A320 Family Non-Normal

Notes
Version 3.2

Jon Hurst

14th November 2023

ii
Contents

Change log xi

1 Operating techniques 1
1.1 Rejected Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Asymmetric takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Low level failure handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 EOSID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 Miscellaneous 7
2.1 Emergency descent (memory item) . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Windshear (memory item) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 Takeoff roll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Reactive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3 Predictive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Unreliable airspeed (memory item) . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5 Forced Landing (inc. Ditching) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6 Overweight landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.7 Engine failure in cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.8 Bomb on board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.9 Single engine circling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.10 Stall recovery (memory item) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.11 Computer reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

iii
iv CONTENTS

2.12 Abnormal V Alpha Prot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.13 Overspeed Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.14 Volcanic Ash Encounter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.15 Incapacitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3 Air con and pressurisation 25

3.1 Cabin overpressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Excess cabin altitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Landing Elevation Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Pack fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.5 Pack overheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.6 Pack off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.7 Pack regulator faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.8 ACSC single lane failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.9 Duct overheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.10 Hot air fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.11 Trim air faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.12 Cabin fan faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.13 Lavatory and galley fan faults . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.14 Pressure controller faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.15 Low diff pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.16 Outflow valve closed on ground . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.17 Open safety valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4 Avionics Ventilation 33
4.1 Blower fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Extract fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3 Skin valve fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4 Avionics ventilation system fault . . . . . . . . . . 34

5 Electrical 35
5.1 Emergency configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2 Battery only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.3 IDG low oil pressure/high temperature . . . . . . . 37
CONTENTS v

5.4 Generator fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5.5 Battery fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.6 AC Bus 1 fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.7 AC Bus 2 fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.8 AC Ess Bus fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.9 AC Essential Shed Bus lost . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.10 DC Bus 1 fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.11 DC Bus 2 fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.12 DC Essential Bus fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.13 DC Essential shed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.14 Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2 . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.15 Generator overload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.16 Loss of TRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.17 Battery bus fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.18 DC Emergency configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.19 Static inverter fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.20 Generator 1 line off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.21 Tripped circuit breakers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6 Flight Controls 47
6.1 Flaps and/or slats fault/locked . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.2 Direct Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.3 Alternate Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.4 Elevator faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.5 Stabilizer jam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.6 Aileron faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.7 Spoiler faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.8 Rudder Jam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.9 ELAC fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.10 SEC fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.11 SFCC faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.12 FCDC faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.13 Wingtip brake fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
vi CONTENTS

6.14 Flap attach sensor failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

6.15 Flight control servo faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.16 Speed brake disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.17 Speed brake fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
6.18 Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedals . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.19 Unannunciated sidestick faults . . . . . . . . . . . 57

7 Fire 59
7.1 Smoke and fumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.2 Smoke/fumes removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.3 Engine fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.4 Lithium Battery Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

8 Fuel 65
8.1 Fuel system differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.2 Fuel leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.3 Fuel imbalance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.4 Gravity fuel feeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.5 Wing tank pump low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.6 Center tank pump low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.7 Center tank transfer pump faults . . . . . . . . . . 70
8.8 Auto feed/transfer fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
8.9 Wing tank overflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.10 Low fuel level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.11 Outer tank transfer valve faults . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.12 Cross-feed valve fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.13 Low fuel temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.14 High fuel temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

9 Landing gear 75
9.1 Loss of braking (memory item) . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9.2 Tyre damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9.3 Residual braking procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
9.4 Gravity extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
CONTENTS vii

9.5 Asymmetric braking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

9.6 Landing with abnormal landing gear . . . . . . . . 77
9.7 Flight with landing gear extended . . . . . . . . . . 78
9.8 Gear shock absorber fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.9 Gear not uplocked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.10 Gear not downlocked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
9.11 Gear doors not closed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
9.12 Uplock fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
9.13 LGCIU disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
9.14 LGCIU fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
9.15 Gear not down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
9.16 Nosewheel steering fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
9.17 Antiskid nosewheel steering off . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.18 Antiskid nosewheel steering fault . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.19 Brake system fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.20 Brakes hot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
9.21 Auto brake fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.22 Hydraulic selector valve fault . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
9.23 Brake system failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.24 Brake accumulator low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.25 Released brakes, normal system . . . . . . . . . . . 84
9.26 Released brakes, alternate system . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.27 Brake temperature limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
9.28 Park brake on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

10 Power plant 87
10.1 All engine failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
10.2 Single Engine failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
10.3 Single engine operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
10.4 Engine relight in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
10.5 Engine stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
10.6 Engine tailpipe fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
10.7 High engine vibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
viii CONTENTS

10.8 Low oil pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

10.9 High oil temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
10.10 Oil filter clog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.11 Fuel filter clog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
10.12 Uncommanded reverser actuator pressurisation . . 98
10.13 Reverser unlocked in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.14 EIU fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10.15 N1/N2/EGT overlimit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.16 N1/N2/EGT/FF discrepancy . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.17 Start valve fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
10.18 Start faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
10.19 Ignition faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.20 Thrust lever angle sensor faults . . . . . . . . . . . 102
10.21 FADEC faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

11 Navigation 105
11.1 EGPWS alerts (memory item) . . . . . . . . . . . 105
11.2 TCAS warnings (memory item) . . . . . . . . . . . 106
11.3 RNAV downgrades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
11.4 RA faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
11.5 ADR faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
11.6 ADR disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.7 IR faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
11.8 IR disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
11.9 IR alignment in ATT mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
11.10 FM/GPS position disagree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

12 Auto-flight 113
12.1 FAC faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
12.2 Yaw damper faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
12.3 Rudder trim faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12.4 Rudder travel limiter faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
12.5 FCU faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
CONTENTS ix

13 Hydraulics 117
13.1 Green + yellow systems low pressure . . . . . . . . 117
13.2 Blue + yellow systems low pressure . . . . . . . . . 118
13.3 Green + blue systems low pressure . . . . . . . . . 119
13.4 Green system low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
13.5 Yellow system low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
13.6 Blue system low pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
13.7 Engine driven pump low pressure . . . . . . . . . . 121
13.8 Electric pump low pressure or overheat . . . . . . . 121
13.9 Low reservoir air pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
13.10 Reservoir overheat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
13.11 Low reservoir fluid level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
13.12 PTU fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
13.13 RAT fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

14 Ice and rain protection 123

14.1 Window heat fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
14.2 Multiple pitot heat failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
14.3 Single pitot probe heat or static port heat fault . . 124
14.4 Double AOA heat fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
14.5 Single AOA or TAT heat fault . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
14.6 Probe heat computer failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
14.7 Engine anti-ice valve fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
14.8 Wing anti-ice valve faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

15 Indicating/Recording 127
15.1 Display unit failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
15.2 Multiple spurious ECAM alerts . . . . . . . . . . . 128
15.3 Flight Warning Computer failure . . . . . . . . . . 128

16 Pneumatic 131
16.1 Dual bleed failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
x CONTENTS

17 Communications 133
17.1 Communication failure (ICAO) . . . . . . . . . . . 133
17.2 Communication failure (UK airspace) . . . . . . . 134

18 Miscellaneous Tips 137

Change log

Change bars show changes between version 3.1 and version 3.2.

Version 3.2
• Section 1.4, EOSID, amended with new 800ft acceleration
altitude.

• Section 2.1, Emergency descent, updated with recommenda-

tion to stay on airway/track in UK airspace and to run the
cab pr excess cab alt ecam prior to the qrh procedure
if it is available.

• Section 2.6, Overweight landing, updated with a discussion

around the incompatibility of slowing to VLS at threshold
crossing and achieving a minimum v/s touchdown in gusty
conditions.

• Removed Landing distance calculation section from Chapter 2

since landing distance tables are no longer available due to
the removal of the paper qrh.

• Section 6.1, Flaps and/or slats fault/locked, updated to point

to Flysmart+ as the source for configuration and Vapp due
to removal of the paper qrh.

xi
xii CHANGE LOG

• Section 6.7 updated to give the required Flysmart+ landing

module selection for spoiler runaway due to removal of the
paper qrh.

• Section 7.1, Smoke and fumes, updated. This is a result of

Airbus changing the line “If perceptible smoke apply imme-
diately” to “If perceptible smoke/fumes apply immediately”,
which clears up a historic ambiguity. The instruction that
unconfirmed avionics smoke ecams should be treated as
spurious is also added. Finally the purpose of turning off
the cabin fans is clarified as being to prevent distribution of
smoke rather than the fans themselves being considered a
likely source.

• Note added to Section 9.1, Loss of braking, that differential

braking will need to be used after selecting the alternate
braking system.

• Added Section 9.2, Tyre burst.

• Updated Section 10.1, All Engine Failure. This removes the

discussion of how to fly a glide approach in favour of a link
to the All Engine Failure Training Tool.

• Section 10.4, Engine relight in flight, rewritten to include

differences for neos.

• Section 10.9, High engine oil temperature, updated to include

slight differences for the neo and to reference the neo fwc
error and associated ofp attachment.

• Section 14.1, Window heat fault, updated with information

that pf windshield heat is non-monitored required equipment
for cat2/3.
 xiii

Version 3.1
• Section 2.3, Unreliable airspeed, rewritten to include more
information about the use of DBUS and BUSS and to focus
more on the fundamentals of the procedure.

• Added warning to Section 6.1 regarding the potential diffi-

culty of diagnosing surfaces stuck at intermediate positions
close to index positions from the flap/slat position indicator.
xiv CHANGE LOG
Chapter 1

Operating techniques

1.1 Rejected Takeoff

The decision to reject rests solely with cm1. This decision is
communicated with the words “Stop” or “Go”. “Stop” implies that
cm1 is taking control of the aircraft.
Below 100kt the rto is relatively risk free and a decision to
stop should be made for any ecam and most other problems.
Above 100kt the rto may be hazardous and stopping should
only be considered for loss of engine thrust, any fire warning, any
uninhibited ecam1 , or anything which indicates the aircraft will
be unsafe or unable to fly.
1
There are five uninhibited amber ecam cautions that require a high speed
rto. Only two uninhibited ecams are not on this list: eng 1(2) thr lever
disagree if the fadec automatically selects idle thrust and fws fwc 1+2
fault. The first of these should never happen due to fadec logic. The second
generates a message on the ewd but no master caution (it is the computers
that generate master cautions that have failed). You could therefore modify
this rule to: stop for any ecam warning or caution except the caution-like fws
fwc 1+2 fault.

1
2 CHAPTER 1. OPERATING TECHNIQUES

If a stop is required, cm1 calls “Stop” while simultaneously

bringing the thrust levers to idle, then to max reverse.
If the stop was commenced below 72kt the ground spoilers
will not automatically deploy and the autobrake will therefore not
engage. Monitor automatic braking, and if there is any doubt, apply
manual braking as required. If normal braking fails, announce
“Loss of braking” and proceed with the loss of braking memory
items (see Section 9.1).
If the reason for the stop was an engine fire on the upwind
side, consider turning the aircraft to keep the fire away from the
fuselage.
If there is any chance of requiring evacuation, bring the aircraft
to a complete halt, stow the reversers, apply the parking brake,
and order “Attention, crew at stations” on the pa.
If evacuation will definitely not be required, once the aircraft’s
safety is assured the rto can be discontinued and the runway
cleared. In this case make a pa of “Cabin crew, normal operations”.
During this initial phase, cm2 confirms reverser deployment
(“Reverse green”), confirms deceleration (“Decel”), cancels any
audio warnings, informs atc and announces “70 knots” when
appropriate. cm2 then locates the emergency evacuation checklist.
Once the aircraft has stopped, cm1 takes the radios and asks
cm2 to carry out any required ecam actions. Whilst the ecam
actions are being completed, cm1 will build up a decision as to
whether to evacuate. If an evacuation is required, see Section 2.4.
Otherwise order “Cabin crew, normal operations”.
If the aircraft has come to a complete halt using autobrake
max, the brakes can be released by disarming the spoilers.
If, following an rto, a new takeoff is to be attempted, reset both
fds, set the fcu, then restart sops from the After Start checklist.
Carefully consider brake temperatures; temperature indications
continue to climb for some time after a significant braking event.
[ eomb 3.10, fctm pro.aep.misc ]
1.2. ASYMMETRIC TAKEOFF 3

1.2 Asymmetric takeoff

Apply rudder conventionally to maintain runway track. At Vr
rotate at a slightly reduced rate towards an initial pitch target of
12½° then target speed V2 to V2 +15kt. Bank angle should be
limited to 15° when more than 3kt below manoeuvring speed for
the current configuration.2
When the ground to flight mode transition is complete,3 select
toga.4 Adjust and trim rudder to maintain β target; this will
result in a small side-slip angle towards the failed engine. Engage
the autopilot once gear is up and rudder is trimmed.

1.3 Low level failure handling

Handling of failures that occur on the takeoff roll or at very low
level is primarily a test of triage skills. Airbus provides support in
three ways:
• ecam flight phase inhibitions filter out less serious failures
until 1500ft aal is attained on climb out or speed is below
80kt on the landing roll.
• toga thrust is made available for an extra 5 minutes (giving
a total of 10 minutes) in emergency situations, which allows
2
This is a conservative rule of thumb. If the fmgc has correctly identified an
engine out condition, the fd/ap will automatically limit bank angle according
to a less conservative algorithm (see fcom sys.22.20.60.40)
3
Introducing toga during the ground to flight mode transition (commences
as the pitch increases through 8°, complete after 5 seconds) results in a pitch
up moment at a time where the effect of stick pitch control is not wholly
predictable: the stick will need to be moved forward of neutral to counteract
the introduced pitch moment and then returned to neutral as flight mode
blends in. A slight pause before selecting toga results in much more normal
and predictable handling.
4
flx may be used but this tends to allow speed to decay unless pitch is
reduced
4 CHAPTER 1. OPERATING TECHNIQUES

more time before acceleration and cleanup is required.

• A recommendation is published at the start of the qrh, that,
apart from cancelling audio warnings, “no action will be
taken” until an appropriate flight path is established and the
aircraft is at least 400ft agl.5
Whilst below 400ft, then, the focus should be on flying and
monitoring, with heightened awareness of the possibility of missing
essential normal actions, such as calling rotate or raising the gear
due to the distraction of the failure. It may help pf assimilate
the challenges of the flying task if pm states the title of the first
displayed ecam procedure, but no action to diagnose or contain
the failure should be taken. A very quick and well timed “Mayday,
Mayday, Mayday, standby” and “Attention Crew at Stations” from
pm may also be useful to forestall external interruptions. When and
if possible, the autopilot should be engaged to reduce workload.
An extremely useful tool for dealing with low level failures is
the eosid, as described in Section 1.4. While the name suggests
that this is only to be used with engine failures, in reality it is a
pre-planned safe flight path that may be flown whenever there is
doubt that available aircraft performance is sufficient to fly the
cleared sid or go-around. Since both pilots should already be aware
of the details of the eosid, pm can simply declare their intention
to fly it to generate a shared mental model. Note that flying an
eosid is higher workload than flying the planned sid in nav or
flying visually; it is an option, not a requirement.
Another useful tool, often used in association with the eosid,
is the concept of “high priority tasks”. These are defined as:
• For engine failure, the master switch of the affected engine
has been turned off.
5
. . . although it does go on to water this statement down by saying that, for
some unspecified emergency situations, the 400ft part of the recommendation
may be disregarded
1.4. EOSID 5

• For engine fires, either one squib has been fired and the fire
warning has extinguished or both squibs have been fired.

These definitions help with the triage process, allowing stan-

dardised interleaving of the diagnosis and containment of the failure
with the flying and monitoring tasks. In particular, the level accel-
eration phase of the eosid is generally delayed until these tasks are
completed, with the phrase “engine is secure” a de facto standard
call to indicate that pf might like to consider interrupting the
containment process.6 Unfortunately, they are only defined for
engine failures and fires, so with other failures, the crew will have
to make a judgement call as to what constitutes “high priority”.
[ fctm pro.aep.eng ]

1.4 EOSID
Before the divergence point (the last common point between the
sid and the eosid), if the aircraft detects a loss of thrust the
eosid will be displayed as a temporary flight plan. In this case
the temporary flight plan can be inserted and nav mode used.
Otherwise it will be necessary to pull heading and manually follow
either the yellow line or bring up a pre-prepared secondary flight
plan and follow the white line.
If beyond the divergence point, pull heading and make an
immediate turn the shortest way onto the eosid. Airbus specifically
recommends against this (fcom as.22.20.60), but easyJet states
it as policy (eomb 4.4.4).
Electing to fly the eosid implies a level acceleration segment:

• Initially fly a toga climb at the higher of V2 or current speed,

up to a limit of V2 +15kt. If a flex takeoff was carried out,
6
The phrases “Stop ecam” and “Continue ecam” are standard for inter-
rupting containment.
6 CHAPTER 1. OPERATING TECHNIQUES

a flex climb is permissible. This climb is continued until

all high priority tasks are complete (see Section 1.3) and the
aircraft is above single engine acceleration altitude (usually
800ft qfe, but may be higher if so specified by the take-
off performance calculation). If the fmgs has detected the
engine out condition, the automatic mode change from srs
to clb will be inhibited; if not, intervention with selected
modes will be required to prevent untimely acceleration.

• The next segment is a toga level acceleration and clean up,

either to conf 1 and S speed if an immediate vmc return is
desired or to conf 0 and green dot. Again flex may be used
if a flex takeoff was carried out. Level acceleration is usually
achieved by pushing v/s; if the fmgs has detected the engine
out condition, all preselected speeds entered in the mcdu
will have been deleted, so the managed target speed should
automatically move to 250kt. The phrases “Stop ecam” and
“Continue ecam” can be used to interrupt ecam procedures
in order to initiate this segment.

• The final segment is a mct climb segment to msa, either

at S speed if in conf 1 or at green dot speed if in conf
0. This is usually achieved in open climb; if the fmgs has
detected the engine out condition, the managed target speed
becomes dependent on flight phase, and in this case should
automatically select green dot.

toga may be used for a maximum of 10 minutes.

If an eosid is annotated as “std”, then acceleration to green
dot should be completed prior to commencing the first turn. If
“non-std”, the turn takes priority.
[ eomb 4.4.4, fcom dsc.22_20.60.40 ]
Chapter 2

Miscellaneous

2.1 Emergency descent (memory item)

If an emergency descent is required, the Captain should consider
taking control if not already pf. pf initiates the memory items by
announcing “Emergency Descent.”
Don oxygen masks and establish communication.
pf then flies the emergency descent. Descent with autopilot
and autothrust engaged is preferred. The configuration is thrust
idle, full speed brake and maximum appropriate speed, taking into
account possible structural damage.1 Target altitude is fl100 or
mora if this is higher. If speed is low, allow speed to increase
before deploying full speedbrake to prevent activation of the angle
of attack protection. Landing gear may be used, but speed must
be below VLO when it is extended and remain below VLE . If on
an airway, consider turning 90° to the left.2
1
According to Airbus, structural damage may be suspected if there has been
a “loud bang” or there is a high cabin vertical speed. When limiting descent
speed due to suspected structural damage, it is ias rather than Mach that is
relevant.
2
In UK airspace it is recommended to stay on the airway or descend on

7
8 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

pm’s only memory action is to turn the seatbelt signs on; their
primary task is to ensure that pf has promptly and correctly
initiated the descent.
Once the memory actions are complete and the aircraft is
descending, complete the cab pr excess cab alt ecam if it is
available, then the qrh emer descent checklist, which covers
much of the same ground as the ecam but adds a couple of useful
items. This will lead pf to finesse the speed and altitude targets
and inform atc of the descent; pm to set continuous ignition on the
engines and set 7700 on the transponder. Both pilots then set their
oxygen flows to the n position3 and, if cabin altitude will exceed
14,000ft, pm deploys the cabin oxygen masks. On easyJet aircraft,
the cids/pram will automatically play a suitable pa, so it is not
necessary for the flight crew to carry out the emer descent (pa)
action.
Once level, restore the aircraft to a normal configuration. When
safe to do so, advise cabin crew and passengers that it is safe to
remove their masks. To deactivate the mask microphone and switch
off the oxygen flow, close the oxygen mask stowage compartment
and press the “press to reset” oxygen control slide.
[ eomb 3.80.2, qrh aep.misc, fcom aep.misc, fctm aep.misc ]

2.2 Windshear (memory item)

2.2.1 Takeoff roll
Windshear encountered on the takeoff roll is only detectable by sig-
nificant airspeed fluctuations. It is possible that these fluctuations
may cause V1 to occur significantly later in the takeoff roll then it
should. In this case it falls to the Captain to make an assessment of
current track.
3
There may be insufficient oxygen to cover the entire emergency descent
profile if the oxygen masks are left set to 100%.
2.2. WINDSHEAR (MEMORY ITEM) 9

whether sufficient runway remains to reject the takeoff, or whether

getting airborne would be the better option. If the takeoff is to
be continued, call “Windshear, toga” and apply toga power.
Rotate at Vr or with sufficient runway remaining4 and follow srs
orders. srs will maintain a minimum rate of climb, even if airspeed
must be sacrificed.

