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India-Pakistan Relations: A Framework for Peace in Future

Aneek Chatterjee

[Published in Riaz Shaikh (ed.), Back From the Brink: India-Pakistan Ties Revisited
(ISBN: 9699154233), Karachi: Ushba Publishing International, 2012]

[Abstract: For the last six decades, the key phrase in Indo-Pak relations has been like this: national
security first, bilateralism next. Foreign policy has very little scope to assert itself in such a situation.
Peace remained elusive not only in bilateral relations, but in South Asia as a whole due to prevailing
animosity between India and Pakistan. But this article is not all about India-Pakistan hostility or bitter
history of negative bilateralism; the purpose of this article is to search a positive and futuristic framework
for bilateralism. It endeavors to find factors for establishing peace in India- Pakistan relations]

Key Words: India, Pakistan, LoC, CBM, JWG, Peace, JATM, Bilateralism.

Introduction

India and Pakistan, two big nations of South Asia are geographically close, yet
mentally distant for the last six decades, since their origin as separate nations in 1947.
Unfavourable political history created by the partition of British India on religious grounds, the
issue of Kashmir, security apprehensions, and deep-rooted mistrust for each other had shaped the
negative mindset of political elites in both countries. Within twenty five years of their existence
as independent nations, India and Pakistan fought three wars. All the first three Prime Ministers
of India had to go to war against Pakistan. Though there was never a full-fledged war after 1971,
war-like situations always prevailed. The call for peaceful negotiation and friendship did arise
sometimes, but they were soon drowned in security concerns. For the last six decades, the key
phrase in Indo-Pak relations has been like this: national security first, bilateralism next. Foreign
policy has very little scope to assert itself in such a situation. Peace remained elusive not only in
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bilateral relations, but in South Asia as a whole due to prevailing animosity between India and
Pakistan. Security fears from the other led to nuclear weapons programme in India and Pakistan,
both of which are now nuclear (weapons) capable states. As a consequence, the tension of war
always prevails in the subcontinent.

This article is not all about India-Pakistan hostility or bitter history of negative
bilateralism, although reality compels an author not to ignore this history. The purpose of this
article is to search a positive and futuristic framework for bilateralism. It endeavors to find
factors for establishing peace in India- Pakistan relations. But before searching for peace, one
must know why the process of peace failed in bilateral relations. In this context, one must also
know the saga of mostly unsuccessful diplomacy during the last six decades since the creation of
India and Pakistan. The next section of the article throws some light on this legacy of
unproductive diplomacy between the two nations. A framework for future bilateralism for peace
would be presented thereafter.

Unproductive Diplomacy: A Brief Historical Sketch

A deconstruction of bilateral initiatives for peace during the last six decades since
1947, reveals a dismal picture. Very few bilateral initiatives could be earmarked as ‘productive’
efforts for peace and harmony during the last 64 years in India-Pakistan relations. These few
‘successful’ efforts are: (i) the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which resolved a water conflict; (ii)
the 1972 Simla Pact which allowed the two nations to move forward for peace after the 1971
war; (iii) the Agreement on not attacking each other’s nuclear installations in 1991; (iv) the
Lahore Declaration of 1999; and the Composite Dialogue process activated in 2004. A look at
the number of successful initiatives, - only five in 64 years, - would indicate that bilateralism is
still very weak between India and Pakistan. Out of these five, two are controversial, and not
accepted by all scholars as true indicators of bilateralism based on free and frank participation.
The 1972 Simla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declaration are the cases in point here. While
one Pakistani author believes that the Simla Agreement did instill an atmosphere of peace and
harmony in the subcontinent, another Pakistani scholar wishes to minimize its importance
because he believes that the Agreement was the product of special circumstance and mindset
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preceded by India’s victory in the 1971 war1. The Lahore Declaration of 1999 was followed by
an undeclared war in Kargil during May-July 1999. The Kargil incident fully negated the spirit
of the Lahore Declaration which called for peace in the region. Therefore only three non-
controversial efforts for peace could be identified in India-Pakistan diplomatic history of 64
years (at the time of writing this article in June 2011). This is surely unproductive bilateralism
spanning across several decades. This unsuccessful diplomacy is the product of long-held
mistrust, schism, and security concerns shared by two close neighbours. May 1998 nuclear
(weapons) testing by both India and Pakistan and the undeclared war in Kargil during May-July,
1999 caused a serious setback to bilateral negotiations. However, an insincere attempt was made
by both the nations to resume the process of dialogue when two leaders Musharraf and Vajpayee
met at Agra, the city of the Taj Mahal, in May 2000. But the ‘Agra Summit’ failed due to
differences over Kashmir. In December 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked, allegedly by
Pakistan-backed terrorists. Thereafter all bilateral efforts for peace were suspended.

