RULING

EDWARD WIREDU, AG. CHIEF JUSTICE

This ruling is the outcome of a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Defendants
by the Attorney General on the following grounds:

(1) This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs action against the Defendants
herein;

(2) That no cause of action is disclosed by Plaintiff's Writ and the Statement of Case;

(3) That the questions raised in the Plaintiff's action for determination are moot; and for
such further or other Orders as to this Honourable Court may seem it.

Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution Provides as follows:—

11. (1) The law of Ghana shall comprise

(a) this Constitution;

(b) enactment’s made by our under the authority of the Parliament established by this
Constitution;

(c) any Orders, Rules and Regulations made by any person or authority under a power
conferred by this Constitution;

(d) the existing law; and

(e) the common law.

From the above it will be observed that there are five different kinds of laws which are
recognised and enforceable in the courts of Ghana.

Each Court in Ghana has it's own jurisdiction prescribed for it under the laws of Ghana.
Some of these laws are not enforceable directly by invoking the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Save those specifically provided for under Article 130 (1) and (2) of
the Constitution which read as follows:—

ARTICLE 130 (1) Subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the enforcement of the
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms as provided in Article 33 of this Constitution,
the Supreme Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in:—

(a) all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of this Constitution; and
(b) all matters arising as to whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers
conferred on Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this
Constitution.

(2) Where an issue that relates to a matter or question referred to in clause (1) of this
Article arises in any proceedings in a Court other than the Supreme Court, that Court
shall stay the proceedings and refer the question of law involved to the Supreme Court
for determination, and the Court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.

That there are different kinds of laws in Ghana in addition to the provisions of the
Constitution itself is also buttressed by Article 1(2) which states in effect that any law
which is inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution is to the extent of such
inconsistency void. See also Article 2 (1) (a).

The events which have provoked this case are provided by the Plaintiff in his Statement
of Claim paragraphs 2 - 7 with particular reference to paragraphs 5 & 6.

The said paragraphs read as follows:—

2. The 1st Defendant is the President of the Republic of Ghana and is being sued as a
person whose conduct is violating the Constitution of Ghana.

3. The 2nd Defendant is the Attorney-General and the Principal Legal Adviser to the
Government who is being sued as the person against whom all civil proceedings
affecting the state shall be instituted.

4. The 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants are private citizens of Ghana and members of the
New Patriotic Party (a Political Party and a corporate body registered under the laws of
Ghana) who are holding themselves out as Officers or Staff in the Office of the
President of Ghana.

5. After the 1st Defendant assumed office as the President of Ghana, he purported to
appoint the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as Chief of Staff, Presidential Adviser for Public
Affairs and National Security Adviser respectively.

6. The purported appointment by 1st Defendant of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as
Staff in the Office of the President were done without consultation with the Council of
State as required by the Constitution and the law of Ghana. (the emphasis is mine).

7. The 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants have since their illegal and unconstitutional
appointment by the 1st Defendant intentionally and deliberately held themselves out
and acted as Officers of Staff in the Office of the President.
It is clear from the above that the 1st Defendant as the President of the Republic of
Ghana is alleged to have violated the provisions of the law governing the appointment
of some members of staff of his office.

The question then is, what kind of law is the Plaintiff complaining about i.e. (the alleged
or the purported appointments).

The answer to the above question posed, is in my judgment the Presidential Office Act
1993 (Act 463). This Act is the creator of the various positions and other office holders
of the President's Office. Such staffers are not the creature of the Constitution. Nowhere
in the Constitution is mention made of the positions allegedly held by the 3rd, 4th and
5th Defendants as stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Plaintiff's statement of claim. The
positions as mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 supra cannot be the subject matter of
adjudication by invoking the original jurisdiction under Article 2(1)(b) of the Constitution
on which the Plaintiff is basing his claim.

I am of the respectful view therefore that the alleged violation of the provision of a
statute such as Act 463 fails outside a provision of the Constitution. For an action to lie
in this Court under Article 2 (1) (b) a specific provision of the Constitution itself must be
the subject for consideration.

The enforcement and interpretation of Act 463 of 1993 in this regard lies elsewhere and
not in this Court. Act 463 is not an extension of any provision of the Constitution but a
Statute which deals with the Offices of the President. Its provisions are not to be
elevated to the status of a provision of the Constitution. In my judgment therefore this
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action.

I will now deal with the 1st Defendant in this case. The 1st Defendant undisputedly is
the President of Ghana and the Commander-In-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces. In
the course of writing my opinion I received the opinion of my sister Sophia Akuffo,
J.S.C. She has exhaustively and eruditely reviewed the facts of this case and dealt with
the law as far as the 1st Defendant is concerned. To avoid repeating the facts and the
law I can say and I say here that I endorse her views. I agree that the action by the
Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant in his personal capacity is misconceived and ought to
be dismissed.

With regard to the 2nd Defendant the Attorney-General, I unfortunately have to part
company with her. I am of the respectful view that at the time of filing his writ the Plaintiff
knew well that there was no Attorney-General at post. I am of the view that if there was,
the Plaintiff would have been content with suing the 2nd Defendant alone as the
Defendant instead of going against the 1st Defendant also who was performing his
executive functions. On the arguments put forward by my sister Sophia Akuffo, J.S.C.
as to joinder of parties, the rules of Court presume that the person sought to be joined
must be known to exist as rightly argued by her. In the instant case, however the post of
the Attorney General was vacant and no one had been put in place, at the time the said
writ was filed. He could not therefore be joined as a party. I think in this regard the haste
with which the Plaintiff issued out his writ ought not be disregarded. The writ ought to be
struck out as having been prematurely issued. I hold in my judgment that the Attorney-
General who under the Constitution is answerable in Court for the executive acts of the
1st Defendant, who had not been put in place at the time the Plaintiff issued his writ is
entitled to move for the writ to be set aside. In my view it is impossible to join a non-
existing personality.

With regard to the rest of the Defendants, I associate myself with her views and ask
myself, following the case of Ghana Bar Association Vrs. Attorney General & Abban,
S.C. December 5th 1995 unreported, what have the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants done
or omitted to do to make them answerable in Court under Article 2 (1) (b) of the
Constitution? Article 2(1)(b) reads

"(1). A person who alleges that—

(b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a

provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a
declaration to that effect.”

The above quoted article presupposes that the person sued must have done or omitted
to do something in contravention of a provision of the Constitution which can provoke an
action under 2(1)(b).

The obvious answer to the above question is that they have done nothing on the facts of
this case. Admitting even that the facts allegedly made by the Plaintiff are true, they did
not appoint themselves as to make them answerable for the act of whoever appointed
them. As pointed out in the able opinion of my sister Sophia Akuffo they are the objects
of the 1st Defendant's action.

Finally, the present undisputed position of the 3rd Defendant at the date when the
submissions were made in this case was that he had already been sworn in as a
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, the 4th Defendant as a Minister of State
responsible for Media Relations and the 5th Defendant as Security Adviser. The above
appointments are now matters of public notoriety and it also shows that none of these
Defendants i.e. 3rd, 4th and 5th holds any office under Act 463 of 1993 as claimed by
the Plaintiff as specified in his statement of case.

In BARAKE VRS. BARAKE, High Court, Accra of 25th June, 1990 unreported Brobbey,
J. (as he then was) had this to say:

“If we should provide any meaningful service to the people of this society wherein our
Courts operate, it is imperative that we in the Courts muster sufficient courage to take
cognisance of the happenings in our society and ensure that our judgments duly reflect
facts of common notoriety. Facts so notorious that everyone in our society can be
deemed to be aware of, can be said to be matters in respect of which judicial notice can
be taken".
On this score I accept the argument that the case is now moot and no useful purpose
will be served by going into the merits. On the present facts Plaintiff has not been able
to prove that the alleged appointments complained about have been made.

MRS. BAMFORD-ADDO, J.S.C.

I agree.

ACQUAH, J.S.C.

My Lords, does this Court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, the subject-matter of
which seeks to challenge an executive action of the President of the Republic? The
learned Attorney-General says that there is no such jurisdiction, while Mr. Martin Amidu
vehemently contends otherwise. But first, the facts.

Following the victory of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the December 2000
parliamentary and presidential elections, Mr. J. A. Kufuor was sworn in as the President
of the Republic on 7th January 2001. Not long thereafter, a number of persons were
announced as assisting the President in the performance of his official duties. Three of
such persons are Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, Elizabeth Ohene and Joshua Hamidu.
Taking the view that the appointments of these persons were improper, Mr. Martin
Amidu, filed the instant action at the Supreme Court, against Mr. J. A. Kufuor as 1st
defendant, the Attorney-General as 2nd defendant, and Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey,
Elizabeth Ohene, and Joshua Hamidu as 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants respectively,
claiming:

1. A declaration that:

(i) On a true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, particularly articles 58 (1) and
(2), 91(1) and (2), 190 and 295 thereof, and sections 2, 3, 4 of the Presidential Office
Act 1993 (Act 463) the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants cannot be appointed by the
President as staff of the Presidential office without consultation with the Council of
State.

(ii) The conduct of the 1st Defendant President John Agyekum Kufuor, in appointing
3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as staff of the Presidential office without consultation with
the Council of State is inconsistent with and in contravention of the latter and spirit of
the Constitution.

(iii) The conduct of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants in holding themselves out and action
as officers or staff in the office of the President is inconsistent with and in contravention
of the Constitution.

(iv) Accordingly, all acts undertaken by the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as officers or
staff in the office of the President are inconsistent with and in contravention of the
Constitution, null, void and without effect whatsoever.
2. Perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant President from appointing the 3rd,
4th and 5th defendants as staff to the Presidential office without consulting the Council
of State.

3. Perpetual injunction, restraining the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants from continuing to
hold themselves out and acting as officers or staff in the office of the President.

4. Such other orders or directives as the Court may seem fit to give effect to the above
declaration.

At the time this writ was filed, Parliament had not yet approved the nomination of any
person to the office of Attorney-General.

On 9th February 2001 after the Honourable Nana Akufo Addo had been sworn into the
office as the Attorney-General, he filed this motion seeking an order to set aside the writ
and statement of case on grounds that

i. This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's action against the defendants
herein.

ii. That no cause of action is disclosed by plaintiff's writ and the Statement of Case and

iii. That the questions raised in the plaintiff's action for determination are moot.

In an affidavit opposing the application, Martin Amidu swore, inter alia,:

"4. The plaintiff/respondent says that the President of Ghana in amenable to the
jurisdiction of this court in the exercise of the executive authority conferred on him by
the Constitution.

5. The plaintiff/respondent says further that the purported appointment of the 3rd, 4th
and 5th defendants/applicants as Chief of Staff, Presidential Adviser on Public Affairs,
and National Security Adviser respectively by the 1st defendant/applicant without
consultation with the Council of State cannot be said to be an exercise of the executive
authority conferred on him by the Constitution.

6. The plaintiff/respondent says in addition that a declaration or a declaration in the

nature of quo warranto can be made by the court against the 1st defendant/applicant in
this action in addition to an order of injunction, or mandamus pursuant to article 2 of the
Constitution.

7. The plaintiff respondent contends that there are triable issues between the parties in
this action.
8. The plaintiff/respondent contends further that the mere subsequent approval by
Parliament and appointment of the 3rd and 4th defendants/applicants as Ministers of
State on 6th February 2001 does not render this action moot.

9. The plaintiff/respondent says that the 2nd defendant/applicant was used only in a
nominal capacity.

10. The plaintiff/respondent says further that the fact that there was no substantive
person appointed as the Attorney-General at the time the writ and statement of case
were filed did not mean that no action could be commenced against the State in the
name of the Attorney-General.

11. The plaintiff/respondent maintains that the application to set aside the writ and
statement of case has no merit whatsoever."

Moving his motion, the learned Attorney-General, advanced a number of arguments. He

contended, inter alia, that since the complaint relates to the performance by the
President of his executive function, this court has no jurisdiction to go into the matter.
He referred to the doctrine of the separation of powers underlying the 1992 Constitution,
and argued that any such interference by this Court would violate this doctrine.
Furthermore, it was wrong for the President to be sued since article 57(4) grants him
immunity from legal proceedings while in office subject to the operation of the
prerogative writs.

He further contended that since the institution of his action, the 3rd and 4th defendants
have been nominated for ministerial positions, and that Parliament has approved the
said nominations. Consequently the plaintiff's actions is now moot and no more live for
adjudication. He pointed out that at the time the writ was issued no one had been
appointed to the office of the Attorney-General, and that since the personality of the
office is important, the action cannot be entertained. He cited in support of his
arguments cases like NPP vrs. President J. J. Rawlings, Writ No, 15/9 of 3rd May 1994;
and J. H. Mensah vrs. Attorney-General (1996-97) SCGLR 320.

Mr. Martin Amidu in his response to the arguments of the Attorney-General, vehemently
disagreed with each of the above arguments. Referring to article 2(1) of the 1992
Constitution he submitted that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain his action.
Conceding that his action is not one seeking a prerogative order, he nevertheless
argued that the President was amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under article 2.
He said that the Attorney-General was sued as a nominal defendant and therefore the
absence of a substantive Attorney-General at the time he issued his writ, was
immaterial. He further submitted that notwithstanding the approval of the 3rd and 4th
defendants by Parliament, his compliant could still be heard.

There is no doubt that the 1992 Constitution prescribes a government consisting of

three branches: the legislative, executive, and the judicial. Each playing a distinct role.
Apart from these three branches of government, the Constitution also establishes a
number of offices, bodies and institutions.

Now each of these branches of government, offices, bodies and institutions is, of
course, subject to the Constitution, and is therefore required to operate within the
powers and limits conferred on it by the Constitution. And in order to maintain the
Supremacy of the Constitution and to ensure that every individual organ of state, body
or institution operates within the provisions of the Constitution, authority is given in
article 2 thereof, to any person who alleges that the conduct or omission of anybody or
institution is in violation of a provision of the Constitution to seek a declaration to that
effect in the Supreme Court.

Thus so long as an individual, body, institution or organ of the government performs its
functions in accordance with the relevant Constitutional provisions and the law, the
Supreme Court has no business or jurisdiction to interfere in the performance of its
functions. But where it is alleged before the Supreme Court that any organ of
Government or an institution is acting in violation of a provision of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is duty bound by articles 2(1) and 130(1) to exercise jurisdiction, unless
the Constitution has provided a specific remedy, like those of articles 33 and 99 for
dealing with that particular violation.

It follows therefore that no individual nor creature of the Constitution is exempted from
the enforcement provision of article 2 thereof. No one is above the law. And no action of
any individual or institution under the Constitution is immuned from judicial scrutiny if the
constitutionally of such an action is challenged. Thus the doctrine of the political
question found mainly in the US Constitutional jurisprudence by which the courts refuse
to assume jurisdiction in certain disputes because the subject-matter of those disputes
are alleged to be “ textually committed” to that institution, is inapplicable in our
constitutional law because of the power granted to any person in article 2 of our
Constitution to challenge the constitutionality of any action or omission of an individual
or institution. For under the 1992 Constitution if even the body in question is
independent from any other authority, the Courts can still assume jurisdiction in disputes
alleging that that institution is acting in violation of the Constitution.

Because article 295(8) provides:

“No provision of this Constitution or of any other law to the effect that a person or
authority shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority
in the performance of any functions under this Constitution or that law, shall preclude a
court from exercising jurisdiction in relation to any question whether that person or
authority has performed those functions in accordance with this Constitution or the law"
(emphasis mine).

Thus in J. H. Mensah vrs. Attorney-General (1996-97) SCGLR 320 at 368, it was

explained:
“... if by the political question doctrine, it is meant that where the Constitution allocates
power or function to an authority, and that authority exercises that power or function
within the parameters of that provision and the Constitution as a whole, a court has no
jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of that function, then I entirely agree that the
doctrine applies in our Constitutional jurisprudence. For this is what is implied in the
concept of the separation of powers. But if by the doctrine, it is meant that even where
the authority exercises that power in violation of that constitutional provision, a court has
no jurisdiction to interfere because it is the Constitution which allocated that power to
that authority, then I emphatically disagree.

For two reasons: First, articles 2(1) and 130(1) of the 1992 Constitution empower this
Supreme Court to declare null and void not only any enactment but also any act of
omission of any person which is inconsistent or in contravention of the Constitution,
Secondly, if even the power or function is entrusted exclusively to an authority ... and in
the exercise that function the authority is subject to no direction or control of anybody,
article 295(8) of the 1992 Constitution still empowers the Ghanaian Courts to enquire
into whether that authority is exercising that function in accordance with the
Constitution".

Consequently I hold that this Court has jurisdiction under article 2(1) and 130(1) in
respect of suits challenging the constitutionality of an executive action of the President.
As to whether the President should personally be made a defendant to such an action is
another matter depending on the scope of the immunity from legal action granted to the
President while in office.

Generally speaking, the head of state, in most jurisdictions, is granted absolute

immunity from legal proceedings in any civil or criminal actions while in office. But the
head of state's immunity from legal proceedings in respect of actions arising from the
performance of his official duties while in office, raises an interesting problem.

A head of state, is certainly the first citizen of every state, and as Justice William
Douglas said in Youngstown Street & Tube Co. vrs. Sawyer 343 US 579 (1952) at 663.

"... represents the people and is their spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs. The
office is respected more than any other in the land. It gives a position of leadership that
is unique. The power to formulate polices and mould opinion inherent in the Presidency
and conditions out national life".

But to grant the President immunity from such actions may remove the needed
accountability which he owes to the people whom he represents. While to allow him to
be subject to such suits could make the execution of presidential duties impossible. The
question therefore is whether the President while in office should not be granted any
immunity at all from legal proceedings in respect of actions arising from the
performance of his official duties, or be granted qualified immunity, or absolute
immunity.
In the US, the Supreme Court's first significant venture into the area of executive
immunity came in the aftermath of the Civil War. In Mississippi vrs. Johnson 4 Wall 475
(1867) the court was asked to enjoin the president from executing laws passed by
Congress the grounds that the laws were unconstitutional the Court unanimously held
that the president was immune from such suits.

Kenya, grants absolute immunity to the President in article 14(2) of the 1992
Constitution (Revised 1998) in the following:

"No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed in respect of anything done or omitted to
be done shall be instituted or continued against the president while he hold office or
against any person while he is exercising the functions of the office of President."

