AUGUST 16-31 2023

AFGHANISTAN
WATCH
CENTRE FOR
JOINT WARFARE
STUDIES
(CENJOWS)

VOLUME 8 | ISSUE 2

WWW.CENJOWS.IN
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Two Years Of Taliban 2.0: Takeaways For India

https://southasianvoices.org/two-years-after-taliban-takeover-what-is-
indias-afghanistan-policy/

August 15, 2023, marked two years since the Taliban stormed to power in Afghanistan.
In this period, Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation has deteriorated markedly, with
women bearing the brunt of the decline. India doesn’t officially recognize the Taliban
regime but has engaged with the group [1]. India has adopted a cautious approach
in its dealings with the Taliban, continues to provide aid, monitoring its disbursal
through a “technical team” that has been stationed in Kabul since June 2022.

Comments
The Indian government’s cautious approach raises the question: What can India do to
further help the people of Afghanistan? Supporting Afghans and enhancing people-
to-people ties is an important attribute of the bilateral relationship that has taken a
backseat. While India’s provision of aid is noteworthy, the government can, and must,
do more for the Afghan people [2].
Afghanistan’s Civil War
The Taliban have doubled down with its authoritative rule over Afghanistan since the
withdrawal of U.S. forces two years back [3]. A national resistance movement
emerged immediately after with the hope of ending the Islamic regime in Kabul. The
Taliban’s growing repression, contrary to their assurances after seizing power in
August 2021, has not stopped the National Resistance Front (NRF) from continuing
operations against Taliban rule [4]. The NRF is involved in a campaign to gain greater
international recognition and support for their efforts to fight the Taliban [5].

The NRF, led by Ahmad Massoud, remains the most formidable Afghan resistance unit
fighting the Taliban, and its leader has vowed to continue the fight even after the loss
of its rear base in the Panjshir Valley which the Taliban recaptured in September 2021
[6]. Currently, the Taliban finds itself entangled in multiple internal conflicts. Among
these challenges, the Taliban likely views the NRF as a particularly substantial threat,
given its recognition and inclusion of notable political figures. The Taliban have been
able to highlight a few key figures within the NRF, but the group has had some
success as well, and the asymmetric tactics they use on the battlefield resulted in the
loss of a few notable Taliban commanders [7].
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NRF attacks declined in the first half of 2023 compared to 2022 but have since
increased from roughly one attack or fewer per week in the first half of 2022 to
multiple attacks a week in the second half of 2023 (July-August) [8]. Operationally
the NRF has shifted from concentrating operations in the Panjshir Valley in 2022 to
seize control of territory from the Taliban, to in 2023 focusing attacks in rural areas in
provinces neighbouring Panjshir, to undermine Taliban governance and control in
those areas [9].

To mark the two-year anniversary of the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the NRF
urged neighbouring nations to avoid establishing strategic or formal relations with
them. Although the Taliban have not received recognition worldwide, the NRF also
lacks external backing to fund its efforts, a key ingredient to sustaining a successful
insurgent campaign [10].

Resistance from the NRF remains spirited but is contained to certain pockets of the
country. While total NRF attacks are down in 2023 compared to 2022, this could
possibly be due to a shift in operations and strategy. The NRF also lacks cohesion with
other opposition groups, which makes combating the Taliban even harder. Two years
into their nascent insurgency, there is little hope that the NRF, along with other
opposition groups, can topple the Taliban government [11].

The NRF has been in a two-year campaign to gain greater international recognition
and support for their efforts to fight the Taliban and has stepped up its political
activity, holding two conferences in Austria and Tajikistan with various opposition
groups and members of the Afghan Diaspora in the hopes of organizing a unified
political opposition and outlining a democratic alternative for Afghanistan’s future
[12].

