Bentham's single scale of pleasure. He thinks that the principle
of utility must distingui sh plea sures qualitatively and not merely quantitatively. For Mill, .
utilitarianism cannot promote th e kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any other
animals. He thinks that there are higher intellectual and lower base pleasures. We, as moral
agents, are capable of searching and desiring higher intellectual pleasures more than pigs
are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and primarily desire sensuality; this is
because we are capable of higher intellectual pleasurable goods. For Mill, crude bestial
sures, which are appropriate for animals, are degrading to us because we are by nature
easily satisfied by pleasures only for pigs.' Human pleasures are qualitatively different
m animal pleasures. It is unfair to assume that we merely pursue pleasures appropriate
for beasts even if there are instances when we choose to pursue such base pleasures. To
explain this, Mill recognizes the empirical fact that there are different kinds of pleasures:

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize th,e fact that some kinds
of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd
that while, in estimating all other things, quallty ls considered as well as quantity, the
estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.,

<;ontrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. An
excessive quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can consider,
for example, our experience of exc_essive eating or exercising. Whereas eating the right
amount of food can be _pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The same is true when
exercising. If the quality of pleasure is so_'!ietimes more important than quantity, then it is
important to consider the standards whereby differences of pleasures can be judged. Tht
test that Mill suggests is sim_ple. In deciding over two comparable pleasures, it is important

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to experience both and to discover which one is actually more preferred than the other."
Th ere is no oth er way of determining which of the two pl easu res is preferable except by
appealing to th e ac tual preferences and experiences. What M ill discovers anth ropologically
is that actu al choices of knowl edgeabl e persons point that higher intellectual pleasures are
preferable th an purely sensual appe tites.';

In defending furth er the co mparati ve choice betwee n intellectu al and bestial

pleasures,Mill offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human person
would prefer to accept th e highly pl easurabl e life of an animal wh ile at the same time being
denied of everyt hing that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any, wou ld give up
human qualities of higher reason for the plea sures of a pig. In th e most famous quote in
Mill's Utilitarianism, we read:
It Is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissattsfted than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion,
it ls because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the

While it is difficult to, understand how Mill was able to compare swinish pleasures
with human o nes, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a
pig satisfied. Simply put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within
our grasp. It is easy to compare extreme types of pleasures as in the case of pigs and humans,
but It Is difficult to compare pleasures deeply integrated in our way of life. The pleasures of
an llonggo eating chicken inasa/ and an lgorot eating pinikpikan is an example. This cannot
be done by simply tasting inasa/ or pinikpikan. In the same way, some people prefer puto to
blbingka or liking for the music of Eraserheads than that of the APO Hiking Society.

PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER

Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian moral
agent alone and independently from others. This is not only about our individual pleasures,
regardless of how high, intellectual, or in other ways noble. it is, but it is also about the
pleasure of the greatest number affected by the consequences of our actions. Mill explains:

~~:,:d~ri;~~~I ~ r,,;n:Jutilityof happjneSS,

c~nslcie~~d:~iih~ di~~-, ~ ,~ans ~~ indispensable·
fo
COnd1tlb~1 t~~\~t c;ptance O -t e ~dard;-for }hat'standard is 'nOt the'agent's"'
o~n✓gr;~t~~t'h~,p~pin'e,ss, b4f ftu/gr:;atest al'l'louf!t"of haPPiOess altogE!ther; -and if it may
possibly be'doubted whJ1he;
0
an6ble.chaiact~r is alw~ys the happier for Its nobleness, ~
there ~;nb~_rio do~~t th'~t it m~k~s.othe~-p~ople_h~~ple;, .and that the world in gen1ra1
is i~,.;;edf8te1;~a gaJ;e/~·if: 'u~litariaDls~t ~he'refdre,,cOut~ only ~ltain its end by th~
g'e~i ~ 1:cii~Vatl~n of'~~-bl~;ess"~~6th~rs};nd his·own;·~o ra~·as hap·PineSs iS concem:d,'
were"'a sheer dedUEtlon·f~oi'.n fhi bt?n~~tBut the·. barl ·e'nunciation ~f such an a'bsufdity
, ,, . ': . '•-~ . : :> ,,- i · :.·,
,i .._. . .,/2, y,.; ;-- .,,.,_,-,r:0 : ,,~
•'.. ~- , · , •
as this last/ rend~~ ~ ti~~~.s ~~.:~r~~!-~lit1il/;.:Z~;-·
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 Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neith er abou t our plr-~,.,,,t ,,
happiness alone; it cannot be all about us. If we are the only ones sa tisfi ed by ou, aqivr:
It does not constitute a moral goodi If we are th e only one,,w ho are made happy tq r, .,
actions, then we cannot be morally good. In this sense, utilitari anism is not di smi,;,.e r:
sacrifices that procure more happiness for others.
Therefore,.it is necessary for us to consider everyone's happiness, includ ing our 0 ,,"
as the standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also, it impli es that utilitari ani sm is not;.
all separate from liberal social practices that aim to improve the quality o f life for all person;
Utilitarianism is interested with everyone's happiness, in fact, the grea test happiness of th,.
greatest number. Mill identifies the eradication of di sease, using technology, and ot~
practical ways as examples of utilitariani sm. Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes tilt
total amount of pleasure over displeasure for the greatest number. Beca use of the premiuTT,
given to the consequences of actions, Mill pushes for th e moral irrelevance of motive i
evaluating actions:
He wh~ saves a fellow creature from drowning does wh at is morally right, wh e ther his
motive be dut_y or the hope of being paid for his troubl e; he w ho bet rays th e fri end th at
trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his obj ect be to serve another fri end to whom
, he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done from th e m otive of
duty, and in direct obedience to principle : it is a misapprehension of th e utilitarian mode
of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fi x their mind s upon 50 wi de
~ generality as the world, or society at large. The great majorjty of good actions are
' ,v,
• intended, not for the benefit of the world but for that of Ind' 'd uaIs, o f which
• the good
. o_-f the. world is made up; and the thoughts of the mo 5t vi·rt uous man nee d not on the se
occasions travel . beyond. the particular persons cone erne d, except so far as is necess ary
. t~• _assure
· • himself · benefiting them he is not v10 Iati ng t h e rights-that
that in . is th e ·
I
~g,tfmate and authmlzed expectations-of anyone else." ,
.....«J.,;;. ..... ~-

Utilitarianism is interested "'!ith the best conse u . ,

·people.It is not interested with the intention fth q ence for the highest number o;
. • . 0 e agent. Moral val · 'b11
m the mtent1on or motivation of the p d . ue cannot be d1scern1 ·
erson omg the act· -1 • b
on the difference it makes on the wo Id' t 1 ' 1 15 ased solely and exclu sivef/
. .. . r s ota amount of pl . .
to question ut,htarianism's take of mo 1 • h f . ea sure and pam. This leads us
ra ng ts. I actions b I
happiness of the greatest number is ·,t. 1.fi bl are ased only on the greate5
, JUS I a e to let go f .
benefit of the majority? 0 some ng hts for the sake of tile

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 JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHTS

What is a right? Mill understands justice as a respect for rights directed toward
society's pursuit for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For him, rights are a valid
claim on society and are justified by utility. He explains:
t have, throughout, treated the idea of a right residing in the injured person, and violated

by the injury, not as a separate element in the composition of the Idea and sentiment, but
as one of the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves. These elements
are, a hurt to some assignable person or persons on the one hand, and a demand for
punishment, on the other. An examination of our minds, I think, will show that these
two things include all that we mean when we speak of vi~lation of a right. When we call
1 anything a person's right, we mean that he has a v_alid claim on society to protect him
in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion.
If he has what we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, to have something
guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has a right to it. 13

Mill expounds that the abovementioned rights referred are related to the interests
that serve general happiness. The right to due process, the right to free speech or religion,
and others are justified because they contribute to the general good. Thi s means that
society is made happier if its citizens are able to live th eir lives knowing that their interests
are protected and that society (as a w hole) defends it. Extending this concept to animals,
they have rights because of the effect of such principles on the sum total of happiness that
follows as a consequence of instituting and protecting their interests. It is not accidental,
therefore, that utilitarians are also the staunchest defenders of animal rights. A right is
justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they produce an overall happiness that is
greater than the unhappiness resulting from their implementation.