But in Namibia and Eritrea, the President has no immunity from legal proceedings in
respect of acts done in his official capacity. Thus article 31(1) of the 1990 Constitution of
Namibia provides:

"No person holding the office of the President or performing the functions of President
may be sued in any civil proceedings save where such proceedings concern an act
done in his or her official capacity". (emphasis mine)

Likewise article 43 of the 1996 Constitution of Eritrea too provides:

"Any person holding the office of the President may not be sued in any civil proceedings
or charged for a crime, save where such proceedings concern an act done in his official
capacity as President..." (emphasis mine).

What is the position in Ghana? Article 57(4) and (5) of the 1992 Constitution provide:

"57(4) Without prejudice to the provisions of article 2 of this Constitution, and subject to
the operation of the prerogative writs, the President shall not while in office, be liable to
proceedings in any court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or
omitted to be done, or purported to be done, or purported to have been done in the
performance of his functions, under this Constitution or any other law.

(4) The President shall not while in office as President be personally liable to any civil or
criminal proceedings in court".

These two provisions are not new in our Constitutional jurisprudence. The 1979
Constitution reproduced them in article 44(9) and (10) thereof while the 1969
Constitution reproduced them with some modifications in its article 36(6) and (7).

Now article 57(5) bars the institution of civil and criminal actions against the President
while in office. Such actions may be instituted within three years of the President leaving
office: Article 57(6).
Clause (4) of article 57 deals with legal actions against the President in the performance
of his duties while in office. The clause deals with three matters: first, the provisions of
article 2; second, the operations of the prerogative writs, and finally immunity from legal
proceedings subject to actions falling under article 2 and those of the prerogative writs.

As earlier explained, article 2 empowers any person who believes that a provision of the
Constitution is being or has been breached to seek the relevant declaration from the
Supreme Court. Article 2(3) directs any individual or institution in respect of whom the
Supreme Court gives a direction, to obey and carry out the terms of the order or
direction. And if the order or direction is to the President or Vice-President, then article 2
(4) provides that failure on his part to comply with such an order constitutes a high crime
under the Constitution and a ground for his removal from office. It stands to reason
therefore that for any such order or directive to be meaningful and satisfy the
requirements of audi partem principle, the President or Vice President must have an
opportunity in the said suit to be heard.

The President's immunity is also subject to the operation of the prerogative writs. These
are actions for habeas corpus and orders of mandamus, certiorari, prohibitions and so
on, directed against the President in the performance of his official functions.

Apart from actions under article 2 and those seeking prerogative orders the President
has immunity from legal proceedings in the performance of his functions under the
Constitution.

But it is important to emphasise that the grant of such immunity to the President does
not mean that legal proceedings cannot be instituted for relief arising from any damage,
harm or otherwise caused to an individual in the exercise of the executive authority of
the President. In the event of such situations, actions, may be instituted against the
Attorney-General, who as provided in article 88(5) of the Constitution:

"shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil cases on behalf of the
State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted against the Attorney-
General as defendant".

What the immunity is article 57(4) does is to prevent the institution of such actions
against the President personally. Article 57(4) does not and cannot, under a regime of
the rule of law, forbid legal actions challenging any conduct or omission of the executive
arm of the State.

Now the scope of article 57(4) fell for determination in NPP vrs. the President of the
Republic of Ghana, Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings and Anor. (supra) wherein the President was
personally sued on his nomination for District Chief Executives of the District
Assemblies. On the issue whether under article 57(4) the President could personally be
made a defendant, Amua-Sekyi and Aikins, JJ.S.C. held that article 57(4) granted the
President qualified immunity and that he can be sued personally in respect of actions
under article 2 and those seeking prerogative orders. Justice Abban and Mrs. Bamford-
Addo, JJ.S.C. were positive that the President could not be personally sued and that in
all such actions, the Attorney-General should be the proper defendant. Ampiah, J.S.C.
on the other hand expressed his view thus:

"Article 57(4) which exempts the President from being brought before the Court
personally for acts done in the exercise of his functions under the Constitution, excludes
actions brought under Article 2 and also proceedings involving prerogative writs. Any
person alleges that there has been executive, legislative or judicial act which is
inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution may bring an
action against any person (including the President) who is alleged to have done the act
or authorised the doing of that act. That action could be against that person alone or
jointly with the Attorney-General". (emphasis mine)

As said earlier on, article 57(4) is a reproduction, word by word, of article 44(9) of the
1979 Constitution of Ghana. Now the rationale for granting to the President, qualified
and not absolute immunity from proceedings arising in connection with the performance
of his official duties, was clearly and unambiguously articulated at paragraph 122 page
of the 1978 Memorandum to the 1979 Constitution in the following words:

"We are, however, convinced that even an executive President should not be endowed
with unlimited powers nor be immune from constitutional controls. On the contrary, we
believe that the President should exercise the executive power of the State in
accordance with the Constitution and subject to conditions clearly stipulated in that
Constitution". (emphasis mine)

Hence the subjection of the President's immunity to the enforcement actions in article 2
of the Constitution. The language of article 57(4) is so clear that I cannot bring myself to
agree with my brethren who hold that the President cannot be sued personally in
actions under article 2 and those of the prerogative writs.

But what is meant or implied by suing the President personally? Certainly no by using
the personal name of the President, as is done in this case, but by naming the
Presidency as the defendant. Like, "His Excellency, The President of the Republic of
Ghana (Mr. J. A. Kufuor)." For so long as he is in office he is entitled to be addressed
properly anywhere he is or mentioned.

The next objection of the learned Attorney-General is that the plaintiff's action is moot
with the approval by Parliament of the 3rd and 4th defendants as ministers.

As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, an action is generally considered moot
when it no longer presents a justiceable controversy because issues involved have
become academic or dead. This may happen when the matter in dispute has either
been resolved already and hence no need for judicial intervention or events happening
thereafter have rendered the issue no longer live. In either situation, unless the issue is
a recurring one and likely to be raised again between the parties, the courts would not
entertain such a dead issue. Let me illustrate with two American cases. First, the case
of De Funis vrs. Odegaard 416 US 312 (1974). Rejected for admission to the University
of Washington Law School, Marco De Funis brought a personal suit against the school,
alleging that it had engaged in reverse discrimination, that it had denied him a place, but
accepted statistically less qualified minority students. In 1971 a trial court found merit in
his claim and ordered that the University admit him.

While De Funis was in his second year of law school, the state's high court reversed the
trial judge's ruling. He then appealed to the US Supreme Court. By that time, De Funis
had registered for his final quarter in school. In a per curiam opinion the Court refused
to rule on the merits of De Funis's claim, asserting that it was moot: At page 319 to 320
the court said:

"Because (De Funis) will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for
which he has now registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the
merits of this litigation, we conclude that the court cannot, consistently with the
limitations of Art III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues
tendered by the parties".

In Roe vrs. Wade 410 US 113 (1973) on the other hand the Court legalized abortions
performed during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Norma McCorvey, also known as
Roe, was pregnant when she filed a class of action challenging the constitutionality of
the Texas criminal abortion law, in 1970.

When the Court handed down the decision in 1973, she had long since given birth and
put her baby up for adoption. But the justices did not declare the case moot. Why? De
Funis had been admitted to law school, and he would "never again be required to run
the gauntlet". Roe could become pregnant again; that is, pregnancy is a situation
capable of repetition or recurrence.

In Ghana, this Court in J. H. Mensah vrs. Attorney-General (supra), relying on US vrs

Concentrated Phosphate Exp Assn 393 US 201, and US vrs. W. T. Grant & Co. 345 US
629, held that if the question though moot, was certainly not likely to re-occur, the courts
would not waste their time to determine dead questions and issues. And that for the
court to decline deciding a moot question it must be established that subsequent events
had made it absolutely clear that the alleged wrong behaviour could not reasonably be
expected to occur. I still hold that this holding represents the correct statement of the
law.

In the instant case, does the approval of Parliament, render the plaintiff's action moot or
pointless for adjudication?

From his reliefs and statement of case the gravamen of plaintiff's case is that the
alleged appointment of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants to the offices of Chief of Staff
Presidential Advisor for Public Affairs and National Security Adviser respectively without
consulting the Council of State was contrary to the Constitution and the Presidential
Office Act 1993 (Act 463). Thus in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his statement of cases the
plaintiff pleaded:

"5. After the 1st defendant assumed office as the President of Ghana he purported to
appoint the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as Chief of Staff, Presidential Advisor for Public
Affairs, and National Security Adviser respectively".

6. The purported appointment by 1st defendant of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as
staff in the office of the President were done without consultation with the Council of
State as required by the Constitution and Laws of Ghana".

Now neither does Act 463 nor the Constitution create any office called Chief of Staff,
Presidential Adviser for Public Affairs and National Security Adviser, to require the
Council of State's consultation in the appointment of person to them. Sections 3 and 4
of Act 463 provide.

"3(1) The Presidential Officer shall be made up of—

(a) persons appointed as presidential staff under this Act one of whom shall be
appointed as head of the office; and

(b) such other public officers as may be seconded or transferred to the office.

(2) subject to section 2 members of the office shall be assigned such duties as the
President may determine.

4(1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint such
persons as he considers necessary to hold office as presidential staff in the office.

(2) The number of person that may be appointed under subsection (1) of this section
and the grade of the officers shall be determined by the President."

It is clear from the above provisions that it is the President's prerogative to determine
the number and designation of persons he desires to appoint as his staffers, and that
those appointed under section 4(1) are required to be so appointed in consultation with
the Council of State. Thus the alleged offices of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants must be
shown to be offices coming under section 4(1) of Act 463 to support any allegation that
such appointments require the Council of State's consultation.

But with the Parliamentary approval of the offices of the 3rd and 4th defendants, is
Council of State's consultation still needed to perfect these appointments? If the answer
to the question is in the negative, as it certainly is, what then is left in the plaintiff’s
action worthy of adjudication? Which provision in the Constitution and Act 463 requires
the President to consult the Council of State in nominating people for ministerial
positions. Indeed if the plaintiff had not hurriedly rushed to issue this writ, he would have
realized that the offices he was complaining of were not contemplated by the President
to be offices under Act 463, and consequently did not require consultation with the
Council of State.

The plaintiff thought the offices were those under section 4(1) of Act 463, but events
thereafter have shown that they are not.

In respect of the 5th defendant there is similarly nothing to show that it is an office under
Act 463.

I think it is important to appreciate that it is notevery appointment by the President that

requires the consent of a Council of State, or Parliament. For example, appointments
under section 7 of Act 463 do not need the consent nor consultation of any body.

Whoever therefore alleges that a particular Presidential appointment requires the

consent of another body, must clearly demonstrate the relevant law and regulation
showing that that particular appointment indeed requires that approval.

In the instant case I am fully satisfied that the subsequent approval by Parliament had
unequivocally shown that the offices complained of were not those contemplated under
Act 463, and that the said Parliamentary approval had glaringly exposed the fallacy
underlying the plaintiff's action and rendered same pointless for adjudication. The
plaintiff's action is nothing but an exercise in futility. I would accordingly uphold the
preliminary objection and dismiss the action.

ATUGUBA, J.S.C.

As the facts of this matter have been stated in the rulings that have preceded mine I
would not repeat them except where necessary.

As to the first contention that "this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's
action against the Defendants herein", the same is partially well founded. The first
defendant is the President of Ghana and it was the contention of the Honourable
Attorney-General, Nana Akufo-Addo that he enjoys immunity from suit or court
proceedings generally under article 57(4) which provides:

"(4) without prejudice to the provisions of article 2 of the Constitution, and subject to the
operation of the prerogative writs, the President shall not, while in office, be liable to
proceedings in any court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or
omitted to be done, or purported to be done in the performance of his functions, under
this Constitution or any other law". (emphasis supplied).

The proper construction of this provision is quite a vexed question. I must confess that if
it were open to me so to hold, I would have eagerly held that the President could be
sued in the performance or purported performance of his functions under the
constitution, since that would advance constitutionalism, the rule of law and the
negation of the bemoaned days of Re Akoto & Ors. But as was aptly put by Smith, J. in
BALOGUN V. EDUSEI (1958) 3 WALR 547 at 553: "The Courts of Justice exist to fulfil,
not to destroy the law…”.

It does not appear that there is any real controversy over the fact that article 57(4) does
confer some immunity from court process on the President, but it is the extent of it, that
is said to fall short of actions under article 2 and the prerogative writs. Thus in BILSON
V. APALOO (1981) GLR 24 at 54 S.C. Anin J.S.C. delivering the judgment of himself
and that of Sowahand Charles Crabbe JJ.S.C. said:

"It would be noticed that article 44(9) relied on by the plaintiff, itself does not create a
right of action; it merely confers a qualified immunity from suit on the President while in
office but significantly saves actions brought under article 2 and by the prerogative
writs... "

It is noticeable that article 44(9) of the 1979 Constitution which was thus construed is in
the ipsissima verba of article 57(4) of the 1992 Constitution. Counsel for the plaintiff
naturally relied on this decision for his contention that his suit against the President, is
proper.

This contention has the support of the wellsettled principle of construction as stated by
James L.J. in Ex Parte Campbell; Re Cathcart (1870) I.R. 5 Ch. App 703 at 706 that:

“Where once certain words in an Act of Parliament have received a judicial construction
in one of the Superior Courts and the Legislature has repeated them without any
alteration in a subsequent statute… the Legislature must be taken to have used them
according to the meaning which a court of competent jurisdiction has given to them.”
(emphasis supplied).

See also ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND V. ORTIZ (1983) 3 All ER C.A. It

is a trite law, as laid down in TUFFOUR V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1980) GLR 637
C.A. SAM V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, S.C. Writ No. 5/98 dated 10th May, 2000 and
others, that a written national Constitution ought not to be construed according to the
ordinary rules of construction of statutes. But that does not mean that they can be
excluded altogether from the construction of such a Constitution. Sowah, C.J. (as he
later became), the chief protagonist of this principle in the Tuffour case, later stated in
THE REPUBLIC V. HIGH COURT, ACCRA Ex Parte ADJEI (1984-86) 2 GLR 511, S.C.
that whether these ordinary rules of construction do or do not apply to the construction
of the Constitution depends on the particular circumstances of each case.

After all these rules of construction are part of the common law which is part of the
existing law under article 11(5) of the 1992 Constitution and are therein allowed to
operate unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution. Accordingly, they have been
applied, sometimes extensively in constitutional cases, see KUENYEHIA V. ARCHER,
25th May, 1993, NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (the 31st
December case), 8th March, 1994, etc.
However the principle about the prior construction of similar statutory words, supra, is a
rebuttable presumption. In DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS V. LUFT (1976) 3
WLR 32 H.L. at 41 the House of Lords held that a long standing wrong construction of
the words of a statute in pari materia is no bar to its correction.

If the President can be sued in respect of the performance of his functions, actual or
purported, under the 1992 Constitution, such action can be brought under articles 2 and
130 of the Constitution. But if that is so then it would mean that the immunity from suit
granted to the President under article 57(4) in respect of the performance of his
functions, actual or purported, has been negated completely. That would mean that
those provisions purporting to confer the said immunity on him have been rendered
meaningless or useless. It is however a settled rule of construction that all statutory
provisions ought, if possible, to be given effect, whether those provisions are in the
same statute or in different statutes, which conflict, and may therefore imply a repeal of
the earlier one by the later statute. I reiterated this principle in NATIONAL MEDIA
COMMISSION V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, SUIT No. 2/96 dated 26th January, 2000,
S.C. In PATTINSON V. FINNLUGLEY DRAINAGE BD (1970) 2 WLR 622 at 624 Bean
J, quoted the following passage from Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes, 12th
edition (1969) with approval. "A later statute may repeal an earlier one either expressly
or by implication. But repeal by implication is not favoured by the courts. ‘Forasmuch',
said Coke, ‘as Acts of Parliament are established with such gravity, wisdom and
universal consent of the whole nation, for the advancement of the commonwealth, they
ought not by any constrained construction out of … general and ambiguous words … to
be abrogated"(emphasis supplied) This is particularly, true of a written national
constitution. As my learned and respected brother Acquah J.S.C. aptly put it in
NATIONAL MEDIA COMMISSION V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, supra, "But to begin with,
it is important to remind ourselves that we are dealing with our National Constitution not
an ordinary Act of Parliament. It is a document that expresses our sovereign will and
embodies our soul. It creates authorities and vests certain powers in them. It gives
certain rights to persons as well as bodies of persons. And imposes obligations as much
as it confers privileges and powers. All these duties, obligations, powers, privileges and
rights must be exercised and enforced not only in accordance with the letter but also
with the spirit of the Constitution. The parts must fit together logically to form a rational,
internally consistent framework. And because the framework has a purpose, the parts
are also to work together dynamically, each contributing something towards
accomplishing the internal goal. Each provision must therefore be capable of operating
without coming into conflict with any other”.

Applying this salutary principle, I would hold that the way to avoid a conflict between the
provisions conferring immunity from suit on the President and article 2 of the
Constitution is to hold that the President’s immunity shields him from suit in respect of
the performance of his functions, actual or purported under the Constitution but his acts
in those respects can still be challenged by suing the Attorney-General under article 88,
particularly under clause 5 thereof, which provides:
“(5) The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil
cases on behalf of the State and all civil proceedings against the State shall be
instituted against the Attorney-General as the defendant”.

This is because the acts of the President in the discharge of his constitutional functions
are acts of the government or the state. This, mutatis mutundis, is substantially what
this court decided in THE REPUBLIC V. HIGH COURT, ACCRA, Ex Parte,
ATTORNEY-GENERAL; [Delta Food case] (1998-1999) SCGLR 583 S.C. After all, such
an action would still be governed by article 2. This is further buttressed by the Report of
the Committee of Experts (Constitution) on Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana.
At page 3 the Committee stated in paragraph 3 thereof as follows:

“3. The Committee operated on the cardinal principle that we should not re-invent the
wheel. Accordingly whenever we found previous constitutional arrangements
appropriate, we built on them. In this connection, we relied substantially on some of the
provisions of the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions of Ghana to the extent that they are
relevant to the general constitutional structure proposed in this report". (emphasis
supplied).

Then at page 22 paragraph 34, the committee clearly and unambiguously stated as
follows:

“34. The Presidential immunity from legal proceedings provided in Article 44 clauses 9 -
11 of the 1979 Constitution of Ghana is meant to preserve the dignity of the office of the
President, but should not preclude proceedings against the state in appropriate cases.
The proper procedure in such cases is to institute proceedings against the Attorney-
General, as the official representative of the Republic" (emphasis supplied)

It is quite clear therefore that the Committee, though sub silento, endorsed the
construction of the President's immunity from suit as expounded by Archer, Sowah and
Apaloo JJ.A. (as they then were) in SALLAH V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1970) 2 G&G
493, at 493, 502 AND 507 respectively. They had to construe articles 36(7) (8) and 47
of the 1969 constitution, the provisions of which, save as the substitution of article 2 for
article 47, are substantially the same as those under the 1979 and 1992 Constitution. In
my view the substitution of article 2 for article 47 was to make it clear that where actions
can’t lie against the President they may lie against the State under that article.

