RULE 69 (Partition)

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A.
FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006

Facts:

On August 23, 1955, Leandro Figuraciom executed a deed of quitclaim over his
real properties in favor of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two
parcels of land. Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents.

What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between
petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot.

While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she
and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the
finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related to her father’s final
illness and burial have not been properly settled.

ISSUE: Is an action for partition appropriate in this case?

No. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable

to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal
heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those
related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all
expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner,
the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the
settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of
the estate’s obligations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision and
resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290 are AFFIRMED in so far as the issue of the
partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de
Figuracion’s affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale in favor of Felipa and Hilaria
Figuracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia
Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.
RULE 68: FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION V. RAMOS

NOTE: Foreclosure is proper, if demand was made and duly received by the respondents and
the latter did not pay they are in default. If demand was not made, then the loans had not yet
become due and demandable.

In sum: Foreclosure is valid only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation.
NO DEMAND, NO DELAY. Wherein in this case there is no demand made by the GMC.

FACTS: General Milling Corporation (GMC) entered into a Growers Contract with Librado and
Remedios Ramos, supplying broiler chickens for their land in Barangay Banaybanay, Lipa City,
Batangas. The contract included a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, a surety bond, and a
maximum credit line of PhP 215,000. The Ramos were unable to settle their account and
alleged business losses due to GMC's negligence and violation of the Growers Contract.

In 1997, GMC instituted foreclosure proceedings on their mortgaged property, which was later
sold by public auction for PhP 935,882,075. The Ramos filed a complaint for annulment and
declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale with damages, claiming that the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale was null and void due to non-compliance with posting and
publication requirements under Act No. 3135, as amended, and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage had no fixed term.

GMC argued that it had repeatedly reminded the Ramos of their liabilities under the Growers
Contract and was compelled to foreclose the mortgage due to their failure to pay their
obligation.

ISSUE: WON the foreclosure of GMC is proper?

RULING: NO. GMC did not make a demand on Spouses Ramos but merely requested them to
go to GMC’s office to discuss the settlement of their account. In spite of the lack of demand
made on the spouses, however, GMC proceeded with the foreclosure proceedings. Neither was
there any provision in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage allowing GMC to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage without need of demand.

Indeed, Article 1169 of the Civil Code on delay requires the following:

Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declares; x x x

As the contract in the instant case carries no such provision on demand not being necessary for
delay to exist, The court agreed with the CA that GMC should have first made a demand on the
spouses before proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.ALEJANDRO and ADELAIDA LICUANAN,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 150097, February 26, 2007.

CORONA, J.:

In 1974, Respondent spouses Alejandro and Adelaida Licuanan ("Respondents") were granted a P4,700
loan by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP") to mature in 1979, and secured by a real
estate mortgage over a 980-square meter property.

In 1975, DBP granted respondents a second loan of P12,000 payable on or before the year 1980, which
was secured by a real estate mortgage over four parcels of land.

In 1975, DBP granted Respondents a third loan of P22,000 maturing in 1985, and was secured by a real
estate mortgage over three parcels of land.

In 1979, petitioner and respondents restructured the second loan, extending the maturity date to 1982.

In 1981, DBP sent a letter to Respondents informing them that they would institute extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings for breach of the conditions of the mortgage (of the first loan).

After an application for extrajudicial foreclosure, the properties were sold in a public auction, in which
DBP was the highest bidder for bidding a total of P16,340.

In 1984, DBP informed Respondents that the properties could be reacquired by negotiated sale. Three
days later, however, the properties were sold to one Emelita Peralta for P104,000.

After being informed of the sale, Respondents offered to repurchase the properties, but it was rejected
by DBP.

Respondents then filed a complaint for recovery of real properties and damages in RTC of Lingayen
against DBP and Peralta.

In its counterclaim, DBP asserts its right to claim for deficiency since the proceeds of the sale (P104,000)
did not cover the debt of Petitioners of P131,642.33. Thus, it is entitled to claim the difference
(P27,642.33) with interest.