Daesh/ISIS

Since 2021, after the Taliban regained control, Daesh/ISIS has targeted Taliban officials
and Afghan clergy, claiming ownership for the frequent assaults including the attacks
on the mosques [13]. Highlighting the documentation and shreds of evidence, Taliban
leadership allegedly attributed Pakistani citizens playing an active role in Daesh/ISIS
strikes in war-torn Afghanistan [14]. The increase in internal conflicts has positioned
the Taliban in a precarious position [15].
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After two decades of battling their own

uprising, they are struggling to guarantee
stability while adhering to the US-Taliban
Doha Agreement [16], prohibiting entities from
exploiting Afghanistan to harm the well-being
of America and its NATO partners. The
Americans have not teamed up with the
Taliban to attack ISIS-K, nor are they sharing
intelligence material with them [17]. On the
contrary, the Taliban is battling the outfit on
their own conducting regular operations and
night raids against ISIS-K [18]. These
operations typically target civilians suspected
of harbouring or assisting ISIS-K militants, with
Source: India Today
the Taliban beating and arresting individuals
without proper trial.
These operations typically target civilians suspected of harbouring or assisting ISIS-K
militants, with the Taliban beating and arresting individuals without proper trial. At
instances, Taliban have forcefully abducted or executed inmates in certain circumstances,
discarding or exhibiting corpses in open spaces [19].The Taliban is currently dealing with
insurgencies viciously which has evoked a lot of bitterness within the region, resulting in
more recruits to join ISIS-K [20].

Reports allude Pentagon's confidential papers labelling Afghanistan primarily as an

outpost for ISIS-K and as a rising danger to America, Asia, and Europe [21]. However, the
Taliban has dismissed the allegations stating that Afghanistan has complete authority
across the nation and prohibits any outfit to utilise Afghanistan as the haven for others
[22]. Further, the Taliban has maintained that ISIS-K has been severely harmed and is
currently in the midst of being eliminated [23].

Lingering Dark Clouds – Social Injustice

With the Taliban on the wheel, human rights have largely taken a backseat. Since the
Taliban retook power, girls over the age of 12 have been mostly left out of schools [24]. For
most Western countries, the ban is a main obstacle to any hope of formal recognition of
the Taliban regime. The Taliban, who say they respect rights in line with their strict
interpretation of Islamic law, have shut down beauty parlours, prohibited women from
entering parks and restricted women's movement without male accompaniment in
Afghanistan [25]. But most Muslim-majority countries and Islamic scholars have rejected
the Taliban's stance on women's rights [26].
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Amnesty International alleges the Taliban have committed war crimes and other gross
violations of international law against civilian population in Panjshir. Some of the Taliban’s
brutal tactics include extrajudicial executions, torture, hostage-taking, unlawful detention,
and the torching of civilian homes [27].

Journalism, which flourished under the two decades of rule by Western-backed

administrations, has been severely repressed [28]. Human rights organisations have
expressed concern about the incarceration of media workers and civil society activists,
including notable education advocate Matiullah Wesa [29]. According to Human Rights
Watch, the Taliban's strict restrictions on local media, which include preventing international
media broadcasts, have made it difficult for Afghans to get information and no one can
report critical information without fear of arbitrary arrest and detention [30].

The Taliban have not commented in detail on these issues, but they claim that their law
enforcement and intelligence agencies investigate suspicious activities to 'seek explanation
[31]. On the flip side, there has been a reduction in corruption that emerged following the
influx of Western funds after the removal of the Taliban in 2001, according to the UN special
[32].

Poppy Ban - Implications

Additionally, there are indications that the implementation of a Taliban prohibition on the
cultivation of poppy has resulted in a significant decrease [33] in poppy production in the
region that has consistently been the world's largest producer of opium, a trade which the
Taliban profited from in the past [34]. However, the increase in methamphetamine
smuggling in Afghanistan and the surrounding area, despite the Taliban's efforts to reduce
heroin trafficking since the takeover, indicates a significant change in the illicit drug trade
and requires immediate focus [35].

Water Wars

The canal construction to divert water from the Amu Darya, which forms the boundary
between five dry Central Asian provinces have already caused triggers between
Afghanistan & Central Asia region [36].