Indeed since the same acts of the President can be challenged under article 2 against
the state rather than against the President, it is difficult to think that article 2 suffers any
real prejudice by reason of the Presidential immunity from suit.

This court has often upheld the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution
wherever revealed by the Committee of experts’ reports on the matter. Indeed resorting
to the appropriate passages of the said Report, this court departed from the requirement
of locus standi for Ghanaian citizens for the purposes of constitutional actions under
article 2, even though previous decisions, inclusive of this court’s own decisions and
some earlier dicta required the contrary, see BILSON V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, S.C.
12th December 1994. However, compare NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY V. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (CIBA CASE) (1996-1997) S.C. GLR 796, and SAM V. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL, supra.

Indeed it is refreshing to note that BILSON V. APALOO (1981) GLR 24 S.C. relied on by
the Plaintiff, was before that, one of those decisions which required locus standi
generally, for actions under the 1992 Constitution.

It is true that in LETANG V. COOPER (1964) 3 WLR 573 C.A. at 578 Lord Denning
M.R. cautioned against too much adherence to committees' memoranda because the
Legislature might as well use language that departs from their recommendations; but as
shown supra, the Committee of experts recommendations on the presidential
immunities, referred to the ipsissima verba provisions of the 1979 Constitution.

I would therefore hold that the Plaintiff’s action against the President in this case flies in
the face of his constitutional immunity from suit and cannot be entertained. I however
refrain from saying that in other proceedings against the State, an order cannot be
made against the President. After all the Constitution omnia potest. It is for these
reasons that I support the majority decision of this court in NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY V.
THE PRESIDENT OF GHANA & ANOTHER dated 3rd May, 1994, despite the views of
Adade J.S.C. and others in NEW PATRIOTIC V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (31st
December case) supra, which tend to support the view that the President can be sued
under article 2 of the 1992 Constitution.

As to whether the action properly lies against the 3rd to 4th defendants, I doubt whether
the decision in Ghana Bar Association v. Attorney-General & Abban S.C. December 5th
1995, is not open to divergent views. A person wrongly appointed to an office and acting
in it can be sued, see GHANN V. TAMAKLOE (1957) 2 WALR 353, ADEGBENRO V.
AKINTOLA (1963) 3 WLR 63 P.C. and NINGKAN V. GOV’T OF MALAYSIA (1970) A.C.
379 P.C. I would therefore not say that they have been wrongly sued.

As to whether the action is now moot because the appointments impugned have, as at
now been regularly made, it was held by this court in J. H. MENSAH V. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (1996-97) SCGLR 320 that if the matter could still arise in future then the
action is not moot. Similarly in MERRICKS V. NOTT-BOWER (1964) 2 WLR 702 C.A. at
707 Denning M.R. said:

"if a real question is involved, which is not merely theoretical, and upon which the
court’s decision gives practical guidance then the court in its discretion can grant a
declaration". (emphasis supplied)

In EASTHAM V. NEW CASTLE UNITED FOOTBALL CLUB (1963) 3 WLR 574 even
though the transfers of the policemen who were plaintiffs had long taken place and
would not be reversed, it was held that the action would still serve a useful purpose to
the various police authorities as to the scope of their powers. Similarly there is no
indication that the President has exhaustively made all his necessary appointments. In
fact some are still going on. A declaration on the issue could still be useful to the
President and other relevant officials, like the Council of State. In TUFFOUR V.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL, supra, it was held that since a citizen has the duty to defend
the Constitution, he can bring an action, (if there is a controversy), for an interpretation
simpliciter, even though no further relief be sought by him. Indeed, since, as was held in
the said TUFFOUR case a Constitution is a living organic document which mirrors the
experiences of its people in the past and their aspirations for the future, then interest in
a constitutional matter would be a recurrent affair and therefore not moot; especially as
similar appointments would fall to be made virtually every 4 years. It has also been said
in OKORIE @ OZUZU V. THE REPUBLIC (1974) 2 GLR 272 C.A. that the question
whether a breach of the constitution causes some injury such as miscarriage of justice
is irrelevant since the mere breach of the constitution carries with it the stigma of
illegality, impropriety, etc. It seems to me therefore that the upholding of the supremacy
of the Constitution is itself of great constitutional utility. This action is therefore not moot.
The declaratory jurisdiction of this Court is not discretionary or the same as a
declaratory action at common law as BILSON V. APALOO (1981) GLR 24 S.C. would
seem to conceive it to be.

However, the ground on which I concur in upholding the preliminary objection,

generally, is that the plaintiff's action arises under certain clauses of the Constitution as
well as under ordinary legislation; namely, the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463).
Section 4(1) thereof provides:

"4(1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint such
persons as he considers necessary to hold office as presidential staff in the office".
(emphasis supplied.).

On the other hand article 70(1) provides:

“70(1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of state, appoint-

X X X

(e) the holders of such other offices as may be prescribed by this Constitution or by any
other law not inconsistent with this Constitution”. Article 91 similarly provides: "91(1) The
Council of State shall consider and advise the President or any other authority in
respect of any appointment which is required by this Constitution or any other law to be
made in accordance with the advice of, or in consultation with, the Council of State".
(emphasis supplied).

By virtue of these provisions, I think that a default in an appointment under Section 4(1)
of the said Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) can be challenged, as here, under
these provisions in this Court. In NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY V. NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS, 21st November 2000, S.C. I concurred in dismissing the
plaintiff's action in that case because it was one that could be instituted either under
article 94(3)(b) of the Constitution or under section 9 of the Representation of the
People Law, 1992 PNDCL 284. In such a situation since the action could have been
instituted in the High Court which, apart from the Fundamental Human Rights, can
enforce ordinary legislation or the common law, the Plaintiff's action, straightaway in this
Court, without first resorting to the High Court violated paragraph 6 of the Practice
Direction of this Court as published in 1981 GLR 1. The Plaintiff's action in this case
suffers, in consimili casu with the NPP v. NDC case, supra, the defect of violating the
said Practice Direction,

No compelling reasons, or at all, have been given for this violation. Consequently I have
no grounds for waiving non-compliance with the said Practice Direction under rule 79 of
the Rules of this Court, C.I. 16.

I do not consider it necessary to deal with the other submissions.

I would therefore also strike out the Plaintiff's action for want of jurisdiction.

SOPHIA A. B. AKUFFO, J.S.C.

By a writ issued by the Plaintiff/Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff')

against the Defendants/Applicants (hereinafter referred to as 'the defendants') the
plaintiff, pursuant to the powers of this court under article 2 of the Constitution seeks the
following declarations:—

1. That on a true and proper interpretation of articles 58 (1) and (2), 190 and 295 of the
Constitution, and sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) the
3rd, 4th and 5th defendants cannot be appointed by the President as staff of the Office
of the President without consultation with the Council of State.

2. That the conduct of the 1st defendant in appointing the above-mentioned defendants
as staff of the Presidential Office without prior consultation with the Council of State is
inconsistent with and in contravention of the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

3. That the conduct of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants in holding themselves out and
acting as staff of the Office of the President is inconsistent with and in contravention of
the Constitution.

4. That all acts undertaken by the said three defendants are void and of no effect.

In this application, the Attorney General, the 2nd defendant in the said writ, prays this
court, to set aside the plaintiff's writ or strike out the action, on the ground that this court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action, because:—

1. The writ and statement of claim disclose no cause of action based on Article 2(1) of
the Constitution.
2. The questions raised for determination by the plaintiff's action are moot.

The plaintiff, in his affidavit in opposition herein, urges the court to decline the
application for the reasons that:—

1. The 1st defendant, as the President of the Republic of Ghana is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the court in the exercise of the executive authority conferred on him by the
Constitution.

2. The appointment of the 3 officials, by the 1st defendant, without prior consultation
with the Council of State cannot be said to be a constitutionally sanctioned exercise of
executive authority.

3. Under Article 2 of the Constitution, the court has the power, to entertain his action
and to make declarations in the nature of quo warranto, as well as injunction or
mandamus.

4. There are triable issues raised by the plaintiff's action and moreover, the matter had
not been rendered moot merely by the subsequent appointment of the 3rd and 4th
defendants as Ministers of State.

5. Since the 2nd defendant was sued in a nominal capacity, the fact that, as at the date
of the filing of the writ, there was no substantive Attorney General does not mean that
no action could be commenced against the state in the name of the Attorney General.

During the hearing of the application, the Attorney General, relying on the authority of
The New Patriotic Party v. The President, Flt. Lt. (Rtd.) J. J. Rawlings and the Attorney
General, unreported S.C. Judgment dated 3rd May 1994, J. H. Mensah v. The Attorney
General, (1996-97) SCGLR 320, submitted that: —

1. The writ against the President, in his personal capacity, is improper.

2. By virtue of article 57(4), executive actions by the President cannot be questioned in

this manner.

3. The writ is defective because at the time it was issued there was no substantive
Attorney General in office.

4. The matters giving rise to the action have been overtaken by events and the action is,
therefore, moot.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the precedents cited by the Attorney
General rather supported his case since Article 57(4) is subjected to Article 2 and
prerogative writs. Furthermore, according to the plaintiff, under Article 2, this court has
the power to make whatever orders it sees fit, therefore, in matters of this nature, the
proper approach must be to take each writ on a case-by-case basis. He further
contended that the decision in J. H. Mensah v. the Attorney General (supra) did not
operate to suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor did it oust the possibility of
making the Attorney General a nominal defendant pursuant to article 88(5). On the
issue of mootness, the plaintiff argued that the cause of his action is still alive and must
be determined. He, therefore, submitted that the writ was properly issued against the
defendants and that it does disclose triable issues.

Before tackling the issues that properly arise from this application, I wish to touch upon
the submission that, since the writ predates the appointment of a substantive Attorney
General, it is defective. In J. H. Mensah V. the Attorney General, the question arose as
to whether or not an action may be instituted against the Attorney General when
Parliament has not previously given its approval to any person to act or hold himself out
as such. This court held that, because it is stipulated under article 88(1) that the
Attorney General shall be a Minister of State and the principal legal advisor to the
government, the individual personality of the office holder is paramount. I see no reason
to depart from this conclusion.

Does it then follow that, for this reason alone, the writ herein is so incurably bad that it
must be struck out? I do not think so. Part IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (Cl 16)
spells out the procedure applicable to actions, brought under article 2, to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In Rules 45(3) and (4), it is provided as
follows:—

“(3) A copy of the writ shall be served on each of the parties mentioned in the writ as
directly affected who shall be considered as the defendants, and on the Attorney
General, if not named specifically as a defendant.

(4) The Court may, at any time on its own motion or on the application of a party order
that any other person shall be made a party to the action in addition to or in substitution
for any other party."

In my opinion, the clear intent of these rules of procedure is to assure that, in all actions
to invoke the original jurisdiction of the court, effect is duly given to article 88(5), firstly,
by requiring the service of a copy of the writ on the Attorney General, and secondly, by
empowering the court to order the addition or substitution of any other person, which
'any other person' presumably includes the Attorney General. The rationale for these
rules is quite obvious; actions to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court are
presumed to be of crucial importance to the enforcement of the supreme law of the
land, the Constitution, and it is, therefore, in the interest of the public that such actions
not be defeated merely by the non-joinder or misjoinder of any party, including the
Attorney General. Indeed, even in ordinary civil actions before the High Court, Rule 6 of
the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) (No. 2) Rules, 1977 (LI 1129) affords
litigants and interested persons a similar safeguard and empowers the High Court,
either on its own motion, or on application, to order the striking out of a party or the
joinder of another person in the suit, so as to ensure that the matters in issue are
thoroughly determined and finally disposed of.
Consequently, although at the time the writ herein was issued against the Attorney
General no person had been approved by Parliament to occupy the position, the writ is
not thereby rendered so incurably defective as to dictate that it is struck out. All that
needs to be done is to order that the Attorney General, now that Parliament has duly
granted its approval, be deemed to have been properly joined as a defendant.

Turning now to the matter at hand, clearly this application raises two fundamental
issues:—

a. Whether or not the writ discloses any cause of action properly arising under Article
2(1)? And if so

b. Whether or not the plaintiff's action is in any case moot?

In dealing with issue (a) I will first consider the question of whether the 1st, 3rd, 4th and
5th defendants have been properly brought before this court. I will then consider
whether, in the circumstances of this case, it was proper for the plaintiff to have brought
his action under Article 2(1).

It is presumed that every word contained in the Constitution was placed therein after the
utmost deliberation. Consequently in the construction and enforcement of the
Constitution, it is necessary to read and apply each provision in such a manner as
would not do injury to any provision merely for the sake of upholding another provision
therein. Therefore, within the context of this matter, we need to consider the cumulative
effect of Articles 2(1), 57(1) and (4) and 88.

Article 57(1) states that:—

"There shall be a President of the Republic of Ghana who shall be the Head of State
and Head of Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ghana."

According to Article 57(4):—

"Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 2 of this Constitution, and subject to the
operation of the prerogative writs, the President shall not, while in office, be liable to
proceedings in any court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or
omitted to be done, or purported to be done, or purported to have been done or
purporting to be done in the performance of his functions, under this Constitution or any
other law." (My emphasis)

And Article 88(5) stipulates that:—

"The Attorney General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil
cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be
instituted against the Attorney General as defendant." (My emphasis)
Under article 2 clause (1)(b), a person who alleges that any act or omission of any
person is inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of the Constitution may
bring an action in this court for a declaration to that effect. Therefore, since the plaintiff
issued his writ pursuant to article 2, does that mean that it was proper for him to have
made the President a defendant therein. The answer is 'no'. In the case of the New
Patriotic Party v. the President of Ghana, Flt. Lt. (Rtd.) J. J. Rawlings (unreported S.C.
Judgment dated 3rd May 1994,), it was held, by a majority of this court, that, although
the President has procedural immunity from civil proceedings, his official actions may be
challenged through prerogative writs or action brought pursuant to article 2. However,
the Attorney General would be the only proper defendant in any such challenge. That
was a case wherein the New Patriotic Party sued the then President of Ghana, together
with the Attorney General, for a declaration that the appointment of District Secretaries
by the said President was inconsistent with and in contravention of the Constitution. The
then Attorney General raised the issue of whether or not, under the Constitution, the
President is personally amenable to suit and, whereas Amua-Sekyi and Aikins, JJ.S.C.,
were of the opinion that he is, Abban, J.S.C., (now C.J), Bamford-Addo and Ampiah,
JJ.S.C., were of the contrary view. His Lordship Abban expressed himself thus:—

"Article 57(5) and (6) of the 1992 Constitution gives complete immunity in civil and
criminal proceedings to the President while in office. But it seems to me that the
immunity which article 57(4) of the Constitution grants to the President is not absolute.
That is, article 57(4) does not confer substantive immunity in so far as prerogative writs
and actions brought under article 2 of the Constitution are concerned. "Thus, official
acts of the President can be challenged either by means of prerogative writs or by
instituting action in the Supreme Court under article 2 of the Constitution. However, I am
of the view that in such cases, it would not be right to make the President a defendant.
By virtue of article 57(1) of the 1992 Constitution, the President is not only the Head of
State but also the Head of Government; and article 58(1) vests the executive authority
of Ghana in the President. So whenever the President carries out executive duties
vested in him by the Constitution or by any other law, he does so as a government of
Ghana. "... In the particular circumstances of the present case, the suit herein should be
brought against the Attorney General only as defendant for and on behalf of the
Government of Ghana, in accordance with article 88(5) of the Constitution. That is, the
Attorney General is the proper defendant and not the President."

Elsewhere in his learned opinion, His Lordship continued as follows:—

"There is therefore no doubt that the official acts of the President can be questioned in
the Supreme Court under Article 2 of the Constitution and also through the use of
prerogative writs. But as I have already stated, in such case, as in the present one, only
the Attorney General should appear in the suit as defendant for and on behalf of the
government or the state for that matter ......

In the writ issued by the plaintiff herein, the conduct at the root of the complaint is the
action of the President in making staff appointments to the Office of the President. If this
is not an act done or purported to be done by the President officially and in his capacity
as President, then I cannot imagine what else could be. Therefore, to borrow the words
of my learned sister Mrs. Bamford-Addo, J.S.C., in the above-mentioned NPP case, if
the President, according to article 57, is the Head of State and has acted in his official
capacity in appointing or purporting to appoint the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants, which
action is alleged to be unconstitutional, then, it is not the Head of State himself who
should be sued, but the Attorney General, as dictated by article 88(5). That this was the
intent of the framers of the Constitution is evidenced by paragraph 34 of the Report of
the Committee of Experts (Constitution) on Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana,
wherein it is explained that:—

"The Presidential immunity from legal proceedings provided in Article 44 clauses 9-11 of
the 1979 Constitution of Ghana is meant to preserve the dignity of the office of the
President, but should not preclude proceedings against the state in appropriate cases.
The proper procedure in such cases is to institute proceedings against the Attorney
General, as the official representative of the Republic."

Consequently, I have no hesitation in concluding that the President is not a proper party
to the plaintiff's suit and he must be struck out as a defendant. In arriving at this
conclusion, I am not unmindful of the concern expressed by Amua-Sekyi, J.S.C., in the
aforementioned NPP case, to the effect that since, under Article 2(4), failure by the
President to obey or carry out the terms of an order or direction addressed to him by the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its powers under Article 2(2) to issue consequential
orders or directions, would constitute a ground for removal from office, to hold that the
President cannot be made a party to an action under Article 2 would offend against the
audi alteram partem rule. However, it is my view that the regime created by Article 2
constitutes an exception to this rule, since the mere existence of such a ground for
removal would not automatically remove the President, for the Constitution provides
specific procedures for the removal of a President.

What about the propriety of the inclusion of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as parties to
the suit? The plaintiff issued his writ because he claims that the appointment of the 3rd,
4th and 5th defendants as staff in the Office of the President is unlawful and
unconstitutional. Clearly, therefore, they have been included in the suit only because of
their alleged appointments and not because of any unconstitutional acts, they
themselves, may have committed. They did not appoint themselves and, as such
therefore, what provision of the Constitution has any of them contravened and what acts
on their parts might we legitimately declare unconstitutional pursuant to article 2? As
was stated by Hayfron Benjamin, J.S.C, in the case of Ghana Bar Association v. the
Attorney General & Abban, S.C judgment dated December 05, 1995, wherein the
Ghana Bar Association, in a suit against the Attorney General challenging the
constitutionality of the appointment of Justice I. K. Abban to the office of Chief Justice,
joined Justice Abban as 2nd defendant:—

“At a glance, it is obvious that the 2nd Defendant – the object of the power conferred on
the PRESIDENT – cannot be involved in this case. He has not committed any infraction
with respect to the Constitution and no action can be brought against him which can be
founded on Article 2 of the Constitution.”

