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 Air Force
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SMARTBOOK
Second
FirstEdition
Edition
(AFOPS2)

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OPERATIONS
& PLANNING
Guide to Curtis E. LeMay Center & Joint Air Operations Doctrine

The Lightning Press

Norman M Wade
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(AFOPS2) The Air Force Operations &

Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed.
Guide to Curtis E. LeMay Center & Joint Air Operations Doctrine
AFOPS2: The Air Force Operations & Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (Guide to Curtis
E. LeMay Center & Joint Air Operations Doctrine) is the second edition of our Air Force
SMARTbook. Topics and references of the 376-pg AFOPS2 include airpower fundamentals
and principles (Volume 1), command and organizing (Volume 3); command and control
(Annex 3-30/3-52), airpower (doctrine annexes), operations and planning (Annex 3-0),
planning for joint air operations (JP 3-30/3-60), targeting (Annex 3-60), and combat support
(Annex 4-0, 4-02, 3-10, and 3-34).

Copyright © 2019 Norman M. Wade e

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ISBN: 978-1-935886-75-4

All Rights Reserved

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No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or other means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval
systems, without permission in writing by the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to
The Lightning Press.
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Notice of Liability
The information in this SMARTbook and quick reference guide is distributed on an “As Is”
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accuracy of all data and contents, neither the author nor The Lightning Press shall have
any liability to any person or entity with respect to liability, loss, or damage caused directly
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(AFOPS2)
Notes to Reader
As the nation’s most comprehensive provider of military airpower, the Air Force
conducts continuous and concurrent air, space, and cyberspace operations.
Airpower exploits the third dimension of the operational environment; the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum; and time to leverage speed, range, flexibility, precision,
tempo, and lethality to create effects from and within the air, space, and cyberspace
domains. From this multi-dimensional perspective, Airmen can apply military power
against an enemy’s entire array of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
instruments of power, at long ranges and on short notice.
The Air Force conducts operations along a varying scale of military involvement and
violence, referred to as the range of military operations (ROMO). They range from
continuous and recurring operations such as military engagement, security cooperation,
and deterrence; through smaller-scale contingencies and crisis response operations, as
well as irregular warfare; to major operations and campaigns such as declared wars.
The Air Force designs, plans, conducts, and assesses operations according to an
effects-based approach (EBAO). There are some significant differences between

e
the focus of strategy during steady-state conditions and the focus during contingen-
cies and major operations. Contingency planning and steady-state planning employ
a common logical approach and process referred to as the common framework for
pl
operations, which helps to foster coherence in Air Force strategy creation.
The JFC’s estimate of the operational environment and articulation of the objectives
needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining components’ objec-
tives. The JFACC uses the JFC’s mission, commander’s estimate and objectives,
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commander’s intent, CONOPS, and the components’ objectives to develop a course
of action (COA). When the JFC approves the JFACC’s COA, it becomes the basis for
more detailed joint air operations planning—expressing what, where, and how joint
air operations will affect the adversary or current situation.
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Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appro-
priate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. The
targeting cycle supports the joint force commander’s (JFC) joint operation planning
and execution with a comprehensive, iterative and logical methodology for employing
ways and means to create desired effects that support achievement of objectives.

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doctrinal reference standard by military, national security and government professionals
around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library.

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plans and checklists in support of training. Visit www.TheLightningPress.com!
Introduction-1
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(AFOPS2) The Air Force Operations

& Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed.
Core Doctrine (Volumes 1-3)

Volume 1 Volume 2 Volume 3

Chap 1: Airpower Fundamentals & Principles (Volume 1)

Air Force Doctrine Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, is the senior statement of Air
Force doctrine. It discusses the fundamental beliefs that underpin the application of Air
Force capabilities across the range of military operations. It provides guidance on the
proper employment of airpower, sets the foundation for educating Airmen on airpower,
guides the development of all other doctrine, and provides insight where personal experi-
ence may be lacking.
Chap 2: Commanding & Organizing (Volume 3) e
Organization is critically important to effective and efficient operations. Service and joint
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force organization and command relationships—literally, who owns what, and who can
do what with whom, and when—easily create the most friction within any operation. Air
Force organization and preferred command arrangements are designed to address unity
of command, a key principle of war.
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Joint Air Operations Doctrine (Joint Pubs)

Joint Publication 3-30 Joint Publication 3-52 Joint Publication 3-60
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Command and Control Joint Targeting

of Joint Air Operations Joint Airspace Control

13 November 2014
10 February 2014 31 January 2013

JP 3-30 JP 3-52 JP 3-60

Chap 6: Joint Air Operations Planning (JP 3-30, 3-52, 3-60)

The JFACC uses the JFC’s mission, commander’s estimate and objectives, com-
mander’s intent, CONOPS, and the components’ objectives to develop a course of action
(COA). When the JFC approves the JFACC’s COA, it becomes the basis for more de-
tailed joint air operations planning—expressing what, where, and how joint air operations
will affect the adversary or current situation.
The JFACC is responsible for planning joint air operations and uses the joint operation
planning process for air (JOPPA) to develop a JAOP that guides employment of the air
capabilities and forces made available to accomplish missions assigned by the JFC. The
JFC will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and
deconfliction associated with joint air targeting to the JFACC and will ensure that this
process is a joint effort. The joint air tasking cycle process provides an iterative, cyclic
process for the planning, apportionment, allocation, coordination, and tasking of joint air
missions and sorties within the guidance of the JFC.

2-Introduction
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Doctrine Annexes (& Air Force Instructions)

-

ANNEX 3-01 COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS

ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
ANNEX 3-03 COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS
CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS

CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS
ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, Introduction to Counterair Operations SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
LINK TO THIS HEADING

ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE,

Introduction to Global Integrated ISR SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
Introduction to Counterland Close Air Support
Airman’s Perspective on Global Integrated ISR Counterair Operations
CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS Role of Counterland Operations CAS Objectives
Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles Air Refueling Requirements
CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance Requirements For Counterair
CAS Effects CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS
Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, Counterland Fundamentals Terminal Attack Control
Introduction to Global Integrated ISR
Policy and Guidance (ISR)
Introduction to Global Integrated ISR ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, Operations
SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
Airman’s Perspective on Global Integrated ISR Counterland Effects Types of Terminal Attack
Introduction Control
to Global Integrated ISR ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
Airman’s Perspective on Global Integrated ISR Air Interdiction Fundamentals CAS Execution SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles Airman’s with Non-JTAC
Perspective Personnel
on Global Integrated ISR
Cross-domain Integration and Integrated
Basic Global Global Integrated ISR
ISR Principles Organization And Command And Control
Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities Close Air Support Fundamentals FriendlyBasic
Fire Incident and Collateral
Global Integrated ISR Principles
Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities Command Relationships/Airspace Control CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS Types of AI and CAS Damage Avoidance
CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS Policy and Guidance (ISR) ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities
Joint Intelligence Policy
Preparation of the Operational
and Guidance (ISR) Environment ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE, Command And Control Resources And Requirements CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS
Introduction to Global Integrated ISR SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS Derivative Missions Associated with Types of CASand
Policy Request and Missions
Guidance (ISR) ANNEX 2-0 GLOBAL INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE,
Introduction to Global Integrated ISR SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS Cross-domain Integration Counterland Conditions for Effective CAS SURVEILLANCE & RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
Command and Organization of Global IntegratedGlobal
ISR Forces The Counterair Framework Airman’sand Global Integrated
Perspective ISR
on Global Integrated ISR Introduction to Global Integrated ISR
Cross-domain Integration
Airman’sand
PerspectiveIntegrated ISR Counterland and Unity of Effort Cross-domain Integration
ISR in the Air Operations Center
on Global Integrated ISR Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles Airman’sand Global Integrated
Perspective ISR
on Global Integrated ISR
Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles Planning Considerations Joint Intelligence Preparation of the ISR
Operational CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS Command and Organization
ISR Centers CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS Global Integrated EnduringEnvironment
Capabilities Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles
CATALOG OF DOCTRINE TOPICS
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the ISR
Operational
EnduringEnvironment Execution Considerations TheaterJoint Intelligence Preparation of the ISR
Operational
ISR Special Relationships
Global Integrated Capabilities Policy and Guidance Introduction
(ISR) to Global Integrated ISR
Air Interdiction Air Ground System (TAGS)
Global Integrated EnduringEnvironment
Capabilities
Policy and Guidance Introduction
(ISR) Assessment Command and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces Air Interdiction Objectives
Presentation of ISRCommand
Forces to Global Integrated ISR Airman’s Perspective on Global Integrated ISR Policy and Guidance Introduction
(ISR) to Global Integrated ISR
and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces ISR in the Air Operations Center Integration and Global Integrated ISR Air Interdiction Effects Command
Counterland and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces
Operations
Reachback and Distributed Airman’s Perspective on Global Integrated ISR Cross-domain
ISR in theOperations (ISR)Center
Air Operations
Cross-domain Integration and Global Integrated ISR ISR Centers
Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles
Types of Air Interdiction Requests ISR in the
Basic Planning Air Operations
Considerations
Airman’s Perspective on Global Integrated ISR
Center Integration and Global Integrated ISR
Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities Cross-domain Basic Global Integrated ISR Principles
ISR Centers ISR Special Relationships ISRPlanning
Centers and Force Execution
Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities Joint Intelligence Preparation Elements of Effective AI Operations Execution
Global Integrated ISR
ISR Special
and Homeland Operations
Relationships Policy and of the Operational
Guidance (ISR) Environment
ISR Special Relationships
Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities
Joint Intelligence Preparation
Policy and of the Operational Environment Presentation of ISR Forces Battlespace Geometry Coordination
Joint Intelligence Preparation
Presentation of ISR Forces
Guidance (ISR) Policy and of the Operational
Guidance (ISR) Environment
Reachback and Distributed Operations (ISR) Presentation of
Linear Coordination ISR Forces
Measures
Irregular Warfare and ISR
Reachback and Distributed Operations (ISR) Command and Organization of Global
Cross-domain Integrated
Integration andISR Forces
Global Integrated ISR
Command and Organization of Global Integrated Reachback and Distributed Operations (ISR)
Cross-domain Integration andISR Forces
Global Integrated ISR ISR in the Air Operations Center Non-linear Coordination Measures
Command and Organization of Global
Cross-domain Integrated
Integration andISR Forces
Global Integrated ISR
ISR in the Air Operations Center Global Integrated ISR
ISR and Homeland Operations
Centers ISR in the Air Operations Center
Force Protection and ISRIntegrated ISR and Homeland Operations
Global Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
ISR Centers Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Global Integrated ISR
ISR and Homeland Operations
Centers
ISR Special Relationships Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
ISR Special Relationships Irregular Warfare and ISR
Presentation of ISR Forces ISR Special Relationships
Intelligence Requirements
Irregular Warfare and ISR Command and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces
Presentation of ISR Forces
Command and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces Irregular Warfare and ISR
Presentation of ISR Forces
Reachback and Distributed
ISR in Operations (ISR) Center
the Air Operations Command and Organization of Global Integrated ISR Forces
Reachback and Distributed
ISR in Operations (ISR) Center
the Air Operations Force Protection and ISR Reachback and Distributed
Global Integrated Force
ISR Methodologies/Products
Protection and ISR ISR Centers ISR in Operations (ISR) Center
the Air Operations
ISR Centers Force Protection and ISR
Global Integrated ISR ISRand Homeland
Special Operations
Relationships ISR Centers
Global Integrated ISR and
ISR Homeland
Special Operations
Relationships Intelligence Requirements Global Integrated ISR and Homeland Operations
Appendix A: Intelligence Disciplines
Intelligence Requirements Presentation of ISR Forces ISR Special Relationships
Presentation of ISR Forces Intelligence Requirements
Irregular Warfare and ISR
Reachback and Distributed Operations (ISR) Presentation of ISR Forces
Irregular Warfare and ISR
Reachback and Distributed Operations (ISR) Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products Irregular Warfare and ISR
Appendix B: ISR Resources
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products Reachback and Distributed Operations (ISR)
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products
Force Protection and ISR Integrated ISR and Homeland Operations
Global
Force Protection and ISR Integrated ISR and Homeland Operations
Global Appendix A: Intelligence Disciplines Force Protection and ISR Integrated ISR and Homeland Operations
Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft
Appendix with an ISR Disciplines
A: Intelligence Mission Global
Intelligence Requirements Appendix A: Intelligence Disciplines
Irregular Warfare and ISR
Intelligence Requirements
Irregular Warfare and ISR Appendix B: ISR Resources Intelligence Requirements
Appendix B: ISR Resources Irregular Warfare and ISR
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products Appendix B: ISR Resources
Force Protection and ISR
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products
Force Protection and ISR Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft with an ISR Mission Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products
Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft with an ISR Mission Force Protection and ISR
Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft with an ISR Mission
Appendix A: Intelligence Disciplines
Intelligence Requirements
Appendix A: Intelligence Disciplines
Intelligence Requirements Appendix A: Intelligence Disciplines
Intelligence Requirements
Appendix B: ISR Resources
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products
Appendix B: ISR Resources
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products Appendix B: ISR Resources
Global Integrated ISR Methodologies/Products

Annexes
Appendix C: Multi-role AircraftA:
Appendix with an ISR Mission
Intelligence Disciplines
Appendix C: Multi-role AircraftA:
Appendix with an ISR Mission
Intelligence Disciplines Appendix C: Multi-role AircraftA:
with an ISR Mission
Appendix Intelligence Disciplines
Appendix B: ISR Resources
Appendix B: ISR Resources Appendix B: ISR Resources
Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft with an ISR Mission
Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft with an ISR Mission Appendix C: Multi-role Aircraft with an ISR Mission

Chap 3: Command & Control (Annexes 3-30 & 3-52)

Command and control (C2) and organization are inextricably linked. Forces should be
organized around the principle of unity of command. Clear lines of authority, with clearly
identified commanders at appropriate echelons exercising appropriate control, are es-
sential to achieving unity of effort, reducing confusion, and maintaining priorities. Airspace
control is defined as “capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effective-
ness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace.
Chap 4: Airpower (Annexes 2-0, 3-01, 3-03, 3-04, 3-05, 3-12,
3-13, 3-14, 3-17, 3-50, 3-51, 3-61, 3-17, 3-72)
Airpower entails the use of military power and influence to achieve objectives at all levels
by controlling and exploiting air, space, and cyberspace. Airpower is a vital component
of successful military operations and can often provide for decisive, rapid, and more ef-
ficient attainment of enduring advantage. It has been an asymmetric advantage for the
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United States in many operations. Defeating enemy forces has traditionally been the most
important of the tasks assigned to the military, and while that remains vitally important,
national strategic guidance increasingly emphasizes the importance of preventing conflict,
deterring adversaries, and shaping the operational environment so as to obtain continuing
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strategic advantage for the US and its allies.
Chap 5: Operations & Planning (Annex 3-0, AFI 10-401/421)
Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0 is the Air Force’s foundational doctrine publication on strategy
Sa

and operational design, planning, employment, and assessment of airpower. It presents the
Air Force‘s most extensive explanation of the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO)
and contains the Air Force’s doctrinal discussion of operational design and some practical
considerations for designing operations to coerce or influence adversaries. It presents doc-
trine on cross-domain integration and steady-state operations–emerging, but validated con-
cepts that are integral to and fully complement EBAO. A common framework of processes
helps to foster coherence in Air Force strategy creation through a process of operational
design, effects-based approach to planning operations, execution, and assessment.
Chap 7: Targeting (Annex 3-60)
Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate
response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. This process
is systematic, comprehensive, and continuous. Combined with a clear understanding of
operational requirements, capabilities, and limitations, the targeting process identifies,
selects, and exploits critical vulnerabilities of target systems and their associated targets
to achieve the commanders’ objectives and desired end state.
Chap 8: Combat Support (Annexes 4-0, 4-02, 3-34, 3-10)
The Air Force defines combat support (CS) as the foundational and crosscutting capability
to field, base, protect, support, and sustain Air Force forces across the range of military
operations. CS enables airpower through the integration of its functional communities to
provide the core effects, core processes, and core capabilities required to execute the Air
Force mission.

Introduction-3
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(AFOPS2)
References
The following primary references were used to compile AFOPS2: The Air Force Operations
& Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. All references are open-source, public domain, available
to the general public, and/or designated as “approved for public release; distribution is
unlimited.” AFOPS2: The Air Force Operations & Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. does not
contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

Air Force Core Doctrine Annex 3-59, Weather Ops (27 May 15)
Volume 1, Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15) Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb 17)
Volume 2, Leadership (08 Aug 15) Annex 3-61, Public Affairs (28 Jul 17)
Volume 3, Command (22 Nov 16) Annex 3-70, Strategic Attack (25 May 17)
Annex 3-72, Nuclear Ops (19 May 15)
Air Force Doctrine Annexes Annex 4-0, Combat Support (21 Dec 15)
Annex 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Ops (29
Annex 4-02, Medical Ops (29 Sep 15)
Jan 15)
Annex 3-0, Operations and Planning (04
Nov 16)
e Air Force Instructions
pl
AFI 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning &
Annex 3-01, Counterair Ops (01 Feb 16) Execution (w/Chg 4, 13 Mar 12)
Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare (12 Jul 16) AFI 10-421, Operations Planning for the
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Annex 3-03, Counterland Ops (17 Mar 17) Steady-State (25 Jun 15)
Annex 3-04, Countersea Ops (07 Nov 14) AFI 13-1AOC, Volume 3, Operational
Procedures-Air Operations Center (AOC) (w/
Annex 3-05, Special Ops (09 Feb 17)
Chg 1, 18 May 12)
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Annex 3-10, Force Protection (17 Apr 17)

AFI 13-103, AFFOR Staff Operations, Readi-
Annex 3-12, Cyberspace Ops (30 Nov 11) ness and Structures (19 Aug 14)
Annex 3-13, Information Ops (28 Apr 16)
Joint Publications
Annex 3-14, Counterspace Ops (27 Aug 18)
JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats
Annex 3-17, Air Mobility Ops (05 Apr 16) (May ‘18)
Annex 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (10 JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (12
Jul 15) Oct 16).
Annex 3-27, Homeland Ops (28 Apr 16) JP 3-14, Space Operations (10 Apr 18)
Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (16 Jul 13)
14)
JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (20 Sept 13)
Annex 3-34, Engineer Ops (15 Aug 17)
JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air
Annex 3-40, Counter-WMD Ops (05 Apr 16) Operations (10 Feb 2014)
Annex 3-50, Personnel Recovery (23 Oct JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control (13 Nov
17) 2014)
Annex 3-51, Electronic Warfare Ops (10 JP 3-60, Joint Targeting (31 Jan 2013)
Oct 14)
Annex 3-52, Airspace Control (23 Aug 17)
4-References
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(AFOPS2)
Table of Contents
Airpower Fundamentals
Chap 1

& Principles
I. Introduction to Air Force Basic Doctrine....................................1-1
- Global Vigilance.................................................................................................1-1
- Global Reach.....................................................................................................1-1
- Global Power.....................................................................................................1-1
II. Air Force Doctrine............................................................................................1-2
- Doctrine Defined..........................................................................................1-2
- Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine......................................................................1-3
II. Airpower........................................................................................1-5
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- The Third Dimension.........................................................................................1-5
I. The Foundations of Airpower............................................................................1-6
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II. Airmindedness.................................................................................................1-8
III. Range of Military Operations (ROMO).......................................1-9
I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)......................................................1-9
- Joint Operations, Unified Action, & the Range of Military Operations........1-10
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A. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.................. 1-11
B. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Operations............................... 1-11
C. Large-Scale Combat Operations............................................................. 1-11
II. Steady-State Operations.................................................................................1-9
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III. The Levels of War.........................................................................................1-13

IV. The Nature of War........................................................................................1-15
- Enduring Truths..........................................................................................1-14
- Traditional and Irregular War......................................................................1-15
- The Role of Culture....................................................................................1-15
V. Homeland Operations....................................................................................1-16
A. Homeland Defense..................................................................................1-16
B. Defense Support to Civil Authority...........................................................1-16
C. Emergency Preparedness.......................................................................1-16
IV. Principles of Joint Operations.................................................1-17
I. Principles of War.............................................................................................1-17
II. Additional Principles of Operations................................................................1-18
V. Tenets of Airpower.....................................................................1-19
A. Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution.........................................1-20
B. Flexibility and Versatility................................................................................1-21
C. Synergistic Effects.........................................................................................1-21
D. Persistence...................................................................................................1-21
E. Concentration................................................................................................1-22
F. Priority............................................................................................................1-22
G. Balance.........................................................................................................1-22

Table of Contents-1
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Chap 2
Commanding &
Organizing
I. Commanding U.S. Air Force Forces............................................2-1
- Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)...................................................2-1
I. COMAFFOR Operational Responsibilities.......................................................2-2
II. COMAFFOR Administrative Responsibilities...................................................2-3
III. Additional Responsibilities as the Service Component Commander..............2-4
II. Organizing U.S. Air Force Forces...............................................2-5
I. Regional versus Functional Organization.........................................................2-5
II. The Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF).......................................................2-5
A. AETF Organization....................................................................................2-6
- Numbered Expeditionary Air Force (NAEF)............................................2-8
- Air Expeditionary Task Force-X (AETF-X)..............................................2-8
- Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW)................................................................2-8
- Air Expeditionary Group (AEG)...............................................................2-8
- Air Expeditionary Squadron (AES).........................................................2-9
- Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level.....................................2-9

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- Provisional Units.....................................................................................2-9
B. AETF Command and Control Mechanisms.............................................2-10
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- Air Operations Center (AOC)................................................................2-10
- AFFOR Staff.........................................................................................2-10
III. Reachback / Distributed / Split Operations................................................... 2-11
IV. Command Relationship Models.................................................................... 2-11
V. Integrating Regional and Functional Air Force Forces..................................2-12
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VI. Transfer of Functional Forces to a Geographic Command..........................2-13
- Specification of OPCON............................................................................2-13
- Specification of TACON.............................................................................2-13
VII. Homeland Organizational Considerations...................................................2-14
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VIII. Integrating the Air Reserve Components...................................................2-16

IX. The Senior/Host Air Force Installation Commander.....................................2-16
III. Air Force Component Within the Joint Force.........................2-17
I. Joint Force Organizational Basics..................................................................2-17
II. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).................................2-18
III. Miscellaneous Joint Notes............................................................................2-18
IV. Air Force Component Presentation..............................................................2-19
- Theater-level component...........................................................................2-19
- Sub-theater-level component.....................................................................2-19
- Sub-theater-level AETF in support of a JTF...............................................2-19
V. Multi-Hatting Commanders/Span of Control..................................................2-20
VI. Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE)..................................2-21
VII. Control of Other Services’ Aviation Capabilities..........................................2-22
IV. Multinational & Interagency.....................................................2-23
I. Multinational Operations.................................................................................2-23
A. Command and Control of U.S. Forces in Multinational Operations.........2-24
- National Command...............................................................................2-24
- Multinational Command........................................................................2-24
B. Command Structure of Forces in Multinational Operations.....................2-25
II. Interagency Coordination..............................................................................2-26

2-Table of Contents
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Chap 3
Command &
Control
Command & Control Overview........................................................3-1
I. Key Considerations of Command and Control.................................................3-1
II. Command Authorities and Relationships.........................................................3-4
III. Operational and Administrative Branches of the Chain of Command............3-5
I. Air Operations Center (AOC)........................................................3-9
I. AOC Primary Functions....................................................................................3-9
II. AOC Organization & Functional Teams.........................................................3-10
III. JFACC Responsibilities (through the JAOC)................................................3-12
IV. Joint Liaisons in the AOC.............................................................................3-14
V. Specialty/Support Functions..........................................................................3-16
II. Air Force Forces Staff (AFFOR)................................................3-17
I. Air Force Forces Staff (AFFOR).....................................................................3-17
II. AFFOR Organization & Staff Directorates.....................................................3-18
III. AFFOR Staff Responsibilities.......................................................................3-20
IV. JFACC Staff..................................................................................................3-20

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III. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).................3-21
- The Joint Force Commander...........................................................................3-22
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I. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).........................................3-22
A. Authority...................................................................................................3-22
B. JFACC Responsibilities...........................................................................3-23
C. Typical JFACC Staff & Joint Air Operations Center Organization............3-24
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D. Tasking Component Forces.....................................................................3-26
E. Options for Establishing a JFACC...........................................................3-26
F. Joint Force Staff Option............................................................................3-27
G. JFACC Basing and Transition.................................................................3-28
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H. JFACC Communications System............................................................3-28

II. Airspace Control Authority (ACA)..................................................................3-28
III. Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)........................................................3-30
IV. Joint Air Operations C2 System....................................................................3-31
- Theater Air-Ground Control System (TACS)..............................................3-31
V. C2 of Joint Air Operations for DSCA and Homeland Defense.......................3-34
IV. Airspace Control........................................................................3-35
I. Airspace Control.............................................................................................3-35
II. Airspace Control Authority (ACA)..................................................................3-36
III. Airspace Control System (ACS)...................................................................3-37
- Airspace Control System Fundamentals....................................................3-38
- Airspace Control Procedures.....................................................................3-38
IV. Airmen’s Perspective....................................................................................3-37
V. Command and Organization..........................................................................3-40
A. Command and Control of Joint Air Operations........................................3-40
B. Air Operations Center (AOC)...................................................................3-40
C. Roles and Responsibilities of the Commander, Staff, and.......................3-42
Subordinate Organization(s)
VI. Cross-Domain Integration............................................................................3-41
VII. Planning Considerations.............................................................................3-44
VIII. Execution Considerations..........................................................................3-46
IX. Limitations of Airspace Control.....................................................................3-52

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Chap 4

Airpower
Airpower (Overview)........................................................................4-1
I. Applying Airpower.............................................................................................4-4
A. Airpower as Maneuver in Warfare..............................................................4-4
B. Parallel and Asymmetric Operations..........................................................4-4
II. Airpower and the Range of Military Operations...............................................4-5
I. Counterair Operations..................................................................4-7
- The Air Domain..................................................................................................4-7
- Air Control..........................................................................................................4-7
I. Air Control Relationships..................................................................................4-9
II. Counterair Operations...................................................................................4-10
A. Offensive Counterair (OCA).....................................................................4-10
B. Defensive Counterair (DCA).................................................................... 4-11
III. Planning Considerations...............................................................................4-12
IV. Combat Identification (CID)..........................................................................4-16

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II. Counterland Operations (AI & CAS).........................................4-17
I. Air Interdiction (AI)..........................................................................................4-20
A. Effects of Air Interdiction..........................................................................4-20
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B. Interdiction Objectives.............................................................................4-21
C. Types of Air Interdiction Requests...........................................................4-22
II. Close Air Support (CAS)................................................................................4-24
A. CAS Responsibilities...............................................................................4-25
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B. CAS Objectives........................................................................................4-25
C. CAS Effects.............................................................................................4-25
D. CAS Planning..........................................................................................4-26
III. Terminal Attack Control.................................................................................4-30
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- Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC).....................................................4-30

- Forward Air Controller FAC(A)...................................................................4-30
- Joint Fires Observer (JFO).........................................................................4-32
- Special Tactics Team (STT).......................................................................4-32
III. Countersea Operations.............................................................4-33
I. Countersea Operations..................................................................................4-33
II. The Maritime Domain....................................................................................4-33
III. (Air Force) Countersea Operations..............................................................4-34
IV. International Law..........................................................................................4-36
IV. Counterspace Operations........................................................4-37
I. Space Superiority...........................................................................................4-37
II. Space Operations Functions.........................................................................4-38
A. Space Situational Awareness (SSA)........................................................4-38
B. Counterspace Operations........................................................................4-38
C. Space Support to Operations..................................................................4-39
D. Space Service Support............................................................................4-39
III. Threats to Space Operations........................................................................4-40
V. Air Mobility Operations..............................................................4-41
I. Global Mobility Enterprise...............................................................................4-41
II. Command Relationships...............................................................................4-42
III. Types of Air Mobility Operations...................................................................4-43

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IV. Airlift..............................................................................................................4-48
V. Air Refueling..................................................................................................4-50
VI. Air Mobility Support/GAMSS........................................................................4-52
VII. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE).....................................................................4-54
VI. Global Integrated ISR Operations............................................4-57
I. Airmen’s Perspective......................................................................................4-58
II. Planning and Direction; Collection; Processing and Exploitation;.................4-59
Analysis and Production; and Dissemination (PCPAD)
III. Global Integrated ISR Enduring Capabilities................................................4-60
IV. Cross-Domain Integration and Global Integrated ISR..................................4-61
V. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)........4-62
VI. ISR in the Air Operations Center..................................................................4-63
VII. Intelligence Disciplines................................................................................4-64
VII. Strategic Attack (SA)...............................................................4-65
I. Strategic Attack and Warfighting Strategy......................................................4-66
II. Basic Characteristics.....................................................................................4-68
III. The Role of Airpower in Strategic Attack......................................................4-69
IV. Command and Control of Strategic Attack...................................................4-69
V. Elements of Effective Employment................................................................4-70
VIII. Nuclear Operations.................................................................4-71
I. Fundamentals of Nuclear Operations.............................................................4-72

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II. Strategic Effects: Deterrence, Assurance, Dissuasion, and Defeat...............4-73
III. Nuclear Surety..............................................................................................4-76
IV. Nuclear Command and Control System.......................................................4-78
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IX. Personnel Recovery.................................................................4-79
I. Personnel Recovery Functions.......................................................................4-80
II. Personnel Recovery Missions.......................................................................4-82
III. Personnel Recovery System........................................................................4-82
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IV. Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC)....................................................4-82
X. Special Operations....................................................................4-83
I. USSOCOM Core Activities.............................................................................4-84
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I. AFSOC Core Activities....................................................................................4-86

III. AFSOC Command Relationships.................................................................4-88
XI. Cyberspace Operations............................................................4-89
I. The Cyberspace Domain................................................................................4-89
II The Operational Environment.........................................................................4-90
III. Challenges of Cyberspace Operations.........................................................4-92
XII. Information Operations (IO)....................................................4-95
I. Role of Information Operations.......................................................................4-96
II. Airmen’s Perspective on IO...........................................................................4-96
III. Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs).......................................................4-98
IV. Organization of Information Operations........................................................4-99
XIII. Electronic Warfare (EW).......................................................4-103
I. Electronic Warfare Divisions.........................................................................4-104
A. Electronic Attack (EA)............................................................................4-104
B. Electronic Warfare Support (ES)............................................................4-105
C. Electronic Protection (EP).....................................................................4-105
II. Electronic Warfare (EW) Effects..................................................................4-106
XIV. Public Affairs (PA) Operations.............................................4-109
I. A Commander’s Responsibility.....................................................................4-109
II. PA Core Competencies................................................................................ 4-110
III. Public Affairs (PA) Activities........................................................................ 4-111
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Chap 5
Operations &
Planning
Operations & Planning (Overview).................................................5-1
I. Strategy............................................................................................................5-2
II. Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)..............................................5-4
III. The Common Operations Framework............................................................5-5
I. Operational Design.......................................................................5-7
I. Operational Design Fundamentals...................................................................5-7
II. Methods of Operational Design.......................................................................5-9
III. Operational Design Methodology.................................................................5-10
A. Framing the Operational Environment.....................................................5-10
B. Framing the Problem...............................................................................5-10
C. Developing the Operational Approach..................................................... 5-11
IV. Steady-State Design: Shaping the Operational Approach............................5-12
V. Practical Design: The Coercion Continuum...................................................5-14
II. Planning......................................................................................5-15

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I. Air Force Planning in the Context of Joint Planning.......................................5-15
II. Steady-State Planning...................................................................................5-16
III. Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning..........................................................5-18
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- Service Component Planning during Contingencies..................................5-19
- Contingency & Crisis Action Planning........................................................5-20
- DCAPES, Force Modules & UTCs........................................................5-20
- Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Orders....................................................5-21
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IV. The Relationship Between Operational Design and Planning......................5-22
- Lines of Effort.............................................................................................5-22
V. An Effects-Based Approach to Planning........................................................5-22
- Effects, Objectives & Actions (EBAO)........................................................5-24
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- Effects (Direct, Indirect, Intended, Unintended).........................................5-25

VI. Types of Plans..............................................................................................5-26
III. Execution...................................................................................5-27
I. Executing Operations.....................................................................................5-25
- The Tasking Cycle......................................................................................5-27
II. Contingency and Crisis Execution: The Tasking Cycle..................................5-28
III. Steady-State Execution................................................................................5-30
IV. Assessment...............................................................................5-31
I. Levels of Assessment.....................................................................................5-32
A. Tactical-Level Assessment.......................................................................5-32
B. Operational-Level Assessment................................................................5-33
C. Strategic-Level Assessment....................................................................5-33
II. Assessing Strategy........................................................................................5-34
III. Assessment Criteria......................................................................................5-35
IV. Assessment Measures.................................................................................5-36
- Measures of Performance (MOP)..............................................................5-36
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).............................................................5-36
V. Steady-State Assessment.............................................................................5-38
VI. Operation Assessment during Contingencies and Crises............................5-39
VII. Assessment Interpretation...........................................................................5-40

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Chap 6
Planning for
Joint Air Operations
Planning for Joint Air Operations (Overview)................................6-1
I. The Joint Air Estimate...................................................................6-3
- Joint Air Estimate of the Situation Template......................................................6-4
II. Joint Air Operations Planning (JOPPA)......................................6-5
Step 1. Initiation...................................................................................................6-8
Step 2. Mission Analysis......................................................................................6-8
Step 3. COA Development................................................................................6-10
Step 4. COA Analysis and Wargaming..............................................................6-14
Step 5. COA Comparison..................................................................................6-14
Step 6. COA Approval........................................................................................6-25
Step 7. Plan or Order Development..................................................................6-25
- Sample Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP).................................................6-16
III. Joint Targeting...........................................................................6-19
I. Joint Targeting Cycle......................................................................................6-19

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II. Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)...................................................6-20
III. Targeting Functions......................................................................................6-20
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IV. The Targeting Effects Team (TET)................................................................6-21
V. Target Development and Prioritization...........................................................6-22
IV. The Joint Air Tasking Cycle......................................................6-23
I. The Joint Air Tasking Cycle.............................................................................6-23
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II. Joint Air Tasking Cycle Stages.......................................................................6-26
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Chap 7

Targeting
I. Targeting Fundamentals...............................................................7-1
I. Target Fundamentals and Characteristics........................................................7-2
II. Types of Targeting...........................................................................................7-4
III. Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).............................................7-5
IV. The Targeting Cycle........................................................................................7-6
V. Targeting-Related Responsibilities..................................................................7-8
VI. Targeting Coordination & Liaisons................................................................7-10
VII. Establishing Collaborative and Support Targeting Relationships................7-12
A. Reachback...............................................................................................7-12
B. Distributed Operations.............................................................................7-12
C. Split Operations.......................................................................................7-12
II. Target Planning...........................................................................7-13
- Targeting Considerations during JOPPA.........................................................7-14
- Target Nomination...........................................................................................7-15
- Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO)..............................................7-16

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III. Deliberate Targeting..................................................................7-17

- The Air Tasking Cycle......................................................................................7-19
IV. Dynamic Targeting....................................................................7-21
I. Dynamic Targeting & the Tasking Process.....................................................7-24
A. Categories of Targets...............................................................................7-24
B. ROE, CID, PID & Target Validation..........................................................7-25
II. Dynamic Targeting Phases (F2T2EA)...........................................................7-26
III. Dynamic Targeting Engagement Authority....................................................7-28
IV. Dynamic Targeting Risks..............................................................................7-29
V. Changes and Limitations (Dynamic)..............................................................7-30
V. Targeting & the Air Tasking Cycle............................................7-31
I. Air Tasking Cycle Phases...............................................................................7-32
A. Objectives, Effects and Guidance............................................................7-32
B. Target Development.................................................................................7-35
C. Weaponeering and Allocation..................................................................7-45
D. Air Tasking Order (ATO) Production and Dissemination..........................7-48
E. Execution Planning and Force Execution................................................7-51
F. Assessment..............................................................................................7-52
VI. Targeting Assessment..............................................................7-53
I. Levels of Assessment.....................................................................................7-54
A. Strategic-Level Assessment....................................................................7-54

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B. Operational-Level Assessment................................................................7-54
C. Combat Assessment (CA)*......................................................................7-54
II. Measures and Indicators...............................................................................7-55
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III. Targeting and Legal Considerations.............................................................7-58

Combat
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Chap 8

Support
Sa

I. Combat Support............................................................................8-1
I. Combat Support Construct...............................................................................8-2
II. Command Relationships.................................................................................8-4
II. Engineering Operations...............................................................8-5
I. Engineering: The Airmen’s Perspective............................................................8-5
II. Engineer Functions..........................................................................................8-6
A. General Engineering..................................................................................8-6
B. Combat Engineering..................................................................................8-6
C. Geospatial Engineering.............................................................................8-7
III. Command and Organization...........................................................................8-8
III. Medical Operations.....................................................................8-9
I. Airman’s Perspective........................................................................................8-9
II. Air Force Medical Forces Employment..........................................................8-10
III. Air Force Medical Forces Objectives............................................................8-12
IV. Force Protection........................................................................8-13
I. Command Responsibilities for Force Protection............................................8-13
II. Force Protection and Command Relationships in a Joint Environment........8-16

8-Table of Contents
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& Principles
Chap 1
I. Introduction to
Air Force Basic Doctrine
Ref: Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15), introduction.