Earlier Afghanistan and Iran exchanged lethal shots over the issue of international water
distribution [37]. Ongoing canal and dam projects could lead to an international crisis with
Europe, China, and Russia, unlikely to remain spectators.
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A Humanitarian Crisis

The nation is in the grip of a huge humanitarian catastrophe as a result of decades of

conflict, frequent catastrophic weather occurrences, corruption, and widespread
unemployment. Many occupations have been lost, particularly those occupied by women,
who were often the sole wage earners in their households [38]. Thousands of Afghans who
fled the nation are still living in poverty in countries like Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates,
Iran, and Turkey [39]. Despite being rated as one of the nations facing severe climate crisis,
its exclusion from COP 27, gradually pushes the Afghan people towards a death without
adaptation strategies in place.

A drop in development funding has reduced work prospects, and the UN estimates that over
two-thirds of the population requires emergency aid to live. The international community
funded over 80% of the previous Western-backed Afghan government's budget [40]. The
now-terminated financing funded not just hospitals, schools, and companies, but also
government organisations. Locust infestation, multiple droughts, a dearth of healthcare
facilities, and the COVID-19 outbreak have all exacerbated Afghanistan's already grave
position. Aid agencies are now providing even the most basic requirements, such as
medical treatment. Afghanistan is experiencing a persistent reduction in household income,
and international banking restrictions [41].

Reconciliation Efforts

The Taliban Movement imposed its authority via force and made no compromises to public
desire. In power, the Taliban have pursued their own brand of tribal-ethnic politics. Three of
Afghanistan's four largest ethnic groups (Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek), which make for the bulk
of the population, have been barred from holding political office. Pashtuns have major
influence in the Taliban regime. However, the bulk of Pashtuns are likewise barred from
leadership since positions of responsibility are only awarded to clerics seen to be faithful to
the organisation. By rejecting pluralism and pursuing a de facto strategy of ethnic
dominance, the Taliban are driving a new era of war. With much of the Taliban’s support
drawn from its claims to offer security and justice that were in short supply under the
previous government, the continuation of devastating terror attacks is undermining the
highly fragile legitimacy of the Taliban authorities. Afghanistan is still grappling with the
unsolved task of crafting an inclusive political solution and establishing the environment for
long-term peace and reconciliation. The Taliban has yet to construct a new inclusive
government to replace the current very exclusive 'caretaker' government, which includes
Taliban members, primarily Kandahari, and token representation from other ethnic groups
in small cabinet seats. In response to UN Security Council pressure to be more 'inclusive,
representative, and unified,' the Taliban stated, "We are ready for inclusivity but not
selectivity.[42]"
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Taliban’s Outreach

For its part, the Taliban has made serious efforts to engage India. The regime, which is
diplomatically shunned and economically isolated, has sought for continued
developmental assistance from India [43]. The Taliban are discussing economic
opportunities with the Chinese and Kazakh in the region. The first significant contract signed
by the Taliban government with a foreign business since regaining control was with a
privately managed Chinese oil company, Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co
(CAPEIC), in January 2023 [44]. The Taliban are expecting that the achievements would lead
to global acknowledgement and a release of approximately seven billion dollars in central
bank assets blocked at the US Federal Reserve Bank of half which was subsequently given to
a Swiss trust. Further the Chinese appointment of its ambassador to Taliban controlled
Afghanistan. The financial sector has not crumbled as many predicted following the
Taliban's foothold. The World Bank recently declared that Afghani has gained some
momentum against major currencies. Clients who made personal deposits prior to August
20, 2021, may retrieve more funds and a large pool of government staff is getting
compensated. The revenue generation was strong and that, amid a shortage, the bulk of
essentials remained in store.
Relations With Pakistan – Severe
Headwinds

In the initial weeks following of the

Taliban takeover, Pakistan petitioned to
give emergency aid and lift sanctions
against Afghanistan to avoid another
humanitarian crisis [45]. However, a lot
has transpired in one year's time and
Islamabad is currently concentrating its
efforts on combating terror across the
border and stopping Indians from
building a footprint in Afghanistan [46].
Apparently, the Taliban regime has failed
to alleviate Pakistan's unique foreign
policy problems [47]. The extent of terror
activities throughout Pakistan has surged
Source: Al Jazeera
by a staggering 51% with Al-Qaeda,
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the
Islamic State in Khorasan among the key
terrorist organisations having a strong
foothold in Afghanistan [48].
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Appeals for foreign assistance for Afghanistan are currently swapped for measured
scepticism. The euphoria over the Taliban win has given grounds to a sobering realisation
that the developing state of security amid Taliban authority implies that Pakistan's episodes
of terror are far from cessation [49]. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif declared in a
speech to the UNGA that he echoed the world's worries regarding terrorist groups based in
Afghanistan [50].