The New Century: Fragile Bilateralism Continues

After a gap of more than two years since the attack on the Indian parliament in
December 2001 both countries agreed to revive the process of Composite Dialogue (CD) in
February 2004 (the CD was originally conceived in 1997). This became possible only after
General Musharraf assured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he would not allow any part of the
Pakistani territory to be used to support terrorism against India. Subsequently, the Foreign
Secretaries of the two countries met on February 18, 2004, to start the process of Composite
Dialogue. Trade and travel across the Line of Control (LoC) were envisaged as key elements of
the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan, among the seventy-two
CBMs proposed by India. After several meetings between the officials of the two countries, the
modalities for cross-LoC travel were finalized on February 16, 2005. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad
bus service was inaugurated on 7 April 2005 and the Poonch-Rawalakote route was opened for
travel in June 20, 2006. Later, the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan met on May 21, 2008
to discuss new and existing Kashmir-specific CBMs, and agreed to increase the frequency of
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Srinagar- Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakote Bus service and allow intra-Kashmir trade. On
July 18, 2008, the India-Pakistan Joint Working Group (JWG) on cross-LoC CBMs met in
Islamabad to simplify the procedure for issuing cross-LoC travel permits; to increase the
frequency of the Srinagar- Muzaffarabad bus service; to launch a postal service between the two
cities; and to expedite the cases of inadvertent crossings of the LoC; and discussed the list of
items to be allowed for trade through the truck service. A triple-entry permit for cross-LoC travel
was approved. The announcement in this regard was made on July 21, 2008, when the Foreign
Secretaries of the two countries met in New Delhi. Following this, cross-LoC trade on the
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch–Rawalakote routes commenced from October 21, 2008.
Twenty-one items were identified for duty free entry from each side.

However, on 26 November 2008, a group of terrorists, traced to Pakistan,

attacked several key places in Mumbai and killed hundreds of people. There is little doubt that
those who planned and carried out the attacks wanted fear and hatred between India and Pakistan
to deepen. In any event, India suspended the ongoing bilateral negotiations after the Mumbai
attacks and refused to revive the peace process till such time that the perpetrators of the Mumbai
attacks were arrested and put on trial. For a long time, the power elite in Pakistan tried to evade
responsibility for the Mumbai attacks. Finally, Pakistan conceded that the main culprit caught in
Mumbai, Ajmal Kasab, was a Pakistani national. The 26 / 11 incidents in Mumbai caused a
setback to bilateralism, and peace process.

The leaders of the two nations, however, continued to meet in different international
fora. Among various meetings, the one between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani during the Non-Aligned Movement summit at
Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt in 2009 attracted attention. On 16 July 2009 they first met for three
hours and together issued a Joint Communiqué. Singh reiterated the need to bring the
perpetrators of the Mumbai attack to justice. Gilani assured that Pakistan would do everything
within its power to do the same. They agreed that the two countries would share credible and
actionable information on any future terrorist threats. Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that
Pakistan had some information on such threats in Baluchistan and other areas. It was agreed,
very correctly, that action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process
and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss
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everything frankly with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues. Both expressed the need for
their countries to cooperate on issues of poverty, development and regional cooperation2.