Air Force Doctrine Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, is the senior statement of Air
Force doctrine. It discusses the fundamental beliefs that underpin the application of
Air Force capabilities across the range of military operations. It provides guidance
on the proper employment of airpower, sets the foundation for educating Airmen on
airpower, guides the development of all other doctrine, and provides insight where
personal experience may be lacking.
As a whole, Air Force doctrine describes the various operations and activities that
underpin the Service’s ability to provide global vigilance, global reach, and global
power, which allows us to anticipate threats and provide strategic reach to curb
crises with overwhelming power to prevail.

Global Vigilance
Global Vigilance is the ability to gain and maintain awareness – to keep an

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unblinking eye on any entity – anywhere in the world; to provide warning and
to determine intent, opportunity, capability, or vulnerability; then to fuse this
information with data received from other Services or agencies and use and
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share relevant information with the joint force commander.
Global Reach
Global Reach is the ability to project military capability responsively – with
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unrivaled velocity and precision – to any point on or above the earth, and
provide mobility to rapidly supply, position, or reposition joint forces.
Global Power
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Global Power is the ability to hold at risk or strike any target anywhere in the
world, assert national sovereignty, safeguard joint freedom of action, and
achieve swift, decisive, precise effects.

The global context in which Airmen must anticipate and plan will remain ambiguous;
unlike the Cold War era, there is no single, clearly defined opponent against which
we can design forces and anticipate strategy. Air Force studies of the likely future
operating environment, such as the Air Force Strategic Environment Assessment,
provide a perspective on future trends and implications. Some key points are sum-
marized as follows:
• Changes are leading to a shift in the balance of power, a more multi-polar
world, and potentially adverse deviations to traditional US alliances and part-
nerships.
• The potential demand for certain types of operations—especially those associ-
ated with irregular warfare (IW), humanitarian operations, special operations,
information gathering, and urban operations—will likely increase, and effective
deterrence will likely become more challenging.
• Adversaries are gaining access to potential new and enhanced technologies
and their associated capabilities. These capabilities, which will challenge Air
Force operations include more lethal and precise weapon systems, enablers,
and defenses; improved capabilities in space and cyberspace; weapons of
mass destruction; and emerging and disruptive technology.
(Fundamentals & Principles) I. Intro to Basic Doctrine 1-1
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& Principles

II. Air Force Doctrine

Ref: Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15), pp. 4 to 21.

Doctrine Defined
Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which the military forces
or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgment in application” (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

“… fundamental principles…”
Doctrine is a body of carefully developed, sanctioned ideas which has been
officially approved or ratified corporately, and not dictated by any one individual.
Doctrine establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools
that commanders use to solve military problems. It is what we believe to be true
about the best way to do things based on the evidence to date.

“…military forces…”
For the purposes of Air Force doctrine, this includes all Airmen, both uniformed
and Department of the Air Force civilians. These constitute the uniformed warf-
ighters, their commanders, and the capabilities and support that they employ.

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They operate across the range of military operations (ROMO) and can be task-
organized into the “right force” for any particular joint contingency.
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“…in support of national objectives…”
Military forces should always conduct operations in order to support objectives
that create continuing advantage for our nation.

“…guide their actions… authoritative… judgment…”

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Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of fixed rules; it recommends, but does
not mandate, particular courses of action.
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Air Force doctrine describes and guides the proper use of airpower in military opera-
tions. It is what we have come to understand, based on our experience to date. The
Air Force promulgates and teaches its doctrine as a common frame of reference on
the best way to prepare and employ Air Force forces. Subsequently, doctrine shapes
the manner in which the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces.
Doctrine prepares us for future uncertainties and provides a common set of under-
standings on which Airmen base their decisions. Doctrine consists of the fundamental
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives;
it is the linchpin of successful military operations. It also provides us with common ter-
minology, conveying precision in expressing our ideas. In application, doctrine should
be used with judgment. It should never be dismissed out of hand or through ignorance
of its principles, nor should it be employed blindly without due regard for the mis-
sion and situation at hand. On the other hand, following doctrine to the letter is not the
fundamental intent. Rather, good doctrine is somewhat akin to a good “commander’s in-
tent:” it provides sufficient information on what to do, but does not specifically say how to
do it. Airmen should strive above all else to be doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound.
In the current turbulent environment of expeditionary operations and the arena of
homeland security, doctrine provides an informed starting point for the many decisions
Airmen make in what seems to be a continuous series of deployments. Airmen no
longer face the challenge of starting with a blank sheet of paper; with doctrine, Airmen
now have a good outline that helps answer several basic questions:

1-2 (Fundamentals & Principles) I. Intro to Basic Doctrine

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& Principles
• What is my mission? How should I approach it?
• What should my organization look like, and why?
• What are my lines of authority within my organization and within the joint force?
• What degrees of control do I have over my forces?
• How am I supported? Who do I call for more support?
• How should I articulate what the Air Force provides to the joint force?
From one operation to the next, many things are actually constant. Doctrine, properly ap-
plied, often can provide a 70-, 80-, or even 90-percent solution to most questions, allowing
leaders to focus on the remainder, which usually involves tailoring for the specific opera-
tion. Good doctrine informs, provides a sound departure point, and allows flexibility.
A study of airpower doctrine should draw a distinction between theory and practice.
Theory is less constrained by limited empirical context, and designed to encourage debate
and introspection with an eye towards improving military advantage. It is part of a vital,
iterative investigation of what works under particular circumstances, and why. Theoretical
discussion is critical to a successful military. This publication does not present a compre-
hensive theory for airpower. Instead, it focuses on those ideas and validated concepts,
grounded in experience and Service consensus. This is the heart of doctrine.
Finally, a study of airpower doctrine should also distinguish between doctrine and public
relations-like pronouncements concerning the Air Force’s role. There have been many of
the latter since the Air Force’s inception. Some have been developed with an eye towards

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influencing public and congressional perception of the Air Force’s role and value. Others
have been made in a strategic planning context (e.g., a “vision-mission-goals” develop-
ment process) that are a normal part of formal, long range corporate planning. Such
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statements are not enduring and not doctrine; they should be viewed in the context in
which they were created.

Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine

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The term “doctrine” is frequently (and incorrectly) used when referring to policy or strategy.
These terms are not interchangeable; they are fundamentally different. Because policy
and strategy may impact each other, it is important to first understand their differences
before delving into a discussion of doctrine.
Sa

Policy
Policy is guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be accomplished. It
reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues and not others. Thus, while doc-
trine is held to be relatively enduring, policy is more mutable and also directive. Policies
may change due to changes in national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal
reasons. At the national level, policy may be expressed in such broad vehicles as the
National Security Strategy or Presidential Executive Orders. Within military operations,
policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement
(ROE)—what we may or may not strike, or under what circumstances we may strike
particular targets.
Strategy
Strategy defines how operations should be conducted to accomplish national policy
objectives. Strategy is the continuous process of matching ends, ways, and means to
accomplish desired goals within acceptable levels of risk. Strategy originates in policy and
addresses broad objectives, along with the designs and plans for achieving them.
Doctrine
Doctrine presents considerations on how to accomplish military goals and objectives. It
is a storehouse of analyzed experience and wisdom. Military doctrine is authoritative, but
unlike policy, is not directive.

(Fundamentals & Principles) I. Intro to Basic Doctrine 1-3

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& Principles
Chap 1

II. Airpower
Ref: Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15), pp. 23 to 35.
Airpower is defined as “the ability to project military power or influence through the
control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, opera-
tional, or tactical objectives.” The proper application of airpower requires a compre-
hensive doctrine of employment and an Airman’s perspective. As the nation’s most
comprehensive provider of military airpower, the Air Force conducts continuous and
concurrent air, space, and cyberspace operations. The air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities of the other Services serve primarily to support their organic maneuver
paradigms; the Air Force employs air, space, and cyberspace capabilities with a
broader focus on theater-wide and national-level objectives. Through airpower, the
Air Force provides the versatile, wide-ranging means towards achieving national
objectives with the ability to deter and respond immediately to crises anywhere in the
world.
Airpower exploits the third dimension of the operational environment; the electromag-
netic spectrum; and time to leverage speed, range, flexibility, precision, tempo, and

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lethality to create effects from and within the air, space, and cyberspace domains.
From this multi-dimensional perspective, Airmen can apply military power against an
enemy’s entire array of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments
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of power, at long ranges and on short notice. Airpower can be applied across the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war simultaneously, significantly increas-
ing the options available to national leadership. Due to its range, speed, and flex-
ibility, airpower can compress time, controlling the tempo of operations in our favor.
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Airpower should be employed with appropriate consideration of land and maritime
power, not just during operations against enemy forces, but when used as part of a
team that protects and aids friendly forces as well.
Much of what airpower can accomplish from within these three domains is done to
Sa

critically affect events in the land and maritime domains—this is the heart of joint-
domain integration, a fundamental aspect of airpower’s contribution to US national
interests. Airmen integrate capabilities across air, space, and cyberspace domains
to achieve effects across all domains in support of joint force commander objectives.

The Third Dimension

Airmen exploit the third dimension, which consists of the entire expanse above the
earth’s surface. Its lower limit is the earth’s surface (land or water), and the up-
per limit reaches toward infinity. This third dimension consists of the air and space
domains. From an operational perspective, the air domain can be described as that
region above the earth’s surface in which aerodynamics generally govern the plan-
ning and conduct of military operations, while the space domain can be described as
that region above the earth’s surface in which astrodynamics generally govern the
planning and conduct of military operations.
Airmen also exploit operational capabilities in cyberspace. Cyberspace is “a global
domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network
of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” In contrast
to our surface-oriented sister Services, the Air Force uses air, space, and cyberspace
capabilities to create effects, including many on land and in the maritime domains,
that are ends unto themselves, not just in support of predominantly land or maritime
force activities.

(Fundamentals & Principles) II. Airpower 1-5

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& Principles

I. The Foundations of Airpower

Airpower stems from the use of lethal and nonlethal means by air forces to achieve
strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The Air Force can rapidly provide na-
tional leadership and joint commanders a wide range of military options for meeting
national objectives and protecting national interests.
Elevation above the earth’s surface provides relative advantages and has helped
create a mindset that sees conflict more broadly than other forces. Broader
perspective, greater potential speed and range, and three-dimensional movement
fundamentally change the dynamics of conflict in ways not well understood by
those bound to the surface. The result is inherent flexibility and versatility based on
greater mobility and responsiveness.
With its speed, range, and three-dimensional perspective, airpower operates in
ways that are fundamentally different from other forms of military power. Air-
power has the ability to conduct operations and impose effects throughout an entire
theater and across the range of military operations (ROMO), unlike surface forces
that typically divide up the battlefield into individual operating areas. Airmen gener-
ally view the application of force more from a functional than geographic standpoint,
and classify targets by generated effects rather than physical location.
By making effective use of the third dimension, the electromagnetic spectrum,
and time, airpower can seize the initiative, set the terms of battle, establish a
dominant tempo of operations, better anticipate the enemy through superior

e
observation, and take advantage of tactical, operational, and strategic oppor-
tunities. Thus, airpower can simultaneously strike directly at the adversary’s
centers of gravity, vital centers, critical vulnerabilities, and strategy. Airpower’s
pl
ability to strike the enemy rapidly and unexpectedly across all of these critical points
adds a significant impact to an enemy’s will in addition to the physical blow. This
capability allows airpower to achieve effects well beyond the tactical effects of indi-
vidual actions, at a tempo that disrupts the adversary’s decision cycle.
m
Airpower can be used to rapidly express the national will wherever and when-
ever necessary. The world at large perceives American airpower to be a politically
acceptable expression of national power which offers reasonable alternatives to
long, bloody ground battles, while making an impact on the international situation.
Sa

While a “boots-on-the-ground” presence may often be required, airpower makes that

presence more effective, in less time, and often with fewer casualties.
The Air Force provides national leadership and joint commanders with op-
tions, the threat of which may accomplish political objectives without the ap-
plication of lethal force. The means is embedded in the ability to respond rapidly
to crises anywhere in the world and across the ROMO.
The Air Force provides the unique ability to hold at risk a wide range of an
adversary’s options and possible courses of action; this is increasingly the
key to successful joint campaigns. Airpower is increasingly the first military instru-
ment brought to bear against an enemy in order to favorably influence the overall
campaign. Frequently, and especially during the opening days of a crisis, airpower
may be the only military instrument available to use against an enemy; this may be
especially true if friendly ground forces are not immediately present in a given region.
Air Force forces can respond rapidly to apply effects. The same spacecraft which
Airmen employ to observe hostile territory prior to the outbreak of hostilities provide
key intelligence to battle planners. The same aircraft which provide visible to battle
planners. The same aircraft which provide visible to battle planners. The same
aircraft which provide visible
Airpower is more than dropping bombs, strafing targets, firing missiles,
providing precision navigation and timing, or protecting networks. It is also a
way of influencing world situations in ways which support national objectives.

1-6 (Fundamentals & Principles) II. Airpower

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& Principles

II. Airmindedness
Ref: Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15), p. 33.

The perspective of Airmen is necessarily different; it reflects a unique appre-

ciation of airpower’s potential, as well as the threats and survival imperatives
unique to Airmen. The study of airpower leads to a particular expertise and a distinc-
tive point of view that General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold termed “airmindedness.”
Airmen normally think of airpower and the application of force from a functional
rather than geographical perspective. Airmen do not divide up the battlefield
into operating areas as some surface forces do; airmindedness entails thinking
beyond two dimensions, into the dimensions of the vertical and the dimension
of time. Airmen think spatially, from the surface to geosynchronous orbit. Airmen
typically classify targets by the effect their destruction would have on the adversary
instead of where the targets are physically located. This approach normally leads to
more inclusive and comprehensive perspectives that favor strategic solutions over
tactical ones. Finally, Airmen also think of power projection from inside the US to any-
where on the globe in hours (for air operations) and even nanoseconds (for space and
cyberspace operations).
Airmindedness impacts Airmen‘s thoughts throughout all phases of operations. It is
neither platform- nor situation-specific. Airmindedness enables Airmen to think and act
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, simultaneously if called for. Thus,

e
the flexibility and utility of airpower is best fully exploited by an air-minded Airman.

The Airman’s Perspective

pl
The practical application of “airmindedness” results in the Airman‘s unique perspective,
which can be summarized as follows.
• Control of the vertical dimension is generally a necessary precondition for control
m
of the surface
• Airpower is an inherently strategic force
• Airpower can exploit the principles of mass and maneuver simultaneously to a far
greater extent than surface forces
Sa

• Airpower can apply force against many facets of enemy power. Air Force-
provided capabilities can be brought to bear against any lawful target within an
enemy‘s diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and social structures simul-
taneously or separately.
• Air Force forces are less culturally intrusive in many scenarios
• Airpower’s inherent speed, range, and flexibility combine to make it one of the
most versatile components of military power
• Airpower results from the effective integration of capabilities, people, weapons,
bases, logistics, and all supporting infrastructure
• The choice of appropriate capabilities is a key aspect in the realization of airpow-
er. Weapons should be selected based on their ability to create desired effects on
an adversary‘s capability and will. Achieving the full potential of airpower requires
timely, actionable intelligence and sufficient command and control capabilities to
permit commanders to exploit precision, speed, range, flexibility, and versatility.
• Supporting bases with their people, systems, and facilities are essential to
launch, recovery, and sustainment of Air Force forces
• Airpower’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by Air-
men. Airpower can quickly intervene anywhere, regardless of whether it is used
for strategic or tactical purposes

1-8 (Fundamentals & Principles) II. Airpower

 Fundamentals
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& Principles
Chap 1
III. The Range of
Military Operations
Ref: Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15), pp. 36 to 47.

I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

Military operations slide along an imprecise scale of violence and scale of military
involvement, from theater-wide major operations and campaigns; to smaller scale
contingencies and crisis response operations; to engagement, security cooperation,
and deterrence (see figure, “The Range of Military Operations”). No two operations
are alike; scope, duration, tempo, and political context vary widely. Some opera-
tions may even change from one form to another, either escalating or de-escalating;
several may exist simultaneously. Military leaders carefully assess the nature of the
missions they may be assigned, not only to properly determine the appropriate mix
of forces but also to discern implied requirements. Some operations involve open
combat between regular forces; in others, combat may be tangential to the main
effort. In some operations, the US military’s contribution may not involve combat at
all; simply providing an organizational framework for an interagency force and key
elements of infrastructure may be all that’s required.

e
Range of Military Operations (ROMO)
pl
m
Sa

For further discussion on the ROMO from JP 3-0, see following pages (pp. 1-10 to
1-11). Refer also to Annex 3-0, Operations and Planning, and Joint Publication 1,
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

II. Steady-State Operations

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force have increased the emphasis
on the military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence portion of the
range of military operations (ROMO). A key milestone was the 2008 release of the
inaugural Guidance for Employment of the Force and complementary Joint Strategic

(Fundamentals & Principles) III. Range of Military Operations 1-9

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& Principles

Joint Operations, Unified Action, &

the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)
Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17) and Annex 3-0 (4 Nov 16), pp. 28 to 32.
Services may accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense
(DOD) objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more services in a single
operation, particularly in combat, through joint operations. The general term, joint opera-
tions, describes military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces employed
under command relationships. A joint force is one composed of significant elements,
assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating under a single joint
force commander. Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service
capabilities through unified action, and joint planning integrates military power with other
instruments of national power to achieve a desired military end state.
Unified Action
Whereas the term joint operations focuses on the integrated actions of the Armed Forces
of the United States in a unified effort, the term unified action has a broader connotation.
JFCs are challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence given the require-
ment to operate in conjunction with interorganizational partners. CCDRs play a pivotal role
in unifying joint force actions, since all of the elements and actions that comprise unified
action normally are present at the CCDR’s level. However, subordinate JFCs also integrate
and synchronize their operations directly with the operations of other military forces and the

e
activities of nonmilitary organizations in the operational area to promote unified action.
Unified action is a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and when
pl
appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and
nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort.
When conducting operations for a joint force commander, Army forces achieve unified
action by synchronizing actions with the activities of components of the joint force and
m
unified action partners.
The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)
The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military
operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from
Sa

military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and
limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. Use
of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities
helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between na-
tions or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

Range of Military Operations

Peace Conflict Continuum War

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Range of
Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Military
Operations

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

1-10 (Fundamentals & Principles) III. Range of Military Operations

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& Principles
Chap 2
V. Tenets of
Airpower
Ref: Volume 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (27 Feb 15), pp. 65 to 75.
The application of airpower is refined by several fundamental guiding truths. These truths
are known as tenets. They reflect not only the unique historical and doctrinal evolution of
airpower, but also the current appreciation for the nature of airpower. The tenets of air-
power complement the principles of joint operations. While the principles of war provide
general guidance on the application of military forces, the tenets provide more specific
considerations for the employment of airpower.

Tenets of Airpower
A Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution

B Flexibility and Versatility

C Synergistic Effects e
pl
D Persistence
m
E Concentration

F Priority
Sa

G Balance

The tenets of airpower are interconnected, overlapping, and often interlocking. Flex-
ibility and versatility necessitate priorities. Priorities determine synergies, levels of
concentration, and degrees of persistence. Balance calculations influence all opera-
tions. The combinations and permutations of interrelationships between the tenets
are nearly endless. However, the oldest tenet of airpower—centralized control and
decentralized execution—remains the keystone of success in modern warfare.
As with the principles of joint operations, these tenets require informed judgment
in application. They require a skillful blending to tailor them to the ever-changing
operational environment. The competing demands of the principles and tenets (for
example mass versus economy of force, concentration versus balance, and priority
versus objective) require an Airman’s expert understanding in order to strike the
required balance. In the last analysis, commanders accept the fact that war is incred-
ibly complicated and no two operations are identical. Commanders should apply their
professional judgment and experience as they employ airpower in a given situation.

(Fundamentals & Principles) V. Tenets of Airpower 1-19

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Chap 2
I. Commanding U.S.
Air Force Forces

Commanding
& Organizing
Ref: Volume 3, Command (22 Nov 16), pp. 43 to 48.
Organization is critically important to effective and efficient operations. Service and
joint force organization and command relationships—literally, who owns what, and
who can do what with whom, and when—easily create the most friction within any op-
eration. Air Force organization and preferred command arrangements are designed to
address unity of command, a key principle of war. Clear lines of authority, with clearly
identified commanders at appropriate echelons exercising appropriate control, are es-
sential to achieving unity of effort, reducing confusion, and maintaining priorities.
The key to successful employment of Air Force forces as part of a joint force effort is
providing a single Air Force commander with the responsibility and authority to properly
organize, train, equip and employ Air Force forces to accomplish assigned functions and
tasks. The title of this commander is Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR).
Operationally, the COMAFFOR should be prepared to employ Air Force forces as
directed by the joint force commander (JFC), and if directed be prepared to employ joint
air forces as the joint force air component commander (JFACC). In either event, the CO-

e
MAFFOR should also ensure that Air Force forces are prepared to execute the missions
assigned by the JFC. The requirements and responsibilities of the COMAFFOR and
JFACC are inextricably linked; both are critical to operational success.
pl
Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR)
The title of COMAFFOR is reserved exclusively to the single Air Force com-
m
mander of an Air Force Service component assigned or attached to a JFC
at the unified combatant command, subunified combatant command, or joint
task force (JTF) level.
Sa

If Air Force forces are attached to a JFC, they should be presented as an air expedi-
tionary task force (AETF).
• The AETF becomes the Air Force Service component to the JTF and the AETF
commander is the COMAFFOR to the JTF commander. Thus, depending on
the scenario, the position of COMAFFOR may exist simultaneously at different
levels within a given theater as long as each COMAFFOR is separately as-
signed or attached to and under the operational control of a different JFC.
• The COMAFFOR provides unity of command. To a JFC, a COMAFFOR
provides a single face for all Air Force issues. Within the Air Force Service
component, the COMAFFOR is the single commander who conveys command-
er’s intent and is responsible for operating and supporting all Air Force forces
assigned or attached to that joint force.
• The COMAFFOR commands forces through two separate branches of the
chain of command: the operational branch and the administrative branch.
The COMAFFOR should normally be designated at a command level above the
operating forces and should not be dual-hatted as commander of one of the subordi-
nate operating units. This allows the COMAFFOR to focus at the operational level.

(Commanding & Organizing) I. Commanding US Air Force Forces 2-1

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II. COMAFFOR Administrative Responsibilities

Ref: Volume 3, Command (22 Nov 16), pp. 47 to 48.
Commanders of Air Force components have responsibilities and authorities that derive
from their roles in fulfilling the Service’s administrative control (ADCON) function.

Commanding
& Organizing
• Within the administrative branch, the COMAFFOR has complete ADCON of all
assigned Air Force component forces and specified ADCON of all attached Air
Force component forces.
• The specified responsibilities listed below apply to all attached forces, regardless
of major command or Air Force component (regular, Guard, or Reserve).
• The COMAFFOR also has some ADCON responsibilities for Air Force elements
and personnel assigned to other joint force components (such as liaisons).
As the Service component commander to a JFC, the COMAFFOR has the following
responsibilities:
• Organize, train, and sustain assigned and attached Air Force forces for combat-
ant commander (CCDR)-assigned missions.
- Prescribe the chain of command within the Air Force Service component.
- Maintain reachback between the Air Force component and other supporting Air
Force elements. Delineate responsibilities between forward and rear elements.
- Provide training in Service-unique doctrine, tactical methods, and techniques.
e
- Provide for logistics and mission support functions normal to the command.
• Inform the JFC (and the CCDR, if affected) of planning for changes in logistics
pl
support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability suf-
ficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior
to final decision or implementation.
• Provide lateral liaisons with Army, Navy, Marines, special operations forces, and
m
coalition partners.
• Maintain internal administration and discipline, including application of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Sa

• Establish force protection and other local defense requirements.

• Provide Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to
ensure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies, and directives.
At the CCDR level, the Air Force Service component commander also has the follow-
ing additional responsibilities:
• Develop program and budget requests that comply with CCDR guidance on war-
fighting requirements and priorities.
• Inform the CCDR (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions
that may affect joint operation planning.
• Support the CCDR’s theater campaign plans through development of appropriate
supporting Service plans.
- Develop steady-state strategy to support the CCDR’s strategy.
- Contribute to the development of CCDR steady-state campaign plans and
security cooperation country plans.
- Develop campaign support plans in support of CCDR campaign plans.

(Commanding & Organizing) I. Commanding US Air Force Forces 2-3

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Chap 2
II. Organizing U.S.
Air Force Forces

Commanding
& Organizing
Ref: Volume 3, Command (22 Nov 16), pp. 49 to 66.
Organization is critically important to effective and efficient operations. Service and joint
force organization and command relationships—literally, who owns what, and who can
do what with whom, and when—easily create the most friction within any operation.

I. Regional versus Functional Organization

It is important to understand that airpower is flexible in organization and presenta-
tion. Because it encompasses a wide range of capabilities and operating environ-
ments, it defies a single, general model for organization, planning, and employment.
• Some assets and capabilities provide relatively localized effects and generally are
more easily deployable, and thus may organize and operate within a regional model.
• Other assets and capabilities transcend geographic areas of responsibility simultane-
ously, and thus have global responsibilities. Such forces may be better organized and
controlled through a functional model.
However, at the focus of operations within any region, it is possible to place the

e
collective capabilities of airpower in the hands of a single Airman through skillful ar-
rangement of command relationships, focused expeditionary organization, reach-
back, and forward deployment of specialized talent.
pl
There will usually be tension between regionally-organized forces and functionally-
organized forces. The former seek effectiveness at the point of their operation, while
the latter seek effectiveness and efficiency across several regions. At critical times,
the requirement for effectiveness may trump efficiency, and additional functional
m
forces may be transferred to the regional command and organized accordingly.
See following page (p. 2-7) for an overview and further discussion. See related
discussion on transferring forces and the complete discussion on “Transfer of
Sa

Functional Forces to a Geographic Command”, Annex 3-30, Command and Control.

These situations require careful and continuing dialogue between competing senior
commanders and their common superior commander.

II. The Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF)

The air expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational structure for Air Force
forces in response to operational tasking (i.e., established for a temporary period of
time to perform a specified mission). It provides a task-organized, integrated pack-
age with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection.
AETFs may be established as an Air Force Service component to a joint task force
(JTF), or as a subordinate task force within a larger Air Force Service component to
address specific internal tasks. If an AETF is formed as the former, the AETF com-
mander is also a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR). Otherwise, the AETF
commander is not a COMAFFOR, but reports to a COMAFFOR.
A single commander presents a single Air Force face to the joint force commander
(JFC) and results in clear lines of authority both ways.
• Internal to the task force, there is only one person clearly in charge; for a JFC,
there is only one person to deal with on matters regarding Air Force issues.
• The AETF commander is the senior Air Force warfighter and exercises the ap-
propriate degree of control over the forces assigned, attached, or in support of
the AETF.

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AETF Organization
Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov ‘14), pp. 58 to 61.
AETFs can be sized and tailored to meet the specific requirements of the mission. The
basic building block of an AETF is the squadron; however, a squadron normally does not
Commanding
& Organizing

have sufficient resources to operate independently. Thus, the smallest AETF is normally
an air expeditionary group; larger AETFs may be composed of several expeditionary
wings. Within an AETF, the AETF commander organizes forces as necessary into wings,
groups, squadrons, flights, detachments, or elements to provide reasonable internal
spans of control, command elements at appropriate levels, and to retain unit identity.
A. Numbered Expeditionary Air Force (NEAF)
Numbered expeditionary Air Force (NEAF) is the generic title for an AETF made up of
multiple expeditionary wings and is the largest sized AETF. NEAFs normally carry an ap-
propriate numerical designation based on NAFs historically associated with the region or
command. Subordinate expeditionary units may retain their own numerical designations.
Use of the NEAF designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards and
honors credit for the units and staffs within the NEAF. The NEAF commander is normally
a COMAFFOR.
B. Air Expeditionary Task Force-X (AETF-X)
“Air Expeditionary Task Force - X” (AETF-X) is the generic title used when a provisional

e
Air Force command echelon is needed between a NEAF and an air expeditionary wing
(AEW). AETF-X is used when a NEAF-level AETF establishes a subordinate provisional
command echelon consisting of two or more AEWs. An example of this usage is when
pl
the Commander, US Air Forces Central (USAFCENT) established two subordinate
AETFs, AETF-Iraq (AETF-I) and AETF-Afghanistan (AETF-A), to provide command over
multiple AEWs in their respective JOAs. Depending on why this echelon is established,
and its relationship within Service and joint force organizations, the AETF-X commander
m
may or may not be a COMAFFOR.
C. Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW)
AEW is the generic title for a deployed wing or a wing slice within an AETF. An AEW
Sa

normally is composed of the wing command element and subordinate groups and squad-
rons. AEWs normally carry the numerical designation of the wing providing the command
element. Subordinate expeditionary groups and support squadrons carry the numerical
designation of the parent AEW. Subordinate mission squadrons and direct combat support
units retain their numeric designation in an expeditionary status. Use of the AEW designa-
tion is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards and honors credit for the parent
unit. An AEW may be composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the AEW
is formed from units of a single wing. AEW commanders report to the COMAFFOR.
D. Air Expeditionary Group (AEG)
Air expeditionary group (AEG) is the generic title for a deployed group assigned to an
AEW or a deployed independent group assigned to an AETF. Unlike traditional “home
station” groups, which are functionally organized (i.e., operations group, maintenance
group, etc.), expeditionary groups that are deployed independent of a wing structure
should contain elements of all the functions to conduct semi-autonomous operations. An
AEG is composed of a slice of the wing command element and some squadrons. Since
Air Force groups are organized without significant staff support, a wing slice is needed to
provide the command and control for echelons smaller than the normal wing. An AEG as-
signed to an AEW carries the numeric designation of the AEW. An independent AEG nor-
mally carries the numerical designation of the unit providing the command element and/
or the largest portion of the expeditionary organization. Deployed squadrons (assigned
or attached) retain their numerical designation and acquire the “expeditionary” designa-

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Chap 2
III. Air Force Component
Within the Joint Force

Commanding
& Organizing
Ref: Volume 3, Command (22 Nov 16), pp. 67 to

I. Joint Force Organizational Basics

When a crisis requires a military response, the geographic combatant commander
(CCDR) will usually form a tailored joint task force (JTF). If Air Force forces are
attached to the JTF, they stand up as an air expeditionary task force (AETF) within
the JTF. The AETF commander, as the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR),
provides the single Air Force face to the JTF commander.
Other Services may also provide forces, and normally stand up as separate Army,
Navy, and Marine forces, each with their respective commander (Commander, Army
forces [COMARFOR]; Commander, Navy forces [COMNAVFOR]; and Commander,
Marine Corps forces [COMMARFOR]).

Joint Task Force Organization

Joint
eForce
Commander
pl
JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC
m
Air & Space Forces Land Forces Naval Forces SO Forces
Made Avaliable Made Avaliable Made Avaliable Assigned/Attached
Made Avaliable
Sa

COMAFFOR COMARFOR COMNAVFOR COMMARFOR

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps
Forces Forces Forces Forces

The designation of joint force air, land, maritime and special operations compo-
nent commanders (JFACC, joint force land component commander [JFLCC], joint
force maritime component commander [JFMCC], and joint force special operations
component commander [JFSOCC] respectively) is at the discretion of the joint force
commander (JFC). The JFC normally assigns broad missions to the component com-
manders; with each mission comes a specification of supported commander for that
mission. As an example, the JFC may designate the COMAFFOR as the supported
commander for strategic attack, air interdiction, and theater airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (among other missions).
The COMAFFOR should establish a close working relationship with the JFC to ensure
the best representation of airpower’s potential. The commander responsible for a mis-
sion should be given the requisite authority to carry out that mission.

(Commanding & Organizing) III. Joint Force Components 2-17

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VI. Joint Air Component

Coordination Element (JACCE)
Ref: Volume 3, Command (22 Nov 16), pp. 72 to 73.

Commanding
& Organizing
The commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), when acting as the joint force air
component commander may establish one or more joint air component coordination
elements (JACCEs) with other component commanders’ headquarters to better inte-
grate the air component’s operations with their operations, and with the supported joint
task force (JTF) headquarters (if the theater COMAFFOR is designated in support to a
JTF) to better integrate air component operations within the overall joint force.
The JACCE facilitates integration by exchanging current intelligence, operational
data, and support requirements, and by coordinating the integration of COMAFFOR
requirements for airspace coordinating measures, fire support coordinating measures,
close air support, air mobility, and space requirements. As such, the JACCE is a
liaison element, not a command and control (C2) node; thus, the JACCE normally has
no authority to direct or employ forces. The JACCE should not replace, replicate, or
circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the component/JTF staffs,
nor supplant normal planning performed by the air operations center and AFFOR staff.
Normally, the JACCE should:

e
• Ensure the COMAFFOR is aware of each commander’s priorities and plans.
• Ensure the COMAFFOR staff coordinates within their surface component/JTF
headquarters counterparts to work issues.
pl
• Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the COMAFFOR’s capabilities and
limitations (constraints, restraints, and restrictions).
• Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the COMAFFOR’s plan to support
m
the surface commander’s scheme of maneuver and JFC’s intent and objectives.
• Facilitate COMAFFOR staff processes with the surface/JTF commanders.
Provide oversight of other COMAFFOR liaisons to component/JTF headquarters
staffs, if directed.
Sa

• Ensure information flows properly between the AOC, sister components, and the
JFC.
See also p. 3-25 (JACCE).