The Taliban additionally want autonomy from Islamabad’s influence on its policy matters to
diminish and has expressed an interest in strengthening relations with Delhi by resuming
trade [51] and humanitarian supplies. They have recently voiced interest in obtaining India's
assistance in training Afghan forces [52]. A further manifestation of the Taliban's desire to
harm Pakistani objectives is through backing the development of the Chabahar Port
initiative in Iran, which was designed to counter Pakistan's Gwadar Port [53].

India’s Approach Towards Taliban 2.0

In the immediate aftermath of the Taiban takeover, India’s approach appeared to be

reactive [54]. It shut down its Kabul embassy in August 2021, initiated a rescue operation,
and limited its interactions with the Taliban to the delivery of aid [55]. Stationing a
“Technical Team” in Kabul was one of the first public steps that the Indian government took
towards engaging with the Taliban. This step indicates that India recognizes the political
realities on the ground and knows that its presence in Afghanistan will have to be mediated
through the Taliban. In the two decades since 2001, under the security umbrella provided by
the United States and its allies, India made considerable investments amounting to over
USD $3 billion for the welfare of Afghan people [56].

Underpinned By Support For Afghans

India’s cautious approach in engaging the Taliban is justified given its twin related concerns
about security threats emerging from Afghanistan and the Taliban regime’s relationship
with Pakistan [57]. Issues include problems around visa-issuance, renewal of visas for
Afghan students in India, challenges faced by Afghani citizens currently in India, and the
uncertainty faced by Afghan refugees in India [58]. Afghan citizens from all walks of life,
from students to politicians, have seen India as a close partner. In the past, India has also
actively sought to strengthen ties by supporting MoUs between “Indian women and Afghan
women-owned companies and organizations” and providing a home ground for
Afghanistan’s national cricket team, on top of the substantive developmental and
humanitarian aid it already provides [59].
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By rectifying the challenges currently faced by the people of Afghanistan, and especially its
students, India, as a key player can support the next generation of Afghans. There exist
mechanisms through which people-to-people ties can be reinstated. Some ways this can
be done include reissuing visas for students who were already studying in India, granting
visas to Afghans who wish to pursue their education in India, reinitiating and supporting
bilateral cultural ties, and welcoming Afghan artists and sportspeople.

Challenges

Even though India has provided $24 million in aid to Afghanistan for 2022-23, the Indian
government remains concerned over security risks arising from the region [60]. Incidents
such as terrorist attack on a Gurudwara by Daesh, demonstrate that terrorist outfits in
Afghanistan can and will harm Indian interests [61].

Another crucial concern for India is the Taliban regime’s proximity to Pakistan [62]. While this
is a valid concern given the deep historical links between Pakistan and the Taliban, there
have been some notable issues between the two actors including disagreement over a
contested border and Pakistani concerns about the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and
the Taliban’s ties with this group [63]. There is no force at present large enough to keep up
with the Taliban in check. They have avoided internal strife by unwaveringly uniting behind
their unflinching leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. They have also kept a faltering economy
afloat, in part by having investment talks with capital-rich regional countries - despite the
global community's lack of legal recognition.

Source: Global Village Space

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Pathways

For India, which has consistently seen challenges emerge within its neighbourhood in the
recent past, the current Taliban rule presents another test. Implementing the suggested
policies remains a challenge given the Taliban’s adherence to Sharia law and severe
restrictions around the movement of women [64].