The Joint Communiqué was welcomed in Pakistan as a triumph of Pakistani

diplomacy, especially that of Prime Minister Gilani. The reception in India was totally opposite.
Prime Minister Singh had to face outbursts from some opposition parties, especially from the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP pointed out that by agreeing to Pakistan’s request to look
into the alleged unwelcome activities of Indian intelligence in Baluchistan, Singh had virtually
conceded that India was involved in Baluchistan3. Also, objections were raised towards the
delinking of the resumption of the peace process to the Mumbai terrorist attacks. However, the
Indian prime minister defended his decision as a friendly gesture and not an admission of guilt.
He received full backing from the Congress president, Mrs Sonia Gandhi4. Moreover, Singh
emphasised that the peace process and contact with Pakistan on other issues would remain
suspended till such time that the culprits of the Mumbai attacks were brought to book. The
uproar in India over the Sharm el Sheikh Joint Communique shows that ‘peace diplomacy’ is a
very difficult task as far as India and Pakistan are concerned.

The two sides met on several occasions since then, mostly on the sidelines of
international organisations’ meetings. But nothing substantial could be achieved in these
‘courtesy’ dialogues. A chronology of these meetings would reveal their nature and lesser impact
on bilateral relations. On 27 September 2009, India’s Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her
Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (UNGA)
in New York. Later, on the same day Indian Foreign Minister Krishna and his Pakistani
counterpart Qureshi met on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York. But the deadlock persisted
with India asking Pakistan to take concrete action against the perpetrators of the 26 / 11 Mumbai
carnage. However, there was a welcome development in bilateral relations in February 2010,
when Foreign Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan resumed after a considerable gap,
in New Delhi. But the talks ended without any meaningful breakthrough with the two diplomats
only agreeing to stay in touch. In March 2010, the Biannual meeting between India’s Border
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Security Force and Pakistan Rangers took place. In early April 2010, two Prime Ministers,
Manmohan Singh and Gilani exchanged greetings at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington
D.C., but no talks took place. On 29 April 2010, Manmohan Singh and Gilani met again in the
Bhutanese capital Thimpu on the sidelines of the SAARC summit and directed their Foreign
Ministers and Foreign Secretaries to work out modalities to bridge the trust deficit. On 11 May,
2010, two Foreign Ministers, Krishna and Qureshi held telephonic conversation. Qureshi invited
Krishna to Islamabad in July 2010 for talks. India’s Home Minister P. Chidambaram visited
Islamabad on June 26 for the meeting of Home Ministers of SAARC countries. In July 2010,
Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna travelled to Pakistan for talks. But the talks did not yield
any results due to pressures put on the Pakistani civilian government by the Pakistani military5.
On 30 March 2011, Singh and Gilani met during the cricket world cup semifinals in Mohali. No
major announcements or policy decisions were made after this ‘unstructured’ talk. A leading
Indian newspaper commented after this cricket diplomacy: “not that the Singh-Yousaf Raza
Gilani meeting was followed by any major announcement. It was described as not really a
dialogue but informal conversations between Singh and Gilani. During the unstructured talks,
Singh touched upon a large number of issues that are yet to be resolved between the two
countries”6. On May 30-31, 2011 India and Pakistan held Defence Secretary-level talks on
Siachen, but failed to agree on the modalities for demilitarisation of Siachen. The two countries
decided to continue talks to arrive at a solution to one of the major vexed issues. Indian Foreign
Secretary Nirupama Rao and her Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir met in Islamabad on June
23-24, 2011. Nothing substantial came out of this dialogue except the routine release of a Joint
Statement

This chronology of mostly insignificant India-Pakistan dialogues in the new

century is indicative of the fact that the peace process has been disrupted due to several factors.
These factors are: mutual allegation of state-backed terrorist acts; unwillingness of the political
elites in both countries to resolve disputes; stubborn attitudes by the Pakistani military and Indian
right-wing parties to yield little space to the other nation; and above all, mutual mistrust and
disregard emanating from security concerns. Does bilateralism have any prospect in this
seemingly bleak scenario? What is the future of India-Pakistan relations: confrontationist or
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peaceful? What is to be done for establishing peace in bilateral relations? The next section of the
article offers some recommendations for peace in India- Pakistan relations.