Utilitarians argue that issues of justice carry a very strong emotional import because
the category of rights is directly associated with the individual's most vital interests. All of
these rights are predicated on the person's right to life. Mill describes:

To have a -~ight! then is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend
me_in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no
other reason than general utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient
feellng of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of the
- feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only
but also an animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity,
as well as its moral justification, from the extra ordinarily imPortant and impressive kind
of utility which is concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to everyone's
l ;,fe~lings_,the most vital of all interests. 14

In this context, our participation in government and social interactions c~n be

explained by the principle of utility and be clarified by Mill's consequentialism. Mill further
· associates utilitarianism with the possession of legal and moral rights.

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 I I d moral right s are respec ted. Mill enume,al!:,;
Wearetreatedjustlywhenour ega ~n d . hts and arc pro tected by lav,.
d that he charac te rize as rig . . ,
/l.
different kinds of goo s - . . !able nor natural, b ut ri ghts are subiect lo
understands that legal right s are neithe r inv10

some exceptions: . of his personal liberty, his prop<:rty,

'd d n·u st to deprive any one
... It is mostly cons1 ere u I . H therefore, is one instance of the
. . h. h b I ngs to him by law. ere,
or any other thing w IC e O • f ti defini te sense, namely, that it i-;
application of the terms just and unjust in a_per ec y But this judgment admits
. . t to violate, the legal nghts of anyo ne. . .
1ust to respect, u_n1us arisin from the other forms in which the noti ons of Justice and
of several exceptions, g he erson wh o suffe rs the depr ivatio n may
injustice present them se lves. Fo r ex~mple, t . P . rive d of: a ca se to v1hich we
{as the phrase is) have forfeited the rights wh1Ch he IS so dep .
shall return presently ... 1~

Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justifi ca ti on. He point~ Otri.
that when legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness
principle, then these rights need neither be observed, nor be resp ected: Th,s_ 15 like saying
that there are instances when the law is not morally ju stified and, in th is case, Ev~n
objectionable.

:.. The legal rights of which he is deprived may be rights which ought not to have belonged
to•him; 'in other words, the law which confers on him these rights may be a bad law.
when it is so, or when (which is the same thing for our purpose ) it is suppose d to be so,
opinions will differ as to the justice or injustice of infringi ng it. So me ma intain th at no
,, ,law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individua l citizen; t hat his ~pposition to
.it, if sh~wn at all, should 'only be shown in endeavoring to get it altered by co mpetent
:, auth □-rity. This opinion {whi~h condemns many of the most illustriou s benefactors of
/ 'tnankirld, and would often protect pernicious institutions against t he o nly weapons
t~',~hich, in the st~te of things existing at the time, have any chance of succeed ing against
f ) n'em) is defended, by those who hold it, on grounds of expe diency; principally on that
~ of the importance; to the common interest of mankind, of maintain ing inviolate t he
k,:_'.se~timent of submission to law.:. When, however, a law is thought to be unju st, it seems
i : always to be regarded as being so in the same ways in which a breach of la1.•; is unj ust,
i( namely, by Infringing somebody's right; which, as it ·cannot in this case be a legal right.
f~·receives a different appella~on, and is called a moral right. We may say, therefore, t hat a
( ', sec~nd case on injustic~ for1sists !n taking or withholding from any person th at to which
rz~~e.h~?il !1or:1.~i!~: t ~ _ _ .

Mill seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible to not foll ow, even violat'
an unjust law. The implication is that those who protest over political policies of a moral\
objectionable government act in a morally obligatory way. While thi s is no t always preferr&

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 Mill thinks that it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil disobedience
for the sake of promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict between moral and
legal rights, Mill points out that moral rights take precedence over legal rights.