(Commanding & Organizing) III. Joint Force Components 2-21

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B. Command Structures of Forces

in Multinational Operations
Ref: JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (Jul ‘13), pp. II-4 to II-8.

Commanding
& Organizing
No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one
absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate
shape of the command structure. Organizational structures include the following:

Integrated Command Structure

Multinational commands organized under Combined
an integrated command structure provide Integrated Commander
unity of effort in a multinational setting. A Headquarters Staff
good example of this command structure
is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Or- Integrated Integrated Integrated
Component Component
ganization where a strategic commander Component

is designated from a member nation, Personnel

Multinational Multinational Multinational
but the strategic command staff and the Services
Forces Forces
Forces
commanders and staffs of subordinate
commands are of multinational makeup.

Lead Nation Command Structure

A lead nation structure exists when all
member nations place their forces under
e Lead Nation
pl
Headquarters
the control of one nation. The lead nation
command can be distinguished by a
dominant lead nation command and staff National Forces US Forces National Forces
arrangement with subordinate elements Commander Commander Commander
m
retaining strict national integrity. A good
Personnel
example of the lead nation structure is National
Services US Forces
National
Forces Forces
Combined Forces Command-Afghan-
istan wherein a US-led headquarters
Sa

provides the overall military C2 over the

two main subordinate commands: one
predominately US forces and the other
predominately Afghan forces.

Parallel Command Structures

Under a parallel command structure, no Personnel
United States
National National
single force commander is designated. President
Services
and SecDef Government Government
The coalition leadership must develop a
means for coordination among the partic- Legitimizing
ipants to attain unity of effort. This can be Authority*

accomplished through the use of coor- Personnel

Combatant Lead Nation
dination centers. Nonetheless, because Services
Commanders Headquarters
of the absence of a single commander,
the use of a parallel command structure
should be avoided if at all possible. US National National National
Force Force Force

National Command
Command Authority Delegated to Multinational Force Cdr
Nation to Nation Communication

(Commanding & Organizing) IV. Multinational & Interagency 2-25

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Chap 3
Command & Control
Overview
Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), pp. 11 to 22.
Modern military operations require flexibility in execution to adapt to a wide variety of
scenarios; this drives a need to assemble the right mix of forces from the appropri-
ate Services to tailor the operation. This need to assemble the right forces drives a
corresponding need for proper organization, clearly defined command relationships,
and appropriate command and control mechanisms.
Command and control (C2) and organization are inextricably linked. Forces should

Command
& Control
be organized around the principle of unity of command. Clear lines of authority,
with clearly identified commanders at appropriate echelons exercising appropriate
control, are essential to achieving unity of effort, reducing confusion, and maintaining
priorities. To this end, commanders should be clearly identified and empowered with
appropriate operational and administrative command authorities, and appropriate
joint command arrangements should be clearly specified to integrate effects across
Service lines. Effective joint and Service organization is “rocket science.”
Air Force expeditionary organization and preferred command arrangements are de-

e
signed to address unity of command. The axiom that “Airmen work for Airmen, and
the senior Airman works for the joint force commander (JFC),” not only preserves the
principle of unity of command, it also embodies the principle of simplicity. When Air
pl
Force forces are assigned or attached to a joint force at any level, the senior ranking
Airman qualified for command should be designated as the commander, Air Force
forces (COMAFFOR) and the Air Force component should normally be formed as an
air expeditionary task force (AETF). As the senior Airman representing the Air Force
m
component, the COMAFFOR provides a single Air Force face to the JFC for all Air
Force matters.
Some capabilities may not be organic to the component and may be made available
through a supported/supporting command relationship, or be made available through
Sa

reachback or distributed C2 arrangements.

I. Key Considerations of Command and Control

Commanders should be cognizant of the authorities they are given and their relation-
ships under that authority with superior, subordinate, and lateral force commanders.
Command relationships should be clearly defined to avoid confusion in executing op-
erations. The command of airpower requires intricate knowledge of the capabilities and
interdependencies of the forces to be employed, and a keen understanding of the joint
force commander’s (JFC’s) intent and the authorities of other component commanders.

A. Unity of Command
Unity of command is one of the principles of war. According to Air Force doctrine
Volume 1, Basic Doctrine, “unity of command ensures concentration of effort for
every objective under one responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that
all efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common objective.”
Unity of command is not intended to promote centralized control without delegation
of execution authority to subordinate commanders. Some commanders may fulfill
their responsibilities by personally directing units to engage in missions or tasks.
However, as the breadth of command expands to include the full spectrum of opera-
tions, commanders are normally precluded from exercising such immediate control
over all operations in their area of command. Thus, C2 arrangements normally

(Command & Control) Overview 3-1

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include the assignment of responsibilities and the delegation of authorities between

superior and subordinate commanders. A reluctance to delegate decisions to sub-
ordinate commanders impedes operations and inhibits the subordinates’ initiative.
Senior commanders should provide the desired end state, desired effects, rules of
engagement (ROE), and required feedback on the progress of the operation and not
actually direct tactical operations.
Forces should be organized to assure unity of command in a carefully arranged
hierarchy with commanders clearly delineated at appropriate echelons. Within a
joint force, the COMAFFOR provides a single Airman in command of assigned and
attached Air Force forces.

B. Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution

Centralized control and decentralized execution are key tenets of C2; they provide
Airmen the ability to exploit the speed, flexibility, and versatility of airpower. Central-
Command
& Control

ized control is defined as “in joint air operations, placing within one commander the
responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military opera-
tion or group/category of operations” Decentralized execution is defined as “the del-
egation of execution authority to subordinate commanders” and other tactical-level
decision makers to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initia-
tive and tactical flexibility. Airpower’s unique speed, range, and ability to maneuver
in three dimensions depend on centralized control and decentralized execution to
achieve the desired effects.

e
Centralized control and decentralized execution are critical to the effective employ-
ment of airpower. Indeed, they are the fundamental organizing principles Airmen
use for effective C2, having been proven over decades of experience as the most
pl
effective means of employing airpower. Because of airpower’s potential to directly af-
fect the strategic level of war and operational level of war, it should be controlled by
a single Airman at the air component commander level. This Airman should maintain
the broad strategic perspective necessary to balance and prioritize use of airpower
m
resources that have been allocated to the theater. A single commander, focused on
the broader aspects of an operation, can best mediate competing demands for tacti-
cal support against the strategic and operational requirements of the conflict.
Air Force doctrine Volume 1, Basic Doctrine, embodies the Air Force’s commitment
Sa

to the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution of airpower.

C. Commander’s Intent
Two joint C2 concepts that nurture implicit communications are commander’s intent
and mission-type orders. By expressing intent and direction through mission-type
orders, the commander attempts to provide clear objectives and goals to enable
subordinates to execute the mission.
Guidance for planning and conducting air component operations is reflected in the
commander’s intent. Those granted delegated authority must understand the com-
mander’s intent, which is disseminated through such products as a JFC’s operation
plan; a COMAFFOR’s air operations plan and air operations directive; air, space,
or cyberspace tasking orders produced by appropriate Air Force components;
and annexes to such plans and orders that provide specific guidance for special-
ized functions. Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through
decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans. Roles and responsibilities
throughout the chain of command should be clearly spelled out and understood, not
only to ensure proper follow-through of the original mission intent and accountability
for mission completion, but also to provide continuity of operations in the event of
degraded communications between echelons. Communication between command-
ers and those to whom authority is delegated is essential throughout all phases of
the military operation.

3-2 (Command & Control) Overview

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Command Authorities and Relationships

Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), app. A.
Clear and effective command relationships are central to effective operations and organi-
zations. A working understanding of command terminology is essential to understanding
the relationships among components and the responsibilities inherent in organizations.
Combatant Command (COCOM)
Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) is defined as “nontransferable
command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform
those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to
Command

accomplish the missions assigned to the command.”

& Control

COCOM is exercised by commanders of combatant commands (CCMDs) as directed

by the President or the Secretary of Defense. COCOM should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations such as subordinate joint force commanders
and Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides full authority
to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander (CCDR)
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. (Note that the acronym “CO-
COM” refers only to the command authority, not to an individual or an organization.)
Operational Control (OPCON)
e
Operational control (OPCON) is defined as “the authority to perform those functions of
pl
command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and
forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction neces-
sary to accomplish the mission.”
OPCON is able to be delegated from a lesser authority than combatant command (com-
m
mand authority) (COCOM). OPCON normally provides full authority to organize com-
mands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative
direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit
Sa

training. For example, OPCON does not include the authority to change the Service’s
internal organization of its forces.
Component forces (e.g., the air expeditionary task force and its subordinate mix of
expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) “should remain organized as designed and in
the manner accustomed through training to maximize effectiveness.” (Joint Publication 1,
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States). OPCON should be exercised through
the commanders of subordinate organizations, such as subordinate JFCs and Service and/
or functional component commanders. Normally, JFCs exercise OPCON of assigned and
attached Air Force forces through the commander, Air Force forces.
Tactical Control (TACON)
Tactical control (TACON) is defined as “the authority over forces that is limited to the
detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area
necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.”
TACON is able to be delegated from a lesser authority than operational control (OPCON)
and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the
level of combatant command (CCMD). TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling
and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the
assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authorita-
tive direction for administrative and logistic support.
An example of TACON is when the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), acting
as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), produces an air tasking order that

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provides detailed instructions for joint air assets made available for tasking. For example,
a JFACC functioning as the area air defense commander (AADC) with TACON over Army
PATRIOT surface-to-air missile forces would have the authority to specify which asset/
battery would be responsible for providing which portion of the air defense coverage for

Continued on next page

the joint force (exact placement of the assets/battery necessary to achieve the required
coverage should normally be left to the Army component commander). The commander
exercising TACON is responsible for ensuring communications with the controlled unit.
Support
Support is a command authority that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another
force. It is used when neither operational control (OPCON) nor tactical control (TACON)
is appropriate. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) specifies support relationships be-
tween combatant commanders (CCDRs); the CCDR may establish support relationships
between components assigned or attached to the command.

Command
& Control
Over several years of experience, the most common example of this between CCDRs
is seen when a functional CCDR (e.g., Commander, USTRANSCOM) is established by
the SecDef as a supporting commander and a geographic CCDR (e.g., Commander,
USCENTCOM) is established as the supported commander. Within a combatant com-
mand, the best example is the last several years of experience within USCENTCOM, in
which the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) (Commander, USAFCENT) is the
supporting commander with the joint force commanders in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM
(redesignated Operation NEW DAWN) and ENDURING FREEDOM designated by Com-
mander, USCENTCOM as supported commanders.
e
The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commanders understand
the assistance required. The supporting commanders should then provide the assistance
pl
needed, subject to a supporting commander’s existing capabilities and other assigned
tasks. When a supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported com-
mander, the establishing authority should be notified by either the supported commander
or a supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a
m
solution.
An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relation-
ship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include:
the forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort; the time, place, level, and
Sa

duration of the supporting effort; the relative priority of the supporting effort; the authority,
if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of excep-
tional opportunity or an emergency; and the degree of authority granted to the supported
commander over the supporting effort.
There are four defined categories of support that a CCDR may direct over assigned or
attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mis-
sion objectives. These include:
• General support. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole
rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.
Continued on next page

• Mutual support. That support which units render each other against an enemy be-
cause of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy,
and their inherent capabilities.
• Direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.
• Close support. That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives
that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or
coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the
supported force.
A supported relationship does not include authority to position supporting units but does
include authority to direct missions or objectives for those units.

(Command & Control) Overview 3-7

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Chap 3
I. Air Operations
Center (AOC)
Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), app. B and AFI 13-1AOCV3,
Operational Procedures—Air Operations Center (2 Nov 11), w/Chg 1.

The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air component forces as the focal point
for planning, executing, and assessing air component operations. The AOC can
be tailored and scaled to a specific or changing mission and to the associated task
force the COMAFFOR presents to the JFC. Thus, for smaller scale operations, the
Air Force may not necessarily provide all of the elements described in the following

Command
& Control
sections if the situation does not warrant them.

I. AOC Primary Functions

The primary functions of the AOC are to:
• Develop air component operations strategy and planning documents that inte-
grate air, space, and cyberspace operations to meet COMAFFOR objectives
and guidance.

e
• Task, execute, and assess day-to-day air component operations; provide rapid
reaction, positive control, and coordinate and deconflict weapons employment
as well as integrate the total air component effort.
pl
• Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence and
weather information to support air component operations planning, execution,
and assessment.
• Integrate space capabilities and coordinate space activities for the COMAF-
m
FOR when the COMAFFOR is designated as space coordinating authority.
• Issue airspace control procedures and coordinate airspace control activities for
the airspace control authority (ACA) when the COMAFFOR is designated the
Sa

ACA.
• Provide overall direction of air defense, including theater missile defense
(TMD), for the area air defense commander (AADC) when the COMAFFOR is
designated the AADC.
• Plan, task, and execute the theater air- and space-borne intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission.
• Conduct component-level assessment to determine mission and overall air
component operations effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the
theater assessment effort.
• Plan and task air mobility operations according to the theater priorities.
The Air Operations Center (AOC) provides operational-level C2 of air, space, and
cyberspace operations. It is the focal point for planning, directing, and assessing
air, space, and cyberspace operations to meet JFACC operational objectives and
guidance. The regional scope of Geographic AOCs and disparate, global scope of
Functional AOCs, require AOCs to be tailored to efficiently and effectively plan and
execute their steady-state missions. Although the USAF provides the core manpow-
er for the AOC, other service components provide personnel in support of exercises
and contingency operations. The AOC coordinates closely with superior and subordi-
nate C2 nodes, as well as the headquarters of other functional and service compo-
nent commands to integrate the numerous aspects of air, space, and cyberspace
operations and accomplish its mission.

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II. AOC Organization & Functional Teams

Ref: AFI 13-1AOCV3, Operational Procedures—Air Operations Center (w/Chg 1, 18
May 12), pp. 12 to 16 and Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), app. B

The baseline AOC organization includes an AOC commander, five divisions (strategy, com-
bat plans, combat operations, ISR, and air mobility), and multiple support/specialty teams.
Each integrates numerous disciplines in a cross-functional team approach to planning
and execution. Liaisons from other Service and functional components may be present to
represent the full range of joint air, space, and cyberspace capabilities made available to
the COMAFFOR. The following provides a summary of the major elements of an AOC.
Note: The AOC is an AF unit. The AOC Commander is responsible for the day-to-day
readiness of the AOC. When the AOC is employed in contingency operations, the AOC
should be prepared to transition, with appropriate joint augmentation, to a JAOC and the
Command
& Control

AOC commander should be prepared to serve as the JAOC Commander.

JFACC

DIRSPACEFOR DIRMOBFOR

JAOC
Commander
e
pl
STRATEGY COMBAT COMBAT ISR AIR
Division PLANS OPS Division MOBILITY
Division Division Division
m

PLANS TARGETING OFFENSIVE ANALYSIS AIRLIFT

EFFECTS OPS CORRELATION CONTROL
GUIDANCE & FUSION
Sa

MASTER AIR DEFENSIVE AIR REFUELING

OPERATIONAL ATTACK OPS TARGETING
ASSESSMENT PLAN AND TACTICAL AIR MOBILITY
SENIOR INTEL ASSESSMENT CONTROL
ATO DUTY OFFICER
PRODUCTION ISR OPS AEROMEDICAL
INTERFACE EVACUATION
C2 PLANS CONTROL PROCESSING
TEAM EXPLOITATION
&
DISSEMINATION
MANAGEMENT

AOC Divisional Teams

Specialty Teams....................................................Support Teams

_______Direct
DirectControl
Control
- - - - - - - Indirect
Indirect Control
Control

Ref: AFI 13-1AOCV3 (w/Chg 1, 18 May 12), fig. 2.2. JAOC Organization and Functional
Teams.
See pp. 3-14 to 3-15 for a listing and discussion of joint liaisons in the AOC.

3-10 (Command & Control) I. Air Operations Center

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IV. Joint Liaisons in the AOC

Ref: AFI 13-1AOCV3, Operational Procedures—Air Operations Center (w/Chg 1, 18 May
12), pp. 81 to 83.

The specialty/support functions provide the AOC with diverse capabilities to help orches-
trate theater air, space, and cyberspace operations power. Many of these capabilities are
provided to the AOC from agencies external to the AOC organization. It is crucial to the
success of the AOC that these capabilities are integrated into the air, space, cyberspace,
and IO planning and execution process to ensure the best use of available assets. The
AFFOR staff coordinates regularly with the AOC and often provides specialized exper-
tise. Specialty/support functions are listed in the following paragraphs.

Component Liaisons
Command
& Control

Component liaisons work for their respective component commanders and with the
JFACC and staff. Each component normally provides liaison elements (e.g., BCD, SOLE,
NALE, MARLE, etc.) that work within the AOC. These liaison elements consist of expe-
rienced warfare specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and
coordination capabilities. They help integrate and coordinate their component’s participa-
tion in joint air, space, and cyberspace operations. The USAF component may require
other liaison augmentation to support AOC functions such as Coast Guard, space forces,
DIA, NSA, CIA, USAF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA),

areas. e
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and FAA in various operational and support

Refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Operations, for additional discussion.
pl
Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD)
The BCD supports the integration of air, space, and cyberspace operations with ground
maneuver. BCD personnel are integrated into AOC divisions to support planning, opera-
m
tions, air defense, intelligence, airlift/logistics, airspace control, and communications. In
particular, the BCD coordinates ground force priorities, requests, and items of inter-
est. One of the BCD’s most important functions is to coordinate boundary line and fire
support coordination line (FSCL) changes and timing. The BCD brings ground order of
Sa

battle (GOB) (friendly and enemy) situational awareness and expertise into the AOC and
will normally brief the ground situation/intelligence update. The BCD may also provide
current ground situation inputs to AOC teams for incorporation into daily briefings and
intelligence summaries.

Air and Missile Defense Commander (AAMDC)

The AAMDC is normally under the OPCON of the ARFOR commander or joint forces
land component commander (JFLCC). When directed by the JFC, AAMDC assets may
be placed in direct support of the JFACC/AADC as appropriate. The roles of the com-
manding general of the AAMDC are Senior Army ADA commander, theater Army air and
missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD), and deputy area air defense commander
(DAADC). Coordination and liaison functions between all three are essential to effective
air and missile defense operations within a given theater. The AAMDC and AOC intel-
ligence personnel build a collaborative TAMD IPB, which serves as the basis for JTAMD
strategies and plans. The AAMDC (attack operations section in coordination with the
intelligence section) submits TM target nominations directly to the AOC for inclusion as
JFACC nominated targets. The AAMDC also sends a robust LNO team (active defense,
intelligence, and attack operations personnel) to support the JFACC, AADC, and DAADC
requirements and may deploy the AAMDC TOC (Main) to the JFACC, AADC location.
As the senior Army air defense element at the AADC’s location, the AAMDC LNO team
serves as the primary interface at the AOC for all land-based active air defense.

3-14 (Command & Control) I. Air Operations Center

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Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE)

NALE personnel from the maritime components support the JAOC in integrating naval
air, naval fires, and amphibious operations into theater air operations and monitor and
interpret the maritime battle situation for the AOC.
Marine Liaison Element (MARLE)
The MARLE represents the Commander, Marine Corps Forces (COMMARFOR) and his
associated Aviation Combat Element Commander. The MARLEs will support the JFACC
in integrating Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) fires, maneuver, and Marine air into
the theater campaign and supporting JAOP. This team will be well versed in the MAGTF
Commander’s guidance, intentions, schemes of maneuver, and direct support aviation
plan.
Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)

Command
& Control
The Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) provides a
SOLE to the JFACC to coordinate and integrate SOF activities in the entire battlespace.
This joint SOLE is comprised of representatives from SOF aviation, intelligence, airspace,
logistics, Air Force STTs, Army Special Forces, Navy Sea-Air Land Teams (SEAL) and
Marine Special Operations Forces, as required. Depending upon command structure
agreements, the SOLE may or may not represent coalition or allied SOF. SOLE personnel
coordinate, integrate and synchronize with various AOC functional areas to ensure that
all SOF targets, SOF teams, and SOF air tasks and/or missions are deconflicted, properly

e
integrated, and coordinated during planning and execution phases. The prevention of
fratricide is a critical product of the SOLE’s efforts.
Specific SOLE functions include, but are not limited to, inputs into the JFACC strategy
pl
development; inputs into the ATO development; inputs into the ACO development;
real-time mission support coordination with the Joint Special Operations Air Component
Commander (JSOACC) with special emphasis on airspace deconfliction; operational and
intelligence inputs into the targeting process; and close coordination with the RCC/JPRC.
m
As the JFSOCC and the JFACC share a common environment throughout the entire bat-
tlespace, it is imperative that SOF aviation and surface forces are integrated into joint air,
space, and cyberspace operations planning and execution to prevent fratricide, duplica-
tion of effort, and conflict. Active SOLE participation in the development of air, space, and
Sa

cyberspace operations strategy and the supporting plans to the theater campaign plan
ensures that SOF efforts will, in fact, be a force multiplier for the theater campaign plan.
SOF normally pursues SOF-unique objectives, which prepare, shape or enhance broader
JFC objectives, they may be tasked to operate in support of conventional objectives or
require conventional support of their objectives.
Additionally, SOLE has the following responsibilities: provide inputs and guidance to the
IO team; act as the focal point for raising JFACC concerns or MISO objective/tasking to
the JFC for consideration, planning, and execution; provide support to the IO team MISO
effort to synchronize and deconflict MISO into the air, space, and cyberspace operations
campaign (e.g., leaflet drops, message broadcasts, and aircraft mission are included into
the ATO, etc.).
Coalition/Allied Liaison Officers
LNOs representing coalition/allied surface forces may improve AOC situational aware-
ness regarding the disposition of friendly forces, especially when those forces do not have
a mature TACS. They are also essential for unity of effort for coalition air defense opera-
tions and airspace deconfliction. When teamed with linguists, they can help overcome
language barriers with remote allied/coalition forces. In force projection scenarios into an
immature theater, the AOC Commander must anticipate the need for LNOs and actively
seek them out via the JFC staff, in-country military group, staff country team, or direct
contact with coalition forces, if necessary.

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Chap 3
II. (AFFOR) Air Force
Forces Staff
Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), app. C and AFI 13-103,
AFFOR Staff Operations, Readiness and Structures (19 Aug ‘14).

I. Air Force Forces (AFFOR) Staff

An Air Force forces (AFFOR) staff (sometimes also called an A-Staff) supports the
commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) at the combatant command, subordinate
unified command, or joint task force level.

Command
& Control
AFFOR Staff
C-MAJCOM / C-NAF Commander
Vice Commander

DS4 Chief of Staff

Service Liaison Elements
(NALE, SOLE, MARLO and BCD)

e Personal Staff
pl
SE Historian TWG IG IMO OSI FM SG
AOC Commander SJA Protocol JSRC Chaplain Corps
DM4 Combat
ARC LNO Host Nation LNO Coalition LNOs
Strategy Foreign Political Advisor FP PA
Plans
Division
Division
m
Combat
ISR
Operations
Division A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
Division Manpower Intelligence Operations Logistics
Plans and
Personnel & Surveillance & Requirements
Services Reconnaissance
Sa

Air
Mobility
Division
A6 A7 A8 A9
Installations and Strategic Plans Studies, Analysis,
Communications Assessments and
Mission Support and Programs
Lessons Learned

Note: AMC, AFSPC, AFGSC, USAFE - AFAFRICA , and PACAF have their AFFOR staff
embedded in the MAJCOM staff.

Ref: AFI 13-103, AFFOR Staff Operations, Readiness and Structures (19 Aug ‘14),
fig. 1. C-MAJCOM/C-NAF Headquarters Organization.
The AFFOR staff is the vehicle through which the COMAFFOR fulfills operational and
administrative responsibilities for assigned and attached forces across the range of
military operations, from steady-state operations in the engagement phase through
major operations and campaigns. In the steady state, the AFFOR staff performs
administrative responsibilities (organize, train, and equip), and also plans, executes,
and assesses operations in support of the CCDR’s theater campaign strategies and
plans. The AFFOR staff is also responsible for the operational planning that occurs
outside the air tasking cycle (e.g., deliberate planning). The AFFOR staff consists
of functionally oriented directorates, a command section, a personal staff, and any
required liaisons. The AFFOR staff issues mission type orders on behalf of the
COMAFFOR to direct subordinate units to execute actions outside of the scope of
the air tasking order (ATO). Examples of such orders may include setting a baseline
force protection condition, directing the move of a unit to another operating base, and
overseeing the execution of steady-state or security cooperation operations.
(Command & Control) II. AFFOR 3-17
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II. AFFOR Organization & Staff Directorates

Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), app. C.
The differing mission requirements of any given operation may dictate different task
emphasis and staff arrangements. Very large or complex operations, for example, may
require all staff directorates. In some cases, senior component liaison elements may
not be needed; in other cases, some of the required support may be obtained through
reachback. For very small or limited operations, a full AFFOR staff may not be required.
As a rule of thumb, the size and span of the AFFOR staff should normally be held to the
smallest number of divisions necessary to handle the demands of the operation; in some
cases, the COMAFFOR may combine some leadership positions (e.g., A-3/5; A-4/7).
Other operations may employ an AFFOR staff split into forward and rear elements, using
reachback to maintain unity of effort. In each case, based upon regional requirements,
the COMAFFOR determines the size, shape, and location of the AFFOR staff and air
Command
& Control

operations center (AOC) to best support the operation.

Command Section
The command section is normally composed of the commander (i.e., the COMAFFOR),
vice commander, chief of staff, command chief master sergeant, executive assistant, and
appropriate administrative support personnel. Within the command section, the chief of
staff coordinates and directs the daily activities of the AFFOR staff; approves actions, or-
ders, and plans, as authorized by the COMAFFOR; and ensures COMAFFOR decisions

e
and concepts are implemented by directing and assigning staff responsibilities.
Personal Staff
pl
The COMAFFOR has several staff activities that normally function outside the AFFOR
staff directorates. These activities fulfill specific responsibilities usually related to provid-
ing close, personal advice or services to the commander, or assist the commander and
the component staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters. These activities
may include the commander’s legal advisor, political advisor (POLAD), public affairs
m
advisor, inspector general, protocol advisor, historian, chaplain, counterintelligence and
special investigations, financial management, force protection, air mobility operations
(DIRMOBFOR), space operations (DIRSPACEFOR), medical, knowledge operations
management, and safety. Based on the needs of the operation and the requirements of the
Sa

AFFOR staff, some of these activities may be located within the AFFOR staff directorates.
Senior Component Liaisons
The senior liaison officer (LNO) from each component represents his or her respective
commander to the COMAFFOR. Subordinate LNOs from each component may perform
duties throughout the staff as required, providing weapon system expertise. LNOs should
be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of their units and Service.
Manpower and Personnel (A–1)
The director of manpower, personnel, and services is the principal staff assistant to
the COMAFFOR for total force accountability, personnel policy and procedures, the
establishment and documentation of manpower requirements, organizational structures,
mortuary affairs, food and force beddown operations, the coordination of exchange ser-
vices, and the provision of quality of life programs to enable and sustain forces assigned
and attached to the COMAFFOR.
Intelligence (A–2)
The director of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is the principal staff as-
sistant to the COMAFFOR for policy and guidance for all Air Force ISR operational architec-
tures, personnel, systems, and training. The A–2 provides intelligence support to forces within
the assigned area of operations. The A–2 does not normally direct ISR collection assets when
an ISR division is resident in the AOC; this is normally directed by ISR division chief.

3-18 (Command & Control) II. AFFOR

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Chap 3
III. (JFACC) Joint Force Air
Component Commander
Ref: JP 3-30, Command & Control for Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), chaps. 1 to 2.
JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and a concept
of operations (CONOPS) developed in coordination with their component command-
ers and supporting organizations. JFCs provide direction and guidance to subordinate
commanders and establish command relationships to enable effective spans of control,
responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and protection. The JFC’s air component should be
organized for coordinated action (through unity of command) using the air capabilities

Command
& Control
of the joint force. Centralized control and decentralized execution are key consider-
ations when organizing for joint air operations. While JFCs have full authority, within es-
tablishing directives, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among
subordinate commanders, they should allow Service tactical and operational groupings
to generally function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC
while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.
A JFC has three basic organizational options affecting C2 of joint air operations.
In each case a key task includes organizing the staff, C2 system, and subordinate

• A JFC may designate a JFACC e

forces that will plan, execute, and assess joint air operations.

• A JFC may designate a Service component commander

pl
• A JFC may retain C2
When designated, the JFACC is the commander within a combatant command,
subordinate unified command, or joint task force (JTF) responsible for tasking joint
m
air forces, planning and coordinating joint air operations, or accomplishing such op-
erational missions as may be assigned. The JFACC is given the authority necessary
to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.
Joint air operations are performed by forces made available for joint air tasking. Joint
Sa

air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts as an
integral and organic part of its own operations. Though missions vary widely within
the operational environment and across the range of military operations, the frame-
work and process for the conduct of joint air operations must be consistent.
Joint air operations are normally conducted using centralized control and decentral-
ized execution to achieve effective control and foster initiative, responsiveness, and
flexibility. In joint air operations centralized control is giving one commander the
responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military opera-
tion or group/category of operations. Centralized control facilitates the integration
of forces for the joint air effort and maintains the ability to focus the impact of joint air
forces as needed throughout the operational area. Decentralized execution is the
delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. This makes it possible
to generate the required tempo of operations and to cope with the uncertainty, disor-
der, and fluidity of combat.
Mission Command
Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execu-
tion based upon mission-type orders and is a key component of the C2 function. Its
intent is for subordinates to clearly understand the commander’s intent and to foster
flexibility and initiative at the tactical level to best accomplish the mission. While philo-
sophically consistent with historical C2 of air operations, modern joint air operations and
their unique aspects of speed, range, and flexibility demand a balanced approach to
C2. This approach is best codified in centralized control and decentralized execution.
(Command & Control) III. JFACC Overview 3-21
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B. JFACC Responsibilities
Ref: JP 3-30, Command & Control for Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), pp. II-2 to II-4.

The responsibilities of the JFACC are assigned by the JFC. These include, but are not
limited to:
• Develop a joint air operations plan (JAOP) to best support the JFC’s CONOPS or
OPLAN
• Recommend to the JFC air apportionment priorities that should be devoted to the
various air operations for a given period of time, after considering objective, prior-
ity, or other criteria and consulting with other component commanders
• Allocate and task the joint air capabilities and forces made available by the Ser-
vice components based on the JFC’s air apportionment decision.

Command
& Control
• Provide the JFACC’s guidance in the air operations directive (AOD) for the use
of joint air capabilities for a specified period that is used throughout the planning
stages of the joint air tasking cycle and the execution of the ATO. The AOD may
include the JFC’s apportionment decision, the JFACC’s intent, objectives, weight
of effort, and other detailed planning guidance that includes priority of joint air
support to JFC and other component operations
• Provide oversight and guidance during execution of joint air operations, to include

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making timely adjustments to taskings of available joint air forces. The JFACC
coordinates with the JFC and affected component commanders, as appropriate,
or when the situation requires changes to planned joint air operations.
pl
• Assess the results of joint air operations and forward assessments to the JFC to
support the overall assessment effort.
• Perform the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA), if designated.
m
• Perform the duties of the area air defense commander (AADC), if designated.
• Perform the duties of the space coordinating authority (SCA), if designated. The
SCA is responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating space operations
support in the operational area and has primary responsibility for joint space
Sa

operations planning, to include ascertaining space requirements within the joint

force. If the individual designated to be the JFACC is also designated to be the
SCA, he/she will normally designate a senior space officer who facilitates coordi-
nation, integration, and staffing activities for space operations on a daily basis.
• Perform the duties of the PR coordinator, as required.
• In concert with the above responsibilities, perform tasks within various mission
areas to include, but not limited to:
- Defensive counterair (DCA) and offensive counterair (OCA)
- CAS
- Airborne ISR and incident awareness and assessment
- Air mobility operations
- Strategic attack
- Air interdiction

(Command & Control) III. JFACC Overview 3-23

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C. Typical JFACC Staff &

Joint Air Operations Center Organization
Ref: JP 3-30, Command & Control for Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), pp. II-11 to II-13.
The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated command center and should
be staffed by members of all participating components, to include key staff positions, to
fulfill the JFACC’s responsibilities. A JAOC provides the capability to plan, coordinate,
allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or attached forces.
Through the JAOC, the JFACC monitors execution of joint air operations and directs
changes as the situation dictates.
Command
& Control

JFACC

Personal & Special Staff Personnel Communications

JAOC Director

Strategy Combat Combat ISR Air Specialty

Strategy
Plans
TET
Plans Operations
Offensive
Operations e
Analysis,
Correlation
& Fusion
Mobility
Aircraft
Control
& Support
Teams
PRCC
pl
Strategy MAAP Defensive Air Refueling
Guidance Operations Targets/ Control
Tactical
Operational ATO SIDO Team Assessment Air Mobility
Assessment Production Control
ISR Ops.
m
Information C2 Plans Interface Aeromedical
Operations Control PED Mgmt. Evacuation

Liaison Elements
Sa

AAMDC AFLE BCD MARLE NALE SOLE USTRANSCOM

Unit Liaisons
Interagency Multinational
NGOs IGOs Contractors
Liaisons Liaisons

JAOC organizations may differ. Elements that should be common to all JAOCs are the
strategy division (SD), combat plans division (CPD), ISR division, air mobility division
(AMD), and combat operations division (COD). Divisions, cells, or teams within the JAOC
should be established as needed.
Refer to JP 3-30, Appendix E, “Joint Air Operations Center Divisions and Descriptions,”
for further discussion.
The JAOC director is responsible to the JFACC for integrating the planning, coordinating,
allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing tasks for all joint air operations, and coordi-
nates with the director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR) to meet airlift and tanker priorities
with support of United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) mobility forces.
Planning future joint air operations and assessing the effectiveness of past operations is
usually the responsibility of the SD, while the CPD is usually devoted to near-term plan-
ning and drafting of the daily ATO. Execution of the daily ATO is carried out by the COD
and closely follows the action of current joint operations, shifting air missions from their
scheduled times or targets, and making other adjustments as the situation requires.

3-24 (Command & Control) III. JFACC Overview

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Theater Air-Ground Control Systems (TACS)

Ref: Annex 3-30, Command and Control (7 Nov 2014), app. D.
The theater air control system (TACS) is the Air Force’s mechanism for commanding
and controlling theater airpower. It consists of airborne and ground elements to conduct
tailored command and control (C2) of airpower operations throughout the range of mili-
tary operations, including counterair and counterland operations, airspace control, and
coordination of space mission support not resident within theater.
When the TACS is combined with other components’ C2 elements, such as the Army air-
ground system, the Navy tactical air control system, and the Marine Corps air command
and control system, they become the theater air-ground system (TAGS), and collectively
support the JFACC.
For a description of each Service’s TAGS element, refer to AFTTP 3-2.17, TAGS.
Command
& Control

The TACS is divided into ground and airborne elements as described below.