2.2.2 Reactive
The reactive windshear detection system is a function of the facs.
It only operates when below 1300ft ra with at least conf 1 selected.
In the takeoff phase, it is inhibited until 3 seconds after lift off and
in the landing phase it is inhibited below 50ft ra.
A warning is indicated by a red windshear flag on the pfd
and a “Windshear, Windshear, Windshear” aural warning. Call
“Windshear, toga” and apply toga power.
The autopilot can fly the escape manoeuvre as long as the
required aoa is less than αprot . If the autopilot is not engaged,
follow the srs orders on the fds. If the fds are not available,
initially pitch up to 17.5°, then increase as required.
Do not change configuration until out of the windshear. Once
clear of the windshear, clean up the aircraft: leveraging the go-
around procedure is useful for this.
In severe windshear, it is possible that Alpha Floor protection
will activate. As toga will already be selected, this will have no
immediate effect. Once clear of the windshear, however, toga
lock will be active. This, combined with the unusual aircraft
configuration, leads to a significant threat of overspeed. The most
natural way to disengage toga lock is to disengage the autothrust
using the instinctive disconnect pb on the thrust levers then use
4
“Sufficient runway remaining” is actually Boeing advice – Airbus offers no
guidance for the case where there is insufficient runway available to stop nor
to rotate at normal speeds.
10 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

manual thrust until the situation has sufficiently stabilised to

re-engage the autothrust.
[ fcom pro.aep.surv ]

2.2.3 Predictive

Below 2300ft agl, the weather radar scans a 5nm radius 60° arc
ahead of the aircraft for returns indicating potential windshear.
Alerts are categorised as advisory, caution or warning, in
increasing order of severity. Severity is determined by range, posi-
tion and phase of flight. Alerts are only provided when between
50ft and 1500ft, or on the ground when below 100kt.
All types of alert produce an indication of windshear position
on the nd, provided that the nd range is set to 10nm. A message
on the nd instructs the crew to change range to 10nm if not already
set. A caution additionally gives an amber w/s ahead message
on both pfds and an aural “Monitor Radar Display” warning.
A warning additionally gives a red w/s ahead message on the
pfds and either a “Windshear Ahead, Windshear Ahead” or “Go
Around, Windshear Ahead” aural message.
If a warning occurs during the takeoff roll, reject the takeoff.
If it occurs during initial climb, call “Windshear, toga”, apply
toga thrust and follow srs orders. If it occurs during approach,
fly a normal go-around. Configuration may be changed as long as
the windshear is not entered.
If a caution occurs during approach, use conf 3 to optimise
go-around climb gradient and consider increasing VAPP ; up to a
maximum of VLS +15 may be used.
If positive verification is made that no hazard exists and pro-
viding that the reactive windshear is serviceable the crew may
downgrade the warning to a caution.
[ fctm pr.np.sp.10.10 ]
2.3. UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED (MEMORY ITEM) 11

2.3 Unreliable airspeed (memory item)

The fmgcs normally reject erroneous adr data by isolating a single
source that disagrees significantly with the other two sources. It is
possible, however, that all adr data is simultaneously compromised
or that the fmgcs reject a single remaining good adr because the
other two sources are erroneous in a sufficiently similar way.
The first problem, then, is recognition of the unreliable airspeed
condition. The key to this is an instinctive understanding of the
relationship between power, attitude and airspeed in all flight
phases. Other clues that may aid identification include fluctuations
or rapid changes in displayed airspeed, abnormal behaviour of the
automatics, high speed buffet, low aerodynamic noise and stall
warnings.5
Even with the condition correctly diagnosed by the crew, until
the unreliable adrs are disabled the aircraft systems will continue
operating on the basis that the erroneous airspeed data is valid.
Flight envelope protections may activate, leading to pitch inputs
from the flight computers that cannot be overridden with the
sidesticks. In this case, immediately switch off any two adrs; this
causes the flight computers to revert to Alternate Law with no
protections, and thus allows control of the aircraft to be regained.
In unaccelerated flight, for a given weight and wing configu-
ration, a given angle of attack will result in a specific airspeed.6
In level flight, angle of attack is a fixed offset from attitude, the
offset being dependent on wing geometry and thus configuration.
5
Stall warning, available in alternate or direct law, is based on alpha probes,
which will likely be giving valid data
6
L = 12 ρ0 Vi2 SCL = W where W is weight, L is lift, ρ0 is sea level air density,
Vi is indicated airspeed, S is wing area and CL is coefficient of lift. When
well away from the stall, SCL is proportional to angle of attack, α, with the
constant of proportionality dependent on wing configuration. 12 ρ0 is a fixed
p
value, so W ∝ Vi2 α. Thus Vi = k W α
, where k is a constant determined by
wing configuration.
12 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

The upshot of this is that, for any given combination of weight

and configuration, indicated airspeed in unaccelerated flight may
be inferred from attitude alone. This allows both for recovery of a
good adr if it has been rejected, or, if necessary, for completion of
the flight without airspeed data.
The initial goal, then, is to stabilise the aircraft in level flight
at a safe altitude with an attitude for which the associated indi-
cated airspeed is known. These attitude vs. airspeed relationships
are tabulated at the start of the qrh nav unreliable speed
indication procedure.
If the aircraft is not yet at a safe altitude, a climb must be
manually flown without reference to airspeed data. The required
power settings and attitudes for this are7 :

Condition Thrust Pitch

Below Thrust Reduction Altitude toga 15°
Below fl100 clb 10°
Above fl100 clb 5°

If configured conf Full, select conf 3, otherwise flap/slat

configuration should be maintained. The gear and speedbrake
should be retracted.
Transitioning to or maintaining level flight requires an altitude
reference, and it is possible that whatever caused the unreliable air-
speed is also causing erroneous altimeter readings. The most likely
root cause in this case would be blocked static ports, which should
be fairly obvious as the altimeters will be frozen. In general, if all
the adrs are giving sensible and near identical altimeter readings
and they are in the ballpark of the gps altitude, reliable barometric
altitude data can be assumed and the fpv, vsi and barometric
7
Airbus have recently (2022) clarified that if you transition through thrust
reduction altitude you should adopt clb 10°, and if you transition through
fl100 you should adopt clb 5°.
2.3. UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED (MEMORY ITEM) 13

altimeters are available. If barometric altitude is considered erro-

neous, a constant gps altitude can be flown. If gps altitude is also
unavailable, the only option is to fly a constant attitude with a
sensible power setting and wait for the resulting phugoid to damp;
this can take a long time, results in significant altitude excursions
and will only approximate level flight, but should be sufficient for
diagnostic purposes.
The initial thrust setting needs to be chosen so that the resultant
airspeed in level flight will be neither too close to the stall nor at
risk of overspeeding any high lift surfaces that are still deployed.
Either use a rule of thumb (e.g. 50% + fl/10 for two engines) or
refer to the table at the start of the qrh nav unreliable speed
indication procedure. Sensible adjustments will need to be made
if there are extra sources of drag such as radome damage or stuck
gear. Thrust should then be adjusted until level flight at the target
attitude is achieved, at which point the actual indicated airspeed
can be read from the table.
With the indicated airspeed now known independently of the
adrs, any working adrs may be identified and used to complete
the flight.
If no working adrs can be identified, the flight will need to be
completed by inferring airspeed from attitude data. To achieve
this, dependent on airframe, you may have access to, from most
advanced to least, Digital Backup Speed (dbus), reversible Backup
Speed Scale (buss), standard Backup Speed Scale or none of these.
dbus equipped aircraft provide a significant amount of assis-
tance. Data from angle of attack sensors is augmented with load
factor and GPS information to provide normal looking speed and
altitude scales, albeit with degraded accuracy.8 These can be used
8
Displayed airspeed is accurate to ±15kt. Displayed altitude is derived
from GPS data which is both less accurate and fundamentally different from
barometric altitude. The degraded accuracy is indicated by two amber lines
through the last digit of the speed scale and the last two digits of the altitude.
14 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

to operate the aircraft in a relatively normal manner. In addition,

the computed speed is available as a fourth source to the com-
puters in identifying compromised adrs, and the computers are
able to identify when an adr becomes reliable again and provide
appropriate ecam procedures.
buss equipped aircraft provide more rudimentary assistance.
The reversible version provides a button to turn the system on and
off, whereas the older version requires all three adrs to be turned
off to activate it. When activated, the speed scale is replaced with
a display showing a bar with green, amber and red sections, the
aim being to fly the green. It is basically a thinly disguised angle of
attack display: the green band can represent a significant range of
speeds, but does not change size, it should not be used for dynamic
manoeuvres such as levelling off, and it’s insufficiently accurate to
use above fl250. To clean up, accelerate until the speed is towards
the top of the green before selecting the next configuration; to
configure, reduce speed towards the bottom of the green before
selecting next configuration.
When neither dbus nor buss are available, pitch vs. airspeed
tables are provided in the qrh which can be used to complete
the flight by inferring airspeed from attitude. The advice when
using these tables is to only change one of altitude, airspeed or
configuration at a time; this means that clean up and configuration
are both done in level flight, stabilising at the attitude associated
with each new configuration before selecting the next. A 3° ILS is
highly recommended for the approach, as this is the angle that the
final approach attitude (and hence airspeed) are predicated on.
[ qrh aep.nav, fcom pro.aep.nav, fctm pro.aep.nav ]

2.4 Evacuation
Evacuation should be carried out in accordance with the emergency
evacuation checklist. The easyJet procedure is for cm1 to call for
2.5. FORCED LANDING (INC. DITCHING) 15

the checklist and then send a Mayday message to atc before

commencing the checklist.
The first two items confirm the rto actions of stopping the
aircraft, setting the parking brake and alerting the cabin crew.
The next item confirms atc has been alerted.
The next four items prepare the aircraft for evacuation. If
manual cabin pressure has been used, cm2 checks cabin diff is zero,
and if necessary manually opens the outflow valve. cm2 then shuts
the engines down with their master switches, and pushes all the
fire buttons (including the apu). Confirmation is not required
before carrying out these actions. In response to the next checklist
item, “Agents”, cm1 decides if any extinguishing agents should be
discharged and instructs cm2 to discharge them as required. Engine
agent 2 will not be available. Agents should only be discharged if
there are positive signs of fire.
Finally, order the evacuation. This is primarily done with the
pa “Evacuate, unfasten your seat belts and get out”, with the
evacuation alarm being triggered as a backup.
[ eomb 3.80.1, fcom pro.aer.misc, fctm pro.aer.misc ]

2.5 Forced Landing (inc. Ditching)

There are two scenarios where off field forced landing or ditching
would be considered: either you have insufficient energy to reach
a suitable airfield (e.g actual or impending fuel exhaustion, catas-
trophic failure of both engines), or you have insufficient time to do
so (e.g. uncontained fire).
Ditching and off field forced landing without power are discussed
in Section 10.1. Support for such landings is provided by the eng
all engines failure ecam and the eng all eng fail qrh
procedure.
Support for ditching and forced landing with power is provided
by the qrh misc ditching and qrh misc forced landing
16 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

procedures respectively. Necessarily implicit in these checklists

is the assumption that the aircraft is fully serviceable, which is
unlikely to be the case. There is also an assumption that plenty
of time is available for extensive preparation of cabin and cockpit.
It is highly likely that these checklists will need adapting to the
situation.
The fundamentals are the same with or without power. Ditching
will be gear up with a target pitch attitude of 11° and minimal
vertical speed, landing parallel to the swell unless there are strong
crosswinds, in which case an into wind landing is preferred. Forced
landing will be gear down with the spoilers armed.
The aircraft should be depressurised for the landing, with the
ditching pb pushed for the ditching case. For forced landings or
for “without power” ditching this is achieved using ram air. For
“with power” ditching, depressurise by turning off all bleeds, which
provides a slightly more watertight hull.
The main difference between the with and without power cases
is that max available slats and flaps are used in the former case,
wheras conf 2 is mandated for the latter. Approach speeds must
also be high enough to prevent rat stall (i.e. >140kt) if it is being
relied upon. The combination of these factors means that much
lower landing speeds can be achieved if power is available.
[ qrh aep.misc ]

2.6 Overweight landing

A landing can be made at any weight, providing sufficient landing
distance is available. In general, automatic landings are only
certified up to mlw, but the fcom specifies that, for the A319 only,
autoland is available up to 69000kg in case of emergency.
The preferred landing configuration is conf Full, but lower
settings may be used if required by qrh or ecam procedures. qrh
misc overweight landing also specifies conf 3 if the aircraft
2.7. ENGINE FAILURE IN CRUISE 17

weight exceeds the conf 3 go around limit; this will only ever be
a factor for airfields with elevations above 1000ft.
Packs should be turned off to provide additional go around
thrust.
If planned landing configuration is less than conf Full, use
conf 1+F for go-around.
It is possible that S speed will be higher than VFE next for
conf 2. In this case, a speed below VFE next should be selected
until conf 2 is achieved, then managed speed can be re-engaged.
Airbus specifies that, in the final stages of the approach, speed
should be reduced in order to cross the threshold at VLS . This
implies manual thrust since use of autothrust requires a 5kt in-
crement. Airbus also specifies that v/s at touchdown should be
minimised, this being achieved by an increase in flare height. It
is worth considering whether these requirements are compatible,
particularly if dealing with gusty crosswinds etc. — if not, an
option would be to add 5kt (or more) ∆VPilot in the landing
performance calculation and use a standard landing technique.
Apply max reverse as soon as the main gear touches down.
Maximum braking can be used after nosewheel touchdown.
After landing, switch on the brake fans and monitor brake
temperatures carefully. If temperatures exceed 800°C, tyre deflation
may occur.
[ qrh aer.misc, fcom pro.aer.misc, fctm pro.aer.misc ]

2.7 Engine failure in cruise

Engine out ceiling is highly dependent on weight; isa deviation
also has a modest effect. It will generally lie between fl180 and
fl350.
The first action will be to select both thrust levers to mct so as
to allow the autothrust its full engine out range. If the n1 gauges
indicate a thrust margin exists, then the aircraft is below engine
18 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

out ceiling; descent may be appropriate to increase the available

thrust margin, but there is no immediate threat. If, however,
the n1 gauges indicate that the autothrust is commanding mct,
and the speed is still decaying, then the aircraft is above engine
out ceiling and prompt execution of a drift down procedure is
required.
Drift down with autopilot engaged in op des is preferred.
Engagement of this vertical mode normally results in the autothrust
commanding idle thrust, which is not what is desired. Thus, having
set the thrust lever to mct, the autothrust is disconnected. The
prog page provides a rec max eo flight level to use as an altitude
target.
If the speed decay is modest, it may be possible to alert atc
before initiating the descent, but in-service events have shown that
speed decay is often very rapid, requiring descent initiation to be
prioritised.
Once drift down has been initiated, a decision needs to be made
about speed.
If obstacles are a concern, the lowest drift down rate and highest
ceiling are achieved at green dot. Airbus refers to drifting down at
green dot as “Obstacle strategy”.
Flying at green dot reduces the chance of the fadecs automat-
ically relighting the failed engine as the engine will be windmilling
more slowly. Therefore, if obstacles are not a concern, M.78/300kt
is flown, a speed that will always fall within the stabilized wind-
mill engine relight envelope; Airbus refers to this as “Standard
Strategy”.
If obstacles remain a problem, mct and green dot speed can
be maintained to give a shallow climbing profile. Once obstacles
are no longer a problem, descend to lrc ceiling (use v/s if <500
fpm descent rate), engage the autothrust and continue at lrc
speed.
[ fctm pro.aep.eng.efdc ]
2.8. BOMB ON BOARD 19

2.8 Bomb on board

The primary aim is to get the aircraft on the ground and evacuated
asap.
The secondary aim is to prevent detonation of the device.
This is achieved by preventing further increases in cabin altitude
through the use of manual pressure control and by avoiding sharp
manoeuvres and turbulence.
The tertiary aim is to minimise the effect of any explosion.
This is achieved by reducing the diff to 1 psi. The method is to set
cabin vertical speed to zero using manual pressurisation control,
then descend to an altitude 2500ft above cabin altitude. As further
descent is required, cabin vertical speed should be adjusted to
maintain the 1 psi diff for as long as possible. Automatic pressure
control is then reinstated on approach.
Low speeds reduce the damage from an explosion but increase
the risk of a timed explosion occurring whilst airborne; a com-
promise needs to be found. The aircraft should be configured for
landing as early as possible to avoid an explosion damaging landing
systems.
In the cabin, procedures are laid down for assessing the risks of
moving the device and for moving the device to the lrbl at door
2R.
[ qrh aer.80, fcom pro.aer.misc ]

2.9 Single engine circling

It may not be possible to fly level in the standard circling configu-
ration of conf 3, gear down. This can be ascertained by checking
the table in the qrh misc one engine inoperative – circling
approach procedure.
If affected, plan a conf 3 landing and delay gear extension
until level flight is no longer required; anticipate a l/g not down
20 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

ecam warning below 750ft (which can be silenced with the emer
canc pb) and a gpws “Too Low Gear” aural alert below 500ft ra.
[ qrh aep.misc ]

2.10 Stall recovery (memory item)

Aerofoil stall is always and only an angle of attack issue. It is not
possible to directly prove an unstalled condition from attitude and
airspeed data. The flight recorders from the December 2014 Air
Asia accident recorded an angle of attack of 40° (i.e. around 25°
greater than critical angle) with both pitch and roll zero and speeds
up to 160kt. Importantly, it is perfectly possible to be fully stalled
in the short term unreliable airspeed configurations described in
Section 2.3. Identification of a fully stalled condition is thus largely
dependent on identifying a high and uncontrollable descent rate
that does not correlate with normal flight path expectations for
the attitude and thrust applied.
To recover from a fully stalled condition, the angle of attack
of the aerofoils must be reduced to below critical. The generic
stall recovery is therefore simply to pitch the nose down sufficiently
to break the stall and level the wings. In normal operations, the
velocity vector of the aircraft is around 3° below the centerline
of the aircraft (i.e. an attitude of around 3° is required to fly
level). In a stalled condition, the velocity vector may be 40° or
more below the centerline of the aircraft. Thus the amount of
pitch down required to recover a fully stalled aircraft can be 30°
or more.
In two recent Airbus accidents involving stalls, the lack of
physical cross coupling of sidesticks was a major factor. If one pilot
elects to hold full back sidestick, the aircraft cannot be recovered
by the other pilot unless the takeover button is used. With all the
alarms, it would be easy to miss “Dual Input” warnings, so always
press the takeover button.
2.11. COMPUTER RESET 21

The aircraft’s thrust vector helps to accelerate the aircraft dur-

ing the recovery, and increasing speed along the aircraft’s centerline
acts to reduce the stalled angle of attack. Thus, while thrust is
not a primary means of recovery, it does help. Unfortunately, Air-
bus have determined that due to the pitch couple associated with
underslung engines, there may be insufficient longitudinal control
authority to pitch the aircraft sufficiently to recover from a stall if
toga is selected. It may therefore be necessary to initially reduce
thrust to allow the primary recovery technique to be applied; this
is extremely counterintuitive.
Once there are no longer any indications of the stall, smoothly
recover from the dive, adjust thrust, check speedbrakes retracted
and if appropriate (clean and below 20,000ft) deploy the slats
by selecting conf 1. The load factor associated with an overly
aggressive pull out can induce a secondary stall; on the flip side,
once reattachment of the airflow occurs, drag rapidly diminishes
and exceedance of high speed airframe limitations becomes a threat.
A balance needs to be found.
If a stall warner sounds on takeoff it is likely to be spurious
since you are almost certainly in normal law. The procedure in this
case is essentially to initially assume unreliable airspeed and fly
toga, 15°, wings level until it can be confirmed that the warning
is spurious.
A stall warning may occur at high altitude to indicate that
the aircraft is reaching αbuffet . In this case simply reduce the back
pressure on the sidestick and/or reduce bank angle.
[ fcom pro.aer.misc ]

2.11 Computer reset

Abnormal computer behaviour can often be stopped by interrupting
the power supply of the affected computer. This can be done
either with cockpit controls or with circuit breakers. The general
22 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

procedure is to interrupt the power supply, wait 3 seconds (5

seconds if a cb was used), restore the power, then wait another
three seconds for the reset to complete. qrh aer.reset details
the specific procedures for a variety of systems.
On the ground, almost all computers can be reset. moc can
usually supply a reset procedure if nothing applicable is available
in the qrh. The exceptions are the ecu and eiu while the asso-
ciated engine is running and the bscu when the aircraft is not
stopped.
In flight, only the computers listed in the qrh should be con-
sidered for reset.
[ qrh aer.system reset ]

2.12 Abnormal V Alpha Prot

If two or more angle of attack vanes become frozen at the same
angle during climb, a Mach number will eventually be reached such
that the erroneous angle of attack data indicates an incipient stall.
When this happens, Normal Law high angle of attack protection
will activate. The flight computers’ attempt to reduce angle of
attack will not, however, be registered by the frozen vanes, leading
to a continuous nose down pitch rate which cannot be overridden
with sidestick inputs.
Indications of this condition are available from the αprot and
αmax strips. If the αmax strip (solid red) completely hides the αprot
strip (black and amber) or the αprot strip moves rapidly by more
than 30kt during flight manoeuvres with ap on and speed brakes
retracted, frozen angle of attack vanes should be suspected.
The solution is to force the flight computers into Alternate Law
where the protection does not apply. This is most conveniently
done by turning off any two adrs. Once in Alternate Law, the
stall warning strip (red and black) becomes available. Since stall
2.13. OVERSPEED RECOVERY 23

warning data also comes from the angle of attack vanes, erroneous
presentation is likely.