A Framework for ‘Peace’ in Future

While many dialogues between India and Pakistan failed in the past, as observed
in the preceding analysis, one must not lose hopes in dialogues. After all, through bilateral
dialogues, a few things like the Joint Working Groups (JWG), CBMs, and the 1991 Agreement
on non-striking each other’s nuclear installations could be achieved. But these are certainly
minimums and the two nations must strive to achieve a lot more in order to normalize relations.
They must collaborate on non-traditional and non-political areas to boost their relations in future.
These possible areas are: (1) strategic collaborations; (2) green initiatives; (3) augmented trade;
(4) educational and cultural exchanges; (5) engagement for counter-terrorism; and (6) delinking
‘conditions’ from bilateral negotiations. In addition to these areas, an acceptable solution to the
Kashmir problem is a prerequisite for peace in the subcontinent, and must be found out. But the
Kashmir problem, a much discussed and debated issue in India-Pakistan relations has not been
highlighted here due to our search for non-conventional areas for future bilateralism. But
continuous efforts to solve the Kashmir problem, involving all major stake holders, must be
undertaken by both India and Pakistan for any future project for peace. It must be kept in mind
here that the Foreign Secretary level meeting of June 23, 1997 agreed to constitute JWGs on
many of these non-conventional areas when the meeting identified ‘eight areas of concern’ in
Indo-Pak relations which needed immediate attention. These eight areas were: (a) Peace and
security, including CBMs, (b) Jammu and Kashmir, (c) Siachen,(d) Wullar Barrage Project and
/Tulbul Navigation Project, (e) Sir Creek, (f) Terrorism and drug-trafficking, (g) Economic and
Commercial Cooperation (h) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, It was decided
that the first two issues would be dealt with at the level of Foreign Secretaries who would also
coordinate and monitor the progress of work of all the JWGs. This initiative of 1997 came to be
known as Composite Dialogue. But these were soon drowned in rivalry and mistrust again due to
the 1998 nuclear tests, the Kargil conflict, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, and the 26 / 11
incidents in Mumbai in 2008. Therefore, collaborations in many of these non-conventional areas
need special emphasis once again for future peace. The potentials of the ‘non-conventional’
segments outlined above, for future partnership and peace, are analysed below.
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Strategic Collaborations –India and Pakistan have entered into several military
CBMs, but they have never tried to be security and strategic partners, because both suffer from
mutual security fears. Many of these CBMs had only existed in principle, but were never
implemented because of the belief that dominant issues, such as those outlined in the composite
dialogue, needed to be resolved before the CBM process could be initiated. The Indian military
and the Pakistani military are engaged, separately, in joint exercises with many third countries
(like U.S.A.), but have never tried to collaborate between the two. Such collaborations may
dilute mutual security fears, and instill confidence and belief, not only among the men in
uniform, but also among the people in both countries. These two nations never tried to use the
fruits of military diplomacy as an instrument for peace-building in the subcontinent, although
they both have substantially strong military establishments7. Military diplomacy has always been
a strong mechanism for bilateralism, and its potentials are now vigourously pursued by many
nations around the globe. But sadly enough, India and Pakistan show inadequate responses to
military diplomacy. Exchange of military technology and information must be implemented and
continued for peace in future; these should not be confined only to CBM rhetoric.
Green Initiatives – Possible cooperation between India and Pakistan on
environmental issues has immense potential to generate trust and confidence. Collaboration on
climate change science in the glaciated headwaters of the Indus basin river system, especially
following the devastating floods of 2010, makes practical and political sense. Climate change is a
global concern and the Karakoram glaciers are a pivotal natural laboratory for understanding
these dynamics. Scientists from Pakistan and India have a clear and present interest in
collaborating on this matter as part of their obligations to international environmental
agreements8. Currently, there are around ten Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) satellites for
generating information on natural resources. Data from the IRS satellites are used for a variety of
applications such as drought monitoring, flood risk zone mapping, urban planning, forestry
surveys, environmental impact analysis, and coastal studies. Pakistan too possesses such
satellites9. The two countries can share data on climate and natural resources, and collaborate
closely to thwart environmental degradation in the subcontinent. A working group on sharing
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these resources could very well serve as a starting point for green engagement. This is a vastly
untapped area in bilateral relations, and needs to be used as a genuine CBM.
Augmented Trade – India-Pakistan two-way trade is woefully inadequate,
although this particular area has huge potential to surge ahead. In an age of economic diplomacy,
the two South Asian neighbours have failed to use the prospects of trade and commerce as a
potential instrument for peace in the region. But better be late than never. The two neighbours
must concentrate on increased trade to arrest mistrust and schism. Total trade (exports plus
imports) between India and Pakistan in 2009-2010 amounted to US$ 1849.26 million, up from a
paltry US $ 868.79 million in 2005-06. But still Pakistan accounts for less than 0.5 per cent of
India’s trade, and India accounts for a little over 1 per cent of Pakistan’s trade in 201010. India’s
trade with several other South Asian countries was higher than Pakistan in 2009-10. Table 1
below highlights India’s trade with some South Asian countries including Pakistan:

Table 1

India’s Trade with Some South Asian Countries in 2009-10

(in U.S. $ Million)

Name of the Country Total Trade (Import + Export)

Bangladesh 2688.44
Sri Lanka 2580.20
Nepal 1985.93
Pakistan 1849.26
Source: Department of Commerce, Export-Import Data Bank (Govt. of India).
[on line web] URL: http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp. Retrieved, June 15, 2011
___________________________________________________________________________

Table 1 reveals that India has stronger trade relations with three other South Asian countries in
comparison to Pakistan in 2009-10, although these three nations are smaller than Pakistan. The
comparative data bring out a sorry state of India-Pakistan trade in recent years. Surely politics
played havoc with economics as far as India-Pakistan relations are concerned. But in the age of
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globalization and economic diplomacy, it must be the other way: economics should play the
pivotal role in bilateral relations.

Economic relations have immense prospects for the future of bilateralism.

According to a study, the potential of formal trade between India and Pakistan is roughly 20
times greater than recorded trade. This means that at 2010 trade levels total trade between India
and Pakistan could expand from its current level of U.S. $ 1.84 billion to nearly U.S. $ 40 billion
if adequate care is taken to improve trade. The current constraints for increased trade between the
two nations are believed to be high tariff and nontariff barriers, inadequate infrastructure,
bureaucratic inertia, excessive red tape, and direct political opposition11. Some measures to
improve trade facilitation between India and Pakistan according to the study, could include:
easing restrictions on visas; opening additional road border crossings and bus routes; increasing
air links between the two countries; increasing the number of customs posts; and allowing
branches of Indian and Pakistani banks to operate in the other country. Some additional measures
are: Pakistan granting MFN (Most Favoured Nation in trade) status to India, and in turn
India significantly lowering tariff rates for goods of particular interest to Pakistan; facilitating
energy trade between the two countries; allowing trade in information technology; and
eliminating obstacles to foreign direct investments by the other country12. However, above all
these measures, the political will to implement these plans must persist.

Educational and Cultural exchanges – Like many other areas of bilateral

relations, this important segment has also been neglected during the last six decades. Educational
and cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan never took place in an organized manner,
supported by concrete plans and policy documents from both governments. Universities in India
and Pakistan are not regularly engaged in exchange programmes for students and faculty,
although they are tied with several other foreign universities for similar exchange programmes.
Use and exchange of research findings between universities and Reasearch Institutes of both
countries are almost absent. Similarly, cross border initiatives at the cultural sphere are mainly
limited to individual, private or NGO based enterprises, with very little governmental patronage
(the “Aman ki Asha” initiative launched by two leading media groups in both countries is a
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recent case in point). This bleak picture must be altered, because through educational and
cultural exchanges more and more people could be involved in the trust-building process. Both
governments must view positively, any collaborative plan between or among universities in India
and Pakistan. Easing of visa restrictions is a prerequisite for such plans and the governments
have a big role to play in this matter. An annual “Pakistan Week” in India, and “India Week” in
Pakistan could be encouraged for cultural programmes and exchanges. Without governmental
patronage and funding, such initiatives would be difficult to sustain for a long period. These
programmes would gradually ease tension and instill trust and confidence among people and
political elites in both countries.

