Distributed Operations

A Concept for Distributed Operations

INTRODUCTION
Marines fighting the Global War on Terrorism confront adversaries that are adaptive,
decentralized, and elusive. Recognizing the overwhelming conventional superiority of
U.S. forces, our enemies will continue to develop new tactics designed to exploit
perceived seams in our capabilities, or to otherwise undermine our advantages in
mobility, firepower, sensing, and command and control. In order to maintain our
dominance on the battlefield, it is essential that we continuously adapt our methods of
warfighting, while remaining a flexible, combined-arms force.

Accompanying this emerging challenge is a new opportunity. After a quarter century of

unwavering commitment to the maneuver warfare philosophy, we are harvesting a
generation of junior officers and noncommissioned officers who are fully prepared to
assume much greater authority and responsibility than is traditionally expected at the
small-unit level. They have proven their critical thinking skills and tactical competence
in combat, achieving results that exceed our highest expectations, and demonstrating a
capacity for small-unit leadership that
will enable us to realize the full
promise of maneuver warfare
philosophy, through maximum
decentralization of informed
decisionmaking, guided largely by
commander’s intent.

CONCEPT
Distributed Operations describes an
operating approach that will create an
advantage over an adversary through
the deliberate use of separation and
coordinated, interdependent, tactical
actions enabled by increased access to
functional support, as well as by
enhanced combat capabilities at the
small-unit level. The essence of this
concept lies in the capacity for coordinated action by dispersed units, throughout the
breadth and depth of the battlespace, ordered and connected within an operational design
focused on a common aim.

Distributed Operations constitutes a form of maneuver warfare. Small, highly capable

units spread across a large area of operations will provide the spatial advantage
commonly sought in maneuver warfare, in that they will be able to sense an expanded

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battlespace, and can use close combat or supporting arms, including Joint fires, to disrupt
the enemy’s access to key terrain and avenues of approach.

Further, these units will also operate at a

temporal advantage. Continuing the
trend toward decentralization of
authority that has been a hallmark of
Marine Corps combat development, this
concept posits the distribution of
decisionmaking authority across a wide
number of junior leaders, who are
directly engaged in the fight. By
moving authority “downward,” we will
dramatically increase the speed of
command. This distribution of authority
among many seasoned and well-trained
junior leaders will result in a
combination of actions that creates for
the enemy a rapidly deteriorating,
cascading effect, shattering his cohesion.
Units conducting distributed operations
will use these advantages to focus on the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, exploiting
fleeting opportunities, and thereby achieving tactical successes that will build rapidly to
decisive outcomes at the operational level of war.

In the tactical application of the distributed operations concept, it is envisioned that

maneuver units will operate in disaggregated fashion, with companies, platoons, and even
squads dispersed beyond the normal range of mutually supporting organic direct fires, but
linked through a command and control network. All units will be organized, trained, and
equipped to facilitate distributed operations, with capabilities beyond those historically
resident at the small unit level. They will employ the advantage of extensive dispersion
to reduce their vulnerability to enemy observation and fire, but will possess significant
combat power, enabling them to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy.

Units will possess the capability to rapidly re-aggregate, in order to exploit fleeting
opportunities and to reinforce or support another unit in need. Commanders will decide
when and where to use distribution and aggregation based on the tactical situation, the
terrain, and the nature of the enemy they are facing. Likewise, commanders may
intentionally opt to undercut an adversary's asymmetrical advantage by matching and
overwhelming the enemy with force symmetrical to his own. On other occasions,
commanders will exploit a symmetrical advantage—usually while operating as a
concentrated force. Units must be flexible and dynamic, having the ability to quickly
respond to a changing situation, evolving faster than the enemy. The ability to re-
aggregate will be enabled by focused and energetic cross training of small units, the
creation and use of a more robust communications capability for small units, and an
increase in the number of tactical mobility assets available for small units.

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Distributed operations capabilities will be additive in nature, providing Marine

commanders a new method for tactical deployment and employment. While the concept
will drive the development of the enhancements required to render Marine units capable
of functioning effectively in a distributed operations scenario, it will not supplant existing
capabilities. All Marine units will retain their capacity to operate effectively using the
full range of tactical employment methods.

The Proliferation of Decisionmakers

Similarly, distributed operations capabilities will be complementary in character. Units

employing these techniques will deploy and fight in coordination with other units using
conventional tactics. For example, sea-based forces will project power using ship-to-
objective maneuver, with units operating in an aggregated fashion being complemented
by other units using distributed operations procedures. Both elements of the sea-based
force will operate under a common commander’s intent, within the framework of an
operational design, and connected by the extended, sea-based network.