2.13 Overspeed Recovery

In general the response to an overspeed should be to deploy the
speedbrake and monitor the thrust reduction actioned by the
autothrust. Disconnection of the autopilot will not normally be
required. If autothrust is not in use, the thrust levers will need to
be manually retarded.
It is possible that the autopilot will automatically disengage
and high speed protection will activate, resulting in an automatic
pitch up. In this case, smoothly adjust pitch attitude as required.
At high altitude, there is a threat of over-correction caused by
the lethargic response of the speedbrake when commanded to stow.
In the worst case, a descent may be required to recover speed. This
threat can be mitigated by promptly cancelling the speedbrake as
soon as the overspeed condition ceases.
[ fctm pro.aer.misc ]

2.14 Volcanic Ash Encounter

Volcanic ash clouds are usually extensive, so a 180° turn will achieve
the quickest exit.
Air quality may be affected, so crew oxygen masks should be
donned with 100% oxygen to exclude fumes. Passenger oxygen
may also need to be deployed.
Probes may become blocked with ash, so be prepared to carry
out the unreliable speed procedure.
Disconnect the autothrust to prevent excessive thrust varia-
tions.
To minimise the impact on the engines, if conditions permit
thrust should be reduced. Turn on all anti-ice and set pack flow to
24 CHAPTER 2. MISCELLANEOUS

high in order to increase bleed demand and thus increase engine

stall margin. Wing anti-ice will need to be turned off again before
attempting relight in case of flameout.
If engine egt limits are exceeded, consider a precautionary
engine shutdown with restart once clear of volcanic ash. Engine
acceleration may be very slow during restart. Since compressor
and turbine blades may have been eroded, avoid sudden thrust
changes.
Damage to the windshield may necessitate an autoland or
landing with a sliding window open.
[ qrh aep.misc, fcom pro.aep.misc, fctm pro.aep.misc ]

2.15 Incapacitation
Take control, using the stick priority button if necessary. Contact
cabin crew asap. They should strap the incapacitated pilot to
his seat, move the seat back, then recline it. If there are two
cabin crew available, the body can be moved. Medical help should
be sought from passengers, and the presence of any type rated
company pilots on board ascertained.
[ fctm pro.aep.misc ]
Chapter 3

Air con and

pressurisation

3.1 Cabin overpressure

There is no ecam in the case of total loss of pressure control
leading to an overpressure, so apply the qrh procedure. The
basic procedure is to reduce air inflow by turning off one of the
packs and put the avionics ventilation system in its smoke removal
configuration so that it dumps cabin air overboard. The ∆P is
monitored, and the remaining pack is turned off if it exceeds 9 psi.
10 minutes before landing, both packs are turned off and remain off,
and the avionics ventilation is returned to its normal configuration.
[ qrh aep.cab pr, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]

3.2 Excess cabin altitude

An ecam warning of excess (>9550ft) cabin altitude should be
relied upon, even if not backed up by other indications.
The initial response should be to protect yourself by getting an

25
26 CHAPTER 3. AIR CON AND PRESSURISATION

oxygen mask on. Initiate a descent; if above fl160, this should be

in accordance with the Emergency Descent procedure (see Section
2.1). Once the descent is established and all relevant checklists are
complete, check the position of the outflow valve and, if it is not
fully closed, use manual control to close it.
[ cab pr excess cab alt, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]

3.3 Landing Elevation Fault

If the landing field elevation is not available from the fmgs, the
landing elevation must be manually selected. This is done by
pulling out and turning the ldg elev knob. The scale on the knob
is only a rough indication; use the ldg elev displayed on either
the cruise page or the cab press sd page instead.
[ cab pr ldg elev fault, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]

3.4 Pack fault

The air pack fault ecam indicates that the pack flow control
valve position disagrees with the selected position or that the pack
valve has closed due to either compressor outlet overheat or pack
outlet overheat.
The affected pack should be turned off.
A possible reason for this failure is loss of both channels of an
Air Conditioning System Controller (acsc). If this occurs, the
associated hot air trimming will also be lost (cockpit for acsc 1,
cabin for acsc 2).
If there are simultaneous faults with both packs, ram air must
be used. This will necessitate depressurisation of the aircraft, so a
descent to fl100 (or mea if higher) is required. If a pack button
fault light subsequently extinguishes, an attempt should be made
to reinstate that pack.
[ air pack 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.air ]
3.5. PACK OVERHEAT 27

3.5 Pack overheat

The associated pack flow control valve closes automatically in
the event of a pack overheating (outlet temp >260°C or outlet
temp >230°C four times in one flight). The remaining pack will
automatically go to high flow, and is capable of supplying all of the
air conditioning requirement. This system’s automatic response is
backed up by turning off the pack. The fault light in the pack
button remains illuminated whilst the overheat condition exists.
The pack can be turned back on once it has cooled.
[ air pack 1(2) ovht, fcom pro.aep.air ]

3.6 Pack off

A warning is generated if a functional pack is selected off in a phase
of flight when it would be expected to be on. This is usually the
result of neglecting to re-instate the packs after a packs off takeoff.
Unless there is a reason not to, turn the affected pack(s) on.
[ air pack 1(2) off, fcom pro.aep.air ]

3.7 Pack regulator faults

A regulator fault is defined as a failure of one of four devices: the
bypass valve, the ram air inlet, the compressor outlet temperature
sensor or the flow control valve. The ecam bleed page can be used
to determine which device is at fault.
Regardless of the device at fault, the ramification is the same;
the pack will continue to operate but there may be a degradation
in temperature regulation. If temperatures become uncomfortable,
consideration should be given to turning off the affected pack.
[ air pack 1(2) regul fault, fcom pro.aep.air ]
28 CHAPTER 3. AIR CON AND PRESSURISATION

3.8 ACSC single lane failure

Each acsc has two fully redundant “lanes”, so loss of a single
“lane” results in loss of redundancy only.
[ air cond ctl 1(2) a(b) fault, fcom pro.aep.air ]

3.9 Duct overheat

A duct overheat is defined as a duct reaching 88°C or a duct
reaching 80°C four times in one flight. If this occurs, the hot air
pressure regulating valve and trim air valves close automatically
and the fault light illuminates in the hot air button. This light
will extinguish when the temperature drops to 70°C.
Once the duct has cooled, an attempt can be made to recover
the hot air system by cycling the hot air button.
If recovery is not possible, basic temperature regulation will
continue to be provided by the packs.
[ cond fwd cab/aft cab/ckpt duct ovht, fcom pro.aep.cond ]

3.10 Hot air fault

If the hot air pressure regulating valve is not in its commanded
position, the effects will depend on its actual position.
If it is closed when commanded open, the packs will provide
basic temperature regulation.
More serious is if it has been commanded closed in response
to a duct overheat and it remains open. Manual control may be
effective, but if it is not the only option is to turn off both packs
and proceed as per Section 3.4.
[ cond hot air fault, fcom pro.aep.cond ]
3.11. TRIM AIR FAULTS 29

3.11 Trim air faults

Either a fault with one of the trim air valves or an overpressure
downstream of the hot air valve. An associated message indicates
which condition exists.
Failure of a trim valve leads to loss of optimised temperature
regulation for the corresponding zone; basic temperature regulation
is still available.
The trim air high pr message may be disregarded if triggered
when all the trim air valves are closed. This occurs during the first
30 seconds after the packs are selected on and in flight if all zone
heating demands are fulfilled.1
[ cond trim air sys fault, fcom pro.aep.cond ]

3.12 Cabin fan faults

If both cabin fans fail, their flow should be replaced by increasing
the pack flow to hi.
[ cond l + r cab fan fault, fcom pro.aep.cond ]

3.13 Lavatory and galley fan faults

The cabin zone temperature sensors are normally ventilated by air
extracted by these fans. Loss of the fans therefore leads to loss of
accurate zone temperature indication.
On older aircraft, temperature control reverts to maintenance
of a fixed cabin zone inlet duct temperature of 15°C.
On newer aircraft the temperature controls for the cabin revert
to controlling temperature in the ducts. If acsc 2 has also failed,
1
The fcom is not very informative regarding response to overpressure when
this does not apply. However the mel operating procedures for dispatch with
this condition indicate that turning the hot air pb-sw off is probably a good
idea.
30 CHAPTER 3. AIR CON AND PRESSURISATION

the duct temperatures are maintained at the same level as the

cockpit duct temperature, and may therefore be controlled with
the cockpit temperature selector.
[ cond lav + galley fan fault, fcom pro.aep.cond ]

3.14 Pressure controller faults

Loss of a single cabin pressure controller leads to loss of redundancy
only.
If both pressure controllers are lost, use manual control. The
outflow valve reacts slowly in manual mode, and it may be 10 sec-
onds before positive control of the outflow valve can be verified. It
may also react too slowly to prevent a temporary depressurisation.
To activate manual pressurisation control, press the mode sel
button. This allows the man v/s ctl toggle switch to directly
control the outflow valve. Moving the toggle to dn closes the
outflow valve causing the cabin altitude to descend, whilst moving
the toggle to up opens the outflow valve causing the cabin altitude
to climb. The target climb and descent rates are 500fpm and
300fpm, these being displayed on the status page for easy reference.
A table of fl versus cab alt tgt is also provided on the status
page; no guidance is given for the interpretation of this table. The
final action of the procedure is to fully open the outflow valve when
reaching 2500ft agl in preparation for an unpressurised landing,
so to avoid large pressurisation changes during this action, the
final cabin altitude target needs to be aerodrome elevation plus
2500ft. This gives an indication of how cab alt tgt should be
interpreted: it is the lowest cabin altitude that still results in a
safe ∆P at a given fl. A cabin altitude greater then cab alt
tgt is always acceptable2 and, moreover, for the final stages of the
approach, it is necessary. The method is therefore to avoid cabin
2
A reasonable maximum cabin altitude is 8800ft, which is when the cab
altitude advisory triggers.
3.15. LOW DIFF PRESSURE 31

altitudes below cab alt tgt for your current fl while ensuring
that a cabin altitude of aerodrome elevation plus 2500ft will be
achieved by the time you need to fully open the outflow valve.
Ensure cabin diff pressure is zero before attempting to open
the doors.
[ cab pr sys 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]

3.15 Low diff pressure

High rates of descent may lead to the aircraft descending through
the cabin altitude when more than 3000ft above the landing altitude.
An ecam warning indicates that this situation is projected to occur
within the next 1½minutes. If the rate of descent of the aircraft is
not reduced, the pressure controllers will have to resort to high rates
of change of cabin altitude, which may cause passenger discomfort.
The aircraft’s vertical speed should be reduced unless there is a
pressing reason not to.
[ cab pr lo diff pr, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]

3.16 Outflow valve closed on ground

If the outflow valve fails to automatically open on the ground, man-
ual control should be attempted. If that doesn’t work, depressurise
the aircraft by turning off both packs.
[ cab pr ofv not open, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]

3.17 Open safety valve

There are safety valves for both cabin overpressure and negative
differential pressure; the associated ecam message does not distin-
guish between the two.
32 CHAPTER 3. AIR CON AND PRESSURISATION

If diff pressure is above 8psi, it is the overpressure valve that

has opened. Attempt manual pressurisation control and if that
fails, reduce aircraft altitude.
If diff pressure is below zero, it is the negative differential valve.
Reduce aircraft vertical speed or expect high cabin rates.
[ cab pr safety valve open, fcom pro.aep.cab pr ]
Chapter 4

Avionics Ventilation

4.1 Blower fault

Defined as low blowing pressure or duct overheat. Unless there is
a dc ess Bus fault, the blower fan should be set to ovrd. This
puts the avionics ventilation into closed configuration and adds
cooling air from the air conditioning system.
[ vent blower fault, fcom pro.aep.vent ]

4.2 Extract fault

Defined as low extract pressure. The extract fan should be put in
ovrd. This puts the avionics ventilation into closed configuration
and adds cooling air from the air conditioning system.
[ vent extract fault, fcom pro.aep.vent ]

4.3 Skin valve fault

Defined as one of three faults: the inlet valve is not fully closed in
flight; the extract valve is fully open in flight; or the extract valve

33
34 CHAPTER 4. AVIONICS VENTILATION

did not automatically close on application of take-off power. The

ecam cab press page will differentiate.
If the fault is with the inlet valve, no action is required since it
incorporates a non-return valve.
If the extract valve is affected, the system should be put into
smoke configuration; this sends additional close signals to the
extract valve. If the extract valve still remains open, the ecam
directs the crew to depressurise the aircraft. The rationale for this
seemingly extreme reaction to a relatively minor issue is that the
ecam can only really occur immediately after the take-off inhibit
ceases at 1500ft aal. The extract valve is normally held closed
by the pressurisation and its motor is not sufficiently powerful to
overcome this. Thus the extract valve can only be open in flight if
it never closed. With the extract valve open, it will likely not be
possible to complete the flight since the additional hole will make
it impossible to properly pressurise the aircraft at cruise altitude,
and the pressurised air rushing through the open outflow valve
will cause it to be unpleasantly noisy in the cockpit. This makes
depressurising the aircraft and returning for engineering attention
the obvious solution.1
[ vent skin valve fault, fcom pro.aep.vent ]

4.4 Avionics ventilation system fault

Defined as either a valve not in its commanded position or the
Avionics Equipment Ventilation Controller (aevc) being either un-
powered or failing its power-up test. The system will automatically
default to a safe configuration similar to smoke configuration. No
crew action is required.
[ vent avncs sys fault, fcom pro.aep.vent ]

1
The ecam procedure associated with this failure is due to be modified in
an upcoming fwc update.
Chapter 5

Electrical

5.1 Emergency configuration

Attempt to restore normal power by recycling the main generators.
If that fails, try again after splitting the systems with the bus tie
button.
If normal power cannot be restored, ensure that the emergency
generator is on line (deploy the rat manually if required) and
maintain speed >140kt to avoid rat stall. Cycling fac1 will
recover rudder trim. Once 45 seconds have elapsed and when
below fl250, the apu can be started.
So much equipment is lost in the emergency configuration
that qrh elec emer config sys remaining provides a table of
surviving equipment. Notable losses are:

• All the fuel pumps, requiring Gravity Fuel Feeding procedures

(see Section 8.4) and making center tank fuel unusable.
• The anti-skid, three fifths of the spoilers and the reversers.
Combined with the higher landing speeds required to pre-
vent rat stall this results in significantly increased landing
distances.

35
36 CHAPTER 5. ELECTRICAL

• Alternate Law with reduced protections (see Section 6.3).

Mechanical yaw becomes Alternate Law yaw with fac1 reset.
Anticipate Direct Law at gear extension.

• Anti-icing for probes supplying adr2 and adr3. Only cm1

instruments should be considered reliable in icing conditions.

• Nose Wheel Steering (see Section 9.16).

The qrh elec elec emer config summary should be applied

once ecam actions are complete.
[ elec emer config, qrh aep.elec, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.2 Battery only

Battery power is available for approximately 30 mins.1
qrh elec emer config sys remaining provides details of
remaining equipment. Mostly this is the same as for emergency
electrical configuration (see Section 5.1). Notable additional losses
are:

• The remaining nd

• The remaining fmgc and mcdu

• The remaining dme and transponder

• The remaining fac

• Wing anti-ice

• cm1 aoa anti-ice

• Passenger oxygen masks

1
This information was part of Airbus cbt training. There is no figure
available in the fcom.
5.3. IDG LOW OIL PRESSURE/HIGH TEMPERATURE 37

An attempt should be made to bring the emergency generator

on line with the emer elec pwr man on button.
[ elec ess buses on bat, qrh aep.elec, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.3 IDG low oil pressure/high temperature

The idg should be disconnected. Assuming the associated engine
is running, press the idg button until the gen fault light comes
on. Do not press the button for more than 3 seconds.
The apu generator should be used if available.
[ elec idg 1(2) oil lo pr/ovht, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.4 Generator fault

Try to reset the generator by turning it off, then, after a short
pause, turning it on again. If unsuccessful, turn it back off.
If an engine driven generator cannot be recovered, the apu
generator should be used if available.
Single generator operation leads to shedding of the galley. Loss
of an engine driven generator leads to loss of cat 3 dual capability.
[ elec(apu) gen (1)(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.5 Battery fault

The affected battery contactor opens automatically. apu battery
start is unavailable with a single battery.
[ elec bat 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.6 AC Bus 1 fault

Some or all of the equipment on ac bus 1 becomes unavailable,
including tr1: dc bus 1 is powered from dc bus 2 via the battery
38 CHAPTER 5. ELECTRICAL

bus.
Power must be re-routed to the essential ac bus via ac bus 2.
This is automatic on some aircraft. Manual re-routing is achieved
with the ac ess feed button. Once essential ac is powered, the
essential tr powers the dc essential bus.
Notable lost equipment includes the blue hydraulic system, ra1
(and hence cat 3 capability), half the fuel pumps, the nose wheel
steering, the avionics blower fan and cm1 windshield heat.
[ elec ac bus 1 fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.7 AC Bus 2 fault

Some or all of the equipment on ac bus 2 becomes unavailable,
including tr2: dc bus 2 is powered from dc bus 1 via the battery
bus.
The majority of this equipment has a redundant backup, the
loss of the fo’s pfd and nd and a downgrade to cat 1 being the
major issues. Landing distances are unchanged.
[ elec ac bus 2 fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.8 AC Ess Bus fault

It may be possible to recover the bus by transferring its power
source to ac bus 2 with the ac ess feed button. If this is
unsuccessful, some or all of the equipment on the ac essential bus
will be lost.
The majority of this equipment has a redundant backup, with
the loss of the Captain’s pfd and nd and a downgrade to cat 1
being the major issues. Landing distances are unchanged.
It is worth noting that loss of ac essential bus implies loss
of passenger oxygen masks. The mel allows dispatch without
operative passenger oxygen masks provided that operating altitude
5.9. AC ESSENTIAL SHED BUS LOST 39

is limited to 10,000ft. Where possible, a descent to this altitude

would seem appropriate.
Where it is not possible to immediately descend to 10,000ft,
a compromise level whereby a descent to a safe altitude can be
achieved without masks needs to be chosen. The main form of
guidance on altitude hypoxia comes in the form of “Time of useful
consciousness” tables. Working on the principal that if you remain
conscious you definitely remain alive, 25,000ft would seem to be a
reasonable compromise. This gives you 2 to 3 minutes of useful
consciousness to dive to 18,000ft, where you would then have 30
minutes to clear any terrain.2
[ elec ac ess bus fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.9 AC Essential Shed Bus lost

Some or all of the equipment on the ac ess shed bus is lost.
The major issue is the loss of the passenger oxygen masks (see
discussion in Section 5.8). Landing distances are unchanged.
[ elec ac ess bus shed, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.10 DC Bus 1 fault

Some or all of the equipment on dc bus 1 is lost. Most of the
equipment loss causes loss of redundancy only. Landing distances
are unchanged.
[ elec dc bus 1 fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

2
These tables are obviously not designed to be used in this way – the
exposure to hypoxia in the descent will likely impact the touc at 18,000ft,
and we are really more concerned with survivability than useful consciousness
– but they can at least give a feeling for the parameters involved.
40 CHAPTER 5. ELECTRICAL

5.11 DC Bus 2 fault

Some or all of the equipment on dc bus 2 is lost. Notable items
are:

• 3 spoilers per side and one reverser. Landing distances in-

crease by ∼35%.

• Autobrake.

• fo’s static probe: select adr3 to fo’s side.

• fo’s window heat, wipers and rain repellent.

The other lost systems either have redundant backups or are

non-essential. It should, however, be noted that the only flight
computers remaining are elac1, sec1 and fac1, so not much
redundancy remains.
[ elec dc bus 2 fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.12 DC Essential Bus fault

The major headache associated with dc essential bus failure is a
significant loss of redundancy in communications systems.
acp1 and acp2 are lost, along with vhf1. This allows two-way
communication to be recovered by one pilot using acp3 (selected
via the audio swtg rotary selector) with vhf2 or vhf3. Since
speaker 1 is also lost, having cm2 handle the radios with speaker 2
at high volume is the only method of both pilots having awareness
of atc communications.
On some airframes,3 this loss of communications is exacerbated
by a design flaw: the audio cards for cockpit mikes and headsets
are all powered from the dc essential bus. It may still be possible
3
msns 2184–2402 and msns 2471–3122 at time of writing.
5.13. DC ESSENTIAL SHED 41

to receive transmissions with a combination of vhf2/3, acp3 on

fo and speaker 2, but transmission is limited to morse code on the
transmit switch.4
Other notable lost equipment includes:

• Reverser 2 and the blue hydraulic system, leading to modestly

increased landing distances.

• The hp fuel shutoff valves. This requires that the engines are
shut down with the Engine Fire pushbutton switches.

• Wing anti-ice.

• Auto-thrust. This is notable because the ecam status page

incorrectly reports that cat 3 single is available, when the
actual landing capability is cat 2.

• gpws.

[ elec dc ess bus fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.13 DC Essential shed

The only major issue is the loss of wing anti-ice. Therefore, avoid
icing conditions, and apply landing distance procedure if ice ac-
cretes.
[ elec dc ess bus shed, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.14 Loss of DC Bus 1 and DC Bus 2

Some or all of the systems supplied by dc bus 1 and dc bus 2 are
lost.
4
I am only inferring this solution from the list of equipment lost; there is
no specific documentation to indicate that it will work.
42 CHAPTER 5. ELECTRICAL

The implications are the same as for dc emergency configu-

ration (see Section 5.18) except that the rat will not need to be
deployed since ess tr will be supplied from ac bus 1 instead of
the emergency generator.
[ elec dc bus 1+2 fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.15 Generator overload

Shed some load by switching off the galleys.
[ elec gen 1(2) overload, elec apu gen overload,
fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.16 Loss of TRs

No systems are lost as a result of failure of a single tr. If the
fault is with tr1 or tr2, dc ess will be supplied by the ess tr
via the ac essential bus; in this case only cat 3 single will be
available.
Dual failures involving the ess tr are similar to single failures,
except redundancy is further compromised. If, however, both tr1
and tr2 fail then dc bus 1, dc bus 2 and the dc battery bus will
be lost. The dc essential bus will remain powered by the ess tr.
The fcom is not very forthcoming regarding this failure; there
is only a description in the dsc section and nothing specific in the
pro section. The situation is, however, very similar to the “ecam
complete” phase of dc emergency configuration (see Section 5.18),
the only difference being that ac bus 1 rather than the emergency
generator is providing the power to the ess tr, and hence you
don’t need to worry about rat deployment.
[ elec tr 1(2), elec ess tr fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]
5.17. BATTERY BUS FAULT 43

5.17 Battery bus fault

Some or all of the equipment on the battery bus is lost. The only
notable losses are apu fire detection and apu battery start.
[ elec dc bat bus fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.18 DC Emergency configuration

Defined as the loss of dc busses 1 and 2, the dc essential bus and
the battery bus. Recovery assumes that the dc essential bus can
be fully restored by deploying the rat with the emer elec pwr
button.
Equipment powered or controlled through dc busses 1 and 2
and the battery bus is therefore lost.
Loss of the equipment associated with the battery bus is fairly
benign: mainly apu battery start is unavailable due to loss of the
apu ecb and apu fire detection.
A lot of equipment is lost with the loss of dc busses 1 and
2, but it is worth remembering that all three affected busses are
also lost in emergency electrical config. Thus, you will have, at
minimum, all the equipment listed in qrh elec emer config sys
remaining. The main items of note are:

• A long runway is required. Minimum VAPP is 140kt to pre-

vent rat stall. Antiskid, reversers and 60% of the spoilers are
lost. Loss of nosewheel steering adds to the difficulty. Braking
is from the abcu, so only manual braking is available.5
• Flight computer redundancy is significantly reduced, with
only elac1, sec1 and fac1 available. This is, however,
sufficient to keep Normal Law, so a conf Full landing and,
indeed, cat 3 single autoland (using ap1 and fmgs1) are
available.
5
easyJet aircraft automatically modulate to 1000psi, but the sim may not.
44 CHAPTER 5. ELECTRICAL

• Pressurised fuel is available from the #1 wing tank pumps,

but center tank fuel is unusable.

