Memory Like Behavior
Memory Like Behavior
Memory as Behavior:
The Importance of Acquisition and
Remembering Strategies
Peter F. Delaney
Florida State University
AND
John Austin
Western Michigan University
The study of memory has traditionally been the province of cognitive psychology, which
has postulated different memory systems that store memory traces to explain remember-
ing. Behavioral psychologists have been unsuccessful at empirically identifying the be-
havior that occurs during remembering because so much of it occurs rapidly and covertly.
In addition, behavior analysts have generally been disinterested in studying transient
phenomena such as memory. As a result, the cognitive interpretation has been the only
one that has made and tested useful predictions. Recent experimental evidence acquired
while having participants "think aloud" suggests that a behavioral approach to memory
may provide a superior account of memory performance and allow applied scientists to
observe and modify memory-related behavior with well-known applied behavior-analytic
techniques. We review evidence supporting and extending the interpretation of memory
provided by Palmer (1991), who described memory in terms of precurrent behavior that
occurs at the time of acquisition in preparation for problem solving that occurs at the time
of remembering.
them theoretically acceptable to behaviorists, will restrict our discussion to humans be-
extracting the actual claims and findings cause the acquisition and remembering
from the explanatory fictions (or, as cogni- strategies we are interested in are directly
tive psychologists prefer, the hypothetical observable only in humans and not because
constructs). other animals might not use them.
Our purpose in writing this paper is to We will begin by briefly describing tradi-
advocate a view of memory based on the tional cognitive models of memory, starting
work of the behavior analyst Palmer (1991) with Ebbinghaus' (1885/1964) pioneering
and the cognitive psychologists Ericsson and work on learning and forgetting. Next, we
Kintsch (1995; Ericsson & Delaney, in press). will discuss our proposal for a behavioral
All of these authors propose, with rather interpretation of memory, arguing that per-
startling concordance given the antagonis- formance on some of these tasks could not
tic histories of the two fields, that many be explained within the traditional cognitive
memory phenomena can be described as models. Finally, we will conclude with some
being mediated by simple acquisition and speculations about how such mechanisms
remembering strategies that can be de- might be relevant to behavior analysts.
scribed behaviorally, and therefore, we in-
COGNITIVE ATTEMPTS TO
fer, can be modified by appropriate means.
DISCOVER LIMITS BY OBSERVING
It is our view that remembering occurs not,
THE MEMORY TRACE
as many cognitive psychologists would have
it, because the memory system remembers, For more than 1,500 years, philosophers
but rather because a person engages in par- have been vexed by the problem of what
ticular behaviors both during learning and memory is and how it works. They reasoned
during recall that enable the person to re- that because events ceased to exist once they
spond appropriately to particular stimuli at were over the event itself was not recalled,
a later time. In demonstrating that such be- but rather some sort of imperfect copy of the
havior is frequently observed in special event, which is today called the memory
populations (e.g., among memory experts), trace. The trace itself could not be examined
we hope that behaviorists will begin to in- by others; rather, words or pictures would
vestigate memory phenomena more care- have to be created that conveyed some rel-
fully and develop methods to improve evant portion of that memory to others. For
memory performance in particular domains. example, Saint Augustine wrote in his Con-
We also believe that by emphasizing a be- fessions, "When we relate the past truly, it is
havioral approach, cognitive psychology can not the things themselves that are brought
benefit by seeing that some of the inherent forth from our memory - for these have
limits that they suggest are less plausible passed away: but words conceived from the
once the behavior underlying memory per- images of the things: for the things stamped
formance in particular situations has been their prints upon the mind as they passed
specified (Chase & Ericsson, 1981; Ericsson & through it by way of the senses" (August-
Delaney, in press; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). ine, 398/1977, p . 353). Hence, learning some-
Most of the arguments we outline here thing was not viewed as a behavior -
have been presented in slightly different something the organism does - but rather
form by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) or as something that happened to the organ-
Ericsson and Delaney (in press). Our role in ism, as the memory trace was "stamped" on
writing this is more as translators than as the mind.
theorists; our primary contribution is to The first serious scientific attempt to un-
make this work, which appears in cognitive derstand the properties of these memory
publications using cognitive terminology, traces was initiated by Ebbinghaus (1885/
accessible to behavior analysts by integrat- 1964), who used himself as a subject, rather
ing it with Palmer's (1991) interpretation of heroically, for about 6 years of experimenta-
memory. At the same time, we hope to sup- tion on memorizing lists. The main problem
port Palmer's interpretation with the data he faced was in equating the different lists
gleaned from the cognitive literature. We to be learned for difficulty. If the items to be