November 2023

Time for a
November 2023

Time for a
Big Rethinking?
Big Rethinking?
A ABrief Assessment on Energy Transition
Brief Assessment on Energy Transition
and
andClimate Ambition
Climate Ambition after after
Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship
Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2023 2023

Writer Reviewer and Contributor

Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad Arief Rosadi, Climate and Energy Diplomacy Coordinator, IESR
Universitas Indonesia Wira A. Swadana, Green Economy Program Manager, IESR
Sicha Alifa Makahekum, Green Economy Program Officer, IESR
Imprint
Time for a Big Rethinking? A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate
Ambition After Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2023

Author:
Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad, Universitas Indonesia

Reviewers:
Arief Rosadi, IESR
Sicha Alifa Makahekum, IESR
Wira A. Swadana, IESR

© COPYRIGHT The material in this publication is copyrighted. Content from this paper
may be used for non-commercial purposes, provided it is attributed to the source.

Enquiries concerning reprint of this paper should be sent to the following address:
Institute for Essential Services Reform Jalan Tebet Timur Raya No.48 B Jakarta Selatan
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Please cite this report as:

IESR (2023). Time for a Big Rethinking? A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and
Climate Ambition After Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2023. Jakarta: Institute for
Essential Services Reform (IESR)

Publication:
November 2023
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 3
 Executive Summary
• As the curtains fall on Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship this year, this policy brief
aims to evaluate the progress of the climate and energy transition agenda in ASEAN
under Indonesia’s Chairmanship and its future trajectory. It looks at Indonesia’s
priority agenda in ASEAN related to energy transition and how far the proposed
initiatives are successfully adopted. It also attempts to look at the connection, or
lack thereof, between the energy sector and climate agenda in ASEAN, including by
looking at the results of the 41st ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting (AMEM) and the
17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME). It then aims to identify
challenges and opportunities to further accelerate progress in energy transition in
the region.

• While energy is a cross-sectoral issue, energy security features more prominently

under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) pillar. Apart from “improving
sustainable energy security through interconnectivity and market integration,”
which is taken as the main theme of the ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting, the
other Priority Economic Deliverables (PED) under the “sustainability” category of
AEC’s “strategic thrusts” are also relevant to the agenda of energy transition. These
include: (1) Development of the Roadmap of ASEAN Harmonized Standards to
Support Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Implementation; (2) Development
of the electric vehicle ecosystem; (3) Development of ASEAN Blue Economy
Framework; and (4) Transition Financing Framework to support sustainable
financing and green economy. These five PEDs seem to be the continuation of
Indonesia’s recent diplomatic push in various multilateral platforms, including most
notably its G20 Presidency last year. These priorities show Indonesia’s ambition to
align energy transition with development agenda through different international
and multilateral platforms.

• The results of the 41st AMEM indicated that most of Indonesia’s proposed
deliverables in the energy sector are accepted. The proposed Joint Declaration is
agreed and adopted, although the title and substance are slightly modified. It is
declared as the Joint Declaration of the 41st ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting
on Sustainable Energy Security Through Interconnectivity. It is also endorsed in
the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the Joint Ministerial Statement of the 41st ASEAN
Ministers of Energy Meeting. The Joint Ministerial Statement also acknowledged
and recognized the important development of the cross-sectoral and overarching
ASEAN sustainability frameworks that is connected to the energy sector, namely the
ASEAN Strategy on Carbon Neutrality, the ASEAN Economic Community’s Circular
Economy Framework, the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance, and the ASEAN
Blue Economy Framework. Indonesia’s concrete initiative, together with Brunei
Darussalam, Malaysia, and the Philippines is also acknowledged and welcomed in
the Joint Declaration as “a potential multilateral power trading project under ASEAN
Power Grid (APG).” However, some of Indonesia’s proposals do not pass. The call

Time for a Big Rethinking?

4 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
 for ASEAN Member States (AMS) to declare their Net-Zero Emissions (NZE) targets
during the 41st AMEM in August 2023 was not enthusiastically responded to.

• The results of the 41st AMEM and the 17th AMME, as well as the 43rd ASEAN Summit,
have shown that ASEAN and regional cooperation on energy transition are still
defined by path dependence, where “business as usual” approach persists. Similar to
previous AMEMs, the 41st AMEM also emphasized the importance of natural gas and
acknowledged the importance of coal-based power, followed by the commitment
to reduce emissions through the deployment of Clean Coal Technology (CCT) and
Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and Storage (CCUS). This is problematic, since such
solutions are often criticized as counterproductive for “real” clean energy transition.

• Another takeaways from the results of the meetings are: (1) There is a general
acknowledgement that climate change is a multi and cross-sectoral issue; (2)
However, this general acknowledgement remains untranslated effectively in
ASEAN mechanisms, as indicated by the lack of coherence in the climate agenda in
different sectors of cooperation in ASEAN. The relatively limited connection between
the AMME and AMEM results, especially in the climate-related aspects, is illustrative
to this; (3) In both the energy sector and in the climate/environment sector,
there is a strong tendency to integrate development agenda. In this context,
just transition and climate commitments are seen as opportunities to mobilize
resources for economic development; and (4) ASEAN has a self-conceptualization
to see itself as part of the developing world. This perception becomes the basis
for ASEAN’s position in the energy transition and climate agenda.

• While continuity is indeed important, ASEAN and AMS need significant

breakthrough if we are serious to pursue the climate agenda. With the ASEAN
Community Vision 2025 is nearing its final episode, and the second phase of ASEAN
Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) almost completed, it is the time for
a big rethinking in the regional cooperation for accelerating energy transition in
a just and inclusive manner. For this purpose, we need to address the four gaps:
institutional gap, ambition gap, implementation gap, and participation gap.

Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 5
 INTRODUCTION

Time for a Big Rethinking?

6 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
Introduction
A week before the commencement of the 43rd ASEAN Summit on September 5-7, 2023,
President Joko Widodo held a special meeting with his cabinet on the worsening air
quality in Jakarta, the city which would be the venue of the peak event of Indonesia’s
ASEAN chairmanship. In July and August, the ‘Big Durian’ and its surroundings
experienced some of the worst episodes of air pollution, to the extent that it visibly
disrupted the daily lives of the people. The Indonesian Agency for Meteorological,
Climatological and Geophysics (BMKG) recorded that in July 2023, the monthly PM
2.5 Index score reached 93.58 μm/m3, far beyond the safe level according to WHO at
35.4 μm/m3. In May 2023, it was even worse with the score reaching 102.68 μm/m3,
significantly exceeding last year’s highest point at 91.77 μm/m3 (Nagara, Azzahrah, and
Mahvitasari, 2023). The air pollution crisis of Jakarta, where the ASEAN Secretariat is
located, shows the urgency of the climate and energy transition agenda in ASEAN and
the danger of not seriously pursuing them. Experts pointed out that the pollution is
strongly contributed by emissions from the transportation sector and from coal plants
surrounding Jakarta. This illustrates the importance of accelerating energy transition
for the region, as well as the persistent challenge in implementing the agenda.

In the Joint Opening Ceremony for the 41st AMEM and the ASEAN Energy Business
Forum (AEBF) 2023, Indonesia’s Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Arifin Tasrif
optimistically remarked that two-thirds of Southeast Asia’s growing energy demand
could be met by renewables (ASEAN, 2023a). This is even more optimistic than the
target set by the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2016-2025, which aims
to raise the share of renewable energy in the region to 23% (APAEC Drafting Committee,
2020).

However, implementation remains a challenge. The International Energy Agency’s

Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2022 (IEA, 2022), as well as the 7th ASEAN Energy Outlook
published by ASEAN Center of Energy (ACE, 2022), recorded that in 2020, the share of
renewables in total primary energy supply is still at 14.2%, far below the stated target
of 23% in 2025. The persistent dependency on fossil fuels among the ASEAN Member
States not only threatens to stall the energy transition and climate agenda, but also
dangerously increases the vulnerability of AMS in the context of increasing geopolitical
tension.

Furthermore, this is especially important because ASEAN is a growing region. It sees

itself as one of the world’s epicenters of growth and aims to be even more central in the
global economy. Economically, almost all ASEAN member states successfully doubled
the size of their economies since 2000. Even during and after the pandemic, coupled
with geopolitical tension and global economic slowdown, Southeast Asia remains a
bright spot in the global economy. As a result, it is expected that energy demand will
continue to increase at around 3% a year (IEA, 2022). Unfortunately, if no significant

Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 7
 policy changes, three-quarters of the increase in energy demand to 2030 is going to be
met by fossil fuels. This would mean a 35% increase in CO2 emissions (IEA, 2022), which
is of course not consistent with ASEAN’s stated aspirations for emission reduction
through energy transition.

Against this backdrop, Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship puts energy transition as one
of its main priority agendas. The theme for this year’s Chairmanship is “ASEAN Matters:
Epicentrum of Growth,” where energy security is among the four elements, which are
considered pillars of ASEAN’s role as the center of regional and global growth (the other
three are health architecture, food security, and financial stability). Energy transition
and climate agenda are also prominently presented as part of the three priority issues
(“strategic thrusts” in the economic sector proposed by Indonesia, which consists of
recovery and rebuilding, digital economy, and sustainability). Specifically, Indonesia
also put “improving sustainable energy security through interconnectivity and market
integration” as one of the 16 Priority Economic Deliverables . While “sustainable” can
refer to the stability and sustainability of energy supply in the context of emerging
disruptions, it also shows Indonesia’s intention to push regional cooperation for the
climate and energy transition agenda.

This policy brief aims to evaluate the progress of the climate and energy transition
agenda in ASEAN under Indonesia’s Chairmanship and its future trajectory. It looks
at Indonesia’s priority agenda in ASEAN related to energy transition and how far the
proposed initiatives are successfully adopted. It also attempts to look at the connection,
or lack thereof, between the energy sector and climate agenda in ASEAN, including
by looking at the results of the 41st ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting and the 17th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment. It then aims to identify challenges and
opportunities to further accelerate progress in energy transition in the region.

Chairmanship Priorities and Results of the 41st AMEM: Aligning Energy Security,
Climate Agenda, and Development

While energy is a cross-sectoral issue, energy security features more prominently

under the ASEAN Economic Community pillar. Apart from “improving sustainable
energy security through interconnectivity and market integration,” which is taken as
the main theme of the ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meeting, the other PEDs under the
“Sustainability” category of AEC’s “strategic thrusts” are also relevant to the agenda
of energy transition. These include: (1) Development of the Roadmap of ASEAN
Harmonized Standards to Support Sustainable Development Goals Implementation;
(2) Development of the electric vehicle ecosystem; (3) Development of ASEAN Blue
Economy Framework; and (4) Transition Financing Framework to support sustainable
financing and green economy (Coordinating Ministry for the Economy of the Republic
of Indonesia, 2023).

Time for a Big Rethinking?