Key Air Force and Army Components of the Theater

Air Control System: Ar my Air-Ground System

FAC(A) JSTARS

e AWACS CRC JFC

pl
Air
Component
Land
AOC Component/
JTF/Corps
m

BCD ASOG*
II X XX
Sa

Battalion Brigade Division

ADAM/ Airspace GLD

TACP BAE Element
WOC
TACP ASOS* (WG, GP, SQN)

Joint Air Request Net

TACS-AAGS Connectivity

*Exact make up and capabilities of the ASOG/ASOS tailored to match the mission assigned to the corps/division.
The ASOC is normally collocated with the senior Army tactical echelon.

NOTE:
Coordination is effected between all organizations for effective/efficient operations.

Ref: JP 3-30 (Feb ‘14), fig. II-3. Key Air Force and Army Components of the Theater Air
Control System: Army Air-Ground System.

3-32 (Command & Control) III. JFACC Overview

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Ground TACS Elements

Ground TACS elements include the CRCs, the ASOC, and TACPs.
• The control and reporting center (CRC) is subordinate to the AOC and conducts
air surveillance and supports strategic attack, counterair, counterland, air refueling
operations, and other airpower functions/missions as directed. Responsibility as
the region/sector air defense commander may be decentralized to the CRC, which
acts as the primary integration point for air defense fighters and air defense artillery
(ADA) fire control in its assigned area. It also enhances the joint forces’ situational
awareness by disseminating the air picture over data-links. The CRC may deploy
mobile radars and associated communications equipment to expand radar cover-
age and communications range within its assigned operating area.
• The air support operations center (ASOC), which reports to the AOC, receives,
coordinates, and processes air support requests from subordinate TACPs, which

Command
& Control
are transmitted through the joint air request net (JARN). ASOCs distribute allocated
sorties to satisfy requests for air support and integrate those missions with the sup-
ported units’ fires and maneuver. An ASOC is normally tasked to support an Army
unit but can also support units from other organizations (e.g., special operations,
coalition forces). It may also augment other missions requiring C2 of air assets
(e.g., humanitarian efforts). The AOC is the senior element within the theater air
control system (TACS). The TACS includes the AOC plus subordinate ground and
airborne elements, and is directly involved in the command and control of most air

e
missions. Collectively, the TACS has the capability to plan, direct, integrate, and
control all air, space, and cyberspace forces assigned, attached, or made available
for tasking; monitor the actions of both friendly and enemy forces; plan, direct, co-
pl
ordinate, and control air defense and airspace control; and coordinate for required
space and cyberspace support.
• Tactical air control party (TACPs) are aligned with Army maneuver elements,
battalion through division level. They are primarily responsible for decentralized
m
execution of close air support (CAS) operations. TACPs request, coordinate, and
control CAS missions as required. For more information on TACPs and ASOCs,
refer to Annex 3-03, Counterland. See also pp. 4-17 to 4-32 for discussion of CAS.

Airborne TACS Elements

Sa

Airborne elements of the TACS include AWACS, JSTARS, and the (FAC [A]).
• AWACS is subordinate to the AOC and conducts air and maritime surveillance
and supports strategic attack, counterair, counterland, countersea, air refueling
operations, and other airpower functions/missions as directed. Responsibility as the
region/sector air defense commander may be decentralized to AWACS, which acts
as the primary integration point for air defense fighters and ADA fire control in its
assigned area. It also enhances the joint forces’ situational awareness by dissemi-
nating the air and maritime picture over data-links.
• JSTARS conducts ground and maritime surveillance and supports strategic attack,
counterair, counterland, countersea, and other airpower functions/missions as
directed. It primarily provides dedicated support to ground commanders and attack
support functions to friendly offensive and defensive air elements and may be em-
ployed as an airborne extension to the ASOC. It also enhances the joint forces’ situ-
ational awareness by disseminating the ground and maritime picture over datalinks.
• The forward air controller(airborne) [FAC(A)] is an airborne extension of the
TACP and has the authority to direct aircraft delivering ordnance to a specific target
cleared by the ground commander. The FAC(A) provides additional flexibility in the
operational environment by enabling rapid coordination and execution of air opera-
tions. It also enhances the TACS’ situational awareness by disseminating informa-
tion on the flow of aircraft on target.

(Command & Control) III. JFACC Overview 3-33

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To better organize operational airspace three characterizations exist:

Permissive Combat Airspace

A low risk exists for US and coalition aircraft operations within the airspace
of interest. Operations can expect little to no use of adversary electronic war-
fare, communications jamming, anti-aircraft systems, or aircraft. Air superior-
ity or air supremacy has been achieved.

Contested Combat Airspace

A medium risk exists to US and coalition aircraft within the airspace of inter-
est. Expect the enemy to employ fighters, anti-aircraft systems, and elec-
tronic jamming. US and coalition aircraft can achieve localized air superiority
for operations within portions of the airspace. Enemy air defense assets are
neither fully integrated nor attrited.
Command
& Control

Denied-Access Combat Airspace

A high risk exists for many, but not all, US and coalition aircraft from integrat-
ed air defense systems, radars, anti-aircraft systems, electronic warfare, and
fighter aircraft. The airspace is characterized by pervasive enemy activity.
Expect operations to result in high losses or denial of sustained operations
until a measure of air superiority can be achieved.

II. Airspace Control Authority (ACA)

e
pl
Normally, the joint force commander (JFC) designates a joint force air component
commander (JFACC) as the commander for joint air operations. The JFACC role is
normally filled by the commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). The JFC may
also concurrently designate an airspace control authority (ACA) and area air defense
m
commander (AADC). The ACA is “the commander designated to assume overall
responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system (ACS) in the airspace
control area.” The AADC, on the other hand, is the commander assigned overall re-
sponsibility for air defense with the preponderance of air defense capability and the
Sa

command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated

air defense operations (Joint Publication [JP] 3-52, Joint Airspace Control). Because
these related authorities are so integral to air operations, the COMAFFOR, as the
JFACC, is normally assigned ACA and AADC responsibilities.
As the ACA, the JFACC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and developing
airspace control procedures and operating the ACS. The ACA does not have the
authority to approve or disapprove combat operations. Airspace control procedures
within the JOA are approved by the JFC and are derived entirely from JFC authority.
If the ACA and an affected component commander are unable to obtain agreement
on an airspace issue, the issue should be referred to the JFC for resolution.
In most operations, the COMAFFOR is designated as the JFACC, ACA, and AADC,
largely due to the Air Force’s ability to concurrently command and control (C2) these
activities. In those joint operations where separate commanders are designated,
close coordination is essential for unity of effort; prevention of fratricide and unin-
tended engagements against civil and neutral aircraft; and joint air operations de-
confliction (JP 3-52). Because such separate arrangements are rare, the remainder
of this publication assumes the COMAFFOR has been designated as the JFACC,
ACA, and AADC. This, in fact, is the preferred Air Force construct for which Airmen
are trained.
See pp. 3-28 to 3-30 for related discussion of the ACA.

3-36 (Command & Control) IV. Airspace Control

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Chap 4
Airpower
(Overview)
Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), pp. 2 to 39.
Editor’s Note: For the purposes of this publication (AFOPS2), the material from Annex
3-0 Operations and Planning is presented in two separate chapters, with chapter four
(this chapter) focusing on airpower and chapter five focusing on strategy, effects-
based approach to operations, and the common operations framework (operational
design, planning, execution, and assessment).
Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0 is the Air Force’s foundational doctrine publication
on strategy and operational design, planning, employment, and assessment of
airpower. It presents the Air Force‘s most extensive explanation of the effects-based
approach to operations (EBAO) and contains the Air Force’s doctrinal discussion of
operational design and some practical considerations for designing operations to co-
erce or influence adversaries. It presents doctrine on cross-domain integration and
steady-state operations–emerging, but validated concepts that are integral to and
fully complement EBAO. It establishes the framework for Air Force components to
function and fight as part of a larger joint and multinational team. Specific guidance

Airpower
e
on particular types of Air Force operations can be found in other operational-level
doctrine as well as Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures documents. This
publication conveys basic understanding of key design and planning processes and
pl
how they are interrelated.
The US’ national security and national military strategies establish the ends, goals,
and conditions the armed forces are tasked to attain in concert with non-military
instruments of national power. Joint force commanders (JFCs), in turn, employ
m
strategy to determine and assign military objectives, and associated tasks and ef-
fects, to obtain the ends, goals, and conditions stipulated by higher guidance in an
effort to produce enduring advantage for the US, its allies, and its interests. Strategy
is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a
Sa

synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational

objectives. Airmen should follow a disciplined, repeatable approach to strategy de-
velopment in order to maximize airpower’s contribution to overarching national aims.
Today, the United States faces many security challenges including an ongoing con-
flict against implacable extremists, engagement with regimes that support terrorism,
and the need to support international partners. Against this backdrop, US military
forces may be called upon to conduct a full range of operations in a variety of
conflicts and security situations, including major operations and campaigns, irregular
warfare , information operation, homeland defense, humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief efforts, building partnerships with other nations, and others.
The operational environments in which airpower is employed may be characterized
by simultaneous action by Air Force forces against more than one adversary at a
time–including the potential for near-peer and peer competitors–who may attempt
to achieve objectives against US interests by using asymmetric advantages across
all instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Conflicts
may occur with little or no warning and they may stretch the Air Force as it works
with JFCs to provide support for the joint force while simultaneously addressing Air
Force-unique missions.

(Airpower) Overview 4-1

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Airpower Overview (Doctrine Annexes)

1. Counterair Operations (Annex 3-01) See pp. 4-7 to 4-16.
The Air Force defines counterair as a mission that integrates offensive and defensive
operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air and protection by
neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, including cruise and ballistic mis-
siles, both before and after launch

2. Counterland Operations (Annex 3-03) See pp. 4-17 to 4-32.

Counterland operations are defined as “airpower operations against enemy land force
capabilities to create effects that achieve joint force commander (JFC) objectives.”
3. Countersea Operations (Annex 3-04) See pp. 4-33 to 4-36.
Countersea operations are those operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired
degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay, diversion, or other
neutralization of threats in the maritime environment.
4. Counterspace Operations (Annex 3-14) See pp. 4-37 to 4-40.
The Air Force uses four space operations functions to clearly delineate the capabilities
required for successful global joint operations and supersede the space mission areas:
space situational awareness (SSA); counterspace operations; space support to opera-
tions; and space service support.
Airpower

e
5. Air Mobility Operations (Annex 3-17) See pp. 4-41 to 4-56.
Joint doctrine defines air mobility as “the rapid movement of personnel, materiel, and
pl
forces to and from or within a theater by air.” The foundational components of air mobility
operations—airlift, air refueling, air mobility support, and aeromedical evacuation—work
with other combat forces to achieve national and joint force commander objectives.
6. Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and
m
Reconnaissance (Annex 2-0) See pp. 4-57 to 4-64.
The Air Force defines global integrated ISR as “cross-domain synchronization and
integration of the planning and operation of ISR assets; sensors; processing, exploitation
and dissemination systems; and, analysis and production capabilities across the globe to
Sa

enable current and future operations.”

7. Strategic Attack (Annex 3-70) See pp. 4-65 to 4-70.
Strategic Attack (SA) is offensive action specifically selected to achieve national strategic
objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage in
conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve
operational objectives as a precondition.
8. Nuclear Operations (Annex 3-72) See pp. 4-71 to 4-78.
The Air Force’s responsibilities in nuclear operations are to organize, train, equip, and
sustain forces with the capability to support the national security goal of deterring nuclear
attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.
9. Personnel Recovery (Annex 3-50) See pp. 4-79 to 4-82.
Our adversaries clearly understand there is great intelligence and propaganda value to
be leveraged from captured Americans that can influence our national and political will
and negatively impact our strategic objectives. For these reasons, the Air Force main-
tains a robust and well trained force to locate and recover personnel who have become
“isolated” from friendly forces. Personnel recovery (PR) is an overarching term that
describes this process, and the capability it represents.

4-2 (Airpower) Overview

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10. Special Operations (Annex 3-05) See pp. 4-83 to 4-88.

Special operations are operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical tech-
niques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandes-
tine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional
expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.
11. Cyberspace Operations (Annex 3-12) See pp. 4-89 to 4-94.
Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdepen-
dent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunica-
tions networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
12. Information Operations (Annex 3-13) See pp. 4-95 to 4-102.
The purpose of information operations (IO) is to affect adversary and potential adver-
sary decision making with the intent to ultimately affect their behavior in ways that help
achieve friendly objectives. Information operations is defined as “the integrated employ-
ment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities [IRCs] in concert with
other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of
adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”
13. Electronic Warfare (Annex 3-51) See pp. 4-103 to 4-108.
Electronic Warfare (EW) is waged to secure and maintain freedom of action in the electro-

Airpower
magnetic spectrum (EMS). Military forces rely heavily on the EMS to sense, communicate,

e
strike, and dominate offensively and defensively across all warfighting domains. EW is es-
sential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations within the EMS.
pl
14. Public Affairs Operations (Annex 3-61) See pp. 4-109 to 4-112.
Air Force PA “advances Air Force priorities and achieve mission objectives through
integrated planning, execution, and assessment of communication capabilities. Through
strategic and responsive release of accurate and useful information, imagery, and musi-
m
cal products to Air Force, domestic, and international audiences, PA puts operational
actions into context; facilitates the development of informed perceptions about Air Force
operations; helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts; and contributes to the
achievement of national, strategic, and operational objectives”.
Sa

15. Combat Support (Annex 4-0) See pp. 8-1 to 8-4.

The Air Force defines combat support (CS) as the foundational and crosscutting capabili-
ty to field, base, protect, support, and sustain Air Force forces across the range of military
operations. The nation’s ability to project and sustain airpower depends on effective CS.
16. Engineering Operations (Annex 3-34) See pp. 8-5 to 8-8.
Air Force civil engineer forces establish, operate, sustain, and protect installations as
power projection platforms that enable Air Force and other supported commanders core
capabilities through engineering and emergency response services across the full mis-
sion spectrum.
17. Medical Operations (Annex 4-02) See pp. 8-9 to 8-12.
The Air Force is increasingly called upon to deliver medical capabilities throughout the
range of military operations. Diverse medical missions may consist of civil-military opera-
tions, global health engagement, or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief as part of joint
or multinational operations.
18. Force Protection (Annex 3-10) See pp. 8-13 to 8-16.
Joint doctrine defines FP as “preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against
Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and
critical information” (Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations). FP is a fundamental principle
of all military operations as a way to ensure the survivability of a commander’s forces.

(Airpower) Overview 4-3

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I. Applying Airpower
Airpower entails the use of military power and influence to achieve objectives at
all levels by controlling and exploiting air, space, and cyberspace. It encompasses
military, civil, and commercial capabilities, the industrial infrastructure, and a doctrine
of employment. Airpower is an indivisible, unitary construct—one that unifies Airmen,
rather than portraying them as a collection of “tribes” broken into technological or
organizational “stovepipes.” Other doctrine publications deal with specific aspects
of airpower or specific types of Air Force operations, but in all cases readers should
remember that airpower accomplishes or contributes to achieving national objectives
across all domains via operations in and through air, space, and cyberspace.
Due to speed, range, and its multidimensional perspective, airpower operates in
ways that are fundamentally different from other forms of military power; thus, the
various aspects of airpower are more akin to each other than to the other forms of
military power. Airpower is the product, not the sum, of air, space, and cyberspace
operations. Each depends on the others to such a degree that the loss of freedom
of action in one may mean loss of advantage in all other domains. Airpower has the
ability to create effects across an entire theater and the entire globe, while surface
forces, by their nature, are constrained to divide the battlespace into discrete operat-
ing areas. Airmen view operations, including the application of force, more from a
functional than a geographic perspective, and usually classify actions taken against
targets (including nondestructive and nonkinetic actions) by the effects created
rather than the targets’ physical locations within the battlespace.
Airpower

A. Airpower as Maneuver in Warfare e

pl
The multidimensional nature of airpower provides distinct advantages. Traditionally,
the physical structure of ground maneuver forces has consisted of fronts, flanks,
and rears. While these concepts do not apply as readily to airpower, it can be useful
to make an analogy in surface terms in order to convey the Air Force’s contribution
to joint warfare. In such terms, airpower adds flanks in other dimensions that make
m
the vertical and virtual battle as important as the horizontal battle. Using a metaphor
from surface warfare, the airspace above the battlespace is like an additional flank
in the third dimension, which can be exploited to achieve a relative advantage. Thus,
as with surface flanks, commanders should seek to gain positions of advantage
Sa

by turning an enemy’s vertical flank, while trying not to expose their own vertical
flank(s). Through cross-domain effects (effects created in one or more domains
through operations in another), airpower can also create virtual “flanks” or “rears” in
other dimensions, such as time and cyberspace (or assist the joint force in doing so).
Integrated with surface forces, airpower can reduce the need for operations like
surface probing actions through such capabilities as wide-ranging intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), information exploitation, and comprehensive
situational awareness and understanding. This enables freedom of action for surface
forces, greatly enhancing their effectiveness and that of the entire joint force.

B. Parallel and Asymmetric Operations

Air Force capabilities are usually employed to greatest effect in parallel, asymmetric
operations.

Parallel Operations
Parallel operations are those that apply pressure at many points across an enemy’s
system in a short period of time to cause maximum shock and dislocation effects
across that system. Sequential, or serial, operations, in contrast, are those that apply
pressure in sequence, imposing one effect after another, usually over a significant
period of time. Parallel operations limit an enemy’s ability to react and adapt and
thus place as much stress as possible on the enemy system as a whole. For exam-
ple, in Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi command and control structure was se-
4-4 (Airpower) Overview
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II. Counterair Operations

Ref: Annex 3-01, Counterair Operations (27 Oct ‘15).
Counterair is directed at enemy forces and other target sets that directly (e.g., aircraft,
surface-to-air missiles) or indirectly (e.g., airfields, fuel, command and control facilities,
network links) challenge control of the air. Normally, counterair operations are classified
as offensive or defensive. However, airpower’s inherent flexibility allows missions and air-
craft to shift from defensive to offensive (or vice versa) to adapt to changing conditions in
the operational environment. Counterair operations can be conducted across the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels of war by any component of the joint force. Operations
are conducted over and in enemy, friendly, and neutral territory. They range from seeking
out and destroying the enemy’s ability to conduct airborne attacks with both aircraft and
missiles, to taking measures to minimize the effectiveness of those attacks. The JFC’s
objectives and desired effects determine when, where, and how these operations are
conducted to gain the desired degree of air control.

The Counterair Framework

COUNTERAIR
Airpower

e
pl
OFFENSIVE COUNTERAIR DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR
Attack Operations Active Air and Missile Defense
Attacks on Missile Sites, Air Defense
Airfields, Missile Defense
Command and Control,
m
Infrastructure Passive Air and Missile Defense
Suppression of Enemy Air Detection and Warning
Defenses Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear Defenses
Fighter Escort Camouflage, Concealment, and
Sa

Deception
Fighter Sweep Hardening
Reconstitution
Dispersion
Redundancy
Mobility

A. Offensive Counterair (OCA)

The objective of offensive counterair (OCA) is to destroy, disrupt, or degrade enemy air
capabilities by engaging them as close to their source as possible, ideally before they
are launched against friendly forces. Otherwise, OCA operations seek out and destroy
these targets as close to their launch locations as possible. These operations may range
throughout enemy, friendly, and international airspace and waters and are generally con-
ducted at the initiative of friendly forces. OCA targets may include but are not limited to:
enemy air defense systems, theater missile systems, airfields, airfield support infrastruc-
ture, C2 nodes, multi-domain launch platforms, and launch platform supporting infrastruc-
ture. OCA operations enable friendly use of contested airspace and reduce the threat of
airborne attacks against friendly forces.

4-10 (Airpower) I. Counterair Operations

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• Attack operations. Attack operations are intended to destroy, disrupt, or degrade

counterair targets on the ground. These missions are directed against enemy air
and missile threats, their C2, and their support infrastructure (e.g., airfields, launch
sites, launchers, fuel, supplies, and runways). The main goal is to prevent enemy
employment of air and missile assets.
• Suppression of enemy air defenses. SEAD is an OCA mission designed to
neutralize, destroy, or degrade enemy surface-based air defenses by destructive or
disruptive means. SEAD requirements may vary according to mission requirements,
system capabilities, and threat complexity. SEAD planners should coordinate with
ISR operators to ensure collection and exploitation opportunities are considered
prior to destroying or disrupting emitters. SEAD operations fall into three categories:
- Area of responsibility (AOR)/joint operating area (JOA) air defense suppres-
sion: Operations conducted against specific enemy air defense systems to destroy,
disrupt, or degrade their effectiveness. It targets high payoff air defense assets,
resulting in the greatest degradation of the enemy’s total system and enabling effec-
tive friendly operations.
- Localized suppression: Operations normally confined to geographical areas
associated with specific ground targets or friendly transit routes, contributing to local
air superiority.
- Opportune suppression: Usually unplanned, including aircrew self-defense and

Airpower
e
attack against targets of opportunity. The JFC or JFACC normally establishes spe-
cific ROE to permit airborne assets the ability to conduct opportune suppression.
• Fighter escort. Escorts are aircraft assigned to protect other aircraft during a mis-
pl
sion (JP 1-02). Escort missions are flown over enemy territory to target and engage
enemy aircraft and air defense systems. Friendly aircraft en route to or from a target
area may be assigned escort aircraft to protect them from enemy air-to-air and
surface-to-air threats. Typically, escort to low-observable (“stealth”) aircraft requires
m
special consideration and planning at the air operations center (AOC) level.
• Fighter sweep. An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy
enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated area.
Sa

B. Defensive Counterair (DCA)

The objective of defensive counterair (DCA) is to protect friendly forces and vital interests
from enemy airborne attacks and is synonymous with air defense. DCA consists of active
and passive air defense operations including all defensive measures designed to destroy
attacking enemy airborne threats or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such threats
should they escape destruction. The basic active defense criteria to detect, identify, inter-
cept, and destroy remain the same for any airborne threat. DCA forces generally react to
the initiative of the enemy and are subject to the weapons control procedures of the area
air defense commander (AADC).
Several types of DCA tasks also help to provide a permissive environment for friendly air
action.
• Active air and missile defense. Active air and missile defense is defensive ac-
tion taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets. It includes actions to counter enemy manned and
unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and ballistic missiles.
These actions are closely integrated to form essential DCA capabilities, but may
involve different defensive weapon systems or tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTP).
• Passive air and missile defense. Passive defense includes all measures, other than
active defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets. It consists of several categories of activities.

(Airpower) I. Counterair Operations 4-11

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Chap 4
II. Counterland
Operations (AI & CAS)
Ref: Annex 3-03, Counterland Operations (17 Mar ‘17) and JP 3-09.3 Close Air
Support (Jul ‘09).
Counterland operations are defined as “airpower operations against enemy
land force capabilities to create effects that achieve joint force commander
(JFC) objectives.” The aim of counterland operations is to dominate the surface
environment using airpower. By dominating the surface environment, counterland
operations can assist friendly land maneuver while denying the enemy the ability to
resist. Although most frequently associated with support to friendly surface forces,
counterland operations may also be conducted independent of friendly surface
force objectives or in regions where no friendly land forces are present. For example,
recent conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq illustrate situations where
counterland operations have been used absent significant friendly land forces or
with small numbers of special operations forces (SOF) providing target cueing. This
independent attack of adversary land operations by airpower often provides the key to
success when seizing the initiative, especially in the opening phase of an operation.

Airpower
Counterland Operations e
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I Air Interdiction (AI)
m

II Close Air Support (CAS)

Sa

Counterland operations provide the JFC two distinct types of operations for
engaging enemy land forces. The first is air interdiction (AI), which is defined as
“air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military
surface capabilities before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly
forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives that are conducted at such distances
from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of friendly forces is not required.” Air Interdiction indirectly supports land
forces and directly supports JFC objectives in the absence of friendly land forces.
The second distinct type of air operations is close air support (CAS) which is defined
as “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in
close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air
mission with the fire and movement of those forces.” While AI can support either the
JFC or the land component, CAS directly supports land maneuver forces. Whether
destroying enemy surface forces, interdicting supply routes, or providing CAS to
friendly troops, counterland operations
Counterland operations can serve as the main attack and be the decisive means for
achieving JFC objectives. Although often associated with support to friendly surface
forces, counterland operations also include operations that directly support the JFC’s
theater strategy rather than exclusively supporting a surface component. In some
cases, counterland operations can provide the sole US effort against the enemy.

(Airpower) II. Counterland Operations 4-17

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Counterland Operations
Ref: Annex 3-03, Counterland Operations (17 Mar ‘17), pp. 9-15.
The commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), executes counterland operations by
conducting air interdiction (AI) as the supported or supporting commander or by support-
ing land forces with close air support (CAS). AI and CAS missions can function under an
overall theater posture of offense or defense and are typically coordinated with a ground
scheme of maneuver to maximize the effect on the enemy.
I. Air Interdiction (AI) See pp. 4-20 to 4-24.
The purpose of interdiction operations is to divert, disrupt, delay, and destroy, by either
lethal or nonlethal means in order to achieve objectives. Actions associated with one de-
sired effect may also support the others. Air interdiction (AI) is defined as “air operations
conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military potential before it can
be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives
that are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each
air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.” 5 AI targets may
include fielded enemy forces or supporting components such as operational command
and control (C2) nodes, communications networks, transportation systems, supply de-
pots, military resources, and other vital infrastructure. When conducted as part of a joint
campaign, AI needs the direction of a single commander who can exploit and coordinate
all the forces involved.
Airpower

e
The commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) is normally the supported commander
for the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) overall AI effort. When designated as the sup-
ported commander, the COMAFFOR will conduct theater-wide or joint operations area-
pl
(JOA-) wide AI to support the JFC’s overall theater objectives. With the preponderance
of AI assets and the ability to plan, task, and control joint air operations, the COMAFFOR
can best plan and execute AI. The COMAFFOR recommends theater and/or JOA-wide
targeting priorities and, in coordination with other component commanders, forwards the
m
air apportionment recommendation to the JFC. The COMAFFOR plans and executes the
interdiction effort in accordance with the JFC’s guidance.
II. Close Air Support (CAS) See pp. 4-24 to 4-30.
Close air support (CAS) is defined as “air action by fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft
Sa

against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.” CAS
provides supporting firepower in offensive and defensive operations to destroy, disrupt,
suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay enemy targets as an element of joint fire sup-
port. The speed, range, and maneuverability of airpower allows CAS assets to attack tar-
gets that other supporting arms may not be able to engage effectively. When conditions
for air operations are permissive, CAS can be conducted at any place and time friendly
forces are in close proximity to enemy forces and, at times, may be the best means to
exploit tactical opportunities.
Although in isolation CAS rarely achieves campaign-level objectives, at times it may be
the more critical mission due to its contribution to a specific operation or battle. CAS
should be planned to prepare the conditions for success or reinforce successful attacks
of surface forces. CAS can halt enemy attacks, help create breakthroughs, destroy tar-
gets of opportunity, cover retreats, and guard flanks. To be most effective, CAS should be
used at decisive points in a battle and should normally be massed to apply concentrated
combat power and saturate defenses. Elements of the theater air control system (TACS)
must be in place to enable command and control and clearance to attack in response to
rapidly changing tactical circumstances. In fluid, high-intensity warfare, the need for ter-
minal attack control, the unpredictability of the tactical situation, the risk of collateral dam-
age and friendly fire incidents, and the proliferation of lethal ground-based air defenses
make CAS especially challenging.

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D. CAS Planning
Ref: Adapted from JP 3-09.3 Close Air Support (Jul ‘09), p. III-4 to II-12.
1. Receipt of Mission/ alert CAS response times, weather
limitations, ROE, etc.)
Prepare for Mission Analysis 4. Warning order(s) to subordinate
As integral parts of the planning team, the
action officers and ALOs should “gather units
the tools” and be prepared to provide 5. Verification that subordinate TACP
pertinent information from the following to elements understand the warning
the ground force commander’s staff: order and have the ability to support
• Air order of battle (apportion- the mission
ment, allocation, and distribution • Key Considerations. During the
decision) mission analysis step, CAS planners
• ATO should be familiar with the following
• ACO elements of the HHQ order:
• SPINS 1. CONOPs/Scheme of Maneuver.
What is the commander’s intent? Is
• OPORD this an offensive or defensive opera-
• Standard operating procedure tion? What type of offensive or defen-
(SOP) sive operation (deliberate attack, hasty
defense, etc.)? How does ROE impact
2. Mission Analysis CAS?
CAS planner responsibilities for mission 2. Concept of fires/essential fire
Airpower

analysis actually begin before the new support tasks (EFSTs). What are
mission is received. As part of the ongoing
staff estimate, they must continuously e
monitor and track the status of fire support
the commander’s desired task and
purpose for fires? How can CAS
contribute? What other joint functions
pl
systems to include available air support. (C2, intelligence, fires, movement and
Specifically, during mission analysis CAS maneuver, protection, sustainment)
planners perform the following actions: are affected? Have all CAS assets
• Update latest products (ATO, been properly integrated with JAAT
ACO, SPINS, etc.) operations?
m
• Estimate air combat capability to 3. JIPOE. What is the enemy order of
support the operations battle? What effects will time of day,
• Determine capabilities and limita- terrain, and weather have on CAS
tions of assigned personnel and operations? What are the likely enemy
Sa

equipment. (# of JTACs, systems, avenues of approach?

equipment status, communications 4. Intelligence, Reconnaissance,
status, etc.) and Surveillance. What ISR assets
• Provide input to the ground com- are available? Where are ISR assets
mander’s initial guidance positioned? How can CAS operators
communicate directly/indirectly with ISR
• Determine specified, implied, and assets? What are the commander’s crit-
mission essential tasks ical information requirements (CCIRs)?
• Consider mission, enemy, terrain Can CAS assets satisfy CCIRs?
and weather, troops and support 5. Observation Plan. How can CAS
available-time available (METT-T) take advantage of available “eyes”
• Assist in developing the mission on the battlefield? Are terminal attack
statement control methods (i.e., types of CAS)
considered? Where will JTACs/JFOs/
• Anticipate air power required to FAC(A)s be required?
support the mission based on:
6. Communications Plan. How will
1. HHQ priorities of fires maneuver elements, fire support, and
2. Facts and assumptions TACP personnel communicate? Are
3. Weight of effort decisions JTACs integrated into the ground force
communications plan? Are communi-
• Provide the following products: cations plans reliable and redundant?
1. AO/ALO estimate • Preplanned Air Support Request.
2. Available CAS assets Once CAS planners have analyzed
3. CAS constraints and restraints the mission and are familiar with CAS
(ground alert CAS and airborne requirements, initial CAS requests

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should be drafted and submitted. See am I going to kill him?

Appendix A, “Joint Tactical Air Strike 4. Statements and Sketches.
Request.” Further refinements to these Once COA development has
initial requests can be forwarded as started, sketches of each COA

Continued on next page

details become available. Adherence should be made with notes for the
to ATO cycle time constraints is critical. staff to better understand what
each can offer the unit. How will
3. COA Development CAS aircraft enter/exit the opera-
After receiving guidance, the staff devel- tional area? Does the CAS overlay
ops COAs for analysis and comparison. reflect artillery positioning areas and
Guidance and intent focuses staff creativity azimuths of fire (AOFs)? Does the
toward producing a comprehensive, flexible plan promote simultaneous engage-
plan within available time constraints. Dur- ment of targets by CAS and surface
ing this step, CAS planners: fires? Has the CAS overlay been
• Update latest products (ATO, ACO, shared with all battlefield operat-
SPINS, etc.) ing system elements? Where will
• Analyze relative combat power. This JTACs/JFOs be positioned on the
is typically accomplished by weigh- battlefield? What ACMs and FSCMs
ing the individual effectiveness of air are needed to support the COA?
platforms against anticipated enemy 5. Priority of CAS Fires. Priority
surface forces to include air defense of fires (POF) for each COA must
threats. be identified. As part of the POF,
• Generate options used to develop priority of CAS fires must also be
possible COAs. Options should be identified. The ground maneuver
suitable, feasible, acceptable, distin- commander establishes which ele-

Airpower
ment will receive POF and priority
guishable, and complete.
• Array initial forces to determine CAS
requirements
e of CAS. It is also important to make
the commander and his staff aware
of their unit’s priority for CAS rela-
pl
• Develop fire support/ACMs tive to other units in the operational
• Develop the CAS integration plan by area. Does the element with priority
examining opportunities for the best of CAS fires have a designated
use of air power including the place- JTAC? What if priorities change or
CAS is unavailable for the planned
m
ment of TACP assets
COA? How will changes in priority
• The AO/ALO assists in developing be communicated with forward
engagement areas, target areas of in- elements and JTACs? Does the
terest (TAIs), triggers, objective areas, priority of CAS support the com-
obstacle plan, and movement plan mander’s intent for each COA?
Sa

• Prepare COA statements and • TACP: The TACP provides the fol-
sketches (battle graphics). This part lowing inputs during COA develop-
involves brainstorming to mass the ment:
most effective combat power against
the enemy (CAS, EW, ISR, and sur- 1. Specific TACP portions of the
face fire support). following plans:
• Key Considerations. During COA a. Observation plan (to include
development (for each COA), CAS target area, aircraft, and BDA)
planners must consider: b. Employment plan (i.e., ACAs)
1. Commander’s Intent. How does c. Communications plan
the commander intend to use CAS? 2. Evaluation of overall TACP
Continued on next page

What are his objectives? Does CAS capabilities/limitations:

facilitate the commander’s ability to
achieve his mission objective? a. Personnel
2. CCIRs. What CCIR can CAS assets b. Equipment
provide? Will TACPs, JFOs, and/or 3. Consideration of the most ef-
FAC(A)s be able to provide critical battle- fective TAC procedures
field information? How will this informa- 4. Update initial or submit new
tion be relayed to the maneuver unit? JTARs with all information cur-
3. Enemy Situation. Where is the rently available
enemy and how does he fight (enemy 5. Current geospatial products
order of battle)? Where is he going? and overlays
Where can I kill him? When will he be
there? What can he do to kill me? How

(Airpower) II. Counterland Operations 4-27

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Chap 4
III. Countersea
Operations
Ref: Annex 3-04, Countersea Operations (7 Nov ‘14).
Our nation depends on assured access to the world’s waterways and coastal regions
for global economic trade, as well as providing a stabilizing military presence abroad.
These waterways, along with our maritime fleet, provide the means for projecting the
bulk of our heavy forces forward, sustaining them over the long term, and projecting
force ashore from the seas. Where airpower is the key to rapid forward presence and
striking power over long distances, sea power is key to extended forward presence,
maritime power projection, mass force deployment, and sustainment through sealift.
Protecting sea lanes, littorals, and our maritime assets operating within them are vital
to US defense posture, economic prosperity, and national security.