DBP also argues that demand is not necessary as the maturity dates are already known to Respondents,
and that Respondents are estopped from questioning the foreclosure sale since they offered to
repurchase the property.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. It held that there was no demand for payment prior to the
extrajudicial foreclosure and ordered Peralta to reconvey the properties to respondents, subject to
Peralta’s right to be paid. It also held that petitioner did not deal fairly with respondents making it liable
for nominal and moral damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
CA affirmed RTC's findings.

1st Issue: W/N a demand for payment of the loans was made before the mortgage was foreclosed.

Ruling: No.
Whether or not demand was made is a question of fact. Both the CA and RTC found that demand was
never made, and no compelling reason has been shown by DBP to rule otherwise.
NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201892 JULY 22, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: Respondent Marcelino Martinez, who executed a promissory and obligated himself to pay his
father’s loan secured by mortgage of a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land to the petitioner
which he believes to be in the amount of P689, 000.00. Respondent who then made a partial
payment of 400, 000, had ceased to pay a supposed balance of P289,000.00 upon learning the
January 30, 1998 RTC decision. Said decision only required his father to pay the total amount of
₱229,200.00 to the petitioner, inclusive of the principal and interest.

Petitioner filed a complaint or sum of money and damages before the court a quo. Respondent
allged that he already settled his father’s obligation and that he committed a mistake in paying more
than the amount due under the loan, thus, warranted the return of the excess payment..

The court a quo denied recovery on the subject promissory note.

It directed respondent to pay the amount of ₱289,000.00 due under the subject PN, plus interest at
the legal rate reckoned from the last extra judicial demand on May 15, 1998, until fully paid, as well
as attorney's fees and the costs of suit.

The CA ruled that the judgment in the judicial foreclosure case relating to Rafael's obligation to
petitioner is final and conclusive on the collection case.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the dismissal of the
collection case.

Ruling: No.
In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or
separate is not always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general
rules, but by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore,
is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract which must, thus, be
sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts, for
which a party may maintain separate suits.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee
has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through
the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action
to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative,not cumulative or
successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt,except
only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-
mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties.
Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property
was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for
judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on
Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse
to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the
principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not
shown to have attained finality.
Further on the point, the fact that no foreclosure sale appears to have been conducted is of no
moment because the remedy of foreclosure of mortgage is deemed chosen upon the filing of the
complaint there for. In Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. CA, it was explained:

x x x x In sustaining the rule that prohibits mortgage creditors from pursuing both the
remedies of a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, the
Court held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Esteban Icarangal, et al. that a
rule which would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would
result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice and obnoxious to law and
equity, but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of
his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the
property lies. Hence, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for
collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the
petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province
where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118. (Emphases supplied)

As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged
property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection,
regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the
dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return
of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the
dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and
evidentiary support.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED
G.R. No. 158891
June 27, 2012
PABLO P. GARCIA,
Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA VALDEZ
VILLAR,
Respondent.

Facts:
Lourdes V. Galas (Galas) was the original owner of a piece of property (subject
property), which she mortgaged to Yolanda Valdez Villar
(Villar) as security for a loan. Galas subsequently mortgaged the same subject property
to Pablo P. Garcia (Garcia) to secure another loan. Both mortgages were annotated
on the subject property’s TCT. Galas thereafter sold the subject property to Villar. The
Deed of Sale was registered and, consequently, a new TCT was issued in the name of
Villar. Both Villar’s and Garcia’s mortgages were carried over and annotated on Villar’s
new TCT. Garcia filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against Villar before the
RTC. Garcia subsequently amended his petition to a Complaint for Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgage with Damages and alleged that when Villar purchased the subject
property, she acted in bad faith as she knowingly and willfully disregarded the laws on
judicial and extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgaged property.
The RTC ruled in favor of Garcia and ordered Villar to pay the former the sum of P1.8M
(the amount of the loan secured by the mortgage) plus legal interest. The RTC declared
that the direct sale of the subject property to Villar, the first mortgagee, could not
operate to deprive Garcia of his right as a second mortgagee.
The RTC further explained that upon Galas’s failure to pay her obligation, Villar should
have foreclosed the subject property to provide junior mortgagees like Garcia the
opportunity to satisfy their claims from the residue, if any, of the foreclosure sale
proceeds. Villar appealed and contended that the second mortgage is a void and
inexistent contract. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision and declared that
Galas was free to mortgage the subject property even without Villar’s consent as the
restriction that the mortgagees consent was necessary in case of a subsequent
encumbrance was absent in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage.
However, the Court of Appeals held that the Sale of the subject property to Villar was
valid as it found nothing in the records that would show that Galas violated the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage prior to the sale. CPG 7.14.2015 Garcia appealed to the
Supreme Court, with the same arguments he posited before the lower courts, but added
that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage contained a stipulation, which is violative of the
prohibition on pactum commissorium
.
Issue
(relating to pactum commissorium ): Whether or not the sale of the subject property to
Villar was in violation of the prohibition on pactum commissorium