• Redundancy in the pressurisation system is seriously compro-

mised. Manual pressure control and cpc2 are lost, so you are
reliant on cpc1 for control. Pack 2, bmc2 and cross bleed
control are all lost, so you are reliant on eng1 bleed and
pack 1 for supply. Ram air remains available, so if required
a slow depressurisation through turning off pack 1 followed
by a depressurised landing with ram air is achievable.

• Communications are limited to vhf1, controlled by rmp1.

All communications will be lost below 100kt on the landing
roll when the dc essential bus is depowered.

• Redundancy in the fire detection and suppression systems is

compromised. The engines each retain one detection loop and
one fire bottle. apu fire detection and cargo fire extinguishing
are lost.

• Heating for all static ports is lost, so be alert for unreliable

airspeed and altitude.

[ elec dc emer config, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.19 Static inverter fault

Normal operations are not affected.
[ elec stat inv fault, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.20 Generator 1 line off

Pressing the gen 1 line button on the emergency electrical panel
has much the same effect as pressing the gen1 button on the main
5.21. TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS 45

electrical panel, with the difference that gen1 continues to supply

its associated fuel pumps. It is primarily used for the smoke drill.
If it’s not meant to be off, turn it on.
[ elec emer gen 1 line off, fcom pro.aep.elec ]

5.21 Tripped circuit breakers

It is generally not recommended to reset circuit breakers in flight.
It is, however, acceptable to attempt a single reset if it is judged
necessary for the safe continuation of the flight.
On the ground, any circuit breakers other than those for the
fuel pumps may be reset as long as the action is coordinated with
moc.
An ecam warning will be triggered if a green circuit breaker
trips. If the circuit breaker is left tripped, additional tripped circuit
breakers on the same panel will not be detected.
[ c/b tripped, fcom pro.aep.elec ]
46 CHAPTER 5. ELECTRICAL
Chapter 6

Flight Controls

6.1 Flaps and/or slats fault/locked

The most pressing concern following a flap or slat problem is to
select a safe initial speed that will avoid overspeeding the stuck
device. To establish a conservative Vmax :

• If the failure occurred while deploying surfaces, use the plac-

arded VFE associated with the new flap lever position. The
Vmax displayed on the pfd will be this VFE .1

• If the failure occurred while retracting surfaces, use the plac-

arded VFE associated with the previous flap lever position.
Consider returning the flap lever to this position to get this
VFE displayed on the pfd.

For minimum speed, the VLS displayed on the pfd is calculated

from actual flap and slat position and can be trusted. If VLS is
unavailable, fly Vmax − 5kt.
1
The Vmax displayed on the pfd is a function of flap lever position. Con-
versely, the ecam overspeed warning is a function of actual flap and slat
positions.

47
48 CHAPTER 6. FLIGHT CONTROLS

Unless there is an obvious reason not to (e.g. wing tip brake

on, alignment fault or fault due to dual hydraulic failure), the flap
lever can be recycled.
If normal operation cannot be restored, there are two major
issues that must be quickly addressed:

• Fuel burn will be dramatically higher when flying with a

locked device. With slats extended, fuel burn will increase
by 60%. With flaps extended it will increase by 80%. With
both slats and flaps extended, fuel burn will double. These
figures are available in qrh ops

• Landing distances are significantly increased, in the worst

case by a factor of 2.2

It may be that the combination of these factors requires a

prompt diversion decision.
The flap and slat systems are largely independent, so the flap
lever will continue to move the slats if the flaps are locked and vice
versa. In general, conf 3 should be selected for landing. There
are two exceptions. If flaps are locked at >3, conf Full should
be used. If both slats and flaps are locked at 0, conf 1 should be
used so that the ap/fd go-around is armed.
Configurations and VREF are available from the FS+ landing
module by selecting suitable f/ctl ecams. Note that the surfaces
can stick at intermediate positions, which can be difficult to detect
from the flap/slat position indicator if they are close to “index”
positions – the difference between, for example, slats 1 and slats < 1
on the indicator can be the width of a single pixel on the display.
If a flapless and slatless landing is required, the threshold speed
may be below VLS . This is necessary as the landing speeds in this
configuration are very close to tyre limit speeds.
Generally, the deployment method is to select a speed 5kt below
VFE NEXT , then select the next configuration as the speed reduces
6.1. FLAPS AND/OR SLATS FAULT/LOCKED 49

through VFE NEXT .2

In the case where VLS >VFE NEXT , prioritise VLS : fly VLS ,
select the next configuration, then track VLS as it reduces with the
extension of the lift device. Use of autothrust with selected speed
is generally recommended for all phases of the approach, but in
this case it will need to be temporarily disconnected.
The autopilot may be used down to 500ft aal, but since it
is not tuned for the abnormal configuration it must be closely
monitored.
Anticipate an unusual visual picture for landing.
For the go-around, initially maintain flap/slat configuration. A
speed 10kt lower than max operating speed should be flown. If it is
the slats that are jammed or if the flaps are jammed at 0, conf 0
can be selected for transit to a diversion airfield. To clean up,
accelerate to VMax − 10kt before selecting each new configuration.
Transit should be at VMax − 10kt unless clean.
Other issues include the possible loss of the automatic operation
of the center tank pumps (which is sequenced to the slats) and
possible reversion to Alternate Law.
It is also worth noting that failure of the slat channels of both
sfccs appears to result in the loss of characteristic speed display
on both pfds. This is not mentioned in the fcom but occurs in
the sim.
The upshot of this is that neither VLS nor VSW are available
at all, since they are not displayed and there is no way to calculate
them. This is of particular concern when trying to deploy conf 2
on the approach: conf 1 does not extend flaps, so the aircraft
will still be clean, yet it must be slowed to the VFE for conf 2.
2
VFE NEXT is a function of flap lever position, so it takes no account of the
failure. Since it is likely that for any given configuration there are fewer high
lift surfaces than normal deployed, the next configuration is selected as soon as
possible, even at the risk of turbulence causing a slight overspeed. If VFE NEXT
is not available, placarded speeds can be used instead.
50 CHAPTER 6. FLIGHT CONTROLS

It is highly likely that the stall warner will activate during this
transition, and if not anticipated, the subsequent recovery will
overspeed the flaps.
The solution is to brief that speed will be reduced very slowly
and if the stall warning occurs the speed will be maintained whilst
allowing the deployment of the flaps to recover the stall margin.
[ f/ctl flaps(slats) fault(locked), qrh aep.f/ctl,
fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.2 Direct Law

In Direct Law, deflection of the control surfaces is a linear function
of deflection of the side-stick and trimming must be done manually.
The controls are very sensitive at high speeds.
Use of manual thrust is recommended as power changes will
result in pitch changes. Similarly, use of the speed brake will result
in nose up pitch changes so it should be used with care.
Protections are unavailable, so speed is limited to 320kt/0.77M
and great care must be taken when flying gpws or windshear
manoeuvres.
Direct Law landings are conf 3; landing distances, in the
absence of other pertinent failures, are comparable to normal conf
3 landings.
The major handling difficulty with Direct Law is the go-around.
There is no compensation for the large pitch moment introduced
by selecting toga power on the under-slung engines, the thrust
levers are non-linear, thrust onset is laggy and non-linear and the
use of the manual pitch trim wheel will be unfamiliar. Apply
power smoothly and progressively and anticipate a requirement for
unusual side-stick inputs.
Direct Law works with or without yaw dampers. The aircraft is
always convergent in dutch roll, so use lateral control, not rudder,
6.3. ALTERNATE LAW 51

if dutch roll is experienced.

[ f/ctl direct law, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.3 Alternate Law

In Alternate Law, pitch is as in Normal Law, but roll is as in Direct
Law. Load factor protection is retained, but other protections
are either replaced with static stability or are lost, depending on
the nature of the failure. Stall warnings and overspeed warnings
become active.
The main effects are that speed is limited to 320kt and stall
warnings must be respected when carrying out egpws manoeuvres.
The autopilot may be available.
Expect Direct Law after landing gear extension (see Section
6.2), and hence increased approach speeds and landing distances
due to the associated conf 3 landing.
[ f/ctl altn law, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.4 Elevator faults

If a single elevator fails, the secs use the remaining elevator to
provide pitch control in Alternate Law (see Section 6.3). In ad-
dition, speed brake should not be used and the autopilots are
unserviceable.
If both elevators fail, the only available mechanism for pitch
control is manual pitch trim, so pitch reverts to mechanical back
up and roll reverts to Direct Law.
For an approach without elevators, fly a long final, initiating
the descent from at least 5000ft aal. Do not try to flare using
trim and do not remove power until after touchdown. From 1000ft
aal, try to keep power changes to within 2% N1. In the event of
52 CHAPTER 6. FLIGHT CONTROLS

a go-around, power must be applied very slowly if control is not to

be lost.3
[ f/ctl l(r)(l+r) elev fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.5 Stabilizer jam

Manual pitch trim is a mechanical connection to the stabilizer
actuator. It may be possible to use manual pitch trim when the
elacs have detected a stabilizer jam, although it may be heavier
than normal. If it is usable, trim for neutral elevators.
The flight controls will revert to Alternate Law. If the stabilizer
could not be moved, gear extension should be delayed until conf 3
and VAPP are achieved so that the elevators are properly trimmed.
If the jam is caused by the mechanical connection, it is possible
that the elacs will not detect the problem. The procedure in this
case is similar, but Normal Law will remain.
[ f/ctl stabilizer jam, qrh aep.f/ctl, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.6 Aileron faults

The lateral aircraft handling is not adversely affected even if both
ailerons fail, as the systems compensate by using the spoilers. Fuel
consumption will, however, increase by approximately 6%.
[ f/ctl l(r) ail fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.7 Spoiler faults

The effect of a spoiler fault depends on whether the spoiler fails
retracted or extended.
3
This is Boeing advice – Airbus does not provide guidance for the flare or
go-around technique when elevators are frozen.
6.8. RUDDER JAM 53

If the spoiler fails in the retracted position, handling should not

be adversely affected. A conf 3 landing may reduce any buffeting
that is encountered. Speed brake should not be used if spoilers 3
and 4 are affected. The loss of ground spoilers will significantly
increase landing distances.
Airbus have identified a failure scenario that leads to high
pressure hydraulic fluid reaching the extend chamber of a spoiler
actuator via a failed o-ring. This has the effect of a spoiler failing
in the fully extended position.
In this case, the autopilot does not necessarily have sufficient
authority to control the aircraft, and it should be disconnected.
Fuel burn will increase significantly; fmgc fuel predictions do
not account for the failure and should be disregarded. Green dot
speed will minimize this increased fuel burn, but may not be vi-
able if there is excessive buffet – attempt to find a compromise
speed. Landing will be conf 3; VAPP is available from the land-
ing module of FS+ by selecting splr fault – spoiler runaway
suspected.
[ f/ctl (gnd) splr (1+2)(3+4) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.8 Rudder Jam

The main indication of jammed rudder is undue and adverse pedal
movement during rolling manoeuvres caused by the yaw damper
orders being fed back to the pedals when they are no longer sent
to the rudder.
Crosswinds from the side that the rudder is deflected should
be avoided, and a cross wind limit of 15kt applies. Control on the
ground will require differential braking until the steering handle
can be used (below 70kt), so landing distances are increased. Do
not use autobrake.
[ f/ctl rudder jam, qrh aep.f/ctl, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]
54 CHAPTER 6. FLIGHT CONTROLS

6.9 ELAC fault

In normal operations, elac1 controls the ailerons and elac2
controls the elevators and stabiliser. Failure of a single elac
will result in failover to the remaining computer. Provided no
uncommanded manoeuvres occurred, an attempt can be made to
reset the failed elac.
Failure of both elacs leads to loss of ailerons and hence Alter-
nate Law. One of the secs will take over control of the elevators and
stabiliser. Again, an attempt can be made to reset the computers.
If the fault is designated a pitch fault, only the pitch function
of the associated elac is lost.
[ f/ctl elac 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.10 SEC fault

Each sec controls either 1 or 2 spoilers per wing. sec1 and sec2
also provide back up for the elacs (see Section 6.9). Loss of a sec
leads to loss of its associated spoilers. sec1 provides spoiler position
to the facs. If speedbrakes are deployed with sec1 failed and sec3
operative, spoiler 2 will deploy without a corresponding increase
in VLS . Therefore, do not use speedbrake if sec1 is affected.
Pairs of secs also provide the signal for reverse thrust lever
angle to the reversers and spoiler deployment to the autobrake. A
dual sec failure will therefore lead to a loss of a reverser and loss
of autobraking.
If all secs are lost, in addition to the above, the controls revert
to Alternate Law. Due to the normal routing of data from the
lgcius to the elacs being via the secs, Direct Law will occur at
selection of conf 2 rather than at gear extension.4
4
The autopilot is available with loss of all secs. If the autopilot is engaged
when conf 2 is selected, Alternate Law will be retained; the reversion to Direct
Law will occur at autopilot disconnection.
6.11. SFCC FAULTS 55

An attempt should be made to reset the affected sec(s).

[ f/ctl sec 1(2)(3) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.11 SFCC faults

Each sfcc has fully independent slat and flap channels. A failure
of a channel in a single controller will lead to slow operation of the
associated surfaces, although this is barely discernible in practice.
In addition, the flap channel of sfcc1 provides input to the idle
control part of the fadecs and to the egpws.
Failure of both flap channels or failure of both slat channels is
covered in Section 6.1.
[ f/ctl flap(slat) sys 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.12 FCDC faults

The two fcdcs are redundant, so a single failure has no immediate
effect.
If both fcdcs fail, the elacs and secs can no longer supply
data to the eis. The major effect of this is that f/ctl ecam
warnings are no longer generated. The warning lights on the
overhead panel continue to give valid information and should be
monitored.
The aircraft remains in Normal Law with all protections, but
protection indications (bank and pitch limits, Vα-prot and Vα-max )
are not shown and the stall warning system becomes active.
[ f/ctl fcdc 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.13 Wingtip brake fault

The wingtip brakes activate in case of asymmetry, mechanism
overspeed, symmetrical runaway or uncommanded movements.
56 CHAPTER 6. FLIGHT CONTROLS

This protection is lost.

[ f/ctl flap(slat) tip brk fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.14 Flap attach sensor failure

The flap attach sensor detects excessive differential movement
between the inner and outer flaps which would indicate failure of
a flap attachment. This protection is lost.
[ f/ctl flap attach sensor, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.15 Flight control servo faults

All flight controls have redundant servos. In the case of an elevator
servo fault, a restriction to not use speedbrake above VMO /MMO
applies.
[ f/ctl ail(elev) servo fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.16 Speed brake disagree

This indicates that the spoiler positions do not correspond with
the speedbrake lever position. This may be as a result of automatic
retraction (α-floor activation or speed brakes deployed when conf
Full selected) or as a result of spoiler malfunction. In both cases
retract the speedbrake lever and in the case of spoiler malfunction
consider the speedbrakes unserviceable.
[ f/ctl spd brk disagree, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.17 Speed brake fault

This indicates a failure of the speedbrake lever transducers rather
than a problem with the spoilers. Ground spoiler activation may
6.18. STIFF SIDESTICK/ RUDDER PEDALS 57

be expected on selection of reverse, so, providing reversers are used,

landing distances should not be affected.
[ f/ctl spd brk (2)(3+4) fault, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.18 Stiff sidestick/ rudder pedals

This may affect both sidesticks at the same time, but not the rudder
pedals or it may affect the rudder pedals and one sidestick. Control
forces will remain moderate and the aircraft remains responsive.
Confirm autopilot disengagement and consider transferring control
if one of the sidesticks is unaffected.
[ qrh aep.f/ctl, fcom pro.aep.f/ctl ]

6.19 Unannunciated sidestick faults

It is possible for a failed sidestick transducer to cause uncommanded
control inputs. If no fault is detected, the result is that the aircraft
behaves as if that input had actually been made. The autopilot
will disconnect and any attempt to control the aircraft with the
failed sidestick will fail.
The aircraft should be recovered with the other sidestick using
the takeover button. Keeping this button pressed for 40 seconds
will lock out the failed sidestick, and the autopilot can then be re-
engaged. The autopilot should not be disconnected in the normal
manner as pressing either takeover button will re-introduce the
failed sidestick and the uncommanded input; use the FCU instead.
58 CHAPTER 6. FLIGHT CONTROLS
Chapter 7

Fire

7.1 Smoke and fumes

The presence of smoke or fumes may or may not generate ecam
warnings. If a smoke related ecam warning occurs, run the ecam
before turning to the qrh.1
The smoke/fumes/avncs smoke qrh procedure should be
applied when:

• An avionics smoke ecam requests it and the flight crew

can confirm the presence of smoke, either visually or by smell.
If unconfirmed it should be treated as spurious.

• Smoke and/or fumes are detected either via any other ecam
or directly by the crew and the avionics, air conditioning or
cabin equipment are suspected as the source.

• Orange peel or pine needle smells are detected in the flight

1
For the avionics smoke ecam, the fctm gives you the option of skipping
the ecam and referring directly to the qrh, since the qrh contains all of the
relevant actions. However, treating this ecam as “special” just complicates
matters, since you will then have to remember which one was “special”.

59
60 CHAPTER 7. FIRE

deck. These are due to rain repellent leaks; the former is

toxic, the latter non-toxic.
What constitutes “smoke” is not especially ambiguous; whether
a “smell” constitutes “fumes” is much more so. Training depart-
ment guidance is that if a “smell” is detected in the cabin and it is
having no physiological effects, no immediate action is required. If
there are physiological effects, treat the smell as fumes and action
the procedure.
The first priority is to protect yourself, so get an oxygen mask
on. The mask must be set to 100% oxygen to exclude fumes; at
minimum dispatch oxygen levels this will provide as little as 15
minutes of protection. Pushing the “Emergency pressure selector”
knob will provide a few seconds of overpressure, which can be used
to clear any smoke trapped in the mask as it was donned.
The qrh smoke/fumes/avncs smoke checklist attempts to
isolate the source of the smoke. It is possible that it may become
impossible to carry out this checklist due to smoke density. In
this case, interrupt the checklist and carry out the smoke removal
drill (see Section 7.2). It is also possible that the situation may
deteriorate to a level that an immediate forced landing becomes
the preferable option. In general, unless the source of the smoke is
obvious and extinguishable, a diversion should be initiated imme-
diately. The smoke removal drill is most effective and adaptable at
lower levels, so a descent to 10,000ft or msa is also a priority.
Likely sources of smoke are the avionics and the galleys. Smoke
from these sources can be contained with simple and reversible
actions which can be initiated immediately: put the avionics ven-
tilation into smoke removal mode by selecting both blower and
extract fans to ovrd and turn off the galleys. Also turn off the
cabin fans to avoid distributing the smoke to other parts of the
aircraft.
Where the source is immediately obvious, accessible and ex-
tinguishable, isolate the faulty equipment. Otherwise the qrh
7.1. SMOKE AND FUMES 61

provides separate drills for suspected air conditioning smoke, sus-

pected cabin equipment smoke or suspected avionics/electrical
smoke. In addition the avionics/electrical smoke drill includes
undetermined and continuing smoke sources.
Suspect air conditioning smoke if it initially comes out of the
ventilation outlets. Several ecam warnings are also likely to occur
as sensors detect the smoke in other areas. The displayed ecam
procedures must be applied. Following an engine or apu failure,
smoke may initially enter the air conditioning system but should
dissipate quickly once the failure is contained. The air conditioning
drill starts by turning the apu bleed off in case this is the source.
The packs are then turned off one at a time to determine if the
source of the smoke is a pack.
The cabin equipment smoke drill involves selecting the com-
mercial button off and searching for faulty cabin equipment.
Suspect avionics smoke if the only triggered ecam is avionics
smoke. If an item of electrical equipment fails immediately prior
to the appearance of the smoke, that equipment should be sus-
pected as the source. The avionics/electrical drill (which includes
the undetermined source drill) reduces the amount of electrically
powered equipment to a minimum by adopting a slightly modified
emergency electrical configuration.2 The resulting ecam may 3 con-
tain instructions to reset the generators; these instructions should
be disregarded, although the rest of the ecam procedure must
be actioned. The intention is to restore power 3 minutes before
landing or at 2000ft aal. Since you will not be able to restore the
two irs that were depowered, the landing will be in Direct Law

2
The emer elec gen 1 line button rather than the gen 1 button is used
to disconnect generator 1 which disconnects generator 1 from the electrical
system but allows it to directly supply one fuel pump in each wing tank.
3
Which ecam procedure is displayed is dependent on whether an avionics
smoke ecam has been triggered prior to the adoption of emergency electrical
configuration.
62 CHAPTER 7. FIRE

and hence conf 3.4 This is not mentioned in qrh, and is only
mentioned on the ecam once gear is extended.
[ avionics smoke, qrh aep.smoke, fcom pro.aep.smoke ]

7.2 Smoke/fumes removal

Smoke removal procedures initially use the pressurisation system to
draw smoke and fumes overboard by increasing the cabin altitude.
If there are no fuel vapours present, the packs are used to drive
the smoke overboard. Otherwise it is driven overboard by residual
pressure.
The final target configuration is packs off, outflow valve fully
open and ram air on. As this depressurises the aircraft, it can only
be achieved at lower levels (preferably fl100). If in emergency
configuration, turning the apu master switch on connects the
batteries for a maximum of 3 minutes and allows manual control of
the dc powered outflow valve motor. Once at a suitable level and
below 200kt, as a last resort pm’s cockpit window can be opened.
[ qrh aep.smoke, fcom pro.aep.smoke ]

7.3 Engine fire

The basic sequence is to bring the thrust lever of the affected
engine to idle, turn off its engine master, push its fire button,
wait 10 seconds then deploy its first fire bottle. If the fire is
not extinguished after 30 seconds, indicated by the fire button
remaining lit, deploy the second bottle.
This sequence is modified on the ground in that both fire
bottles are fired immediately. Cross confirmation is not required
4
qrh elec elec emer config sys remaining indicates that by selecting
the att hdg selector to capt 3 it may be possible to retain ir3 and hence
have sufficient equipment for a Cat 3 Single landing once power is restored.
This has not yet been confirmed by Airbus.
7.4. LITHIUM BATTERY FIRE 63

for master switches or fire buttons when operated on the ground.