8 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
These five PEDs seem to be the continuation of Indonesia’s recent diplomatic push
in various multilateral platforms, including most notably its G20 Presidency last year.
During Indonesia’s Presidency, G20 reiterates the commitment to support “orderly,
just, and affordable energy transitions” (G20, 2022, par. 16) in developing countries,
including through “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy,
capacity building, affordable latest technology within the public domain, mutually
beneficial technology cooperation, and financing mitigation actions in the energy sector”
(G20, 2022, par. 11). It is interesting to note that throughout G20 outcomes, energy
transition is consistently and frequently framed as an integral part of development,
and should not be counterproductive to the development agenda. In line with this
framing, Indonesia also seeks to mobilize resources for developing countries, including
for its own ‘green development’ agenda. Apart from urging developed countries to
fulfill their USD 100 billion per year commitment for climate financing (G20, 2022, par.
16), Indonesia also successfully secured commitments for the Just Energy Transition
Partnership (JETP), which will mobilize USD 20 billion.

The ambition to align energy transition with development agenda, as well as energy
security, which is increasingly vulnerable due to the rising geopolitical tension, is the
dominant theme for Indonesia’s agenda in the energy sector during this year’s ASEAN
Chairmanship. During the Chairmanship Kick-Off event, on March 31, 2023, the Minister
of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia, Arifin Tasrif, mentioned
that acceleration of just, affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy transition must be
based on the the principle of “no one left behind,” and “in accordance to the specific
social economic circumstances and priorities of ASEAN Member States” (Ministry
of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). In the same
speech, the Minister also highlighted the importance of access to affordable low-
carbon technology and financing in supporting the energy transition agenda. Quoting
IRENA, the Minister mentioned that the region will need USD 29.4 trillion in 2050 to
ensure energy transition with 100% renewable energy and thus called for support
from developed countries as well as international financial institutions (Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). Additionally, the
Minister also pointed out the importance of critical minerals, including nickel, rare
earth elements, and tin, in energy transition and thus calling for the development of
downstream industries in the Southeast Asian region (Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Resources of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). While access to affordable technology
and financing has been frequently mentioned in other multilateral platforms, the call
for the development of downstream industries based on critical minerals such as nickel
is quite new. This is practically connected to Indonesia’s recent push for industrialization
through downstreaming (hilirisasi) policy.

The conceptualization of the issue is quite comprehensive, but the outcomes pursued
by Indonesia are relatively simple. Indonesia aimed to lead the Ministers of Energy
of ASEAN Member States to agree on a Joint Declaration on Improving Sustainable
Energy Security Through Interconnectivity and Market Integration. The declaration was

Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 9
 proposed to declare the commitment to expand the implementation of the ASEAN
Power Grid (APG) and Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP), push further initiatives for
energy connectivity, and establish regional supply chains for renewable energies to
accelerate energy transition. Alongside the “symbolic” outcome in the form of the
declaration, Indonesia also seeks a concrete outcome, which can be understood as
the implementation of the commitments stated in the declaration. Indonesia, together
with Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, initiated the establishment
of the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines Power Integration Project
(BIMP-PIP), as a potential multilateral power trading project under the APG. Indonesia
also pushed for the signing of MoUs between electricity enterprises or authorities to
implement commitments for energy connectivity.

Apart from pursuing Indonesia’s priority deliverable in the energy sector, Indonesia’s
Chairmanship also takes the responsibility to push for the progress of the
implementation of the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation. The APAEC
consists of 7 program areas, which includes ASEAN Power Grid (APG), Trans-ASEAN
Gas Pipeline (TAGP), Coal and Clean Coal Technology (CCT), Energy Efficiency and
Conservation (EE&C), Renewable Energy (RE), Regional Energy Policy and Planning
(REPP), and Civilian Nuclear Energy (CNE). Furthermore, Indonesia sees the importance
of preparing the continuation of the Plan of Action in ASEAN’s Post-2025 Vision.
With this in mind, Indonesia conceptually put the aspirational goals of the APAEC as
“short term” targets (23% share of renewable energy in 2025), Nationally Determined
Contributions of each AMS as “intermediate targets,” and net zero emissions 2050 as
the “long-term” target. It is in this context that Indonesia called all AMS to declare their
net zero emissions targets in the 41st AMEM, which then will be used as the basis to
develop an ASEAN NZE Roadmap (Ministry of Communication and Information of the
Republic of Indonesia, 2023).

How successful is Indonesia’s Chairmanship in the energy sector? The proposed Joint
Declaration is agreed and adopted, although the title and the substance is slightly
modified. It is declared as the Joint Declaration of the 41st ASEAN Ministers of Energy
Meeting on Sustainable Energy Security Through Interconnectivity (ASEAN, 2023a). It
is also endorsed in the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the Joint Ministerial Statement of
the 41st ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting. The declaration included statements to
declare the commitment “to expand the implementation of the ASEAN Power Grid
(APG) and Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP),” “to encourage the development of
detailed studies to support the realization of ASEAN energy interconnectivity, such as
feasibility studies on specific power integration projects, including in-land transmission
and sub-sea cables, and the update of the TAGP Master Plan,” as well as “to encourage
the possibility of establishing sustainable regional supply chains for solar, wind,
geothermal, hydro, bioenergy, waste-to-energy, marine renewable energy, and energy
storage systems to accelerate the energy transition in the region.” The Joint Ministerial
Statement also acknowledged and recognized the important development of the cross-
sectoral and overarching ASEAN sustainability frameworks that is connected to the

Time for a Big Rethinking?

10 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
energy sector, namely the ASEAN Strategy on Carbon Neutrality, the ASEAN Economic
Community’s Circular Economy Framework, the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable
Finance, and the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework. The ministers also affirmed
the relevance of strategies in the energy sector, such as connecting ASEAN’s green
infrastructure and markets (e.g. ASEAN Power Grid), attracting and deploying green
capital, and developing interoperable carbon markets. The ministers also stressed the
importance of transition finance and also expressed their enthusiasm to be involved in
the stakeholder consultations on Version 2 of the ASEAN Taxonomy.