Ruling:
No. The sale of the subject property does not violate the prohibition on pactum
commissorium.

Ratio:
Garcia claims that the stipulation appointing Villar, the mortgagee, as the mortgagor’s
attorney-in-fact, to sell the property in case of default in the payment of the loan, is in
violation of the prohibition on pactum commissorium, as stated under Article 2088 of the
Civil Code.
The following are the elements of pactum commissorium
:
(1) There should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the
principal obligation; and (2) There should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by
the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation
within the stipulated period. Villar’s purchase of the subject property did not violate the
prohibition on pactum commissorium
.
The power of attorney provision above did not provide that the ownership over the
subject property would
automatically pass to Villar upon Galas’s failure to pay the loan on time. What it granted
was the mere appointment of Villar as attorney-in- fact, with authority to sell or
otherwise dispose of the subject property, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of
the loan. This provision is customary in mortgage contracts, and is in conformity with
Article 2087 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2087.
It is also of the essence of these contracts that when the principal obligation becomes
due, the things in which the pledge or mortgage consists may be alienated for the
payment to the creditor. CPG 7.14.2015 Galas’s decision to eventually sell the subject
property to Villar was well within the scope of her rights as the owner of the subject
property. The subject property was transferred to Villar by virtue of another and
separate contract, which is the Deed of Sale. Garcia never alleged that the transfer of
the subject property to Villar was automatic upon Galas’s failure to discharge her debt,
or that the sale was simulated to cover up such automatic transfer.
 Natalia Bustamante vs Rodito and Norma Rosel [G. R. No. 126800. November
29, 1999] 319 SCRA 413 Case Digest

Natalia Bustamante vs Rodito and Norma Rosel

Concept:
Article 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is
alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money,
shall be governed by the law on sales.
Facts:
· March 8, 1987. Norma Rosel entered in a loan agreement with Natalia Bustamante with the conditions:
1. That the borrowers are the registered owners of a parcel of land, evidenced by TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 80667, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY THREE (423)
SQUARE Meters, more or less, situated along Congressional Avenue.
2. That the borrowers were desirous to borrow the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS from the LENDER, for a period of two (2) years, counted from March 1, 1987, with
an interest of EIGHTEEN (18%) PERCENT per annum, and to guaranty the payment thereof, they are
putting as a collateral SEVENTY (70) SQUARE METERS portion, inclusive of the apartment therein, of
the aforestated parcel of land, however, in the event the borrowers fail to pay, the lender has the option to
buy or purchase the collateral for a total consideration of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00)
PESOS, inclusive of the borrowed amount and interest therein;
3. That the lender do hereby manifest her agreement and conformity to the preceding paragraph,
while the borrowers do hereby confess receipt of the borrowed amount.”
·
When the loan was about to mature the respondent proposed to buy the land for P200,000 but the petitioner
refused and offered another residential lot at road. 20 project 8, quezon city. Respondent accepted the
lot. The Respondents were not the owner but entitled as Land developers
· March 1, 1989. Petitioner tendered payment for the loan but the respondent refused insisting that the
former sign the document as deed of absolute sale of the collateral
· Respondent filed a complaint and sent a letter asking the petitioner to sell the collateral pursuant to the
loan agreement
· March 5, 1990. Petitioner filed a petition for consignation and deposited the amount of P153,000 with the
City Treasurer of Quezon City. Petitioner refused the sell the collateral and the respondent cosigned the
amount of P47,500 with the trial court. In arriving at the amount deposited, respondents considered the
principal loan of P100,000.00 and 18% interest per annum thereon, which amounted to P52,500.00. The
principal loan and the interest taken together amounted to P152,500.00, leaving a balance of P47,500.00
· The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and denied the prayer of the respondents in the execution of
the deed of sale
· Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
· The SC found no error in the decision of the trial court, petitioner asked for a reconsideration.
Respondent filed an opposition against petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. They contend that the
agreement between the parties was not a sale with right of re-purchase, but a loan with interest at 18%
per annum for a period of two years and if petitioner fails to pay, the respondent was given the right to
purchase the property or apartment for P200,000.00, which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.