The emergency evacuation procedure is then applied if required
(see Section 2.4).
[ eng 1(2) fire, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

7.4 Lithium Battery Fire

If there are flames, they should be attacked with a halon extin-
guisher. This will necessitate pf donning a crew oxygen mask and
pm donning the smoke hood.
If there are no flames, or once the flames have been extinguished,
the cabin crew should remove the device from the cockpit and store
it in a lined container filled with water. If the device cannot be
removed, water or non-alcoholic liquid should be poured on the
device, and it should be continuously monitored for re-ignition.
Note that these procedures assume that you are dealing with
lithium ion batteries (i.e. rechargeable batteries found in laptops,
tablets, phones etc.) where the amount of water reactive lithium
metal is actually fairly low. Once the flames have been knocked
down, the focus is on cooling to prevent thermal runaway in ad-
jacent cells. Counter-intuitively, it is vital that ice is not used
as this acts as a thermal insulator and will likely cause adjacent
cells to explode. For the same reason, smothering with anything
that might thermally insulate the battery pack (e.g. a fire bag) is
probably a bad idea.
If smoke becomes the biggest threat, see Section 7.2. If the
situation becomes unmanageable, consider an immediate landing.
[ qrh aep.smoke, fcom pro.aep.smoke, faa videos (youtube) ]
64 CHAPTER 7. FIRE
Chapter 8

Fuel

8.1 Fuel system differences

The easyJet Airbus fleet has evolved to include a number of varia-
tions of the fuel system. The two major variations, from the point
of view of non-normals, are the replacement of electrical center
tank pumps with jet transfer pumps on some airframes and the
simplified tank system of the A321 neo where the normal outer
and inner cells are replaced with a single wing tank. In addition,
some airframes are fitted with a center tank fuel inerting system,
but since there are no cockpit controls for this, it doesn’t affect
the non-normal procedures.
The philosophy of center tank jet transfer pumps is very dif-
ferent from that of the electrical pumps. With the electric pumps,
fuel is supplied directly from the center tank to the engines, and
any transfer between center tank and wing tank is a side effect of
the fuel return system. With the jet transfer pumps, fuel is only
ever transferred from the center tank to wing tanks: it is always
the wing tank pumps that supply pressurised fuel to the engines.
The jet transfer pumps themselves are also powered by the wing
tank pumps: if there is a need to shut down a jet transfer pump,

65
66 CHAPTER 8. FUEL

that is achieved by turning off the associated wing pumps. There

also appears to be some scope for gravity feeding from the center
tank when jet pumps are fitted (although 2T of center tank fuel
will still be unusable),1 something that is not possible with the
electrical pumps. This leads to some subtle airframe dependent
differences in non-normal fuel procedures.
The simplification of the wing tanks on the A321 neo has less
impact on non-normal procedures: it is mainly a case of changing
ecam titles appropriately.

8.2 Fuel leak

Whenever a non-normal fuel event occurs, the possibility that the
underlying cause of the event is a fuel leak should be considered.
Only when a fuel leak has been categorically ruled out should the
cross-feed valve be opened.
The primary method used to detect fuel leaks is a regular check
that actual fuel remaining corresponds to expected fuel remaining
and that fuel used plus fuel remaining corresponds to fuel at engine
start. The latter parameter is monitored on some aircraft and may
trigger an ecam warning. Other indications of a leak include fuel
imbalance or excessive fuel flow from an engine. It is also possible
that a fuel leak may be detected visually or by a smell of fuel in
the cabin.
If a leak can be confirmed to be coming from an engine or
pylon, either visually or as indicated by excessive fuel flow, the
affected engine must be shut down. In this case, cross-feeding is
allowable. Otherwise, the cross-feed must be kept closed.
If the leak cannot be confirmed to be originating from an engine
or pylon, an attempt should be made to identify the source of the
leak by monitoring the inner tank (or, for A321 neo, wing tank)
1
This information only appears in the fuel ctr l+r xfr fault checklist.
I have requested further information and will update once I get a response.
8.2. FUEL LEAK 67

depletion rates with the crossfeed valve closed and the center tank
pumps off.
If depletion rates are similar, a leak from the center tank or
from the apu feeding line should be suspected. If there is a smell
of fuel in the cabin, it is likely that the apu feeding line is at fault
and the apu should be turned off. Fuel from the center tank should
be used once one of the inner/wing tanks has <3000kg.2
If, after 30 minutes, one tank has been depleted by 300kg more
than the other, the location of leak is narrowed down to the engine
or the wing on the more depleted side. To confirm which it is, shut
down the engine. If the leak then stops, an engine leak is confirmed
and the cross feed can be used. If not, a leak from the wing is
most likely. In this case, an engine restart should be considered.
The handling of the center tank pumps in the presence of a fuel
leak is dependent on whether the aircraft is fitted with electrical
center tank pumps or with jet transfer pumps. When electrical
center tank pumps are on, no fuel is transferred between the center
tank and the wing tank unless the engine associated with that
wing tank is running. If an engine is running with electrical center
tank pumps on, surplus fuel is returned from the engine to the
associated wing tank, and thus a fairly modest rate of transfer
occurs. The jet transfer pumps, on the other hand, transfer fuel
directly from center tank to wing tank at a high rate regardless of
whether the associated engine is running. It is therefore important
not to run a jet transfer pump if you suspect its associated wing
tank has a leak since significant extra fuel loss would likely occur.
2
The logic here is strange. An unofficial explanation of the requirement for
<3000kg in the inner tank was given to me: some of the fuel lines from the
center tank run through the wing tanks, so fuel from a center tank leak may
end up transferring to the wing tanks and with full wing tanks will be lost
overboard. As for the apu feeding line leak, I would expect the left tank to
decrease faster than the right in this case; my guess is that the expectation is
that an apu feeding line leak will be detected as a smell in the cabin and the
leak will be too small to become apparent as an imbalance.
68 CHAPTER 8. FUEL

In an emergency, a landing may be carried out with maximum

fuel imbalance.
Do not use thrust reversers.
[ fuel f used/fob disagree, qrh aep.fuel, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.3 Fuel imbalance

All fuel balancing must be carried out in accordance with qrh fuel
fuel imbalance, paying particular attention to the possibility
of a fuel leak. Any action should be delayed until sufficient time
has passed for a fuel leak to become apparent. The fcom adds a
note not found in the qrh that “there is no requirement to correct
an imbalance until the ecam fuel advisory limit is displayed”, an
event that occurs when one inner tank holds >1500kg more than
the other. The limitations for fuel imbalance in fcom lim.fuel,
however, show that the fuel advisory does not necessarily indicate
that a limitation is likely to be breached. In particular, when
the outer tanks are balanced and the heavier inner tank contains
≤2250kg, there are no imbalance limitations. Furthermore, the
aircraft handling is not significantly impaired even at maximum
imbalance.
To balance the fuel, open the cross-feed valve and turn the
lighter side pumps and the center tank pumps off.
[ qrh aep.fuel, fcom pro.aep.fuel, fcom lim.fuel ]

8.4 Gravity fuel feeding

Turn on ignition and avoid negative G. The ceiling at which fuel
can be reliably gravity fed depends on whether the fuel has had
time to deaerate, this being a function of achieved altitude and
time at that altitude. The algorithm used to calculate gravity feed
ceiling is airframe dependent and is provided in the qrh. Once
8.5. WING TANK PUMP LOW PRESSURE 69

calculated, descend to the gravity feed ceiling; it may be as low as

fl150, so terrain must be considered.
It is also possible to gravity cross feed by side slipping the
aircraft with the cross feed valve open. The section of the qrh
describing this procedure has recently (June 2017) been cleaned up
by moving an explanatory note into a branch title, but this has had
the effect of changing the apparent intention. Previously, gravity
cross feeding was indicated when single engine and required “for
aircraft handling” (i.e. it could generally be disregarded), whereas
with the update the procedure is indicated whenever gravity feeding
on a single engine. Clarification has been requested from Airbus
via the easyJet Technical Manager, and these notes will be updated
once a response is received.
[ qrh aep.fuel, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.5 Wing tank pump low pressure

Failed pumps should be turned off.
Failure of a single pump in either tank results in reduced
redundancy only.
Failure of both pumps in a given tank means that the fuel in
that tank is only available by gravity feeding. Pressurized fuel may
be available from the center tank (use manual mode if necessary) or
by cross-feeding. A descent to gravity feed ceiling may be required
(see Section 8.4).
[ fuel l(r) tk pump 1(2)(1+2) lo pr, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.6 Center tank pump low pressure

Failed pumps should be turned off.
Failure of a single center tank pump results in a loss of redun-
dancy. The crossfeed should be opened until the center tank fuel
70 CHAPTER 8. FUEL

has been exhausted so that the remaining pump can supply both
engines.
Failure of both center tank pumps makes the fuel in the center
tank unusable.
[ fuel ctr tk pump(s)(1(2)) lo pr, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.7 Center tank transfer pump faults

Since the motive power for jet transfer pumps comes from their
associated wing tank pumps, their main failure mode is failure of
their associated center transfer valve.
If a valve fails in a not fully closed position, fuel may continue
to be transferred to the wing tank even when it is full, and will
thus overflow. Selecting the transfer pump off may be effective;
otherwise the jet transfer pump’s motive power is removed by
switching off its associated wing tank pumps, with the wing tank
pumps from the unaffected side supplying both engines until the
center tank is empty. If both sides fail in this way, all that can be
done is to turn the center tank transfer pumps off; it may not be
possible to prevent fuel overflow.
If a valve fails in a not fully open position, fuel may not be
transferred between center tank and wing tank on the affected
side. Manual control of the transfer pumps may be effective; if not,
feeding both engines with the wing tank pumps of the unaffected
side until the center tank is empty is once again the solution. If
both sides fail in this way and manual control is not effective, 2T
of center tank fuel are unusable; the rest is available by gravity.
[ fuel ctr l(r)(l+r) xfr fault, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.8 Auto feed/transfer fault

Whenever center tank fuel is being used, fuel is transferred from
the center tank to the wing tanks. In the case of jet transfer pumps
8.9. WING TANK OVERFLOW 71

this is a direct transfer; in the case of electrical pumps it is via

the fuel return system. Center tank fuel can thus only be used
when there is space in the wing tanks to receive this transferred
fuel. The pumps therefore automatically cycle on and off, starting
when there is space for 500kg in the wing tanks and stopping when
the wing tanks are full, until such time as the center tank fuel is
exhausted. In addition, electrical center tank pumps are inhibited
whenever the slats are extended.3
Malfunction of the automatic cycling of the center tank pumps
(electrical or jet transfer) is identified by the presence of more than
250kg of fuel in the center tank when there is less than 5000kg
in one of the wing tanks. Malfunction of automatic control of
electrical pumps is also indicated when they continue to run when
slats are extended or the center tank is empty.
If the automatic control has malfunctioned, the cycling of the
center tank pumps must be managed manually. For both types
of pump, they should be switched on whenever one of the wing
tanks has less than 5000kg fuel and center tank fuel remains, and
switched off when one of the wing tanks is full or the center tank
fuel is exhausted. In the case of electrical pumps, they must also
be switched off whenever the slats are extended.
[ fuel auto feed(transfer) fault, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.9 Wing tank overflow

When center tank fuel transfers to a wing tank, either directly
in the case of transfer pumps of via the fuel return system in
the case of electrical pumps, and that wing tank has no space to
accommodate it, that fuel will overflow.
3
As always with Airbus, there is an exception. If there is fuel in the center
tank, each electrical center tank pump will operate for two minutes after its
associated engine is started, regardless of slat selection, to pre-pressurise the
center tank fuel lines.
72 CHAPTER 8. FUEL

To stop the overflow, the fuel transfer must cease. In the case of
electrical center tank pumps, this is just a matter of switching the
offending center tank pump off. With jet transfer pumps, switching
the pump off may also be effective; if not, remove motive power of
the offending pump by switching off both of its associated wing
pumps – pressurised fuel will be available via crossfeed.
[ fuel l(r) wing tk overflow, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.10 Low fuel level

The ecam is triggered at approximately 750kg. This warning is
generated by sensors that are independent of the fqi system. The
warning may be spurious if the ecam is triggered just before the
wing cell transfer valves open. If center tank fuel remains, it should
be used by selecting the center tank pumps to manual mode. If
there is a fuel imbalance and a fuel leak can be ruled out, crossfeed
fuel as required.
If both tanks are low level, about 30 minutes of flying time
remain.
If any change to the current clearance will lead to landing with
less than minimum reserve fuel, declare “minimum fuel” to atc.
This is just a heads up to atc, not a declaration of an emergency
situation. If it is calculated that less than minimum fuel will remain
after landing, declare a Mayday.
[ fuel(r)(l+r) wing tk lo lvl, fcom pro.aep.fuel, eoma 8.3.8.2 ]

8.11 Outer tank transfer valve faults

Imbalances caused by the outer tank transfer valves on one side
failing to sequence correctly, either by failing to open or by opening
out of sequence, will not exceed limits, provided that the total fuel
in each wing is the same (see fcom lim.fuel).
8.12. CROSS-FEED VALVE FAULT 73

Of more concern is the sudden loss of usable fuel when transfer

valves fail to open on schedule. If only one side is affected, 700kg
of fuel will become unusable. If both sides are affected, 1400kg
of fuel will become unusable. This will happen when fuel levels
are already fairly low, as the valves are triggered when an inner
tank reaches 750kg, potentially leaving you with just 1500kg of
fuel when you were expecting to have 2900kg.
[ fuel l(r) xfr valve open, fuel l(r) xfr valve closed,
fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.12 Cross-feed valve fault

If the valve has failed open, fuel balance can be maintained through
selective use of fuel pumps. If it has failed closed, crossfeeding is
unavailable.
[ fuel feed valve fault, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.13 Low fuel temperature

ecam is triggered at approx -43°C for A319/A320 and -44°C for
A321. If on the ground, delay takeoff until temperatures are
within limits. If in flight, descending or increasing speed should be
considered.
[ fuel l(r) outer(inner) tk lo temp, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]

8.14 High fuel temperature

This ecam is known to be triggered spuriously by interference from
communication equipment. The procedure should only be applied
if the message has not disappeared within 2 minutes.
The ecam temperature triggers on the ground are 55°C for an
outer cell and 45°C for an inner cell or A321 wing tank. In the air
74 CHAPTER 8. FUEL

they are 60°C for an outer cell and 54°C for an inner cell or A321
wing tank.
The temperature of fuel returning to the tanks is primarily
a function of idg cooling requirement. The immediate action,
therefore is to turn the galley off to reduce the idg load.
On the ground, the engine on the affected side must be shut
down if an outer cell reaches 60°C, an inner cell reaches 54°C or,
for the A321, the wing tank reaches 55°C. An expeditious taxi may,
therefore, be advantageous.
In the air, if only one side is affected, fuel flow can be increased
so that less hot fuel is returned to the tanks. If the temperature gets
too high (>65°C outer or >57°C inner/wing), idg disconnection
will be required (see Section 5.3).
[ fuel l(r) outer(inner)(wing) tk hi temp, fcom pro.aep.fuel ]
Chapter 9

Landing gear

9.1 Loss of braking (memory item)

If it is simply an autobrake failure, just brake manually.
Otherwise, apply max reverse and attempt to use the alternate
brake system. To do this, release the brake pedals and turn off the
askid & nw strg switch. Note that this action also disables the
nosewheel steering, so differential braking will be required once
the rudder ceases to be effective.
If the alternate system also appears to have failed, short suc-
cessive applications of the parking brake may be used. Use of
the parking brake in this way risks tire burst and lateral control
difficulties (due brake onset asymmetry) so delay until low speed
if at all possible.
[ fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.2 Tyre damage

The diagnosis of a damaged tyre on easyJet aircraft is very difficult
since the optional Tire Pressure Indicating System is not installed.
The most likely source of pertinent information is therefore ATC

75
76 CHAPTER 9. LANDING GEAR

reporting tyre debris, possibly combined with unusual sounds on

the takeoff roll.
The qrh wheel tire damage suspected checklist indicates
that Airbus consider a damaged tyre to have much the same effect
as a released brake, at least in terms of landing performance.
The fcom additionally provides taxi speed limitations for de-
flated or damaged tyres in the lim section.
There is some question as to whether the effect of both tyres
on one side being damaged can be extrapolated to give the Asym-
metric braking case (see Section 9.5) with associated crosswind
and reverser handling considerations. Guidance is being sought on
this, and these notes will be updated once a response is received.
[ qrh wheel tire damage suspected ]

9.3 Residual braking procedure

Residual brake pressure must be checked after landing gear exten-
sion as there is no ecam warning. A brief brake pressure indication
is expected as the alternate system self tests after the gear is
downlocked, but pressure should quickly return to zero. If the
triple indicator shows residual pressure after this test, try to zero
it by pressing the brake pedals several times. If a landing must
be made with residual pressure in the alternate braking system,
use autobrake med or immediate manual braking to prioritise the
normal system. Anticipate brake asymmetry at touchdown.
[ qrh aep.brakes, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.4 Gravity extension

Gravity extension is achieved by turning the gravity gear extn
handcrank clockwise three times until a mechanical stop is reached.
Once the gear is down, the lg lever should be set to down to
9.5. ASYMMETRIC BRAKING 77

extinguish the unlk lights and remove the lg ctl message from
the wheel page.
Availability of landing gear indications depends on the nature
of the failure that resulted in the requirement for gravity extension.
ldg gear control panel indications may still be available if lgciu1
is otherwise unserviceable, providing that it is electrically supplied.
Gear doors may show amber on the wheel page after gravity
extension. There may also be spurious l/g lgciu 2 fault or
brakes sys 1(2) fault ecam warnings.
[ qrh aep.l/g, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.5 Asymmetric braking

Defined as all brakes on one gear released (indicated by amber
brake release indicators on both wheels of one main gear on the
wheel sd page). When the remaining brakes are applied, the
aircraft will tend to swing towards them. This tendency must be
countered with rudder, hence the braking must be progressive and
co-ordinated with available rudder authority. Crosswinds from the
side of the available brakes will re-inforce the swing, so anything
greater than 10kt from that side should be avoided.
If a reverser is inoperative on the same side as the inoperative
brakes, do not use the remaining reverser since it would also re-
inforce the swing.
Landing distances will increase significantly.
[ qrh aep.brakes, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.6 Landing with abnormal landing gear

A landing should be carried out on a hard surface runway using any
available landing gear. Foaming of the runway is recommended.
Manual braking should be used. Reverse thrust should not be used
78 CHAPTER 9. LANDING GEAR

as it will cause ground spoiler extension. The grvty gear extn

handcrank should be turned back to normal to allow the landing
gear down actuators to be pressurised and thus reduce the chance
of gear collapse.
If the nose gear is not available, move the cg aft by moving
passengers to the rear of the aircraft. Use elevator to keep the
nose off the runway, but lower the nose onto the runway before
elevator control is lost. Braking must be progressive and balanced
against available elevator authority. The engines should be shut
down with the eng master switches prior to nose impact.
If one main gear is not available, consider crossfeeding to remove
the fuel from the wing with the unserviceable gear. The anti-
skid system cannot operate with a single main gear extended
and must be switched off to avoid permanent brake release. The
ground spoilers should not be armed in order to maintain the
maximum possible roll authority. The engines should be shut
down at touchdown. After touchdown, use roll control to keep the
unsupported wing from touching down for as long as possible.
If both main gear are unavailable, the engines should be shut
down in the flare. Pitch attitude at touchdown must be >6°.
All doors and slides are available for evacuation in any of the
normal gear up attitudes.
[ qrh aep.l/g, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.7 Flight with landing gear extended

Flight into expected icing conditions is not approved. Gear down
ditching has not been demonstrated. fmgc predictions will be
erroneous – selected speed should be used for all phases except
approach. clb and des modes should not be used. Altitude
alerting will not be available. Any failure that normally causes a
degradation to Alternate Law will instead cause a degradation to
Direct Law.
9.8. GEAR SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT 79