While this presents a serious impediment to enacting the recommended policies, it is useful
to highlight two factors that might influence the Indian government’s approach. First,
ensuring strong people-to-people ties between Afghanistan and India is in India’s long-
term interests. In the past, India has benefited from its ties with Afghan elites and there
exists considerable goodwill towards India among Afghan citizens. Furthermore, India's
association with the Taliban is motivated by its desire for Central Asian influence.

The Central Asian Republics have grown in importance for India since 2015. The Modi
administration has endeavoured to strengthen ties with all five countries during its second
term. With its involvement in the region, it proved critical for India to develop its Afghanistan
engagement.

Second, India can emphasize that its renewal of mechanisms that foster greater people-to-
people ties is only a return to a status quo for India, notwithstanding who holds power in
Kabul. India has a strong track record of aiding Afghan citizens. Given the Taliban’s appeal
for better ties, the Indian government can leverage its position to reinstitute ways for
greater people-to-people ties [65].

India has the capability to ensure that people-to-people ties are tended to even as it
ensures that security threats from the region are minimized. To actualize this capability that
exists in theory requires political will and creative diplomatic initiatives. For a country that
constantly invokes its “civilizational relationship” with the Afghan people, it is in India’s
interest to ensure that it remains proactive, and not reactive, when it comes to Afghanistan.