Indonesia’s concrete initiative, together with Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and the
Philippines is also acknowledged and welcomed in the Joint Declaration as “a potential
multilateral power trading project under APG.” Furthermore, this initiative provides the
impetus and example to call for more AMS to initiate new multilateral power trading
projects and bridge the gap by connecting the north, south, and east sub-regions based
on the recommendations under AIMS III.

However, some of Indonesia’s proposals do not pass. The call for AMS to declare their
NZE targets during the 41st AMEM in August 2023 was not enthusiastically responded
to. It is unclear if any of the countries submitted such a declaration or information, but
these could not be found in the Joint Ministerial Statement of the 41st ASEAN Ministers
on Energy Meeting as well as the Joint Declaration.

Overall, the 41st AMEM resulted in continuities, with some new notable developments.
The meeting continued to advocate for expanding regional energy connectivity
initiatives through the APG and the TAGP. It supported the extension of the existing
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of APG until December 31, 2025, as well as
supported ASEAN Power Grid Consultative Committee (APGCC) as the lead body for the
preparation of the successor APG agreement. Similar to previous AMEMs, the meeting
also emphasized the importance of natural gas and acknowledged the importance
of coal-based power (even the texts on these issues were simply paraphrases from
the previous AMEM’s Joint Ministerial Statement, see table 1). Also similar to previous
AMEMs, this was followed by stating the commitment to reduce emissions through
the deployment of Clean Coal Technology (CCT) and Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and
Storage (CCUS). Some developments were highlighted in this context, such as the
acknowledgement that there are 12 CCUS projects in the pipeline in AMS and that
there is on-going process of developing the ASEAN CCUS Deployment Framework
and Roadmap. In the RE program area, development to be observed is the ongoing
preparation of Version-1 of the ASEAN Long-Term RE Roadmap and the development of
Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) Framework in BIMP. In CNE, not so much progress
is identified.

In the EE&C program area, we see that the transportation sector is more explicitly
integrated. While the previous AMEM stated that it welcomed the initiation of the study
on status and Potential of EE&C for Transport and Industry Sectors in ASEAN through a

Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 11
 range of capacity building activities, the 41st AMEM agreed to enhance EE&C measures
in the transport sector through the increasing utilization of biofuels, deployment of
electric vehicles (EVs), and improvement of fuel efficiency. The statement also mentioned
‘ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Developing Regional Electric Vehicle Ecosystem’ as a
positive development, as well as the ongoing development of the ‘ASEAN Plus Three
Leaders’ Statement on Developing of Electric Vehicle Ecosystem. The explicit inclusion
of biofuel and electric vehicle ecosystem development in the joint statement is quite
obviously linked to Indonesia’s current development priorities. In multiple statements
by President Joko Widodo and other high-ranking officials, industrial downstreaming
(hilirisasi industri), especially in the nickel industry (including to develop electric vehicle
ecosystem) is explicitly mentioned as the national priority (President of the Republic
of Indonesia, 2023). Similarly, biofuel is connected to the palm oil sector, which is
identified as a national strategic commodity (Karmini, 2021; Choiruzzad, 2019).

To have a more comprehensive picture of the results of the 41st AMEM, a summary of
the 41st AMEM Joint Ministerial Statement (ASEAN, 2023a) and its comparison to the
40th AMEM Joint Ministerial Statement (ASEAN, 2022) can be found in the table below:

Table 1. Comparison of the 40th and 41st AMEM Joint Ministerial Statements

40th AMEM 41st AMEM

Supported the APG and Joint Declaration on

TAGP by accelerating Sustainable Energy
remaining important works; Security through
endorsed the increase of Interconnectivity, further
Host Specific electricity trading, enhanced enhancing and expanding
Priority and mixed and complementary APG and TAGP
Important ASEAN energy sources, exchanged
experiences and shared new Developed the basis for
milestones technologies, and increased post-2025 ASEAN vision in
access to financing; the energy sector by
supported ASEAN Plan of highlighting the principle
Action for Energy of “just and inclusive
Cooperation (APAEC): energy transitions,” while
2021-2025. ensuring “energy security,
reliability, accessibility,
Launched the 7th ASEAN sustainability, resiliency,
Energy Outlook and affordability.”

Acknowledgement of the
importance of the
overarching ASEAN
sustainability agenda,
which requires
cooperation across
sectors and pillars.

Took note of the

development and
implementation of ASEAN
Time for a Big Rethinking?
12 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
Strategy on Carbon
Neutrality, the ASEAN
Economic Community’s
 Acknowledgement of the
importance of the
overarching ASEAN
sustainability agenda,
which requires
cooperation across
sectors and pillars.

Took note of the

development and
implementation of ASEAN
Strategy on Carbon
Neutrality, the ASEAN
Economic Community’s
Circular Economy
Framework, the ASEAN
Taxonomy for Sustainable
Finance, and the ASEAN
Blue Economy Framework.
40th AMEM 41 AMEM
st

Noted the discussion to extend Extension of the existing

the existing Memorandum of
Memorandum of Understanding
Understanding (MOU) on the (MoU) of APG until 31
ASEAN Power Grid APG; December 2025;
(APG) supported
Congratulated all parties APGCC as the lead body for
involved in the Lao the preparation of the
PDR–Thailand–Malaysia successor APG
–Singapore Power agreement.
Integration Project (LTMS-PIP)
Welcomed the continuing
initiatives to enhance the
region’s power systems, the
implementation of APG
interconnection projects, and
the work to
advance multilateral power
trading (MPT).

Commended the release of

the Joint Statement initiating
the Brunei
Darussalam–Indonesia
–Malaysia–Philippines Power
Integration Project (BIMP-PIP),
the first anniversary of the
Lao PDR–Thailand–Malaysia
–Singapore Power
Integration Project (LTMS-PIP)
that will work towards
continued power trade of up
to 100 MW; cross-border
electricity trading between
Cambodia and Singapore via
subsea cables.

Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 13
 40th AMEM 41st AMEM

Emphasized the importance of Emphasized the

the continuing role of natural importance of the
gas in a continuing role of
Trans-ASEAN well-balanced and just energy natural gas in a well
transition -balanced and just energy
Gas Pipeline (TAGP) transition
Supported for the inclusion of
natural gas in the Extension of the current
sustainable finance ASEAN Petroleum
taxonomies developed by Security Agreement (APSA)
governments and and drafting of the new APSA
transnational bodies, agreement in 2024.
including in the ASEAN
Sustainable Finance
Taxonomy that is being
developed by the ASEAN
Taxonomy Board
40 AMEM
th
41st AMEM

Acknowledged the Acknowledged the

Coal and Clean Coal continuing role of coal-based continuing role of coal-based
Technology (CCT) power in ASEAN’s current power power in ASEAN’s energy
mix and called for stronger security and affordability;
regional called for enhancing
cooperation to address regional intra-regional coal trade
supply stability and security.
Commitment to reduce
Commitment to reduce emissions in ASEAN through
emissions in ASEAN, for which the deployment of CCT and
CCT and CCUS are inevitably CCUS.
required.
Acknowledged the 12 CCUS
Encouraged cross-sectoral projects in the pipeline in
cooperation to explore best AMS.
practices and measures to
accelerate the deployment of Welcomed the on-going
CCT and CCUS development of the ASEAN
CCUS Deployment
Framework and Roadmap.

Agreed to explore avenues for

enabling cross-border carbon
transport and storage, as well
as to support
development of regional
carbon markets to improve the
economic and technical
feasibility of CCUS projects
in the region.

Time for a Big Rethinking?

14 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
 40th AMEM 41st AMEM

Welcomed the: (i) initiation Agreed to enhance EE&C

Energy Efficiency of the study on Status and measures in the transport
and Potential of EE&C for Transport sector through the
increasing utilization of
Conservation (EE&C) and Industry Sectors in ASEAN
biofuels, deployment of
through a range of capacity
building activities, and (ii) the electric vehicles (EVs), and
plan to initiate discussions improvement of
on EE&C in the power sector fuel efficiency.
through a Deep-Dive Workshop
on EE&C in the Power Sector Encouraged by ‘ASEAN
Leaders’ Declaration
on Developing Regional
Electric Vehicle
Ecosystem’, as well as to
develop the ‘ASEAN
Plus Three Leaders’ Statement
on Developing Electric Vehicle
Ecosystem’

Looked forward to further Welcomed the ongoing

Renewable Energy progress in the development preparation of Version-1 of the
(RE) of the ‘ASEAN Long-Term ASEAN
RE Roadmap’ and its Long-Term RE Roadmap
recommendations in scaling
up RE deployment in ASEAN Welcomed the project
‘Development of
Renewable Energy
Certificate (REC)
Framework in BIMP,’ which will
study the market potential of
REC in BIMP countries with
potential replication in other
AMS.

40th AMEM 41st AMEM

Commended the expansion of Welcomed the good progress
Regional Energy energy engagement with new in implementing activities
DPs/IOs. under the APAEC Phase II and
Policy and noted the increasing need to
Planning (REPP) leverage opportunities for
multilateral collaboration
through new partnerships
throughout the seven (7)
programme areas.

Noted the potential for ASEAN Noted that several AMS are
Civilian Nuclear Member States to explore exploring nuclear
Time energy
for a Big for
Rethinking?
15
Energy (CNE) A Brief
nuclear Assessment
energy on Energy Transition
for power power and Climate Ambition after
generation in the future, given generation, given the
 multilateral collaboration
through new partnerships
throughout the seven (7)
programme areas.

Noted the potential for ASEAN Noted that several AMS are
Civilian Nuclear Member States to explore exploring nuclear energy for
Energy (CNE) nuclear energy for power power
generation in the future, given generation, given the
the emerging technologies and emerging technologies and
new developments in the field new developments in the field
of nuclear energy. of nuclear energy.
Acknowledged the need to
assess the role of nuclear in
providing stable, low-carbon
baseload power by exploring
the potential utilization of
nuclear energy beyond
conventional power plants.

Another key takeaway from the results of the 41st AMEM Joint Ministerial Statement is
the persistence of the “business as usual” approach. While the commitment for “just
and inclusive energy transition” is declared, there are no significant new measures
to accelerate the transition. The Joint Statement praised the achievement of RE in
installed power capacity and proudly mentioned that it is already very close to the
target of 35% share (33.6% in 2021). But when it “noted the achievement” of 14.4% RE
share in the Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) in 2021, it did so without mentioning
that the 2025 target is 23%. It did not clearly acknowledge that the gap between
14.4% and 23% target is a real challenge that needs to be addressed. Rather than
acknowledging the gap and investing more aggressively and effectively on renewable
energy, this “business as usual” approach led to the continuing framing that fossil fuel
dependency, such as coal, is inevitable. This approach and frame of thinking shifted
the focus and resources from accelerating real transition to controversial solutions
such as CCT and CCUS. CCT and CCUS, strongly featured in the Joint Statement, are
frequently criticized as counterproductive for energy transition, since they still require
expensive investment but proven to be underdelivering in terms of GHG emissions
reduction (Garcia Freites and Jones, 2021). Existing CCT/CCUS projects are often proven
to be “nowhere near expectations” in terms of carbon capture rate and capacity rate
(Schlissel, 2021). Furthermore, the life cycle emissions of Coal Fired Power Plants with
CCT/CCUS will remain relatively large due to the increase in the use of coal to support
CCT operations (Simanjuntak, 2022).