Issue: W/ON the petitioner failed to pay the loan at its maturity and is the stipulation in the loan contract
valid

Held: No. The respondents refused to accept payment, petitioner consigned the amount with the trial
court. We note the eagerness of respondents to acquire the property given as collateral to guarantee the
loan. The sale of the collateral is an obligation with a suspensive condition. It is dependent upon the
happening of an event, without which the obligation to sell does not arise. Since the event did not occur,
respondents do not have the right to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligation, especially where the
same would not only be disadvantageous to petitioner but would also unjustly enrich respondents
considering the inadequate consideration (P200,000.00) for a 70 square meter property situated at
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.

No, The SC said that the stipulation is void. the intent of the creditor appears to be evident,for the debtor
is obliged to dispose of the collateral at the preagreed consideration amounting to practically the same
amount
as the loan. In effect, the creditor acquires the collateral in the event of non-payment of the loan. This is
within the concept of pactum commissorium. Such stipulation is void.
Ignacio v. Reyes GR No. 213192 July 12, 2017

FACTS:
The petitioner, Teresa R. Ignacio, sought the review of the Court of Appeals' (CA)
decision annulling the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
151. The case involves the partition and distribution of co-owned properties in Baguio
City among the heirs of Florencio Reyes, Sr. The facts reveal that Teresa, as the
administratrix of the estate, entered into lease contracts over the properties without the
conformity of the co-owners. The heirs filed complaints for partition, annulment of lease
contracts, accounting, and damages.
The Baguio RTC commissioned auditors to conduct an accounting, revealing Teresa's
total cash accountability. The Baguio RTC awaited a Request Order from the intestate
court regarding the distribution of properties. The heirs moved for the issuance of an
order allowing distribution, but the intestate court denied it, asserting jurisdiction. The
CA granted the heirs' petition, annulling the orders and directing the Baguio RTC to
partition the properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of partition of respondents’ co-owned properties on the
ground that the intestate court has jurisdiction over the matter is proper.