By By
Col Ajay Thakur, VSM Ms Anamitra Banerjee
Senior Fellow, CENJOWS Research Assistant, CENJOWS
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Endnotes
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.[1]Sareen, S. (2022, June 8). India’s outreach to the Taliban: Engage, don’t endorse. ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-
outreach-to-the-taliban/
[2]Haidar, S. (2023, March 14). Despite lack of recognition, Taliban claims Indian Mission invited officials for online training programmes.
The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/despite-lack-of-recognition-taliban-claims-indian-mission-invited-officials-for-
online-training-programmes/article66615812.ece
[3]Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed. (2023, February). Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction - SIGAR Report.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf
[4]Sopko, J. F., Bindell, M., Irwin, C., Lim, V., Locker, M., Paek, O., Robinson, H., Schneider, E., Scroggins, D., Stovall, A., Gaba, S. T., Weggeland, D.,
Wilson, G. A., & Windrem, J. (2022). SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN
RECONSTRUCTION, No. 115-91, 115–91. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2022-07-30qr.pdf
[5]I. The Taliban’s War Against Women. (n.d.). https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/6185.htm
[6]Massaro, C. (2023, August 29). 2 years after US withdrawal Afghanistan resistance group yearns for Western help as they take on
Taliban. Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/world/2-years-us-withdrawal-afghanistan-resistance-group-yearns-western-help-take-
on-taliban
[7]Cuffley, A. (2022). Afghanistan under the Taliban: Findings on the current situation. Stimson Center.
https://www.stimson.org/2022/afghanistan-under-the-taliban-findings-on-the-current-situation/
[8]Karacalti, A., & Bynum, E. (2023). Two years of repression: Mapping Taliban violence targeting civilians in Afghanistan. ACLED.
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[9]Amnesty International. (2023). Afghanistan: Taliban’s cruel attacks in Panjshir province amount to war crime of collective punishment –
new report. Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/06/afghanistan-talibans-cruel-attacks-in-panjshir-
province-amount-to-war-crime-of-collective-punishment-new-report/
[10] Gilles Dorronsoro. (2022, January). The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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[11] 8/30/23 National Security news and commentary. (n.d.). Informal Institute of National Security Thinkers and Practitioners (IINSTP).
https://myemail.constantcontact.com/8-30-23-National-Security-News-and-Commentary.html?soid=1114009586911&aid=HslQ4aUKhc4
[12]Vindobona. (2022, September 19). Taliban opponent Massoud at Afghanistan Conference in Vienna. Vindobona.org | Vienna
International News. https://www.vindobona.org/article/taliban-opponent-massoud-at-afghanistan-conference-in-vienna
[13]Mackintosh, E., Popalzai, E., Jarne, A., & Robinson, L. (2023, May 19). ‘No one feels safe’: The Taliban promised to provide security to
Afghans. New data shows threat from ISIS is growing. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/asia/isis-k-attacks-afghanistan-taliban-
cmd-intl/index.html
[14]Taliban say Pakistani nationals involved in Daesh/ISIS attacks in Afghanistan. (2021, August). Anadolu Ajansı.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/taliban-say-pakistani-nationals-involved-in-daesh-isis-attacks-in-afghanistan/2965003
[15]With Afghanistan ‘Hanging by a thread’, Security Council delegates call on Taliban to tackle massive security, economic concerns,
respect women’s equal rights | UN Press. (2022, January 26). https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14776.doc.htm
[16]US and Taliban sign historic agreement. (2020, February 29). CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/29/politics/us-taliban-deal-
signing/index.html
[17]Mackintosh, E., Popalzai, E., Jarne, A., & Robinson, L. (2023b, May 19). ‘No one feels safe’: The Taliban promised to provide security to
Afghans. New data shows threat from ISIS is growing. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/asia/isis-k-attacks-afghanistan-taliban-
cmd-intl/index.html
[18]Gul, A. (2023a, February 27). Taliban forces kill top IS commanders in Afghanistan. VOA. https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-forces-
kill-top-is-commanders-in-afghanistan-/6981441.html
[19]Afghanistan: Taliban execute, ‘Disappear’ alleged militants. (2022b, July 7). Human Rights Watch.
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[20]Afghanistan: Taliban execute, ‘Disappear’ alleged militants. (2022, July 7). Human Rights Watch.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/07/afghanistan-taliban-execute-disappear-alleged-militants
[21]Lamothe, D., & Warrick, J. (2023, April 22). Afghanistan has become a terrorism staging ground again, leak reveals. Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/
[22]Jazeera, A. (2023, June 19). Taliban slams US report on rising threats in Afghanistan. News | Al Jazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/19/taliban-slams-us-report-on-rising-threats-in-afghanistan
[23]Noorzai, R. (2023, June 29). Taliban flouts terrorism commitments by appointing Al-Qaida-Affiliated governors. VOA.
https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-flaunts-terrorism-commitments-by-appointing-al-qaida-affiliated-governors-/7153860.html
[24]Farr, G. (2022). Female education in Afghanistan after the return of the Taliban. E-International Relations. https://www.e-
ir.info/2022/04/23/female-education-in-afghanistan-after-the-return-of-the-taliban/
[25]Yawar, M. Y., & Greenfield, C. (2023, July 24). Beauty salons ban in Afghanistan a blow to women’s financial freedom. Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/beauty-salon-ban-afghanistan-blow-womens-financial-freedom-2023-07-21/
[26]Dawi, A. (2022, December 22). Muslim countries blast Taliban for university ban for Afghan women. VOA.
https://www.voanews.com/a/muslim-countries-blast-taliban-for-university-ban-for-afghan-women/6887860.html
[27] Amnesty International. (2023a). Afghanistan: Taliban’s ‘suffocating crackdown’ destroying lives of women and girls – new report.
Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/07/afghanistan-talibans-suffocating-crackdown-destroying-
lives-of-women-and-girls-new-report/
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[28]Tanjim, N. (2023, August 20). Two years under Taliban rule: How is Afghanistan faring? The Business Standard.