One positive development is the increasing explicit recognition of the nexus between
climate change and energy. The 41st AMEM Joint Ministerial Statement acknowledged
“the importance of the overarching ASEAN sustainability agenda, which requires

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16 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
cooperation across sectors and pillars” and “took note of the development and
implementation of the ASEAN Strategy on Carbon Neutrality, the ASEAN Economic
Community’s Circular Economy Framework, the ASEAN Taxonomy for Sustainable
Finance, and the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework.” This recognition is important and
in the right direction, because the energy transition cannot be successful without being
closely integrated with the climate agenda. Integration, or at least synchronization of
regional initiatives and mechanisms, in energy, climate, and other related sectors, is
imperative.

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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 17
 THE CONNECTION
-OR LACK THEREOF-
BETWEEN ENERGY
SECTOR AND CLIMATE
AGENDA IN ASEAN

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18 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
The connection between the energy sector and the climate agenda is clear. Unfortunately,
this connection is often missing in the regional cooperation in the energy, environment,
and other related sectors. In the ASEAN mechanism, the “environmental” or “climate
change” agenda is mostly discussed under the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Pillar
(ASEAN, 2016), while the energy sector is under the ASEAN Economic Pillar. Despite
some recognition of the connection between them, the discussion and initiatives are
relatively fragmented.

Under the Indonesian Chairmanship, the climate agenda also appeared in different
sectoral priorities, but without clear connection between them in terms of planning
and implementation. There is a “sustainability” strategic thrust in Indonesia’s Priority
Economic Deliverables, which includes development of the electric vehicle ecosystem,
blue economy, transition financing, and interconnectivity in the energy sector. But
there is also a “sustainability” element in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community pillar,
which focuses on “promoting environmental cooperation to conserve biodiversity
and mitigate the impacts of climate change.” Indonesia especially mentioned that the
specific priorities are to enhance regional capacity to conserve biodiversity and to
implement the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN, 2023b).
While there is acknowledgement of the importance of cross-sectoral frameworks,
especially between the energy sector and the climate agenda, the discussions are done
separately and the integration between different initiatives are still weak.

Conducted in almost similar periods, the results of the 41st ASEAN Ministers on Energy
Meeting (held in Bali, 24 August 2023) and the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
the Environment (held in Vientiane, 23 August 2023) do not show strong connection.
While the 41st AMEM Joint Ministerial Declaration does acknowledge the importance
of overarching and cross-sectoral frameworks in ASEAN’s “sustainability agenda,”
it still does not clarify how initiatives in the energy sector affect (or be affected by)
climate change mitigation and adaptation measures discussed under the ASCC and
in the 17th AMME. On the other hand, while the 17th AMME discussed the progress
of regional cooperation efforts in addressing “a number of environmental issues,”
the energy sector or energy transition is not mentioned (ASEAN, 2023c). The meeting
welcomed some progress in the regional cooperation on environment and advancing
climate action, such as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (the
AMME is hold back-to-back with the 18th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to
the AATHP), Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Climate Change
based in Brunei Darussalam, the Horizontal Learning for ASEAN Sustainable Cities
on Indonesia, as well as multiple cooperation initiatives with Dialogue Partners. The
meeting also recognized the increasing danger of marine plastic debris and agreed
that ASEAN should step up efforts to combat the problem. However, the cross-sectoral
linkage, including with the energy sector, is still missing. The general understanding
that the climate agenda is a cross-sectoral issue is not reflected in the discussion and
the results of different ASEAN meetings.

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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 19
 One document that shows the connection between energy sector and climate agenda
is the Joint Statement on Climate Change to 28th Session of the Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP28), which
was endorsed by the 17th AMME and finally agreed by ASEAN leaders during the ASEAN
Summit (ASEAN, 2023d). The Joint Statement listed ASEAN’s progress on energy transition
among the evidence that ASEAN is committed to achieving the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement goals (3rd paragraph, point e). The same paragraph also mentioned ASEAN
Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance and ASEAN Green Map in the Joint Statement of
the 9th ASEAN Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (AFMGM) (3rd
paragraph, point f), showing that there is a recognition of the importance of cross-
sectoral coordination. When mentioning negative impacts of climate change on basic
human needs, “energy” was also mentioned together with food, water, clean and green
environment, and health. It also called upon UNFCCC parties and its Paris Agreement
to “communicate their long-term low GHG emission development strategies referred in
Article 4 Paragraph 19 of the Paris Agreement and enabling just transitions to achieve
balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHG in
the second half of this century” as well as to promote “the development of low-emission
technologies” and “cross-border flow of clean and renewable energy to enable just and
inclusive energy transition.”

In general, the Joint Statement itself frequently stressed the cross-sectoral nature of
the climate agenda. Not only listing different ASEAN initiatives in different sectors that
are considered as related to the climate agenda, it also highlighted the interconnection
of climate change mitigation and adaptation to other sectors such as trade, agriculture,
and even gender equality and youth. Moreover, it attempts to connect initiatives at
global level with ASEAN’s initiatives.