The same may be said of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants in the plaintiff’s suit; they are
merely the objects of the President’s action. Therefore, their names must be struck out
as defendants to the plaintiff’s writ.

In view of the foregoing, assuming there is proper cause of action raised by the
plaintiff’s writ, the only proper defendant would be the Attorney General.

However, there remains the question of whether or not the executive action complained
of by the plaintiff may be subjected to judicial scrutiny by way of a writ under article 2.
There is no doubt that as already discussed above, executive action is subject to judicial
scrutiny, provided the writ is one properly issued pursuant to Article 2, or is a
prerogative writ. In Ghana, the Constitution is the supreme law and every act performed
by the President in the exercise of his executive authority, must be referable to the word
or spirit of the Constitution, or a law properly existing under the Constitution. However, a
writ, such as the Plaintiff's, issued under Article 2(1)(b), must necessarily show that the
act complained of is in contravention of a provision of the Constitution.

Although there are several provisions in the Constitution governing appointments into
certain positions by the President, these do not include of staff appointments to the
Office of the President. Rather, the latter appointments are governed by the Presidential
Office Act, 1993 (Act 463). If it is alleged that any appointments are in breach of this
legislation, there are other legal processes by which such appointments may be
challenged and the proper course of action for the plaintiff is to pursue such processes,
not to seek to enforce such legislation by way of a writ under Article 2.

Consequently, it is my view that, indeed, the plaintiff's writ does not disclose a proper
cause of action under article 2 and must, therefore, be struck out. Hence I do not see
the need to advert my mind to the issue of mootness.

LAMPTEY, J.S.C.

I agree that the plaintiff's writ and statement of case be struck out and the action be
dismissed against all the five defendants. I wish however to express my opinion on
some of the issues raised.

I must preface my opinion with the unambiguous statement that this court has no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the plaint before it. I agree with and adopt the
opinions expressed so clearly and succinctly by the majority of this court on the issue of
jurisdiction.

The action of the plaintiff cited Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor as the 1st defendant. The
address for service was stated as "office of the President State House Accra." The
plaintiff in providing the address of 1st defendant referred to and described 1st
defendant as "President of Ghana”. Since the plaintiff commenced the action on relying
on the power and right guaranteed to him, among others, on article 2(1)(a) and (b) of
the Constitution I reproduce in particular article 2(1)(b) as follows:

"2(1) A person who alleges that

(b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with or is in contravention of a

provision of this Constitution may bring an action in the Supreme Court ........ for a
declaration ......"

Is it the intention of the law makers that the "person" whose act or omission of the
alleged breach should and must be sued in his person. The answer in my views is and
must be in the positive. Prima facie the plaintiff must be right in law to sue Mr. John
Agyekum Kufuor, as the 1st defendant in the instant case. However the plaintiff at
paragraph 2 of his statement of case averred as follows:

“2. The 1st defendant is the President of Ghana and is being sued as person whose
conduct is violating the Constitution of Ghana."

Further and better particulars of the conduct of 1st defendant were stated at paragraphs
5, 6 and 8. These are:

“5. After the 1st defendant assumed office as the President of Ghana he purported to
appoint the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as Chief of Staff, Presidential Adviser for Public
Affairs and National Security Advisor respectively.

6. The purported appointment by the 1st defendant of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants
as staff in the Office of the President were done without consultation with the Council of
State as required by the Constitution and laws of Ghana.

8. By virtue of the conduct of the defendants state resources are being misappropriate
and misapplied by the defendants without any constitutional authority whatsoever."

In my view the statement of case shows and establishes that the conduct complained of
was the conduct of the President of Ghana. The action must not be mounted against
Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor. In my understanding of the Constitution and the facts stated
by the plaintiff the proper and lawful party to sue is the President of Ghana and not John
Agyekum Kufuor.

In further support and explanation of my view, I cite Article 60(9) and (12) of the
Constitution as follows:

"60(9) The Vice-President shall, before commencing to perform the functions of the
President under clause (6) of this article, take and subscribe the oath set out in the
second schedule to this Constitution in relation to the office of President.
(12) The Speaker shall, before commencing to perform the functions of the President
under clause (11) of this article take and subscribe the oath set out in relation to the
office of President."

I must point out and draw attention to the fact that the Constitution enjoined the Vice-
President and the Speaker each to take and subscribe the respective oaths of their
offices before they each assumed that office. The Constitution at article 60(9) and (12)
imposed a legal obligation on the Vice President and the Speaker to each take and
subscribe the oath of a President before they each assumed office as President. My
understanding of these Constitutional provisions is that the office of President is not
personal to the holder for the time being in office. In my view the President of Ghana is
the person who at any point in time has taken and subscribed the oath of President.

I find further support for my view on article 58(1) of the Constitution. This provision
reads as follows:

"58(1) The executive authority of Ghana shall rest in the President and shall be
exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution."

The Constitution in clear and plain language spelt out the functions and duties of the
Vice-President at article 60(1) and of the Speaker at article 101 of the Constitution.
Thus when the Speaker, acting legally and constitutionally as President of Ghana, is
alleged to have violated and breached a provision of the Constitution a plaintiff cannot
sue the Speaker by his or her true name, or sue him or her as "Speaker" or as "acting
President" because it would be wrong in law to sue in the name of the person for the
time being occupying the high office of President. I agree with and accept the opinion
that in cases of this nature, that is, when the exercise of the executive authority and
power is alleged to be unconstitutional, the proper and lawful party to sue is the
Attorney-General. On this issue article 88(5) of the Constitution provides:

"88(5) The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all
civil cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be
instituted against the Attorney-General as defendant."

This provision clearly makes the Attorney-General the party to sue in civil proceedings
against the President when he has exercised executive power of state.

The provision at article 57(5) of the Constitution is in language following:

"57(5) The President, shall not while in office as President, be personally liable to any
civil or criminal proceedings in Court".

In my opinion, the above provision clearly and plainly guaranteed to the President while
in office qua President, total and complete immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts, in
simpler language, the President cannot be sued in the civil courts and or criminally
prosecuted in the criminal courts. This legal immunity is intended to continue for a
period of three years only after the President leaves office as President. In my view this
constitutional provision gives further support to my opinion that it was wrong to sue Mr.
John Agyekum Kufuor as 1st defendant.

The Hon. Attorney-General and the plaintiff each addressed us on the issue whether or
not the plaintiff's writ and statement of case disclosed a cause of action. I must preface
this opinion with the statement that as at the date of considering the arguments and
submission of counsel for parties the plaintiff failed and omitted to provide further and
better particulars called for by the statement of case filed on behalf of the defendants. I
received a copy of the memorandum of issues filed by the plaintiff on the 2nd April
2001. The defendant caused to be filed the memorandum of issues on 19th March
2001.

To deal carefully and critically with the claim of the plaintiff before the court, I again refer
to the statement of case of plaintiff as I have reproduced same elsewhere in this Ruling,
in particular, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8. In reply to the averments cited therein the
defendants caused to be filed a statement of case.

I reproduce the relevant paragraphs as follows

“7. In answer to paragraph 5 of the plaintiff's statement of case, the 3rd, 4th and 5th
defendants aver that the 1st defendant exercising his executive authority called in aid
the expertise of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants to assist him in the performance of his
functions as advisers and spokesperson to the 1st defendant.

9. In further answer to paragraph 6 of the plaintiff's statement of case, the defendants

aver that the plaintiff has not shown any evidence to indicate that the 1st defendant has
appointed the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as staff in the office of the President."

There can be no doubt that paragraph 9 of the defendants' statement of case raised a
serious issue, namely that the case put forward by the plaintiff was not supported and or
verified by further and better particulars. The defendants specifically disputed and
denied the substance of plaintiff's case at paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 as follows:

“6. The 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants admit that they are citizens of Ghana and members
of the New Patriotic Party but deny they are holding themselves out as staff in the office
of the President.

7. In answer to paragraph 5 of the plaintiff's statement of case, the 3rd, 4th and 5th
defendants aver that the 1st defendant exercising his executive authority called in aid
the expertise of the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants to assist him in the performance of his
functions as advisers and spokesperson to the 1st defendant.

(9) In further answer to paragraph 6 of the plaintiff's statement of case the defendants
aver that the plaintiff has not shown any evidence to indicate that 1st defendant has
appointed the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants as staff in the office of the President".
The substance of the defendant's case as I understand it is a complete and total denial
of plaintiff's case. They have denied and challenged their appointment as staff in the
Office of the President. In my view there must be evidence from the plaintiff to establish
and support his case. I do not find such material before the court.

Be that as it may, I proceed to consider whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of action
against the defendants because the defendants admit unequivocally that 1st defendant
appointed them “to assist him in the performance of his functions as advisers and
spokesperson to the 1st defendant”.

The case of the plaintiff simply put is that the appointments were made and announced
without the prior consultation with the Council of State. The conduct of the defendants
breached and violated the Constitution. I note that the plaintiff did not cite article 70 (1)
(e) to support his case. I find it relevant and helpful. Article 70 (1)(e) provides:

"70(1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint ----

(e) the holders of such other offices as may be prescribed by this Constitution or by any
other law not in consistent with this Constitution"

Pursuant to the above provision the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) was passed
into law.

I must now turn to Act 463 which provided the plaintiff the reason and genesis of his
case. S.4(1) provides as follows:

"4(1) The President acting in consultation with the Council of State shall appoint such
persons as he considers necessary to hold office as presidential staff in the Office".

It is accepted by all the parties that as at the date of the writ and statement of case of
the plaintiff a Council of state was not in being and existence. It therefore cannot be
controverted that any purported appointments made pursuant to S.4(1) of Act 463 would
be unlawful, that is, the appointment(s) is or are in flagrant breach of Act 463. The case
of the defendants, simply expressed, is that the appointments were in the capacities of
"advisers and spokesperson" respectively to the 1st defendant. They stated further they
were chosen for their "expertise". Finally they challenged the plaintiff to produce
evidence of their appointments as "Chief of Staff", "Presidential Adviser for Public
Affairs" and "National Security Adviser". In view of the issue raised by the parties I must
examine Act 463 to ascertain what positions or offices have been created by it. S.4(1)
provided for the appointment of presidential staff. The appointment as Presidential Staff
must be in writing. The plaintiff failed and or omitted to establish and prove his case by
supplying copies of the warrants or letters of appointment in respect of 3rd, 4th and 5th
defendants. He failed and omitted to explain his default in this matter. In my view, the
omission and failure to provide the court with the supportive documents was fatal to his
case in the light of S.7 of Act 463. This section provides as follows:
"7. The President may appoint for specified periods such consultants or experts as he
may require for any specific assignments".

In the instant case, the defendants claimed that they were appointed because of their
"expertise". I must point out that the President in exercising the power and right to
appoint under S.7 of Act 463 does not need to consult with the Council of State. It
would be seen that the appointments complained of may lawfully be made pursuant to
S.7 of Act 463 bearing in mind the uncontroverted defence put forward in the statement
of case.

I find further that the plaintiff did not in his statement of case indicate that the post of
"Chief of Staff", "Presidential Adviser for Public Affairs" and "National Security Adviser"
are all offices created under S.3(1)(a) of Act 463. In my opinion since the defendants
disputed and denied the averments contained in the statement of case and in the
absence of material supportive of his case, the plaintiff's writ and statement of case did
not disclose a cause of action.

Another serious issue raised for determination by the plaintiff would be found at
paragraph 8 of his statement of case. It reads—

"8. By virtue of the conduct of the defendants state resources are being misappropriated
and misapplied by the defendants without any constitutional authority whatsoever".

There can be no doubt in any one's mind that the above averment needs to be proved
and supported by material in the statement of case. The defendants denied paragraph 8
of the statement of case at paragraph 11 of their statement of case as follows:

"11. The defendants categorically deny paragraph 8 of the Statement of case of plaintiff
and aver that it is without foundation."

It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff was enjoined to file such other statement or
documents as would seek to support and establish the averment at paragraph 8 of his
statement of case. This Court is therefore confronted with the bare assertion of the
plaintiff that State resources are being misapplied and misappropriated by the
defendants. When it is pointed out that the allegation of misappropriation of State funds,
prima facie, constitute on accusation that crime is being committed by the defendants,
this court was entitled to receive such material as would enable it to rule that plaintiff
has a cause of action against the defendants. It seems to me that the plaintiff failed and
or omitted to provide the court with material to support his claim and case against each
and every one of the defendants that they had each misapplied and misappropriated
State resources. In the absence of material from the plaintiff, it is difficult if not
impossible for me to venture to think what declaration this court would make on this very
serious issue of misapplication and misappropriation of State funds. I do not have a
shred of evidence of misapplication and or of misappropriation before me to support and
buttress the case of the plaintiff. I am satisfied that the plaintiff's writ and statement of
case did not disclose a cause of action for this further reason.
AMPIAH, J.S.C.

This is an application by the Defendants to have set aside the Writ filed against them by
the Plaintiff.

In his writ, filed on 29th January, 2001 to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court, the
plaintiff claims against the Defendants—

(1) A declaration that:

(i) On a true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, particularly articles 58(1) and
(2), 91(1) and (2), 190 and 295 thereof, and Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Presidential
Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants cannot be appointed by the
President as Staff of the Presidential Office without consultation with the Council of
state.

(ii) The conduct of the 1st Defendant, President John Agyekum Kufuor, in appointing
3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as Staff of the Presidential office without consultation with
the Council of State is inconsistent with and in contravention of the letter and spirit of
the Constitution.

(iii) The conduct of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants in holding themselves out and
acting as Officers or Staff in the Office of the President is inconsistent with and in
contravention of the Constitution.

(iv) Accordingly, all acts undertaken by the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as Officers or
staff in the Office of the President are inconsistent with and in contravention of the
Constitution, null, void and without effect whatsoever.

(2) Perpetual injunction restraining the 1st Defendant President from appointing the 3rd,
4th and 5th Defendants as Staff to the Presidential Office without consulting the Council
of State.

(3) Perpetual injunction, restraining the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants from continuing to
hold themselves out and acting as Officers or Staff in the Office of the President.

(4) Such other orders or directives as to the Court may seem fit to give effect to the
above declaration."

Before process in this action could come to a close, the Applicants herein filed this
application contending inter alia that,

“(1) This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action against the Defendants
herein;

(2) ... No cause of action is disclosed by Plaintiff's Writ and the Statement of Case;
(3) ... The questions raised in the Plaintiff's action for determination are moot; and for
such further or other orders to this Honourable Court may seem fit".

An application for interim injunction to restrain the Defendants from exercising the
functions of whatever office they were holding seemed to have outlived its purpose, by
the available evidence on record, as at 6th February, 2001, Parliament had approved
the nominations of the 3rd and 4th Defendants as substantive Ministers of State.

The Writ and the Statement of Case of the Plaintiff, as well as the Statement of Case of
the Defendants were not attached to the application. It is required that in such
applications all the necessary documents and orders upon which the applicant relies
must be attached or exhibited. For a fuller understanding and appreciation of the nature
of issues posed in his application however, I would look at these writ and statement of
cases if only to do justice in the case.

The Plaintiff in this action seeks a declaration as to the true and proper interpretation of
the Constitution in particular, Articles 58(1) and (2), 91(1) and (2), 190 and 295, and
also Sections 2, 3, 4 of the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463). He contends that in
a true and proper interpretation the appointment of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as
Staff of the Presidential Office, without consulting the Council of State was inconsistent
with and in contravention of the letter and spirit of the Constitution. To my mind, the
claim calls for the interpretation of provisions of the Constitution.

The Applicants contend that the writ discloses no cause of action and that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action.

Article 2(1) (b) of the Constitution provides:—

"A person who alleges that—

(a) X X X X

(b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a

provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a
declaration to that effect." (emphasis supplied).

Also, Article 130(1) of the Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
in “all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of the Constitution."

It is therefore only the Supreme Court which can interpret a provision of the Constitution
when that question arises. And when that issue becomes contentious in any other
Court, that Court "shall stay the proceedings and refer that question of law involved to
the Supreme Court for determination; and the Court in which the question arose shall
dispose of the case in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court"- vide Article
130(2) of the Constitution.
Thus, where in this action the Plaintiff seeks a declaration on the interpretation of a
provision of the Constitution, and alleges that someone's conduct is inconsistent with, or
in contravention of a Constitutional provision, it cannot be said either that there is no
cause of action or that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action.

The allegation may not be true, but it remains an issue to be determined one way or
another. And, the interpretation must be done as requested. The Supreme Court is the
only Court to do that.

It is a cardinal principle of law that when an issue of jurisdiction is raised, it is not proper
for the Court to decide on the merits of the case; this may prejudice a subsequent
hearing of the case. It must be noted that all the issues raised in this application, have
been set down for determination in the Memorandum of Issues filed on behalf of the
Defendants. I will therefore as much as possible refrain from going into the merits of the
issues raised in this writ.

CAN THE PRESIDENT BE SUED PERSONALLY?

Article 57(4) of the Constitution provides—

"Without prejudice to the provisions of article 2 of this Constitution, and subject to the
operation of the prerogative writs, the President shall not, while in office, be liable to
proceedings in any court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or
omitted to be done, or purported to be done, or purported to have been done or
purporting to be done in the performance of his functions, under this Constitution or any
other law."

And sub-clause (5) of this article provides further—

"The President shall not, while in office as President be personally liable to any civil or
criminal proceedings in Court."

'The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil
cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be
instituted against the Attorney-General as Defendant' - vide Article 88(5) of the
Constitution.

It follows therefore that save for matters or acts done within article 2 of the Constitution
or matters or acts for which a prerogative writ could be issued, all other actions against
the President, while in office, shall be brought against the Attorney-General on behalf of
the State as the Principal Legal Adviser to the Government. I had an occasion to give
an opinion on this issue in the NPP vrs the President of the Republic of Ghana, Flt. Lt.
(Rtd) J. J. Rawlings and the Attorney-General, S.C. (unreported) dated 3rd May, 1994.
In that case, I stated inter alia that no action could be brought against the President in
his personal capacity. That was a case under Article 2 of the Constitution. I have since
reconsidered my opinion. I am in agreement with my learned brother Amua Sekyi,
J.S.C. (now retired), in that case, that if the action fell within article 2 or prerogative
proceedings were brought against the President, the President could be sued in his
personal capacity.