RULING:
No. The intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted
jurisdiction over the subject properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters
having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Any decision that
the intestate court would render on the title of the properties would at best be merely
provisional in character and would yield to a final determination in a separate action.
An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically brought by a
person claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or
defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, and is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
As defined in Art. 1079 of Civil Code of the Philippines, Partition is the separation,
division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong.
Determining co-ownership, the initial step in judicial partition, involves assessing its
existence and legal permissibility. The court may declare the plaintiff ineligible for
partition if co-ownership is absent or legally restricted. Alternatively, if confirmed, the
court may decree partition, requiring an accounting of rents and profits. Parties, in
agreement, can execute a partition, subject to court confirmation. The resulting order,
whether dismissing the action or decreeing partition, is final and appealable.
The court concludes that the intestate court's decisions would be provisional and
asserts the need for a definitive ruling on co-ownership through an ordinary action for
partition. The decision is affirmed with modifications, directing the Baguio RTC to
resume trial to determine ownership and effect partition as co-owners if necessary.
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY, Petitioners, -
versus - SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI, Respondents. G.R. No. 192486
November 21, 2012 RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD
VIRAY, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR.,
J.:
FACTS:
The case involves a piece of land, lot no. 733, registered under the name of Ellen and
Moses Mendoza. The said lot was subdivided to 6 parts by Engr.Fajardo but was not
officially approved by the LMB. On, April 29, 1986, Mendoza executed two separate
deeds of absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray
(Jesus Viray), and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A to spouses AvelinoViray and
Margarita Masangcay (Sps. Viray). The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding,
Mendoza, Emerenciana M. Vda.deMallari (Vda. de Mallari) and respondent spouses
Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733,
executed on August 20, 1990 a Subdivision Agreement, or the 1st subdivision
agreement (1st SA) where lot no. 733 was divided to 3 lots: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B and
Lot 733-C. Lot 733-C was further subdivided to 13 lots under a 2
nd
subdivision agreement (2
nd
SA) where herein respondents appeared as owners of some the further subdivided lots
covering a part of the lot sold to herein petitioners. As to be expected, the foregoing
overlapping transactions involving the same property or portions thereof spawned
several suits and countersuits between petitioner and respondents herein. The RTC
rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the Sps. Usi but was reversed by the CA
on appeal, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the two (2) subdivision agreements dated August 20, 1990 and April 5, 1991,
respectively, partake of a bona fide and legally binding partition contracts or
arrangements among co-owners that validly effectuated the transfer of the subject lots
to respondent spouses Usi?
HELD:
NO. The earlier sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) on April 29, 1986 was
valid and effective conveyances of said portions of Lot Decision G.R. No. 192486 15
733. The subsequent transfers to the Sps. Usi of substantially the same portions of Lot
733 accomplished through the subdivision agreements constitute in effect double sales
of those portions. Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a
thing held in common by those to whom it may belong. Contrary to the finding of the CA,
the subdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for
the partition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually 35 Heirs of
Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 15678, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 409, 445;
citing Noceda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA
504, 517 and Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122904, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA
165, 171. Decision G.R. No. 192486 16 conveyances, disguised as partitions, of
portions of Lot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the subsequent
subdivision of Lot 733-C. There is simply nothing in the records to demonstrate how the
Sps. Usi became co-owners of Lot 733 before or after the death of Moses Mendoza.
Elsewise put, no evidence had been adduced to show how the alleged interest of the
Sps. Usi, as co-owner, came about, except for the bare assertions in the 1st and 2nd
SAs that they co-owned Lot 733 and Lot 733-C. In light of the convergence of the
foregoing disposed-of cases, there can be no question as to the ownership of the Sps.
Viray and Vda. deViray (vice Jesus Viray) over the specified and delineated portions of
Lot 733 which they purchased for value from Mendoza. And Mendoza, as vendor, was
bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant, the thing which is the
object of the sale. From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza to respondents
Usi. The parties did not execute a valid deed of sale conveying and transferring the lots
in question to respondents. What they rely on are two subdivision agreements which do
not explicitly chronicle the transfer of said lots to them. Under the 1st SA, all that can be
read is the declaration that respondents, together with others, are the
“sole and exclusive owners” of the lots subject of said
agreement. Per the 2nd SA, it simply replicates the statement in
the 1st SA that respondents are “sole and exclusive undivided
co-
owners” with the other parties. While respondents may
claim that the SAs of 1990 and 1991 are convenient conveying vehicles Mendoza
resorted to in disposing portions of Lot 733 under the Galang Plan, the Court finds that
said SAs are not valid legal conveyances of the subject lots due to nonexistent
prestations pursuant to Article 1305 which prescribes “a
meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to
render some service.”
Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and Vda.deViray (vice Jesus Viray) have,
as against the Sps. Usi, superior rights over Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F or portions thereof
MODESTO LEOVERAS,
Petitioner,

vs.

CASIMERO VALDEZ,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011

BRION,
J.:
Facts:Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-
fourths (¾) andone-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land. Sta. Maria
sold her three-fourths (¾)share to Benigna Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the
back of OCT No. 24695. WhenBenigna died in 1944,

she willed her three-fourths (¾) share equally to her sisters AlejandraLlamas and Josefa
Llamas.
8
Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-
half (½) of Benigna’s
three-fourths (¾) share.
Alejandra’s heirs sold their predecessor’s one
-half (½) share (roughlyequivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the respondent, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Also, Josefa sold her own one-half (½) share (subject property) to the respondent and
thepetitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent and the
petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property. The
petitioner and therespondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject
property.