However, the strongest feature of the Joint Statement is its emphasis on the importance
of aligning the climate agenda and development, positioning most ASEAN Member
States as developing countries. In different parts of the joint statement, it frequently
highlighted the CBDR-RC principle and the acknowledgement of national circumstances.
When mentioning ASEAN’s potentials for emissions avoidance, reductions removals,
and carbon stock enhancement, it argued that these are “dependent on technological
developments, international cooperation, and the enhanced support provided by
developed countries as guaranteed by the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.” In
this context, this paper argues that the call for the developed countries to seriously
implement their commitment is the main point. The Joint Statement listed demands
for developed countries in point 15, which included providing enhanced means of
implementation support to assist developing country Parties with respect to both
mitigation and adaptation, fulfilling their commitment to provide USD 100 billion
annually to developing country Parties by 2023, and providing adequate and sustainable
support to ASEAN Member States to develop their plans related to adaptation and loss
and damage. In the final paragraph, the Joint Statement “urged” developed countries
to “provide more financial, technological, and capacity support to ASEAN Member

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20 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
States in a timely, coordinated, sustainable, and gender-responsive manner for better
understanding the impacts of climate change at regional, national, and local levels to
achieve climate commitments.”

It is also interesting to note that the Joint Statement also criticized unilateral measures
that could lead to unjustified discrimination or disguised restrictions. While not
explicit, this is referring to EU Deforestation Regulation and the Renewable Energy
Directives, which are considered by many policymakers in Indonesia and Malaysia as
trade discrimination against palm oil. Indonesia and Malaysia strongly criticized the
European Parliament’s vote to indirectly limit the import of palm oil by 2030, calling it
a protectionist move and even ‘crop apartheid’ (Reuters Staff, 2018). These two largest
producers of palm oil also argued that the EU RED II violates the WTO’s principle of
non-discrimination (Arief et al., 2020).

There are few important takeaways from the discussion above related to the climate-
energy nexus in ASEAN:
1. There is a general acknowledgement that climate change is a multi and cross-
sectoral issue.
2. However, this general acknowledgement remains untranslated effectively in
ASEAN mechanisms, as indicated by the lack of coherence in the climate agenda
in different sectors of cooperation in ASEAN. The relatively limited connection
between the AMME and AMEM results, especially in the climate-related aspects,
is illustrative to this.
3. In both the energy sector and in the climate/environment sector, there is a
strong tendency to integrate development agenda. In this context, just transition
and climate commitments are seen as opportunities to mobilize resources for
economic development.
4. ASEAN has a self-conceptualization to see itself as part of the developing world.
This perception becomes the basis for ASEAN’s position in the energy transition
and climate agenda.

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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 21
 THE FOUR GAPS

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22 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
Under Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2023, many of the priorities were linked to
energy transition and climate agenda. The meetings, including the ASEAN Summit,
also listed progress in these sectors, with some of them explicitly written in the Joint
Statement on Climate Change to 28th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP28). While it is important
to appreciate these progress, it is important to identify the gaps to be closed if we
would like to see more meaningful impact in the region.

This paper identifies at least four gaps to be addressed. The first is the “institutional
gap.” By institutional gap, this paper argues that ASEAN’s institutional framework in
the energy transition and climate agenda is still fragmented. This has led to ineffective,
often overlapping, works and initiatives across different ASEAN cooperation sectors.
There is an acknowledgement of the cross-sectoral nature of energy and climate
issues, but the institutional design of ASEAN cooperation, which is based on three
ASEAN Community Pillars and specific sectors, have made relevant initiatives and work
distributed across different sectors with no clear connection to each other.

ASEAN and AMS actually recognized this problem of fragmentation. The ASEAN Working
Group on Climate Change Action Plan 2019-2025 put Cross-Sectoral Coordination
as one of its core-themes. The action plan also recognized that “there is a lack of
awareness in the full landscape of climate change-related work in ASEAN” which lead
to “overlapping roles and responsibilities.” It also mentioned that “mapping” is needed
to provide “some coherence,” indicating the realization of the current institutional
limitation. Unfortunately, it seems that there is limited progress in this “mapping”
exercise so far.

The second gap is the “ambition gap”. This paper argues that ASEAN regional and AMS’
national targets for emission reduction are still not enough to achieve the objectives
of the Paris Agreement. While ASEAN leaders frequently emphasize the importance of
ambitious climate actions, their own ambitions are low. From year to year, the AMEM
continues to include the progress in the share of RE in installed power capacity and
proudly mentioned that it is already very close to the target of 35% share (33.5% in
2020 and 33.6% in 2021). But the fact that the target is “very close” and the progress
is only around 0.1% per year probably means that the target is not ambitious enough.
Furthermore, in the Climate Action Tracker (2023), five AMS that are monitored are still in
the insufficient, highly insufficient, and critically insufficient categories in the overall rating
(see table 2). It is not a surprise that ASEAN’s joint statement on climate is met with
criticism from civil society (Ibnu Aqil, 2023).

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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 23
 Table 2. AMS in the Climate Action Tracker (only five are included)

Related to this “ambition gap” is the acceptance of the “business as usual”, such
as the inevitability of fossil fuel dependency. Each year, the AMEM joint ministerial
statements continue to emphasize the importance of coal-based power in ASEAN for
energy security. The tendency to frame fossil fuel dependency as inevitable leads to the
reliance on controversial solutions such as clean coal technology and CCUS, which are
criticized by many as distracting the resources from more impactful measures such as
more aggressive investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency (Garcia Freites
and Jones, 2021). With energy demand growth at around 3% a year and continuing
domination of fossil fuels, ASEAN would experience a 35% increase in CO2 emissions by
2030 (IEA, 2022).