In this action, the Attorney-General has been sued as "..the person against whom all
civil proceedings affecting the state shall be instituted". It is being contended that since
there is no substantive holder of that office, there could not be a defendant in the
action. I do not think that it is necessary to have a substantive holder of that office
before that office is made a defendant. If that were so, it would mean that since all
actions against the State should be brought in the name of the Attorney-General, no
action could be brought against the State until such time that a holder of that office is
appointed. Where an action is brought against the Attorney-General or the Attorney-
General sues and the incumbent dies or vacates his office, there is no application for
substitution because that office as long as it exists could be represented in the action
and whoever takes over that position subsequently, continues with the action. The
Attorney-General need not prosecute or defend the action personally. It is different
where the Attorney-General is sued or brings an action in his personal capacity. In
which case if he vacates his office or dies, there should be substitution, if the case
persists. I do not think the joinder of the Attorney-General in these proceedings would in
any way invalidate the proceedings as the Court would have to determine the issues or
questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and interests of all persons who are
parties to the proceedings.

With regard to the other Defendants (ie. 3rd, 4th & 5th) it cannot be said that they are
not interest in the issues to be determined, if there is a cause of action. They are
alleged to be beneficiaries of the acts of the 1st Defendant. It would be against the rules
of natural justice if they were not heard before they were condemned or commended.
The Court would have to determine the issues as they affect them. I think they are
necessary parties to the action.

What is the cause of action?

All citizens of Ghana have the constitutional right and duty at all times to defend the
Constitution. (See Article 3(4) of the Constitution). Article 2 empowers any person to
bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration as to whether any person has
acted or omitted to act consistently with, or in contravention of a provision of the
Constitution. And, the court shall for that purpose, make such orders and give such
directions as it may consider appropriate for giving effect or enabling effect to be given
to the declaration. No one can deny any person his right to seek such a declaration.

The Plaintiff in the instant case alleges that the 1st Defendant as President has
appointed the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants to positions namely, Chief of Staff,
Presidential Adviser for Public Affairs and National Security Adviser respectively in the
Office of the President without consultation with the Council of State, an act, which
violates the Constitution. He wants a declaration to that effect. The Applicants contend
that,
"...The 1st Defendant in exercising his executive authority called in aid the expertise of
the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants to assist him in the performance of his functions as
Adviser and Spokesperson to the 1st Defendant." (See paragraph 7 of the Statement of
Case of the Defendants).

And that,

"... 1st Defendant had raised the Status of the 3rd and 4th Defendants by nominating
them as Ministers designate." (See paragraph 17 of the Defendants' Statement of
Case).

Thus, an issue has been joined as to whether or not there have been such
appointments. The Applicants contend that there has been no statutory publication of
such appointments and that no evidence has been led to establish that. Newspaper
publications cannot, they submit, be used to establish that fact.

That no Council of State has yet been put in place is not denied. It is a notorious fact
that such appointments have been made; this was published in the local newspapers.
Of course since processes for the commencement of hearing of the action had not been
concluded, it is difficult to determine what evidence would be given to establish these
appointments, save from the publications in the newspapers. As to whether these
alleged appointments qualify as 'Presidential Staff' as defined under Section 16 of the
Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463), is also an issue to be determined. Until then
however, Section 156 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) provides that—

"Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals are presumed to be

authentic."

Section 4(1) and (2) of the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) provides—

"(1) The President shall acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint such
persons as he considers necessary to hold office as Presidential Staff in his Office.

(2) The number of persons that may be appointed under sub-section (1) of this Section
and the grade of the Officers shall be determined by the President." (emphasis
supplied).

And, "The Presidential Office shall be made up of—

(a) Persons appointed as Presidential Staff under this Act one of whom shall be
appointed head of the office;

(b) Such other public officers as may be seconded or transferred to the office". (See
Section 3(1) of Act 463).
Thus in so far as the appointment of the Presidential Staff is concerned, Section 4(1) of
Act 463 must be complied with.

Article 70(1) of the Constitution provides—

"(1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint—

(a) X X X X X

(b) X X X X X

(c) X X X X X

(d) X X X X X

(e) the holders of such other officers as may be prescribed by this Constitution or by any
other law not inconsistent with the Constitution." (emphasis mine).

In fact it is in the letter and spirit of the Constitution that Act 463 was enacted.

Section 2 of Act 463 provides—

"The function of the Office is to provide the President and the Vice President such
services as they may require for the efficient and effective implementation of the
executive functions of the President and Vice President under the Constitution, or any
other law."

And, Article 91(1) of the Constitution states—

"The Council of State shall consider and advise the President or any other authority in
respect of any appointments which is required by this Constitution or any other law to be
made in accordance with the advice of, or in consultation with the Council of State."

It cannot be said that the Presidential Act, 1993 (Act 463) is inconsistent with the
Constitution. The "such other officers" include the Presidential Staff as prescribed by
Act 463 and, "such other officers" must be appointed in consultation with the Council of
State. An appointment without such consultation is inconsistent with and in
contravention of not only Act 463 but also Article 70(1) of the Constitution, by which
authority the appointments are to be made. The Presidential Staff are there to assist the
President in the effective and efficient performance of his functions. Naturally the
President would need some expert advisers. It cannot be said that the three Defendants
are the only advisers he has, but the fact remains that the three Defendants are the only
persons he has so far named and appointed as his expertise advisers to assist him in
the performance of his functions in his Office as President. The question is, who are
these officers who have been so appointed? The Plaintiff claims that they are members
of the Presidential Staff. The Defendants say that they are only advisers. An issue is
therefore joined for the determination of the Court.

The Applicants say that the issue is moot as these appointees have since been 'raised'
in their status and have been nominated as Ministers designate. The Writ for the action
was filed on 29th January, 2001. A motion ex-parte for interim injunction to restrain
further commission of the alleged violation of the Constitution and to prevent the alleged
appointees from acting was filed on 29th January 2001, the same day the Writ was filed.
This could not come on. However, a repeat application, this time, on notice for interim
injunction was filed on 2nd February, 2001. This also could not come on because of the
instant application by the Defendants to have the Writ set aside. Meanwhile on 6th
February, 2001, the "raised" status of the 3rd and 4th Defendants was put before
Parliament and approved. It is therefore not correct to say that at the time the Writ was
issued, the issue was moot. Be that as it may, I am of the opinion that there exist issues
which are capable of determination for future conduct of the framers of the Constitution,
the Legislature and the Executive- see US vrs. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Assn. 393
US 201 and US vrs. W.T. Grant Co. "345" US 629.

In conclusion, I am satisfied that a cause of action is established on the face of the

records. Pertinent issues have been raised and the Court would have to determine
these issues. This Court has jurisdiction to determine these issues. It would fail in its
duties if it does not determine the declaration sought. I would accordingly dismiss the
application and set the action down for determination on the merits.

KPEGAH, J.S.C.

I will preface this ruling with the words of Lord Delvin in his book entitled, THE JUDGE,
Oxford University Press, 1979 at page 4 where he said:—

"If a judge leaves the law and makes his own decision, even if in substance they are
just, he loses the protection of the law and sacrifices the appearance of impartiality
which is given by adherence to the law. He expresses himself personally to the
dissatisfied litigant and exposes himself to criticism. But if the stroke is inflicted by law, it
leaves no sense of individual injustice; the losing party is not a victim which had been
singled out; it is the same for everybody, he says. And how many a defeated litigant has
salved his wounds with the thought that the law is an ass."

These words of wisdom were quoted by Aikins, J.S.C. in the case of J. H. MENSAH
VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1996-97) SCGLR 320. Like him, I will allow myself to be
guided by these words of wisdom from a man who can easily be rated as one of the
best jurists of his time. Coupled with this is the traditional saying among the legal
fraternity that the Bench is not for timorous souls.

Every student of the Constitutional Law of Ghana might have felt, after reading the
celebrated case of IN RE AKOTO (1961) 2 GLR 523, that if the decision had gone the
other way the political and constitutional development of Ghana would have been
different. "Different" in the sense that respect for individual rights and the rule of law
might have been well entrenched in our land, and we who now occupy this Court would
have had a well-beaten path before us to tread on in the discharge of the onerous
responsibilities imposed upon us by the Constitution of this country.

In this action, Mr. Martin Amidu is complaining that certain appointments made or
purported to have been made by the President, Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor to the Office
of the President contravenes or is a violation of some provisions of the Constitution; and
he seeks a declaration to the effect that, by appointing Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey to
the Office of the President as Chief of Staff, Ms. Elizabeth Ohene as Spokesperson in
the Office of the President and Lt. General (Rtd) Joshua Hamidu as National Security
Advisor to the President without first consulting with the Council of State is a violation of
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Mr. Amidu (hereinafter referred to as the
Plaintiff) argues that by the said appointments President Kufuor (hereinafter referred to
as the 1st Defendant) acted in breach of Sections 3 and 4 of the Presidential Office Act,
1993, (Act 463) and article 91 of the Constitution. He, therefore invoked our original
jurisdiction under Articles 2(1)(b) and 130(1)(a) of the Constitution and sought a
declaration that:—

(i) On a true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, particularly articles 58(1) and
(2), 91(1) and (2), 190 and 295 thereof; and sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Presidential
Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants cannot be appointed by the
President as Staff of the Presidential Office without consultation with the Council of
State.

(ii) The conduct of the 1st Defendant, President John Agyekum Kufuor, in appointing
3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as Staff of the Presidential office without consulting with the
Council of State is inconsistent with and in contravention of the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.

(iii) The conduct of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants in holding themselves out and
acting as Officers or Staff in the Office of the President is inconsistent with and in
contravention of the Constitution."

The Plaintiff further asked for a declaration that all acts done or undertaken as Staff in
the President's office are null and void. He, also asked for the ancillary reliefs of
injunction, or such orders or directions as this Court may deem fit or appropriate.

In a statement of case filed on behalf of the Defendants, the Solicitor General, raised a
number of factual and legal issues upon which the application to set aside the Plaintiff's
writ and statement of case is premised. The relevant averments in the Defendants'
statement of case are:—

“3. The Defendants aver that the executive authority of this nation resides in the 1st
Defendant and in the exercise of this authority this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendant.
X X X X

5. The 2nd Defendant admits paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff's statement of case but denies
that he could be sued at the point of time that the Writ and Plaintiff's statement of case
were issued and filed.

X X X X

7. In answer to paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff's statement of case the 3rd, 4th and 5th
Defendants aver that the 1st Defendant exercising his executive authority called in aid
the expertise of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants to assist him in the performance of his
function as advisers and spokesperson to the 1st Defendant.

X X X X

9. In further answer to .... the Plaintiff's statement of case the Defendants aver that the
Plaintiff has not shown any evidence to indicate that the 1st Defendant has appointed
the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants as Staff in the Office of the President.

X X X X

17. The Defendants aver that before the Plaintiff filed his Writ and the statement of
case, the 1st Defendant had raised the status of the 3rd and 4th Defendants by
nominating them as Ministers designate.

18. The Defendants say further that since the nomination of the 3rd and 4th Defendants,
Parliament had as of 6th February 2001 approved the appointment of the 3rd and 4th
Defendants as Ministers and have been sworn in as such Ministers.

19. Regarding the position of the 5th Defendant the Defendants say that his position or
status is not contemplated under the Constitution and therefore no provision of the
Constitution is violated.

20. It is further averred by the Defendants that the appointments of the 3rd, 4th and 5th
Defendants by the 1st Defendant and, which is the subject of attack by the Plaintiff, is a
prerogative of the 1st Defendant and this Court lacks or any other Court jurisdiction to
entertain any action brought against the 1st Defendant in this regard.

21. The Defendants aver that the action brought by the Plaintiff is frivolous and an
abuse of this Court's process."

On the very day that the Defendants statement of case was filed, the Solicitor General
immediately proceeded to file a motion seeking to set aside the Plaintiff's writ and
statement of case on three main grounds; namely,
(i) that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action against the
Defendants;

(ii) that the Plaintiff's writ and statement of case disclose no cause of action; and

(iii) that the questions raised in the Plaintiff's action for determination have become
moot.

Before proceeding any further I would like to deal with an issue which is germane to this
case. The point was raised in argument, based on paragraph 9 of the Statement of
Defendants' case, that the Plaintiff's failure to exhibit the letters of appointment is fatal to
his case since the Defendants had, in the said paragraph 9, denied his averments.

The Plaintiff countered this argument by submitting that the fact of the said
appointments are common knowledge having been so published by both the electronic
and print media to which there had not been any official denial. Fortunately, Section 156
of the Evidence Decree, 1975, (NRCD 323) provides:

"Printed materials purporting to be newspaper or periodicals are presumed to be

authentic."

My brother Acquah, J.S.C. in the case of NPP VRS. NDC & ORS. (2000) SCGLR 461 at
page 508 commenting on the efficacy of the said section 156 in judicial proceedings
said:

"[T]he law recognises the existence of newspapers as sources of information, and

accordingly, provides in section 156 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) that:

'Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or periodicals are presumed to be

authentic.'

This does not mean that whatever is stated in a newspaper is true. What the provision
does is to give recognition to the existence of a newspaper. It would certainly be
outrageous in my view, for anyone to make capital out of the fact that the source of the
Plaintiff's information is a newspaper when even the Courts rely on publications in
newspapers for a variety of purposes including substituted services, as authentic means
of giving notice to those entitled to be given such notices. It would be unfathomable for
this Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction on grounds inter alia, that the Plaintiff's
source is the newspaper.” (emphasis supplied).

Concluding his discourse on section 156 of the Evidence Decree, Acquah, J.S.C. said:

"After all, instances abound where parties to suits have relied on newspaper
publications in support or defence of their case."

He then cautioned that

"no fetish should be made of the fact that the Plaintiff's source of information is THE
GHANAIAN TIMES."

Section 156 of the Evidence Decree entails more than merely give recognition to a
newspaper. The important words in the provision are "presumed to be authentic". The
word "authentic" is defined in the Chambers Dictionary (New Edition) as "genuine;
authoritative; true, entitled to acceptance, of established credibility". Used in relation to
writing it means "trustworthy, as setting forth real facts".

We should be wary of setting aside a Plaintiff's Writ and Statement of Case for failing to
disclose evidence of a pleaded fact, which is denied, when there is a legal presumption,
though rebuttable, in the Plaintiff's favour in respect of that fact. It will certainly be a thin
ground on which to decline jurisdiction and set aside the writ and statement of case in
an important constitutional case which, in my view, involves so much law.

The Plaintiff's action was provoked by various announcements in both the electronic
and print media that the 1st Defendant had appointed the 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants
to certain staff positions in the Office of the President when the Council of State has not
been constituted because in such appointments the Council of State must be consulted.
In respect of the 3rd Defendant for example, it was carried in both the print and
electronic media on the 8th and 9th of January, 2001 that he had been appointed the
Chief of Staff in the President's Office. This was how the "Daily Graphic” of 9th January,
2001 presented the news of the 3rd Defendant’s appointment: "JAKE MADE CHIEF OF
STAFF". The story that followed was:

"The President, Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor, has appointed Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey
as Chief of Staff, Office of the President."

The same news item was carried in the EVENING NEWS of the previous day.

In respect of the 4th Defendant, Ms. Elizabeth Ohene, her appointment was on the 4th
day of January, 2001 and carried in the DAILY GRAPHIC of 5th January, 2001. The
caption read: "ELIZABETH OHENE NAMED PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER" with the
following story:

"The President-elect, Mr. John Agyekum Kufuor, has appointed Ms. Elizabeth Ohene,
one-time Editor of the Daily Graphic as his Advisor on public affairs. A press release
issued from the Office of Mr. Kufuor yesterday, said in her capacity as Public Affairs
Advisor, Ms. Elizabeth Ohene will be responsible for all media-related activities of the
President-elect. The release signed by Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, Campaign Manager
of Mr. Kufuor, said Ms. Ohene would also be responsible for all statements issued on
behalf of the President-elect."

This story was also carried by the other print and electronic media. It does seem,
therefore, that Ms. Ohene's appointment was made by the President even before he
assumed office on the 7th January, 2001. The 1st Defendant, therefore, could not have
been exercising his executive authority, not having been vested with such authority, to
call in aid the expertise of the 4th Defendant as Spokesperson to assist him in the
performance of his functions as pleaded in the Statement of Defendants' case. The
release which announced the appointment of the 5th Defendant, Lt. Gen. Joshua
Hamidu, as the National Security Advisor to the President was signed by the 4th
Defendant in her appointed capacity. The appointment of the 5th Defendant was
captioned in the DAILY GRAPHIC of 12th January, 2001 thus: "HAMIDU MADE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER". The story under this headline was:

"The President, Mr. J. A. Kufuor, has appointed Lt. Gen. Joshua Hamidu as National
Security Advisor, a press release signed by Ms. Elizabeth Ohene, Presidential Advisor
of Public Affairs announced yesterday. Lt. Gen. Hamidu is a former Chief of Defence
Staff."

In moving the motion to set aside the Plaintiff's writ and statement of case, the learned
Attorney-General, Nana Akufo-Addo raised a number of issues. First, that the 1st
Defendant as President of Ghana, being vested with the executive authority of the state
is not amenable to the jurisdiction of any court in the exercise of that authority. For this
submission he relied on the decision of this Court in the case NPP VRS. FLT. LT. (RTD)
J. J. RAWLINGS & ANOR. Suit No. 15/93 (Unreported) dated 3/5/94 where by a 3-to-2
majority this Court held that the President was not amenable to court proceedings for
the performance of his official functions whilst in office. Thus, the per curiam decision
placed the President, in the due exercise of his powers, whether constitutional or
statutory, political or otherwise, beyond the reach of judicial proceedings. The J. J.
RAWLINGS' case will be examined in greater detail in this ruling. However, it is worth
mentioning at this stage that the court failed to consider the issue whether a President
can under any circumstances be compelled through the judicial process to perform a
purely ministerial act under a positive law otherwise for impeachment under article 2(4).

The second point raised in support of the motion was that there being no substantive
Attorney-General when the writ was issued the joinder of the 2nd Defendant (Attorney-
General) as a party was improper and the writ against him was null and void. Third, that
by the nomination of the 3rd and 4th Defendants by the President as Ministers of State
and their subsequent approval by Parliament as Ministers of State, the questions raised
by the Plaintiff's action had become moot and this court should accordingly decline
jurisdiction. Admittedly, the function of a Court of law in our jurisdictions is to determine
issues of law and fact when properly raised before it in a dispute between parties. The
question then is, how far does the American principle of mootness based on the "case"
and "controversy" requirement of Article III (2) of their Constitution and as applied in the
case of DEFUNDIS VRS. ODEGAARD, 416 U.S. 312, apply under Article 2 of our
Constitution, if it does at all. The assault on the competence of this Court to adjudicate
the Plaintiff's case is based on the above basic grounds. There are other strands to the
challenge raised in argument which will be considered in the course of this opinion.