The parties tookpossession of their respective portions of the subject property and
declared it in their name for taxation purposes.The respondent asked the Register of
Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of title over the
portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, therespondent learned
that the petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer certificatesof title.The
respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages
against thepetitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion
(disputed property)covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is
entitled only to the 3,020 square
meters identified in the parties’ Agreement.

The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner’s titles by contesting the
authenticity of the petitioner’s documents. Part
icularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting
Benigna’s death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have
executed a
deed, which purports to convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because
Benignaalready died in 1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have
sold to the partiesher three-fourths (¾) share in 1969 because she had already sold her
share to Benigna in 1932.
22
The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration that he is
the lawfulowner of the parcels of land covered by his titles.The RTC dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against theauthenticity of the
Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. As the totality of the evidence presented
sufficiently sustains [the respondent’s] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were
based on
forged and spurious documents, it behooves this Court to annul these certificates of
title. Hence,this petition for revie.Issues:Whether the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the
petitioner’s titles.

Held:We partially grant the petition. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner,whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel theregistered owner to transfer or
reconvey the land to him.
33
The plaintiff in this action must allege
and prove his ownership of the land in dispute and the defendant’s erroneous, fraudule
nt or wrongful registration of the property.
The petitioner’s argument confuses registration of title with ownership.
52

While the petitioner’s

ownership over the land covered by TCT No. 195812 is undisputed, his ownership only
gave himthe right to apply for the proper transfer of title to the property in his name.
Obviously, thepetitioner, even as a rightful owner, must comply with the statutory
provisions on the transfer of registered title to lands.
53
Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that thesubsequent registration of
title procured by the presentation of a forged deed or other instrumentis null and void.
Thus, the subsequent issuance of TCT No. 195812 gave the petitioner no better right
than the tainted registration which was the basis for the issuance of the same title. The
Court
simply cannot allow the petitioner’s attempt to get around the proper procedure for
registering the
transfer of title in his name by using spurious documents.Reconveyance is the remedy
of the rightful owner only
While the CA correctly nullified the petitioner’s certificates of title, the CA erred in
ordering thereconveyance of the entire subject property in the respondent’s favor. The
respondent himself
admitted that the 3,020- square meter portion covered
by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioner’s just
share in the subject property.
54
Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using thesame spurious
documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of
therespondent since he is not the rightful owner of the property covered by this title
 HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR v. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON

475 SCRA 73 (2005)

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title
for a period of ten years while extraordinary acquisitive prescription only requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs. Restar’s eldest child,
Flores, on the basis of a Joint Affidavit he executed with Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of
Tax Declaration in Restar’s name. The same covers a 5,918 square meter parcel of land in Aklan
which was among the properties left by Restar. Flores thereafter sought the issuance of another
Tax Declaration in his name. Flores later on died.

Ten years later, the heirs of Flores’ sisters, Dolores R. Cichon, et. al. (Heirs of Cichon) filed a
Complaint against Flores’ heirs for “partition of the lot, declaration of nullity of documents,
ownership with damages and preliminary injunction” before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aklan alleging that the widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to
finance the education of her children, to which they agreed on the condition that after the
children had finished their education, it would be divided into eight equal parts; and upon their
demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Flores‘ heirs refused, they claiming that they were
the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores. Flores‘ heirs claimed that they had
been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have
been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the
plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores’ death in 1989, Esmenia requested the
plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her children’s education, they contending that by
1977, the children had already finished their respective courses.

The RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to
constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by
prescription. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision finding that there was no adequate
notice by Flores to his co-heirs of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a
categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the
plaintiffs’ claim of ownership.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Heirs of Flores acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription

HELD:

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for
a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by
intestate succession. Heirs of Chichon never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their
claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the
present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and exercised
acts of dominion thereon — tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and
enjoying the produce thereof. Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of
the New Civil Code.

Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in
Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of
Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit “20”). If they
were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in
question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar,
considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were
still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of
the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the
execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion
of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever
contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the
exclusion of respondents. And Flores’ adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The trial court’s finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years
possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner — which
length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of the heirs of
Cichon, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner
of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights.
Dura lex sed lex.