I. Countersea Operations
Countersea operations are those operations conducted to attain and maintain
a desired degree of maritime superiority by the destruction, disruption, delay,
diversion, or other neutralization of threats in the maritime environment. The main

Airpower
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objective of countersea operations is to secure and dominate the maritime domain
and prevent opponents from doing the same.
The countersea function entails Air Force operations in the maritime domain to
pl
achieve, or aid in the achievement of, superiority in that medium. This function
fulfills Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for the use of Air Force forces
to counter adversary air, surface, and subsurface threats, ensuring the security
of vital sea and coastal areas, and enhancing the maritime scheme of maneuver.
m
More importantly, it demonstrates the teamwork required of Service forces working
together in a joint environment. Air Force forces achieve effects in the maritime
domain through the integrated employment of airpower. The overarching effect of
countersea operations is maritime superiority—denial of this domain to the adversary
Sa

while assuring access and freedom of maneuver for US and allied maritime forces.
To this end, Air Force operations can make significant contributions to maritime
components in support of joint force objectives.

II. The Maritime Domain

From a military perspective, the maritime domain is not limited to the open seas.
The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02)
defines the maritime domain as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal
areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals.” Littoral comprises two
segments of the operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean
to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward:

Refer to the Naval Operations and Planning SMARTbook

for further discussion of the Maritime Domain. The Naval
Operations & Planning SMARTbook covers essential Navy
keystone warfighting doctrine and maritime operations at the
JFMCC/CFMCC, Fleet and JTF levels -- to include maritime
forces, organization and capabilities; maritime operations;
maritime headquarters (MHQ) and the maritime operations
center (MOC); the maritime operations process; naval plan-
ning; naval logistics; and naval theater security cooperation.

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II. Space Operations Functions

Ref: Annex 3-14, Counterspace Operations (27 Aug ‘18), pp. 7 to 15.

A. Space Situational Awareness (SSA)

Space situational awareness (SSA) is foundational and fundamental to the conduct of all
space operations functions and is especially critical to the effective conduct of counter-
space operations. Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, defines SSA as “the requisite
foundational, current, and predictive knowledge and characterization of space objects and
the operational environment upon which space operations depend – including physi-
cal, virtual, information, and human dimensions – as well as all factors, activities, and
events of all entities conducting, or preparing to conduct, space operations.” SSA makes
it possible to understand the space domain, allowing effective command and control of
counterspace missions, leading to the desired control of space. SSA is divided into four
functional capabilities:
• Detect / Track / Identify. Detect / track / identify (D/T/ID) is the ability to search, dis-
cover, and track space objects in order to maintain custody of objects and events;
distinguish objects from others; and recognize objects as belonging to certain types,
missions, etc.
• Threat Warning and Assessment. Threat warning and assessment (TW&A) is the
ability to predict and differentiate between potential or actual attacks,space weather
Airpower

force status.
e
environment effects, and space system anomalies, as well as provide timely friendly

• Characterization. Characterization is the ability to determine strategy, tactics, intent,

pl
and activity, including characteristics and operating parameters of all space capabili-
ties (ground, link, and space segments) and threats posed by those capabilities.
• Data Integration and Exploitation. DI&E is the ability to fuse, correlate and
integrate multi-source data into a UDOP and enable decision-making for space
m
operations.

B. Counterspace Operations
Counterspace* is a mission, like counterair, that integrates offensive and defensive
Sa

operations to attain and maintain the desired control and protection in and through space.
These operations may be conducted across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels
in all domains (air, space, land, maritime,and cyberspace), and are dependent on robust
space situational awareness (SSA) and timely command and control (C2). Counterspace
operations include both offensive counterspace (OCS) and defensive counterspace
(DCS) operations. (* Counterspace is referred to as “space control” in Joint Publication
3-14, Space Operations.)
• Offensive Counterspace (OCS). OCS operations are undertaken to negate an
adversary’s use of space capabilities, reducing the effectiveness of adversary forces
in all domains. These operations target an adversary’s space capabilities (space,
link, and ground segments, or services provided by third parties), using a variety
of reversible and non-reversible means. These actions may include strikes against
adversary counterspace capabilities before they are used against friendly forces.
OCS operations may occur in multiple domains and may result in a variety of desired
effects including deception, disruption, denial, degradation,or destruction.
OCS operations may occur in multiple domains and may result in a variety of desired
effects including deception, disruption, denial, degradation,or destruction.
- Deceive. Measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion,
or falsification of evidence or information into a system to induce the adversary to
react in a manner prejudicial to their interests.

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- Disrupt. Measures designed to temporarily impair an adversary’s use or access of a

system for a period of time, usually without physical damage to the affected system.
- Deny. Measures designed to temporarily eliminate an adversary’s use, access, or
operation of a system for a period of time, usually without physical damage to the
affected system.
- Degrade. Measures designed to permanently impair (either partially or totally) the
adversary’s use of a system, usually with some physical damage to the affected
system.
- Destroy. Measures designed to permanently eliminate the adversary’s use of a
system, usually with physical damage to the affected system.

• Defensive Counterspace (DCS). DCS operations protect friendly space capabilities

from attack, interference, and unintentional hazards, in order to preserve US and
friendly ability to exploit space for military advantage. Space capabilities include the
space segment (e.g., on-orbit satellites), ground segment (e.g., space operations
centers and telemetry, tracking, and commanding stations), and the link segment
(the electromagnetic spectrum).
• Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR). NAVWAR contributes to counterspace operations
by preventing adversary use of PNT information while protecting the unimpeded use
of the information by forces and preserving peaceful use of this information outside

Airpower
the area of operations.

C. Space Support to Operations

e
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The space support to operations function provides capabilities to aid, protect, enhance
and complement the activities of other military forces, as well as intelligence, civil, and
commercial users. These capabilities improve the integration and availability of space
capabilities to increase the effectiveness of military operations and achieve national and
m
homeland security objectives. Space support to operations capabilities contribute to coun-
terspace operations, incorporate both active and passive measures for self-protection,
and benefit from defensive counterspace (DCS) actions to suppress attacks, as required,
in all domains. Space support to operations capabilities include:
Sa

• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

• Launch Detection
• Missile Tracking
• Environmental Monitoring
• Satellite Communications
• Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)

D. Space Service Support

Space service support capabilities ensure access to, transport through,operations in,
and, as appropriate, return from space through reliable, flexible, resilient, responsive, and
safe launch and satellite operations. Space service support consists of spacelift, range,
and satellite operations. Space service support capabilities contribute to counterspace
operations, incorporate both active and passive measures for self-protection, reconstitute
capabilities lost due to enemy attack, and benefit from defensive counterspace actions to
suppress attacks,as required, in all domains:
• Spacelift Operations
• Range Operations
• Satellite Operations (On-Orbit Reconstitution, Disposal of Space Vehicles, and Ren-
dezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO)

(Airpower) IV. Counterspace Operations 4-39

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Chap 4
V. Air Mobility
Operations
Ref: Annex 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (5 Apr ‘16) and JP 3-17, Air Mobility
Operations (Sept ‘13).
Air mobility operations support all of the geographic combatant commanders and
functional combatant commanders. The foundational components of air mobility op-
erations—airlift, air refueling, air mobility support, and aeromedical evacuation—work
with other combat forces to achieve national and joint force commander objectives.
Joint doctrine defines air mobility as “the rapid movement of personnel, materiel,
and forces to and from or within a theater by air.” The Department of Defense (DOD)
transportation mission involves many transportation communities and assets, ser-
vices, and systems owned by, contracted for, or controlled by the DOD. US Trans-
portation Command serves as the manager of the transportation community and is
supported by the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, the Army’s Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command, and the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command.

Air Mobility Operations

Airpower
A Airlift
e
pl
B Air Refueling (AR)
m

C Air Mobility Support

Sa

D Aeromedical Evacuation (AE)

See p. 4-43 for an overview and further discussion of the four types of air mobility
operations.

I. Global Mobility Enterprise

The global mobility enterprise is an integrated series of nodes that support air mobil-
ity operations. The four components of the enterprise consist of Airmen, equipment,
infrastructure, and command and control (C2). In a dynamic, complex, or contested
environment, the enterprise requires global situational awareness through collabora-
tion, coordinated operations, and adherence to processes and support disciplines.
Specifically, the airfields or nodes that are part of this enterprise have the four
components (Airmen, equipment, infrastructure, and C2). When contingencies arise,
planners identify key nodes and components. Mobility Airmen label these nodes as
aerial ports of embarkation, aerial ports of debarkation/hubs, intermediate staging
bases, and forward operating bases. Through mission analysis, planners adjust the
nodes to drive greater velocity and thus effectiveness throughout the global mobility
enterprise. Most importantly, restricting any component or failing to protect all lines of
communication from physical or cyberspace attacks within the enterprise can jeopar-
dize its ability to support air mobility operations.
(Airpower) V. Air Mobility Operations 4-41
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III. Types of Air Mobility Operations

Ref: Annex 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (5 Apr ‘16), pp. 7 to 9.

Intertheater / Intratheater
Air mobility operations are described as either intertheater (operations between
two or more geographic combatant commands) or intratheater (operations
exclusively within one geographic combatant command). Differences exist
between intertheater and intratheater airlift operations. Effective integration and
synchronization of intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations is crucial
to air mobility support to the warfighter. A combination of intertheater and
intratheater air mobility operations requires close coordination and cooperation
between the 618th Air Operations Center (AOC) (Tanker Airlift Control Center
[TACC]) and the respective geographic AOC.

Air mobility allows forces to reach destinations quickly, thereby opening opportunities
for seizing the initiative via speed and surprise, and by providing follow-on sustainment
of critical materiel. The four types of air mobility operations are:
A. Airlift See pp. 4-48 to 4-49.

Airpower
Airlift is “the movement of personnel and materiel via air mobility forces to support of

e
strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.” Airlift provides rapid, flexible, and secure
transportation. Because airlift is a high demand asset, it should be used carefully when
satisfying warfighter requirements.
pl
B. Air Refueling (AR) See pp. 4-50 to 4-51.
AR is defined as “the refueling of an aircraft in flight by another aircraft.”2 AR extends
presence, increases range, and serves as a force multiplier. AR significantly expands
m
the options available to a commander by increasing the range, payload, persistence,
and flexibility of receiver aircraft.
C. Air Mobility Support See pp. 4-52 to 4-53.
Air mobility support provides command and control (C2), aerial port, and maintenance
Sa

for mobility air forces. Air mobility support is part of the global air mobility support
system (GAMSS). The GAMSS consists of a limited number of permanent en route
support locations plus deployable forces that deploy according to a global reach
laydown strategy.
D. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) See pp. 4-54 to 4-55.
AE provides time-sensitive en route care of regulated casualties to and between medi-
cal treatment facilities using organic and/or contracted aircraft with medical aircrew
trained explicitly for that mission. AE forces can operate as far forward as aircraft are
able to conduct air operations, across the full range of military operations, and in all
operating environments. Specialty medical teams may be assigned to work with the AE
aircrew to support patients requiring more intensive en route care. The Air Force descrip-
tion supplements the joint definition in JP 3-17: “AE is the movement of patients under
medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation.”
Air mobility operations are described as either intertheater (operations between two or
more geographic combatant commands) or intratheater (operations exclusively within
one geographic combatant command). Differences exist between intertheater and
intratheater airlift operations. Effective integration and synchronization of intertheater
and intratheater air mobility operations is crucial to air mobility support to the warfight-
er. A combination of intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations requires close
coordination and cooperation between the 618th Air Operations Center (AOC) (Tanker
Airlift Control Center [TACC]) and the respective geographic AOC.

(Airpower) V. Air Mobility Operations 4-43

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II. Planning and Direction; Collection;

Processing and Exploitation; Analysis and
Production; and Dissemination (PCPAD)
Ref: Annex 2-0, Global Integrated ISR Operations (29 Jan ‘15), pp. 4 to 5.
The Air Force conducts global integrated ISR operations through a five-phase process:
planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and produc-
tion; and dissemination (PCPAD). The process is not linear or cyclical, but rather rep-
resents a network of interrelated, simultaneous functions that can, at any given time,
feed and be fed by other functions.

Planning and Direction

The planning and direction phase begins the process by shaping decision-making with
an integrated and synchronized ISR strategy and collection plan that links global inte-
grated ISR operations to the JFC’s intelligence requirements and integrates them into
the air tasking order (ATO) and its reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
(RSTA) annex.

Collection
The collection phase occurs when the mission is executed and the sensors actually

Airpower
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gather raw data on the target set. The collected data in its raw form has relatively
limited intelligence utility.
pl
Processing and Exploitation
The processing and exploitation phase increases the utility of the collected data by
converting it into useable information. During the analysis and production phase ana-
lysts apply critical thinking and advanced analytical skills by fusing disparate pieces of
m
information and draw conclusions resulting in finished intelligence.

Dissemination
Finished intelligence is crucial to facilitating informed decision-making, but only if it
Sa

is received in a timely manner. Dissemination, the final phase of PCPAD, ensures

the commander, planners, and operational forces receive the derived intelligence in
time to make effective decisions and conduct effective operations. The Air Force’s
distributed operations capability enables it to conduct global integrated ISR operations
and provide timely and tailored intelligence on a global level to multiple end users. The
analyzed intelligence can be disseminated or stored for future use. Properly formatted
and archived data makes previously collected and exploited information readily avail-
able to correlate and provide context to data.

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Chap 4
VII. Strategic
Attack (SA)
Ref: Annex 3-70, Strategic Attack (25 May ‘17).
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the Department
of Defense and Its Major Components, states that one of the functions of the Air
Force is to “organize, train, equip, and provide forces to…conduct global precision
attack, to include strategic attack… and prompt global strike.” Formerly, strategic
attack (SA) was defined in terms of nuclear delivery systems or weapons. This is no
longer true. SA is not defined in terms of weapons or delivery systems used—their
type, range, speed, or destructiveness—but by its effective contribution to achieving
strategic objectives.
Strategic Attack (SA) is offensive action specifically selected to achieve national
strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to
engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having
to achieve operational objectives as a precondition.

Strategic Attack

Airpower
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SA includes analysis, planning, targeting, command and control (C2), execu-
tion, and assessment in combination to support achievement of strategic
pl
objectives. An analysis of the definition clarifies SA:
“Strategic” refers to the highest level of an enemy system that, if affected,
will contribute most directly to the achievement of our national security
objectives. It is not limited to the use of nuclear weapons, although in some
m
instances the weapon most appropriate for a particular set of circumstances
may be nuclear. (System: “A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally
related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a
unified whole.”)
Sa

“Attack” entails offensive action. It implies proactive and aggressive opera-

tions against an enemy (whether a state, a non-state actor, or other organi-
zation) and may be used preemptively and without regard to enemy military
force. Attacks may employ kinetic or non-kinetic means, from nuclear and
conventional destructive weapons, to forms of cyberspace power like offen-
sive cyberspace operations, in order to create lethal and non-lethal effects.

SA is an approach to war focused on the adversary’s overall system and the most
effective way to target or influence that system. SA planners should examine the
full spectrum of that system: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and
information in the context of stated national security objectives. SA involves the com-
bination of effects that most effectively and efficiently achieves those objectives at
the strategic level. In the Air Force context, SA is a discrete set of military operations
aimed at achieving those strategic objectives. Airpower offers the quickest and most
direct means to conduct those operations.
SA involves the systematic application of lethal and non-lethal capabilities against an
enemy’s strategic centers of gravity (COG), to undermine the enemy’s will and ability
to threaten our national security interests.
The aim of SA is to help directly achieve national security objectives by generating
effects that significantly influence adversary COGs. SA operations are essentially
effects-based and should be planned, executed, and assessed as a unified, adaptive

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Strategic Effects: Deterrence, Assurance,

Dissuasion, and Defeat
Ref: Annex 3-72, Nuclear Operations (19 May ‘15), pp. 5 to 17.

Deterrence
Deterrence is defined as “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of
unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived
benefits.” Deterrence is critical to US national security efforts. Both nuclear and conven-
tional operations contribute to the effect. Although nuclear forces are not the only factor in
the deterrence equation, our nuclear capability underpins all other elements of deterrence.
Deterrence requires US nuclear operations to be visible to the target audience. To have
credibility, an adversary must believe that the Air Force has the capability to act quickly,
decisively and successfully. The cumulative effects of deterrence and assurance stem
from the credibility of nuclear capabilities in the minds of those we seek to deter, assure,
or dissuade. This credibility is attained through activities such as day-to-day training,
periodic exercises, and regular inspections which demonstrate Air Force nuclear force
capability and readiness.
Nuclear delivery system testing and treaty inspections are distinct messaging opportu-
nities. Both are highly visible examples of strategic messaging. Successful capability
Airpower

secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

e
testing and treaty inspections provide the world evidence of the credibility of the US’ safe,

Nuclear operations can also be used to deter conventional threats. Nuclear operations
pl
in the 21st century may be tied to more complex situations, combining both conventional
and nuclear operations. Today’s Air Force recognizes that many adversaries are willing to
employ nuclear operations under many different circumstances.

Extended Deterrence
m
Historically, the United States provides for the security of its allies by threatening a
nuclear response in the event of an enemy attack. This threat of retaliation serves as the
foundation for what is defined as extended deterrence.
Sa

Extended deterrence is sometimes described as providing a nuclear umbrella over allies

and partners. The United States pledges use of its own nuclear arsenal to allies in order
to provide for their security and serves as a nonproliferation tool by obviating the need for
allies and partners to develop or acquire and field their own nuclear arsenals.
In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the continued deployment
of US nuclear weapons in Europe is a strategic alliance issue. This on-going forward
basing of US nuclear capabilities not only extends deterrence of adversaries on behalf of
European allies, but also assures NATO partners that the Air Force is capable of helping
ensure their collective national security.
According to the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, “Nuclear weapons are
a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside
conventional and missile defense forces. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance. Allies agree … to develop concepts for how to ensure broadest
possible participation of Allies concerned in their nuclear sharing arrangements.” For the
United States’ Pacific partners, the Air Force provides a nuclear umbrella over Japan and
South Korea, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
Extended deterrence and assurance of allies are two sides of the same coin. Shows of
force, which are “operations designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased
visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed
to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives,” shape both allied
and adversary beliefs.

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Assurance
Complementing extended deterrence, where the objective is to influence the decision-
making of an adversary, assurance involves the easing of the fears and sensitivities of
allies and partners.
US assurance of allies and partners has been conveyed through various alliances, trea-
ties, and bilateral and multilateral agreements. For example:
• The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the US and Japan speci-
fies a commitment to defense cooperation, regular consultations, and peace and
security in the Far East
• The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea
declares the countries’ shared determination to defend themselves and preserve
peace and security in the Pacific area
• The North Atlantic Treaty reaffirms the goal of promoting stability, uniting efforts for col-
lective defense, and for the preservation of peace and security among NATO partners
A key Air Force contribution to assurance is through shows of force.
If proliferation increases, it can be expected that allies and partners will demand tangible
assurance from the US. This, in turn, will continue to drive demands on the force struc-
ture and capability requirements.

Dissuasion

Airpower
e
Dissuasion, also closely related to deterrence, consists of actions taken to demonstrate
to an adversary that a particular course of action is too costly, or that the benefits are too
meager. The intent is thus to dissuade potential adversaries from embarking on programs
pl
or activities that could threaten our vital interests, such as developing or acquiring nuclear
capabilities. Dissuasion differs from deterrence in that it is a concept aimed at precluding
the adversary from developing or acquiring nuclear capabilities. Dissuasion is most often
conducted using instruments of national power in concert, such as a combination of dip-
m
lomatic, economic, and military measures. Air Force nuclear forces may play an important
role in the latter, often by providing a credible deterrent.

Defeat
Sa

To convince an adversary to surrender or to end a war on terms favorable to the United

States, the President may authorize defeat of an enemy using nuclear weapons. Defeat
is an objective (and thus technically an effect) that may be achieved using nuclear
weapons, by themselves or in conjunction with other forces, should the decisive and
culminating nature of their effects be required to resolve a conflict. Operations seeking
outright defeat of an enemy using nuclear weapons will likely use other effects of nuclear
operations (any or all of the other nuclear operations effects) simultaneously to influence
the decision making process of all parties involved.
Defeat may entail prevailing over the enemy’s armed forces, destroying their war-making
capacity, seizing territory, thwarting their strategies, or other measures in order to force
a change in the enemy’s behavior, policies, or government. Escalation control is a major
consideration for this effect. Escalation control entails the ability to increase the enemy’s
cost of defiance, while denying them the opportunity to neutralize those costs. In addi-
tion, the high level of commitment required for the use of nuclear weapons by the United
States is a tangible demonstration of our resolve and likely to affect our ability to defeat
the will of an enemy.
Nuclear weapons have been used in combat only twice, of course: at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, culminating World War II in the Pacific.
Refer to “Practical Design: The Coercion Continuum” in Annex 3-0, Operations and
Planning, for additional discussion on effects.

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Chap 4
IX. Personnel
Recovery
Ref: Annex 3-50, Personnel Recovery (23 Oct ‘17).
Our adversaries clearly understand there is great intelligence and propaganda value
to be leveraged from captured Americans that can influence our national and political
will and negatively impact our strategic objectives. For these reasons, the Air Force
maintains a robust and well trained force to locate and recover personnel who have
become “isolated” from friendly forces. Personnel recovery (PR) is an overarching
term that describes this process, and the capability it represents.

Personnel Recovery (PR)

Airpower
e
pl
m
Sa

Ref: Annex 3-50, Personnel Recovery (23 Oct ‘17), p. 8. Personnel Recovery
Options, Capabilities, and Methods.
PR is defined as “the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and
execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.” (Joint Publication
[JP] 3-50, Personnel Recovery). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3270.01B, Personnel Recovery and Presidential Policy Directive 30, Hostage Recov-
ery Activities, and Executive Order 13698, Hostage Recovery Activities, expand PR
responsibilities to: prevent, plan for, and coordinate a response to isolating events to
include all US Government (USG) departments and agencies.
The Air Force conducts PR using the fastest and most effective means to recover
IP. Air Force PR forces deploy to recover personnel or equipment with specially
outfitted aircraft/vehicles, specially trained aircrews and ground recovery teams
with PR support personnel and capabilities in response to geographic combatant
commander (CCDR) taskings. Traditionally the Air Force focused on the recovery of
downed aircrews; however, recent experience has proven that Air Force PR forces
are responsible for the recovery of many types of IP.
(Airpower) IX. Personnel Recovery 4-79
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II. AFSOC Core Activities

Ref: Annex 3-05, Special Operations (9 Feb ‘17), pp. 11 to 14.

As an Air Force major command, and the Air Force component to US Special Opera-
tions Command (USSOCOM), AFSOC is responsible for providing specially tailored
aviation related capabilities to conduct or support special operations core activities and
other SecDef directed taskings. AFSOC refers to these capabilities as core missions.
AFSOC core missions include:

Agile Combat Support (ACS)

Enables all AFSOC core missions and capabilities across the range of military opera-
tions. Protects, fields, prepares, deploys, maintains, sustains, and reconstitutes Air
Force special operations personnel, weapons systems, infrastructure, and information in
support of USSOCOM core activities.

Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID)

AFSOC combat aviation advisors (CAA) assess, train, advise, assist, and equip
(ATAAE) partnered forces aviation assets in airpower employment, sustainment, and
integration. CAA conduct special operations activities by, with, and through foreign
aviation forces. CAA mission priorities are focused on mobility, ISR, and precision strike
missions, with associated surface integration tasks that enable the air-to-ground integra-
Airpower

tion of partnered forces.

Command and Control (C2) e

pl
C2 is the exercise of the commander’s authority and direction over assigned and
attached forces. Operational C2 elements consist of personnel and equipment with
specialized capability to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces to conduct joint /
combined special operations.
m
Information Operations (IO)
IO is an integrated approach utilizing information-related capabilities during all phases
of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated
decision making while protecting our own by producing effects across the entire bat-
Sa

tlespace. The resulting information superiority allows friendly forces the ability to collect,
control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition. IO is successful by
identifying and using any combination of information-related capabilities necessary to
achieve the desired effects.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

ISR synchronizes and integrates sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation and dis-
semination in direct support of current and future SOF operations. It consists of manned
and remotely piloted aircraft and Distributed Common Ground Systems that deliver
actionable intelligence to the special operations forces (SOF) operator. ISR produces
detailed, specialized products tailored to mission, customer, and pace of operation that
gives SOF a decisive advantage against our adversaries.

Precision Strike (PS)

PS provides the joint force commander and the SOF operator with specialized capabili-
ties to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess (F2T2EA) applicable targets. F2T2EA
can use a single weapon system or a combination of systems to fulfill elements of the
kill chain. PS missions include close air support, air interdiction, and armed recon-
naissance. Attributes associated with PS include persistence, robust communications,
high situational awareness, precise target identification, lethality, and survivability (as
required for the environment).

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Specialized Air Mobility (SAM)

SAM missions include both specialized mobility and refueling. Specialized mobility is the
rapid global infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of personnel, equipment, and material
using specialized systems and tactics. Specialized refueling is the rapid, global refueling
using specialized systems and tactics, thereby increasing mission flexibility and aircraft
range. This is done via in-flight refueling either as a tanker or receiver and can addition-
ally be conducted on the ground through a forward arming and refueling point (FARP).
These missions may be clandestine, covert, low visibility, or overt and through hostile, de-
nied, or politically sensitive airspace using manned or unmanned platforms with a single
aircraft or part of a larger force package. SAM aircraft operate across the range of military
operations in all environmental regions (e.g. arctic, desert, littoral, mountainous, sea,
tropical, etc.), day and night, and during adverse weather conditions to include transient
exposure to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear effects.

Special Tactics (ST)

ST uses highly specialized, combat proven capabilities to integrate, synchronize, and
control air assets to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. ST is com-
prised of the total force consisting of combat controllers (CCT), pararescue (PJ), special
operations weather teams (SOWT), tactical air control party (TACP), special operations
surgical team (SOST), and specialized combat mission support. ST capabilities consist
of air traffic control; assault zone assessment, establishment and control; terminal attack

Airpower
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control; fire support; operational preparation of the environment; special reconnaissance;
command and control communications; full spectrum personnel and equipment recovery;
humanitarian relief; and battlefield trauma care. ST supports and optimizes airpower
pl
effects. Agile ST forces enable projection and integration of SOF power across domains,
geographic boundaries, and operational environments in support of the ST core capabili-
ties Global Access, Precision Strike, and Personnel Recovery requirements. Through an
integrated warfighting approach, ST is uniquely capable of delivering airpower against
m
hard problem sets that are not otherwise within operational reach of the joint force.

Special Operations Relationship to Irregular Warfare

Sa

Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, criminal networks, and

rogue states, resort to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to chal-
lenge US forces. Irregular warfare (IW) conflicts are a violent struggle among
state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population(s).
Since many irregular threats are not purely military problems, many of the re-
sponses required are not purely military either. Due to the complex nature of
these threats, such conflicts may not end with decisive military victory. They
are more likely to require long-term involvement to remedy, reduce, manage,
or mitigate the conflict. To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats,
US forces should seek to work in concert with other government agencies
and multinational partners, and, where appropriate, the partnered actors to
understand the situation in depth, plan and act in concert, and continually
assess and adapt their approach in response to the dynamic and complex
nature of the problem. Because of inherent capabilities, characteristics, and
specialized training, SOF are ideally suited to participate in US efforts to
counter IW adversaries and threats.
Refer to Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare, for more information on IW.

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Chap 4
XI. Cyberspace
Operations
Ref: Annex 3-12, Cyberspace Operations (30 Nov ‘11).

Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the inter-
dependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, tele-
communications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve
military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.

Cyberspace Superiority
Cyberspace superiority is the operational advantage in, through, and from cy-
berspace to conduct operations at a given time and in a given domain without
prohibitive interference.
Cyberspace superiority may be localized in time and space, or it may be
broad and enduring. The concept of cyberspace superiority hinges on the
idea of preventing prohibitive interference to joint forces from opposing

Airpower
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forces, which would prevent joint forces from creating their desired effects.
“Supremacy” prevents effective interference, which does not mean that no
interference exists, but that any attempted interference can be countered or
pl
should be so negligible as to have little or no effect on operations. While “su-
premacy” is most desirable, it may not be operationally feasible. Cyberspace
superiority, even local or mission-specific cyberspace superiority, may provide
sufficient freedom of action to create desired effects. Therefore, commanders
should determine the minimum level of control required to accomplish their
m
mission and assign the appropriate level of effort.

I. The Cyberspace Domain

Sa

Cyberspace is a domain. Cyberspace operations are not synonymous with informa-

tion operations (IO). IO is a set of operations that can be performed in cyberspace and
other domains. Operations in cyberspace can directly support IO and non-cyber based
IO can affect cyberspace operations.
Cyberspace is a man-made domain, and is therefore unlike the natural domains of air,
land, maritime, and space. It requires continued attention from humans to persist and
encompass the features of specificity, global scope, and emphasis on the electromag-
netic spectrum. Cyberspace nodes physically reside in all domains. Activities in cyber-
space can enable freedom of action for activities in the other domains, and activities in
the other domains can create effects in and through cyberspace.
Even though networks in cyberspace are interdependent, parts of these networks are
isolated. Isolation in cyberspace exists via protocols, firewalls, encryption, and physi-
cal separation from other networks. For instance, classified networks such as the US

Refer to CYBER: The Cyberspace Operations SMARTbook (in

development). U.S. armed forces operate in an increasingly network-
based world. The proliferation of information technologies is changing
the way humans interact with each other and their environment,
including interactions during military operations. This broad and
rapidly changing operational environment requires that today’s armed
forces must operate in cyberspace and leverage an electromagnetic
spectrum that is increasingly competitive, congested, and contested.
(Airpower) XI. Cyberspace Operations 4-89
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IO Definitions and Descriptions

Ref: Annex 3-13, Information Operations (28 Apr ‘16), pp. 3 to 4.
Commander’s Communication Synchronization
Commander’s communication synchronization (CCS) is the Department of Defense’s
primary approach to implementing United States Government (USG) strategic com-
munication guidance as it applies to military operations. The CCS is the joint force
commander’s (JFC’s) approach for integrating all IRCs, in concert with other lines
of effort and operation. It synchronizes themes, messages, images, and actions to
support the JFC’s objectives. Commander’s intent should be reflected in every staff
product. Air Force component commanders should similarly conduct their own com-
mander’s communication synchronization program. This component level communica-
tion synchronization coordinates themes, messages, images, and actions to support
the commander, Air Force forces’ objectives.
Information Environment
The information environment is defined as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations,
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.” The information
environment is comprised of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. IO
primarily focuses on affecting the cognitive dimension, where human decision making
occurs, through the physical and information dimensions.

Airpower
Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)
e
IRCs are defined as “tools, techniques, or activities using data, information, or
knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the physical,
pl
informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment.” IRCs create
both lethal and nonlethal effects. When IRCs are employed with the primary purpose
of affecting the cognitive dimension, it is typically considered IO. IRCs may also
include activities such as counterpropaganda, engagements, and shows-of-force, as
m
well as techniques like having the host nation designated as the lead for night raids or
not using dogs to search houses. IRCs can be employed individually or in combination
to create lethal and non-lethal effects.
Informational Dimension
Sa

The informational dimension encompasses where and how information is collected,

processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It is the dimension where the com-
mand and control (C2) of military forces is exercised and where the commander’s
intent is conveyed.
Physical Dimension
The physical dimension is composed of C2 systems, key decision makers, and sup-
porting infrastructure that enable individuals and organizations to create effects. The
physical dimension includes, but is not limited to, human beings, C2 facilities, news-
papers, books, microwave towers, computer processing units, laptops, smart phones,
tablet computers, and any other objects that are subject to empirical measurement.
The physical dimension is not confined solely to military or nation-based systems
and processes; it is a defused network connected across national, economic, and
geographical boundaries.”
Cognitive Dimension
The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, receive and
respond to, or act on information. These elements are influenced by many factors,
including individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions,
experiences, morals, education, mental health, identities, and ideologies.
Target Audience
A target audience is defined as “an individual or group selected for influence.”

(Airpower) XII. Information Operations 4-97

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ment each other and do not detract from or interfere with any IO-related/messaging
objectives. It includes informing and attempting to affect behavior and decision mak-
ing as it applies to all relevant non-US audiences. IO should not be confused with
integrating non-lethal capabilities. IO planners should be aware of capabilities for
creating both lethal and non-lethal effects, as well as plans to ensure any cognitive
effects they have will enhance and not detract from IO-related/messaging objectives.
IO planners work with all other planners and IRC liaisons, using standard planning
and execution steps of the joint operation planning process for air, air tasking cycle,
and targeting cycle to accomplish commander’s objectives. IO-specific by-products
include items such as synchronization matrices, coordinated narratives and themes,
and target audience analysis. There is no separate IO plan.
The targeting of a select audience’s decision-making process is not new for Airmen.
In addition to the requisite understanding of the information content and connectivity
used by targeted decision makers, the Air Force has developed an analysis capabil-
ity called behavioral influence analysis (BIA). BIA provides an understanding of the
decision makers’ behavior to include culture, organization, and individual psychology
(e.g., perceptual patterns, cognitive style, reasoning and judgment, and decision
selection processes). It is this knowledge, coupled with an Airman’s ability to strike
information-related targets that is the essence of Air Force IO. The integrated em-
ployment of capabilities to affect information content and connectivity of an adver-
sary provides military advantage to friendly forces.
Air Force IO also includes the integrated planning, employment, monitoring, and
Airpower

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assessment of themes, messages, and actions (verbal, visual, and symbolic) as part
of the commander’s communication synchronization (CCS) at the component level.
The CCS will include pertinent portions of the joint force commander’s or combatant
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commander’s communication strategy, which may include communication synchro-
nization themes and messages as well as any relevant component commander’s
themes and messages. At the air component level, Air Force IO planners should
ensure these themes, messages, and actions (e.g., IRCs) are integrated across all
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lines of operation.

III. Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

In 2011, the definition of information operations (IO) was revised to eliminate refer-
Sa

ences to specific capabilities and describe those generically as information-related

capabilities (IRCs). As a result, the Air Force no longer distinguishes and categorizes
IO capabilities with terms like “core capabilities”, “influence operations,” or “integrat-
ed control enablers.” The Air Force now references tools, techniques, and activities
when used to affect the information environment.
The distinction of IO’s role as an integrating function merits emphasis. IO is not a
capability in and of itself. IO does not “own” individual capabilities but rather plans
and integrates the use of IRCs, tools, techniques, and activities in order to create a
desired effect—to affect adversary, neutral, and friendly decision making, which con-
tributes towards a specified set of behaviors. IRCs can be employed by themselves
or in combination to conduct or support a wide range of missions. For example,
IO planners should help ensure electronic attack (EA), offensive space control, air
attacks, and cyberspace operations are coordinated and deconflicted from the per-
spective of cognitive/behavioral effects. The coordination process should also strive
to resolve conflict between actions and messages. Individually, IRCs have wider
application than IO employment. What unites capabilities as IRCs is a common IO
battlespace—the information environment—whether those capabilities operate in
it or affect it. Numerous Air Force capabilities have potential to be employed for IO
purposes.
See following pages (pp. 4-100 to 4-102) for an overview and further discussion.