The Plaintiff on the other hand urged us to reject the Attorney-General's position
because the action is brought under Article 2 of the Constitution; that in such a situation
the President, while in office, can be sued personally for infractions of any constitutional
provision in the discharge of his executive functions. As to the second point, the
absence of a substantive Attorney-General, the Plaintiff argued that the Attorney-
General was sued only as a nominal Defendant and the fact that nobody had then been
appointed to the position was not a sine qua non. And on mootness the Plaintiff argued
that the principle of mootness is not contemplated in respect of actions brought under
Article 2 of the Constitution.

The last two points were considered in the case of J. H. MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (1996-97) SCGLR 320. The then Attorney-General, Dr. Obed Asamoah
together with his Deputy, the present Plaintiff, raised preliminary objections to the
Plaintiff's action. First, that the issues which fell for determination had become moot;
and secondly, that on the basis of the Plaintiff's own showing, the action could not be
maintained against the Attorney-General because, he too, like the retained Ministers,
had not been approved by Parliament. The present Attorney-General who then
appeared for the Plaintiff in the J. H. MENSAH's case resisted the application on the
ground that the Attorney-General was sued as a nominal defendant. This argument was
accepted by the court. At this point I crave indulgence to digress and indicate some
aspects of this ruling in advance.

In this ruling apart from answering the major questions raised, I may also consider other
points indirectly raised in the course of argument:

How far American principles of judicial self-restrain can be applied in our Constitutional
adjudications, particularly the political question doctrine and the principle of ripeness.

This discussion will dove-tail into a consideration of the plea of mootness, its origin and
scope, since it is raised in this case. I intend to do this because we have not been
consistent in our applications of these principles. In some cases there are dicta
suggesting that American doctrines of judicial self-restrain developed as a result of the
"case" and "controversy" requirement of article III (2) of the American Constitution are
not applicable in our circumstances. But in other cases, some of the principles are given
tacit approval or applied. These principles have been developed by American Courts as
a convenient way of avoiding jurisdiction in certain cases. One of these principles, the
mootness doctrine, has now been pleaded in bar to our jurisdiction in this case.

I think this offers us an opportunity to confront once and for all these discretionary
avoidance principles of American jurisprudence and determine how relevant they are to
our circumstance instead of the selective approach we have been adopting so far;
otherwise such approach will deprive our jurisdictional decisions of any principled
content or basis.

A review of some of the cases in which these doctrines have been applied or rejected
may help illustrate our ambivalence towards these principles. For example, in the recent
case of NPP VRS. NDC & ORS. (SUPRA) at 505-506, the following words of caution
were given against these discretionary avoidance principles:
"Generally an action is speculative if it is not grounded on real situations but on
conjectures and therefore not ripe for adjudication. In United States constitutional
jurisprudence, such an action is discussed under the doctrine of ripeness. For article III
of the United States Constitution requires a court to consider whether a case has
matured or ripened into a controversy worthy of adjudication before it can be
determined."

After this preliminary observation the caution was sounded thus:

"Now a close study of the United States Constitutional jurisprudence vis-a-vis the
language and provisions of our 1992 Constitution, clearly shows that the United States
doctrine of ripeness, like most of their principles of judicial self-restraint, is inappropriate
in the interpretation of our Constitution. In J. H. MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL
(1996-97) SCGLR 320 this Court finally decided that the political question doctrine as
applied in the United States was inapplicable in our jurisprudence."

But, in J. H. MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1996-97) SCGLR 320 the Court,

while rejecting the political question doctrine, one of the principles of judicial self-
restraint, proceeded to apply the doctrine of mootness another principle of judicial self-
restrain which had been developed in the United States specifically because of the
"Case" and "Controversy" requirement of Article III(2) of their Constitution. The first
holding in the J. H. MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SUPRA) states:

"The preliminary objection by the Defendant would be dismissed: (a) the principle
guiding the court in refusing to decide moot questions was quite settled. If the question,
though moot, was certainly not likely to re-occur, the courts would not waste their time
to determine dead questions and issues. Thus for the court to decline deciding a moot
question, it must be established that subsequent events had made it absolutely clear
that the alleged wrong behaviour could not reasonably be expected to occur. Where it
was not so established (as in the instant case) the court would go into the question to
forestall a multiplicity of suits."

The court, for the above holding, relied on two United States Supreme Court decisions;
namely U.S. VRS. CONCENTRATED PHOSPHATE EXP. ASSN. 393 U.S. 201; and
U.S. VRS. W.T. GRANT & CO. 345 US 629.

It does appear from the first holding, does it not, that the court approved the doctrine of
mootness as applicable to our Constitutional adjudications but only found it inapplicable
to the case before it for, in the words of Aikins, J.S.C., "the issue in the instant case is
still alive".

The other so-called American doctrine often applied with some inconsistency is the
political question doctrine the development of which is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers which underpins the American Constitution, like ours, rather than
any specific provision in the American Constitution. It was applied in the case of
TUFFOUR VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1980) GLR 632 without the court specifically
saying so; but the principle was rejected in the case of NPP VRS. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (THE 31ST DECEMBER CASE) Suit No. 18/93 (unreported) dated 8/3/94.
The issue again arose in the case of G.B.A. VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL & ANOR.
(THE ABBAN CASE) Suit No. 8/95 (unreported) dated 5/12/95 where THE 31ST
DECEMBER CASE was criticised and the doctrine applied in the ABBAN case. This is
what Hayfron-Benjamin, J.S.C. said in his supporting opinion:

"This leads me to a consideration of the second of what I have termed the twin pillars
constituting jurisdiction. Whether this action can be maintained, or more properly,
whether this Court can clothe itself with jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. I
have already referred to the opinion of my learned and respected brother Kpegah,
J.S.C. in particular and to the concurring opinion of my learned and respected sister and
brethren. I do not think it is necessary for me in this opinion to discuss the principle of
the non-justiciable political question. It is certainly one of the grounds upon which the
jurisdiction of this Court may be ousted". (emphasis supplied).

One of the grounds on which the Court declined jurisdiction in the Abban case therefore
was non-justiciable political question doctrine. And commenting on the case of
TUFFOUR VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SUPRA) in ABBAN CASE, Hayfron-
Benjamin, J.S.C. said:

"In my respectful opinion in the case of TUFFOUR VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1980)

GLR 639, this Court discussed in full the scope and limits of our jurisdiction with respect
to dealings with other arms of government. Although in the TUFFOUR case, Supra,
their Lordships did not use the term - non-justiciable political question, I think they
reached conclusions, which accord with JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dictum in the American
case of BAKER VRS. CARR, 369, US, 186 (1962)".

This was not to be the end of the matter. In the case of J. H. MENSAH VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1996-97) SCGLR 320 the Court rejected the avoidance
principle of political question doctrine and held that the court had jurisdiction to
determine political questions. It is interesting that the ABBAN CASE which disapproved
of NPP VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (31ST DECEMBER CASE) was not referred to
but rather the latter was relied upon although it was severely criticised in the ABBAN
CASE which, as indicated, the Court never referred to in J. H. MENSAH VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SUPRA). The argument could therefore be made that this
case was decided per incuriam.

It seems to me, therefore, that this Court had not been consistent in its application of the
so-called American principles of political question doctrine to our circumstance. One
may therefore legitimately ask to what extend such applications or rejections of these
so-called discretionary avoidance principles of the American jurisprudence have been
based on principled grounds, or to what extend they were AD HOC invocations or
applications of prudential judgments. I find it irresistible to consider some of these
principles for fear that such an inconsistent approach by this Court may deprive our
jurisdictional decisions of any principled basis; especially when one of these principles
have been cited in bar to our assumption of jurisdiction in the instant case.

I will be discussing these concepts and their relevance to our circumstance and finally
link the discussion with what we actually mean and must do in our jurisprudence when a
defendant moves a court to have the plaintiff's writ and statement of claim set aside for
"failing to disclose any cause of action”. What factors or considerations must a court
take into account before granting or refusing such a request will be part of the burden of
this opinion.

After this self-explanation why I will be delving into areas which may “appear", I use the
word advisedly, to some as not really necessary for the decision, I will revert to a
consideration of some of the legal issues raised.

THE IMMUNITY OF THE PRESIDENT WHILE IN OFFICE

It is trite learning that a court can be said to lack jurisdiction either because it has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a claim, or over any of the parties. The learned
Attorney-General's contention is that since the 1st Defendant, His Excellency President
J. A. Kufuor, was exercising his executive authority he is not amenable to the
jurisdiction of this court or any other court while in office. He supported his argument
with the decision of this court in the case of NPP VRS. FLT. LT. (RTD) J. J. RAWLINGS
& ANOR. Suit No. 15/93 (unreported) dated 3rd May, 1994 where this court in a 3 to 2
majority decision interpreted article 57(4) to mean that the President, while in office, is
immuned from any judicial proceedings in the performance or purported performance of
his official functions. Article 57(4) of the Constitution states:

"Without prejudice to the provisions of article 2 of this Constitution, and subject to the
operations of the prerogative writs, the President shall not, while in office, be liable to
proceedings in any court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or
omitted to be done, or purported to be done, or purported to have been done or
purporting to be done in the performance of his functions, under this Constitution or any
other law."

That the executive authority of Ghana vests in the President of the Republic is very
clear from the language used in article 58(1) of the Constitution. However, this same
article doth enjoin the President that while exercising his undoubted executive authority
he must do so in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It states:

"The executive authority of Ghana shall vest in the President and shall be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution." (emphasis supplied).

So that article 58(1) not only grants executive power to the President but also imposes a
mandatory duty on him to do so in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
This duty is enforceable because "any act or omission of any person" which is alleged
to be inconsistent with, or to be in contravention of a provision of the Constitution can be
challenged in the Supreme Court under Article 2 to which the immunity of the President
is made subject. As was poignantly pointed out by Amua-Sekyi, J.S.C. in the
RAWLINGS case,

"If words have any meaning, the term 'any person' must include the President of the
Republic; and, if it does, then there is no reason why he cannot be called upon to
answer for alleged infringements of constitutional provisions."

The submission that article 58(1) while vesting the President with executive authority
also, expressly, or at least by necessary implication, imposes an enforceable duty on
him to observe the provisions of the Constitution in the process, is underscored by the
provisions in clause 2 of the said article 58 which makes it clear that the President's
executive authority "shall extend to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution
and all laws made under or continued in force by this Constitution".

It does appear, therefore, that there is sufficient internal evidence in article 58 not only
of the vesting of the executive authority in the President, but also the imposition of a
duty on him to exercise those powers in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and any other law made or continued under the Constitution. This duty is
enforceable, and can be enforced by recourse to our enforcement jurisdiction under
article 2 of the Constitution to which the President's immunity from judicial proceeding is
made subject.

I have read the case of NPP VRS. FLT. LT. (RTD) J. J. RAWLINGS & ANOR. (SUPRA)
several times and find that the views and sentiments expressed by Amua-Sekyi, J.S.C.
in his minority opinion accords with those of my own. This is what he said:

"Although the President is the first citizen, he is not above the law. The medieval fiction
that the 'king can do no wrong', which the sophist interpreted to mean that if the action
was wrong, then it was not that of the king, has no place in a republican setting which
prides itself on all citizens being equal under the law and therefore obliged to act in
conformity with it. We recognise that an executive President being the most powerful
person in the State is the one who has the greatest capacity for wrong-doing. We do not
need a Petition of Right or a notional defendant like the Attorney-General before we can
exercise our democratic right of calling an erring President to order under Article 2
which not only commands him to obey any order or directions this court may give, but
also makes his failure to obey any order or direction a ground for his removal from
office."

What happens when the President refuses to perform a public duty imposed on him by
a Statute. He must, like anybody, be amenable to the prerogative writ of MANDAMUS to
compel him to discharge the duty. As was observed by Apaloo, J.A. (as he then was) in
the case of SALLAH VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1970) 2 G & G 493,

"It ought, however, to be borne in mind that the immunity from legal proceedings
granted to the President in the performance or purported performance of his
constitutional or other legal duty is not absolute. His immunity from Court proceedings
does not extend to proceedings taken against him by any of the prerogative writs. It
would follow from this that if the President failed or neglected to perform a public duty
imposed on him by law, a person affected by his failure can compel him in Court by the
prerogative order of Mandamus."

The above dictum of Apaloo, J.A. (as he then was) implies the submission that the order
could be enforced if the President deliberately refuses to comply.

Such an order can only be enforced by contempt proceedings, which proceedings being
quasi-criminal are inappropriate for the citation of a "nominal contemptnor" like the
Attorney-General; personal demand is required before such a procedure can be
invoked.

And for a contempt proceeding to be successful the party proceeded against must be
proved to have been guilty of a wilful or intentional, or deliberate disobedience of the
order, and if this is not fully and satisfactorily made out, the Court will refuse to commit.
The words "wilful", "intentional" or "deliberate" require a particular state of mind on the
part of the person alleged to be in contempt. Can this necessary state of mind be
attributed to "a nominal defendant" like the Attorney-General for him to be committed.
For all we know, he might have advised the President to obey the order.

Also, an application for contempt can result in the contemptnor being committed to
prison. Will a "nominal contemptnor" like the Attorney-General go to prison instead of a
recalcitrant and obstinate President?

Should we decline to over-rule the RAWLINGS' case and hold that the President is not
amenable to any judicial proceedings even if, in the performance of his duties he
breaches the Constitution, we may possibly be condemning the citizens of this country
to the calamity which befell the nation after the RE: AKOTO case. And this Court would
have reneged on one of its functions - the maintenance of the culture of
Constitutionalism. In my dissenting opinion in the case of YEBOAH VRS. J. H.
MENSAH (1998-99) SCGLR 492 at page 517, I said:

"The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land, and, all person must look at it and
adjust their actions or conduct accordingly. And it has to be emphasised that one of the
primary functions of the Supreme Court, apart from adjudication of constitutional
matters, is promoting and safe-guarding constitutional values." (emphasis supplied)

I cannot conclude this aspect of my opinion without again calling in aid the words of my
brother Amua-Sekyi, J.S.C. in the RAWLINGS case (Supra):

"In the light of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that whenever it is alleged that the
President acted in a manner inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of the
Constitution, an action may be brought against him under Article 2 for a declaration to
that effect, and for consequential orders, including an injunction. President Rawlings
was, therefore, properly made a defendant in this suit."

For the name "President Rawlings" substitute the name "President Kufuor" and this will
adequately reflect my humble view in this case.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

The point was also raised that since there was no substantive Attorney-General before
the writ was issued, the writ against the 2nd Defendant is null and void and should be
dismissed accordingly. This argument was earlier made in the recent case of J. H.
MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SUPRA) by the then Attorney-General but the
present Attorney-General, Nana Akufo-Addo, who then appeared for the Plaintiff
countered this line of argument by submitting that the Attorney-General was sued as a
nominal defendant. This argument found favour with the Court which held that the
Plaintiff was right in contending that the Attorney-General was constitutionally a nominal
Defendant in the action. Currently, this is the view I hold and the case of J. H. MENSAH
VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SUPRA) should lay to rest the contention of the
Honourable Nana Akufo-Addo that the writ was void against the 2nd Defendant
because he had not been appointed before the writ was issued. In any case the point
could not defeat the action as the non-joinder or mis-joinder of a party cannot defeat an
action.

APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CONCEPTS OF JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAIN AND

OTHER PRINCIPLES TO OUR CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

(a) POLITICAL QUESTION-AKIN TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTION OR INHERENT IN

DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

Our Constitution, like the American Constitution, is a written Constitution underpinned

by the doctrine of the separation of powers. And it is important to say that being a
written Constitution, it has, like the American Constitution, certain fundamental or basic
attributes. The first is that the people of Ghana VOLUNTARILY, in the words of the
Preamble "do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution". And under
the Constitution the people of Ghana have exercised their "natural and inalienable right
to establish a framework of government". The second attribute is that the form of
government envisages three important branches or arms of government - that is the
EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATURE and JUDICIARY. The third attribute is that these various
departments of government have their respective powers laid down with limits not to be
infringed or transgressed by any arm of government. But these limits, expressed in a
written Constitution, would be meaningless and serve no purpose if freely ignored or
infringed by the organs intended to be restrained. Although power is dispersed among
the various organs of government, it should not be at the expense of harmony and
governance.
In the American case of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. VRS. SAWYER (STEEL
SEIZURE CASE) 343 U.S. 579, Justice Jackson said of the doctrine of the separation of
powers:

"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity".

Our Constitution, unlike the American Constitution, is expressed to be "the Supreme

Law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this
Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void". Despite this provision
there is inherent or internal evidence in our Constitution that the policy which informs or
should inform an Act, and the desirability of enacting such a law are matters for the
Executive and Legislature to decide. But the interpretation of the law, its enforcement
and matters relating to the validity of the law enacted by Parliament fall within the
adjudicatory functions of the Courts. So that when we decide the validity of an Act of
Parliament, we are not descending to the well of Parliament and thereby interfering with
its work. We are empowered by the Constitution to so declare if Parliament
transgresses the Constitutional limitation placed on its legislative powers. Therefore, the
issue whether an Act or any of its provisions are constitutionally valid or not, is not a
question of a political nature and this Court cannot refrain from deciding same. Because
in doing so the Court is not encroaching any particular function or privilege of
Parliament. This distinction is important and must be maintained. The principle of non-
justiciable political question did not evolve in American jurisprudence due to the fact that
the Courts were not endowed with the power of judicial review in the Constitution.
Although it was the case of MARBURY VRS. MADISON 1 Cranch 137 which formally
broke the ground for judicial review in America, earlier jurists have anticipated and read
into the Constitution such a power. For example, Hamilton in his THE FEDERALIST No.
78 (Modern Library ED. 1937) at page 506 wrote:

"The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the Courts. A
Constitution, is, in fact, and must be regarded by the Judges, as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between two, that which has the superior obligation and validity
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be
preferred to the Statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents".

Some are of the view therefore that Chief Justice Marshall only gave philosophical
justification to the concept of judicial review in the MADISON case. It is not primarily
because of the absence of the power of judicial review in the American Courts that the
principle of non-justiciable political question was evolved. It is a necessary derivative
from the doctrine of separation of powers. Justice Brennan in BAKER VRS. CARR 369
U.S. 186 (1962) at page 682 said:
"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers".