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Thus, as an additive and complementary capability, the distributed operations approach

will provide Marine commanders the advantage of surprise, by enabling our forces to
modify their tactical “shape,” rapidly and unpredictably. Armed with the means to
employ a range of tactics—concentrated or distributed—Marines will impose asymmetric
challenges and crippling uncertainty upon their adversaries.

DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS IN HISTORY

During the twentieth century, the military forces of many nations, in many conflicts, have
attempted to develop the idea of purposeful separation to influence a vast area of
operations. Their experiences provide useful insights that will serve to inform our
approach to the development of distributed operations capabilities. The following
examples illuminate some principles common to distributed operations scenarios.

In their 1939-1940 winter war against the Soviet Union, the Finns successfully employed
widely distributed forces against less mobile Soviet columns, inflicting disproportionate
casualties upon a numerically superior foe. The Finns used an operational design that
relied on independent actions and a mobility advantage to generate a string of tactical
level successes. In some engagements, the small units of the Finnish Army fought semi-
autonomously, but were guided by a common understanding of the operational aim. The
superb individual proficiency of the Finnish soldiers and their junior leaders served as a
force multiplier that raised
the combat power of their
forces well beyond that
represented by mere
numbers of personnel and
quantities of equipment.

During the Second World

War, in the China-Burma-
India Theater, British and
Indian “Chindits” employed
long range penetration
tactics, in which numerous
separated columns
simultaneously infiltrated
the Japanese Army’s rear
areas, in dispersed fashion.
These units were large
enough to inflict a heavy
blow to the enemy, but
small enough to avoid

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decisive engagement if outnumbered. Supplied by air, the columns operated behind

Japanese lines for extended periods of time, forming concentrations, in some instances, to
establish strong bastions astride Japanese lines of communications.

In Vietnam, U.S. Marines employed

a rudimentary form of distributed
operations, known as the Combined
Action Program. This involved
squad-sized Marine units deployed
in villages, fighting alongside
Vietnamese Popular Force militia.
Combined Action units worked in
coordination with conventional
Marine forces that possessed greater
mobility and combat power. In the
Combined Action Program,
separation and interdependent
tactical actions were effective
within an operational framework
designed for area stability and
counterinsurgency.

Area of Operations of CAP 2-7-4

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT

This concept will drive the entire range of combat development activities that deliver
fully tested, combat ready, warfighting capabilities. Thorough experimentation and
wargaming, supported by in-depth analysis, will guide the integration of solutions that
address all pillars of combat development, all warfighting functions, and all elements of
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

Focusing on the Marine: The Foundation of a Distributed Operations

Capability

One of the principal requirements for development of a distributed operations capability

will be the further enhancement of training and professional education for small-unit
leaders and individual Marines. Building on our existing ethos and our maneuver warfare
philosophy, we must continue to elevate the already high competence of our most junior
leaders, educating them to think and act at the tactical level of war, with an understanding
of the application of commander’s intent to achieve operational level effects. For
example, we will provide infantry squad leaders a broad understanding of command and
control systems, the intelligence cycle, fire support coordination, logistics, and other
disciplines, in which extensive knowledge has heretofore been principally the domain of
Marines far more senior. Further, we will provide junior leaders additional technical

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skills that will enable them to perform combat tasks normally accomplished at higher
levels of command. Marines at the infantry squad level, for example, will be trained to
direct all forms of
supporting arms, to provide
terminal guidance for
rotary wing and tiltrotor
aircraft, to perform casualty
evacuation, to maintain
access to high-level
communications networks,
and other functions,
without the aid of the
specialists typically found
at higher levels of
command. A greater focus
on cultural factors and
language training will
enhance small units in
operating in complex
environments.

The addition of extensive and complex new training standards and professional education
requirements will demand concomitant adjustments in the personnel policy pillar of
combat development. For example, increased training requirements will affect staffing
levels in units as Marines attend additional or longer duration schools. Further, the time
required to master new skills will potentially be considerable, calling for a review of
personnel policies concerning tour length, promotion, and career patterning.

Distributed Operations and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force—the MAGTF—will remain our organizing principle
in distributed operations, just as in all other forms of operations. As we explore the range
of combat development initiatives necessary to transform this concept into warfighting
capabilities, we will involve all elements of the MAGTF: Command, Aviation Combat,
Ground Combat, and Combat Service Support. Enhancements will be applied to ensure
that all elements of the MAGTF develop the range of capabilities required for distributed
operations.

Enhancing Warfighting Capabilities Sets

Units employing distributed operations will require capabilities that extend across the six
warfighting functions.

Maneuver. Distributed operations will require both air mobility and organic vehicles for
ground mobility. In order to exploit intelligence, individual units must move rapidly to
maintain positional advantage relative to the enemy, or to enhance force protection

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measures. Further, units will require the ability to re-aggregate, in order to temporarily
mass for missions requiring larger physical concentrations of combat power. To facilitate
rapid, coordinated action by dispersed units, new doctrine must be developed to articulate
appropriate tactical control measures appropriate to this environment.