The dual engine failure scenario is modified to reflect the gear

limiting speed. Assisted start should be preferred. If the apu is
not available, gear limit speeds should be disregarded to achieve a
windmill start. Flight controls will be in Direct Law; manual pitch
trim should be available, even when not annunciated on the pfd.
Performance in all phases will be affected. In particular, ap-
proach climb limiting weights for go-around1 must be reduced by
14%. Fuel burn will increase (approximate factor is 2.3). Engine
out ceiling and take-off performance are also impacted.
[ fcom pro.nor.sup.l/g ]

9.8 Gear shock absorber fault

A shock absorber did not extend when airborne or did not compress
on landing. If airborne the gear cannot be retracted. Respect the
gear extended limit speed of 280kt and see Section 9.7.
[ l/g shock absorber fault, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.9 Gear not uplocked

Landing gear retraction sequence has not completed within 30
seconds. If the gear doors have closed, the gear will rest on the
doors so avoid excessive g loads. If the doors have not closed,
recycle the gear. If this does not work, select the gear down and
see Section 9.7.
[ l/g gear not uplocked, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.10 Gear not downlocked

If the landing gear extension sequence has not completed within
30 seconds, retract the gear, wait until it has fully stowed, and
1
See fcom pro.nor.sup.l/g
80 CHAPTER 9. LANDING GEAR

then redeploy it. Recent studies show that if the gear does not
immediately deploy successfully following reselection, it may de-
ploy normally within the next two minutes as hydraulic pressure
continues to act on the gear and doors throughout this time. If
still unsuccessful after two minutes, attempt to deploy the gear by
gravity (see Section 9.4).
[ l/g gear not downlocked, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.11 Gear doors not closed

A gear door is not uplocked. Recycle the gear. If the doors cannot
be closed, speed is limited to 250kt/M0.6.
[ l/g doors not closed, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.12 Uplock fault

An uplock is engaged when the corresponding gear is downlocked.
As the uplock will not move to accept the gear, the gear must be
left down. See Section 9.7.
[ l/g gear uplock fault, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.13 LGCIU disagreement

The lgcius disagree on the position of the gear. In the absence of
other ecam warnings, the gear position can be assumed to agree
with the gear lever position.
[ l/g sys disagree, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.14 LGCIU fault

The fadecs use lgciu input to determine idle mode. If a lgciu
is determined to be faulty, the system failsafes to approach idle
9.15. GEAR NOT DOWN 81

mode, and modulated idle and reverse idle (and hence reversers)
will not be available.
The gpws uses lgciu1 to determine landing gear position. If
this lgciu is faulty, the gpws will need to be inhibited to prevent
spurious warnings.
If both lgcius are lost, normal landing gear control and indi-
cating systems are lost. The gear must be gravity extended (see
Section 9.4). Additionally, the autopilots and autothrust are lost
(Normal Law remains available) and wing anti-ice is limited to 30s
of heating (i.e. the ground test), the only indication of which is a
no anti-ice message on the bleed sd page.
[ l/g lgciu 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.15 Gear not down

Indicates that the landing gear is not downlocked when radio
altitude is below 750ft rad alt and n1 and flap setting indicate
that the aircraft is on approach. If rad alt data is not available, it
indicates gear is not down when conf 3 or conf Full is selected.
In some cases the warning may be cancelled with the emergency
cancel pushbutton.
[ l/g gear not down, fcom pro.aep.l/g ]

9.16 Nosewheel steering fault

Nosewheel steering is unavailable so differential braking must be
used to steer the aircraft. The nosewheel may not be aligned if
the l/g shock absorber fault ecam is also displayed, in which
case delay nosewheel touch down as long as possible. Cat 3 dual
will not be available.
[ wheel n/w strg fault, fcom pro.aep.wheel ]
82 CHAPTER 9. LANDING GEAR

9.17 Antiskid nosewheel steering off

The a/skid & nw strg switch is off. The abcu controls braking
through the alternate braking system. Antiskid is not available
so landing distance will increase significantly. Autobrake and
nosewheel steering will also not be available.
[ brakes anti skid/nws off, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.18 Antiskid nosewheel steering fault

Either:

• both BSCU channels have failed or

• the normal brake system has been lost and the yellow hy-
draulic pressure is low.

Effects are as for Section 9.17, although, if yellow hydraulic

pressure is low, braking will be accumulator only.
[ brakes a/skid nws fault, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.19 Brake system fault

A fault has been detected in one channel of the bscu. Loss of
redundancy only.
[ brakes sys 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.20 Brakes hot

At least one brake temperature is >300°C. Check Section 9.27 if
the temperature is excessive or the brake temperatures are not
reasonably even.
9.21. AUTO BRAKE FAULT 83

Temperature must be <300°C for takeoff to prevent ignition

of any hydraulic fluid that leaks onto the brake. Use brake fans
as necessary to bring the temperature down in time for the next
takeoff. The brake fans also cool the temperature sensor, so assume
the real brake temperature is twice that indicated if they have
recently been used.
If the warning appears in flight, providing that performance
permits, the landing gear should be extended to allow the brakes
to cool.
[ brakes hot, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.21 Auto brake fault

A failure was detected when the autobrake was armed. Brake
manually.
[ brakes auto brk fault, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.22 Hydraulic selector valve fault

This ecam message may indicate two completely different condi-
tions:

• The normal brake selector valve has failed in the open position.
The normal servo valves (downstream of the selector valve)
will have continuous full pressure at their inlets, but, as
long as anti-skid is operative, will control brake pressure and
anti-skid normally.

• The steering selector valve has failed in the open position.

This means that the steering will remain pressurised as long
as there is pressure in the yellow hydraulic system. This has
obvious implications if towing is attempted, but will also
mean that the nosewheel will go to maximum deflection if
84 CHAPTER 9. LANDING GEAR

the a/skid & n/w strg switch is selected off or the bscu
is reset.

[ wheel hyd sel fault, fcom pro.abn.32 ]

9.23 Brake system failures

Loss of the alternate braking system results in loss of redundancy
only.
If the normal brake system is lost, alternate braking and anti-
skid are available. Landing distance increases slightly.
Loss of both normal and alternate brake systems leaves the
parking brake as the only remaining braking option. See Section
9.1 for method.
[ brakes norm brk fault, brakes altn brk fault,
fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.24 Brake accumulator low pressure

Braking is not available unless either the green or yellow hydraulic
systems are pressurised.
If the engines are shut down, attempt to recharge the accumu-
lator using the yellow system electrical pump.
When parking the aircraft, use chocks.
[ brakes brk y accu lo pr, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.25 Released brakes, normal system

If normal braking is active and at least one engine is running, the
bscu self tests when it receives a “gear downlocked” signal from
either of the lgcius. The brakes released ecam is provided if
at least one set of brakes on a main wheel is incorrectly released
9.26. RELEASED BRAKES, ALTERNATE SYSTEM 85

during this test. The failed brake is shown by an amber release

symbol on the wheel page. Loss of a brake leads to increased
landing distances. If both brakes on the same gear are released,
see Section 9.5.
[ brakes released, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.26 Released brakes, alternate system

The abcu self tests the brakes in a similar manner to the bscu
(see Section 9.25). If this test is failed, normal braking can be
expected as long as the normal braking system is active. If the
alternate braking system is active, braking will be asymmetric
(see Section 9.5) because released brakes occur in pairs with the
alternate braking system.
[ brakes altn l(r) released, fcom pro.aep.brakes ]

9.27 Brake temperature limitations

Maintenance is required if:

• One brake temp is >600°C and the other brake on the same
gear is 150°C less.

• One brake temp is <60°C and the other brake on the same
gear is 150°C more.

• The average temp of one gear is 200°C more than the average
temp of the other.

• Any brake temp exceeds 900°C.

• A fuse plug has melted.

[ eomb 2.3.21 ]
86 CHAPTER 9. LANDING GEAR

9.28 Park brake on

The parking brake is set when the thrust levers are set to flx or
toga. Check the position of the brake handle position and for
pressure indications on the brake triple gauge.
[ config park brk on, fcom pro.aep.config ]
Chapter 10

Power plant

10.1 All engine failure

The entire easyJet fleet has, thankfully, now been upgraded such
that the various eng dual failure checklists are no longer appli-
cable. Where plenty of time is available, the response to failure of
both engines is now supported by the eng all engines failure
ecam and the eng all eng fail qrh procedure. For Hudson-like
events, the qrh misc emer landing all eng failure checklist
(also available on the back of the normal checklist) should be used.
Note that the qrh misc ditching and qrh misc forced land-
ing checklists are for engines operative landings and are therefore
not applicable; engine inoperative ditching and forced landing are
included in the eng all eng fail qrh procedure.
The eng all engines failure ecam actions ensure that emer-
gency electrical power is online and that the aircraft is optimally
set up for an immediate windmill relight (300kt/M0.77 for ceo,
270kt/M0.77 for neo, thrust levers idle). apu start is suggested if
below fl250, although this may be spurious if fuel is exhausted or

87
88 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

the apu is otherwise unavailable. For the ceos, a fac1 reset is also
actioned in order to recover pfd characteristic speeds and rudder
trim; this does not appear to be necessary for the neos. The ecam
then suggests a diversion and hands off to the qrh procedure. The
qrh includes the ecam actions, so it can be used directly if the
ecam is unavailable.
Due to lack of engine bleeds, a slow depressurisation will likely
be occuring. Since it would be easy to miss excess cabin altitude
warnings, donning an oxygen mask may be a sensible precaution.
ram air can be used once below fl100 with differential pressure
<1psi.
For the diversion, as a rough rule of thumb, from normal cruise
levels any airfield within 80nm should be reachable with sufficient
height remaining to position for a glide approach. You really
want at least a 3000m runway, although if you can get the apu
supporting normal electrics and the yellow electrical hydraulic
pump it may be possible to make do with less. Take account of
descent winds, airport elevation and available runway directions
when selecting an airport.
There are two main bifurcations in the procedures, dependent
on whether there is any chance of restarting an engine in the first
case, and whether an emergency landing will be made on water or
land in the second.
Where relight is feasible, parallel windmill start attempts may
be attempted once below fl2701 (or below fl250 on some air-
frames), and sequential starter assisted start attempts may be
made once below fl200, provided that the apu bleed is available.
The windmill start attempts consist of selecting ign on the
eng mode sel, turning both engine masters off for 30 seconds to
ventilate the combustion chambers, then turning them both back
1
Note that this is different from the old eng dual failure checklist, where
windmill start attempts were tried immediately, even if outside the relight
envelope.
10.1. ALL ENGINE FAILURE 89

on, repeating the cycle if unsuccessful.

Starter assisted start is much like the normal engine start
procedure: turn both masters off for 30 seconds, ensure eng mode
sel ign, pneumatic pressure is available to the starter and wing
anti-ice is off, then turn one of the masters on. If the engine fails
to start, turn that master off, and try the other one, ensuring 30
seconds of combustion chamber ventilation between each attempt.
When making starter assisted start attempts, speed should be
reduced to green dot to achieve maximum glide range; if windmill
starts are required below fl200 (e.g. due lack of apu), suitable
speeds can be found in the eng relight qrh checklist.
Where relight is not a possibility, speed should be reduced
to green dot to maximise glide range and available time. At
windmill relight speeds, available range is 2nm per 1000ft, wheras
at green dot it is 2½nm per 1000ft. If available, the apu should
still be started at fl250 in order to provide normal electrics and
pressurisation.
The Green and Yellow hydraulic failure aspect of the dual engine
failure is interesting in that the checklists make no attempt to bring
the Yellow Electric pump online once electrical power is available
from the apu. The rationale for this has three parts: firstly, there
are branches of the failure where the yellow electric pump will not
be available, such as if the apu was inop, and accounting for these
cases in the checklists would over-complicate them; secondly, the
engine driven pumps continue to provide hydraulic pressure for
some time due to windmilling; and lastly, the ecam will eventually
recognise the dual hydraulic failure and request the pump be turned
on, and the checklist does encourage you to clear the ecam alerts
and status if sufficient time is available.
The problem with this is that you will likely have given up on
the ecam by the time it makes this suggestion. In general, then, if
you recognise that the yellow electric pump is available, turn the
ptu off (see Section 13.1) and turn the yellow pump on. You will,
90 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

of course, still need to gravity extend the gear, as the green system
will not be recovered, but with blue from the rat and yellow from
the electric pump, your stopping ability is greatly enhanced.
The recommended configurations are conf 2, gear up for ditch-
ing and conf 2, gear down for forced landing. VAPP is available
in each of the checklists; it will always be at least 150kt to give a
10kt margin against rat stall. The gear is available with gravity
extension. If the yellow hydraulics have not been reinstated with
the electric pump the stabilizer will be frozen once engine driven
hydraulics are lost and elevator trimming will cease with transition
to Direct Law at gear extension. Therefore, it may be advanta-
geous to delay gear extension until conf 2 and VAPP are reached
in this case. A pitch attitude of 11° with minimal vertical speed is
suggested for ditching.
If an airfield can be reached, a glide approach and landing
will need to be flown. Successful execution requires a good un-
derstanding of A320 family glide performance and navigational
techniques for track mileage adjustment. I have provided a web
browser based tool at https://aeftt.hursts.org.uk to help de-
velop these skills. A discussion of methods can be found via the
“Background Information” button in the main menu of this tool.
[ eng dual failure, qrh aep.eng, fcom pro.aep.eng,
fctm pro.aep.eng ]

10.2 Single Engine failure

Defined as a rapid decrease in egt, n2 and ff, followed by a
decrease in n1. The crew must determine whether the engine has
been damaged or whether a simple flame-out has occurred. Indica-
tions of damage are loud noises, significantly increased vibration
or buffeting, repeated or uncontrollable engine stalls or abnormal
post-failure indications (e.g. hydraulic fluid loss, zero n1 or n2
etc.).
10.3. SINGLE ENGINE OPERATION 91

Firstly, the ignitors are turned on to protect the remaining

engine and to confirm an immediate relight attempt. The thrust
lever of the failed engine is then moved to idle (pf moves the
lever after confirmation from pnf). If the fadec hasn’t relit the
failed engine within 30 seconds of the failure, it is shut down with
the master switch. If damage is believed to have occurred, the
associated fire button is pushed and, after 10 seconds, agent 1
discharged.
If it is believed that the engine is undamaged, a relight can
be considered. The relight procedure is fairly long and highly
unlikely to be successful; do not delay diversion and landing by
attempting a relight. Also note that a relight attempt will erase
fadec troubleshooting data.
If there is vibration and/or buffeting, attempt to find an air-
speed and altitude combination that minimizes the symptoms.
Refer to Section 10.3 if unable to relight the engine.
[ eng 1(2) fail, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.3 Single engine operation

The most pressing issue is that a single engine bleed cannot support
wing anti-ice and two packs. With the crossbleed valve selector
in the normal auto position, the crossbleed valve is effectively
synchronised to the apu bleed valve2 and thus will most probably be
closed; wing anti-ice, if it is in use, will be operating asymmetrically.
If a fire button has been pushed, its associated side of the pneumatic
system will be locked out and thus the only option is to turn the
wing anti-ice off. pro.nor.sup.aw minimum speed with ice
accretion provides mitigation of icing in the event of inoperative
wing anti-ice. If both sides of the cross bleed system are available,
the cross bleed valve can be manually opened at a cost of 1200ft
2
The exception is that the crossbleed won’t open if a bleed air duct leak is
detected except during engine start.
92 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

to the single engine gross ceiling. With the cross bleed valve open,
wing anti-ice is available, but one of the packs must be turned off3
whenever it is used.
The remaining engine must be safeguarded. To this end, con-
tinuous ignition should be selected.
A fuel imbalance may develop. Fuel imbalance limitations
are detailed in fcom lim.fuel. If the outer tanks are balanced,
once the fuller inner tank contains less than 2250kg, fuel balance
will never be limiting. Since this first occurs with approximately
5900kg of fuel remaining, fuel balancing due to balance limitations
will generally not be required. Fuel may, however, still need to be
crossfed to prevent fuel starvation of the remaining engine. Balance
this concern against feeding your live engine the same fuel that
was feeding your failed engine when it stopped working.
tcas should be selected to ta to avoid unflyable climb ras.
If a reverser is unlocked with associated buffet, speed should
be limited to 240kt. See Section 10.13 for more details of this
scenario.
If the remaining engine is operated at maximum power with the
aircraft at low speed (e.g. responding to windshear) it is possible
that directional control may be lost before the flight computer
protections apply. Be cautious about reducing speed below VLS
on one engine.
The main systems lost are the generator, bleed and hydraulic
pump associated with the engine. Other systems may be lost
depending on the reason for the shutdown. The apu can be
used to replace the lost generator and, providing the left side of
the pneumatic system is available and isolated (i.e. cross bleed
valve closed), provide pressurisation through pack 1, thus giving
additional margin for the go-around. The bmcs automatically
close the engine bleeds when the apu bleed valve is opened, so it is
3
It will need to be pack 1 in Emergency Electrical config; otherwise it will
generally be the pack on the dead engine side.
10.4. ENGINE RELIGHT IN FLIGHT 93

not necessary to manually turn them off to achieve this additional

go-around margin. Note, however, that the apu cannot support
wing anti-ice.
Approach and landing will be fairly normal. The main provisos
are:

• Full flap should only be selected once descending on the

glidepath; if a level off is required, the landing should be
conf 3 [qrh eng oei – straight in approach]
• Only Cat 3 Single is available due to the loss of the ability
to split the electrical system.[qrh ops]
• On A319s, the autopilot cannot fly final app, nav/vs or
nav/fpa approaches. All modes are available for manual
flight with flight directors. [fcom lim.afs.gen]
• If flying manually, consider using manual thrust to better
anticipate the rudder inputs required by thrust changes. Also
consider setting rudder trim to zero at a late stage of the
approach.[fctm pro.aep.eng]

[ eng 1(2) shut down, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.4 Engine relight in flight

A graphic showing the envelope for in-flight relight is provided in
section abn.eng of the eqrh.
Automatic start abort is not available — crew action is required
in the highly likely event of an abnormal start. Indications of
abnormal start include exceedance of n2 or egt limits and no engine
light up within 30 seconds of fuel flow increasing. Additionally,
for the neo, n2 should be greater than 50% within 70 seconds of
starting the attempt. It may be necessary to check the engine’s
response to thrust lever movement to confirm a successful relight.
94 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

neo engines may exhibit a rapid egt increase to below egt

limit; this is normal and start should not be aborted unless the
egt limit is actually exceeded.
A spurious eng 1(2) start fault - eng stall may occur
during in-flight start of some ceo engines — a note towards the
bottom of the airframe specific eqrh checklist discriminates. Check
all engine parameters are normal before disregarding.
To abort a start, simply turn off the engine’s master switch; at
least 30 seconds should elapse before another attempt is made in
order to ventilate the combustion chambers.
To prepare for the start attempt, ensure the affected engine
master switch is turned off and the affected thrust lever is at idle.
Select ignition on the engine mode selector and open the cross
bleed. If it is anticipated starter assist may be required, ensure
wing anti ice is selected off.
To begin the start sequence, select the affected master switch
on. The fadec will determine whether starter assist is required
and will open the start valve as needed.
[ qrh abn.eng, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.5 Engine stall

A stall is indicated by abnormal engine noise, flame from the
engine exhaust (and possibly inlet in extreme cases), fluctuating
performance parameters, sluggish thrust lever response, high egt
and/ or rapid egt rise when the thrust lever is advanced.
A variety of fadecs are fitted within the easyJet fleet. The
earlier fadecs do not trigger an ecam warning if n2 is above idle,
whereas the later fadecs are more capable. The fctm warns that
all fadecs may fail to detect engine stalls in some cases. Crew
must therefore be ready to diagnose engine stalls on the basis of the
above symptoms and apply the qrh procedures where necessary.
If an engine stall occurs on the ground, shut the engine down.
10.6. ENGINE TAILPIPE FIRE 95

When an engine stall occurs in flight, the response is airframe

specific. For the earlier fadecs, if an ecam is triggered, the engine
is simply shut down. In all other cases (no ecam triggered on
earlier fadecs; later fadecs) an attempt is made to contain the
stall without shutting down the engine. The affected thrust lever
is retarded to idle and the engine parameters checked. If the
engine parameters remain abnormal, the engine is shut down. If,
however, the parameters return to normal, stall margin is increased
by turning on anti-icing4 and the thrust levers are slowly advanced.
If the stall recurs, the engine can be operated at low thrust settings,
otherwise it can be operated normally.
[ eng 1(2) stall, qrh aep.eng, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.6 Engine tailpipe fire

An internal engine fire may be encountered during engine start
or shutdown. It will either be seen by ground crew or may be
indicated by egt failing to decrease after the master switch is
selected off.
Start by getting the engine to a known state by ensuring the
man start button is selected off and the affected engine master is
selected off.
The concept is to blow the fire out by dry cranking the engine.
It is therefore essential that the fire button is not pressed, as
this will remove external power from the fadec and prevent dry
cranking. Firstly, a source of bleed air must be available to power
the starter. Possibilities, in order of preference, are the apu, the
4
The new qrh procedure for the neo requires wing anti-ice be turned on
whereas that for the ceo requires engine anti-ice be turned on, but both then
go on to mention that stall margin is increased by turning on both, albeit
at a cost of increased egt. The old qrh procedure did turn on all relevant
anti-icing. I have requested more information and will update this section
when I get a response.
96 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

opposite engine or a ground air cart. If using the opposite engine,

the source engine bleed must be on, the target engine bleed should
be off, the cross bleed should be opened and thrust increased to
provide 30 psi of pressure. If using ground air, both engine bleeds
should be off and the cross bleed opened.
Once high pressure air is available, select the engine mode
selector to crank and select the man start button to on.
When the fire is extinguished, select the man start button off
and the engine mode selector to normal.
As a last resort, external fire suppression agents may be used.
They are, however, highly corrosive and the engine will be badly
damaged.
[ qrh aep.eng, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.7 High engine vibration