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I. Electronic Warfare Divisions

Ref: AFDD3-13.1, Electronic Warfare (Sept ‘10), pp. 7 to 9.
EW consist of three divisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic warfare support (ES), and
electronic protection (EP). All three contribute to the success of air, space, and cyber-
space operations. Capabilities inherent to the EW divisions can be used for both offensive
and defensive purposes and are coordinated through electromagnetic battle management
(EMBM).

Electronic Warfare Divsions

A Electronic Attack (EA)

B Electronic Warfare Support (ES)

C Electronic Protection (EP)
Airpower

A. Electronic Attack (EA) e

pl
EA is the division of EW involving the use of electromagnetic (EM), directed energy (DE),
or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of de-
grading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy operational capability. EA prevents or reduces
an enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). It can be accomplished through
m
detection, denial, disruption, deception, and destruction. EA includes lethal attack with as-
sets like high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs); active applications such as decoys
(flares or chaff), EM jamming, and expendable miniature jamming decoys; and employs
EM or DE weapons (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams, etc.).
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EM jamming and the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) are applications of EA:

Electromagnetic Jamming
EM jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of EM energy for the
purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the EMS, with the intent of
degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. Early Air Force EW efforts were
primarily directed toward electronically jamming hostile radars to hide the number and
location of friendly aircraft and to degrade the accuracy of radar-controlled weapons. Cur-
rently, jamming enemy sensor systems can limit enemy access to information on friendly
force movements and composition and cause confusion. Jamming can degrade the en-
emy’s decision making and implementation process when applied against command and
control systems. An adversary heavily dependent on centralized control and execution for
force employment presents an opportunity for EA.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)

SEAD is that activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based
enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. The goal of SEAD opera-
tions is to provide a favorable situation in which friendly tactical forces can perform their
missions effectively without interference from enemy air defenses. In Air Force doctrine,
SEAD is not part of EW, but it is a broad term that may include the use of EW. In Air
Force doctrine, SEAD is part of the counterair framework and directly contributes to

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offensive counterair and obtaining air superiority. This may involve using EM radiation
to neutralize, degrade, disrupt, delay, or destroy elements of an enemy’s integrated air
defense system (IADS). During hostilities, enemy IADS will probably challenge friendly
air operations. EW systems tasked to perform SEAD may be employed to locate and de-
grade, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy airborne and ground-based emitters. Typically, SEAD
targets include radars for early warning/ground-controlled intercept (EW/GCI), acquisition
(ACQ), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Many Air Force
functions can be enhanced with the employment of SEAD operations.

B. Electronic Warfare Support (ES)

ES responds to taskings to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional
and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of threat recognition.
Commanders, aircrews, and operators use ES to provide near-real-time information to
supplement information from other intelligence sources. Additionally, ES information can
be correlated with other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information
to provide a more accurate picture of the electromagnetic operational environment and
therefore a better understanding of the battlespace. This information can be developed
into an electronic order of battle for situational awareness and may be used to develop
new countermeasures. The relationship between ES and signals intelligence (SIGINT),
which includes electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (CO-
MINT), is closely related because they share common functions of search, interception,

Airpower
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identification, location, and exploitation of electromagnetic radiation. The distinction lies
in the type and use of information, and who has tasking authority. ES resources are
tasked by or under direct control of operational commanders. The operational commander
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may have authority to task national SIGINT assets to provide ES or may have direct
operational control over tactical resources capable of providing ES. In either case, ES is
distinguished by the fact that the operational commander determines aspects of resource
configuration required to provide ES that meets immediate operational requirements. SI-
m
GINT is tasked by national authorities. The passive nature of ES allows it to be effectively
employed during peacetime.
Refer to Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.03C, Joint Electronic Warfare Policy, for a more in-depth
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discussion of the relationship and distinctions between ES and SIGINT.

C. Electronic Protection (EP)

EP includes the actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any
effects of friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the EMS, as well as naturally occurring phe-
nomena that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Examples of EP
include frequency agility, changing pulse repetition frequency, emission control (EMCON),
and low observable technologies. Integration of EP and other security measures can
prevent enemy detection, denial, disruption, deception, or destruction. Friendly force
reliance on advanced technology demands comprehensive EP safeguards and consid-
erations. Proper frequency management is a key element in preventing adverse effects
(i.e., jamming friendly forces) by friendly forces. Much of the success of EP occurs during
the design and acquisition of equipment. EMCON and low observable technologies are
passive applications of EP.

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III. Public Affairs (PA) Activities

Ref: Annex 3-61, Public Affairs Operations (28 Jul ‘17), pp. 11-14.

Public Affairs (PA) operations begin at home, before the first Airman deploys, and
continue long after the last Airman is redeployed. PA operations focus on 10 synergistic
activities to achieve the desired effects of its core competencies:
PA Functional Management
PA functional management ensures the PA office and assigned personnel are resourced,
trained, equipped, and ready to accomplish the mission in garrison or deployed.
Communication Planning
Communication planning is important to the creation of strategic, operational, and tacti-
cal effects in PA operations. PA operators must gain awareness of the aspects of the
total information environment (IE) affecting their location or operation, and should have
the means to evaluate and analyze aspects of the IE.
Security and Policy Review
While adhering to the policy of “maximum disclosure, minimum delay,” PA ensures
information intended for public release neither adversely affects national security nor
threatens the safety, security, or privacy of Air Force personnel.

Airpower
Media Operations
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Working proactively with the media increases trust and two-way communication, and is
often one of the most rapid and credible means of delivering the commander’s message.
pl
Community Engagement
Community engagement encompasses activities of interest to the general public, busi-
nesses, academia, veterans, service organizations, military-related associations, think
tanks, and other community entities.
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Environmental
PA supports environmental program objectives and requirements by facilitating public
notification and involvement and communicating the Air Force’s commitment to envi-
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ronmental excellence.
Visual Information
Visual products, such as photo, video, and graphics, are essential to effective commu-
nication and document the Air Force’s visual history, through the accessioning process,
for future generations.
Band Operations
Air Force bands provide a wide spectrum of musical support for events that enhance
the morale, motivation, and esprit de corps of our Airmen, foster public trust and sup-
port, aid recruiting initiatives, and promote our national interests at home and abroad.
Contingency Operations and Wartime Readiness
PA forces are foremost a deployable combat capability, fully trained and prepared to
meet the needs of the joint warfighter inside and outside the wire.
Command Information
PA provides effective and efficient communication tools to link Airmen with their lead-
ers. Command information helps Airmen and their families understand their purpose,
role, and value to the Air Force. A free flow of information to Airmen and families
creates awareness of and support for the mission, increases their effectiveness as Air
Force ambassadors, reduces the spread of rumors and misinformation, and provides
avenues for feedback.

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Chap 5
Operations & Planning
(Overview)
Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), pp. 40 to 41.
Editor’s Note: For the purposes of this publication (AFOPS2), the material from Annex
3-0 Operations and Planning is presented in two separate chapters, with chapter four
focusing on airpower and chapter five (this chapter) focusing on strategy, effects-
based approach to operations, and the common operations framework (operational
design, planning, execution, and assessment).
Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0 is the Air Force’s foundational doctrine publication
on strategy and operational design, planning, employment, and assessment of
airpower. It presents the Air Force‘s most extensive explanation of the effects-based
approach to operations (EBAO) and contains the Air Force’s doctrinal discussion of
operational design and some practical considerations for designing operations to co-
erce or influence adversaries. It presents doctrine on cross-domain integration and
steady-state operations–emerging, but validated concepts that are integral to and
fully complement EBAO. It establishes the framework for Air Force components to
function and fight as part of a larger joint and multinational team. Specific guidance

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on particular types of Air Force operations can be found in other operational-level
doctrine as well as Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures documents. This
publication conveys basic understanding of key design and planning processes and
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how they are interrelated.
The US’ national security and national military strategies establish the ends, goals,
and conditions the armed forces are tasked to attain in concert with non-military
instruments of national power. Joint force commanders (JFCs), in turn, employ

Operations
& Planning
m
strategy to determine and assign military objectives, and associated tasks and ef-
fects, to obtain the ends, goals, and conditions stipulated by higher guidance in an
effort to produce enduring advantage for the US, its allies, and its interests. Strategy
is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a
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synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational

objectives. Airmen should follow a disciplined, repeatable approach to strategy de-
velopment in order to maximize airpower’s contribution to overarching national aims.
Today, the United States faces many security challenges including an ongoing con-
flict against implacable extremists, engagement with regimes that support terrorism,
and the need to support international partners. Against this backdrop, US military
forces may be called upon to conduct a full range of operations in a variety of
conflicts and security situations, including major operations and campaigns, irregular
warfare , information operation, homeland defense, humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief efforts, building partnerships with other nations, and others.
The operational environments in which airpower is employed may be characterized
by simultaneous action by Air Force forces against more than one adversary at a
time–including the potential for near-peer and peer competitors–who may attempt
to achieve objectives against US interests by using asymmetric advantages across
all instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Conflicts
may occur with little or no warning and they may stretch the Air Force as it works
with JFCs to provide support for the joint force while simultaneously addressing Air
Force-unique missions.

(Operations & Planning) Overview 5-1

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Nonetheless, operations in recent decades have shown that there is significant

common ground between steady-state and contingency conditions, and there are
considerable advantages to designing coherent and comprehensive strategies for
shaping the actual steady-state environment. Potential contingencies and major
operations are then considered branches to combatant commanders’ overarching
theater or global campaign plans. Contingency planning and steady-state planning
employ a common logical approach and process.

Common Framework for Operations

I Operational Design (pp. 5-7 to 5-14)

II Planning (pp. 5-15 to 5-26)

III Execution (pp. 5-27 to 5-30)

IV Assessment (pp. 5-31 to 5-40)

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Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), p. 40.
A common framework of processes helps to foster coherence in Air Force strategy
creation by:
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• Creating explicit linkages to national objectives and desired end states.
• Encouraging continuity in thinking used to design and plan operations, regard-
less of where they occur in the ROMO, whether during steady-state or contin-
Operations
& Planning

m
gency operations.
• Providing a common method for commanders and staff elements to use in de-
signing and planning contingencies as logical follow-ons to ongoing operations.
• Encouraging logical linkages between resources needed for ongoing opera-
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tions and those to be flowed in to support emerging contingencies.

• Fundamentals of assessment, including discussions on assessing strategy in
general, assessment criteria, assessment measures and indicators, and as-
sessment interpretation.
The common framework for operations is broken into the following general consider-
ations:
• Operational Design. Fundamentals of operational design, including discussion
of the elements and methods of operational design, the coercion continuum as
a practical design construct, and additional considerations specific to airpower.
(See pp. 5-7 to 5-14.)
• Planning. General planning considerations, including discussions on Air Force
planning in the context of broader joint planning and the effects-based ap-
proach to planning. (See pp. 5-15 to 5-26.)
• Execution. General execution considerations. (See pp. 5-27 to 5-30.)
• Assessment. Fundamentals of assessment, including discussions on assess-
ing strategy in general, assessment criteria, assessment measures and indica-
tors, and assessment interpretation. (See pp. 5-31 to 5-40.)

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Chap 5
I. Operational
Design
Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), pp. 42 to 60.

I. Operational Design Fundamentals

As an element of strategy, operational design is defined as “the conception and
construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan,
and its subsequent execution” (Joint Publication [JP] 5-0, Joint Operation Planning).
Operational design helps establish a logically consistent structure from which to
understand an operation’s aims and, broadly, the methods and means to be used in
obtaining them. In other terms, design provides a necessary “front end” to the formal
planning processes described in JP 5-0 and elsewhere in Annex 3-0. The “process”
of determining the overall focus of an operation—of deciding on the end state,
objectives, desired effects, and so on, has been largely a matter of art throughout
most of military history. Understanding certain aspects of problem solving can make
portions of the commander’s art more systematic, although it will never make them
“scientific”—in the sense of making them prescriptive and predictable. Approaching

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operational design deliberately, however, can provide a foundation that facilitates de-
cision-making by creating a structure linking decision analysis to emerging opportu-
nities. Creating such a linkage can substantially reduce the risks associated with an
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operation and increase the utility of a plan following first contact with an adversary.

Relationship Between Strategy Processes

Operations
& Planning
m
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Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), p. 42. Relationship Between
Strategy Processes.
Design consists of three closely interrelated activities, which collectively allow com-
manders and their staffs to understand and visualize an operation’s purpose. These
activities are framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and devel-
oping the operational approach. Design helps formulate an operational approach

(Operations & Planning) I. Operational Design 5-7

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Chap 5

II. Planning
Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), pp. 61 to 77.

I. Air Force Planning in the Context of Joint

Planning
Joint operation planning is an integrated process for orderly and coordinated prob-
lem solving and decision-making across the spectrum of conflict. In its peacetime
application, the process allows the thorough and fully coordinated development of
plans for operations during steady-state conditions as well as contingencies. During
crises, the process is shortened as needed to support the dynamic requirements of
changing events. During execution, the process adapts to accommodate changing
factors in the operational environment and maximize the flexibility of operations. For
today’s commanders, plans are useful as necessary points of departure— planning
as a process is still the most important.
Joint operation planning is conducted at every echelon of command, during peace-
time as well as conflict, and across the range of military operations. Joint operation

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planning is accomplished through the adaptive planning and execution (APEX)
system, which is “the Department of Defense- (DOD-)level system of joint policies,
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processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and
information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community
to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment,
redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations” (JP

Operations
& Planning
5-0, Joint Operation Planning). The APEX system facilitates iterative dialogue and
m
collaborative planning between the many echelons of command, including between
the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), who usually acts as the joint force
air component commander (JFACC), and the joint force commander (JFC) and other
components. This helps ensure that the military instrument of national power (IOP)
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is employed in accordance with national priorities, and that plans are continuously
reviewed and adapted to accommodate changes in strategic guidance, resources,
the actions of adversaries and other actors, and the operational environment. Joint
operation planning also identifies capabilities outside the DOD, and provides the
means of integrating military actions with those of other IOPs and multinational part-
ners in time, space, and purpose to create all effects necessary to achieve objec-
tives required to attain the desired end state.
The APEX System formally integrates the activities of the entire joint planning and
execution community (JPEC), which facilitates seamless transition from operational
design and planning efforts to execution in times of crisis. APEX, and the joint opera-
tion planning and execution system (JOPES) technology that underpins it, provides
for planning that is integrated from the national level down to theater and component
levels.
See chap. six for detailed discussion of planning for joint air operations planning --
including the joint air estimate, joint operation planning process for air (JOPPA), joint
targeting, and the joint air tasking cycle.

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Contingency & Crisis Action Planning

Ref: AFI 10-401, AF Operations Planning & Execution (w/Chg 4, 13 Mar ‘12), pp. 49 to 50.

DCAPES, Force Modules, and UTCs

Air Force planners, regardless of organization, will use Deliberate and Crisis
Action Planning and Execution Segments (DCAPES), force modules, and unit
type codes (UTCs) during the planning process. DCAPES is the Air Force feeder
to JOPES. DCAPES use is directed because it provides a variety of capabilities
to Air Force planners and agencies not found in JOPES that are necessary for
management and oversight of Air Force planning and execution. Force modules
and UTCs are the building blocks of AEWs, AEGs, and AESs -the way the Air
Force presents and sources capabilities to the JPEC.
Air Force Instruction 10-401 (w/Chg 4, 13 March 2012).

Planning, whether legacy or Adaptive has contingency and crisis action components.

1. Contingency Planning (formerly “Deliberate Planning”)

Combatant commanders, their components, and supporting commands accomplish
contingency planning during peacetime conditions. Planners use scenarios and threats

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identified in national guidance, such as the JSCP, along with the combatant com-
mander’s evaluation of their AOR, to develop a series of plans that span a wide range
of operations. This formal process develops responses to potential crises, determines
pl
forces required to achieve objectives, prepares deployment plans, and continually
evaluates selected courses of action (COAs). This process results in a series of formal
plans within each theater that contain lists of apportioned forces and their time-phased
deployment schedules. The process for contingency planning is cyclic and continual
Operations
& Planning

m
and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed
OPLAN, CONPLAN, or FUNCPLAN. Operations plans remain in effect until canceled
or super ceded by another approved plan. While in effect, they are continuously main-
tained and updated.
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2. Crisis Action Planning (CAP)

Crisis action planning is driven by current events in real time and normally occurs in
emergencies and in the context of time-sensitive situations. Planners base their efforts
on the actual circumstances that exist when crisis action planning occurs. Detailed
guidance and instructions are located in JOPES Volumes I-III. Ideally, an existing
contingency plan addresses the crisis situation. If there is not a contingency plan that
can be used or modified to respond to the crisis, planners must start from scratch.
Each MAJCOM must establish complementary procedures and must ensure adequate
procedures exist for subordinate command and agency use. These procedures must
be periodically exercised during joint and unilateral command post exercises and field
training exercises to ensure the required capability is available. The JPEC’s Global
Force Management (GFM) process developed policy and procedures in support of
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) as the DOD primary joint
force provider (JFP). Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC), as the Air Force
component commander to USJFCOM, is the Air Force’s primary Service force provider.
MAJCOM and AEFC roles in sourcing crisis requirements will mature under GFM. The
GFMB and CDRUSJFCOM will establish complementary procedures to determine
sourcing recommendations and issues related to risk to sourcing other requirements,
sustainability assessment and issues identified by other combatant commanders and
JFCOM Service components. The AEFC and each MAJCOM must establish comple-
mentary procedures. MAJCOMs must ensure adequate procedures exist for subordi-
nate command and agency use.

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Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Orders

Ref: AF1 10-401, Air Force Operations Planning & Execution (Apr ‘07), pp. 53 to 54.

The Warning Order (WARNORD)

The CJCS Warning Order initiates COA development and applies to the supported
command and supporting commands. It is normally published by the CJCS during
Phase II planning. The WARNORD establishes command relationships (designat-
ing supported and supporting commanders) and provides the mission, objectives,
and known constraints. It establishes a tentative C-day and L-hour. It may apportion
capabilities for planning purposes or task the combatant commander to develop a list
of forces required to confront the crisis. A warning order does not authorize movement
of forces unless specifically stated. If the crisis is progressing rapidly, a planning order
or alert order may be issued instead. When a WARNORD is issued, the Air Force
component headquarters commander prepares a TPFDD in DCAPES for the Air Force
portion of the supported commander’s TPFDD in JOPES in accordance with CJCSM
3122.01A and CJCSM 3122.02B. The AEFC sources for Air Force requirements.
The Planning Order (PLANORD)
The CJCS can send a PLANORD to the supported commander and JPEC to direct
execution planning before a COA is formally approved by the SecDef and President
of the United States (POTUS). If the PLANORD is used in lieu of a WARNORD, the
PLANORD will include a COA, provide combat forces and strategic lift for planning

e
purposes, and establish a tentative C-day and L-hour. The PLANORD will not be
used to deploy forces or increase readiness unless approved by the SecDef. When a
PLANORD is issued, the Air Force component headquarters commander prepares a
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TPFDD in DCAPES for the Air Force portion of the supported commander’s JOPES
TPFDD in accordance with CJCSM 3122.01A and CJCSM 3122.02B. The AEFC
sources Air Force requirements.

Operations
& Planning
m
The Alert Order (ALERTORD)
The SecDef approves and transmits an ALERTORD to the supported commander and
JPEC announcing the selected COA. This order will describe the COA sufficiently to
allow the supported commander and JPEC to begin or continue the detailed planning
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necessary to deploy forces. If the ALERTORD is used in lieu of a WARNORD, the

PLANORD will include a COA, provide combat forces and strategic lift for planning
purposes, and establish a tentative C-day and L-hour. In a time-sensitive crisis, an
Execute Order may be issued in lieu of an ALERTORD.
The Execute Order (EXORD)
This order is issued by the authority and direction of the Sec-Def and directs the deployment
and/or employment of forces. If the EXORD was preceded by a detailed Alert Order or PLA-
NORD, then the EXORD simply directs the deployment and employment of forces. If nature
of the crisis results in an EXORD being the only order dispatched, then the EXORD must
include all the information normally contained in the warning, alert, and planning orders.
The Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO), Deployment Order
(DEPORD) and Redeployment Order
Issued by the SecDef, these orders are used to prepare forces to deploy or deploy
forces without approving the execution of a plan or OPORD. Prior to issuance, JFCOM
develops a draft DEPORD with recommended sourcing solutions. The Joint Staff
coordinates the draft DEPORD with agencies and OSD then forwards the proposed
DEPORD to SecDef for approval. When a PTDO or DEPORD is issued, the AEFC,
through ACC, sources Air Force requirements. Upon receipt of the CJCS Orders, the
HAF Crisis Action Team (AFCAT) (or Air Force Operations Group (AFOG) if the CAT is
not stood up) will transmit an order to all U.S. Air Force components and commands.

(Operations & Planning) II. Planning 5-21

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the air operations center’s (AOC’s) contribution to JOPES is dependent upon the
COMAFFOR’s staff. Specifics concerning the products of the deliberate and crisis
action planning processes can be found in the JOPES/APEX manuals.
Absorbing lessons learned and adapting to them appropriately is critical to opera-
tional success. Observations should be captured after every operation in the form of
lessons learned. Events should be documented in detail to provide information that
improves planning and execution of future actions.

IV. The Relationship Between Operational

Design and Planning
In many respects, operational design constitutes a necessary “front end” of plan-
ning, since the commander should frame the problem he or she seeks to solve and
determine its scope and parameters. It logically forms the first steps of campaign,
deliberate, crisis action, and other operational planning. It makes sense to determine
an operation’s overall end state before detailed steady-state or employment planning
begins (or, for that matter, before many aspects of force deployment and sustain-
ment planning begin). In other respects, design and planning are complementary
and even overlap: Design may begin before initiation of the JOPP or JOPPA, but
some portions of the mission analysis stage of the JOPP and JOPPA may provide
insights needed to properly frame an operational problem. Design often begins with
step 1 of the JOPP (“Initiation”), but certain formal products of contingency plan-

e
ning (such as warning and planning orders) may be issued after design efforts have
begun but before more detailed planning has started. Design often also continues
after completion of initial JOPP and JOPPA planning. There is no clear demarcation
pl
between when design ends and planning begins (or vice versa), especially dur-
ing the “first round” of design and planning. Strategists often also identify possible
branches and sequels at various points based on planning assumptions. In doing so,
they must often make assumptions in the absence of facts in order to allow planning
Operations
& Planning

m
to continue. The need for many assumptions is typical of designing and planning for
ill-structured problems.
Later, during plan execution and assessment, operational design may be conducted
in concert with planning to adapt to emerging situations or behaviors. In this part of
Sa

the process, commanders and strategists determine whether to implement pre-

planned branches or sequels, or even initiate complete re-design of an operation.

Lines of Effort
It is very helpful during design and planning to have a tool that depicts the rela-
tionship of effects to decisive points (DPs), centers of gravity (COGs), objectives,
and other events and concepts, using the logic of purpose–cause and effect.
Such a tool is usually arranged in proper time sequence to help commanders
and strategists visualize how operations evolve and interact over time. Lines
of Effort (LOE) provide just such a tool. Commanders and strategists may use
LOEs to link multiple actions and effects on nodes and DPs with COGs and
objectives to enhance effects-based planning efforts.

V. An Effects-Based Approach to Planning

The effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) informs every aspect of how the
Air Force designs, plans, executes, assesses, and adapts operations. The effects-
based approach applies as well to steady-state planning (such as campaign support
plans and country plans) as it does for planning the employment of forces (as in the
joint air operations plan).
See following pages (pp. 5-23 to 5-25) for further discussion of EBAO to include an
overview of effects (direct, indirect, intended and unintended), objectives and actions.
5-22 (Operations & Planning) II. Planning
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Effects, Objectives & Actions (EBAO)

Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), pp. 66 to 68.

Effects
“Effect” refers to “the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an
action, a set of actions, or another effect.” Effects are elements of a causal chain that
consists of tasks, actions, effects, objectives, and the end state(s), along with the
causal linkages that conceptually join them to each other. “Tasks” refer to an action or
actions that have been assigned to someone to be performed. Actions are the results
of assigned tasks. Actions produce specific direct effects, those effects produce other,
indirect effects that influence the adversary and other actors within the operational
environment, and this chain of cause and effect creates a mechanism through which
objectives and ultimately the end state are achieved. The end state is a set of condi-
tions that needs to be achieved to resolve a situation or conflict on satisfactory terms,
as defined by appropriate authority.

Objectives
Objectives at one level may be seen as effects at other, higher levels. Effects, how-
ever, comprise all of the results of actions, whether desired or undesired, intended or
unintended, immediate or ultimate. From a military planning perspective, operations
should be planned “from the top down,” starting with the desired military end state,

e
determining subordinate objectives needed to bring about that end state, then deriv-
ing the effects and causal linkages needed to accomplish the objectives, and finally
determining the actions and resources necessary to create those effects. The end
pl
state should explain the operation’s ultimate purpose—the outcome that is sought. The
objectives and effects should explain what results are required to attain that outcome.
The task and their resultant actions should explain the steps needed to achieve the
required results.

Operations
& Planning
m
Perspective is important here. What may seem like an action to the operational-level
warfighter may seem like an objective to warfighters at tactical units. Conversely, what
may be an objective for a component commander may seem like an action to the
President of the United States.
Sa

Planners should maintain awareness of the “big picture”—how the component’s effects
and objectives support the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) effects and objectives. This
is especially important during execution, where it is easy to get caught up in the details
of daily processes and lose sight of the end state. For example, “gain and maintain
air superiority to X degree in and over area Y for Z period” may be an objective for
the joint force air component commander (JFACC), but will likely be one of the effects
the JFC directs the JFACC to deliver (often stated as an execution task) in support of
the notional objective “defeat enemy A’s offensive into region B.” In turn, the JFACC’s
objective may seem like an action to the President, who has given the JFC the desired
effect of “defeating A’s offensive” in order to accomplish his national strategic objective
of restoring stability and maintaining political order in the applicable global region.

Actions
An action is performance of an activity to create desired effects. In general, there are
two broad categories of actions that are relevant at the tactical and operational levels:
Kinetic and nonkinetic. Examples of kinetic actions include the use of explosive muni-
tions and directed energy weapons. Examples of nonkinetic actions include use of
cyberspace weapons, an information operations radio broadcast to encourage enemy
surrender, and employment of electronic warfare capabilities.

(Operations & Planning) II. Planning 5-23

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Chap 5

III. Execution
Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), p. 78 and Volume 3, Command
(22 Nov 16), pp. 33 to 35.

Plans describe the ways and means through which given ends (objectives and end
states) can be achieved. Plans are carried out through a process called “execution,”
which involves putting into effect any courses of action, orders, or subordinate plans
needed to achieve the ends specified by the governing plan. Execution takes place
within the timeframe specified in the governing plan and usually encompasses some
mechanism through which forces are tasked or ordered to carry out specific mis-
sions. Assessment of ongoing operations usually takes place during execution.
The process of tasking forces and generating orders for specific missions itself
entails cycles of planning, execution, and assessment. Generally speaking, plan-
ning refers to activities intended to govern future operations and execution refers to
actions taking place inside the timeframe spanning from whenever an order is given
to carry out the governing plan to the point when the commander has decided that
the operation can be terminated. Execution encompasses the commander’s “battle

e
rhythm”—the deliberate cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to inte-
grate and synchronize current and future operations. The tasking cycles that govern
pl
execution vary greatly between steady-state conditions (one or two fiscal years) and
contingency or crisis operations (days or hours).

I. Executing Operations

Operations
& Planning
m
Execution of operations is an integral part of the overarching effects-based approach
construct. Many Air Force operations are executed by means of a tasking cycle. The
cycle is used with some modifications for tasking operations in the air, space, and
cyberspace and is the heart of the Air Force battle rhythm.
Sa

Once execution begins, the commander continues to guide and influence operations
through the air operations directive (AOD) (and, in some cases, equivalent space
and cyberspace operations directives).

The Tasking Cycle

Many Air Force operations are executed by means of a tasking cycle. The tasking
cycle creates a daily articulation of the overall airpower strategy and planning efforts.
The tasking cycle is the means Airmen use to accomplish deliberate and dynamic
targeting, among other requirements.
The tasking cycle develops the products needed to build and execute an air tasking
order (ATO) and related products, and accomplish assessment.
Although it is presented below as six separate, sequential stages, in reality the task-
ing process is bi-directional, iterative, multidimensional, and sometimes executed in
parallel. It is built on a foundation based on thorough joint intelligence preparation
of the operational environment (JIPOE). The cycle typically consists of the following
stages performed at various levels of command (illustrated in the figure on the fol-
lowing page, Typical Tasking Cycle).

See following pages (pp. 5-28 to 5-29) for an overview of the tasking cycle. See pp.
6-23 to 6-28 for detailed discussion of the joint air tasking cycle.

(Operations & Planning) III. Execution 5-27

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I. Levels of Assessment
Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), pp. 80 to 82.
Assessors perform many types of assessment across the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels to inform a wide array of decisions. The figure, “Common Levels and
Types of Assessment” displays some common types of assessment and, broadly, the
levels where each would most likely be applied (the depiction is not all-inclusive). The
figure also shows the level of commander who commonly directs a given type of assess-
ment (e.g., the joint force commander [JFC] and joint force air component commander
[JFACC]). At all levels–but especially at the operational level–the commander, Air Force
forces (COMAFFOR), JFACC, and respective staffs should observe how the JFC takes
information “on board” and craft assessment products that convey the Airman’s perspec-
tive without seeming “air-centric” or presenting a biased view.

Common Levels and Types of Assessment

e
pl
Operations
& Planning

m
Sa

Ref: Annex 3-0, Operations & Planning (4 Nov 16), p. 80. Common Levels and Types of
Assessment.

A. Tactical-Level Assessment
Tactical-level assessment is generally performed at the unit or joint force component
level and typically measures physical, empirical achievement of direct effects. Combat
assessment (CA) is an umbrella term covering battle damage assessment (BDA), muni-
tions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and recommendations for re-attack (RR).
BDA is the estimate composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as
well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal
military force. BDA consists of three phases. Phase I BDA consists of reporting physical
damage (kinetic) or other changes (nonkinetic) to the target and, if possible, evaluating
the physical damage or change to the target quantitatively or qualitatively. Phase II BDA
measures what effect the weapon had on that individual target and to what extent it can
perform its intended function. Phase III BDA then measures the effect of striking a par-
ticular target on the overall target system (e.g., what effect does taking out a command
and control [C2] node have on the overall combat capability of an integrated air defense

5-32 (Operations & Planning) IV. Assessment

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system? This might relate to the overall effect of gaining and maintaining air superiority).
MEA evaluates whether the selected weapon or munition functioned as intended. MEA
is fed back into the planning process to validate or adjust weaponeering and platform
selections. RR and future targeting recommendations merge the picture of what was done
(BDA) with how it was done (MEA), comparing the result with predetermined measures of
effectiveness, to determine the degree of success in achieving objectives and to formulate
required follow-on actions, or indicate readiness to move on to new tasks.
Another assessment consideration at the tactical level is estimated damage assessment
(EDA). EDA is a type of physical damage assessment; it anticipates damage using the
probability of weapon effectiveness to support estimated assessments and allows com-
manders to accept risk in the absence of other information.
Tactical-level assessment should also be accomplished following tactical employment of
nonkinetic actions and non-offensive capabilities. Examples include military information
support operations (MISO; e.g., Commando Solo missions), public affairs (PA; e.g., media
engagements), cyberspace operations (e.g., temporary utility outages), operations security
(OPSEC; e.g., signature management), etc.
See pp. 7-53 to 7-58 for related discussion of tactical-level assessment (combat
assessment) as related to targeting from Annex 3-60.

B. Operational-Level Assessment
Operational-level assessment is the component’s evaluation of whether its objectives—at

e
the tactical and operational levels—are being achieved. Operational assessment addresses
effects, operational execution, environmental influences, and attainment of success indica-
tors for the objectives to help the COMAFFOR/JFACC decide how to adapt the compo-
pl
nent’s portion of the joint force strategy. Assessment at this level begins to evaluate com-
plex indirect effects, track progress toward operational and strategic objectives, and make
recommendations for strategy adjustments and future action extending beyond tactical re-
attack. Assessment at this level often entails evaluation of course of action (COA) success,

Operations
& Planning
m
assessment of the progress of overall strategy, and joint force vulnerability assessment.
Operational assessment should also include evaluation of changes to key parameters of
adversary force performance, changes in adversary capabilities, and what the adversary
is doing to limit the effects of friendly actions and to overcome friendly strategy. These are
Sa

commonly performed by joint force component commanders and the JFC and their staffs.
Operational-level assessment evaluates a wide range of data: Quantitative and qualitative, ob-
jective and subjective, observed and inferred. Some measures can be expressed empirically
(with quantitative measures); others, like psychological effects, may have to be expressed in
qualitative or subjective terms. Both rely on extensive data and analysis from federated intel-
ligence partners, including other US government agencies and multinational partners.

C. Strategic-Level Assessment
Strategic-level assessment addresses issues at the joint force (“theater strategic,” as in
bringing a particular conflict to a favorable conclusion) and national levels (enduring se-
curity concerns and interests). It involves a wide array of methodologies, participants, and
inputs. The President and Secretary of Defense rely on progress reports produced by the
combatant commander or other relevant JFC, so assessment at their levels often shapes
the nation’s, or even the world’s, perception of progress in an operation. This places a
unique burden on assessors, planners, strategists, and commanders to be accurate,
meaningful, and to complete their analysis and communicate results clearly and logically.
The time frames considered by the various assessment types may vary widely, from
rather short intervals at the tactical level to longer time horizons at the strategic level, even
reaching well beyond the end of an operation, as lessons learned are determined and
absorbed. The relationship among the various assessment types is not linear, with outputs
from one type often feeding multiple other types and levels.

(Operations & Planning) IV. Assessment 5-33

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Chap 6
Planning for
Joint Air Operations
Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), exec. summary.
The JFC’s estimate of the operational environment and articulation of the objectives
needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining components’ objec-
tives. The JFACC uses the JFC’s mission, commander’s estimate and objectives,
commander’s intent, CONOPS, and the components’ objectives to develop a course
of action (COA). When the JFC approves the JFACC’s COA, it becomes the basis for
more detailed joint air operations planning—expressing what, where, and how joint air
operations will affect the adversary or current situation.

The Joint Air Estimate

The joint air estimate is described as a process of reasoning by which the air com-
ponent commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation
and decides on a COA to be taken to accomplish the mission. The joint air estimate
reflects the JFACC’s analysis of the various COAs that may be used to accomplish
the assigned mission(s) and contains the recommendation for the best COA.
See pp. 6-3 to 6-4.
e
The Joint Operation Planning Process for Air (JOPPA)
pl
The JFACC is responsible for planning joint air operations and uses the joint opera-
tion planning process for air (JOPPA) to develop a JAOP that guides employment of
the air capabilities and forces made available to accomplish missions assigned by
the JFC. JOPPA follows the joint operation planning process found in Joint Pub-
m
lication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, with specific details for joint air operations.
JOPPA drives the production of the JAOP and supporting plans and orders.
See pp. 6-5 to 6-18.