Fires. Distributed operations by networked forces will potentially generate significant

amounts of actionable intelligence. Small units will exploit this intelligence by using
both enhanced direct fire capabilities and supporting arms to neutralize or destroy much
larger hostile forces. Additionally, increasing the amount of separation among units
beyond mutually supporting range will require the use of supporting arms to supplement
organic fires. For these reasons, small unit leaders will be trained in the employment of
the full array of ground and aviation supporting arms, to include Joint fires, and will be
provided the necessary equipment to perform target identification, location, and
designation, as well as communication with fire support elements, and control of indirect
fire weapons and aircraft. Further, this concept will require the development of new fire
support coordination measures and procedures that will account for the unique battlefield
geometry associated with distributed operations.

Intelligence. While the distributed operations concept is not oriented on reconnaissance,

it nonetheless underscores the importance of individual Marines and small units in
generating intelligence for their own use, as well as for their higher headquarters.
Tactical intelligence will drive distributed operations, while the operations themselves
will stimulate the collection and reporting of high-quality tactical intelligence. Of
particular importance is the realization that the human dimension manifested in small
units may be the only way to make positive identification of our adversary and gain an
insight into his likely intent. Small units at the platoon level and below will require
enhanced capabilities to collect, report, and exploit intelligence. These might include
employment or direction of unmanned ground or air vehicles, or the ability to access
command and control networks for the purpose of extracting specific intelligence
pertinent to the unit’s local situation.

Command and Control. A robust and resilient network will enable this operating
approach. This network will include over-the-horizon, on-the-move, and beyond-line-of-
sight communications assets that connect commanders to distributed units, and provide
connectivity throughout the force, to include, where applicable, the sea-based elements of
that force. The network will provide commanders the ability to coordinate the actions of
widely separated small units. Further, it will enable separated small units to “self-
organize” by carrying out mutually supporting tactical actions, in accordance with
commander’s intent. Most importantly, the command and control system will be
designed to optimize and exploit the advantages of distributed decisionmaking by
empowered small unit leaders, with “command and feedback” characterizing the
distributed operations environment.

Logistics. Units operating in widely dispersed fashion will require unique combat
logistics support, especially in supply, maintenance, and health services. The supply
chain will be highly adaptive and flexible. Through “sense and respond” logistics, we

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will share logistics information and allow for reconfiguration of the logistics system,
when needed. At the same time, ground lines of communications will rarely be secure, in
the traditional sense. Therefore, the development of logistics capabilities for distributed
operations must take a two-pronged approach. First, we must invest small units with the
capability to operate with only limited access to conventional combat logistics
mechanisms. For example, man-portable water purification systems and the substitution
of alternate power sources for batteries used in communications equipment and sensors
can dramatically reduce two significant requirements for periodic resupply. Through the
use of Autonomic Logistics, we will sense the development of maintenance problems,
and will respond to them before they affect the mission. Marines will be trained to
perform quick repairs to equipment by exchanging key components. The second prong
of our approach must be to enable our combat logistics elements to perform their mission
in a distributed operations environment. This will require a common perspective of the
battlespace, shared by maneuver, logistics, and intelligence elements, as well as
innovations in packaging and delivery.

Force Protection. In the case of protection against enemy action, an increased degree of
force protection is inherent in distributed operations, in that dispersion itself is a
protective measure. At the same time, however, dispersion beyond the range of mutual
support with direct fire weapons is a potential source of increased vulnerability. We must
develop capabilities to capitalize upon the advantages of dispersion, while mitigating its
dangers. Such measures include enhanced, lightweight ballistic protective equipment,
multi-spectral camouflage systems, and the capability to rapidly harden positions with
minimal manpower.

CONCLUSION

Distributed Operations will provide the leverage to move to the next level of
accomplishment within the ongoing advance of innovation that has marked the history of
the Marine Corps. The implementation of the Distributed Operations concept will
provide Marine commanders an additive and complementary capability that will further
strengthen the power inherent in the combined arms Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
Through the employment of distributed operations techniques, Marines will confound the
enemy’s decision-making processes, while further increasing their own capacity for
coordinated and decisive action. Once implemented, the concept will provide additional
capabilities applicable to a wide range of adversaries and operational environments. The
integration of new doctrine, force structure, training, equipment, personnel policies and
leader development initiatives will afford our tactical and operational commanders a
much-needed weapon in the brutal, yet increasingly sophisticated, Global War on
Terrorism. Most importantly Distributed Operations will enhance the flexibility of our
units and exploit the capacity of our Marines to more fully implement the principles of
maneuver warfare.

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