The third gap is the “implementation gap”. This means that effective implementation
of regional and national energy transition and climate initiatives are still hindered by
different factors, from technical to political ones. The much-lauded Just Energy Transition
Partnership (JETP), for example, is still facing delay (Take and Maulia, 2023). The
Indonesian government mentioned that the delay is needed to make adjustments to
Time for a Big Rethinking?
24 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
the plan because of some technical issue. However, observers mentioned that there
are some critical issues that remain as obstacles for proceeding further, such as the
treatment of coal power and unclear global consensus on the definition of transition
(Take and Maulia, 2023). In this context, it is important to learn from the experience
of REDD+, which had achieved initial progress but then slowed down after the 2014
election due to policy change. Not only that it is sensitive to political changes, REDD+
implementation in Indonesia is also criticized as being too focused on technicalities and
not addressing the socio economic and political drivers of the problem (Nofyanza, et.al,
2020). The political-economic complexity in the energy sector is no less complicated
than in the forestry sector addressed by REDD+. With the international coal market
shrinking due to global climate change mitigation measures, the domestic market is
increasingly becoming more important to Indonesia’s coal industry. Thus, it is expected
that there will be a strong push from this highly concentrated and politically connected
industry to shape policies in the energy sector. State’s reliance on the mining royalties
also creates situations that might not be conducive for green transition (Ordonez,
et.al., 2021).

The prominence of the development agenda in the energy sector as well as in the
climate agenda, as observed in the ASEAN documents discussed above, makes the
political economic landscape more challenging for implementation of energy transition
initiatives. While the integration of development agenda in climate and energy transition
initiatives is necessary to align the often contradictory development and climate goals,
it is important to ensure that the implementation does not reflect the subordination of
climate goals to economic development.

The fourth gap is the “participation gap”, which is strongly connected to the third gap.
Without inclusive process and strong multi stakeholder participation, energy transition
initiatives will not be effective. This remains a huge challenge at regional and national
levels. While ASEAN officially aims and claims to be a “people-centred” organization,
public involvement in the ASEAN processes is still limited (Atkinson & Mahaffey, 2021;
Djalal, 2023). Similar complaints are also heard in domestic levels, where the decision-
making process of policies related to climate and to energy sector often lack public
participation.

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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 25
 MOMENT FOR A
BIG RETHINKING

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26 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
As Indonesia passes the baton of ASEAN Chairmanship to Laos, more efforts are
needed to ensure that the energy transition and climate agenda can progress further
and faster in ASEAN. As the results of the 41st AMEM and the 17th AMME, as well as the
43rd ASEAN Summit have shown, ASEAN and regional cooperation on energy transition
is still defined by path dependence. While continuity is indeed important, ASEAN and
AMS will need a major breakthrough if they are serious about pursuing the climate
agenda. With the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 is nearing its final episode, and the
second phase of APAEC almost completed, it is the time for a big rethinking in the
regional cooperation for accelerating energy transition in a just and inclusive manner.
For this purpose, the four gaps that have been previously discussed: institutional gap,
ambition gap, implementation gap, and participation gap need to be addressed.

To address the institutional gap, ASEAN can start by comprehensively mapping

different sectors and initiatives that are relevant to the climate agenda, as already
mentioned in the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change Action Plan. From there,
it can develop a more effective and efficient institutional framework to synchronize
and integrate them. While there are already on-going developments of overarching
and cross-sectoral initiatives and frameworks such as the ASEAN Strategy on Carbon
Neutrality, the ASEAN Economic Community’s Circular Economy Framework, the ASEAN
Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance, and the ASEAN Blue Economy Framework, more
coherence and integration is needed. ASEAN leaders’ statement on the commitment
to strengthen ASEAN’s capacity and institutional effectiveness can be a starting point
(ASEAN, 2023e). While this commitment is mostly driven by geopolitical factors—to
ensure ASEAN’s centrality amidst the increasing Great Power rivalry,it is an opportunity
to push institutional reforms in ASEAN that could strengthen mechanisms for regional
cooperation in the climate and energy transition.

To address the ambition gap, it is obvious that ASEAN and AMS need more ambitious
targets. Indonesia’s call for all AMS to declare their NZE targets during the 41st AMEM to
develop an ASEAN NZE Roadmap was a step in the right direction. The fact that it was not
enthusiastically responded shows that it requires a stronger push. The assumptions,
such as the inevitability of coal dependency, need to be evaluated thoroughly.

Similar rethinking is also important to develop the continuation of the APAEC, such
as on the relevance of the existing seven program areas and programs under them.
The next phase of APAEC must be able to break from the path dependence and
“business as usual” approach by focusing more on developing renewable clean energy,
rather than continuing the expensive and unsustainable solutions. The huge gap in
the achievement of RE share in the TPES must be acknowledged as a challenge to be
addressed through real and sustainable solutions.

To address the implementation and participation gaps, ASEAN needs to push more
meaningful involvement of multiple stakeholders in all phases of policy making and
policy implementation processes at both regional and national level. At the ASEAN

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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 27
 level, there are several limitations on the ASEAN-Civil Society Organizations (CSO)
engagement that must be addressed, including: (1) inherent limitations imposed
by ASEAN in the engagement channels (e.g. ASEAN controls which group can
participate, informality of the engagement, selective issue for engagement) ; (2) lack
of institutionalization of the engagement between ASEAN and CSOs; (3) hesitancy of
the member states; and (4) fragmentation of the CSOs (Nogra, 2023). To address these
limitations, ASEAN must further institutionalize CSO participation, including in the
climate and energy-related cooperation sectors. This can be integrated as part of the
larger ASEAN “institutional strengthening” agenda agreed in the 43rd ASEAN Summit.

One of the most important issues to be discussed through this multi stakeholder
involvement at both domestic and ASEAN levels is on the definition of just and
inclusive transition. What does it mean and what parameters can be used to measure
its achievement? This must be the basis in the development of the next phase of the
APAEC. By having clear definition and parameters, ASEAN will have a clear guidance
in developing innovative and effective regional cooperation for accelerating energy
transition.

Only by daring to significantly rethink can ASEAN break the path dependence.

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28 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
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A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 29
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Time for a Big Rethinking?

32 A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after
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Time for a Big Rethinking?

A Brief Assessment on Energy Transition and Climate Ambition after 33