While it can be justified why others violate legal rights, it is an act of injustice to
violate an individual's moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating
circumstances in which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater
general happiness. Going back to the case of wiretapping, it seems that one's right to
privacy can be sacrificed for the sake of the common good. This means that moral rights are
o_nly justifiable by considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies moral rights in
this way:

All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, except when some
recognized social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social inequalities
which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple
inexpediency, but of injustice, and ~ppear so tyra·nnical, that people are aPt to wonder
how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they thenisel,ves perha~s
tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notio_n of expediency, the
correction of which would make that which they approve seem quit~, as monstrous as
what they have at least leaqlt to condemn. 17

In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and
the like. We say ' theoretically" because this merely constitutes a thought experiment and
need not be actualized. Since what matters in the assessment of what we do is the resultant
happiness, then anything may be justified for the sake of producing the greatest happiness
of the greatest number of people .
. .... ..,. ...... . , ~ - ~.,.....,.~~~,....---~-·•-')
~

Thus, to save a life, It may-not only ~ allow~ble; ~~t a duty to steal or take by forCe,
the necess.iry food ~r "1edici~·e, or to ki~n,a~, •~n~ co,mpel fo offic!ate, the o~ly qualified
medical practitioner. ll_l such cases, as we do not call justice which is not a virtue, we
usu.illy say, not that justice must give wa'i( to some other inoral principle, but that what is
, just iri ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, n~t just in the particular case.
By·thi~ Useful accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to
· justice is kept up, and w~ ,are saved_from"the necessity of maintaining that there can be
l~~dable injus,tice.ia
i i,,.£.; '-µ

While there is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill appeals
to the utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness
principle. There is no right to violate where utility is not served by the social protection of
individual interests. While he recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate
us to perform acts that would regularly be understood as disregarding individual rights, he
argues that this is only possible if it is judged to produce more happiness than unhappiness.

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In short, Mill's moral rights and considerations of justice are not absolute, but arQOni I
justified by their consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest numbQr, 1 I
With these understanding of rights in place, MIii explains his understanding 01
justice and it is with this that we end this section. For Mill, justice can be Interpreted in tcrrn 1
of moral rights because justice promotes the greater social good. He explains:
·- the idea of justice supposes two things; • rule of conduct and a se ntiment which sancttoll\
the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and Intended for th eir ROOd .
. · The other (sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by tho se who Infringe th,
t ., ;.,le. There is involved, in addition, the conception of some definite person who suffers bvth!
. infringement; whose rights (to use the expression appropri ated to the case) are violated by
it. And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliatea
r hurt or damage to oneself, or to t hose with whom one sympathizes, widened so as to Include
all persons, by.the human cap_acity of enlarged sympathy, and th e human conceptton al
i~telligent self•interest. From th~ latter elements, the feeling derives Its morality; from th,
former, iis ~eculiar i.;,p_
1
i-~~i;eness; .~~cf-enE!rgy ~f self:assertjon. 1' •
...._,.._.• ..,,, : ~..;,.:-••i•..:k.i.L.t~lbi, ~.lit .i- ,..:;.. ..

SUMMARY

Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, bul ,
also the greatest happiness principle or the greatest happiness for the greatest number
of people. We are compelled to do .whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to the
most number of persons, counting each as one and none as more than one. In determining
the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, there is no distinction between
Bentham and Mill. Bentham suggests his felicific calculus, a framework for quantifying moral
valuation. Mill provides a criterion for comparative pleasures. He thinks that persons who
experience two different types of pleasures generally prefer higher intellectual pleasures to
base sensual ones.
Mill provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued:
to be the weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected interest5
that are justified by their contribution to _the greatest happiness principle. However, he also
claims that in extreme circumstances, respect for individual rights can be overridden 10
promote the better welfare especially in circumstances of conflict valuation.

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