Joint Targeting
Sa

The JFC will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordina-
tion, and deconfliction associated with joint air targeting to the JFACC and will ensure
that this process is a joint effort. Targets scheduled for attack by component air capa-
Operations
Joint Air

bilities and forces should be included on an ATO for deconfliction and coordination.
See pp. 6-19 to 6-22.

The Joint Air Tasking Cycle

The joint air tasking cycle process provides an iterative, cyclic process for the plan-
ning, apportionment, allocation, coordination, and tasking of joint air missions and
sorties within the guidance of the JFC. The joint air tasking cycle is synchronized with
the JFC’s battle rhythm. The full joint air tasking cycle, from JFC guidance to the start
of ATO execution, is dependent on the JFC’s and JFACC’s procedures. The precise
timeframes should be specified in the JFC’s operation plan or the JFACC’s JAOP.
See pp. 6-23 to 6-28.

(Joint Air Operations Planning) Overview 6-1

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Joint Air Estimate of the Situation Template

Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), app. B.
A. Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and its purpose.
• JFC’s mission statement (from the JFC’s estimate), or other overarching guid-
ance if the latter is unavailable
• JFACC’s mission statement. Include additional language indicating how overarch-
ing guidance will be supported, as required
B. Situation and Courses of Action.
1. Commanders’ Intent
• JFC’s intent statement, if available (or other overarching guidance stipulating the
end state, as required)
• JFACC’s intent statement
2. Objectives. Explicitly state air component objectives and the effects required to
support their achievement. Include as much detail as required to ensure that each
objective is clear, decisive, attainable, and measurable.
3. Summary of the Results of JIPOE. Include a brief summary of the major factors
pertaining to the characteristics of the operating environment and the relative capabili-
ties of all actors within it that may have a significant impact on alternative air COAs.
4. Adversary Capability. Highlight, if applicable, the adversary capabilities and
e
psychological characteristics that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mis-
sion, giving information that would be useful in evaluating the various air COAs. This
pl
section should describe, at a minimum, the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous
potential COAs.
5. Force Protection Requirements. Describe potential threats to friendly forces,
including such things as the threat of terrorist action prior to, during, and after the
m
mission that can significantly affect accomplishment of the mission.
6. Own Courses of Action. List air COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and accept-
able means of accomplishing the mission. If specific air COAs were prescribed in the
WARNING ORDER, they must be included. For each air COA:
Sa

• Combat forces required. List capabilities needed, and, if applicable, specific units
or platforms. For each, list the following, if known:
1. Force provider
Operations
Joint Air

2. Destination
3. Required delivery date(s)
4. Coordinated deployment estimate
5. Employment estimate
6. Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate
• ISR forces required. List capabilities needed, and, if applicable, specific units or
capabilities
• Support forces required. List capabilities needed, and, if applicable, specific units
or capabilities
C. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Highlight adversary capabilities and
intent (where known) that may have significant impact on friendly COAs.
D. Comparison of Own Courses of Action. For submission to the JFC, include only
the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored air COA.
Discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of the alternative air COAs if this
will assist the JFC in arriving at a decision.
E. Recommended Course of Action. State the JFACC’s recommended COA.

6-4 (Joint Air Operations Planning) I. The Air Estimate

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Joint Air Operations Planning Overview

Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), pp. III-2 to III-3.
The JFACC’s role is to plan joint air operations. In doing so, the JFACC provides focus
and guidance to the JAOC staff. The amount of direct involvement depends on the time
available, preferences, and the experience and accessibility of the staff. The JFACC
uses the entire staff during planning to explore the full range of adversary and friendly
COAs and to analyze and compare friendly air capabilities with the adversary threat. The
JFACC must ensure that planning occurs in a collaborative manner with other compo-
nents. Joint air planners should meet on a regular basis with the JFC’s planners and with
planners from other joint force components to integrate operations across the joint force.
Planning is a continuous process and only ends with mission accomplishment.

Joint Air Operations Planning

Joint Force Mission

JFC Estimate

Objectives and Comprehensive AOR and JOA Perspective

e
JFACC/JFC Staff Estimate of the Situation
JFACC and/or JFC Staff Recommended COA
pl
JFC Approves COA
Joint Air Operations Plan
Supporting Plan
m
Area Air Defense Plan - Airspace Control Plan
JFACC’s Daily
Guidance
Sa

Master Air Attack Plan and Supporting Orders

Air Operations Directive- Air Tasking Order
Operations

Airspace Control Order

Joint Air

Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, fig. III-1, p. III-2.

The Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP)

The JAOP is the JFACC’s plan for integrating and coordinating joint air operations and
encompasses air capabilities and forces supported by, and in support of, other joint force
components. The JFACC’s planners must anticipate the need to make changes to plans
(e.g., sequels or branches) in a dynamic and time-constrained environment. Planners
should include representatives from all components providing air capabilities or forces to
enable their effective integration.
See pp. 6-16 to 6-18 for a sample joint air operations plan (JAOP) format.

6-6 (Joint Air Operations Planning) II. JOPPA

 Joint Air Operations Planning Process
Ref: Adapted from JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Jan ‘10), fig. III-13, p. III-25 (not provided in Feb ‘14 edition).

LEGEND
AADC area air defense ATO air tasking order JFACC joint force air component commander
commander COA course of action JFLCC joint force land component commander
AADP area air defense plan FRAG fragmentation code JFMCC joint force maritime component
Warning Order/ ACA airspace control authority JAOC joint air operations commander
Planning Commander's ACO airspace control order center JFSOCC joint force special operations component
Directive Estimate AOD air operations directive JAOP joint air operations plan commander
JTF joint task force

Combatant Mission COA COA Analysis/ COA Plan or Order

Commander/ COA Approval
Analysis Development War Gaming Comparison Development
JTF Initiation
Sa
Warning Order/ JFACC/ Alert/
Planning JFLCC/JFMCC/JFSOCC Planning/
Directive Commander's Estimate FRAG Order
m
JFACC/ Supporting
Mission COA COA Analysis/ COA COA Approval Plan/Order
JFLCC/JFMCC/JFSOCC Analysis Development War Gaming Comparison
Initiation (i.e., JAOP,
ATO, ACO,
AOD)
Development
Warning Order/ Commander's Alert/
pl
* The warning Planning Planning/
order includes Staff Estimate
Directive FRAG Order
the purpose,
situation,
mission,
e
execution,
administration, JAOC/ACA/ Mission COA COA Analysis/ COA Supporting
AADC COA Approval Plan/Order
and logistics Analysis Development War Gaming Comparison
paragraphs. Initiation (i.e., AADP)
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(Joint Air Operations Planning) II. JOPPA 6-7

Joint Air
Operations
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Step 1. Initiation
Planning is usually initiated by direction of a JFC, but the JFACC may initiate planning
in anticipation of a planning requirement not directed by higher authority, but within
the JFACC’s authority. Joint air operations should be coordinated with space and
cyberspace operations. Military air options are normally developed in combination with
the other military and nonmilitary options so the JFC can appropriately respond to a
given situation.
The JFACC and staff perform an assessment of the initiating directive to determine
how much time is available until mission execution, the current status of intelligence
products and staff estimates, and other relevant factors that influence the planning
situation. The JFC and JFACC typically provide initial guidance that may specify time
constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key ca-
pabilities within the commanders’ authority, and direct other actions as necessary. The
JFACC may produce an initial commander’s intent during this step.
See facing page to see a sample JFACC mission statement and commander’s
intent.

Step 2. Mission Analysis

Mission analysis is critical to ensure thorough understanding of the task and subse-
quent planning. It results in the JFACC’s final mission statement that describes the
joint air component’s essential tasks. It should include the “who, what, when, where,

e
and why” for the joint air operation, but seldom specifies “how.” At the end of mission
analysis, the JFACC should issue his intent for the overall joint air operation, that is,
the JFACC’s contribution to the JFC’s military end state. The JFACC’s intent should
pl
express the end state to be produced by joint air operations and the purpose for pro-
ducing them. It should also include the JFACC’s assessment of where and how much
risk is acceptable during the operation. While the commander’s intent for the overall
operation is needed at the end of mission analysis, the JAOP will eventually contain
m
the commander’s intent for each phase of the operation, and the AODs will contain
the JFACC’s intent for a specific ATO or period of time. Hence the commander’s intent
articulates a desired set of conditions for a given point in time and the purpose those
conditions will support.
Sa

See facing page to see a sample JFACC mission statement and commander’s
intent.
Anticipation, prior preparation, and a trained staff are critical to timely mission analysis.
Operations

Staff estimates generated during mission analysis are continually revisited and up-
Joint Air

dated during the course of planning, execution, and assessment.

Mission analysis includes developing a list of critical facts and assumptions.

Facts
Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation.

Assumptions
Assumptions are suppositions on the current situation or a presupposition on the
future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive
proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete
an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the COA. Assumptions may
also become commander’s critical information requirements or drive the develop-
ment of branch plans to mitigate the risks of a wrong assumption. Assumptions must
be continually reviewed to ensure validity. Once an assumption is proven correct, it
becomes a fact; or if proven incorrect, a new fact or assumption is determined. They
are necessary to enable commanders to complete estimates of the situation, influence
commander's critical information requirements, drive branch planning, and make deci-
sions on COAs.

6-8 (Joint Air Operations Planning) II. JOPPA

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Sample Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP)

Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), app. C.
Continued from previous page

e. Civil Affairs. Use as required.

f. Meteorological and Oceanographic. Explain factors like climate and terrain, and
how they will likely affect air operations.
g. Geospatial Information. Explain common geospatial reference system require-
ments and plans here.
h. Medical Services. Use as required.
5. COMMAND AND CONTROL
a. Command
(1) Command Relationships. Specify command relationships for all organizations
relevant to the JFACC operations. Be as specific as possible
(2) Memoranda of Understanding. As applicable
(3) Command Headquarters. Designation and location of all air-capable command
headquarters
(4) Continuity of Operations. Any general considerations unique to the operation
(5) Command Posts. List the designations and locations of each major headquarters

e
(6) Succession to Command. Designate, in order of succession, the command-
ers responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific applicable
circumstances
pl
b. C2 and Communications Systems. General overview of C2 and communication
systems required to support air operations.
6. ANNEXES
m
JAOP annexes should be written for a functional domain-specific audience and con-
tain technical details necessary for C2 of all air organizations and capabilities across
the joint force. They should contain any details not considered appropriate for the
relevant section of the main plan.
Sa

A. Task Organization
B. Intelligence
C. Operations
D. Logistics
Operations
Joint Air

E. Personnel
F. Public Affairs
G. Civil Affairs
H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
Continued from previous page

I. Force Protection
J. Command Relationships
K. Joint Communications System
L. Environmental Considerations
M. Geospatial Information and Services
N. Space Operations
P. Host-Nation Support
Q. Medical Services
S. Special Technical Operations
V. Interagency Coordination
(Signed) (Commander)

DISTRIBUTION:
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION.

6-18 (Joint Air Operations Planning) II. JOPPA

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Chap 6
III. Joint
Targeting
Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), chap. III.

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropri-
ate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting is
both a joint- and component-level function to create specific desired effects that achieve
the JFC’s objectives. Targeting selects targets that, when attacked, can create those
effects, and selects and tasks the means to engage those targets. Targeting is compli-
cated by the requirement to deconflict unnecessary duplication of target nominations by
different forces or different echelons within the same force and to integrate the attack of
those targets with other components of the joint force. An effective and efficient target
development process coupled with the joint air tasking cycle is essential for the JFACC
to plan and execute joint air operations. The joint targeting process should integrate
the intelligence databases, analytical capabilities, and data collection efforts of national
agencies, combatant commands, subordinate joint forces, and component commands.

I. Joint Targeting Cycle

Joint Targeting Cycle e
pl
1.
End State and
Commander’s
Objectives
m
2.
6.
Assessment Target Development
and Prioritization
Sa

5.
3.
Mission Planning
Capabilities
Operations
and Force
Analysis
Joint Air

Execution
4.
Commander’s
Decision and Force
Assignment

Ref: JP 3-60, Joint Targeting (Jan ‘13), fig. II-2. Joint Targeting Cycle.
The joint targeting cycle is an iterative process that is not time-constrained, and steps
may occur concurrently, but it provides a helpful framework to describe the steps that
must be satisfied to successfully conduct joint targeting. The deliberate and dynamic
nature of the joint targeting process is adaptable through all phases of the air tasking
cycle. As the situation changes and opportunities arise, steps of the joint targeting pro-
cess can be accomplished quickly to create the commander’s desired effects. There
are six phases to the joint targeting cycle: end state and commander’s objectives,
target development and prioritization, capabilities analysis, commander’s decision and
force assignment, mission planning and force execution, and assessment.
See chap. 7, Targeting, for further discussion from Annex 3-60. See pp. 7-6 to 7-7 for
an overview of the targeting cycle.
(Joint Air Operations Planning) III. Joint Targeting 6-19
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V. Target Development and Prioritization

Ref: JP 3-60, Joint Targeting (Jan ‘13), pp. II-5 to II-6.
Target development is the analysis, assessment, and documentation processes to
identify and characterize potential targets that, when successfully engaged, support
the achievement of the commander’s objectives. A fully developed target must comply
with national and command guidance, law of war, and the applicable ROE to be en-
gaged. Phase 2 is comprised of three steps:
(a) Target system analysis;
(b) Entity-level target development; and
(c) Target list management (TLM).
Target developers systematically examine the enemy to the entities to the elements
utilizing the targeting taxonomy, which hierarchically orders the adversary, its capabili-
ties, and the targets which enable the capabilities into a clarifying framework.

Target Development Relationships

1.
End State and Taxonomy Product
Commander’s
Objectives Joint Intelligence

e
Adversary Preparation of the
Operational
Environment
pl
Target System Target
2. System
Target Analysis
Development and Target System Component
Prioritization
m
Target

Electronic
Target
Sa

3. Target Folder
Capability Analysis Element
Operations
Joint Air

Ref: JP 3-60, Joint Targeting (Jan ‘13), fig. II-3. Target Development Relationships.
Target systems are typically a broad set of interrelated functionally associated compo-
nents that generally produce a common output or have a shared mission. Target devel-
opment always approaches adversary capabilities from a target systems perspective.
This includes physical, logical, and complex social systems, and the interaction among
them. While a single target may be significant because of its own characteristics, the
target’s real importance lies in its relationship to other targets within an operational
system. A target system is most often considered as a collection of assets directed
to perform a specific function or series of functions. While target systems are intra-
dependent to perform a specific function, they are also interdependent in support of
adversary capabilities. System-level target development links these multiple target
systems and their components to reflect both their intra- and interdependency that,
in aggregate, contribute to the adversary capabilities. JIPOE helps target developers
prioritize an adversary’s target systems based on how much each contributes to the
adversary’s ability to wage war.

6-22 (Joint Air Operations Planning) III. Joint Targeting

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Chap 6
IV. The Joint Air
Tasking Cycle
Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations (Feb ‘14), chap. III.
The joint air tasking cycle provides for the effective and efficient employment of joint
air capabilities and forces made available. This process provides an iterative, cyclic
process for the planning, apportionment, allocation, coordination, and tasking of joint
air missions and sorties within the guidance of the JFC. The cycle accommodates
changing tactical situations or JFC guidance as well as requests for support from
other component commanders. The joint air tasking cycle is an analytical, system-
atic cycle that focuses joint air efforts on accomplishing operational requirements.
Much of the day-to¬day tasking cycle is conducted through an interrelated series of
information exchanges and active involvement in plan development, target develop-
ment, air execution, and assessment (through designated component LNOs and/or
messages), which provide a means of requesting and scheduling joint air missions.
A timely ATO is critical—other joint force components conduct their planning and op-
erations based on a prompt, executable ATO and are dependent on its information.

The Joint Air Tasking Cycle

1
e
Objectives, Effects, and Guidance
pl
2 Target Development
m
3 Weaponeering and Allocation

4 ATO Production and Dissemination

Sa

5 Execution Planning and Force Execution Operations

Joint Air

6 Assessment

Ref: JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, chap. III.
The joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFC’s objectives, incorporates guidance
received during JFC and component coordination, and culminates with assess-
ment of previous actions. The ATO articulates the tasking for joint air operations
for a specific execution timeframe, normally 24 hours. The joint air tasking cycle is
synchronized with the JFC’s battle rhythm. The JAOC normally establishes a 72- to
96-hour ATO planning cycle. The battle rhythm or daily operations cycle (schedule
of events) articulates briefings, meetings, and report requirements. It provides sus-
pense for targeting, AIRSUPREQs, friendly order of battle updates, etc., to produce
the air battle plan (ABP) that includes the ATO message and other products. The
battle rhythm is essential to ensure information is available when and where required
to provide products necessary for the synchronization of joint air operations with
the JFC’s CONOPS and supporting other components’ operations. Nonetheless,
airpower must be responsive to a dynamic operational environment and the joint air
(Joint Air Operations Planning) IV. The Joint Air Tasking Cycle 6-23
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Chap 7
I. Targeting
Fundamentals
Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 1-30.

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the ap-
propriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.
This process is systematic, comprehensive, and continuous. Combined with a clear
understanding of operational requirements, capabilities, and limitations, the targeting
process identifies, selects, and exploits critical vulnerabilities of target systems and
their associated targets to achieve the commanders’ objectives and desired end
state. Targeting is a command function requiring commander oversight and involve-
ment to ensure proper execution. It is not the exclusive province of one type of
specialty or division, such as intelligence or operations, but blends the expertise of
many disciplines.
Targeting helps translate strategy into discrete actions against targets by linking
ends, ways, means, and risks. It is a central component of Air Force operational
art and design in the application of airpower to create lethal and nonlethal effects.
Strategy allows commanders to choose the best ways to attain desired outcomes.

e
Strategy forms the plans and guidance that can be used to task specific airpower ca-
pabilities through the tasking process. The processes of planning, tasking, targeting,
pl
and assessing effects provide a logical progression that forms the basis of decision-
making and ensures consistency with the commander’s objectives and the end state.
Too often targeting is tied just to the delivery of kinetic capabilities and the tasking
cycle. However, achieving JFC objectives can be accomplished by creating lethal
m
and nonlethal effects, using a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. To
optimize military action, targeting should integrate the full spectrum of capabilities
beginning at the onset of planning. In addition, targeting should occur in peacetime
well before hostilities and continue through post-hostilities. Targeting occurs at all lev-
Sa

els of conflict (strategic, operational, and tactical), for all phases of operations (Phase
0 through Phase 5), across all domains, and across the range of military operations.
Airmen tie the targeting process to creating specific desired effects that achieve
objectives. Additionally, Airmen recognize that targeting is a systematic process of
analyzing adversaries and enemies to determine critical vulnerabilities against which
national capabilities can be applied to create specific desired effects that achieve
objectives, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.
A target is an entity or object considered for possible engagement or other actions.
Joint doctrine describes entities as facilities, individuals, equipment, virtual, and
organizations. Targets are identified for possible action to support the commander’s
objectives, guidance, and intent. It is a fundamental tenet of targeting that no poten-
Targeting

tial target derives its importance or criticality merely by virtue of the fact that it exists,
or even that it is a crucial element within a target system and other interdependent
target systems. Any potential target derives importance, and thus criticality, only by
virtue of the extent to which it enables enemy capabilities and actions that must be
affected in order to achieve the commander’s objectives. Military actions employed
may produce lethal or nonlethal effects. Multiple actions may be taken against a
single target, and actions may often be taken against multiple targets to achieve a
single effect.

(Targeting) I. Fundamentals 7-1

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II. Types Of Targeting

There are two categories of targeting: deliberate and dynamic. It is a mistake to asso-
ciate deliberate targeting with fixed targets and dynamic targeting with mobile targets.

Deliberate Targeting Dynamic Targeting

(Planned) (Targets of Opportunity)

Scheduled On-Call Unplanned Unanticipated

Targets Targets Targets Targets

Sensitive Targets

Time Sensitive Targets

Component Critical Targets

e
pl
A. Deliberate Targeting
Deliberate targeting applies when there is sufficient time to add the target to an air
m
tasking order (ATO) or other plan. Deliberate targeting includes targets planned for
attack by on-call resources. The air tasking cycle is sufficiently flexible to allow for
most mobile targets to be planned and attacked with deliberate targeting.
Sa

B. Dynamic Targeting
Dynamic targeting includes targets that are either identified too late, or not selected
in time to be included in deliberate targeting, but when detected or located, meet cri-
teria specific to achieving objectives. When plans change and planned targets must
be adjusted, dynamic targeting can also manage those changes.

Sensitive and Time Sensitive Targets

Two subsets of targets that require special consideration are sensitive and
time sensitive. Sensitive targets are targets where the commander has esti-
mated the physical and collateral effects on civilian and/or noncombatant per-
Targeting

sons, property, and environments occurring incidental to military operations,

exceed established national-level notification thresholds. Sensitive targets are
not always associated with collateral damage. They may also include those
targets that exceed national-level rules of engagement (ROE) thresholds, or
where the combatant commander (CCDR) determines the effects from striking
the target may have adverse political ramifications. Time-sensitive targets
(TSTs) are joint force commander (JFC) validated targets or sets of targets
requiring immediate response because they are highly lucrative, fleeting tar-
gets of opportunity or they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces.
These targets present one of the biggest targeting challenges.

7-4 (Targeting) I. Fundamentals

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Targeting Considerations during JOPPA

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 35 to 37.

Targeting During Formal Planning

Targeting supports every form of employment planning for joint operations. Joint
operation planning employs an integrated process for orderly and coordinated
problem solving and decision-making of JFC’s desired objectives. In its peace-
time application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully
coordinated development of contingency plans. In crisis, the process is shortened
as needed to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime,
the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation
planning activities.
The JAOP is created through the seven step JOPPA and is normally developed
in support of the JFC’s plan or order. Almost all targeting support to pre-conflict
planning is accomplished through the JOPPA.

See pp. 6-5 to 6-18 for an overview and complete discussion of the Joint Operations
Planning Process for Air (JOPPA). The discussion below only highlights certain targeting
considerations during specific steps of JOPPA.

Initiation e
The commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) and staff performs an assessment of
pl
the initiating directive to determine time available until mission execution, current status
of intelligence products, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation.

Mission Analysis
m
During this stage, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE)
begins. In order to fully support an effects-based campaign, the intelligence community
should conduct robust JIPOE to inform planning. JIPOE provides a comprehensive
framework for Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to planning
Sa

and COA selection. Consequently, JIPOE should assist commanders in anticipating

enemy intent and enable them in pre-empting enemy actions. The JIPOE process con-
tinues throughout planning by examining adversary and friendly capabilities, adversary
intent, and the operational environment. Enemy and friendly centers of gravity (COG)
are also identified during this initial stage of the JOPPA. As mission analysis is refined
through later stages of the JOPPA, enemy COGs are analyzed, yielding critical vulner-
abilities or other key system nodes. These are further examined through target system
or nodal analysis to yield target sets, targets, critical elements, and aimpoints, as well
as commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) to support JIPOE and tactical
assessment. Such analysis carries a considerable information-flow cost. In order to prop-
erly identify collection and exploitation requirements for targeting, target system analysis
Targeting

(TSA) and or targeting effects studies should begin well in advance of operations and
should continue throughout them. It should begin during the initial stages of JIPOE and
draw upon as much ongoing peacetime intelligence/targeting material as is available
for the theater or area of operations. While space, cyberspace, and information opera-
tions should already be fully integrated into mission analysis, JIPOE, TSAs and target
development should also ensure integration of specialized analysis in support of space,
cyberspace, and information operations.

7-14 (Targeting) II. Target Planning

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COA Development
JIPOE is refined during this stage and includes detailed analysis of COGs identified dur-
ing mission analysis. COG analysis is important to targeting efforts because it identifies
the enemy’s sources of power and will to fight and tries to discover how and where those
sources of power are vulnerable, where critical nodes within them are, and how they
can be exploited by the full capabilities of the joint force (e.g., air, space, cyberspace,
information operations, etc.). Critical vulnerabilities can be difficult to pick from critical
requirements or to translate those vulnerabilities into explicit target sets. Techniques for
translating vulnerabilities into targets can be used as the foundation for development of
COAs or a selected COA may be directed by the JFC.

Plan or Order Development

This step and its ultimate product, the JAOP, describe how the air component may
support the JFC’s operational plan. The JAOP identifies objectives, desired effects,
targets, and assessment measures in as much detail as available time and intelligence
allow. Objectives and the end state are derived from commander’s guidance, strategy
development and planning. Targeting efforts should always aim toward achieving these
objectives and the end state. During JAOP development, deliberate targeting is used
to develop targets and target sets included in the JAOP and its attachments. Even if
targeting information developed during planning is not included in the JAOP or its attach-
ments, JAOP development may require considerable targeting effort in order to validate

e
selected COAs, CONOPS, and other elements of the plan. Commanders and planners
should know, at least approximately, how much effort and what resources are required
to achieve the operation’s desired effects. This knowledge can be gained by conducting
pl
some (at least notional) deliberate targeting systems analysis using existing TSA prod-
ucts, functional system products (i.e., power, roads, communications, chemical, etc.),
targeting databases, and/or assessment of the total number of potential targets within
the modern integrated database (MIDB) binned into functional categories (e.g., airfields,
m
air defense, ballistic missile, WMD, C4I, etc.) before the conflict begins. Target selection
should be based upon desired effects against enemy COGs, which in turn should be
based upon the objectives for the conflict.
The JAOP should be effects-based, including lethal and/or nonlethal effects, as appropri-
Sa

ate. It is the air component’s main source of guidance. Targeting efforts play a major
role in building an effects-based JAOP by relating effects to particular targets and target
systems and helping validate whether planned resources can achieve those effects.
The JAOP should provide broad guidelines for prioritizing targets/target systems, as well
as making clear which categories or sets are most important to the campaign. The JAOP
should also provide guidance on the sequencing of targeting actions or effects, which
is not the same thing as priority. Although parallel effects are generally best, sometimes
some targets should be attacked first to enable effects against other targets. The JAOP,
as well as subsequently published special instructions (SPINS), AOD, and ATOs, should
clearly articulate the commander’s rules of engagement (ROE) that ensure operations
comply with the law of war (LOW).
Targeting

Finally, the JAOP should establish guidelines for dynamic, especially time-sensitive, tar-
geting. Dynamic targeting is one of the most labor-intensive and intellectually demanding
challenges the air component faces. Anticipating as much of the challenge as possible
and spelling out guidance and priorities in the JAOP may ease the burden on com-
manders and air operations center (AOC) combat operations division (COD) personnel
once the daily battle rhythm begins. This may prevent mistakes from being made during
employment or may at least mitigate their impact. Planners should address as broad a
scope as possible in as much detail as time and planning resources allow. This should
include robust ROE and related legal considerations.

(Targeting) II. Target Planning 7-15

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The Air Tasking Cycle

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 38 to 41.

A principal purpose of the air tasking cycle is to produce orders and supporting docu-
mentation to place a flexible array of capabilities in a position to create desired effects
in support of the commander’s intent. This cycle is driven by the tyranny of time and
distance. It takes time for ground crew to prepare aircraft for flight, for aircrew to plan
missions, and for aircrew to fly to the immediate theater of operations from distant
airfields. Likewise, commanders should have enough visibility on future operations to
ensure sufficient assets and crews are available to prepare for and perform tasked mis-
sions. These requirements drive the execution of a periodic, repeatable tasking process
to allow commanders to plan for upcoming operations. The ATO execution period (usu-
ally 24 hours in duration) and the preceding process during which the ATO is developed
(usually 72-96 hours in duration) are a direct consequence of these physical constraints.
See pp. 6-23 to 6-28 for detailed discussion of the Joint Air Tasking Cycle from JP 3-30.

Contingency Crisis Action

KEY
Planning Planning
Meetings or sub-
processes Campaign
Common products
of this phase Planning
Teams and staff
agencies involved JAOP
e
Objectives,
ROE ALLOREQ

JTCB
pl
Recommendations for
future action; Effects, and
Tactical, operational, and Guidance
campaign assessment AOD
m
JFC Staff,
Strat Plans Target
Assessment and
Guidance
Development
Tac and Teams Strat
Comp Guidance
Assess Teams and TET
JFC Staff
Sa

Phys. damage Teams Component/

assessment; Agency
Inflight reports, ISR JIPTL Target
MISREPs Coordination
Combat Ops’ MAAP
Off, Def, and Team
TST Teams
Execution
ATO Prod
Planning and Team Weaponeering
Force Execution and Allocation

ATO MAAP Brief

ACO ATO SORTIE/ALLOT
SPINS Production Message
and MAAP
Dissemination Briefing
Targeting

LEGEND
ACO airspace control order MISREP mission report
ALLOREQ allocation request Off offense
AOD air operations directive Ops operations
Assess assessment Phys physical
ATO air tasking order Prod production
Def defense ROE rules of engagement
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and SORTIE/ALLOT sortie allotment
reconnaissance SPINS special instructions
JAOP joint air operation plan Strat strategic
JFC joint force commander Tac tactical
JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list TET targeting effects team
JTCB joint targeting coordination board TST time-sensitive target
MAAP master air attack plan

(Targeting) III. Deliberate Targeting 7-19

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II. Dynamic Targeting Phases (F2T2EA)

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 47 to 49.

Dynamic targeting consists of six distinct phases: find, fix, track, target, engage, and as-
sess (F2T2EA). These are the same phases used to prosecute joint TSTs, as explained
in the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting (AFTTP
3-2.3). This method referred to as F2T2EA or colloquially as the “kill chain.”

F - Find
The find phase involves detection of an emerging target, which various aspects of its
characterization will result in it being binned into one of the dynamic targeting categories
listed above. The find phase requires clearly designated guidance from commanders,
especially concerning target priorities, and the focused ISR collection plan based on
JIPOE, to include named areas of interest and target areas of interest. Following this
collection plan leads to detections, some of which may be emerging targets, that meet
sufficient criteria (established by the AOC with commander’s guidance) to be considered
and developed as a target. The time sensitivity and importance of this target may be ini-
tially undetermined. Emerging targets usually require further ISR and analysis to develop
and confirm.
Commanders should not task sensors without an idea of what they may collect. They
should anticipate results, not request unfocused detection. The result of the find phase

e
is a potential target that is nominated for further investigation and development in the fix
phase.
pl
F - Fix
The fix phase positively identifies an emerging target as worthy of engagement and
determines its position and other data with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement.
When the emerging target is detected, sensors are focused upon it to confirm its identity
m
and precise location. This may require implementing a sensor network or diverting ISR
assets from other uses to examine it. The COMAFFOR may have to make the decision
on whether diversion of ISR resources from the established collection plan is merited,
but this decision can often be made by COD personnel. Data correlation and fusion
Sa

confirms, identifies, and locates the target, resulting in its classification in one of the four
target categories listed above. Target location and other information should be refined
enough to permit engagement in accordance with ROE. An estimation of the target’s
window of vulnerability frames the timeliness required for prosecution and may affect the
prioritization of assets and the associated risk assessment.
If a target is detected by the aircraft or system that may engage it (for example, by an
armed remotely piloted aircraft, or platform with an advanced targeting pod), this may
result in the find and fix phases being completed near-simultaneously, without the need
for additional ISR assets. It may also result in the target and engage phases being com-
pleted without a lengthy coordination and approval process. Battle management systems
[i.e., airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and joint surveillance target attack
Targeting

radar system (JSTARS) aircraft] can often fix target locations precisely enough to permit
engagement without the need for further ISR collection. Growth in sensor technology has
permitted “non-traditional” sources of ISR to supplement the find, fix, and track phases.
Integrating data from platforms other than those traditionally dedicated to intelligence
collection, to include information gleaned from weapons systems or even munitions
themselves, helps to build a common operating picture that commanders can use to
shorten the F2T2EA cycle.

7-26 (Targeting) IV. Dynamic Targeting

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T - Track
The track phase takes a confirmed target and its location, maintaining a continuous
track. Sensors should be coordinated to maintain situational awareness and track
continuity on targets. Windows of vulnerability should be updated when warranted. This
phase may require re-prioritization of ISR assets, just as the fix phase may, in order
to maintain situational awareness. If track continuity is lost, it may be necessary to re-
accomplish the fix phase—and possibly the find phase as well. The track phase results
in track continuity and refining the target identification. This is maintained by appropri-
ate sensors or sensor combinations, a sensor prioritization scheme (if required), and
updates on the target’s window of vulnerability (if required). The process may also be
run partially “in reverse” in cases where an emerging target is detected and engaged.
Once it becomes clear that it is a valid target, the sensors detecting it can examine
recorded data to track the target back to its point of origin, such as a base camp. This
could potentially identify threats or more lucrative targets. Such point of origin hunting
has proven especially useful during stability and counterinsurgency operations such as
those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

T - Target
The target phase takes an identified, classified, located, and prioritized target; deter-
mines the desired effect and targeting solution against it; and obtains required ap-

e
proval to engage. During this phase, COD personnel should review target restrictions,
including collateral damage, ROE, LOW, the no strike list (NSL), the restricted target list
(RTL), and fire support coordination measures (FSCM). In essence, the targeting and
pl
operational members of the COD must accomplish all facets of the “target validation”
process. This phase also accomplishes effects validation, weaponeering/capabilities
analysis, and collateral damage estimation (CDE) analysis. COD personnel match
available strike and sensor assets against desired effects, then formulate engagement
m
options. They also submit assessment requirements.
The selection of assets for a specific target may be based on many factors, such as
the location and operational status of ISR and strike assets, support asset availability,
weather conditions, ROE, target range, the number and type of missions in progress,
Sa

available fuel and munitions, the adversary threat, and the accuracy of targeting acquisi-
tion data. This can be the lengthiest phase due to the large number of requirements that
should be satisfied. In many cases, however, dynamic targeting can be accelerated if
target phase actions can be initiated and/or completed in parallel with other phases.

E - Engage
In this phase, identification of the target as hostile is confirmed and engagement is
ordered and transmitted to the pilot, aircrew, or operator of the selected weapon system.
The engagement orders should be sent to, received by, and understood by the operator
of the weapons system. The engagement should be monitored and managed by the en-
gaging component (for the air component, by the AOC). The desired result of this phase
is successful action against the target.
Targeting

A - Assess
In this phase, predetermined assessment requests are measured against actions and
desired effects on the target. ISR assets collect information about the engagement
according to the collection plan (as modified during dynamic targeting) and attempt to
determine whether desired effects and objectives were achieved. In cases of the most
fleeting targets, quick assessment may be required in order to make expeditious re-
attack recommendations.

(Targeting) IV. Dynamic Targeting 7-27

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Target Development Phase Products

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 68 to 69.

Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL)

The JIPCL is a prioritized list of intelligence collection and exploitation requirements
needed to support indications and warning, analysis, and future target development
efforts and to measure whether desired effects and objectives are being achieved.
Requirements and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in
conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the JFC’s objectives and guid-
ance. An approved JIPCL is a product of answering information gaps as well as the
collection and exploitation requirements stage of target development. The ISRD has
primary responsibility within the AOC for the JIPCL, although considerable consulta-
tion with the SD OAT is required.