I think it is this basic distinction which Archer, C.J. in the case of NPP VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (31ST DECEMBER CASE) (supra), where the issue was
raised, recognised or acknowledged and meant when he cautioned, thus:

"The Constitution gives the Judiciary power to interpret and enforce the Constitution and
I do not think this independence enables the Supreme Court to do what it likes by
undertaking incursions into territory reserved for Parliament and the Executive. This
Court should not behave like an octopus stretching its eight tentacles here and there to
grab jurisdiction not constitutionally meant for it”.

The above dictum by Archer, C.J. was given some approval, in another direction, in the
J. H. MENSAH CASE (supra). One may be tempted to ask what philosophical
considerations might have informed this dictum of Archer, C.J. He was considering the
applicability of the political doctrine to our circumstance, which the majority rejected in
that case (i.e. 31st December Case) (supra) as inapplicable in our Constitutional
adjudications. And Sowah, J.S.C. (as he then was) in the case of TUFFOUR VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1980) GLR 637 after examining the question of how far the
courts can question what, under our Constitution, had been done in, and by Parliament,
said at page 651 thus:

"These Courts cannot therefore enquire into the legality or illegality of what happened in
Parliament. In so far as Parliament has acted by virtue of the powers conferred upon it
by the provisions of clause (1) of Article 91, its actions within Parliament are a closed
book."

The Court then proceeded to discharge the Speaker as the 1st Defendant because he
ought not to have been joined as a party. The rationale for the Court's decision that
proceedings in Parliament are a closed book and cannot be subjected to judicial review
is the concept of separation of powers and its necessary implication of non-justiciability
of proceedings of Parliament.

And in the ABBAN case I cautioned against the relentless use of our power of judicial
review as follows:

"I do not think the framers of our Constitution intend to anoint and enthrone the
Judiciary. The political question is one basic virtue to emanate from the concept of
separation of powers. This Court must apply it in an endeavour to find its proper place
within the Constitutional structure".

THE BRITISH CONCEPT AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In British Constitutional law, the "traditional view" is that Parliament is Supreme. Some
of its proponents had been Dicey and Blackstone Coke. The concept of supremacy
implied that Parliament could enact laws on any topic affecting any persons, and there
are no laws which Parliament is impotent to repeal or amend. In this context Parliament
means "the crown in Parliament" - that is, the combined effect of the Queen, House of
Lords and the House of Commons. Under the British domestic law, the efficacy of the
laws passed by Parliament may be challenged, but the power to make such a law has
never been challenged. But some of the assumptions which flow from the theory of
supremacy of Parliament in British Constitutional Law, are slowly coming under stress
by certain realities of the modern state and relations between other states. Although the
British Constitution is not written, the non-justiciability of certain types of actions,
perhaps on grounds previously unknown or unacceptable, has started to creep in. In the
recent case of BLACKBURN VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1971) 1 WLR. 1037, the
Plaintiff brought two actions against the Attorney-General seeking a declaration that the
effect of signing the Treaty of Rome (which would permit Britain to join E.E.C. and some
of its organs) would be irreversibly to surrender in part the Sovereignty of the Crown in
Parliament and that, accordingly, Her Majesty's government will be acting in breach of
the law. The Court of Appeal held that the Courts could not impugn the treaty-making
powers of the Crown. Lord Denning, M.R said:

"The treaty-making powers of this country rests not in the Courts, but in the Crown; that
is Her Majesty acting upon the advice of her Ministers. When her Ministers negotiate
and sign a treaty, even a treaty of such paramount importance as this proposed one,
they act on behalf of the country as a whole. They exercise the prerogative of the
Crown. Their action in so doing cannot be challenged or questioned in these Courts".

Lord Salmon in his opinion on the issue of jurisdiction said:

"Whilst I recognise the undoubted sincerity of Mr. Blackburn's views, I deprecate

litigation the purpose of which is to influence political decisions. Such decisions have
nothing to do with these Courts. Nor have the Courts any power to interfere with the
treaty-making power of the sovereign..."

Lord Justice Stamp was more forthright in his opinion. This is what he said:

"I agree that the appeal should be dismissed; but I would express no view whatever
upon the legal implications of this country becoming a party to the Treaty of Rome. In
the way Mr. Blackburn put it I think he confused the division of powers of the Crown,
Parliament and the Courts. The Crown enters into treaties; Parliament enacts laws; and
it is the duty of this Court in proper cases to interpret those laws when made; but it is no
part of this Court's function or duty to make declarations in general terms regarding the
power of Parliament ... Nor ought this Court at the suit of one of Her Majesty's subjects
to make declarations regarding the undoubted prerogative powers of the Crown to enter
into treaties".

The second point taken by the Plaintiff in the BLACKBURN CASE is that if Parliament
should implement the Treaty of Rome by enacting an Act of Parliament for the purpose,
it would try to do the impossible; in that it will be trying to bind its successors since it is a
term of the Treaty that once it is signed, then Britain would be committed irrevocably.
For this view point, the Plaintiff relied on the principle that no Parliament can bind its
successor, and that no Act of Parliament is irreversible. In support of this argument the
Plaintiff relied on the comment of Professor Maitland on the Act of Union between
England and Scotland. At page 332 of his "Constitutional History of England" he said:

“We have no irrepealable laws; all laws may be repealed by the ordinary legislature,
even the conditions under which the English and Scottish Parliaments agreed to merge
themselves in the Parliament of Great Britain".

Responding to this argument Lord Denning said:

"We have all been brought up to believe that, in legal theory, one Parliament cannot
bind another and that no Act is irreversible. But legal theory does not always march
alongside political reality. Take the Statute of Westminster 1931, which takes away the
power of Parliament to legislate for the Dominions. Can anyone imagine that Parliament
could or would reverse that statute? Take the Acts which have granted independence to
the Dominions and territories overseas. Can anyone imagine that Parliament could or
would reverse those laws and take their independence? Most clearly not. Freedom once
given cannot be taken away. Legal theory must give way to practical politics. It is well to
remember the remark of Viscount Sankey, L.C. in BRITISH COAL CORP. VRS. THE
KINGS (1935) A.C. 500 at 520:

‘…. The Imperial Parliament could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or disregard
section 4 of the Statute of Westminster. But that is theory and has no relation to
realities.

It seems to me that some of the traditional concepts underlying the British Constitution
are being imperceptibly pecked at by the realities of modern political considerations.
Otherwise, the suit of Blackburn could have been dismissed on traditional ground that
the "Queen can do no wrong" and the "Queen cannot be sued in her own Court”.
Instead the law Lords have started deprecating litigation which are intended to influence
political decisions which have nothing to do with the Courts; that legal theory does not
always march alongside political reality, or that theory has no relation to realities. More
importantly, the British courts, which operate an unwritten Constitution, have started
talking about a Plaintiff being confused about the division of powers between the Crown,
Parliament and the Courts.

To me, it is significant that the British Court of Appeal declined jurisdiction and
dismissed the suit on the ground that the issue for determination was a “political
decision” and that “such decisions have nothing to do with these Courts”. Even if it is
argued that our Constitution does not recognise the doctrine of separation of powers in
its absolute rigidity, the functions of the different branches of government have been
sufficiently demarcated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution
does not contemplate assumption, by one arm or branch, functions of state which
essentially belong to another branch.
Any blanket rejection of the principle of non-justiciable political question will, in my
humble view, create jurisdictional problems in the future. It is not a concept developed
from any particular provision of the American Constitution, but is a concept which is
inherent in the doctrine of separation of powers, which concept underpins our
Constitution also. The fact that it was developed and so named within American
jurisprudence should not give us goose pimples and make us averse to its application to
our Constitutional adjudication. After all, what is in a name? A rose will always smell
sweet even if it is called "ammomia".

To emphasise a point I would like to relate the Blackburn Case to our current situation.
What will be the attitude of this Court if a citizen should bring an action seeking a
declaration that the recent decision of His Excellency the President for Ghana to join the
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is against both the spirit and letter of the
Constitution on the ground that it is not in the interest of Ghanaians "in whose name and
for whose welfare," in the words of Article 1(1) of the Constitution, "the powers of
government are to be exercised"; and arguing in the process that the HIPC initiative will
not lead to a realisation of the economic objectives anticipated under Article 35 of the
Constitution of Ghana.

I asked this question because under Article 75 it is the President's prerogative to enter
into treaties, agreements, or conventions subject to ratification by Parliament through an
Act of Parliament, or by a resolution supported by the vote of more than one-half of all
Members of Parliament. And the HIPC has been adopted in the BUDGET Statement
which has been approved by Parliament. What will be the jurisprudential considerations
which will influence our determination whether we are clothe with jurisdiction to
determine such matters.

Should we decline jurisdiction what will be the philosophical or the jurisprudential

justification for such a decision? And should we decide we have jurisdiction to entertain
such an action shall we not be interfering with the functions of both the Executive and
Parliament? Or shall we not appear to be pronouncing on matters of policy, or
substituting our own notions of what is wise and politic for that of the Executive and
Parliament. I do not think the judicial power we enjoy under the Constitution authorises
the Courts to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what Parliament and the Executive
branches do.

Fortunately, the American principle of non-justiciable political question can be invoked

to assist us avoid such a temptation. The fact that it is American jurists who have
identified the concept of non-justiciable political question as inherent in the doctrine of
separation of powers and named it as such does not make the principle a virogene to
our Constitution, and for which reason, we must avoid its application in our
constitutional adjudication.

There are, however, other principles of American jurisprudence which have been
evolved as a result of specific provisions of their Constitution but are finding acceptance
in our Constitutional adjudications. It is rather some of these principles which have
found favour with us. Some of these concepts are MOOTNESS and RIPENESS of a
case.

(b) MOOTNESS

As has been pointed out earlier in this opinion, the doctrine of mootness is an American
concept derived from the "case" and “controversy" requirement of Article III (2) of the
U.S. Constitution. This article is peculiar to the United States of America and it limits the
jurisdiction of the federal Courts to "cases' and “controversies". The essence of this
doctrine is that although a case might present all the attributes for litigation, it could at a
certain point lose some of the attributes of justiciability and become moot. This is
because of the American rule that an actual controversy must exist at all stages, both
the trial and appellate considerations, and not simply at the date of the commencement
of the action. According to this principle an action can become moot due to a change in
the law, or in the status of the parties; or it could become moot by some actions of one
of the parties to the litigation which tends to terminate or remove the controversy.

In his book, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th Ed.), Prof. Gerald Gunther of Stanford
University had this to say at page 1628"

"The mootness cases involve litigants who clearly had standing to sue at the outset of
the litigation. The problems arise from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten
under way - changes in the facts or in the law - which deprive the litigant the necessary
stake in the outcome. The mootness doctrine requires that 'an actual controversy must
be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed'. The
modern Court has repeatedly insisted that the mootness doctrine is an aspect of the
Article III case or controversy requirement".

Although the mootness doctrine has a Constitutional basis, yet the U.S. Courts now
tend to relax their application of the mootness barrier to adjudication or the assumption
of jurisdiction, and have created several exceptions. The real legal question is whether
the mootness doctrine can be said to have been anticipated under Article 2 of the
Constitution by the framers to enable us adopt this concept which is based solely on a
specific constitutional requirement of article III(2) of the American Constitution; or put in
another way, does Article 2 require that there must be a continuing breach before the
Courts can act under the said article; or this Court must, once a breach of the
Constitution is brought to its notice, even if the alleged conduct is terminated whether
before or after a writ is issued under Article 2, we still have the bounden duty to make a
declaration to that effect, if only to preserve the sanctity of the Constitution. We cannot
apply the doctrine to the instant case unless we answer these questions. It is therefore
necessary to examine the provisions or Article 2 in some detail. Article 2 provides:

"(1) A person who alleges that —

(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any
other enactment; or
(b) any act or omission of any person; is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a
provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a
declaration to that effect".

For example, is it a necessary requirement under article 2(1)(a) that there should be a
case and controversy in respect of an enactment considered to be inconsistent with a
provision of the Constitution before an action can be brought for it to be so declared? I
do not think so because an enactment which falls into disuse can be a subject of an
action under article 2(1)(a) due to its potential to be used in the future. Even if we
rejected such a writ it would be on ground that it presented a hypothetical question. And
if we look at the provisions of article 2(1)(b) all that is required to ground an action in this
Court is an "act or omission of any person" which is inconsistent with or is in
contravention of any provision of the Constitution. The "act" or the "omission" need not
be a continuing one before an action can be brought. Indeed even a threat to breach the
Constitution is enough.

In the case of YEBOAH VRS. J. H. MENSAH (1998-99) SCGLR 492, a case in which I
dissented, I said at page 517-518 thus:

“[I]t should be possible for any person who fears a threatened breach of the
fundamental law to invoke our enforcement jurisdiction in a sort of QUIA TIMET action
to avert the intended or threatened infringement of the Constitution. This is because our
enforcement jurisdiction is premised upon the consideration that, to quote from the
Memorandum on the 1969 Constitution, 'any person who FEARS a threatened
infringement or ALLEGES an infringement of any provision of the Constitution' should
be able to seek redress in this Court ... so that if the act or conduct of any person
threatens the breach of the Constitution, it is the duty of this Court to immediately
intervene ... with the sole objective of preventing such unconstitutional conduct”.

And my brother Acquah, J.S.C. in his dissenting opinion in NPP VRS. NDC & ORS.
(already cited) said:

“In other words, the plaintiff sees from the activities of the 1st and 3rd defendants, a
threatened breach of the Constitution, and therefore comes to Court to prevent them
from breaching the law. On this, the principle is too trite to require an authority in
support that where one discovers from the acts and omissions of others that same
constitute a threat to a breach of the Constitution and the law, that person has right of
access to the Courts to forestall the said threat. If the said acts and omissions are
against a provision of the Constitution, then, as Azu Crabbe J.A as he then was, said in
Gbedemah vrs. Awoonor-Williams (1969) 2 G & G 438 of 440, it becomes 'the
inescapable duty of the Supreme Court to suppress it by enforcing the Constitution'."

In YEBOAH VRS. MENSAH (Supra) where I had the occasion to consider whether a
period of limitation, or a plea of laches can apply when a breach of any provision of the
Constitution is alleged, I had this to say at page 524-525:
“The answer should be obvious. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
enforce the Constitution against any person whose act or conduct is an infringement of
any provision of the Constitution, and the fact that the jurisdiction was not invoked for
several years should make no difference to the jurisdiction. And any limitation on a
citizen's constitutional right to enforce any provision of the Constitution cannot be
permitted unless expressly stated by the Constitution itself."

The enforcement of the fundamental law is not the same as enforcement of personal
rights or private litigation.

To read the doctrine of mootness into Article 2 of the Constitution will be a dangerous
step to take. A breach of the Constitution cannot be countenanced under any
circumstances; nor can any plea of extenuating circumstances be allowed to prevail. A
Constitution cannot be operated and defended by such considerations, lest we put
expediency above constitutionalism. The mootness can easily expose the Constitution
to frequent breaches resulting in subsequent loss of sanctity. A Constitution must be a
sacrosanct document and must remain so in all situations or circumstances. And it
cannot remain inviolate as a sacred document if certain alleged infringements are
denied judicial attention because there are extenuating or special circumstances
justifying such a breach. There cannot be any plea of justification when a breach of the
Constitution is alleged; otherwise this Court could be accused of casting an indulgent
judicial eye on certain breaches, by certain persons, of the fundamental law.

This is the sort of approach which, that jewel that once adorned the judicial crown of this
country, Apaloo, C.J., had in mind when in the case of KWAKYE VRS. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (1981) GLR 994 at 958 said:

"In the exercise of the interpretative jurisdiction of this Court, it is obvious we should go
beyond statutory interpretation since we are concerned with the most fundamental
issues of our jurisdiction. We must have regard to the terms of our particular
Constitution where specific reference points are largely unique to our national history. In
this area, more than other, judicial pronouncements in other jurisdictions on the
particular facts of their experience are not likely to be of much assistance; the range of
judicial wisdom embodied in them will, of course, influence our judicial reflections. I think
originality is required of us in the exercise of our original jurisdiction if we are to attend
to the letter and spirit of the Constitution as a basic law of our land. That originality
must, of course, be judicial and must not do damage to the plain and obvious meaning
of the words used nor is it the province of this Court to be astute to find some reason or
other for depriving the constitutional provision of an effect clearly intended".

If this Court had, in the case of J. H. MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (already

cited), considered the language of Article 2 of the Ghana Constitution as against that of
Article III of the American Constitution it would have come to the conclusion that the
American doctrine of mootness has its origin in their Article III and inapplicable to Article
2 of our Constitution.
I must admit that in the case of BILSON VRS. ATTORNEY-GENERAL Suit No. 12/93
(unreported) dated 12th December, 1994, I made certain statements which could be
interpreted to mean an application of the doctrine of ripeness to that case.

This is what I said:

"Although it may be right to say that there is no law which inhibits the jurisdiction of this
court in matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution, 1992 I think it will be
worthwhile applying the concept of judicial self-governance or self-restraint in such
matters.

The judicial authority of which this court is the beneficiary or endowed with is essentially
a jurisdiction to deal with real or substantial disputes which affect the legal rights or
obligations of parties who appear before us, and whose interests are adverse to each
other. These competing interest will necessarily call for specific reliefs through
conclusive and certain judicial decree or decrees. In these circumstances the matter
could be said to be justiciable and not otherwise. The principle of justiciability precludes
us from giving advisory opinions based on hypothetical facts which are not part of an
existing controversy."

I have had second thought about the above dictum and I am prepared to abandon my
views. However, I must say I would have reached the same conclusions on some other
ground, that the plaintiff's case be dismissed; possibly because it discloses no cause of
action.

THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE ACT, 1993 (ACT 463)

AND

ARTICLE 70(1)(e) OF THE CONSTITUTION

It needs no reminder that this litigation has been sparked off by certain appointments
alleged to have been made by the President, His Excellency John Agyekum Kufuor, to
the Office of the President as established under the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act
463). Those who can work in this office as Presidential Staffers are specified in Section
3 of the said Act. And those who so qualify under the said Section 3 are categorized
into two groups; firstly, persons appointed under the Act; and secondly, persons who
are public officers and have either been seconded or transferred to the Presidential
Office. The Act is specific that it is only one of the persons appointed under the Act, or
who belong to the first category of persons that can be appointed by the President to
head the office. For avoidance of doubt I will quote Section 3 in full. It provides:

"3(1) The Presidential Office shall be made up of—

(a) persons appointed as Presidential Staff under this Act one of whom shall be
appointed as head of the Office;
(b) such other public officers as may be seconded or transferred to the office".