The ecam vib advisory (n1≥6 units, n2≥4.3 units) is simply an
indication that engine parameters should be monitored more closely.
High vib indications alone do not require the engine to be shut
down.
High engine vibration combined with burning smells may be
due to contact of compressor blade tips with associated abradable
seals.
If in icing conditions, high engine vibration may be due to fan
blade or spinner icing. The qrh provides a drill to shed this ice,
after which normal operations can be resumed.
If icing is not suspected and if flight conditions permit, reduce
thrust so that vibrations are below the advisory level. Shut down
the engine after landing for taxiing if vibrations above the advisory
level have been experienced.
[ qrh aep.eng, fcom pro.aep.eng ]
10.8. LOW OIL PRESSURE 97

10.8 Low oil pressure

The sensors for the gauge on the ecam eng page and the ecam
warning are different. If there is a discrepancy between the two,
a faulty transducer is the most likely cause and the engine can
continue to be operated normally. If both sources agree, the engine
should be shut down by retarding its thrust lever and selecting its
master switch off and the after shutdown procedure applied (see
Section 10.3).
[ eng 1(2) oil lo pr, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.9 High oil temperature

Both engine oil and IDG oil are cooled by heat exchange with fuel.
The neo additionally has an oil to air heat exchanger. The FADEC
primarily controls engine oil temperature and fuel temperature by
modulating the amount of fuel bypassed back to the tanks.
An ecam advisory occurs when oil temperature reaches 140°C.
The advisory suggests that if oil temperature increase followed a
thrust reduction, increasing thrust may contain the problem. It
also suggests that it might be an IDG cooling issue; again, if at low
speed increasing the engine speed may help, or, if at high speed,
you can try reducing the generator load or disconnecting the IDG.
The eng 1(2) oil hi temp ecam is triggered if oil temperature
exceeds 155°C or exceeds 140°C for 15 minutes. On the ceo the
engine is simply shut down. On the neo an attempt is made
to reduce the temperature by reducing thrust, and only if this is
unsuccessful is the engine shut down. At time of writing (November
2023) the ecam actually presented by the fwc on the neo is
incorrect — the correct procedure is currently being promulgated
as an ofp attachment.
[ eng 1(2) oil hi temp, fcom pro.aep.eng ]
98 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

10.10 Oil filter clog

If a warning occurs during a cold engine start with oil temperature
<40°C, the warning may be considered spurious. The oil filter
features a bypass mechanism, so there is no immediate problem.
[ eng 1(2) oil filter clog, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.11 Fuel filter clog

No immediate crew action required. I assume there is some sort of
bypass mechanism, but this isn’t apparent from the fcom.
[ eng 1(2) fuel filter clog, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.12 Uncommanded reverser actuator pres-

surisation
There are two valves that prevent pressure reaching the thrust
reverser actuators at an inopportune moment, plus a third that
commands direction of movement. The most upstream of these,
controlled by the secs, prevents any hydraulic pressure reaching
the Hydraulic Control Unit (hcu) when the thrust levers are not
in the reverse quadrant. If this protection is lost, the correct
operation of the hcu should keep the doors properly stowed. An
hcu malfunction, however, could result in an in-flight reverser
deployment. If flight conditions permit, idle thrust should be
selected on the affected engine.
It is unclear from the fcom whether the ecam indicates pres-
sure has reached the directional solenoid valve and hence that the
reverser door jacks are pressurised, albeit in the closed direction,
although the existence of the eng rev isol fault ecam indicates
that this is probably the case.
[ eng 1(2) rev pressurized, fcom pro.aep.eng ]
10.13. REVERSER UNLOCKED IN FLIGHT 99

10.13 Reverser unlocked in flight

If one or more reverser doors are detected as not stowed in flight,
the associated fadec will automatically command idle on the
affected engine. This should be backed up by setting the thrust
lever to idle.
A warning without associated buffet is likely to be spurious.
In this case limit speed to 300kt/M.78, keep the engine running
at idle and expect to make a normal single engine approach and
landing.
If there is buffet, shut the engine down and limit speed to 240kt.
Full rudder trim may be required. The ecam will provide one
of two approach procedures depending on how many doors are
detected as not stowed:

• If all 4 doors are not stowed on ceo or the reverser is deployed

on neo, it will be a conf 1 landing, with approach speed
VREF + 55kt slowing to VREF + 40kt below 800ft. Gear
should only be deployed once landing is assured.

• Otherwise, it will be a flap 3 landing at VREF + 10kt for

ceo or VREF + 15kt for neo.

[ eng 1(2) reverse unlocked, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.14 EIU fault

The Engine Interface Unit (eiu) receives data from the engine start
system, the auto-thrust system, the lgcius, the air conditioning
controller and the engine anti ice system and feeds it to its related
fadec. Thus loss of the eiu leads to loss of auto-thrust, reverser,
idle control (defaults to approach idle) and start for the affected
engine. If engine anti ice is used, the ignitors must be manually
selected.
100 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

If an engine fails whilst its associated eiu is inoperative, the

usual ecam messages will not be generated. The failure can still
be diagnosed from the system pages and an appropriate drill can
be actioned from the fcom.
[ eng 1(2) eiu fault, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.15 N1/N2/EGT overlimit

If the overlimit is moderate, the associated thrust lever can be
retarded until the overlimit ceases, and the flight may be continued
normally.
If the overlimit is excessive, the engine should generally be shut
down. If there are over-riding factors precluding a shut down, the
engine may be run at minimum required thrust.
[ eng 1(2) n1/n2/egt overlimit, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.16 N1/N2/EGT/FF discrepancy

The system can detect a discrepancy between actual and displayed
values of n1, n2, egt and fuel flow. This is indicated by an amber
check beneath the affected parameter. Attempt to recover normal
indications by switching from dmc1 to dmc3. If this fails, values
can be inferred from the opposite engine.
[ eng 1(2) n1(n2)(egt)(ff) discrepancy, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.17 Start valve fault

If a start valve fails open, remove bleed sources supplying the faulty
valve. If on the ground, turn off the man start button if used,
and shut the engine down with its master switch.
If the start valve fails closed, it may be that insufficient pressure
is reaching it. Try opening the cross bleed and turning on the apu
10.18. START FAULTS 101

bleed.
On the ground, a start may still be possible with manual
operation of the start valve.
[ eng 1(2) start valve fault, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.18 Start faults

Start faults include ignition faults (no light off within 18 seconds of
ignition start), engine stalls, EGT overlimit (>725°C) and starter
time exceedance (2 mins max).
On the ground, nearly all starts are auto starts. In this case
the fadec will automatically abort as needed. It will then auto-
matically carry out the required dry crank phase and make further
attempts. Once the fadec gives up, an ecam message will instruct
the crew to turn off the relevant engine master. If the fault was a
stall due to low pressure, consider another automatic start using
cross bleed air.
If a manual start is attempted, the crew must monitor the
relevant parameters (the fadecs will provide some passive mon-
itoring) and, if necessary, abort the start by turning the engine
master and man start button off. The crew must then carry
out a 30 second dry crank phase manually. Note that this is
not mentioned in the relevant supplementary procedure, nor are
the relevant lines displayed on the ecam. It is probably worth
having fcom pro.aep.eng handy when carrying out manual
starts.
Following an aborted start in flight, the engine master should
be turned off for 30 seconds to drain the engine. A further start
attempt can then be made.
If the electrical power supply is interrupted during a start
(indicated by loss of ecam dus) turn the master switch off, then
perform a 30 second dry crank.
If a fuel leak from the engine drain mast is reported, run the
102 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT

engine at idle for 5 minutes. If the leak disappears within this time
the aircraft may dispatch without maintenance action.
[ eng 1(2) start fault, fcom pro.aep.eng, eomb 2.3.8.1 ]

10.19 Ignition faults

Each engine has two ignitors. If both fail on a single engine, avoid
heavy rain, turbulence and, as far as possible, icing conditions.
[ eng 1(2) ign fault, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.20 Thrust lever angle sensor faults

Each thrust lever has two thrust lever angle (tla) sensors.
Failure of one sensor only leads to a loss of redundancy; the
proviso is that it must have failed in a way that the system can
positively detect.
More difficult is when the sensors are in disagreement. In this
case, the fadec makes the assumption that one of the sensors
is accurate and provides a default thrust setting based on this
assumption:

• On the ground, if neither sensor is in a take-off position, idle

power is commanded. If one sensor is in take-off position and
the other is above idle, take-off thrust is commanded. This
leaves the completely conflicted case of one sensor at take-off
and the other at idle or below; the fadec selects idle power
as the best compromise.

• In flight, once above thrust reduction altitude the fadec

will assume that the largest tla, limited to clb, is correct.
The autothrust can then manage the thrust between idle and
this position. For approach (slats extended), as long as both
tlas indicate less than mct, thrust is commanded to idle.
10.21. FADEC FAULTS 103

If both tla sensors fail, the fadec again goes for sensible
defaults. On the ground, idle thrust is set. In flight, if the thrust
was to or flex at the time of failure, this setting will be maintained
until slat retraction, whereupon clb will be selected. If the thrust
was between idle and mct, clb will be selected immediately. As
soon as slats are deployed, idle is commanded; this remains the
case even for go-around. Autothrust will manage thrust between
idle and clb whenever clb is assumed.
[ eng 1(2) thr lever disagree, eng 1(2) thr lever fault,
eng 1(2) one tla fault, fcom pro.aep.eng ]

10.21 FADEC faults

The fadecs have two redundant channels; loss of a single channel
does not generally require crew action. Single channel fadec faults
during start may be considered spurious on successful application
of the reset procedure detailed in fcom pro.aep.eng.
If both channels of a fadec are lost, the thrust lever should be
set to idle. Engine indications will be lost. If all other parameters
are normal (check all ecam system pages), the engine can be left
running. Otherwise, shut it down.
If a fadec overheats, reducing engine power may reduce tem-
perature in the ecu area sufficiently to prevent shutdown. If on the
ground the engine must be shut down and the fadec depowered.
[ eng 1(2) fadec a(b) fault, eng 1(2) fadec fault,
eng 1(2) fadec hi temp, fcom pro.aep.eng ]
104 CHAPTER 10. POWER PLANT
Chapter 11

Navigation

11.1 EGPWS alerts (memory item)

egpws alerts can be categorised into warnings and cautions. A
warning is any alert with the instruction “Pull up” or “Avoid”
attached. All other alerts are cautions. A warning may be down-
graded to a caution if flying in daylight vmc and positive visual
verification is made that no hazard exists, or if an applicable nui-
sance warning notice is promulgated in Company documentation
[eoma 8.3.6].
The response to a “Pull up” type warning is to call “Pull up,
toga”, disconnect the autopilot and simultaneously roll the wings
level, apply full backstick and set toga power. The speedbrake
should then be checked retracted. Once the flight path is safe and
the warning stops, accelerate and clean up as required. Note that
it is highly likely that the autothrust alpha floor protection will
have engaged and thus the autothrust will need to be disengaged
to cancel toga lk mode.
An “Avoid” warning indicates that a vertical manoeuvre alone
is insufficient to prevent collision, and lateral avoiding action must
also be taken. The response is essentially the same except that

105
106 CHAPTER 11. NAVIGATION

instead of rolling wings level, a turn must be initiated. The direc-

tion of the turn is at the discretion of the pilot, with the terrain or
obstacle that is the source of the warning being displayed in red
and black crosshatch on the nd.
The response to a caution is to correct the flight path or aircraft
configuration as necessary. A configuration warning will almost
always require a go around.
[ fcom pro.aep.surv ]

11.2 TCAS warnings (memory item)

tcas warnings may be either traffic advisories (“Traffic, Traffic”)
or resolution advisories (anything else).
From 28th January 2017, new easyJet deliveries are fitted with
the new ap/fd tcas mode. When this mode is fitted, the autopilot
is capable of autonomously flying the tcas escape manoeuvre. pf
simply calls “tcas blue” then calls the fmas and monitors the
autopilot as it flies the manoeuvre. If flying manually with flight
directors and autothrust on, the flight directors will give standard
guidance to fly the manoeuvre. If flying fully manually, the flight
directors will pop up and the autothrust will engage, although it
may be necessary to set the thrust levers to the climb gate.
If ap/fd tcas mode is not installed or not available, the first
response to either advisory is to call “tcas, I have control” to
unequivocally establish who will be carrying out any manoeuvres.
If it is a resolution advisory, the autopilot should be disconnected
and both flight directors turned off.1 The autothrust remains
engaged and reverts to speed mode. A vertical manoeuvre should
then be flown to keep the v/s needle out of the red areas shown
on the v/s scale. atc should then be notified (e.g “Radar, Easy
123 – tcas ra”). When clear of conflict, return to assigned level
1
If one fd is left engaged, the autothrust will not revert to speed mode,
possibly resulting in speed decay and engagement of normal law protections.
11.3. RNAV DOWNGRADES 107

and re-engage the automatics (atc phraseology: “Radar, Easy 123

– clear of conflict, returning to flXXX”).
If a climb resolution advisory occurs on final approach, a go
around must be flown.
[ fcom pro.aep.surv, cap413 1.7 ]

11.3 RNAV downgrades

rnav operations fall into three main categories:

• rnav approach (usually rnp 0.3)

• rnp-1 (aka prnav)

• rnp-5 (aka brnav)

The equipment that must be serviceable is listed in eomb 2.3.18

for rnav approach and fcom pro.spo.51 for rnp sid/star.
The following messages indicate loss of rnav capability:

• nav accur downgrad (mcdu and nd) on both sides2

• fms1/fms2 pos diff (mcdu)

• nav fm/gps pos disagree (ecam)

• check irs 1(2)(3)/fm position (mcdu)3

2
If nav accur downgrad occurs on one side only, the procedure may be
continued using the unaffected fmgc.
3
This is missing from the rnp-1 list in eomb but is listed in the fcom. It
is not listed as a go around criteria for rnav approach, but continuing would
seem somewhat brave. . .
108 CHAPTER 11. NAVIGATION

For rnav approaches, a go-around is mandated for any of these

messages or if gps primary lost is annunciated on both nds4 .
In an rnp-1 (prnav) environment, an rnav downgrade may
leave the aircraft unsure of position and below msa. The initial
response is to notify atc with the phrase “Unable rnav due equip-
ment” and request reclearance. An immediate climb above msa
should be considered if a suitable alternative navigation method
(e.g. radar vectors) is not available.
Some rnp-1 procedures specify additional downgrade criteria
such as a requirement for dual rnav systems or gps. If gps is
not specifically mandated as an additional restriction, an rnp-1
procedure may still be flown without gps primary: set rnp to
1, check nav accuracy is high and carry out a raw data check
prior to commencement (see Section 11.10).
Downgrades in an rnp-5 (brnav) environment are less critical
as the aircraft will be above msa. The irss provides rnp-5 required
accuracy for two hours from last full alignment regardless of mcdu
enp, and it is acceptable to carry out a raw data check (see eomb
2.3.15) to confirm that rnp-5 capability is maintained. If loss
of rnp-5 capability is confirmed, inform atc and continue with
conventional navigation.
[ fcom pro.spo.51, eom a.8.3.3.5, eomb 2.3.18.3 ]

11.4 RA faults
A single ra fault results in degradation of approach capability to
Cat 2.
Loss of both ras will lead to Direct Law at landing gear exten-
sion and a loss of ils appr mode capability. Therefore, landing
4
If gps primary lost is annunciated on only one nd, the approach may
be continued using the unaffected fmgc. There is also conflict between eoma
and eomb as to whether gps primary is required at all for rnav(vor/dme)
or rnav(dme/dme) etc. – I’ve gone with the most restrictive here.
11.5. ADR FAULTS 109

will be conf 3 with associated corrections and the approach should

be flown in loc and fpa. The fctm recommends that the final
stages of the approach are flown raw data as the autopilot gains
are not being updated and autopilot performance is likely to be
unsatisfactory. Height callouts are not available.
[ nav ra 1(2) fault, fcom pro.aep.nav, fctm aep.nav ]

11.5 ADR faults

A single adr fault simply requires switching to the hot spare and
turning the affected unit off. Loss of adr1 will lead to the loss
of the extended functions of the egpws. Loss of adr2 will lead
to both baro reference channels being driven by the same fcu
channel, so the baro refs should be checked.
Loss of two adrs will lead to Alternate Law with associated
speed restrictions and landing configuration considerations. Air
data switching is used as necessary, and the affected adrs are
turned off. atc switching may be required to restore transponder.
If adr1 and adr3 are lost, the landing gear safety valve is con-
trolled closed, so the gear must be gravity extended and cannot
subsequently be retracted. This is not mentioned by the ecam –
the gear will simply fail to extend normally.
If all three adrs are lost, the result is airframe dependent.
Some of the fleet now have a nav adr 1+2+3 fault ecam
and an appropriate procedure utilising the Backup Speed Scale,
completing with the qrh nav all adr off paper procedure. For
older airframes the ecam displayed will be for Dual adr failure
and must be ignored since it will request meaningless air data
and atc switching. Instead revert to standby instruments (the
standby asi and Altimeter have direct pressure feeds from the the
standby pitot and static ports) and refer to qrh nav adr 1+2+3
fault. Interestingly, when Backup Speed Scale is available, the
ecam advises that the standby instrument indications may be
110 CHAPTER 11. NAVIGATION

unreliable. . .
Triple adr failure has a few additional ramifications. Of note is
loss of automatic cabin pressure control (see Section 3.14 for manual
pressure control methodology), Alternate Law and gravity gear
extension. Of lesser concern are loss of stall warning5 , rudder travel
limiter frozen until slat extension and loss of auto flap retraction.
[ nav adr 1(2)(3)(1+2)(1+3)(2+3) fault,
qrh aep.nav, fcom pro.aep.nav ]

11.6 ADR disagree

The ecam message indicates that, following an adr fault or rejec-
tion, there is a speed or angle of attack disagreement between the
two remaining adrs. This will cause a degradation to Alternate
Law. If there is a speed disagreement, apply the Unreliable Speed
procedure (see Section 2.3). If the speed does not disagree, an aoa
sensor is providing incorrect data and there is a risk of spurious
stall warnings.
[ nav adr disagree, fcom pro.aep.nav ]

11.7 IR faults
In case of simultaneous loss of the adr and ir associated with an
adiru, apply the adr fault procedure first.
A single ir fault will simply require att/hdg switching. This
may lead to loss of the extended functions of the egpws and/or
loss of tcas. It may be possible to recover the ir in att mode
(see Section 11.9).
A dual ir fault will lead to loss of pfd indications on at least
one side so use att/hdg switching to recover. It will also lead
5
Most of the easyJet fleet has now been modified so that the stall warning
is not lost in the event of triple adr failure.
11.8. IR DISAGREE 111

to Alternate Law and associated speed restrictions and landing

configuration considerations.
[ nav ir 1(2)(3)(1+2)(1+3)(2+3) fault, fcom pro.aep.nav ]

11.8 IR disagree
Following rejection or failure of an ir, there is disagreement between
the two remaining irs. Normal and alternate laws are lost, but
alternate law with reduced protections can be recovered by isolating
the faulty ir (use standby horizon to cross-check) and resetting
the elacs.
[ nav ir disagree, fcom pro.aep.nav ]

11.9 IR alignment in ATT mode

If ir alignment is lost, it may be possible to recover attitude
and heading information by switching the adiru selector to att
and maintaining level constant speed flight for 30 seconds. The
magnetic heading will need to be entered, the exact method being
dependent on the adirs cdu fitted.
[ ir alignment in att mode, qrh aep.nav, fcom pro.aep.nav ]

11.10 FM/GPS position disagree

This can be disregarded if on an ils or loc approach. On an
overlay approach, revert to raw data. On an rnav approach, go
around unless visual.
In other flight phases, manually tune a vor and check against
either the needle and dme on the nd or the brg/dist to field on
the prog page. If the error is greater than 3nm in the cruise or
greater than 1nm for approach, raw data navigation and ap/fd
112 CHAPTER 11. NAVIGATION

selected lateral and vertical modes should be used.

[ nav fm/gps pos disagree, qrh aep.nav, fcom pro.aep.nav ]
Chapter 12

Auto-flight

12.1 FAC faults

Failure of a single fac results in loss of redundancy and hence
loss of Cat 3 Dual. In particular, a single fac provides all the
characteristic speeds (VSW , VLS , VFE , VFE next , VLE , VMO /MMO ,
Green dot, S speed and F speed). It may be worth cross-checking
against eqrh ops – operating speeds.
If both facs are lost the rudder travel limit system, rudder
trim control, yaw damper and pfd characteristic speeds are lost
and Alternate Law with mechanical yaw control becomes active.
Recovery of full rudder authority at flap extension should be
anticipated, but use rudder with care above 160kt.
[ auto flt fac 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.auto flt ]

12.2 Yaw damper faults

A single failure leads to loss of redundancy, and hence loss of Cat
3 Dual. On some airframes a reset of the affected fac can be
attempted.

113
114 CHAPTER 12. AUTO-FLIGHT

With a dual failure a reset of the facs should be attempted.