Engagement for Counter-terrorism – Both India and Pakistan have entered

into counter-terrorism engagements with third countries (like USA, Russia) but have never
seriously taken up the issue between them. Although the two countries have established Joint
Anti Terror Mechanism (JATM), conceived in 2006 by Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf
when they met on the sidelines of the NAM Summit in Havana, the JATM was unsuccessful in
preventing acts of terrorism in both countries. Lack of inclination and trust among political elites
in two countries made the JATM practically ineffective. As one Pakistani author correctly
pointed out, “India-Pakistan anti-terrorism cooperation can rightly be classified as a ‘fisherman
model’ that is, you catch a fish when it comes to you! This implies an absence of a sustained and
pro-active interaction versus the issue of terrorism, undermining peace and stability within and
beyond their respective territorial boundaries”13. Like many CBMs between the two countries,
the JATM is just another institutional mechanism without much real action. Its role in countering
terrorist activities across the LoC is insignificant. The two governments periodically reiterate the
need to prevent terrorism in the subcontinent, but do little to minimize and control terror acts.
Such ‘eye wash’ measures must be replaced by concrete actions. The JATM must be thoroughly
activated; it must meet on a monthly basis, and not annually as per the current practice, and chart
out concrete plans to stop terrorism. Intelligent agencies in the two nations should regularly
exchange information about terrorists, and their harmful plans. Counter-terrorism requires the
coordinated actions of many agencies, civilian, police, paramilitary, and military. Political elites
across the border must allow different agencies to coordinate closely to effectively monitor and
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counter terrorist activities. The JATM must function as the apex body for such coordination. But
the big question here is: will the hardliners in both nations allow such coordination? Terrorism is
a threat to the survival of both nations, and joint efforts would be more fruitful than a single
nation’s fight against terrorism. The sooner the hardliners realize this, the better for both nations,
because state-sponsored terrorism would only ensure mutual destruction.

Delinking ‘conditions’ from bilateral negotiations – Both India and Pakistan

must keep the process of dialogue open, and must not put any condition upon bilateral
negotiations. It has been observed that both countries usually prefer to put conditions before top-
level bilateral talks; Pakistan normally raises the Kashmir issue, and India prefers to pursue the
issue of alleged Pakistan-backed terror activities in India (like the 2001 attacks on the Indian
parliament, and the 26 / 11 Mumbai attacks). As a consequence bilateral talks ultimately lead to
failed diplomacy. Both countries must come out of this mindset, and avoid putting conditions on
bilateral talks. Talks must be held between the two nations in a free and frank manner, without
any pre-imposed conditions. To achieve this, both countries must first delink themselves from
backing terrorist activities in the other territory. Engagement for counter-terrorism between India
and Pakistan, outlined above as a step for positive bilateralism, may help in the process of refrain
from state-backed terrorism. It would be easier to delink ‘conditions’ from bilateral talks if
political elites in both countries sincerely pursue the task of refraining from abetting terrorism in
the other territory.

Conclusion

India and Pakistan are two important nations of South Asia. Peace in South Asia is
largely dependent on cordial relations between India and Pakistan. But sadly enough, these two
nations failed to achieve cordiality in their relationship for the last six decades. But prolonged
political rivalry has become a thing of the past in the age of globalization and information
technology revolution. Very few areas in the world bear the burden of continuous tension due to
political rivalry, like the subcontinent. This continuous tension leads to security fears, and
inflated defence budgets. Two poor nations like India and Pakistan can hardly afford to divert
much of their revenues to plump defence budgets. The huge money these nations spend for
augmenting security could well be used for developmental purposes, if they were free from
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security fears. Currently, in the post-cold war world order, India and Pakistan continue to suffer
from cold war like situation where security concerns outpace positive bilateralism. Four and half
decades of continuous cold war caused havoc to the exchequer of a once-mighty state like the
Soviet Union. In this context, a few questions that naturally follow are: can poor states like India
and Pakistan afford to be engaged in a cold war like situation of continuous tension about
national security? Can they afford to spend such huge sums continuously for defence purposes?
Can they become socially advanced and economically prosperous when security budgets loom
large at the back of their thinking? These questions also lead us to think about the necessity of
peace in India-Pakistan relations. Peace is absolutely required to divert meager resources of these
two nations for developmental activities. The political elites of India and Pakistan must choose
between survival and extinction, because any future conflict between the two may turn into a
nuclear war. Even if no actual war takes place between the two, the ‘cold war’ psyche may
further impoverish them leading to decays from within. Continuous rivalry between these two
leading South Asian states would only ensure gloom and destruction. This unenviable scenario
desperately necessitates the establishment of peace in the subcontinent.
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Notes and References