From the above provision it is patently clear that only persons who belong to the first
category and are appointed under the Act that can be appointed by the President to
head the Presidential Office. Therefore, the argument hardly need be made that those
persons who belong to category two and have either been seconded or transferred from
the public service cannot be appointed to head the Presidential Office; that is to say
public office holders, seconded or transferred to the Presidential Office. Not even a
Minister of State, not having been appointed under the Presidential Office Act, 1993
(Act 463), can be appointed to head the office.

In respect of those who are appointed under the Presidential Office Act, one of whom is
eligible to head the said office, the procedure for such appointment is provided for in
Section 4 of the Presidential Office Act. This is what the Act says in Section 4 (1):

"The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint such
persons as he considers necessary to hold office as Presidential Staff in the office".

It is therefore a requirement of the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463), which Act
certainly cannot be held to be inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution, that
any appointment under the Act should be made in consultation with the Council of
State. Article 70 of the Constitution which regulates Presidential appointments to certain
para-statal organisations provides in clause (1)(e) as follows:

“The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State, appoint—

X X X X

(e) the holders of such other offices as may be considered by this Constitution or by any
other law not inconsistent with this Constitution".

Unless it is the contention of the Learned Attorney-General that the Presidential Office
Act is inconsistent with the Constitution, then the requirement of the Act that
appointments made under it must be done in consultation with the Council of State has
to be complied with in order not to infringe Article 70 of the Constitution. That the
previous Council of State ceased to exist is clear from the provisions of Article 89(1)(5)
of the Constitution which provides that the term of office of a member is co-terminous
with that of a President.

So that if there is a general duty to consult the Council of State before an appointment,
the particular question arises whether in the circumstances averred (the non-
establishment of the Council of State), that general duty to consult was excluded by the
fact that the Presidency must be seen to be working and not come to a standstill. I do
not think so because it would amount to putting expediency above constitutionalism.
This is because just as a Tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it fails to observe certain
essential preliminaries to the assumption of jurisdiction, so also if the exercise of an
endowed or vested authority or power is dependent on the existence of a state of facts,
or on the occurrence of an event then, its exercise, without satisfying the conditions so
specified, would be unlawful and illegal. And the violation of such a constitutional
requirement cannot be excused under any circumstances whatsoever.

The instant case can be distinguished from that of J. H. MENSAH VRS. ATTORNEY-
GENERAL (already cited) because the latter involved only the interpretation of certain
provisions of the Constitution rather than an alleged conduct of a person being an
infringement of the Constitution. When the positive conduct of a person, be it an act or
an omission, is said, to be in breach of the Constitution, I cannot countenance any
submission which will mean giving judicial blessing to the alleged infringement because
there are good reasons or reasonable grounds for the person's conduct. Our oath to
defend the Constitution neither permits nor gives us the discretion not to defend the
Constitution when we feel there are extenuating circumstances for the alleged breach.

The next point I would like to deal with is whether a Minister of State, being a public
office holder, can be appointed to head the Presidential Office? I do not think so for the
person who is eligible to be appointed to head the Presidential Office must come from
among "persons appointed ... under this Act". It is from this group of persons that
"one ... shall be appointed as head of the office". There is therefore also the issue
whether the 3rd Defendant, Mr. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, who has been appointed under
the Constitution as Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, can hold the position of
Chief of Staff in the Presidential Office; unless, of course, we are told that the Chief of
Staff is not the head of the office. These are some of the important issues, with
profound implications for our constitutional law, which will have to be resolved at a full
trial and should militate against the summary dismissal of this case.

NON-DISCLOSURE OF REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFF'S

WRIT AND STATEMENT OF CASE

This should bring me to a discussing of what we mean and must look for in our
jurisprudence when we have an application that a writ and statement of claim be
dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. I do not intend to go into lengthy
discourse on this issue. But I must say that we cannot appreciate the nature of such an
application unless we have a clear understanding of what a cause of action means
within our jurisdiction. Simply, put, it means the entire set or combination of facts that
gives rise to an enforceable claim. SEE SPOKESMAN (PUBLICATIONS) LTD. VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1974) 1 GLR 88 at page 91 and 92, C.A. (Full Bench).

And in the case of LETANG VRS. COOPER (1965) 1 Q.B. 232 Lord Diplock offered a
very beneficial clarification of the term "cause of action". His Lordship said at pages
242-243 as follows. "A cause of action is simply a factual situation the existence of
which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person".
Under what circumstances can a pleading be struck out for disclosing no cause of
action?
In the case of GHANA MUSLIMS REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL VRS. SALIFU (1975)
2 GLR 246, C.A. The respondent brought an application to strike out the applicant's
pleading was made under ORDER 25 R.4 of the HIGH COURT (CIVIL PROCEDURE)
RULES, 1954, (which this Court can apply by virtue of Article 129(4) of the
Constitution), and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. It was pointed out that the
difference in practice under the rule and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is
well established. See the case of LAWRENCE VRS. LORD NORREYS (1890) 15
Appeal Case 210 at p. 219, where Lord Herschell described the practice under the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court. This practice, which is different, was explained by
Danckwerts, L.J. in WENLOK VRS. MOLONEY (1965) 2 All E.R. 871.

However, speaking about the exercise of the power under the rule, Azu Crabbe, C.J.
said in GHANA MUSLIMS REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL VRS. SALIFU (SUPRA) at
page 261:

"It is clearly a matter in the judicial discretion of the judge, and a pleading will only be
struck out under the rule in a plain and obvious case, where it is apparent that even if
the facts are proved, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks".

In the same case His Lordship said at page 264:

"This Court will not permit a plaintiff to be 'driven from the judgment seat', without
considering his right to be heard, 'excepting in cases where the cause of action is
obviously and almost incontestably bad'; per Fletcher Moulton L.J. in DYSON VRS.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1911) I K.B. 410 at page 419, C.A. And again, as the Lord
Justice said later in the same case at page 420: 'an order of this kind ought not to be
made where there is any reasonable ground for argument as to the maintainability of
the action'."

The headnote to the DYSON case is specific about the fact that Order 25 r.4 which
enables the Court or judge to strike out any pleading in the ground that it discloses no
cause of action, was never intended to apply to any pleading which raises a question of
general importance, or serious questions of law.

This was a case in which COZENS-HARDY M.R. found himself faced with a situation
where important questions of law, raised in the plaintiff's pleadings were sought to be
disposed of summarily by recourse to an application to strike out the pleadings under
Order 25. r.4. He recorded his reaction at page 414 thus:

"It might be sufficient to say that Order xxv.., r.4 ... ought not to be applied to an action
involving serious investigation of ancient law and questions of general importance, and
on this ground alone I think the plaintiff is entitled to have the action proceed to end in
the usual way.."

The question then is should an alleged infringement of the fundamental law in

circumstances indicated in this opinion be given a judicial hush through a summary
dismissal of the plaintiff's case? I do not think so unless, of course, it is very clear that
the action is not maintainable on some good legal ground, or that it would be improper
for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter.

In the case of the 5th Defendant Lt. Gen. Joshua Hamidu, for example, a case can be
made that the writ and statement of case disclose no cause of action against him
because his appointment is to be made under the SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES ACT, 1996 (ACT 526). This Act does not require any consultation with the
Council of State. The position of the 5th Defendant can conveniently be brought under
Section 18(1) of Act 526 which requires the advice of the National Security Council. It
provides:

"There shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the advice of the Council
given in consultation with the Public Service Commission an officer to be designated as
National Security Co-Ordinator referred to in this Act as 'the Co-Ordinator'."

I take it that the presidency can only be blamed for a case of misnomer as the 5th
Defendant is currently being referred to as "National Security Adviser" instead of
"National Security Co-Ordinator". I am therefore of the view that the Defendants'
application to summarily dismiss this case can only succeed in respect of the 5th
Defendant, Lt. Gen. Hamidu. Save the above I will dismiss the application.

ADJABENG, J.S.C.

I agree with my Brothers, Ampiah and Kpegah, JJ.S.C., that the application must be
dismissed. I have had the privilege of reading the opinion of my Brother, Kpegah,
J.S.C., just read and I agree with his reasoning. I do not think that it is fair and or
advisable that this important constitutional matter should be dismissed summarily. This
is so, especially, when this application was filed at a time when the plaintiff/respondent
did not have an opportunity to react to the applicants' statement of case in response to
the one filed by the respondent, as this application was filed by the
defendants/applicants herein the same day their statement of case was filed. And, also,
both sides were yet to file, at the time, a memorandum of agreed issued to be
determined in the plaintiffs' substantive action.

The defendants/applicants' application or motion prays for

"an order of this Court to set aside the plaintiff's writ and statement of case or to strike
out the action by the plaintiff on the grounds that:

(1) this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action against the Defendants
herein;

(2) that no cause of action is disclosed by Plaintiff's writ and statement of case;

(3) that the questions raised in the Plaintiff s action for determination are moot;.."
In a rather short affidavit in support of the application, it is deposed on behalf of the
defendants/applicants as follows:

“2. I have the authority of the Attorney-General and other Defendants to swear to this
affidavit on their behalf.

3. I am informed by Counsel and verily believe the same to be true that this Court lacks
the jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's action against the Defendants on the grounds
that:

(1) the Plaintiff's Writ and Statement of Case disclose no cause of action based on
Article 2(1) of the Constitution;

(2) that the questions raised in the Plaintiffs' action for determination are moot."

The plaintiff/respondent filed an affidavit in opposition to the application.

In paragraphs 3 to 11 of the affidavit in opposition, the respondent deposed as follows:

“3. I deny paragraph 3 of the Defendants/Applicants' affidavit in support of their

application.

4. The Plaintiff/Respondent says that the President of Ghana is amenable to the

jurisdiction of this Court in the exercise of the executive authority conferred on him by
the Constitution.

5. The Plaintiff/Respondent says further that the purported appointments of the 3rd, 4th
and 5th Defendants/Applicants as Chief of Staff, Presidential Adviser on Public Affairs,
and National Security Adviser respectively by the 1st Defendant/Applicant without
consultation with the Council of State cannot be said to be an exercise of the executive
authority conferred on him by the Constitution.

6. The Plaintiff/Respondent says in addition that a declaration or a declaration in the

nature of quo warranto can be made by the Court against the 1st Defendant/Applicant in
this action in addition to an order of injunction, or mandamus pursuant to Article 2 of the
Constitution.

7. The Plaintiff/Respondent contends that there are triable issues between the parties in
this action.

8. The Plaintiff/Respondent contends further that the mere subsequent approval by

Parliament, and appointment of the 3rd and 4th Defendants/Applicants as Ministers of
State on 6th February, 2001 does not render this action moot.

9. The Plaintiff/Respondent says that the 2nd Defendant/Applicant was sued only in a
nominal capacity.
10. The Plaintiff/Respondent says further that the fact that there was no substantive
person appointed as the Attorney-General at the time the writ and statement of case
were filed did not mean that no action could be commenced against the State in the
name of the Attorney General.

11. The Plaintiff/Respondent maintained that the application to set aside the writ and
statement of case has no merit whatsoever."

Even though none of the parties filed a statement of case in support of his case, they
were allowed by the Court to offer oral arguments in respect of their respective cases.

The Honourable Attorney-General, Nana Akufo-Addo, on behalf of the

defendants/applicants moved the motion to set aside the plaintiff's writ and statement of
case. He first submitted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action. He
argued that the 1st Defendant, as the President of Ghana, cannot be questioned in
respect of the exercise of his executive power or authority. He is, therefore, not
amenable to the Court's jurisdiction. The Honourable Attorney-General cited in support
the case of NPP vrs. The President of Ghana, J. J. Rawlings, unreported, Suit No.
15/93, dated 3rd May, 1994. He submitted that this decision in which this Court ruled
that the President was not amenable to the Court's jurisdiction is binding on the Court.
The Honourable Attorney-General also referred to Bimpong-Buta's Law of Interpretation
in Ghana, page 345. He submitted, therefore, that the plaintiff’s writ which brings the
President into the suit as a defendant is incompetent. The Court, therefore, has no
power to entertain the action against the President.

Secondly, it was submitted by the Honourable Attorney-General that at the time this
action was filed, there was no Attorney-General at post as he had not then been
appointed. And as such it was wrong to make the Attorney-General the 2nd defendant
in the action. He relied on J. H. Mensah vrs. Attorney-General [1996-97] SCGLR 320.

In respect of the 3rd and 4th defendants, it was submitted by the Attorney-General that
at the time the writ was filed, these defendants had been nominated by the President as
Ministers of State, and had since been so approved, and sworn in. Consequently, the
questions raised in respect of them had become moot.

For the above reasons, the Honourable Attorney-General prayed this Court to dismiss
the plaintiff’s action.

In reply, the plaintiff/respondent invited the Court to dismiss the application. He argued
that the case of NPP vrs. The President (J. J. Rawlings), cited by the Honourable
Attorney-General in support of his contention that the President is not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Court, did not in fact decide that the President cannot be sued in all
cases. In his view, the President can be sued under Article 2 of the 1992 Constitution,
and also in respect of prerogative writs. The plaintiff/respondent cited in support the
case of Bilson vrs. Apaloo[1981] GLR.
The plaintiff/respondent also submitted that the President has violated Article 70(1)(e) of
the Constitution, and also Section 2, 3 and 4 of the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act
463).

He submitted that the J. H. Mensah case (supra) did not decide that the office of the
Attorney-General cannot be sued when there is no substantive Attorney-General. In his
view, the Attorney-General is a nominal party in the present action.

The plaintiff/respondent finally submitted that the action against the 3rd and 4th
defendants was not moot.

He therefore, prayed that the motion to set aside the writ and statement of case should
be dismissed and the matter gone into on its merits.

Article 70(1)(e) of our Constitution provides as follows:

"70(1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State, appoint-

(e) the holders of such offices as may be prescribed by this Constitution or by ay other
law not inconsistent with this Constitution."

And sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Presidential Office Act, 1993 (Act 463) also provide as
follows:

"2. The functions of the Office is to provide the President and the Vice-President such
services as they may require for the efficient and effective implementation of the
executive functions of the President and Vice-President under the Constitution and any
other law.

3. (1) The Presidential Office shall be made up of—

(a) persons appointed as presidential staff under this Act one of whom shall be
appointed as head of the office; and

(b) such other public officers as may be seconded or transferred to the office.

(2) Subject to section 2 members of the office shall be assigned such duties as the
President may determine.

(4) (1) The President shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State appoint such
persons as he considers necessary to hold office as presidential staff in the office.

(2) The number of persons that may be appointed under sub-section (1) of this section
and the grade of the officers shall be determined by the President."
The complaint of the plaintiff/respondent, as disclosed in his writ, statement of case, and
in his arguments before us in this application, is simply that His Excellency, the
President, in appointing the 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants/applicants herein violated the
Constitution, particularly article 70(1)(e) thereof, and also sections 2, 3 and 4 of the
Presidential Office Act, 1993, all quoted above, by not consulting the Council of State as
he is required to do by the Excellency indeed violated the Constitution as alleged.
Attempting to answer this question will be going into the merits of the matter.

The Attorney-General says that we cannot go into the matter because we have no
jurisdiction to do so. This is because according to him, His Excellency the President
cannot be sued. Secondly, that the plaintiff's action has not disclosed any cause of
action. And, thirdly, that the questions raised are moot.

In my humble opinion, the last two grounds ought to be rejected at once as being
without merit. An issue involving the violation of the Constitution cannot, in my view, be
said to be an issue disclosing no cause of action, or that it is a question which is moot.

The argument that the President cannot be sued as he is not amenable to the
jurisdiction of this Court, however, needs scrutiny. Article 57(4) which gives to the
President immunity from liability for proceedings in any Court for the performance of his
functions, while in office, provides as follows:-

"57(4) Without prejudice to the provisions of article 2 of this Constitution, and subject to
the operation of the prerogative writs, the President shall not, while in office, be liable to
proceedings in any Court for the performance of his functions, or for any act done or
omitted to be done, or purported to be done, or purported to have been done, or
purporting to be done in the performance of his functions, under this Constitution or any
other law."(emphasis mine).

Article 2 of the Constitution also provides as follows:

"2 (1) A person who alleges that—

(a) an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any
other enactment; or

(b) any act or omission of any person is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a

provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a
declaration to that effect.

(2) The Supreme Court shall, for the purposes of a declaration under clause (1) of this
article, make such orders and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for
giving effect, or enabling effect to be given, to the declaration so made.
(3) Any person or group of persons to whom an order or direction is addressed under
clause (2) of this Article by the Supreme Court, shall duly obey and carry out the terms
of the order or direction.

(4) Failure to obey or carry out the terms of an order of direction made or given under
clause (2) of this article constitutes a high crime under this Constitution and shall, in the
case of the President or Vice-President, constitute a ground for removal from office
under this Constitution.

(5) A person convicted of a high crime under clause (4) of this article shall—

(a) be liable to imprisonment not exceeding ten years without the option of a fine; and

(b) not be eligible for election, or for appointment, to any public office for ten years
beginning with the date of the expiration of the term of imprisonment."(emphasis mine).

It is very clear from the above-quoted articles of the Constitution, articles 57(4) and 2(1-
5), that the President is not immune to proceedings in Court in respect of allegations
involving the contravention or violation of the Constitution. Any decision to the contrary
must, therefore, be wrong. The Constitution indeed crystal clear on the point.

It must be noted that our 1992 Constitution has firmly established the rule of law in this
country. The Constitution makes it clear that everybody in this country, including His
Excellency the President, is under the Constitution and the law. This clearly is what we
mean by the rule of law. It is heartening that governance by the rule of law is one of the
cornerstones of the policies of the present Government. And I have no doubt that
adherence to this policy will indeed bring about real democracy in this country and
therefore real freedom, justice and prosperity.

In conclusion, I must say that an allegation involving the violation of our Constitution is a
very serious matter which must be dealt with on its merits. Article 2 of the Constitution
shows clearly how seriously such a matter is viewed. It is therefore not a matter which
should be summarily dismissed on a technical ground.

It is clear from what I have said earlier in this opinion that it would be wrong to grant the
application to dismiss the plaintiff's writ at this stage. I think that the matter should be
heard on its merits. I would refuse the application of the defendants/applicants. It is
accordingly dismissed.

COUNSEL

Mr. Martin Alamisi Amidu, Plaintiff/Respondent in person.

Nana Akufo-Addo, Attorney-General, with him Mr. S. Y. Anim, Mrs. Quansah,

Mr. Kuwornu and Mrs. Owusu-Adjei for the Defendants/Applicants.