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[29]Azadi, R. R., & Siddique, A. (2023, March 30). Arrest Of Prominent Afghan Education Campaigner A “Sign Of Authoritarianism” Under The
Taliban. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/arrest-afghan-campaigner-taliban-authoritarianism/32342260.html
[30]Afghanistan: Repression Worsens 2 Years into Taliban Rule. (2023, August 11). Human Rights Watch.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/10/afghanistan-repression-worsens-2-years-taliban-rule
[31]Afghanistan: Repression Worsens 2 Years into Taliban Rule. (2023, August 11). Human Rights Watch.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/10/afghanistan-repression-worsens-2-years-taliban-rule
[32]Overview. (n.d.). World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview
[33]Limaye, B. Y. (2023, June 6). Inside the Taliban’s war on drugs - opium poppy crops slashed. BBC News.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65787391
[34]OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN-Latest findings and emerging threats. (2022). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
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[35]Reuters. (2023, September 10). Afghanistan meth trade surges as Taliban clamps down on heroin, UN report says. Reuters.
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[36]O’Donnell, L. (2023, August 2). How the Taliban Is Worsening Central Asia’s Water Problem. Foreign Policy.
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[37]Arduino, A., & Arduino, A. (2023, June 23). With Iran-Afghanistan on the brink of a ‘water war’, who else might be drawn in? South China
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[38]According to the UN, four million individuals are critically malnourished, including 3.2 million kids under the age of five. For the past two
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[39]Afghanistan refugee crisis explained. (n.d.). https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained/
[40]Overview. (n.d.-b). World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview
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[42] G, C. (2022a). A Step-by-Step roadmap to peace in Afghanistan. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2021/a-step-by-step-
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[43] Instability in Afghanistan | Global Conflict Tracker. (n.d.). Global Conflict Tracker. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-
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[44] Yawar, M. Y. (2023, January 5). Afghanistan’s Taliban administration in oil extraction deal with Chinese company. Reuters.
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[45]Waheed, W. (2022). Pakistan’s troubled ties with the Taliban. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/11/22/pakistans-
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[46]- PAKISTAN: FRIEND OR FOE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM? (n.d.). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
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[47]Waheed, W. (2022). Pakistan’s troubled ties with the Taliban. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/11/22/pakistans-
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[48]Pti. (2022, October 20). Pak records 51% rise in terror attacks in one year after Afghan-Taliban got power in Afghanistan: Report. The
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afghan-taliban-got-power-in-afghanistan-report/articleshow/94982559.cms?from=mdr
[49]WATCH | “No Harm in India talking to the Taliban”: senior Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain. (n.d.). The Wire.
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[50]Siddiqui, N. (2022, September 24). In UNGA address, PM Shehbaz highlights Pakistan's plight and urges global leaders to 'act now' on
climate change. DAWN.COM. https://www.dawn.com/news/1711591
[51]Joshi, M. (2022). India’s cautious return to Afghanistan | East Asia Forum. East Asia Forum.
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[52]Gupta, M., & Gupta, M. (2022, June 2). Great expectations of India gave crucial help in past: Afghan Defence Minister to News18 | Global
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[53]Parashar, S. (2021, November 21). Chabahar sees increase in traffic as Taliban backs trade via port. The Times of India.
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[54]Afghanistan and its neighbourhood: A stocktaking of regional cooperation since the Taliban takeover. (2022, December 15). SIPRI.
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[55]The Diplomat. (2022, October 17). India, the Taliban, and the Country In Between. https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/india-the-taliban-
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[56]Subramanian, N. (2021, August 24). Explained: What are India’s investments in Afghanistan? The Indian Express.
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[57]Longtail-e-media. (n.d.). Afghanistan: Taliban takeover and way ahead. Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs.
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[58]Chaba, A. A. (2023, June 11). Denied visa, no online exams, Afghan students in India stare at a bleak future. The Indian Express.
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[59] Ibid.https://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/32489_AR_Spread_2020_new.pdf
[60]Icwa. (n.d.-b). India sends Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan via Pakistan - Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of
India). https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7169&lid=4849
[61]Mukharji, S. (2022, July 9). Opinion | Afghanistan: Kabul Gurudwara under attack. WION. https://www.wionews.com/opinions-
blogs/opinion-afghanistan-kabul-gurudwara-under-attack-495750
[62]India-Taliban relations: A careful balancing act, driven by pragmatism. (n.d.). Middle East Institute.
https://www.mei.edu/publications/india-taliban-relations-careful-balancing-act-driven-pragmatism
[63]Pakistan’s twin Taliban problem. (n.d.). United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/pakistans-twin-
taliban-problem
[64]Security Council emphasizes that punitive restrictions on women’s rights, escalating hunger, insecurity taking devastating toll in
Afghanistan | UN Press. (2023, March 8). https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15222.doc.htm
[65]India’s delicate dance with the Taliban. (n.d.). Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-s-delicate-dance-
taliban