1. Apparent support for the Simla Agreement comes from Moonis Ahmar. See in this
cntext, Moonis Ahmar, ‘For a South Asian Renaissance: To Help the Peace Processs,
India and Pakistan must Reclaim their Civilisational Heritage’, The Times of India, New
Delhi, June 29, 2011. For the opposite view, see, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Security in
South Asia: An Approach” in Shelton U. Kodikara (ed.), External Compulsions of South
Asian Politics, New Delhi, Sage publications, 1993, p. 43.
2. See in this context, ‘India, Pak issue joint statement on bilateral relations’, for the full text of the
Joint statement issued at Sharm El Sheikh, The Indian Express, New Delhi, July 16, 2009.

3. See the news item, ‘Nothing will wash away the shame of Sharm-al-Sheikh: BJP’, The Indian
Express, July 29, 2009.

4. See in this context, ‘Sonia rallies party behind PM stand on Pak’, The Indian Express, July 31,
2009.
5. See the news item, ‘To spite Zardari, Pak military foils peace talks’, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi, July 18, 2010.
6. See, Diptosh Majumdar, ‘No Breakthrough, but Singh and Gilani have a Good
Conversation’, The Times of India, New Delhi, March 31, 2011.
7. For potentials of military diplomacy as a mechanism for peace, see, Ali Ahmed, “India-
Pakistan Relations: Military Diplomacy vs Strategic Engagement”, Journal of Defence
Studies, Vol. 5, No.1, pp. 147-154.
8. See in this context, Alexander Carius, “Environmental Cooperation as an Instrument of
Crisis Prevention and Peace building: Conditions for Success and Constraints”, Study
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ), Berlin, Adelphi Consult GmbH, 2006, pp. 2- 26.
9. After successful launching and operation of BADR series of experimental Low Earth
Observational satellites in the 1990s and early 2000s, Pakistan’s Space and Upper
Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) plans to launch high resolution Pakistan
15

Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS) to meet the national and international user
requirements. The Badr satellite family has the following satellites (i) Badr-1 (digital
communication satellite); (ii) Badr-B (low earth observatory satellite); (iii) Badr-3
(Communication satellite); (iv) Badr-4 (communication satellite); (v) Badr-5
(telecommunication satellite); and (vi) Badr-6 (communication satellite). PRSS is
planned to be a progressive and sustainable program. Initially, SUPARCO plans to
launch an optical satellite with payload of 2.5 meter PAN in 700 km sun-synchronous
orbit by the end of year 2011, which will be followed by a series of optical and SAR
satellites in future. For more on Pakistan’s Remote Sensing Satellite programme, visit
SUPARCO’s home page, http://www.suparco.gov.pk/pages.prss.asp. Retrieved, June 16,
2011.
10. Source: Department of Commerce, Export-Import Data Bank (Govt. of India). [on line
web] URL: http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp. Retrieved, June 15, 2011.
11. Mohsin S . Khan, “India-Pakistan Trade: A Roadmap for Enhancing Economic
Relations”, Policy Brief, Washington D.C., Peterson Institute for International
Economics, 2009, pp. 1-4.
12. Ibid.
13. See in this context, Shabana Fayyaz, “Indo-Pak Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism:
Perspectives from Pakistan”, New Delhi, IPCS, Issue Brief 26, September 2009, p.1.