Joint Integrated Prioritized Collection List (JIPCL)

The JIPCL is a prioritized list of intelligence collection and exploitation requirements
needed to support indications and warning, analysis, and future target development
efforts and to measure whether desired effects and objectives are being achieved.
Requirements and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components
in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the CFC’s objectives and
guidance. An approved JIPCL may be a product of answering information gaps as

e
well as the collection and exploitation requirements stage of target development. The
ISRD has primary responsibility within the CAOC for the JIPCL, although considerable
consultation with the SD OAT is required.
pl
No Strike List (NSL)
The NSL is a list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects
of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement. Attacking
m
these may violate LOW—interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or
governments or breach ROE. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and JFCs determine
which targets are included on the NSL based upon inputs from components, support-
ing unified commands, or higher authorities. Targets on this list require national-level
Sa

approval to strike. Targets on the NSL can only be moved to the RTL or JIPTL with
national-level approval.

Restricted Target List (RTL)

The RTL is a list of targets that have specific restrictions imposed upon them. Some
actions on restricted targets are prohibited until coordinated and approved by the
establishing headquarters. Targets are restricted because certain types of actions
against them may have negative political, cultural, or propaganda implications, or may
interfere with projected friendly operations. The RTL is nominated by elements of the
joint force and approved by the JFC. This list also includes restricted targets directed
by higher authorities. Actions taken by an opponent may remove a target from the RTL.
Targeting

Target System Analysis

Target System Analysis which provides an all-source examination of potential target sys-
tems to determine relevance to stated objectives, military importance, and priority of attack.

Electronic Target Folders (ETF)

Electronic target folders (ETF) developed to intermediate level. Depending on the level
of intermediate development, ETFs will contain data on the target characterization,
significance, location, type, function, expectation, elements, collateral damage con-
siderations, intelligence gain/loss, and facility graphics (see CJCSI 3370 for complete
details on ETF content at basic and intermediate levels to include graphics types).

7-44 (Targeting) V. Targeting & the Air Tasking Cycle

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Air Tasking Order (ATO) Phase Products

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 76 to 77.

Air Tasking Order (ATO)

The ATO is a medium used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units,
and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to
targets and specific missions. It normally provides specific instructions to include call
signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. The ATO may
subsume the ACO and SPINS or published as separate orders.
Special Instructions (SPINS)
SPINS are a set of instructions that provide information not otherwise available in the
ATO, but are necessary for its implementation. This may include such information as
commander’s guidance (often including the AOD itself), the C2 battle management
plan, combat search and rescue procedures, the communications plan, and general
instructions for inter- and intratheater airlift.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circum-
stances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue
combat engagement with other forces encountered. They should be published sepa-
rately, versus being buried in the SPINS or another document.

Airspace Coordination Order (ACO) e

The ACO provides direction to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict the use of air-
pl
space within the operational area. (Note: this does not imply any level of command
authority over air assets.)

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

m
(RSTA) Annex
The reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) annex is produced
during this stage by the ISRD. The RSTA annex is the ISR supplement to the ATO. It
contains detailed tasking of intelligence collection sensors and processing, exploita-
Sa

tion, and dissemination (PED) nodes and provides specific guidance to tasked ISR
assets, including ISR platforms, sensors, and PED.

The finalized JIPTL cutline associated with the ATO is fed back into the target devel-
opment process for situational awareness on status of targets to be serviced in order
to accurately produce the follow-on JIPTL.
As the ATO is finalized, the targeting staff will continue to update and/or refine
targeting products in accordance with the coordination activities in developing
the MAAP. Guidance may preclude a particular weaponeering solution or risk assess-
ment may require combined kinetic and non-kinetic solutions to create the desired
Targeting

effect(s).These refinements will be documented within the ETF and specific products
modified (e.g., JDPI, CDE, etc.) accordingly.

7-50 (Targeting) V. Targeting & the Air Tasking Cycle

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E. Execution Planning and Force Execution

Purpose of the Phase
Execution planning includes the preparation necessary for combat units to accom-
plish the decentralized execution of the ATO. Force execution refers to the 24-hour
period an ATO is executed by combat units, which generally includes 12 hours
immediately prior to the start of a given day’s execution period. The AOC aids both,
preparing input for, supporting, and monitoring execution. The COMAFFOR, as the
Air Force’s warfighting commander, directs execution of Air Force capabilities. If a
JFACC is appointed, that commander directs execution of air component capabilities
and forces made available for joint or combined operations. It is normal, of course,
for the COMAFFOR to also be the JFACC. Inherent in this is the authority to redirect
joint or combined air assets made available for tasking. Under the Air Force tenet
of centralized control and decentralized execution, unit commanders are given the
freedom and flexibility to plan missions and delivery tactics as long as they fall within
timing requirements, ROE, and intent of effects. The COMAFFOR coordinates redi-
rection of sorties that were previously allocated for support of component operations
with affected component commanders. For targeting, this is the application of all
previous steps of targeting and monitoring the execution in preparation for assess-
ment. During execution, the AOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of air
forces, the JSpOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of Air Force space
forces, and the 624th OC is the central agency for revising the tasking of Air Force
cyberspace forces. They are also responsible for coordinating and deconflicting any

e
changes with appropriate agencies or components. These operations centers may
or may not have authority to re-direct use of other capabilities supporting theater
pl
efforts, depending upon the asset.
Due to operational environment dynamics, the COMAFFOR may be required to
make changes to planned operations during execution. The AOC should be flexible
and responsive to changes required during execution of the ATO. Forces not allo-
m
cated for joint or combined operations, but included on the ATO for coordination pur-
poses, can be redirected only with the approval of the respective component or allied
commanders. During execution, the COMAFFOR is also responsible for retargeting
air assets to respond to emerging targets or changing priorities. The COMAFFOR
may delegate the authority to re-direct missions made available for higher priority
Sa

targets to C2 mission commanders as necessary. The AOC should be notified of all

redirected missions. This can have significant impact on the ISR and collection plan-
ning efforts and require significant oversight by targeting personnel within the AOC.
The COD supervises the detailed execution of the ATO. Targeteers monitor ATO
execution and recommend alternate targets when necessary. Normally, target-
ing changes are needed due to adverse weather, assessment requirements, or
modification of priorities. The ability to quickly recommend good alternate targets is
very important to the flexibility of airpower. Combat operations targeteers should be
aware of all significant information on the current ATO to include targets, desired ef-
fects and objectives, guidance, and ROEs, and weaponeering and collateral damage
Targeting

estimates.
The rational use of force relies on the capability to achieve positive identification
(PID) and geolocation of adversary entities as a precursor to taking action against
them. Conducting CID of all operational environment entities is thus a critical en-
abling capability in any use, or potential use, of military force. Identifying adversary
or enemy entities is essential, of course, but so is identifying friendly and neutral en-
tities. Friendly force tracking (FFT) is a core function of combat identification (CID).
FFT is the process of fixing, observing, and reporting the location and movement of
friendly forces. The purpose of FFT is to provide commander’s enhanced situational
awareness and to reduce friendly fire incidents.

(Targeting) V. Targeting & the Air Tasking Cycle 7-51

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II. Measures and Indicators

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 82 to 83.

At all levels of assessment, planners should choose criteria that describe or estab-
lish when actions have been accomplished, desired effects created, and objectives
achieved. These criteria are called “measures and indicators.” There are two common
types of measures:

Measures of Performance (MOP)

A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task ac-
complishment. An example of this would be five offensive cyberspace operations
performed, 100 combat sorties flown, and 98% ordnance delivered effectively.

Measures of Effect (MOE)

A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement
of an objective, or creation of an effect. An example would be to prevent the en-
emy’s weapons factory from delivering weapons to the enemy for at least 48 hours.

Measures and Indicators

e
Measures and indicators are selected MOEs and MOPs established during plan-
ning. When selecting assessment measures, planners should identify the essential
pl
elements of information required to collect against them and provide guidance in
the collection plan and JIPCL if special ISR resources are needed. These measures
should be refined or amended during the tasking cycle, as the tactical situation or the
status of the target changes. Selection of assessment measures is an iterative, ongo-
ing effort.
m
To be useful as a gauge of effectiveness, a measure, whether a MOP or MOE, should
be meaningful, reliable, and either observable or capable of being reliably inferred.
Meaningful means it should be tied, explicitly and logically, to objectives at all levels.
Sa

Reliable means it should accurately express the intended effect. If quantitative mea-
sures are used, they should be relevant. It is not sufficient to choose, for example,
“fifty percent of enemy armor attrited” as an MOE without understanding why that
measure is relevant to objectives. Observable means that existing ISR collection
methods can measure it with the required precision to detect the intended change.
MOEs and MOPs may be quantitative or qualitative. Sometimes subjective measures,
independent of other empirical measures, determine whether indirect effects and the
objectives they lead to are being accomplished. Qualitative means primarily that judg-
ment should be made in the absence of meaningful quantitative measures. Military
personnel tend to be less comfortable with these rather than with more empirical,
quantitative, measures, since they are generally trained to regard their profession as
Targeting

more of a science than an art, but often the numbers themselves involved in quantita-
tive measures can deceive. Seemingly “scientific” quantitative measures are often
poorer representations of what should happen in the operational environment than
more qualitative measures, like “enemy armor units A, B, and C not offering larger
than platoon sized resistance to forces closing on Phase Line X until at least day Y.”
Such a measure may be much more relevant to the friendly scheme of maneuver, be
easier to collect against, and be easier for commanders to act upon. It is often easier,
especially at the higher levels of assessment, to choose qualitative measures that are
logically tied to objectives. Quantitative measures, on the other hand, can, through
their very seeming certainty, take on a life of their own, leading to actions that do not
contribute to accomplishing objectives or the end state.

(Targeting) VI. Assessment 7-55

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Combat Assessment (CA)

Ref: Annex 3-60, Targeting (14 Feb ‘17), pp. 85 to 87.

CA determines the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capa-
bilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process.
To conduct CA, it is important to fully understand the linkages between the targets and
the JFC’s objectives, guidance, and desired effects. CA includes the three related ele-
ments: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack
recommendations or future targeting.

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

The purpose of battle damage assessment (BDA) is to compare post-execution results
with the projected results generated during target development. Comprehensive BDA re-
quires a coordinated and integrated effort between joint force intelligence and operations
functions. Traditionally, BDA is a phased process. It begins with aimpoint-level evaluations
of primary damage mechanisms and effect upon the targeted elements of a given target
type (facility, individual, virtual, equipment, or organization). These assessments are ag-
gregated and form the basis of system-level assessments. BDA is defined in three phases:
• Phase 1 BDA: This is the Initial Target Assessment reporting on physical dam-
age assessment (PDA) and or change assessment with initial functional damage
assessment (FDA) of the target. This BDA level phase is often derived from single

e
source reporting. Typical timelines associated with this phase are 1-2 hours after
information becomes available (e.g. sortie debrief, WSV review, Initial Imagery
Report). It also provides initial inputs for a Restrike Recommendation.
pl
• Phase 2 BDA: This is the Supplemental Target Assessment report on the physical,
change assessment, and functional damage assessment of the target. This report
is a detailed Physical Damage Assessment (PDA), Functional Damage Assess-
ment FDA, and change assessment normally based on multi-source reporting.
m
Phase 2 BDA reporting is provided when there is a significant change to the Phase
1 reporting to include the multi-source verification and change to the confidence
level of the initial reporting.
Sa

• Phase 3 BDA: This is the Target System Assessment (TSA) and represents the
aggregate of previous phase reporting. This assessment is normally produced by
national-level intelligence agencies working closely with the Joint Task Force as-
sessment teams (J2, J3, & J5). It represents an in-depth target system functional
damage assessment with respect to a target system (collection of related facilities/
entities) and provides commanders with high level assessments that help deter-
mine future weights of effort for future planning and execution. Reporting for this
phase is normally provided 24 hours after information becomes available.
For additional information on the BDA process, refer to Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) publications DI-2820-4-03, Battle Damage Assessment Quick Guide; DI 2800-2-
YR, Critical Elements of Selected Generic Installations (Critical Elements Handbook);
Targeting

and JP 3-60, Appendix D, The Targeting Assessment Process.

Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA)

MEA evaluates whether the selected weapon or munition functioned as intended. It
examines the munitions’ known parameters, the delivery tactics used, and the interac-
tion between the munition and the delivery platform. MEA is fed back into the planning
process to validate or adjust weaponeering and platform selections. It is also the form of
assessment with the highest potential return on investment in terms of weapons and tac-
tics development, because the data it generates is fed into the JMEM revision process,
resulting in more accurate future capability analysis. MEA is combined operations and
intelligence function.

7-56 (Targeting) VI. Assessment

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Chap 8
I. Combat
Support
Ref: Annex 4-0, Combat Support (21 Dec ‘15).
The Air Force defines combat support (CS) as the foundational and crosscutting ca-
pability to field, base, protect, support, and sustain Air Force forces across the range
of military operations. The nation’s ability to project and sustain airpower depends on
effective CS.

A Readied Force An Employed Force

A Prepared Operational CORE A Sustained Force

Environment
EFFECTS A Reconstituted
A Positioned Force Force

Readying the Force Employing the Force

Preparing the CORE Sustaining and

Recovering the Force
Operational Environment
PROCESSES Reconstituting the
Positioning the Force

e Force

Protect Forces
pl
Field Forces
Generate the Mission
Base Forces CORE Support the Mission,
Posture Responsive CAPABILITIES Forces, and
Infrastructure
Forces
m
Sustain the Mission,
Forces, and
Infrastructure
Sa

FUNCTIONAL COMMUNITIES
Acquisition Distribution Munitions Mgmt
AFOSI Force Support Postal Services
Airfield Operations Financial Mgmt/Comptroller Public Affairs
Analyses, Assessments, and Health Services Safety
Lessons Learned Historian Science/Technology
Chaplain Corps Judge Advocate Security Forces
Civil Engineer Logistics Planning Test and Evaluation
Communications/Information Maintenance Weather Services
Contracting Materiel Management

CS enables airpower through the integration of its functional communities to provide

the core effects, core processes, and core capabilities required to execute the Air
Force mission. The integration of these functional communities ensures Air Force
forces are ready, postured, equipped, employed, and sustained at the right place
and time to support the joint force.

Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics

SMARTbook (Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health
Services Support). Includes ATP 4-94 Theater Sustainment
Command (Jun ‘13), ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade (Aug ‘13), ATP
4-90 Brigade Support Battalion (Aug ‘14), Sustainment Planning,
Support
Combat

JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Oct ‘13), ATP 3-35 Army Deployment and
Redeployment (Mar ‘15), and more than a dozen new/updated
Army sustainment references.
(Combat Support) I. Combat Support 8-1
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II. Engineer Functions

Ref: Annex 3-34, Engineer Operations (15 Aug ‘17), pp, 6 to 7.

In joint and Air Force operations, engineering functions are categories of related
engineering capabilities and activities that are grouped together to help commanders
integrate, synchronize, and direct engineering operations. These functions fall into three
basic groups: general engineering, combat engineering, and geospatial engineering:

Engineer Functions

A General Engineering

B Combat Engineering

C Geospatial Engineering

e
pl
A. General Engineering
General engineering consists of those engineer capabilities and activities that provide in-
frastructure and modify, maintain, or protect the physical environment. Examples include
construction, repair, maintenance, and operation of infrastructure, facilities, lines of com-
m
munication, and bases; airfield damage repair (ADR), terrain modification and repair, and
selected explosive hazard activities. General engineering provides the means to develop
installations to project airpower. It can occur under combat conditions but differs from
combat engineering in that it is not in support of maneuver of forces. General engineer-
Sa

ing focuses on rapidly responding to establish, sustain, and recover airbases, conducting
ADR as needed. These types of activities are usually required during initial stages of
major operations when base infrastructure is unavailable or inadequate to support the
commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) in achieving the joint force commander’s
objectives. Engineering tasks are time consuming, requiring centralized planning and
control to effectively manage limited resources. Commanders may employ a combination
of military engineers, civil service, contractors, multinational engineers, and host nation
personnel to fulfill engineering requirements. Although the nature of some tasks or the
threat of violence in an operational area may require military engineers, once the area
begins to stabilize the tasks can be performed using multiple available resources. For
more detailed information on general engineering capabilities, see Appendix B.

B. Combat Engineering
Combat engineering is defined as those engineering capabilities and activities that
provide close support to the maneuver of land combat forces. It consists of mobility,
countermobility, and survivability operations. The primary difference between combat en-
gineering and general engineering is combat engineering’s requirement for close support
to land combat forces and its focus on mobility/maneuver versus supporting base and
mission operations from fixed locations. This should not be confused with “engineering
under combat conditions.”
Support
Combat

Although Air Force civil engineers are not specifically organized, trained, and equipped
to conduct combat engineering, their inherent skills are used to conduct tasks to sup-

8-6 (Combat Support) II. Engineering Operations

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III. Air Force Medical Forces Objectives

Ref: Annex 4-02, Medical Operations (29 Sept ‘15), pp. 11 to 17.

Sustain a Healthy and Fit Force

To sustain a healthy and fit force is the first of four objectives of Air Force medical
operations. A fit and healthy force increases the Air Force’s capability to withstand the
physical and mental rigors associated with combat and other military operations. The
ability to remain healthy and fit despite exposure to numerous health threats is a force
multiplier at home station and in deployed settings.
Fit and healthy Airmen can deploy on short notice and operate effectively in austere
environments. Early identification and intervention of health conditions that could oth-
erwise prohibit Airmen from being fully ready to deploy, increases the commander, Air
Force forces’ (COMAFFOR’s) ability to mass forces.
Prevent Illness and Injury
To prevent illness and injury is the second of four objectives of Air Force medical
operations. Illness and injury prevention is the framework by which Air Force leaders
and individuals optimize health readiness and protect Airmen. The force health protec-
tion goal is to prevent illness and injury from the physical and mental stress caused by
environmental, occupational, operational, and warfare, to include chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Air Force medical personnel recognize and

e
prepare for emerging man-made and natural threats. They make reasonable efforts to
identify and protect our forces from emerging infectious diseases, as well as potential
genomic/proteonomic, directed energy, and other new technologies. Casualty preven-
pl
tion is a continuous process conducted throughout pre-deployment, deployment, and
post-deployment phases. Illness and injury prevention requires the full commitment of
commanders, leaders, and individuals.
Restore Health
m
To restore health is the third of four objectives of Air Force medical operations. Medi-
cal forces use combined processes to rapidly restore each Airman to a combat ready
status or arrange for the appropriate rehabilitative services. Restoring health requires
Sa

a continuum of medical capabilities that includes first responders, forward resuscitative

care (FRC), en route care, theater hospitalization, and definitive care.
Optimize Human Performance
To optimize human performance is the last of four objectives of Air Force medical
operations. Personnel are the most important and valuable resource for the Air Force.
Accordingly, Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) focuses on human performance in
addition to health care as a primary means of supporting the COMAFFOR. Given the
prerequisite need for health, addressing human performance requires achievement of
the AFMS effects of “a healthy and fit force” and “prevent illness and injury”—two key
objectives of force health protection.
The AFMS becomes a force multiplier by focusing on human performance in addition
to health care as the primary means of supporting Air Force and joint forces. Air Force
medical personnel work to sustain the performance of Airmen, whether in the face of
enemy conflict, environmental threats and stressors, or advancing age. Any activity
that supports or encourages improvement in physical, mental, or emotional health and
fitness contributes to sustaining human performance. Additionally, Air Force medical
personnel develop risk mitigation approaches. They employ approved countermea-
sures to help Airmen maintain performance (or minimize performance degradations)
during warfare or upon exposure to environmental threats such as climatic extremes,
Support
Combat

g-forces, fatigue, weapons effects, prolonged mental or physical stress, witnessing or

participating in violent acts, etc.

8-12 (Combat Support) III. Medical Operations

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Chap 8
IV. Force
Protection
Ref: Annex 3-10, Force Protection (17 Apr ‘17).
The 21st Century has, thus far, been characterized by a significant shift in Air Force
responsibilities and an increased exposure of its resources to worldwide threats.
This point is underscored by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and ongoing
operations worldwide. Today, potential opponents are less predictable, leverag-
ing the increased availability of both high and low technology weapons, including
weapons of mass destruction. The Air Force’s ability to project US airpower requires
protection from these threats at home, in transit, and abroad.
Due to the increased lethality of international and domestic threats, it is imperative
the Air Force take strong measures to protect our personnel and installations around
the world. How the Air Force protects its forces is critical to global engagement. An
air expeditionary task force poised to respond to global taskings within hours should
establish the capability to fully protect its forces.

Force Protection Defined

e
Joint doctrine defines FP as “[p]reventive measures taken to mitigate hostile
actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family mem-
pl
bers), resources, facilities, and critical information” (Joint Publication 3-0,
Joint Operations). FP is a fundamental principle of all military operations as a
way to ensure the survivability of a commander’s forces.
A comparison of the joint definition with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
m
(NATO), definition is instructive. NATO doctrine explains that “[t]he operation-
al environment may have no discernable ‘front-lines’ or ‘rear area’ and an ad-
versary may be expected to target Allied vulnerabilities anywhere with a wide
range of capabilities.” Consequently, NATO defines FP as “[m]easures and
Sa

means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, opera-

tions, and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of
action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success.”

Commanders at all levels should have an effective force protection program. Com-
manders are responsible for protecting their people and the warfighting resources
necessary to perform any military operation. We are obligated by the moral necessity
of protecting our Airmen to ensure force protection (FP) is a part of Air Force culture.
Understanding and using FP doctrine will help ensure the successful protection of
our people and resources.
FP supports combat support, and its supporting capability of “Protect the Force.”
Protecting Air Force personnel and resources is critical to the Service’s ability to
perform its mission.

Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability

of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment,
facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within
or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0).
Refer to AODS6: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook for
Support
Combat

an entire chapter on protection to include the protection warfighting

function, protection supporting tasks, and protection planning.

(Combat Support) IV. Force Protection 8-13

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(AFOPS2)

Index
Index
A Air Force Planning in the Assessment Interpretation,
Additional Principles of Op- Context of Joint Planning, 5-40
erations, 1-18 5-15 Assessment Measures, 5-36
Additional Responsibilities as Air Interdiction (AI), 4-20 Asymmetric Operations, 4-4
the Service Component Air Mobility Operations, 4-41
Commander, 2-4 Air Mobility Support/GAMSS, B
Aeromedical Evacuation 4-52 Balance, 1-22
(AE), 4-54 Air Operations Center Basic Doctrine, 1-1
AETF Command and Control (AOC), 2-10, 3-9, 3-40 Battlefield Coordination De-
Mechanisms, 2-10 Air Refueling, 4-50 tachment (BCD), 3-14
AETF Organization, 2-6 Air Tasking Cycle, 7-19
AFFOR Organization & Staff Air Tasking Cycle Phases, C
Directorates, 3-18 7-32 CAS Effects, 4-25
AFFOR Staff Responsibili- Air Tasking Order (ATO) CAS Objectives, 4-25
ties, 3-20
AFFOR Staff, 2-10 e
Production and Dissemi-
nation, 7-48
CAS Planning, 4-26
CAS Responsibilities, 4-25
pl
AFSOC Command Relation- Airlift, 4-48 Categories of Targets, 7-24
ships, 4-88 Airmen’s Perspective, 3-37 Centralized Control, 1-20
AFSOC Core Activities, 4-86 Airmindedness, 1-8 Changes and Limitations
Air and Missile Defense Airpower and the Range of (Dynamic), 7-30
m
Commander (AAMDC), Military Operations, 4-5 Close Air Support (CAS),
3-14 Airpower as Maneuver in 4-24
Air Control, 4-7 Warfare, 4-4 COA Analysis and Wargam-
Air Control Relationships, 4-9 Airpower, 1-5, 4-1 ing, 6-14
Sa

Air Domain, 4-7 Airspace Control, 3-35 COA Approval, 6-25

Air Expeditionary Group Airspace Control Authority COA Comparison, 6-14
(AEG), 2-8 (ACA), 3-28, 3-36 COA Development, 6-10
Air Expeditionary Squadron Airspace Control Proce- Coercion Continuum, 5-14
(AES), 2-9 dures, 3-38 COMAFFOR Administrative
Air Expeditionary Task Force Airspace Control System Responsibilities, 2-3
(AETF), 2-5 (ACS), 3-37 COMAFFOR Operational
Air Expeditionary Task Force- Allocation, 7-45 Responsibilities, 2-2
X (AETF-X), 2-8 AOC Organization & Func- Combat Assessment (CA)*,
Air Expeditionary Wing tional Teams, 3-10 7-54
(AEW), 2-8 AOC Primary Functions, 3-9 Combat Engineering, 8-6
Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1-1 Applying Airpower, 4-4 Combat Identification (CID),
Air Force Component Pre- Area Air Defense Command- 4-16
sentation, 2-19 er (AADC), 3-30 Combat Support, 8-1
Air Force Component Within Assessing Strategy, 5-34 Combat Support Construct,
the Joint Force, 2-17 Assessment, 5-31, 7-52, 8-2
Air Force Doctrine, 1-2 7-53 Command & Control, 3-1
Air Force Forces Staff (AF- Assessment Criteria, 5-35 Command and Control of
FOR), 3-17 Joint Air Operations, 3-40

Index-1
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D
Index

Command and Control of Enduring Truths, 1-14

U.S. Forces in Multina- DCAPES, Force Modules & Engineer Functions, 8-6
tional Operations, 2-24 UTCs, 5-20 Engineering Operations, 8-5
Command and Organization, Decentralized Execution, Executing Operations, 5-25
3-40 1-20 Execution, 5-27
Command Authorities and Defense Support to Civil Execution Considerations,
Relationships, 3-4 Authority, 1-16 3-46
Command Relationship Defensive Counterair (DCA), Execution Planning and
Models, 2-11 4-11 Force Execution, 7-51
Command Relationships, 3-4 Deliberate and Crisis Action Expeditionary Elements be-
Command Responsibilities Planning, 5-18 low Squadron Level, 2-9
for Force Protection, 8-13 Deliberate Targeting, 7-17
Command Structure of Developing the Operational F
Forces in Multinational Approach, 5-11 Flexibility and Versatility, 1-21
Operations, 2-25 Distributed Operations, 2-11, Force Protection and Com-
Commander, Air Force Forc- 7-12 mand Relationships in a
es (COMAFFOR), 2-1 Doctrine, 1-2 Joint Environment, 8-16
Commander’s Responsibility, Dynamic Targeting, 7-21 Force Protection, 8-13
4-109
Dynamic Targeting Engage- Forward Air Controller
Commanding U.S. Air Force ment Authority, 7-28 FAC(A), 4-30
Forces, 2-1
Dynamic Targeting Phases Foundations of Airpower, 1-6
Common Operations Frame-
work, 5-5
Component Liaisons, 3-14
e
(F2T2EA), 7-26
Dynamic Targeting Risks,
7-29
Framing the Operational
Environment, 5-10
Framing the Problem, 5-10
pl
Concentration, 1-22
Contingency and Crisis E G
Execution: The Tasking Effects (Direct, Indirect, General Engineering, 8-6
Cycle, 5-28 Intended, Unintended),
m
Geospatial Engineering, 8-7
Contingency Planning, 5-20 5-25 Global Integrated ISR Opera-
Control of Other Services’ Effects of Air Interdiction, tions, 4-57
Aviation Capabilities, 2-22 4-20 Global Mobility Enterprise,
Counterair Operations, 4-7,
Sa

Effects, Objectives & Actions 4-41

4-10 (EBAO), 5-24 Global Power, 1-1
Counterland Operations, Effects-Based Approach to Global Reach, 1-1
4-17 Operations (EBAO), 5-4,
Global Vigilance, 1-1
Countersea Operations, 7-5, 7-16
4-33, 4-34 Effects-Based Approach to
Counterspace Operations, Planning, 5-22
H
Homeland Defense, 1-16
4-37, 4-38 Electronic Attack (EA),
Homeland Operations, 1-16
Crisis Action Planning, 5-18, 4-104
5-20 Homeland Organizational
Electronic Protection (EP),
Considerations, 2-14
Crisis Action Planning (CAP) 4-105
Orders, 5-21 Electronic Warfare (EW),
Crisis Response & Limited 4-103
I
Information Operations (IO),
Contingency Operations, Electronic Warfare (EW) 4-95
1-11 Effects, 4-106
Information-Related Capabili-
Cross-Domain Integration, Electronic Warfare Divisions, ties (IRCs), 4-98
3-41 4-104
Initiation, 6-8
Cyberspace Domain, 4-89 Electronic Warfare Support
Integrating Regional and
Cyberspace Operations, 4-89 (ES), 4-105
Functional Air Force
Emergency Preparedness, Forces, 2-12
1-16

Index-2
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Index
Integrating the Air Reserve Joint Targeting Coordination
Components, 2-16 Board (JTCB), 6-20 Objectives, Effects and Guid-
Intelligence Disciplines, 4-64 Joint Targeting Cycle, 6-19 ance, 7-32
Interagency Coordination, Joint Terminal Attack Con- Offensive Counterair (OCA),
2-26 troller (JTAC), 4-30 4-10
Interdiction Objectives, 4-21 Operation Assessment dur-
International Law, 4-36 L ing Contingencies and
Irregular War, 1-15 Large-Scale Combat Opera- Crises, 5-39
tions, 1-11 Operational Approach, 5-11
J Levels of Assessment, 5-32, Operational Design, 5-7
JFACC Basing and Transi- 7-53, 7-54 Operational Design Method-
tion, 3-28 Levels of War, 1-13 ology, 5-10
JFACC Communications Limitations of Airspace Con- Operational-Level Assess-
System, 3-28 trol, 3-52 ment, 5-33
JFACC Responsibilities Lines of Effort, 5-22 Operational-Level Assess-
(through the JAOC), 3-12 ment, 7-54
JFACC Responsibilities, 3-23 M Operations & Planning, 5-1
JFACC Staff, 3-20 Marine Liaison Element Options for Establishing a
(MARLE), 3-15 JFACC, 3-26
Joint Air Component Coordi-
nation Element (JACCE), Maritime Domain, 4-33 Organizing U.S. Air Force
2-21, 3-13 Measures and Indicators, Forces, 2-5
Joint Air Estimate, 6-3
Joint Air Estimate of the Situ-
ation Template, 6-4
7-55
e
Measures of Effectiveness
(MOE), 5-36
P
PA Core Competencies,
pl
Joint Air Operations C2 Sys- Measures of Performance 4-110
tem, 3-31 (MOP), 5-36 Parallel and Asymmetric
Joint Air Operations Plan Medical Operations, 8-9 Operations, 4-4
(JAOP), 6-16 Methods of Operational Persistence, 1-21
m
Joint Air Operations Planning Design, 5-9 Personnel Recovery, 4-79
(JOPPA), 6-5 Military Engagement, Se- Personnel Recovery Func-
Joint Air Tasking Cycle curity Cooperation, and tions, 4-80
Deterrence, 1-11
Sa

Stages, 6-26 Personnel Recovery Mis-

Joint Air Tasking Cycle, 6-23 Mission Analysis, 6-8 sions, 4-82
Joint Fires Observer (JFO), Multi-Hatting Commanders, Personnel Recovery System,
4-32 2-20 4-82
Joint Force Air Component Multinational Command, Plan or Order Development,
Commander (JFACC), 2-24 6-25
2-18, 3-21, 3-22 Multinational Operations, Planning and Direction; Col-
Joint Force Commander, 2-23 lection; Processing and
3-22 Exploitation; Analysis and
Joint Force Organizational N Production; and Dissemi-
Basics, 2-17 National Command, 2-24 nation (PCPAD), 4-59
Joint Force Staff Option, 3-27 Nature of War, 1-15 Planning, 5-15
Joint Intelligence Preparation Naval and Amphibious Planning Considerations,
of the Operational Envi- Liaison Element (NALE), 3-44
ronment (JIPOE), 4-62 3-15 Planning for Joint Air Opera-
Joint Liaisons in the AOC, Nuclear Command and tions, 6-1
3-14 Control System, 4-78 Policy, Strategy, and Doc-
Joint Operations, 1-10 Nuclear Operations, 4-71 trine, 1-3
Joint Personnel Recovery Nuclear Surety, 4-76 Practical Design: The Coer-
Center (JPRC), 4-82 Numbered Expeditionary Air cion Continuum, 5-14
Joint Targeting, 6-19 Force (NAEF), 2-8

Index-3
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Principles of Joint Opera- Steady-State Execution, Theater Air-Ground Control

tions, 1-17 5-30 System (TACS), 3-31
Principles of War, 1-17 Steady-State Operations, Theater-level component,
Priority, 1-22 1-9 2-19
Provisional Units, 2-9 Steady-State Planning, 5-16 Third Dimension, 1-5
Public Affairs (PA) Activities, Strategic Attack (SA), 4-65 Threats to Space Operations,
4-111 Strategic Effects: Deter- 4-40
Public Affairs (PA) Opera- rence, Assurance, Traditional War, 1-15
tions, 4-109 Dissuasion, and Defeat, Transfer of Functional Forces
4-73 to a Geographic Com-
R Strategic-Level Assessment, mand, 2-13
Range of Military Operations 5-33, 7-54 Types of Air Interdiction
(ROMO), 1-9, 1-10 Strategy, 1-3, 5-2 Requests, 4-22
Reachback, 2-11, 7-12 Sub-theater-level AETF in Types of Air Mobility Opera-
Regional versus Functional support of a JTF, 2-19 tions, 4-43
Organization, 2-5 Sub-theater-level compo- Types of Plans, 5-26
Relationship Between nent, 2-19
Operational Design and Synergistic Effects, 1-21 U
Planning, 5-22 Unified Action, 1-10
ROE, CID, PID & Target T USSOCOM Core Activities,
Validation, 7-25 Tactical-Level Assessment, 4-84
Role of Culture, 1-15

S
5-32
e
Target Development, 7-35
Target Development and
W
Wargaming, 6-14
pl
Senior/Host Air Force Instal- Prioritization, 6-22 Weaponeering and Alloca-
lation Commander, 2-16 Target Fundamentals and tion, 7-45
Service Component Planning Characteristics, 7-2
during Contingencies, Target Nomination, 7-15
m
5-19 Target Planning, 7-13
Space Operations Functions, Targeting, 7-1
4-38
Targeting & the Air Tasking
Space Service Support, 4-39
Sa

Cycle, 7-31
Space Situational Awareness Targeting and Legal Consid-
(SSA), 4-38 erations, 7-58
Space Superiority, 4-37 Targeting Assessment, 7-53
Space Support to Opera- Targeting Considerations
tions, 4-39 during JOPPA, 7-14
Span of Control, 2-20 Targeting Coordination &
Special Operations, 4-83 Liaisons, 7-10
Special Operations Liaison Targeting Cycle, 7-6
Element (SOLE), 3-15 Targeting Effects Team
Special Tactics Team (STT), (TET), 6-21
4-32 Targeting Functions, 6-20
Specialty/Support Functions, Targeting Responsibilities,
3-16 7-8
Split Operations, 2-11, Split Tasking Component Forces,
Operations, 7-12 3-26
Steady-State Assessment, Tasking Cycle, 5-27
5-38
Tenets of Airpower, 1-19
Steady-State Design: Shap-
Terminal Attack Control,
ing the Operational Ap-
4-30
proach, 5-12

Index-4
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