If the yaw damper is not recovered, the flight controls revert to
Alternate Law (see Section 6.3). Unless the failure occurred below
alert height, only Cat 1 will be available.
[ auto flt yaw damper 1(2)(sys), fcom pro.aep.auto flt ]

12.3 Rudder trim faults

Loss of a rudder trim from a single fac leads to loss of redundancy
and hence loss of Cat 3 Dual.
If complete loss of rudder trim occurs, an attempt should be
made to reset the facs. If this is not successful, only Cat 1 is
available.
[ auto flt rudder trim sys(1)(2) fault), fcom pro.aep.auto flt ]

12.4 Rudder travel limiter faults

Loss of rudder limit functionality from a single FAC leads to loss
of redundancy only.
The effect of complete loss of rudder limiter functionality de-
pends on when the failure occurred.
In general, the rudder should be used with caution when above
160kt.
An attempt should be made to recover the limiter by resetting
the facs. If unsuccessful, full rudder travel authority may or may
not be recovered at slat extension. If a landing must be made
with the rudder travel limiter frozen in the high speed regime,
max crosswind is reduced to 15kt and differential braking may be
required on the landing roll (do not arm autobrake).
[ auto flt rud trv lim(1)(2)(sys), fcom pro.aep.auto flt ]
12.5. FCU FAULTS 115

12.5 FCU faults

Loss of a single channel will result in the spare channel automati-
cally taking over. All that is required is a cross check of the baro
refs.
Loss of both channels leads to loss of all fcu and efis pan-
els. The autopilots, flight directors1 and autothrust are lost and
parameters that are normally controlled by the panels revert to
sensible default values. If the weather radar image remains dis-
played, disregard it since the scale will be incorrect. Since it will
only be possible to set the qnh on the standby altimeters, the
mda should not be set in the mcdu; instead the pm should make
standard callouts from the standby altimeter.
[ auto flt fcu 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.auto flt ]

1
Flight Directors will pop up to provide guidance in the event of a go-around.
116 CHAPTER 12. AUTO-FLIGHT
Chapter 13

Hydraulics

13.1 Green + yellow systems low pressure

It may be possible to recover the yellow system using the yellow
electrical pump. The ptu will need to be turned off in this case,
as the yellow electric pump lacks sufficient capacity to pressurise
the green system through the ptu. Systems lost because of low
air pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at lower altitudes.
Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may be usable for the
approach once they have cooled down.
Roll control is available from ailerons and spoiler 3. Pitch
control is available from the elevators, but the ths is frozen. Yaw
damping is lost. Slats are available, but slow. Flaps are frozen.
Control law reverts to Alternate Law without stability protections.
The autopilots are lost.
The gear must be gravity extended, but due to the frozen ths
this must be delayed until VAPP is achieved in conf 3. Further-
more, transition to conf 3 must be achieved with the method
described in Section 6.1 due to the flaps being frozen. Transition
to Direct Law on gear deployment adds to the fun, especially as
pitch trim is unavailable.

117
118 CHAPTER 13. HYDRAULICS

Cat 2 and 3 capability is lost. The landing will be conf 3,

most probably with only the slats deployed; the flare attitude will
be abnormal. There will only be one spoiler (#3), no reversers,
accumulator only braking and no nose wheel steering. Hence
required landing distances almost triple.
The go around, in some ways, is exceptionally straightforward.
The gear cannot be raised and the configuration should be main-
tained. Due to the frozen stabiliser, a speed close to VAPP should
be flown.1 As long as the flaps are frozen at zero, the slats can be
retracted for a subsequent diversion; fuel flow will be approximately
3 times normal due to the extended gear. If flaps are not at zero,
fuel flow will be up to 4 times normal.
A paper summary is available in the hyd section of the qrh,
and this should be applied once all ecam actions are completed.
[ hyd g + y sys lo pr, qrh aep.hyd, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.2 Blue + yellow systems low pressure

It may be possible to recover the yellow system using the yellow
electrical pump or the blue system using the rat. Systems lost
because of low air pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at
lower altitudes. Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may be
usable for the approach once they have cooled down.
Roll control is provided by ailerons and spoiler 5, pitch control
by the ths and left elevator. Slats and flaps are available at
reduced rate. The autopilots are lost but Normal Law is retained.
Speedbrake is unavailable.
Cat 2 and 3 capability is lost. Landing distances are increased
due to loss of spoilers 2, 3 and 4 and loss of #2 reverser. Approach
configuration is normal apart from slow flaps and slats and gravity
gear extension (protects green system). Nose wheel steering is lost.
1
Airbus originally suggested flying VFE − 10kt; I assume this was found to
cause handling difficulties due to pitch trim not being available.
13.3. GREEN + BLUE SYSTEMS LOW PRESSURE 119

Gear cannot be retracted on go-around. Fuel burn for a subse-

quent diversion will be significantly greater (approx factor 3 times
normal); see Section 9.7 for further details.
A paper summary is available in the hyd section of the qrh,
and this should be applied once all ecam actions are completed.
[ hyd b + y sys lo pr, qrh aep.hyd, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.3 Green + blue systems low pressure

If the blue system has been lost due to the loss of its electrical
pump, it may be recovered by deploying the rat. Systems lost
because of low air pressure in the reservoir will be recoverable at
lower altitudes. Systems lost due to reservoir overheats may be
usable for the approach once they have cooled down.
Roll control is provided by spoilers 2 and 4 only. Use of
speedbrake would therefore lead to loss of roll control. Pitch
control is available from the starboard elevator; the ths remains
available. Due to the limited control surfaces available, the aircraft
will be slightly sluggish. The slats are frozen, but flaps are available.
Control law reverts to Alternate Law without stability protections.
The autopilots are lost. The approach will be flown with the
autothrust off.
Due to the frozen slats, configuration changes must be carried
out using the method described in Section 6.1. The gear must be
gravity extended; to benefit from the improved elevator response
available in Direct Law, this is done at 200kt. Manual trim will be
available.
Cat 2 and 3 capability is lost. The landing will be conf 3. Two
spoilers per wing are available, reverser 2 is available, alternate
braking is available and nose wheel steering is available. Landing
distances approximately double.
Go around is straightforward – the gear cannot be retracted
and the flap configuration should be maintained. Simply select
120 CHAPTER 13. HYDRAULICS

VFE − 10kt. For diversion, the flaps can be retracted. With

the gear remaining down, fuel burn will increase by a factor of
approximately 3 if the slats are at zero or up to approximately 3½
if they are extended.
A paper summary is available in the hyd section of the qrh,
and this should be applied once all ecam actions are completed.
[ hyd g + b sys lo pr, qrh aep.hyd, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.4 Green system low pressure

The major lost systems are normal landing gear operation (gravity
extension is available but gear retraction is not) and the normal
brake system, including the autobrake (alternate braking is avail-
able). Landing distance will be increased due to loss of two spoilers
per wing and reverser 1. Flap and slat deployment will be slow.
[ hyd g sys lo pr, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.5 Yellow system low pressure

It may be possible to recover the yellow system by using the yellow
electric pump.
Two spoilers per wing and reverser 2 are lost, so landing distance
will increase slightly. Nose wheel steering is lost. Flap deployment
will be slow. As the alternate braking system is only available
through the brake accumulator, ensure there is sufficient pressure
when the parking brake is set.
[ hyd y sys lo pr, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.6 Blue system low pressure

One spoiler per wing will be lost but this has negligible effect on
landing distance. Slats will be slow to deploy. Deployment of
13.7. ENGINE DRIVEN PUMP LOW PRESSURE 121

the rat is not recommended unless another system is lost. If the

system is lost due to low reservoir level, emergency generation
capability is lost.
[ hyd b sys lo pr, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.7 Engine driven pump low pressure

Turn off the affected pump. The ptu will pressurise the affected
system.
[ hyd g(y) eng 1(2) pump lo pr, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.8 Electric pump low pressure or overheat

Turn off the affected pump. In the case of an overheat, the pump
may be re-engaged for the approach providing the relevant fault
light on the overhead panel has extinguished.
[ hyd y(b) elec pump lo pr(ovht), fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.9 Low reservoir air pressure

Loss of air pressure to a hydraulic reservoir may lead to pump
cavitation and hence fluctuating pressures. If this occurs, turn off
the affected pump, and if applicable, turn off the ptu. Cavitation
reduces with altitude, so it may be possible to reinstate the system
during the descent.
[ hyd g(y)(b) rsvr lo air pr, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.10 Reservoir overheat

Turn off all affected pumps and if applicable, turn off the ptu.
The system should be reinstated for the approach if it has cooled
122 CHAPTER 13. HYDRAULICS

sufficiently. This is indicated by the fault light going out on the

overhead panel.
[ hyd g(y)(b) rsvr ovht, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.11 Low reservoir fluid level

Turn off all affected pumps and, if applicable, turn off the ptu.
The affected system is not recoverable. In the case of low reservoir
level in the yellow system, it is possible that the fluid from the
brake accumulator may also be lost. This usually occurs within 10
minutes of the initial warning. Without the brake accumulator, the
parking brake is not available, so chock the aircraft before shutting
down engine 1.
[ hyd g(y)(b) rsvr lo lvl, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.12 PTU fault

In flight this indicates that either the green or yellow system is low
on fluid and has low system pressure. The ptu must be turned off
to prevent overheating the supplying system.
[ hyd ptu fault, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]

13.13 RAT fault

Indicates that either the rat is not fully stowed, pressure is present
in the rat stowing actuator or that the rat pump is not available.
No action is required.
[ hyd rat fault, fcom pro.aep.hyd ]
Chapter 14

Ice and rain protection

14.1 Window heat fault

Windshield heat for pf is non fmgs monitored required equipment
for cat2/3 landings — see eqrh ops. Other than that, there is
no immediate operational effect.
[ anti ice l(r)(l+r) windshield(window), fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]

14.2 Multiple pitot heat failures

The issue with loss of anti-ice on more than one pitot probe is that
it is possible that the two unprotected pitot probes will ice up at the
same time and provide erroneous but coherent data. This leads to
a situation where the adr associated with the remaining protected
probe is locked out despite being the single correct source.
Obviously, the first thing to do is to avoid icing conditions.
If there is a working adr connected to a protected probe,
turn one of the adrs associated with an unprotected probe off.
This ensures that an adr disagree ecam caution is triggered by
significant speed discrepancies and ensures that the protected adr
will not be automatically deselected.

123
124 CHAPTER 14. ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION

If pitot heat is lost on all probes, one of the adrs should,

again, be turned off to ensure the adr disagree ecam caution is
provided. If icing is expected, turn off a second adr and be ready
to apply unreliable airspeed procedures (see Section 2.3).
[ anti ice all(capt(f/o)+f/o(stby)) pitot, fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]

14.3 Single pitot probe heat or static port

heat fault
The adr associated with the failed probe or port should be consid-
ered unreliable. adr1 or adr2 can be replaced with adr3 using air
data switching. If using standby instruments with adr3 unreliable,
air data information must be monitored closely.
[ anti ice capt(f/o)(stby) pitot(l(r) stat), fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]

14.4 Double AOA heat fail

If two aoa probes are affected by icing, the computers may erro-
neously deselect the remaining good adr. Switching off one of the
affected adrs leaves the system in the state described in Section
11.6.
[ qrh aep.a-ice, fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]

14.5 Single AOA or TAT heat fault

No immediate operational effect.
[ anti ice capt(f/o)(stby) aoa(tat), fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]

14.6 Probe heat computer failure

If applicable, deselect the affected ADR.
[ anti ice capt(f/o)(stby) probes, fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]
14.7. ENGINE ANTI-ICE VALVE FAULT 125

14.7 Engine anti-ice valve fault

If a valve fails to open when commanded, avoid icing conditions.
If it fails to close when commanded, a thrust limit penalty applies.
[ anti ice eng 1(2) valve open(clsd), fcom pro.aep.a-ice ]

14.8 Wing anti-ice valve faults

If a wing anti-ice valve is open when commanded closed:

• In the air, just allow the failed side to be continually anti-iced

and use wing anti-ice on the working side when required. A
thrust limit penalty will apply.

• On the ground, if this occurs after the ground self-test, simply

switch off the wing anti-ice with the pb. Otherwise, isolate
and depressurise the pneumatic system on the failed side.

If a wing anti-ice valve is closed when commanded open, the

wing anti-ice must be turned off to avoid asymmetrically de-icing
the wings. Avoid icing conditions. If ice accretion does occur,
landing distances and VAPP adjustments are in qrh and speed
must be maintained above either VLS + 10kt or Green Dot.
[ wing anti ice sys fault, fcom pro.aep.a-ice, fcom pro.nor.sup.aw ]
126 CHAPTER 14. ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
Chapter 15

Indicating/Recording

15.1 Display unit failure

Intermittent flashing of dus may be indicative of a generator issue.
If cm1 dus are flashing, try turning off generator 1. If cm2 dus
are flashing, try turning off generator 2. The apu generator can
be used if successful.
In the case of a blank du, a large amber “F”, a distorted
display or minimum brightness, on some airframes a reset may be
attempted by selecting the du brightness off then back on. If the
reset is not applicable or the du does not recover after 10 seconds,
the affected du can be turned off. In the case of an invalid
display unit message, an automatic recovery attempt is initiated;
this can take 40 seconds or more. If automatic recovery does not
succeed, the du can be turned off.
An invalid data message is indicative of a dmc problem; eis
dmc switching may recover the du, as may turning the du off then
on. It is possible that this message will appear simultaneously
on all dus; this initiates an automatic recovery attempt, which,
again, can take 40 seconds or more. dus that are not automatically
recovered may be recovered manually by sequentially turning them

127
128 CHAPTER 15. INDICATING/RECORDING

off for 40 seconds then back on. If resetting a du triggers a

recurrence of the original problem, leave that du off for the next
recovery cycle.
In the event of an unrecoverable failure of a display unit, some
automatic display switching will occur: pfd will auto-transfer to
ndus and ewd will auto-transfer to sdu. Each pilot has a pfd/nd
xfr button that allows their pfd to be toggled onto their ndu and
their nd to be toggled onto their pfdu. An ecam/nd xfr switch
on the switching panel allows either the sd (when sdu xor ewdu
failed) or ewd (sdu and ewdu failed) to be displayed on an ndu.
The most likely end result of a du failure is that one nd must
be shared and/or that the sd is not displayed. The ecam can be
operated with just the ewd. When a sys page is needed, press
and hold the required sys page button. When status is required,
press and maintain the sts key. The ewd will be displayed 2s
after the sts key is released. To access status overflow, release
then repress the sts key within 2s.
[ qrh aep.eis, fcom pro.aep.eis ]

15.2 Multiple spurious ECAM alerts

A faulty dmc can cause multiple spurious ecam alerts (spurious
as confirmed by sd pages). The eis dmc switch should be used to
identify the faulty dmc and replace it with dmc3.
[ qrh aep.fws, fcom pro.aep.fws ]

15.3 Flight Warning Computer failure

The two identical fwcs generate alert messages, memos, aural
alerts, and synthetic voice messages. Loss of a single fwc leads
to downgrade to Cat 3 Single due to loss of redundancy. The
major effects of loss of both fwcs are loss of ecam (including
15.3. FLIGHT WARNING COMPUTER FAILURE 129

attention getters, status page and takeoff/landing memos), loss

of auto callouts1 (radio height and decision height) and loss of
altitude alerting. In the sim, there is also loss of rudder trim reset,
loss of apu fuel valve status and loss of cabin crew call alert as
side-effects.
The procedure is simply to use the sys pages and overhead
panel warning lights to monitor the systems, and for pm to make
the relevant callouts. Alternative method for cabin crew to get
flight deck attention may be required.
[ fws fwc 1(2)(1+2) fault, fcom pro.aep.fws ]

1
There is some question as to whether windshear and gpws aural alerts are
included under ‘auto callouts’. The fcom is unclear on the matter.
130 CHAPTER 15. INDICATING/RECORDING
Chapter 16

Pneumatic

16.1 Dual bleed failure

The historical failure case where supplying two packs from one bleed
would overload it and cause it to fail appears to have been resolved.
Furthermore, recent airframes have four new ecam procedures
associated with dual bleed failure, the variants based on whether
neither, either or both bleeds have failed due to a wing or pylon
leak on its respective side. The ecams all hand off to a new qrh
paper procedure if no successful reset is achieved. Older airframes
make do with just the qrh procedure.
Whilst the procedures look complex, the underlying philosophy
is fairly simple:

• A depressurisation will be underway. It should be relatively

slow, but unless a successful reset is achieved immediately, a
prompt descent to fl100/mfa needs to be initiated.
• A bleed lost to a wing or pylon leak is lost for good, whereas
a simple bleed fault or bleed low pressure may be recoverable.
The cross bleed should be shut and the wing anti-ice should
be off before an attempt is made to recover a bleed.

131
132 CHAPTER 16. PNEUMATIC

• A leak on the left side precludes the use of the apu bleed for
pressurisation, but otherwise the apu bleed can be used to
supply pack 1 when below 22500ft. If pack 1 is unavailable,
the apu bleed can supply pack 2 via the cross bleed provided
the whole pneumatic system is available.

In line with this philosophy, both the ecam and qrh procedures
start by shutting the cross bleed and turning off the wing anti-ice.
The ecam procedures each then attempt an immediate recovery of
any recoverable bleed by cycling the bleed off then on. The qrh
attempts an immediate recovery only in the case that both bleeds
are potentially recoverable.
If no bleeds are recovered, the bleeds are all turned off and
a descent to fl100/mfa is initiated. At this point, the ecam
procedures join the qrh procedure.
During the descent the apu is started. If the left hand side
of the pneumatic system is available, at attempt to use the apu
bleed for pressurisation is made at fl200. If this is successful, the
descent is stopped at fl200 and a further attempt is made to reset
the engine bleeds.
If apu cannot be used for pressurisation descent must be contin-
ued. When level at fl100/mfa, a final attempt is made to restore
any available engine bleeds. If unsuccessful, the flight is completed
with ram air.
[ air 1+2 bleed fault (left(right) leak (and right leak)),
qrh aep.air, fcom pro.aep.air ]
Chapter 17

Communications

17.1 Communication failure (ICAO)

If all attempts to establish contact fail, transmit message twice on
designated channel, proceeded by the phrase “Transmitting Blind.”
Set Mode A Transponder Code to 7600.
If in vmc, continue in vmc to the nearest suitable airfield and
land, reporting arrival to appropriate ats by the most expeditious
means.
If in imc or unlikely to be able to maintain vmc:

• If in airspace where a procedural separation service is being

applied, maintain speed and level, or minimum flight altitude
if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following failure to
report over a compulsory reporting point, then adjust level
and speed in accordance with flight plan.

• If in airspace where an ats surveillance system is in use,

maintain speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher,
for 7 minutes after Code 7600 is set, then adjust level and
speed in accordance with flight plan.

133
134 CHAPTER 17. COMMUNICATIONS

• If being radar vectored or having been directed to proceed

offset using rnav without specified limit, rejoin the flight
plan route no later than the next significant point.

• On reaching the appropriate navaid or fix serving the des-

tination aerodrome, hold if necessary, then at eat, or if no
eat has been received and acknowledged, computed flight
plan eta, commence an appropriate instrument approach
procedure. If possible land within 30 minutes of this time.

• Watch for visual signals from the tower:

– Red Pyro: Permission to land cancelled

– Flashing Red Light: Land elsewhere
– Continuous Red: Give way to other aircraft, continue
circling
– Flashing Green: Return to circuit, await landing clear-
ance
– Continuous Green: Permission to land

17.2 Communication failure (UK airspace)

The UK procedures expand on the icao procedures:

• If following a sid fly the published lateral and vertical pro-

files, including any step climb, until the last waypoint of
the procedure is reached. Maintain current speed and last
assigned level (or minimum flight altitude if this is higher)
until 7 minutes have elapsed since setting 7600. Then adjust
speed and level in accordance with current flight plan. This
procedure also applies to rnp-1 (prnav) departures.

• If following a star, follow the lateral profile but maintain

current speed and last assigned level (or minimum flight
17.2. COMMUNICATION FAILURE (UK AIRSPACE) 135

altitude if this is higher) until 7 minutes have elapsed since

setting 7600. Subsequently, arrange descent to be as close
as possible to published planning profile. If no profile is
published, arrange to be at the iaf at minimum published
level. This procedure also applies to rnp-1 (prnav) arrivals.

• If under radar vectors from Approach Control Radar, comply

with instructions on radar vectoring chart. If under radar
vectors without specified limit from other ats unit, continue
in accordance with last instructions until 3 minutes have
elapsed since setting 7600, then proceed in most direct man-
ner to rejoin current flight plan route. If necessary, climb to
minimum flight altitude.

• If performing an sra, continue visually or by using an alter-

nate approach aid. If this is not possible, carry out a missed
approach and continue to the holding position of a suitable
aerodrome with a notified instrument approach and carry
out that procedure.

[ icao annex 10, icao doc 4444, ukaip enr 1.1.3.4 ]

136 CHAPTER 17. COMMUNICATIONS
Chapter 18

Miscellaneous Tips

• When configuring, VLS is more critical than VFE , which

in turn is more critical than manoeuvring speeds (S and F
speeds). Both VLS and VFE are trustworthy with jammed
flaps/slats.

• When configuring on approach, flaps do not begin to extend

until conf 2 is selected.

• Slat position does not change between conf 2 and conf 3.

• Dual hydraulic failure fundamentals:

– You will always need to gravity extend the gear, so you

will never be able to retract it on the go-around.
– If you only have blue, you lose the flaps; if you only have
yellow, you lose the slats. The flaps/slats jammed pro-
cedure (including go-around modifications) is therefore
incorporated into both these procedures.
– If you only have blue or yellow, it will be a Direct Law
landing; Normal Law is retained if green is available.
Direct law is triggered by gear extension. If you only

137
138 CHAPTER 18. MISCELLANEOUS TIPS

have blue, the ths is frozen, so you need to trigger Direct

Law late (at conf 3, VAPP ) to get neutral trimming
of the elevators. If you only have yellow, the aircraft
handling is sluggish; trigger Direct Law early (at 200kt)
to improve responsiveness.
– You’re going to need a longish runway. Worst case is if
you only have blue, since you have, at best, accumulator
braking and you’re coming in fast due to lack of flaps.
Yellow is better since you have alternate braking, and
its mainly about the lack of slats. If you have green, its
not really all that bad.